THE HUMPHREY VICE PRESIDENCY IN RETROSPECT by MARIE D. NATOLI Associate Professor of Political Science Emmanuel College As the body of Hubert Humphrey lay in the Capital Rotunda, in January nineteen seventy eight the array of mourners began to gather to pay final tribute to the man who had been such a prominent figure in Washington politics for thirty years. Some of these men had shared something in common with Hubert Humphrey the Vice Presidency. Richard Nixon had been a Vice President, as had Gerald Ford and Nelson Rockefeller. And the incumbent Vice President Walter Mondale, Humphreys protege of thirtyone years delivered one of the most eloquent eulogies of our time. For Hubert Humphrey, the Vice Presidency was the most difficult period in his entire political career. To accurately understand what happened to Hubert Humphrey during the years nineteen sixty four to nineteen sixty eight, we must look back to nineteen sixty three, November 22, nineteen sixty three, to be precise. Lyndon Johnson was catapulted into the Presidency by the assassins bullet that snuffed out the life of John Kennedy. Lyndon Johnson a Southerner, viewed as a conservative who had been opposed by the Democratic Party liberals for the Vice Presidential spot during the nineteen sixty nominations, was now in charge. To many of these liberals in both parties and to civil rights groups across the country, this mistakingly spelled the death knoll of the proposed Kennedy programs for which they had waited so long. And Lyndon Johnson knew that if he were to lead a united country and have any chance at the nineteen sixty four Democratic presidential nomination and election he would have to correct this mistaken notion. Johnson reflected in his memoirs: Every President has to develop a moral underpinning to his power, or he soon discovers that he has no power at all. For me, that presented special problems. In spite of more than three decades of public service, I knew I was an unknown quantity to many of my countrymen and to much of the world when I assumed office. I suffered another handicap, since I had come to the Presidency not through the collective will of the people but in the wake of tragedy. I had no mandate from the voters. A few people were openly bitter about my becoming President. They found it impossible to transfer their intense loyalties from one president to another. I could understand, although it complicated my task. Others were apprehensive this was particularly true within the black community. Just when the blacks had had their hopes for equality and justice raised, after centuries of misery and despair, they awoke one morning to discover that their future was in the hands of a President born in the South. NOTE 1 Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point New York: Holt Rinehart Winston nineteen seventy one page eighteen Somehow, during the intervening year between the assassination and the nineteen sixty four election, Lyndon Johnson had to broaden both the moral and political underpinning to his power. And so, as he addressed the Congress in a Joint Session following John Kennedy's burial, Lyndon Johnson proclaimed "Let Us Continue," and asked for immediate passage of the civil rights legislation Kennedy had initiated certainly symbolic of the liberal transition LBJ hoped to undertake. By nineteen sixty three, Humphrey had been championing civil rights for two decades. And Johnson, who had always enjoyed a dominant relationship in working with Humphrey in the Senate, decided to put Humphrey's commitment to civil rights as well as the Minnesota Senator's legislative expertise to the test. Regarding Humphrey and civil rights, Johnson later reflected: The liberals were organized as never before. Senator Humphrey did a good job as floor manager. The key to his approach, with my encouragement; as restraint. The restraint of nonpartisan politics, stressing the integrity of the Senate as an institution and the heritage of Lincoln's party. Humphrey constantly emphasized the need for bipartisan cooperation. He never questioned the motives of Republicans or Southern Democrats. The debate at all times was dignified. Note 2 Lyndon Johnsons The Vantage Point Page 159 Humphrey's success as floor manager of the nineteen sixty four civil rights legislation, as well as his long commitment to many of the programs which would comprise the Johnson Great Society, significantly added to Humphrey's appeal as the nineteen sixty four Vice Presidential running mate. Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk commented in an interview with this author in nineteen seventy three: Hubert Humphiey combined the deep commitment of ... a liberal with common sense of what is possible in our political system and world affairs. Note 3 Dean Rusk Interview, University of Georgia Law School, Athens Georgia, May nineteen seventy three Humphrey had the solid identification of a liberal. And Johnson needed this identification. The long arm Humphrey had extended into the liberal camp was crucial to the nineteen sixty four campaign and election, and ultimately to the Great Society. Note 4 Marie D. Natoli "The Vice Presidency Since World War 2" unpublished P H D dissertation. Tufts University nineteen seventy five, chapter 5 "Conciliation: The selection of Hubert Humphrey In the course of running a government, making critical choices, and forging difficult paths, political circumstances combine with political personality. Johnson knew that Humphrey was one of the most well liked members of the Senate. And Humphrey embodied the virtue Johnson deemed most critical in a Vice Presidential choice: loyalty. Note 5 ibid Much has been written depicting the Johnson personality and temperament. He has been pictured as a towering, demanding man who was capable of reducing his aides as well as his enemies to shreds. He demanded subordination far beyond that expected by most Presidents. The Johnson personality, then, necessitated the selection of an individual who could compatibly do the President's bidding. The Johnson Humphrey personal relationship had, over their many years of service in the Congress, been one of domination subordination. Hubert Humphrey's career had on many an occasion been furthered by Lyndon Johnson, and both men knew it. Further, they had worked as Majority Leader and Majority Whip, a set of roles which formalized Humphrey's subordination. Subordination in the Vice Presidency would not be a different role for Humphrey. Very significantly, Humphrey understood the loyalty Johnson required and he was willing to accept this prerequisite which the President had made so clear to all those he interviewed for the nineteen sixty four running mate spot. By Inauguration Day, January twentieth, nineteen sixty five, the stage was set for the Humphrey Vice Presidency. Very early in his incumbency, Humphrey learned a message which would be repeated over and over again during the next four years: It's the President who makes or breaks the Vice President. Certainly, Humphrey's was a very active Vice Presidency, but all the while it was subject to the whims of Lyndon Johnson. And, beyond being demanding, Lyndon Johnson was unpredictable. Humphrey's greatest strength in his attempt to survive this unpredictability was his own flexibility. Note 7 ibid The Vice President was frequently the victim of what Humphrey biographer Albert Eisele (Almost to the Presidency) has called the "hot-and-cold Johnson treatment." Some days, Humphrey could do no wrong. Other days found the second man in the dog house, often for little or no apparent reason. But Humphrey seemed determined to ride out the wave, remembering his promise of loyalty to the President. And so the President would become irate if Humphrey received too much publicity, and the Vice President would decline interviews. Following ebullient moments so inherently a part of the Humphrey character and personality, the Vice President sometimes accidentally leaked information; he was promptly chewed out by the President. Once, for example, he excitedly called for a "Marshall Plan" for the cities; the President exploded. Another time, Humphrey, in talking with labor leaders, leaded information regarding minimum wage increases; again the President chewed him out. But perhaps the Vice President got into his most serious trouble with the President in his divergence on one grave and controversial point. Deviating from his promise to above and beyond all else remain loyal and not to publicly disagree with the President, Humphrey, at the February tenth, nineteen sixty five meeting of the National Security Council, raised questions regarding the advisability of bombing North Vietnam, and then followed this questioning by a memorandum to Johnson. Note 8 ibid Chapter nineteen, "The impact of personality: The Johnson Humphrey relationship What followed was a long period of an "exile" of sorts for Humphrey. Johnson excluded Humphrey from the so called "Tuesday luncheons" comprised by the President's closest advisers who participated in making decisions on the war. Ironically, however, this exile did not extend to a defense of the Administration's policy on Vietnam, both on the foreign and domestic fronts. If anything, this defense emerged as one of Humphrey's biggest chores. Perhaps this too was part of the Johnson treatment. In a nineteen seventy four interview with this author, Humphrey talked about the role he was expected to play, and captured one of the essential characteristics of the Vice Presidency. A Vice President can serve as a political spokesman for the Administration. President Johnson did not always want to get involved in all the campaign and politics, so I was a political spokesman. I went to the party conventions. Obviously, he went to some the biggest ones, but I was sent to many of the state meetings, and I had to take on defending the Administration at the college campus level. The college campuses were in turmoil during my Vice Presidency and went through a tremendous upheaval, unbelievable, but I never once was ever driven from a platform. Most of the time, despite all the heckling it came off all right with a good reception Note 9 Hubert Humphrey interview held at the U S senate in washington D C in march nineteen seventy four And there was a dilemma attached to this role. Again, Humphrey recalled: The Vice President can be a spokesman because the President can always disavow you, you see, if you get too far out. He can say, "Well, that's the Vice President speaking. He wasn't speaking for me." If he speaks well, and gets by, he was speaking for him, so it's really a no win job, you know what I mean? It's really a no win job. It's really being willing to do the Lord's work, you know. Whoever you are, I think that's the case. Note ten ibid Hubert Humphrey's flexibility and charitable good humor made it easier for him to accept the uncertainties and demands of the Vice Presidency. Loyal to the end, he did the Lord's work. But Humphrey's flexibility and subordination to L B J also contributed to his loss of identity and doubtless to his defeat in the nineteen sixty eight presidential campaign. Ultimately, Hubert Humphrey was swallowed up by a war which the Johnson Administration had inherited and expanded with little assistance from Hubert Humphrey. The modern Vice Presidency has been talked about as a stepping stone to the Presidency. Contemporary Vice Presidents are far more prepared to take over the burdens and office of the Presidency than any in history. And they have increasingly taken on more duties than during any other period in history. Justifiably so, since approximately one out of four Vice Presidents has succeeded to the Presidency upon the death or resignation of the incumbent. But while the office has been the "back door" entry to the White House and tile stepping stone to the presidential nomination, the path from the nomination to the White House is less certain. Few Vice Presidents in history have been in as awkward a position as was Hubert Humphrey in 1968. Note eleven Natoli chapter ten "the Bridled Vice Presidency, The Humphrey Case He had spent four years under the tutelage and subordination of Lyndon Johnson and he had kept his promise of loyalty. He had done the job his President had assigned to him despite his disagreement privately. Time after time, in arena after arena, he had publicly defended the Administration policy on Vietnam, both at home and abroad. And now, four years later, that President and that Administration were in trouble. The President to whom Humphrey had pledged his loyalty was now being forced not to seek reelection. And Hubert Humphrey, whose fate had so often been linked to Lyndon Johnson, was to undergo one of the most agonizing campaign years in American history. Nineteen sixty eight. A year unlike virtually any other in American history. By June of sixty eight, a President had made himself a lame duck because of a war six thousand miles away; a civil rights leader had been assassinated, triggering riots across the country; a Senator, campaigning for the Democratic Party presidential nomination, was gunned down as he rode to victory in the California primary. And the year was only half over. Hubert Humphrey seemed to be the survivor. But as he approached the nomination which Lyndon Johnson had virtually sewn up for him, Humphrey was well on the road to being the year's next victim. Chicago sixty eight and the Democratic National Convention witnessed as did millions of viewers all over America the street protest which realistically and symbolically echoed the increasingly controversial violence six thousand miles away in Southeast Asia. In a very real sense, Hubert Humphrey lost the election the night he won the nomination. Nonetheless, he had to undergo the grueling campaign in the weeks and months ahead. And those weeks and months were no doubt among the worst in Humphrey's life. Inextricably the Vice President found himself in the position of having to defend an Administration he had had little hand in shaping especially since the Democratic Convention had endorsed a hawkish Vietnam plank. Humphrey suffered from an identity problem as well. Note twelve ibid For millions of Americans protesters and non protesters alike Hubert Humphrey appeared to be a stand in for Lyndon Johnson. And Humphrey clearly recognized this as a problem. In a meeting with newsmen during the campaign, the candidate had stated this recognition. My most serious dilemma, the thing that is at the core of our whole campaign is how on the one hand do you chart an independent course and yet at the same time not repudiate the course of which you've been a part. Note thirteen as cited by albert eisele, Almost to the presidency minnesota, the piper company nineteen seventy two page 372 Psephologists Richard Scammon and Ben Wattenberg have astutely pointed out in their work The Real Majority that Hubert Humphrey was the victim of a sentiment pervading the country which essentially said "I'm displeased" and which extended to anyone associated with the Johnson Administration. Note fourteen richard scammon and ben watenberg The Real Majority new york coward mccann and geoghegan nineteen seventy page 119 In an attempt to get out from under this association and to forge an independent identity, the sixty eight Humphrey campaign intentionally played down the Vice President's affiliation with the President. Certainly, the choice of Senator Edmund Muskie of Maine as his running mate was part of this disassociation, and a good deal of the campaign focused attention upon Muskie as a contrast to the Republican Vice Presidential running mate, Spiro Agnew and Humphrey's independent choice of Muskie. But throughout the campaign, Humphrey was hampered by his own view of the relationship between the Presidency and the Vice Presidency, and certainly by his promise made to Lyndon Johnson four years earlier. Praising Johnson's domestic policies but largely ignoring Vietnam, Humphrey merely flirted with independence. This flirtation was certainly reflected in the spirit of his remarks following the disastrous Democratic Convention in Chicago, when he said, "The policies of tomorrow need not be limited by the policies of yesterday." And yet, he was running on the strong Vietnam plank adopted by the Convention. Lyndon Johnson had insisted that the Democratic Presidential nominee be someone who would hold the line on the Administration's position and the record on Vietnam, and Humphrey had to go along with that insistence. Again Humphrey found himself in the position of indebtedness to Lyndon Johnson. Just as Johnson' had made Humphrey Vice President, so had he made him the Presidential nominee. But would Johnson lose the election for Humphrey? Humphrey's dilemma was to somehow strike a balance between the loyalty he had promised and the independence he so desperately needed. Note fifteen Natoli chapter ten "The bridled Vice Presidency The humphrey case Despite the fact that his advisers had seriously and strongly advocated a break with Johnson and a clearcut one at that, since they had recommended that Humphrey resign the Vice Presidency Humphrey refused. He had a contract with the American people; to resign would be to break that contract. Note sixteen Hubert Humphrey interview So, continuing his incumbency in the Vice Presidency, Humphrey campaigned for the Presidency, while his opponent, Richard Nixon, needed to say little concerning Vietnam. Clearly, Nixon's greatest asset was that he was not part of the Johnson Administration. While Humphrey was forced to defend the Administration record, Nixon could shun the issue under the guise of not jeopardizing the President's peace efforts abroad. Besides this, Nixon was also the beneficiary of another closely related phenomenon, and that is that the Democratic Party in many Americans' minds was identified as the party which did not represent the great "silent majority," as Nixon would later call the mass of citizens who were the vast middle of America. Law and order had been thrust into the sixty eight campaign by third party candidate George Wallace, and that issue further engulfed Humphrey, for the Democratic Party in that year appeared to be the party of disorder both at home and abroad. And so, Humphrey's position worsened. Clearly, something had to give. And his September thirtieth Salt Lake City speech was a response to the very real need to break with Lyndon Johnson. Deviating from his policy of not disagreeing with the President, Humphrey made the attempt to appear his own man. Symbolically, Humphrey spoke from a lectern which did not bear the seal of the Vice President, and was not introduced as the Vice President. At best, however, the speech was ambiguous. Humphrey began by saying, "Tonight I want to share with you my thoughts as a citizen and a candidate for President of the United States." He had struck the initial note of independence from Lyndon Johnson. He asserted: When I accepted the Democratic Party's nomination and platform, I said that the first reality that confronted this nation was the need for peace in Vietnam. I have pledged that my first priority as President shall be to end the war and obtain an honorable peace. For the past four years I have spoken my mind about Vietnam, frankly and without reservation, in the Cabinet and in the National Security Council and directly to President. When the President made his decisions, I have supported them. He has been the Commander in Chief. It has been his job to decide. Humphrey was attempting to indicate how little a Vice President can do in the face of Presidential policy. Not wanting to alienate Johnson, he added that "the choices have not been simple or easy." And then he returned to forging his independence: President Johnson will continue until January twentieth,nineteen sixty nine to make the decisions in Vietnam. The voice at the negotiating table must be his. I shall not compete with that voice. I shall cooperate and help.... Humphrey, in the face of the position Richard Nixon was taking in the campaign that of supporter of Presidential peace initiatives had little choice but to pledge the same. But then, there was the note that a Humphrey Presidency would be different. But one hundred and twelve days from now, there will be a new President a new, Administration and new advisers. As I said in my acceptance: The policies of tomorrow need not be limited by the policies of yesterday. We must look to the future. Then Humphrey turned back to his role as loyalist: For neither vindication nor repudiation of our role in Vietnam will bring peace or be worthy of our country.... And then the loyal Humphrey recalled that it was not President Johnson his President who initiated Vietnam. He endeavored for obvious political reasons to imply that Eisenhower, not Kennedy, had initiated American military presence in Vietnam. Eisenhower's few technical advisers somehow were transformed into Kennedy's major force disposition in Vietnam: The original Vietnam decision made by President Eisenhower was made for one basic reason. President Eisenhower believed it was in our national interest that Communist subversion and aggression should not succeed in Vietnam. It was his judgment and the judgment of President Kennedy and President Johnson since then that if aggression did succeed in Vietnam, there was a danger that we would become involved on a more dangerous scale in a wider area of Southeast Asia. . . . Humphrey spent some time noting that his opponent in the Presidential race had supported American armed intervention in Vietnam in nineteen fifty four, only to have had President Eisenhower repudiate the suggestion. With all of this as the groundwork, Hubert Humphrey attempted to forge his identity on the Vietnam issue: (-iwii i Let me make clear what I would not do. I would not undertake a unilateral withdrawal. To withdraw would not only jeopardize the independence of South Vietnam and the safety of other Southeast Asian nations. It would make meaningless the sacrifices we have already made. It would be more an open invitation to more violence, more aggression more instability. Peace would not be served by weakness or withdrawal. So what Humphrey attempted to do in forging his identity was to appear to both hawks and doves alike and all those in between. In summary of his position Humphrey concluded: A stopping of the bombing of the North taking account of Hanoi's actions and assurances of prompt good faith negotiations and keeping the option of resuming that bombing if the Communists show bad faith. Careful, systematic reduction of American troops in South Vietnam a de Americanization of the war turning over to the South Vietnamese Army a greater share of the defense of its own country. An internationally supervised cease fire and supervised withdrawal of all foreign forces and South Vietnam. Free elections, including all people in South Vietnam willing to follow the peaceful procedures. Those are risks I would take for peace. . . . We have learned a lesson from Vietnam that we should carefully define our goals and priorities. . . . I do not condemn any past commitment. I do not judge the decisions of past Presidents when, in good conscience, they made those decisions in what they thought were the interests of the American people. But I do say, if I am President, I owe it to this nation to bring our men and resources back to America where we need them so badly, and to be sure we put first things first in the future. . . . As President, I would undertake a new strategy for peace in this world. Note seventeen Vital Speeches thirty five colon eight thru eleven nineteen sixty eight and sixty nine Needless to say, Johnson was furious. Hubert had been disloyal. As for Richard Nixon Humphrey was damned either way, first for agreeing and running on the Administration record, and then for disagreeing. Nixon was in the cat bird seat. He could and did make statements such as: I think we ought to be consistent on this and I think President Johnson has been consistent, I've been consistent. Mister Humphrey ought to get in line, agree with his President for a change. Note eighteen as cited by Jules Witcover, The ressurection of Richard Nixon new york putnam nineteen seventy pages 429 thru 430 In one sense, Humphrey's identity forging had perhaps come too late. In another sense, perhaps there was no appropriate time when it could have taken hold. Perhaps the times were so fraught with negativism, cynicism, and "I'm displeased" that nothing Hubert Humphrey could have said would have made any difference. But in a realistic sense, what another Democratic could have said and didn't might have made a difference. And that Democrat was Eugene McCarthy, the man who in March had won the New Hampshire primary, throwing serious doubt upon the Johnson renomination. But by the time of the Humphrey nomination, Eugene McCarthy was as were his followers. So Hubert Humphrey was further handicapped by a splintered party. Clearly, internal disunity is the real opponent in a Presidential race, and Hubert Humphrey knew it well. Note nineteen Natoli chapter ten "the bridled vice presidency the humphrey case The Kennedy people had eventually fallen in line with Humphrey as the Democratic nominee; but McCarthy and his people remained steadfast. Not even the Salt Lake City speech had changed their minds. It was only at the very end of October that McCarthy gave his support to Hubert Humphrey, and then only very weakly, saying that Humphrey, although unsatisfactory, was preferable to Nixon. So Hubert Humphrey, one of the most brilliant men to illuminate American politics in the mid twentieth century, fell victim to the mood of nineteen sixty eight America. Ironically, he had become the victim of his own best quality his loyalty, both to his President and to the American people. He continued to serve the nation with great dignity. First, with the help of DeWitt Wallace, founder of the Reader's Digest, he returned to Macalester College and the University of Minnesota to again teach political science as he had done a quarter century before. And then in nineteen seventy one he returned to the United States Senate for the remaining seven years of his life, respected and revered. With his passing many reflected not only upon his accomplishments but also what more might have been had the Nation's highest office not eluded him. transcribed by richard altman