from   Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview I*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW I 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview I, 9/ 18/ 85, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
For Electronic Copy on Diskette from the LBJ Library: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview I, 9/ 18/ 85, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
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Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-12 
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INTERVIEW I 
DATE: September 18, 1985 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 5, Side 1 
G: Let me ask you first to review some of the episodes at the 1960 [Democratic National] Convention and particularly Lyndon Johnson's selection as vice president. 
O: As they headed into the convention, our game plan, to secure the nomination over that two-year period after Kennedy's re-election to the Senate, was based on utilizing primaries 
selectively. We felt that we had to be awfully concerned about the party pros accepting a Catholic nominee, for obvious reasons. It presented difficulties, too. As it turned out, 
that was exactly the case. So we attempted to very carefully orchestrate our primary effort and my recollection is that we wound up in seven primaries. We negotiated out of 
some major primary states--California, Ohio, Pennsylvania--in a variety of ways; we'd stay out if this happened or that happened, and whatever commitments could be made for the 
future, favorite sons in some instances, like [Michael] DiSalle in Ohio, Pat Brown's activities in California and the rest. 
But the effort was to build up within the party a recognition that Kennedy could be a strong candidate for president regardless of the aspect of his religion. And in doing that 
we really were fortunate because of the seven primary states, three or four of them were rather easy marks for us. Avoiding major states where we required a great deal of money 
and organization was very helpful. And the primary focus in terms of national attention and party attention really became Wisconsin and West Virginia. The Hubert Humphrey 
efforts in Wisconsin and West Virginia did elicit a great deal of media attention. And the West Virginia primary, where it was predicted Kennedy would lose but he ultimately won, 
really was the catalyst that moved us forward. 
So then we had to focus our attention on the party pros, whether it was Michigan, Ohio, California, Pennsylvania--the major delegate states that we had some degree of 
entree to. It was very difficult because, interestingly enough, it wasn't a matter of liking or disliking Kennedy. It was a matter of self-preservation among the pros, and the most 
difficult people to deal with in the final analysis, as we headed toward Los Angeles, were Catholic pros. David Lawrence was governor of Pennsylvania; Mike DiSalle was 
governor of Ohio; Dick Daley was the kingpin, of course, in Chicago and, therefore, Illinois. In each instance there was deep concern--Bill Green was a powerhouse in 
Pennsylvania, also--that the nomination of Kennedy could bring down the ticket in their states, the governorship or a Senate contest or a local contest. So [we had] to persuade 
them that while they thought Jack was a nice guy and all the rest, the political reality was 
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O'Brien --Interview I --2 
that he could be a winner and, consequently, could indeed be a help to them in their individual state efforts to maintain party control. 
So, going into Los Angeles, we had continuing question marks. My recollection is that Mayor Daley did not join the Kennedy effort until Los Angeles. David Lawrence and 
Bill Green still were concerned. Pat Brown was off again, on again. He had an Adlai Stevenson situation in California. We weren't locked in. 
But, nevertheless, once we had completed our primary route in those seven states--and that included Maryland, Oregon--we were able to organize quite well in all of 
them. They were doable in terms of our resources, and we were successful. And in the process, as I said, we had elicited a terrific amount of national attention and, obviously, a 
great amount of professional Democratic Party people's attention. So we developed a system of checking and rechecking every delegate. Bobby Kennedy and I jointly put 
together an organization for Los Angeles in which every state delegation was assigned to a Kennedy person, and that Kennedy person, whether it was Abe Ribicoff or John Bailey 
or whoever--and there were a large number of them then--would literally live with the delegation. That was the contemplation; regardless of whether they were delegates from 
their own states, they would literally live in the hotel where the delegation was located that they were assigned to monitor. 
So each morning for several days prior to the opening of the convention, we would meet at our headquarters in Los Angeles and each of these assigned people would go 
over, name by name--it was a rather tedious task--the delegates of the state or states in a couple of instances, two or three small states put together, that they were responsible for. 
So we got to caucuses--the route that Lyndon Johnson and other candidates were obviously following in Los Angeles--going around to the various caucuses. I remember 
particularly the California caucus--still trying to lock up those last pieces. But we had a pretty clear idea that we had the nomination. Now, it could be taken away. You could 
have dissipation of delegate strength, particularly if you had a major party leader that had a change of heart or change of mind. But the objective was to win on the first ballot. 
G: Did you feel then that if it didn't go over on the first ballot that you might have some erosion? 
O: Yes, we felt that that would create a danger and certainly make it much more difficult. I remember the California caucus, because while you had candidates--we had Scoop 
[Henry] Jackson, as I recall, Stu Symington, we had a number of them, and we had Lyndon Johnson. 
Jack Kennedy and I were returning to our hotel from the California caucus when I told Kennedy in the car that the Johnson delegation had extended an invitation to Kennedy 
to appear before the Texas delegation. I immediately followed up by saying, "Of course, there's no point to that. First of all, you're not going to gain a darn thing. Secondly, you'll 
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O'Brien --Interview I --3 
get into a direct confrontation," because Lyndon Johnson would appear jointly with him and it might cause problems. And I attempted to persuade Kennedy not to do it. I felt 
that there was no valid point to it. Kennedy thought about it. His first reaction was "yes, I've got a lot of other things to do." But it was a long trip in; I think we were out in 
Hollywood somewhere at this California caucus--you know the travel problems on the roads in Los Angeles. And the more Kennedy thought about it, the more intrigued he 
became with it. He then concluded before we got to the hotel that he was going to appear later that afternoon before the Texas delegation. It kind of intrigued him. I therefore had 
lost the argument. My argument was obviously based on what I thought was political reality, delegate counts. 
So he did appear, and from that came the long-remembered comment that Kennedy made that he thought Johnson was certainly the greatest majority leader the 
Senate had ever had, and he, Kennedy, was going to do everything possible to ensure that he continued as majority leader. And so nothing negative occurred, we gained no 
delegates, but it achieved a dimension of publicity. The Johnson-John Connally effort to stop Kennedy--which was an obvious effort I would have been making if I were with 
them--was intense. And our continuing delegate counts showed that we were withstanding that effort. 
We then had the unexpected. That was the appearance of Adlai Stevenson and Eleanor Roosevelt at the convention in an attempt to swing the convention with the 
enthusiasm of the moment. However, the efforts we had expended over that long period of time stood us in good stead because, again, there was no erosion. So when the actual 
balloting started, we were very confident that we were going to win on the first ballot, and we did. In fact, I think, as I recall it, we were within three votes of our head count when 
the roll call was completed. 
Then, at that moment, after the nomination, Kennedy chose to appear before the convention that night even though he was to formally accept the nomination at that 
stadium the following day or a couple of days later. But through this entire effort, we had had no serious contemplation of a running mate. 
G: You'd never talked to Kennedy about that before? 
O: Oh, you know, there were a lot of names out there and I guess we probably talked at one time or another about eight or ten possibilities. So I think the enthusiasm of the moment, 
the culmination of a couple of years of effort, the fact that we had achieved the nomination was so overwhelming to all of us that we just didn't focus. So after that long night, we all 
went to bed in the early hours of the morning, I received a call from Kennedy early--it probably was 6: 00 a. m. or something like that--to immediately join him in his suite. So I 
hastily dressed and went down to the suite, and there were several people there, of course, Bobby, Ken O'Donnell, and now I don't recall the others. And I don't recall specifically 
how this had taken place over a matter of very few hours, but Jack Kennedy had made a decision that he'd like to have Lyndon Johnson as his running mate. 
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O'Brien --Interview I --4 
I don't know what came first in terms of whose great thought it was. There were those that later claimed it was their thought; Joe Alsop claimed that and Phil Graham 
claimed that. But I think in the normal course of events, Jack Kennedy came up with this idea, because I think perhaps he was probably the first to focus on "Are you going to be a 
footnote in history as a nominee for the presidency or are you indeed going to achieve election?" And you had the South and the Southwest; you had this whole problem of 
bringing a high degree of unity in terms of the ticket to this campaign effort, and it was a stroke of genius. I can't lay any claim to participating in it in terms of it being a stroke of 
genius. 
G: When Kennedy mentioned this, were these the elements that he cited? 
O: Basically, he felt that it would achieve great balance on the ticket and that now we had just come off within hours of, not a bitter struggle, but certainly a vigorous struggle with 
Lyndon Johnson, who was our prime opposition as we got to the close-out of the nominating process. 
G: So you're convinced that the offer was not intended as one that Johnson would decline? 
O: Oh, no, we were not at all sure he'd accept. No. In fact, it caused turmoil, off-again, on-again activity over a period of a couple of hours. Johnson was in his suite, as I 
recall--it was just below Kennedy's--and Sam Rayburn was there and others. It was a matter of some time elapsing and I believe that there was, during that period, [the feeling 
that] no, he won't accept. Sam Rayburn was absolutely adamant that he not accept; a quote attributed to him is "I'll shoot you, Lyndon, if you take this," something to that 
effect. He felt very strongly about it. 
G: Let me ask you to go back to that suite, the Kennedy suite, and the initial meeting when the proposition of asking LBJ to serve as the nominee of vice president. What was your 
reaction to it? 
O: I was stunned. Because I guess whatever little thought I ever gave to the second place on the ticket, I don't think I ever focused at all on having your major opposition wind up your 
running mate. Now, obviously, that's something that's happened many times in American political history, but somehow or other if I ever really gave more than a fleeting thought to 
Lyndon Johnson, it would be in the context, "Heck, Lyndon Johnson would not accept second spot. He's the majority leader of the Senate. He isn't going to sacrifice what he 
has to be on this ticket." So I never gave it any serious thought myself. Maybe I was thinking of Stu Symington or whoever. 
G: Was Symington your own personal choice? 
O: I didn't have one. There were half a dozen people that obviously would be the people on a list that you would ultimately select from. None of them were stick-outs in the sense that, 
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O'Brien --Interview I --5 
boy, this has got to be it. But see, Lyndon Johnson was another dimension. He wasn't one of these fellows that really never had a chance to be nominated but had gone through 
some of the exercise and, consequently, had reasonably high national visibility and therefore could be on the ticket. Now this was entirely different. Of course, part of the 
problem was that some of our most ardent supporters in acquiring the nomination would be nothing short of appalled with a decision of this nature, in the event Lyndon Johnson 
accepted. That wasn't a happy task that Jack assigned his brother, Bob, who was to go up and visit with Governor G. Mennen Williams and Walter Reuther, and advise them of the 
decision. 
G: Was this at that early meeting that he asked his brother to--? 
O: Once it was determined that Lyndon Johnson would accept the nomination, there were a couple of assignments. I remember, because immediately as part of that you had to think 
about your own supporters and what their reaction would be, and I guess you would direct your thought process immediately to Michigan, to G. Mennen Williams and to 
Walter Reuther. They were very liberal. They were certainly in leadership roles in the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. Reuther as the head of the UAW obviously was a 
very prominent and important force in the activity that brought about the nomination. Bobby was charged with that duty, and Bobby was not at all enchanted with the selection 
of Lyndon Johnson. 
G: What was his reaction? 
O: As mine, I think he was shocked, probably for different reasons. I'm going back twenty-five years, but I would react in terms of trying to put the numbers together right 
away rather than any of the philosophical views or the rest. But there had been some fairly bitter moments in the process. As for Bobby Kennedy, it was his nature to strongly 
react pro and con to most things. I think that he perceived attacks on his brother Jack as highly personal as far as he was concerned. 
G: So he felt this should eliminate Johnson? 
O: Yes. So Bobby first had to accustom himself to this, and then take on the job of smoothing some of what would be obviously ruffled feathers. 
G: How did the discussion go between the two Kennedy brothers, can you recall? 
O: Some of that discussion was just between the two of them. 
G: Really? 
O: Yes. 
G: By the time you came, was this still being debated? 
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O'Brien --Interview I --6 
O: No, this was off and on, but Jack would go in the other room, Bob might go in another. You know, this was one of these totally unstructured situations. Everybody, I think, was 
in somewhat of a daze. The whole thing was unfolding, and as the minutes went on, will he or wouldn't he if he was offered? And then he's offered, would he take it? No, he 
won't, and then the word would come back, well, no, he's not going to take it, and then, well, he'll think about it some more. This sort of thing just went on and on. The key to it 
all was that Jack Kennedy had made up his mind this was absolutely the right thing to do, and there were no alternatives. 
During the course of this activity, you got to the stage where Lyndon Johnson agreed to take it. Before this would ever become public knowledge--it was still confined 
to this room and Lyndon Johnson's suite--it was necessary to round up all of the potential vice presidential nominees one by one and have them come in and meet privately with Jack 
Kennedy, where Jack Kennedy would tell them individually that he had made his decision. Part of that brought Scoop Jackson to becoming national chairman during the campaign. 
It was just an unbelievable experience in every respect. It absolutely shook all of us, because to my knowledge, I don't know who might have whispered in Jack's ear or 
something like that. I certainly didn't. I know my mind was wide open. When I got that call that morning, obviously I knew the subject. The subject was now let's go over the list 
and let's get a consensus among the half-dozen of us that were intimately involved with Jack and the campaign and let's put this to bed, because we're going to have a session of 
the convention starting at noon and we've got to resolve this. I didn't go into his suite with any thought in my mind about Lyndon Johnson, not only that he'd be on the list, [but] 
there would be no list. It would be Lyndon Johnson. I did not know Lyndon Johnson intimately at all. Perhaps I had met him once or twice. 
But, anyway, people fanned out and there were tasks to do. You had to decide who was going to place him in nomination, who was going to second the nomination. 
Then the report back from the Michigan delegation was that they were totally displeased, and then there was the threat that this would be a floor fight. So that required all kinds of 
posturing on the convention floor and all kinds of assurances that we had everybody in place and that the motion to close the nominations and the motion to declare the election 
of Lyndon Johnson be made from the floor. I forget now, but Abe Ribicoff was a party to it in the Connecticut delegation. There was someone else; in case the chair didn't 
recognize one, they'd recognize the other. John McCormack was up on the platform with Rayburn. So all of this was part of what had to be done before the afternoon. At a point 
when things settled down in the suite, people moved out to carry on their tasks, including Bobby going up to whatever hotel it was to meet with Walter Reuther and the Governor. 
G: Soapy Williams? 
O: Soapy Williams. There were other assignments. You knew what your soft spots were. You knew there was going to be some strong adverse reaction. 
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O'Brien --Interview I --7 
Then Lyndon Johnson came into the suite. And I remember that because Jack Kennedy took a call or went off into another room for a while, so that left Lyndon 
Johnson and me alone. At which point Johnson said to me just what I have stated, "You and I don't know each other well at all. I know of you and obviously you know of me. 
But I want to tell you something. In making this commitment, I am going to do everything humanly possible to help this man and to help this ticket. I am going to do 
everything physically and mentally that I'm capable of doing in the interests of this campaign and this ticket. And I want you and whoever else that handles this campaign to 
tell me what I should be doing, assign tasks to me. I don't care how difficult the task might be. Move me everywhere and anywhere you can. I am totally committed, and 
you're going to find that I am everything that you would want me to be in terms of being a running mate." It was a very impressive monologue. I was impressed. I started even then 
adjusting. I don't know as it had fully penetrated with me that, by gosh, this was a coup and this was something that was going to really have an impact on this election. 
But anyway, that's what took place, and I must say, throughout the campaign, Lyndon Johnson did everything he had committed to do. 
G: Who were the other people considered for the vice presidential nomination? 
O: No one had been, as I said, contacted even indirectly regarding it, and we had not had any kind of a formalization of discussion regarding it. But as I recall it, and I'll miss some 
names, but Symington sticks out, Scoop Jackson sticks out, Orville Freeman was another fellow on that list, also Humphrey. And it seems to me there were a couple more who 
elude me at the moment. When I say half a dozen, I think there were half a dozen names that were bandied about by the press as potential VP candidates. 
G: Were there any other southerners considered? 
O: I don't know of any. It's probably somewhat remote, but only because of his position and his early advocacy of Kennedy that the name of Terry Sanford might have come up. 
G: That's who I was wondering about. 
O: Yes. 
G: What in particular did you hope Johnson would add to the ticket's electability? 
O: I think first of all it gave what we like to term geographical balance. He was nationally prominent and he was from Texas; Kennedy was the nominee and he was from 
Massachusetts. Johnson, as majority leader and for other reasons obviously, had entree to the South and the Southwest. He was eminently acceptable on the ticket, and more than 
that, with some degree of enthusiasm on the part of any number of southerners. As for Kennedy, his strength was in the West, the industrial Midwest, and the East. And it 
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O'Brien --Interview I --8 
seemed that they complimented each other in that sense, in terms of a campaign. There was no great disagreement between them regarding the issues and their views on where 
they might tend or hoped to go once they achieved election. 
G: Did you ever do a state-by-state breakdown of what numerically Johnson could add to the election? 
O: No. All of that might have been something we kicked around after the fact, but I can tell you that I don't think, even though I'm trying to reflect on it after twenty-five years, my 
reflections today would alter in any meaningful sense what actually occurred. It was out of the blue; there was an initial disbelief, there was concern on the part of Bobby about 
our supporters and their reactions. And then there was the problem of making sure that you kept a pleasant relationship with all the candidates or potential VP nominees. All of 
that was swirling around the suite. And you had a time frame. You had to try to smooth the ruffled feathers of a number of liberals in the Democratic Party that had supported 
Kennedy. You didn't have that kind of problem with a Dick Daley or a Dave Lawrence, or those people; they were political pros and it wouldn't take more than a few minutes for 
any of them to say, "Well, this sounds good." 
G: Was there anybody that served as a go-between between the Johnson forces and the Kennedy forces? You know, Jim Rowe and Phil Graham have been mentioned as people 
who shuttled back and forth. 
O: No, I don't think so. I think it was a relatively easy matter. There were people, I don't know how many people were around Johnson at that point, but I don't think the 
structuring of it in any sense ever occurred. In other words, "All right, you speak to so-and-so," or "You do this and you do that, and then you have him speak to Johnson or 
to Rayburn. "This just. . . . If you had had two days to plan this coup, I'm sure you would have had it well orchestrated and well organized, and everybody would know what 
everyone else was doing. But we, who had some reputation, at that hour at least, of being fairly good organizers and all the rest, found ourselves without a game plan other than 
"let's get him," which was Jack Kennedy's game plan. 
G: Jack Kennedy did go down to the Johnson suite that morning and talk with him. 
O: Yes. Yes. 
G: It's unclear exactly what was said, but apparently there was no outright, formal offer at that point, is that correct? 
O: It was a feeler, yes. 
G: It was a feeler. Okay. 
O: Yes. Because, you see, he had to wrestle, too, with if you placed it in a formal context 
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O'Brien --Interview I --9 
and it was turned down, that could be adverse to this campaign. So how do you get to putting the thought across, avoiding the formalization, and yet getting the temperature? 
G: Did Kennedy come back from that meeting with the notion that Johnson would accept it? 
O: That he would be thinking about it. But Sam Rayburn got into that picture at some stage, and Rayburn was doing everything he could on the basis of their lifelong friendship to 
dissuade him. 
G: Now, Kennedy did talk to Rayburn at this point, didn't he? 
O: Yes. 
G: Do you recall the circumstances of that? 
O: No. There was just a lot of movement up and down the stairway. 
G: Then Robert Kennedy went and talked with the Johnson people--Johnson, Rayburn, Connally, and the like--and told him of the opposition to LBJ, particularly in the Michigan 
delegation, and suggested maybe that he consider the chairmanship of the DNC as an alternative to VP. Do you remember that? 
O: No. 
G: Do you have any--? 
O: No. No. And I can say this, in the group meeting with Kennedy present, there was never a reference to that. 
G: Really? 
O: No. Not in my recollection. Because I know, twenty-five years later, what my reaction would have been to that. I would have thought that was ridiculous, to put it mildly. I 
think it would have bordered on the insulting rather than getting the objective accomplished. 
G: Well, why would Robert Kennedy have done this? 
O: Robert Kennedy was not enamored with the whole concept. He had a responsibility to fulfill his brother's direction, and Bob was good at that, and as the years went on, Jack 
Kennedy never at any fleeting moment was other than president of the United States. His brother was the attorney general and his brother was his confidant and adviser, but the 
decision maker sat in the Oval Office and the decision maker sat in the suite that day. It took some doing, and obviously Bobby wasn't saying "I'm going to fight my brother" or 
anything, but it took some doing, first of all, to have Bobby get to the point of the 
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O'Brien --Interview I --10 
accommodation, and then to carry out his responsibilities as a spokesman for his brother with Johnson, Rayburn, as well as Williams and Reuther and the rest. And I don't confine 
it to Williams and Reuther; there were others that were aroused, and there was the threat. 
I don't want to overemphasize the threat of a floor fight, but I must say when you're engaged in something like that you don't just overlook any possibility of difficulty 
arising, and the threat was made. We didn't contemplate that somehow or other they could defeat Johnson on the floor, but, obviously, we were contemplating how to avoid 
this. So before the Michigan delegation got into the act and there was a roll call, you had to plan something, because you didn't want to walk out into that convention with that kind 
of controversy if you could avoid it. 
G: It would have been an embarrassment. 
O: Of course. So, you see, this was not a simple matter. I'm talking about 6: 00 or 6: 30 a. m., or whatever it was, to noontime, when all of these things occurred--the fanning-out 
process around the city. 
G: Did Jack Kennedy ever seem to waver on Johnson during the course of this? 
O: Not to my recollection. 
G: This has been one possible explanation. 
O: Waver on Johnson? 
G: On his choice of Johnson as the nominee. 
O: I don't recall it. If that occurred, I didn't perceive it. 
G: All right. Now let me ask you to describe the anti-Kennedy propaganda that seemed to come from the Johnson forces. Was this, do you think, the genesis of the friction between 
some of the Kennedy people and the Johnson people? 
O: I suppose so. As it got to D-day, hour by hour the effort on the part of the Johnson people seemed to us to become more intense, more personalized. There were all kinds of 
rumors around and circulation of stories about Kennedy's health and that sort of thing. 
G: How could you trace these to the Johnson people? 
O: Well, we really tabbed John Connally and a lady whose name eludes me. 
G: Oh, India Edwards, yes. 
O: Yes. Whether rightly or wrongly, we felt that was the source and that Connally was a 
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O'Brien --Interview I --11 
good bare-knuckle fighter and this was desperation. It was a little bit like it happened by sheer coincidence that I was being interviewed by Mike Wallace up in the booth at the 
time of the Adlai Stevenson demonstration. And Mike Wallace, in his inimitable style, started in saying, "Well, look at this! Look at this, I'm looking out the window of the 
booth. The aisles are jammed and the enthusiasm is great. You people have felt you had this set and now look at this. This could turn out to be a debacle for you." My only 
comment was, "Mike, why don't you look at the floor? The delegates are all in their seats. The people in the aisles, the demonstrators with the balloons and the horns and 
everything, all came from the balconies." And that was really what was happening and it meant little or nothing. But, of course, if you're a reporter, you're hoping that something 
like that will occur so it's a much better story. 
But on the Johnson side it didn't take that form at all. It was the difficult, difficult situation that you have when it's clear that your opponent has "pledges," quote, unquote, 
that indicate he's going to win that nomination and on the first ballot. How do you try to peel off some of that support? How do you try to disrupt this bandwagon? And that's 
really the position Johnson was in. You resort to whatever comes to your mind, I guess. I don't recall that I reacted to the attacks the Johnson people were making or the effort 
they were expending in a very, shall I say, personalized manner. I think that I had enough years behind me in politics to kind of ride with that. 
But there were those among us in this little handful of people who had not had that background. And, of course, you had Bobby, who was reacting much more strongly than 
I was because it was his brother they were attacking. 
G: Had he had a dislike for Johnson before this point, do you think? 
O: I don't recall. I don't think there was anything like a relationship or contact between the two of them that would have brought about any. . . . 
G: Okay. The health accusations are well known. What else did Johnson's forces promote, do you recall? Was there any anti-Catholic propaganda? 
O: I don't really recall any. I think that what happened with the Johnson forces, as Lyndon Johnson years later told me when we discussed a lot of this in a different context, was that 
he had a team out there dealing with delegates. He wasn't in primaries, but he had them fanned out across the country during that same period. These fellows would meet back in 
Washington and report on their findings and delegate count and Johnson felt his people had failed him because they had given him all kinds of reports over those months that gave 
him a true belief that he had a good shot at the nomination. I don't recall now, but I remember Johnson and I discussing specific states in conversations over the intervening 
years. 
G: North Carolina, Arizona. . . . 
15
O'Brien --Interview I --12 
O: Yes. And he said, "I got counts from my people, and then, my God, it was just the other way around!" He told me on a number of occasions that he thought truly that he had a 
good organization in the field with accomplished pros, and that their organized effort in the delegate hunt was productive, and their reports to him, which he insisted upon--I'm 
sure he did--being specific, were very encouraging. And he was truly taken aback to find there was so much air in all of this and that we somehow or other--this is [in] nonprimary 
states--had due to our efforts, as he pointed out, clandestinely really made an impact state by state on these elected delegates. He insisted that there were times when he had X 
number of delegates in certain states and somehow or other we were able to shake them loose. I don't know if he was giving us too much credit; I think he probably never had 
them. 
G: Anything else vis-a-vis Johnson at the convention? 
O: No. I think that he exhibited a little concern in that suite in the conversation about the upcoming session to nominate the VP. He was obviously totally aware of the 
disenchantment of some of those Kennedy supporters, the opposition indeed of a number of prominent Kennedy supporters. He exhibited to me, in the conversation, a confidence 
that we'd get that resolved, but it was clear, too, that he was concerned that having made this commitment it could turn out to be a debacle, and that would be not only devastating 
to us but to him, too. He did exhibit that. But I must say in the context of that discussion, he also went on to talk about what his role would be. 
Tape 1 of 5, Side 2 
G: At the point that Johnson agreed to go on the ticket with Kennedy, did he have any requirements with regard to patronage or responsibilities as vice president? Did he want 
any conditions? 
O: Not that I'm aware of. None. I think that what transpired was that the assignments given Johnson, which he readily accepted throughout the campaign, were the rather traditional 
assignments of a VP candidate. A great deal of emphasis was placed on the train through the South and all of this sort of thing, but also a great deal of emphasis on the travel in the 
Midwest, in states like Indiana is a good example, where the nominee has the big street parades and all the rest. The VP candidate gets in there and speaks to smaller groups and 
hits a lot of the smaller communities that the candidate doesn't, this type of thing. Johnson, as I recall it, never had a complaint to make of any kind, and acquitted himself 
admirably. 
And at no time, and this went on beyond when I really got to know the man in the White House and the rest, was his loyalty to Kennedy questioned by me. I resented some 
of the writings of later years, indeed by some of my colleagues, that indicated that the relationship between Kennedy and Johnson was not of the level that some people might 
have thought, and that Kennedy contemplated dropping him from the ticket at the time of re-election. Never a word such as that was ever uttered in my presence. Never. 
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O'Brien --Interview I --13 
G: Anything to the contrary that might--O: 
To the contrary, I cite one incident, as it never left my mind. I don't recall the circumstances of the meeting that was to take place, but we, by that I mean the special 
assistants--that would be Ken O'Donnell, [Theodore] Sorensen, and me, but probably more Ken O'Donnell than me--were involved. The instructions were that any meeting of a 
substantive nature that we were going to have in the White House, and that would involve, obviously, contemplation of messages to Congress or other decisions, 
automatically the Vice President was to be invited. If he was out of the country or something, perhaps it would be well to reschedule the meetings so he could be present. 
An occasion arose and we were in the Cabinet Room, and there were a number of us sitting there, and it had to do with some kind of domestic message. As I say, I don't 
remember the specifics, but I do remember the President sitting down. We just barely got started, and it hit him, and he said, "Where is the Vice President?" Everybody just looked 
at him. And it turned out we had neglected to notify the Vice President. Kennedy expressed his views in the strongest terms. 
G: What did he say? 
O: Well, he said in substance, "Don't let this ever happen again. You know what my rules are, and we will not conduct meetings without the Vice President being present. I want 
his input, and I don't want this ever to happen again, and I want to be darn sure that it doesn't." He couldn't have been stronger. That incident really, I think, exemplified the 
professional relationship between the two men. Now, I'm not suggesting that Johnson and Kennedy became social buddies any more than I was a social buddy of Jack Kennedy's. 
But in a professional sense, Jack Kennedy was extremely appreciative of Johnson's support, which was evidenced in every way. I had a relationship of fourteen years with 
Jack Kennedy; I wasn't at social events with him. We had a friendship of fourteen years, but my relationship with him was not one of an intimate buddy from college days or what 
have you. So in the Johnson relationship--they were two entirely different types of fellows; they accommodated each other. I'm not saying it was love and affection for 
Johnson, although I never heard Kennedy say a bad word about Lyndon Johnson in all of those years. But, certainly, as president he wanted to ensure that the role of the Vice 
President was as meaningful a role as could be provided and that he wanted the Vice President at his right hand. 
G: How would you assess LBJ's relationship with Bob Kennedy during this period, not the later period, but during this transitional [period]? 
O: I don't recall anything untoward in the early stages. I was involved between those two men at a later stage, but I don't recall anything in those early days. 
G: Writers have suggested a bad chemistry between the two. Was this at all evident at the time? 
17
O'Brien --Interview I --14 
O: Not at that time. 
G: Do you think that after the convention, when both the Johnson forces and the Kennedy forces were working on the general election, was there sort of a good feeling between the 
two camps, or how would you describe the working [relationship]? 
O: Yes, because I was responsible for the organization. I was national director of the campaign. Bobby Kennedy was the campaign manager. But as far as staff melding and all 
the rest of this, I have no recollection of anything other than upbeat. Following the selection of the vice presidential candidate, you selected the Democratic national chairman 
the day following the formal convention. We then met with all of our Kennedy leaders across the country before we left Los Angeles. We had schedules and material already 
prepared. We had an intensive briefing session with them. We then set up a series of regional meetings across the country to get to the grassroots, or as close as we could, of 
the party organization and the Kennedy activists across the country, in an organizational context. We toured the country, and we had eight or nine organizational meetings in a 
period of I think probably seven to ten days. We just flew across the country and met in all the major areas and brought in everybody we could from the surrounding areas or in 
some instances three or four surrounding states. We had representatives of all the elements of the campaign, the women's division and the Citizens [for Kennedy], Whizzer 
[Byron] White and people like that. There was a team and I'd conduct the meetings. We made every effort to put in place what really had been our organizational effort in 
Massachusetts when Kennedy defeated [Henry Cabot] Lodge all the way back in 1952. It was a basic fundamental manual we followed that maximized the potential. So off we 
went. The candidate went his way and we went ours, which is the way it should be. 
G: One final question on the convention itself. In your own mind, did you ever come up with a reason why Johnson agreed to step down as majority leader to accept the vice 
presidential [nomination]? 
O: No, I didn't. I think there was one probable misjudgment that Johnson made, and that was if he were no longer majority leader but vice president of the United States it would [not] 
significantly change his position and role in the Senate among his colleagues. That took place in the early stages of the Congress. Although I don't recall the details, apparently 
Lyndon Johnson made some effort to retain a formalized leadership position even as vice president, and he was advised, which I think he probably should have anticipated, that he 
was no longer a member of the club. It wasn't personal, but you're no longer a member of the club, my friend. And I think that bothered him because, and we'll get into it later, 
there were times when he made comments to me that indicated he was bothered by that. 
We then went on through the campaign and there was one element of surprise at Hyannis Port on election night, and that was the closeness of the election. I remember 
while flying to Hyannis election day recalling the Harris and Gallup polls and the others that showed Kennedy a winner a week before the election, which was comforting. They 
18
O'Brien --Interview I --15 
then started to close over that weekend, and they were quite close as of election morning. I was somewhat disbelieving. But as the night unfolded, it turned out, as we know, to be 
a very, very close election. It was a long night. 
As a matter of fact, when it was decided that we would go to the national guard armory in Hyannis and claim victory with all the Kennedy family and entourage, I went 
with the group, but I was still just a little uneasy. I didn't like the way this was turning out--the closeness of it. So I went into a side office while all of this excitement was 
unfolding and called Chicago. I didn't locate the Mayor, but I did talk to an election official or somebody who was in a position of authority, and my simple question was, 
"Has the count been completed in Illinois?" He said that it had just been completed downstate. While Daley had been accused of thievery over the years, we were fully aware 
of the games played by the Republicans downstate, so they tried to get the downstate vote in before the final count in Cook County. He said there were approximately 25,000 votes 
for Kennedy which as yet had not been officially recorded, and downstate was already complete. So we had squeezed out Illinois. 
I came out of the office and Ted White was standing there. Ted was a perceptive fellow, and he had gone through the entire campaign with us. He said, "I bet I know who 
you were talking to." And I said, "Who was I talking to?" He said, "You were talking to Dick Daley." I said, "No, I wasn't," which was a truthful answer, and I walked away from 
him. But that was an indication of my concern. 
G: The story goes that in later years Jack Kennedy at troublesome times would say he was going to demand a recount in Illinois. 
O: (Laughter) 
G: Do you think that Daley threw in some extra votes? 
O: No. Because we had the reverse of that, a very close margin, with Humphrey, when I ran the Humphrey campaign [in 1968], which went in the wrong direction. No, there was a 
degree of hanky-panky somewhere in Illinois, but I always felt that whatever it was--and I had no knowledge of it and if it indeed existed--it appeared to be in the southern part of 
the state, because they were very adept at that sort of thing. No, it was just a darn close race. You could look across the results and Illinois didn't stick out in any sense. You lost 
a couple here and there by small margins, you won a couple by small margins--more than a couple, it was a very, very close election. 
G: Texas was relatively close, too. 
O: Yes. 
G: Do you recall any of the problems there? 
19
O'Brien --Interview I --16 
O: No, that was Johnson's territory. We went through the whole campaign thinking that "Lyndon is going to carry Texas for us, just don't dwell on it. It's in his hands and we're 
confident," but it was close. The whole election, actually, when you think about it, was extremely close; closer than we had anticipated. We eked it out, that's about what it 
amounted to. And the fact of the matter is we lost twenty-one seats in the House in that election. 
G: Did you play any role in Kennedy's speech to the Baptist ministers in Houston? 
O: I was with him. Contrary to what was the prevailing view after the speech and I guess historically is the view, I never accepted the feeling that he had turned something around. 
G: Really? 
O: No. I was with him, and I remember being in the elevator with him and going to the hall. You could always depend upon Kennedy to acquit himself well. I saw so many occasions 
over those fourteen years of association that I certainly didn't have any feeling that it was going to be otherwise. Obviously, the Houston ministers conference was going to treat 
him cordially. There wasn't going to be any conflict. He'd make his presentation and leave. But I never accepted that it impacted on the election. 
I think that what happened on the religious issue is underscored by the West Virginia primary. Lou Harris was our pollster. That was prior to Lou Harris becoming a 
national pollster. And I remember he'd have a pad just like that one, and he'd do his polling, and we'd sit in the lobby of that Kanawha Hotel down there, and he'd go over his 
numbers and I would tell him about certain arrangements that had been made, to be slated with county slates I thought would be helpful, and we might adjust the numbers a little bit 
in that regard. But the fact of the matter was that the Sunday before the West Virginia primary we were rained out on a tour; it called for a plane tour and we were grounded. 
So Kennedy and I were sitting in the hotel and we were depressed. The conversation went along these lines: "Well, if we come within two or four percentage points of Hubert, 
maybe we can claim some sort of a moral victory, because everybody's predicting we're going to lose and the polls indicate we're going to lose." That was really our view, and the 
scope of the victory was very surprising to us. 
G: Well, isn't it correct that you got a lot of sheriffs behind you and other county [officials]? 
O: Well, we got the organization, because it is an organization state--but you have to remember that was their first presidential primary. There was no interest on the part of 
the pros. The last item on that ballot as far as they were concerned was the presidential primary. No interest. I remember talking to the clerk of courts in a county trying to get 
slated on the slate they'd have printed to pass out to the voters. I regretted what I said to him, because I suggested that a) I was confident that Kennedy would be the next president 
of the United States; b) I wanted him to understand that we would never forget him, that the White House door would be open to him. And he said to me, "O'Brien, stop there. I 
20
O'Brien --Interview I --17 
can work this out. He seems to be a nice guy and I don't mind him being on the slate. But I couldn't care less about the White House door. I don't know if there's more than a 
handful of people in this whole state [who've] ever been in the White House. But," he said, "I want to have you understand I'm not interested in the White House; I'm solely 
interested in the courthouse," and that was the story of West Virginia. 
But we worked hard at it and it was helpful to tie in to some of the county organizations around the state. But the fact of the matter was that later that Sunday 
afternoon, reporters had gone off on tours of their own during the day, and some of them had visited churches. Almost invariably the preacher or minister in his sermon spoke 
about the primary. And I guess, at least from what they detected, it was in the context of "let's not be what people think we are. We resent it." There was a distinct statewide 
reaction to this repeated media suggestion that because Kennedy was a Catholic he couldn't carry the state. Something had to happen in those twenty-four or forty-eight 
hours. Now, Kennedy had the debate, maybe there was a delayed reaction from the Kennedy-Humphrey debate, because Kennedy had acquitted himself extremely well in the 
debate. Kennedy had gone on television that Sunday. No script, just went on for the half-hour, and he talked about his heritage and his religion and his contemplation of the 
future and his country. You know, Kennedy was an excellent communicator. 
So all of those things, you see, probably went into the mix when Tuesday came. But there was great pride across West Virginia, interestingly enough, in Kennedy winning 
that primary, because they felt that an unfair weight had been put on them. I really believe to this day something had to happen to change the Lou Harris poll that showed us losing 
by six or eight percentage points, and we were hopeful that we might reduce the two to four, and we won strongly. 
G: Critics have argued that the victory was a result of Joe Kennedy having pumped a lot of money into the effort. 
O: I'll tell you, any money that was pumped into West Virginia I had knowledge of and made decisions concerning. And I'll tell you, the entire expenditure in West Virginia in that 
primary wouldn't have financed a Congressional election in Massachusetts. 
G: Did you feel that you had adequate financing in that primary? 
O: Yes, because it really was Kennedy at the mine shafts, Kennedy on the street corners, Kennedy with FDR [Jr.] traveling around. And what we found was that all over West 
Virginia you'd go into these homes, go into stores, and there was a picture of Roosevelt. That made an impact. No question that we tried to organize West Virginia, as we tried to 
organize anything we were ever engaged in. And we had Bob McDonough, that was the local Kennedy director, and he was very good, very dedicated, and did an excellent job. 
And there were any number of West Virginia folks with Bob that formed the campaign effort there. We had an extremely well organized campaign, because as I said early on, 
we're dealing with seven primaries in relatively small states. If you take New Hampshire 
21
O'Brien --Interview I --18 
and a couple of others that were walk-through primaries, or Maryland, we really had Oregon, Wisconsin, West Virginia. And West Virginia became pre-eminent off the results 
of the Wisconsin primary that preceded it. We had won Wisconsin, but the press across the country said that it was a moral victory for Hubert Humphrey because we hadn't come 
up to the press' predictions. We came very close to our own but not to the press' predictions. Bobby Kennedy and I had to hustle the next morning to West Virginia on the 
"Caroline" and meet with McDonough, and we traveled to four or five locations to reassure our own troops in West Virginia that indeed we had won the Wisconsin primary, 
and they were not to believe the media claims. 
I came out of West Virginia with great admiration for those people. Also, I think I learned a lot. I know Jack Kennedy learned a lot and he never forgot it. 
G: Well, the story goes that it was that experience that really made him aware of the poverty in this country. 
O: That's right. And you have to realize the breakthrough, and this was this man's breakthrough. Sure, there was an organization; there was O'Brien doing his thing or 
whatever. But the fact of the matter is that to see this man waiting in a mine shaft for those miners to come up all blackened and stick out his hand and say, "I'd like to meet 
you," and then visit with them. He had to break through. He had to break through. This didn't happen easily, but he did break through. They did accept, but not at the outset. It 
was a difficult task. 
G: Remarkable. Did you play a role in the television debates? 
O: Yes. 
G: What was your [role]? 
O: Well, the role was really in trying to take advantage of an opportunity in terms of early acceptance. Our absolute conviction, certainly mine, [was] that if we could get to those 
debates, Nixon would live to regret it. The total understanding we had [was] that Nixon felt completely otherwise, as evidenced by the failure of Nixon to go back and take a look 
at the Lodge-Kennedy debate in Massachusetts, and to take a look at the Humphrey-Kennedy debate in West Virginia. Nixon was very self-assured. 
The debates were something that we wished for and anticipated from the day the agreement was formalized. I was with him at all four debates. Jack Kennedy was a 
remarkable fellow and I had great admiration for him or I wouldn't have gone through all I did with him on these things. I never had a moment's discomfort when it came to Kennedy 
going one-on-one under any set of circumstances. He had a lot of guts. He was an extremely courageous guy. Really, it was just like with the Texas delegation; he couldn't 
resist it. Even if it might have hurt, he just couldn't resist it. He couldn't resist going to the Houston ministers conference. That sort of thing got his adrenalin flowing, and I think 
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O'Brien --Interview I --19 
that without question, particularly in retrospect on the closeness of the election, those debates, or that debate really, the first one, had a tremendous impact. I had occasion to 
recall it recently. Some reporter called me. Apparently it's the twenty-fifth anniversary of the debate coming up in the next few days. And I remember it vividly. There wasn't that 
much planning. There were position papers and Jack took whatever opportunities he could between stops to brief himself. You know, you're pretty limited on how deeply you 
can get into it. But there was the regular briefing procedure with Ted Sorensen and others providing material. 
But that debate was not a substantive debate, nor did you contemplate it would be. You don't know what's going to happen. But the question is, what is the mass audience 
perception going to be? And when we gathered in Chicago for that debate, in that holding room Kennedy had already taken a look at the studio, just as Nixon had. Kennedy had 
suggested it was too cold in the studio and insisted they turn up the heat a little bit. As we sat in the holding room, I remember there were some sandwiches and tea, and Kennedy 
did pour a cup of tea for himself. Nobody else touched anything, Joe Kennedy, Ken O'Donnell--there were about five or six of us, including Ted Sorensen, I guess. I was a 
wreck. 
G: Were the Nixon people in the same area? 
O: No, they were on the other side of the studio. Time starts to run; now you're just checking your watch. And there were ten minutes or so to go, or probably between 
fifteen and ten minutes to air time. There was no outward indication at least of any Kennedy concern. He was very self-composed. But there wasn't a normal conversation 
taking place, and I really couldn't stand it, so I walked out of the room and strolled down the hall. Down the hall a short distance, I realized that was the door to the studio, so I 
opened the door, walked in, closed the door and stood there. There were a number of staff people, camera crews and all that, finalizing everything, checking the lights, et cetera. 
And I looked across this very large studio and noted a fellow pacing up and down alone, and it was Nixon. As I watched him, at one point he went over and checked the podium, 
where his position would be, and he went back. And even with my rather poor eyesight I could see that this man was heavily made up. He just didn't quite look like Nixon in a 
way. But clearly I was observing a fellow that was terribly uptight. 
Then the countdown over the loudspeaker began, and I am still standing there. Nixon hasn't left the studio. And the countdown came and I don't recall the exact minutes, 
but four minutes to air time there's no Kennedy. Three minutes to air time, there's no Kennedy. At which point I'm semi-hysterical standing there, and I'm just about to say, 
"God, didn't you hear the--?" And at perhaps two minutes to air time the door opened, Kennedy walked in, moved directly to the podium and stood. Nixon, looking ill at ease, 
took his position, attempted to speak to Kennedy--Kennedy nodded. And they were on the air. 
After that debate, I visited the press room. There were hundreds of press present, 
23
O'Brien --Interview I --20 
many of whom I knew, and I asked, "What do you think?" While they were relatively noncommittal, it was clear to me that the prevailing attitude was Kennedy had done a 
great job. He had won that debate; to what degree might vary from writer to writer. 
Then I went over to the hotel lobby, which was jammed with all the Daley pros, Dick Daley's organization, and I started to chat with some of them. Then it hit me, and I 
started to say, "What do you think the two major issues were?" Nobody had the faintest idea. There was fleeting reference to Quemoy and Matsu, but nobody there had any real 
idea of the debating points. 
The next day, it was the first stop in Indiana--Evansville--and the crowd at the airport was two to three times what we had experienced at earlier stops. In a few hours 
that debate had made a major impact. I was at all four debates with Jack, and all he had to do was just play out the other three. 
There's no question that first debate had a real impact. Now, there are those that say, "If you just read the transcript." And others will say, "Well, if you'd listened to it on 
radio you would have concluded it either was a draw or Nixon won." The fact is that it was the first, it placed every candidate from then on in a tough position on debates, to this 
day. Debates now take place at every level of politics all over America. People even started to debate empty chairs. 
The Jack Kennedy I knew and saw in action was a remarkable fellow when it came to a crisis. He came up to it. Typical of him was his handling of the Bay of Pigs. It was a 
disaster, and he, figuratively, went out on the White House steps and said to the American people, "My fellow Americans, I goofed. I have absolutely blown this. I let you down. 
All I can say to you is I hope I've learned a lesson. I pledge to do better in the future." My God, the polls showed his ratings went up off disaster, not down! So that really was 
the type of courageous man you were dealing with. 
While we had attempted at all times to be as organized as we could be in the political context, in the elections in Massachusetts, in the nomination quest and the 
election, we now focused on the future in specific terms, programmatically. I remember very well being with him at Palm Beach. He put together his cabinet. Each cabinet 
member selected then met with me, generally over dinner in my suite at the Mayflower Hotel, to review his role as a member of the team. I made it very clear that the President--G: 
What does this encompass, can you--? 
O: Everything they would be engaged in would focus on the President. The President's programs--i. e., legislative programs--would be a responsibility shared by every cabinet 
member. Each cabinet member would be in communication with us on the selection of all his top people in his department, and we would be advising him. 
Now, that was an integral part of the process. Some of these people were 
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O'Brien --Interview I --21 
relatively new to me. Bob McNamara was a good example. I spent an evening in my suite at the Mayflower with Bob McNamara, telling him as best I could, as diplomatically 
as I could, the political facts of life as we saw them, now that he was a member of the team. And this fellow had not had an experience like that before. So, you know, you had 
to be very careful about how you presented it. It might take a few hours over dinner before you finally painted the whole picture. 
G: Were they all receptive to this element, dimension? 
O: Yes. I think in a couple of instances you had to be. . . . Some obviously not only were receptive, but they knew the name of the game, but there were others that just never had 
been in politics. Then, with all of that, while sitting in Palm Beach and the selection process is reasonably completed, we're talking about the White House staff, about 
relations with the Congress, and we look at, I guess they call it, the green book where it listed the positions in departments, agencies, starting with the White House staff, and it 
was like looking at a Christmas catalog. 
The President-elect and I are looking at this book, thumbing through it and discovering all of those goodies. We talked about the White House, and I think it again 
underscored our lack of basic understanding of the whole process, the separation of powers, in terms of how you deal with the Congress. Because I remember that the top 
special assistant to Eisenhower, Bryce Harlow, was special assistant for congressional relations. And then there was an administrative assistant for personnel and Kennedy 
suggested to me that we combine the two jobs, because we both understood personnel meant patronage. It sort of fitted, congressional relations-patronage, and the title would 
be special assistant for congressional relations and personnel. And we both thought that was a whale of an idea, and that's what happened. 
Tape 2 of 5, Side 1 
O: --press relations and personnel, and we were busily engaged, among other things, or I was, in the upcoming inauguration, because there again, we wanted to ensure that all our 
friends and loyal supporters around the country had an opportunity to participate in this great event. So again we were involved in organizational activity. Simultaneously, I had 
to work on my assignment. I had no perception of it, no knowledge of it, even to the point where perhaps somebody might have to steer me toward the Hill. 
The fact of the matter was that all I could do and did was talk to a couple of people that had had some White House experience in Democratic administrations: Dave 
Bell, Clark Clifford, Charlie Murphy. They'd tell me about it, give me a feel for it, and relate how the President, President Truman, or [in the case of] Jim Rowe, President 
Roosevelt, handled their relationships with the Hill in the context of their legislative programs. There had been no formalization at any time; it was just sort of 
seat-of-the-pants. The President might make a call or send somebody to see someone. But it wasn't organized. I guess I wasn't shocked or stunned because I didn't know 
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O'Brien --Interview I --22 
whether it required organization. 
We took the occasion to ask a couple of old hands that were knowledgeable to give us a written evaluation or analysis of this kind of activity. One was Clark Clifford, 
the other was Dick Neustadt. We did know that the first occasion for the White House to have a formalized congressional relations entity was under Eisenhower with Bryce 
Harlow. I hadn't met Bryce Harlow, and inauguration was upon us. Bryce Harlow had called me and had offered his services, which I deeply appreciated. It turned out after I 
did get to know him that he was just a really fine fellow. He was very helpful. 
But in any event it began to penetrate what Bryce Harlow's role was in this formalized congressional relations activity in the Eisenhower Administration. And it 
seemed to me, from what little I'd learned, in fleeting moments before actually going in the White House, that the congressional relations activity in the Eisenhower Administration 
had focused on blocking legislation, avoiding its arrival at the White House for a potential veto, because they were dealing with a Democratic Congress and they had no very 
meaningful legislative program of their own. So it was sort of, if you can call it that, a negative approach: see what you can do up there to stop Democrats from enacting 
legislation that we disapprove of. 
The Clark Clifford presentation, as I recall it, was [to] have a White House activity that was very limited in staff, was not involved in a public context, tried to avoid general 
knowledge of its existence, and did not engage the departments and agencies in joint activity. Let them (departments and agencies) handle their own matters directly with the 
Congress. 
Dick Neustadt chose to chat with me as part of a written outline that he presented and his view was just the opposite--that you should enlist the aid in an organized sense of 
everyone you could throughout the administration. This was a big effort--you were dealing with five hundred and thirty-five people--and as you would not have a large White 
House staff, you'd have to look elsewhere for support. And it wasn't because of any knowledge I had of what was going to transpire, but I guess by nature most of my life had 
been organizing and maximizing the potential. I knew some congressmen and senators, but not well, and only in the political context, certainly not in the legislative context. So I 
decided that we ought to try to build an organization in the executive branch. I had been forewarned by both Clifford and Neustadt that it was a very sensitive area. The separation 
of powers was there, and it certainly could be counterproductive if you didn't handle whatever activities you engaged in with an understanding of this great sensitivity, impact, 
or recognition of the constitutional provisions. 
In any event, none of this was in place come Inauguration Day. I had developed a list of possible staff people. Somewhere along the line Mike Manatos was brought to my 
attention. I contacted Mike and asked if he'd like to join the White House staff as the Senate representative. Henry Hall Wilson, similarly, who had been very active in the 
Kennedy campaign, very close to Terry Sanford, and a member of the state legislature in 
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O'Brien --Interview I --23 
North Carolina--I asked him to join us. And I had a fellow that was associated with me and continued to be associated with me intimately over his lifetime, and that was Claude 
Desautels. These were supplemented from time to time by others over those years: Chuck Daly, who later was vice president of Harvard and the University of Chicago; Dick 
Donahue, a very prominent, very able attorney from Massachusetts and a long-time Kennedy associate. And there were others in later years, but basically the White House 
staff started with Manatos, Henry Hall Wilson, and Claude Desautels, my administrative assistant, and my long-time secretary, Phyllis Maddock. 
G: Was there anybody that you tried to get that you couldn't get to join the staff? 
O: No, and I really didn't know what to look for. You have to understand that this was from ground zero, and all of the organization that ultimately took place over the first few 
months of the Kennedy Administration, putting it in place and refining it, was not remotely in place or really carefully thought out by inauguration time. In fact, it was so, if you will, 
disjointed that we all went into the White House the day after inauguration and we didn't even have office assignments. 
I hadn't seen Bryce Harlow. I called Bryce; I was just stuck with the inauguration. Again, it was the politics of it. I didn't want any disappointed long-time Kennedy 
campaign leaders. And I concentrated on all of that, and Phyllis went over to the White House. I got to call Bryce and apologize that I haven't been back to him, and I was 
looking forward to sitting down with him. Well, Phyllis went over. He said, "Well, maybe some of the details of the way the White House operates I can go over with Phyllis." And 
that was very kind of him. She went over and spent several hours with him. That was the extent of my knowledge of it. I'd never been in the building, even as a tourist. 
So we walked in, with the staff, and looked around the two floors. I don't think I even knew the basement was there. And I found this corner office on the second floor, 
and I noted that there was space for two secretaries and a conference room, and about three offices. So I planted myself in the center office and my staff on each end. And that's 
how the office was established. Somebody then suggested that everybody on the staff go downstairs to the Fish Room, outside the Oval Office, to be sworn in. I didn't go 
downstairs. I was never really sworn in. (Laughter) 
Now what do you do, where do you go and how do you put this together? Well, I received this call from a fellow that was over in the EOB building next door--the old State 
Department. He introduced himself to me on the phone and said he was looking forward, along with the personnel staff, to meeting their new boss. And he knew it was premature, 
but inasmuch as it was snowing he thought he would get directions from me regarding my decision on whether or not to close down the federal establishment early that day. I was 
obviously taken aback, and I said, "Well, let me get back to you." So I called Phyllis in and I said, "Let's see if we can find what department of government has responsibility for 
the Weather Bureau." Lo and behold, there was a fellow by the name of Dan [Clarence Daniel] Martin, Jr., who was under secretary of commerce, who had been a staunch 
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O'Brien --Interview I --24 
Kennedy supporter from California, and under him came the Weather Bureau as we noted in the table of organization. 
Well, that was a relief, because I knew Dan intimately, and I called him. And I said, "How are you doing?" "Fine." I said, "What decision are you going to make today, 
Dan, on closing the federal establishment?" Of course, he didn't know a thing more about what I was talking about than I did when this Lyons called me. "God, what?" I said, 
"Well, the Weather Bureau [is under you]." He said, "It is?" And I said, "Yes, you're responsible for the Weather Bureau. So you'd better just check on what the procedure has 
been in the past, determine whether the projected snowfall justifies early departure of the federal employees for their homes, and I'll give you the extension number of Mr. Lyons, 
and you can advise him on your decision." I hung up. In addition, there were half a dozen telegrams laying on my desk inviting me to various functions, get-acquainted functions, of 
federal unions, employee unions. It hit: personnel wasn't what the President and I had envisioned at all. This was the job of maintaining liaison with the various elements of the 
federal employee establishment, which was of no interest to me whatsoever. I then had Phyllis check with the printing office; it was too late to eliminate "and personnel" from my 
title in the Congressional Directory, so it stayed there for a year. And I never did to this day meet Mr. Lyons or any of the staff over in the EOB building. 
So with that, and with all of the excitement of this new experience, we scheduled the first leadership meeting with the Democratic leaders of the House and Senate, the 
weekly breakfast meeting, four days after the inauguration. The first order of business in the House would be the vote on expanding the Rules Committee. So at the leadership 
breakfast, the President welcomed the leaders; pointed out that there would be a leadership breakfast on a regular basis, and we chatted for a while. 
Then the President said to the Speaker, "You have the vote on expanding the Rules Committee scheduled as the first order of business." The Speaker said, "Yes, as a 
matter of fact, we're going to vote tomorrow." And the President, I'm sure, assumed that everything was in order. It was a fairly routine activity in the house. Mr. Rayburn said, 
however, "I'm concerned about it." "Oh?" "Yes, as a matter of fact, I don't think we have the votes. It's very, very difficult, and we've had compromise after compromise on what 
to do with the Rules Committee, but now this expansion and the assignment of these new members to the Rules Committee would give us, as we saw it, just a majority, that's all, to 
bring your program to the floor." So whatever else was discussed at the leadership breakfast eludes me, and probably everything else that might have been discussed that 
morning eluded me because I was in a state of semishock. 
So after the leadership breakfast the President and I discussed this and it dawned on us that, my God, we can't let this go forward. So the Speaker was contacted. 
G: Did you call him or did the President call him? 
O: The President called him. And he came down again that afternoon, and as a result of the 
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discussion he agreed to postpone it for a week. And if you want a cold shower, you've had it; if you wanted to learn how congressional relations are supposed to function, you're 
going to have a quick learning process, and we had to try to develop a head count. 
There were some close and friendly Democrats up there we contacted who we thought would be in a position because of their seniority to be helpful to us in trying to 
determine what the true story was. There was no head count or anything; Rayburn was worried--that was his gut feeling, and it turned out he was right, of course. 
So we got together with Congressmen Frank Thompson, Carl Elliott, Bob Jones, I believe, and went over every member of the House and their perception on how these 
fellows could be categorized at that point. Got hold of Bobby, and Stu Udall, [who] was a former member of the House and was now in the cabinet; got hold of Andy Biemiller of 
the AFL-CIO, and we tried to put together to the best of our ability a head count, and that head count showed that we would lose the Rules fight by at least seven votes, probably 
more. That was our most optimistic view. 
I have some statistics here, because I wanted to recall it. You take the breakdown of the House at the outset of the Kennedy presidency. First, we had lost twenty-one 
Democrats in the Kennedy presidential election victory. The coalition, so-called, of southern Democrats and Republicans was well known, and it had been effective in many 
ways during the Eisenhower period. My notes indicate the vote was scheduled for January 25 and it was postponed to January 31. That may or may not be accurate. 
G: That's what my notes show, too. 
O: At that moment, the House consisted of 174 Republicans, 151 Democrats, non-southern, 108 southern Democrats, and two vacancies. So clearly, the only way this could be put 
together was to get a minimum of twenty Republicans, as we tried to put numbers to this, a third of the southern Democrats, and a united non-southern Democratic vote. The 
southern Democrats had been subjected to a great deal of pressure and media attention back in their districts, to varying degrees throughout the South, opposing any change in 
the Rules Committee, Judge [Howard] Smith or the others. And I remember Overton Brooks of Louisiana saying that it was so difficult. After the fact he told me that he had 
been viciously attacked by his local media and he had a cross burned on his lawn. So that was what we were up against. 
But the time was utilized to the best of our ability. We didn't have the staff, you know, in agencies or departments of government; we just went at it, one on one, phone 
calls and what have you. During the entire course of that several days, we did not involve the President. The President finally made one call, and that was to the chairman of the 
North Carolina delegation, Harold Cooley, and he asked Cooley if he couldn't help--on the basis of our head count there was a serious problem with the North Carolina delegation. 
We felt maybe this was the delegation that might take a second look, or some of them. Cooley convened them--he'd agreed to do that--and I assume that he probably didn't exert 
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O'Brien --Interview I --26 
any great pressure on them, but they did discuss the matter, discuss the President's interest, and Cooley then told the whole world that the President had called him. Then 
some of the media decided that if he had called Cooley, he must have been calling the world, which wasn't the case. 
But anyway, the effort was expended to the best of our ability, and the end result was that we won by five votes. And I believe that we got--what?--twenty-two 
Republicans. 
G: That's right. 
O: I had it broken down. Yes, twenty-two Republicans. We got thirty-four southern Democrats, which was close to one-third of the southern Democrats, and we got a solid 
additional Democratic vote, and we won by five votes. 
Now, first of all, as belated as our recognition of the seriousness of this problem [was], the effect a loss would have had on anything we attempted to do with the Congress 
would have been far-reaching, but we had salvaged it for the moment. If we had failed, there wouldn't have been, in my judgment, any Kennedy program during that two-year 
period that would have gotten to the floor of the House. 
The other aspect of it, however, was that with the effort we expended over about a week, with the closeness of the vote, with the anticipation that you were not apt to get 
twenty Republican votes in many matters up there, clearly we were faced with a very difficult situation, but at least we had salvaged enough so that we would have a chance to 
give it a real try in due course. 
But it was a lesson, and that lesson brought me to the realization that I'd better move as quickly and as vigorously as possible to put together an organized congressional 
relations entity in the executive branch of government. And so we proceeded posthaste. And that, as it unfolded, took the form of weekly, written, detailed reports that had to be 
submitted by noontime every Monday from every department and agency, reviewing what had transpired between their department or agency and the Congress the prior week, 
projecting what they anticipated the next week and beyond, and explaining to the best of their ability any failure of movement, and [they were] to be as specific and detailed as 
possible. 
We then, in our small staff, would analyze and evaluate those reports on Monday afternoon, compile the salient elements for the President's night reading on Monday night, 
and develop the agenda, at least the domestic side of the agenda, legislative side of the agenda, for the President for the breakfast meeting with the congressional leaders on 
Tuesday morning. In addition, the some-forty congressional relations people from these departments and agencies would meet with us regularly at our direction, in the White 
House, and we would review, face-to-face, the entire legislative program, so that all departments and agencies knew their responsibility and the responsibility of their 
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O'Brien --Interview I --27 
respective bosses in the cabinet. It extended even well beyond their own departments and agencies, so that they were responsible, indeed, got specific assignments from time to 
time, for legislative matters that didn't relate to their department or agency directly. 
We then endeavored to orchestrate Kennedy's contact with the Congress, and that took a variety of forms. We put into effect briefing sessions with selected members of 
Congress, probably specific committee members depending on the issues at the moment, in the White House. Twenty or thirty members would come in, and the President would 
meet with them directly and review the specific matter of the moment. We had individual meetings with key members of Congress that would come in the back door, if you will, of 
the White House, not on the President's schedule: Bob Kerr, Wilbur Mills, people like that, on a regular basis. 
We would develop a program where every department and agency that had good news to announce, contracts in a member's state or district, or whatever--Defense 
Department contracts would be a good example--were to advise us of these decisions and the anticipated announcement, and we developed in the White House, on my staff, a 
procedure to notify "friendly" quote, unquote, members of the House and Senate, twenty-four hours in advance of these announcements from the department or agency so 
that they could get out their own press releases to their local media. 
How do you utilize the President? At this point I think it's worth mentioning that President Kennedy had spent four terms in the House, eight years; one term in the Senate, 
six years. He had been on the Hill fourteen years, but he had not been part of the establishment on the Hill. He had not been a total, full-time activist in that sense. He did 
not have the kind of seniority in either the House or Senate, obviously, to be a prime mover. He was very much junior to all his former colleagues, and how do you utilize him? 
The Cooley experience indicated that you would husband the President's direct intervention, that you never wanted to reach a point where the President's direct 
involvement would cause members on the floor to say, "Oh, I got another call from the President today." You wanted that member, if he said anything, to say, "What do you 
think, buddy, happened? I got a call from the President today." He talked to the President of the United States. And that, of course, was the way to go, and it was the 
only way you could maintain presidential impact, hopefully at a given moment under extreme circumstances. 
G: Was the key to doing that limiting the President's--? 
O: It was ensuring that anytime the President intervened, it would have an individual or collective impact. Whether it succeeded in accomplishing the purpose was another thing. 
But there would be a recognition on the Hill that you don't hear directly from the President, or the President will not call you down to the White House unless he is directly, 
seriously involved and this means everything to him. And you've tried to use every other source of persuasion to the fullest in every conceivable way before you bring the President 
into the act, and you try to avoid doing that because there will always be another time. If 
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O'Brien --Interview I --28 
there's not a need for it, a perceivable need, then you shouldn't do it, and you shouldn't--my responsibility was to husband the President's time and effort, and the easy 
route was to say, "Here's a list, Mr. President. In your spare time why don't you call these thirty fellows? Or have them come down one by one?" It just didn't make sense; it would 
be counterproductive over the long haul. It would be meaningless ultimately. 
Just as a statistic, through this organized effort, in 1961, the first year of President Kennedy's term, he presided over thirty-two leadership breakfasts. He had ninety group 
meetings the first year in the White House, by personal invitation of the President, meeting directly with selected groups of members of the House and Senate. He had five hundred 
members, the entire Congress, at one time or another at coffee hours, which were informal. They weren't briefing sessions, they were just little social hours. We had a 
regularly scheduled ceremony every bill signing--we made sure that we extended personal invitations to appropriate members of Congress to participate in every bill signing. Every 
member of the Congress received a letter personally from the President on his birthday with birthday greetings. I took the occasion to send a letter to every member, too, on his 
birthday. That became an established procedure. I had the Sequoia made available to me to take out small groups of members at appropriate times--and this became a regular 
event--for a three-hour trip on the Potomac, where we'd have a buffet dinner and maybe an accordion player, at times, or a sing-along. We would leave the dock at 6: 00 p. m., 
return at 9: 00. And that became the greatest tool available to us, and I utilized it to the fullest. It became a great bore to be on that Sequoia for my wife for three hours, 
sometimes two and three times a week. (Laughter) 
G: When we talked last time, you made the comment, I suspect not in jest, that you felt that one of President Carter's biggest mistakes was selling the Sequoia. 
O: (Laughter) I guess you shouldn't say we were appalled. It isn't that big a thing in that sense, but I certainly reflected upon the Sequoia when I read about the President and his 
economy drive--all presidents have economy drives, but we'll get into those. President Kennedy had one and President Johnson had one. So Jimmy Carter had his, and the 
Sequoia was just a great help in maintaining this dialogue and improving this relationship and getting better acquainted, whatever way you want to describe it. There was nothing 
approaching it. For instance, I was in Washington just two weeks ago, and I was talking to some of our old friends. Two members that I talked to brought up the Sequoia to me 
and reflected on the times that I had invited them on the Sequoia. And they never saw it again. 
G: Well, you described at length how you found out about the White House proper, and allocated your own office space, and things of this [nature]. How did you become aware 
of the Sequoia and--? 
O: I became aware of it in the sense that it was one of two, as I recall, presidential yachts. And it was the largest of the two and therefore it could accommodate more people. And 
the recognition that it is a presidential yacht, the president can designate the utilization of 
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it as he sees fit, and the president doesn't use it very often. So that moment it occurred, the light went on and I thought to myself, "It's too bad to have that yacht [and] staff over 
there on the dock somewhere. I can think of a way to utilize it, hopefully effectively." And I spoke to the President about it, and I had the free use of the Sequoia, unless the 
President was using it, on a designated time frame, from then on. 
G: Were there others that you had to negotiate times with, or did you have first dibs after the President? 
O: No, first dibs after the President. I don't recall any time being told that the Sequoia would not be available when I wanted it. 
G: Did you go out on it with the President first, before this, at least to become--? 
O: No. 
G: You just found out that the yacht existed and--? 
O: There were a couple of occasions with President Kennedy and President Johnson that I was on the Sequoia, not related to this activity but, no, all I knew was, hey, how many 
people can it accommodate, and how many people can be handled reasonably? They have a pleasant little trip down to Mount Vernon and have the salute and the music play and 
turn around and come back. And [you] utilize that three hours of confinement to make it as pleasant as you can, with food and drink, but also circulate and put little groups 
together on the Sequoia so that at the end of the three hours you've felt you might have made your sales pitch, hopefully effectively, and not to such an extent that you turn 
anyone off, so that they did leave feeling that it was a social hour but incidentally there was some conversation about some pending legislation that they were significantly 
involved with. 
G: Would you speak generally to the group or would you speak one on one to--? 
O: One on one. Or when you got with one, then you'd keep your eyes open and maybe you'd want to bring one or two more into that little corner of the boat for that little chat. 
G: Did you normally organize the trips around a legislative issue? Let's say if a bill was coming to a vote, would you get the people who were--? 
O: You tried to, but it didn't work out quite that way because you wanted to utilize it as often as you could. So there were times where you just tried to anticipate that you would be 
busily engaged with these fellows say a month or two from now, and it wouldn't hurt a bit to just get to know them better, have them know you better, and have a pleasant social 
evening with them prior to trying to convince them to be supportive. 
G: Say, for example, if you had a labor bill, minimum wage or something like that and you 
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O'Brien --Interview I --30 
were working on this particular element, would you have lobbyists or people from, let's say, the labor movement, invited as well? 
O: No, this was confined. No, I wouldn't do that. I thought about that, frankly, but then I thought, "That's just takes away some of the niceties of the whole thing." So it was 
confined to my wife and me with one or two members of the White House staff, depending on the circumstances. And it was always a melding of senators and 
congressmen; you never did an exclusive either way, sort of balanced it that way. And really, it was an opportunity that was there, available. These people were all on standby 
on the Sequoia, just waiting for the President or under the President's direction, somebody to say, "Okay, tonight you're going out." 
But what else can you do? You see, in that first year, literally, as a statistic, President Kennedy had 2,500 individual contacts with members of Congress. Now, that's 
really from our records. That took all those forms that I enumerated, but that's direct contact: there's been a chat; there's been a briefing; there's been a visit under any number 
of circumstances. This doesn't include any contacts that we on the staff made at all. This was presidential. So at the end of the year we felt that we had utilized his time fairly. He 
and I had a standing sort of--I don't know how to describe it, but I'd say, "Mr. President, I've got three dates I'd like to put on the calendar for some coffee hours or briefings. I 
have a few dates, and I think we ought to get it done." "Well, all right, come on, level with me. How many dates and what are you involving me in?" He'd always agree. You 
know, I tried to make it just as light as I could and get by and say to Ken O'Donnell, "Okay, it's done. Put them on the schedule." 
But he was accommodating. I had to recognize we had our problems--it did involve his New Frontier program--but he had problems that extended far beyond that, 
and his time had to be properly utilized. And it couldn't be wasted; it couldn't be something to engage in small talk, it had to have some meaning to it if I was carving out of 
his schedule X amount of time over a period of weeks and months. 
And how do you supplement it? We came up with another idea, and this was all part of trying to do an organized effort. We decided to have Sunday brunches at my 
home. We had rented a house in Georgetown, and so that became a regular activity of ours. We tried to meld members of Congress and their wives with members of the media, 
and I was really surprised how successful they were, because it would be a simple sort of breakfast, a little buffet--just have a table and have some bacon and scrambled eggs and 
baked beans or something, and a bloody mary if you wanted it. That was the extent of it. And it would start at noontime and go just like any social time you have at your home, a 
couple of hours or so, and people would drift away. 
I remember the first one I had. There'd be a half a dozen media people I'd invite: Joe Alsop, who at that time was an extremely important member of the media; his column 
was extremely important to everybody. And I invited Joe, and Joe came, and Joe was so struck by the whole thing and the people he met that the next day he called me and asked 
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me if I would include him in some future ones because he just enjoyed it so much and it meant a lot to him. He met people. What amazed me about those meetings was that, 
particularly on the House side, you had important members of Congress: Wilbur Mills, Al [Albert] Thomas, the fellow that was chairman of the Appropriations Committee from 
Texas--G: 
Oh, George Mahon. 
O: George Mahon. You know, another twenty of that level in Congress that--this is long before House reform. And to have a brunch and to have three or four fellows like that 
along with half a dozen, or whatever it was, younger members of the House and Senate, and have Walter Lippmann and Joe Alsop, people like that, saying to me, "Who is that 
fellow over there?" Or having Al Thomas say, "That's Walter Lippmann? I've never met him." Or "That's Joe Alsop? I've never met him." What I realized early on was that with 
all of these people reporting about Washington, particularly the more senior and more widely known columnists and senior reporters, a great deal of their personal contact and 
concentration was on the Senate side of the Congress. 
Tape 2 of 5, Side 2 
O: The brunch [was part of] that continuing effort, again, I repeat the cliche: maximize your potential. And the objective--I'd have members of my White House staff at these 
brunches--we were trying in every conceivable way to get to know these people, to have some reason for contact. They talked about patronage, you know, as though you could 
control the Congress through some patronage device. And it was just not realistic; it never has been and never will be. First of all, it's very limited. Sure, Congress might 
recommend somebody to be an assistant secretary of something or other. Maybe six congressmen recommended somebody; maybe three or four senators recommended 
somebody. An ultimate decision has to be made and there are going to be nine disappointed people and one that feels pleased. That's a task that has to be discharged. 
What do you do in servicing these people or trying to ensure that they know that you care about them, you're interested in them, and you recognize their importance? And all of 
these things I've discussed are all part of it. 
Now, constantly, every day, I had reams of phone calls from the Congress, from members of the House and Senate, and sometimes it was a hang-up on a constituent 
inquiry; maybe a department or agency was aggravating the member because he couldn't get a response, that sort thing. And we were quick to do that. Every cabinet member 
knew that Larry O'Brien calling him called for an immediate response. 
G: You were sort of an ombudsman for the Congress then in terms of [inaudible]. 
O: You did; that was part of it, too. And it was just a part of trying to be as alert as you could, and as communicative as you could with these people. And oftentimes the day 
would end and you hadn't completed your phone calls, but all of us on the staff, four or 
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five of us, would see to it that our phone lists were complete. And we knew that complete meant that that return call had been made, or attempted, even if it were six or seven or 
eight o'clock at night. No answer in the office, maybe you'd call the man's home. You tried to find some way of letting a man know that you did return his call, although you 
[had] missed each other, and not have that hang over. 
All of that was geared to the day, which was every day, that you were going to drop by offices. You'd walk in, and the staff would know who you were at least--you 
were from the White House. And the member would not be reluctant to see you, and in most instances, frankly, he would be pleased that you dropped by. Now, that drop-by may 
be at the time when you're trying to prevail upon the member to change his point of view and support you. People used to envision that that was some kind of a weapon that you 
could use or something, but it was human relations. And I'll tell you, out of every five occasions when we or any one of us would try to persuade a member to come aboard who 
was reluctant or a question mark or indeed, had indicated he was voting wrong as we saw it, I'd say four out of five times those efforts were personalized: "The President would 
appreciate it." And I remember [on] so many occasions, I'd say, "Gee, don't do this. The President's having a hell of a time as it is. You know it's tough up here." And very 
honestly, I think that was more effective than debating the substance. 
Now, they'd talk about constituents: "Well, I'd like to go along with you, but this is going to hurt me." We had the cardinal overriding rule: you never, never suggest 
remotely to a member that he should commit political hara-kiri to support the President. Understand, he was elected to office; none of us have been. There's only one guy 
downtown in that White House that was elected to anything and his name is Kennedy, and up there, there were five hundred and thirty-five people that have constituents and want to 
stay in office and you've got to be realistic, you've got to be understanding, and on the occasion when the fellow says sorry, but no, don't take it personally at all. There'll be 
another occasion when maybe it will be yes, or maybe, or I'll abstain, or I'll pair, or something. Somewhere along the line, if you stay with it, and you communicate and you 
get to know people more and more, there's going to be a greater tendency on the part of that individual to try to be helpful to you somewhere, somehow. As long as it isn't going 
to cause him great political harm, at least potentially. 
For example, foreign aid, which we will get to. Ultimately, and it took a long time to get into this, [we would] do an analysis of the expenditures of foreign aid money 
district by district. People disliked foreign aid but if you could point out to them over in Missouri that X number of dollars flowed into companies and to employees in Missouri of 
foreign aid money as part of that foreign aid budget, that could be helpful in suggesting to the members' constituents that it wasn't a giveaway program, that they got a piece of the 
action. 
Now, I don't know, but you kept trying to think of these things, to develop them. Then the most sensitive part of it, and that was the difficulty because you had to be so 
careful. When I started in the job, first of all, I didn't know Mr. Rayburn. I had to get to 
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know him somehow. I would see him at the leadership breakfasts, I understood that, but I had to be up there and I had to see if I couldn't be a fellow who could drop in with some 
regularity and have a nice pleasant visit. And that applied to the Speaker on down through the key people in the Congress, in the House and in the Senate. 
G: Was Rayburn approachable in that sense? Could you set up an appointment and just go and--? 
O: At the outset it wasn't easy. He didn't make it difficult, but it was something that took him out of his normal pattern; here was this guy from the White House, you know. So I made 
the point when I'd make an appointment in advance, and I'd get the appointment but when I went in, I would play it as low key as possible and elicit from Mr. Rayburn conversation 
about Sam Rayburn and his life and his background and his experiences. And over a period of time it got so that I would drop in regularly, the blinds would be drawn; his 
eyesight was obviously deteriorating. He was using the spittoon and hitting it remarkably well, and he would talk about the Texas Rangers and the porch on his house that he used 
for an office, and all of the years, and how he tries to tell these members that you get this publicity in Washington, you enjoy the Washington social life, but you won't be here long 
if you don't remember back home and pay attention to back home, and all of this. 
Well, that's going on. On the Senate side, Mike Mansfield is extremely supportive and without my effort said to me at the outset, "This back room in my office suite, this 
room is yours to come and go as you please and have any meetings you want to in here." 
G: So was that your base on the Hill then? I was going to ask you about that. 
O: Yes. 
G: Did you keep any staff there or did--? 
O: Oh, no, no. 
G: Did you requisition some of their staff? 
O: No, on the Senate side, let's talk about Mike's role. Hubert was the number-two fellow in the leadership, but Mike was--I don't know whether I'd call him reticent--not a gregarious 
guy, let's put it that way, but very interested in the President's program, and he had been a Lyndon Johnson supporter for the nomination. But he was a staunch, loyal, just 
completely committed and dedicated supporter of the New Frontier program and Kennedy. And it was nice to be able to come into the back door of that room, and I 
would go and have a cup of coffee with him during the course of the day. Mike Manatos had the daily contact responsibilities, but I would be in with him [Mansfield], and 
depending on what was going on at the moment, he would arrange to have somebody go out on the floor and call in the appropriate senators, whether it was Bob Kerr, Clint 
Anderson, or what have you, so we could talk about our interests in the legislation, maybe 
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O'Brien --Interview I --34 
talk about an amendment or whatever. And then he'd even have a group of senators come in at lunch from time to time, where he'd serve lunch and I'd sit there, and he'd say, "Okay, 
Larry, now you tell them your sad story," or "Go ahead." And I'd make my pitch. Now, my God, you know, that's of tremendous value. Well, in the course of this, and with 
Rayburn, it got so that I didn't make an appointment. I didn't have to. I would drop in, and I would say, "Is the Speaker in?" "Oh, wait a couple of minutes; he's got somebody in 
there. I'm sure he'll be glad to see you." So it became informal, dropping by. 
So then it got to the next stage. With John McCormack I had a personal problem, at least I envisioned it might be, because I had been a Young Turk back in Massachusetts 
in the Kennedy group that got into a big battle with the McCormack people over control of the party structure there. And being an arrogant young guy, as you're apt to be when 
you're young, I thought that those old geezers ought to be thrown out and we'd take over. And it became a real riot in Massachusetts, not to get into all of that. But that was in the 
background. So it was with a little trepidation that I would walk in to see John. Well, to the contrary, John couldn't have been more cooperative and pleasant and gave me advice 
right from the start. Carl Albert and Hale Boggs were tremendous guys, and Sam--you know, he was a little remote, but at least I had established some contact with him. And so 
had Henry Hall Wilson. 
In any event, you've got to take it to another stage, and that's where the sensitivity came in. It was unheard of, I'm sure unprecedented, to have a joint head count, [between 
the White House staff and the congressional leadership], House and Senate--to sit down, actually in a room on the Hill, compare notes on the members of the House and the 
members of the Senate, with the leadership of the House and Senate, the Democratic leadership, and work out a joint head count. Now you're getting perilously close to 
violating the separation of powers, and there was a little flak on the House side in that regard. Because as this moved along, Rayburn and McCormack would call in the regional 
whips, and then we'd go over the whole--well, you know, you might as well set up shop up on the Hill, you're just about at the verge of that. There was no outward indication of 
any disturbance about it, but, I can't remember who it was, finally I saw an item in a column one day that one of the whips had said that he had registered his objection to the 
Speaker or the leadership about the incursion of the White House--O'Brien and his people from the White House--who had moved into activities up there that he felt weren't 
appropriate or proper in terms of the separation of the Congress and the White House. But that blew over, and I never had it brought directly to my attention. 
So over a period of time and then through the Johnson period [there were] even more refinements, more activities, so that it was a totally accepted procedure. And it was 
unprecedented. It wasn't motivated by any great strokes of smartness or genius or anything else; it was purely trying to utilize what you had available to try to cope with 
your responsibilities to promote the President's program with the Congress. And how do you do it? You did it the best way you could and tried to personalize it in human terms. 
G: Tell me, what was the significance of the joint head count? Did that give you an added 
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O'Brien --Interview I --35 
leverage because of the dynamics between the two? How did that work? 
O: Well, it was a cross reference and double check, for one thing, because you get to John Smith and we'd say, "Our information on John Smith is that he's right." The regional whip 
or the leader would say, "I question that. What's your source?" And then you go into that: "Because I feel that he has not made up his mind, that he's a question mark." So you 
go over name after name, and then [when] you get to the end of it, you have the number of rights, the number of wrongs, and the number of question marks. Then you get to what 
are the possibilities, and you put together a possibility list. Then you determine whether one of the whips or somebody else should be contacting the member, or somebody from 
downtown ought to be contacting the member again, or jointly you should be contacting the member, or the member should be asked by Sam Rayburn, and later John McCormack, 
who vigorously got into all of this, to come into his office to have a personal chat and McCormack would, incidentally, take on a lot of this. He would bring them off the floor 
all day long one-by-one to try to see if he couldn't sell them. So you pooled your intelligence. 
Now, you had an outside part of the head count and that was the White House outside, not White House-Congress jointly outside. And that would be head counts that 
we'd engage in that we would bring into the White House Biemiller and others in the AFL-CIO, maybe depending on the circumstances the teachers' federations or whatever, 
unions of one sort, or people that are natural allies, or allies in this given instance. Then you would bring them in and you'd work the head count there. That head count would be 
utilized after you refined as best you could the joint head count on the Hill. 
G: I see. But in these joint head counts on the Hill, would you have the House leadership and the Senate leadership there together? 
O: No, no. 
G: Oh, by joint you mean joint White House and legislative [liaison staff], but you wouldn't combine the two legislative sides? 
O: No. On the Senate side, of course, it was always much simpler. You know, it's again the numbers. So we'd sit in Mansfield's office on the Senate side, and Bobby Baker, who was 
in a key position in those early days, would join in the head count. And Mike would call in probably the chairman of the appropriate committee, or others, whatever, and we'd 
work out the head count of the hundred. Now, you're working out a head count of four hundred and thirty-five over on the other side and it can be much more complex. 
On the Senate side, you could get to that bottom line pretty well with the contributions. Baker was very good, you know. He was very knowledgeable and he'd 
just be around the floor and then he'd check out the ten or eleven and just see what the feel was. We would be talking to them directly. We had occasions, as you know, in these 
legislative struggles, to deal with the Republican side of the aisle. Ev [Everett] Dirksen, 
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O'Brien --Interview I --36 
specifically, was dealt with with regularity. On the House side [we dealt with] Charlie Halleck, Gerry Ford, and a handful of others up there that were in key positions. At times 
you'd find a friendly member. [William] McCulloch was a stalwart in the whole civil rights struggle in the House Judiciary Committee, and he was the senior minority member of the 
committee. 
But you knew that you'd better not spin too many wheels. You knew that under normal circumstances the maximum number of Republicans that you could attempt to do 
business with in a New Frontier legislative proposal probably was limited to no more than thirty, and that was based on the districts they represented. And on the Senate side it 
wouldn't be any more than [a handful], if indeed it was a handful. [Jacob] Javits comes to my mind, because Javits was a New York congressman and therefore there'd be an 
inclination on the part of Javits--or John Lindsay when Javits was a New York senator or Lindsay a New York congressman. Now, Lindsay voted with us on some occasions 
because it was in his best interests to do that. 
(Interruption) 
It should be mentioned at this time that it might be well to consider the role of the Vice President in the legislative process, because apparently, and I never had direct 
knowledge of this but it was perceived by me, [he had some] sensitivity regarding the initial treatment he received in terms of his colleagues in the Senate and what his 
continuing role would be with them. I think that bothered him for a long time. I'll tell you that we never had a Senate head count in Mike Mansfield's office, or a substantive 
discussion with a senator or senators in Mike Mansfield's office, without requesting the presence of the Vice President, who was across the hall in his office. And the Vice 
President would come over and join us, because there'd generally be a group or something where we were sitting around a table. And he'd participate fully in all of the give and take, 
and the guessing games at times about attitudes, or the perception of why I thought [someone] might be for or against, and all the things that go into trying to develop a 
majority vote. 
But you have to remember, too, that in the Senate we had a much easier time. The Senate was strongly Democratic anyway, even though it had its composition of southern 
Democrats. The fact is that you had a pretty darned good shot at an up vote, a plus vote, most of the time in the Senate, if you put the work and effort into it. I'm not suggesting it 
was just a simple rollover, but it was just easier to handle, easier in the sense that the number of people you were dealing with, the Democratic-Republican breakdown in the 
Senate, and you had Mansfield and Humphrey in the leadership, both of them working arduously on behalf of the program. And the Vice President would participate in all these 
meetings, and his input was always sought and welcomed. But nevertheless, I was never quite sure--I never discussed it with the Vice President, or later President for that 
matter--but I always had the feeling that he was sensitive to what he perceived as somewhat of a change in the attitude of senators toward him, because he was no longer a 
member of the club. 
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O'Brien --Interview I --37 
G: Was he more tentative than he had been before, do you think? 
O: Seemed to be or--yes. And certainly I didn't see any indications of personal effort along the often-reported, traditional, Johnson nose-to-nose, chest-to-chest persuasion. He had 
stepped back from that. But he was ever present and involved and interested. It didn't even have to do with the Senate. I remember on one occasion, when it had to do with I 
think perhaps Medicare, and we had that long bout with Medicare that extended into the Johnson presidency. We had Kerr-Mills; we had Wilbur Mills' reluctance to go with our 
program; we had the terrific effort being made by the American Medical Association and others to block all this; we had in Kerr, obviously, on the Senate side a very strong 
member that wielded a lot of power. All of this added up to an effort that extended, as you know, over a long period of time before we began to approach a breakthrough. 
I remember, and I believe it was in that context, at some stage I was talking to the Vice President, and I may have suggested to him that perhaps he could talk to Wilbur 
Mills, or three or four members in the House. It might not even have been Medicare, but I think it involved three or four key members of the House on this particular issue. This 
was in the White House one day, and we had just left a meeting in the Cabinet Room and were standing in the hallway. And he said, "Well, sure, I'll be happy to. I'll get hold of 
them. But Larry, I just wonder about my influence on them. I just wonder about my impact. I'm not sure that it really may mean as much as you think," something like that, 
that indicated to me that that was a feeling he retained throughout. 
When I first took over the task, he contacted me and we visited, and he at that time said he was fully prepared and would have the time to do it and he was located up in 
the Senate, to be a total participant in the effort and that he fully intended to do that. Which was great. And he invited my wife and I out to his house one evening and we spent 
a long evening just chatting. And it was clear--this was early on--that he envisioned that he could make a continuing significant contribution to the movement of the New Frontier 
program in the Congress generally and in the Senate specifically. And he undertook that with these head counts and these meetings we'd have and these strategy sessions we'd 
have. But I don't think he felt, as time went on, as comfortable as he had envisioned in this activity, or that he was really making the impact he had hoped to make. 
G: Do you think it was a result of that caucus where it was [inaudible]? 
O: I think that was part of it. It had to be. I never, as I said, was intimate with what took place, I was just on the periphery of that activity. But it became widely known that there 
had been an impasse of sorts or a degree of conflict, or that Lyndon Johnson had been diplomatically advised that he was not going to be playing the role he envisioned. 
G: Do you think it had to do with his own disillusionment with the vice presidency in general and perhaps--? 
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O'Brien --Interview I --38 
O: No. I think that, no, it was more personal than that. It was that he was a member of the club for a long time, and somehow or other he was--what do they do with people on 
occasion? They become a member emeritus, sort of. You know, you're just not as intimate with us as you used to be; you can't be. You're in the executive branch of 
government, you know, therefore you can't be. 
This whole thing involved two very different human beings, Jack Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, during an eight-year span at different periods, having the same 
responsibility and the same goals, objectives, whether it was called the New Frontier or the Great Society. But [they were] very different kinds of people. 
Maybe I'm getting ahead of myself, but while I think of it, these meetings that I have described and these contacts that Jack Kennedy had, Jack Kennedy would not force 
the issue with a group of senators or congressmen or a mixed group in terms of securing their support. He would present his case, he would respond to questions, he'd engage in a 
vigorous exchange of views and all the rest, but he would stop short of sort of putting the finger on the fellow's chest and saying, "Are you with me? You've got to be with me," 
that sort of sales pitch. In that area, he didn't feel that degree of comfort or that "we're old buddies," you see. I mean, he knew them all, they all knew him, but he wasn't an intimate, 
really, of any of them in the final analysis. Maybe there were two or three congressmen or a couple of senators that he had close friendships with but it was there, he was the 
president of the United States and he had been junior among them, and it wasn't his nature, to use the vernacular, to put the arm on you directly, frontally. But he would 
vigorously present his views and his arguments. 
Now, Lyndon Johnson in the same set of circumstances, the same kind of a grouping or meeting, would make an effort, before that meeting ended, to really get a 
complete, total commitment from the individual or individuals within a group. It was a difference in approach. But you see, both men recognized that within the time limits 
imposed upon them as president, that it was of overriding importance to try to get their program enacted. Sure, you have foreign policy, you have crises, you have all the rest, but 
this is integral to the whole activity and integral to establishing a record and making progress. 
In both cases, with both men, I attended every cabinet meeting from day one with President Kennedy. The cabinet members sat at the cabinet table. Those of us [on the 
White House staff], the three or four or whatever it was that might be in there for a purpose as participants in the meeting, would sit along the wall. But the legislative 
program would be on the agenda every cabinet meeting, without fail. It would be on the formal agenda of the meeting. Therefore I would be a participant at that point in the 
meeting, in terms of discussing the progress, or lack of it, of the legislative program. When I became a member of the cabinet with President Johnson, it was a simple matter of 
moving from the wall to a seat at the table. But the item was still on the agenda--there was very little discussion of the Post Office Department in cabinet meetings--and when the 
item came up, I would handle the presentation. 
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O'Brien --Interview I --39 
There was another difference. I would report at the cabinet meeting as a noncabinet member, with President Kennedy, on progress or lack of progress. And 
Kennedy would allow comments [from] the appropriate members of the cabinet, naturally, as we discussed these matters. And that was it. With Lyndon Johnson, when my end of it 
would be completed, he would literally point the finger at the specific members of the cabinet, about lack of progress. And he would want to know, not from me, but from 
whoever it might be, why. And "When's the last time you saw the chairman of the committee?" "Have you been up on the Hill recently?" and, you know, all of that. That 
was another added dimension, just the approach to things of the two very different kinds of men. 
Furthermore, at the leadership breakfasts, while Kennedy was content to have the full discussion of the legislative program and have Mike Mansfield and the Speaker and 
McCormack and whoever, or Humphrey, report on what they anticipated and when a bill might come up and what the committee progress looked like and all the rest of it, and 
you'd have a full-blown discussion, Lyndon Johnson wasn't satisfied with that. So we developed flow charts, and at each leadership breakfast somebody on the staff would get 
up there in the dining room and put those flow charts up on easels, show what progress had been made since the prior week, listing the legislation, having a big circular thing with 
a dial on it or whatever. Then everybody would have to turn to the flow chart and stare at it while the President wouldn't only verbalize this, but he would actually specify 
percentages of progress to date in terms of the overall program, what percentage of bills were out of committee, what percentage of bills had passed either house, either body, and 
so forth. So that was an additional refinement, which is a reflection on the man's approach to things. 
G: How did the flow charts get started? 
O: I don't remember. I think I had the Defense Department--we got some department to make these flow charts. I really don't know. I think it was my reaction to President 
Johnson, frankly, that he would be so specific. The general discussion, fine. But then he'd be so specific that it might be better to have flow charts. Well, flow charts, the first time 
we ever put them in the leadership breakfast, [it] startled the devil out of the leaders. Because they looked, and you were coming perilously close to where some leader might 
say, "Hey, wait a minute, I really don't work for you." (Laughter) "You're asking me all these questions, the man needs to know why the color hasn't changed or--" 
G: That's incredible. 
O: But that, anyway, is part of the role of the Vice President, Lyndon Johnson, in the legislative process and I think his personal perception regarding it, and the approach of 
both Presidents to the legislative process. 
G: Fascinating. You mentioned that you went out to his house for dinner, and that you met 
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O'Brien --Interview I --40 
with him when you first got that job. What advice did he give you in terms of dealing with the Congress? 
O: I think he refrained from any specific advice. There were two other couples present. One was Bobby Baker and his wife, and I must say--it was a Texas congressman and his wife. 
Jack Brooks. I didn't think after twenty-five years I'd recall who was at dinner that night, but I think I have it right. 
The conversation after dinner really went along the lines of the struggle, the House situation, the Senate situation, the New Frontier program, the activities that we were 
jointly engaged in, and Bobby Baker's ability to contribute in terms of head counts and giving us counsel and up-to-date knowledge on what was transpiring. The Vice 
President--his office was up there and he was alert to everything and would continue to be, and the three of us would be in communication, along with Mike Mansfield, on a 
regular basis. And I don't recall that he ever said, "And here, A, B, C, D, is what you ought to contemplate doing." I think it was very general, but clearly, we're part of a very 
small team up in the Senate, the three of us along with Mike. 
G: You've mentioned that he did participate in those meetings, but do you think he was utilized as much as he should have been on the Hill? 
O: I don't know. I think he was kept advised of and privy to everything. He was kept abreast of what we might have determined was the current state of something, where the holes 
and the individual problems were, whether it was substantively with the legislation under consideration or with the member of the Senate or House that we were trying to persuade. 
He was privy to all of that. And I was not, frankly, other than I'll bet [on] a rare occasion--one I recall of asking him specifically--I didn't feel I was in a position to say to 
the Vice President of the United States, "Will you contact these five fellows?" On a couple of occasions it occurred, only in general conversation. My responsibility was to be 
sure that he was fully abreast of everything that was going on, and from that point on he would make his contribution to progress as he saw it. You know, you were not dealing 
around the table as with a cabinet member; you were dealing with the Vice President of the United States. Now, I would feel fairly comfortable--I would feel comfortable, I 
wouldn't say fairly--saying to John Gardner or Bob McNamara or anybody, "Here's what I think you ought to do, and you want to get back to that chairman and from what we've 
learned you've just got to--" you know, that kind of conversation, not arrogant or anything, but just sort of you're on an even keel, among equals, in a sense. But with the 
Vice President of the United States, it would not be seemly to say, "By the way, this is what I think you ought to do." He had all the facts, he had all the problems before him, he 
could make his own judgments on how he could be most effective. 
G: You've covered a lot of ground here, and I want to ask you to go back in some detail on some of the various facets of your congressional relations job. First of all, let's talk a little 
bit more about the Sequoia. I would like for you to describe, if you will, a trip on it. You mentioned some of the elements of it, but tell me how you would describe an evening. 
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O'Brien --Interview I --41 
What did it entail? 
O: Well, first of all, I'm not familiar with yachts, but the Sequoia to me was rather an impressive yacht, or boat or whatever you call it. I recognized it as a tool that was highly 
usable. By the same token, at least on the first few occasions, it was a pleasant experience. I think the crew was composed probably of about seven people. It would 
leave the dock promptly [at six o'clock], or as promptly as we could. Sometimes there was a delay of ten or fifteen minutes while one of our guests and his wife hadn't arrived, 
but we found that guests arrived promptly as a rule. It would be very unusual for it to have any undue delay. There was never a declination of an invitation that I can recall on 
it. Maybe a fellow had a conflict on a date and asked to be considered the next time out, but I don't recall anyone saying, "Oh, that's nice, but I'm not interested." This had not 
been a boat that members of Congress were used to being aboard. 
The trip was carefully structured so that six o'clock was an appropriate departure time because an hour out you would probably be at the point where you would give a 
signal to start serving food. An hour and a half out, you were at Mount Vernon where this little recorded ceremony would take place with the flags flying, and [then] the boat 
would turn around. 
The first hour, generally, was sitting around, roaming around, just small talk, and everyone with a drink of one sort or another. Occasionally we'd bring an accordion player 
aboard, so you might have a sing-along, depending on the nature of the group as you got a feel for them. And sometimes yes, sometimes no, maybe it was just the accordion player, 
or maybe you decided to tell the accordion player to take a long break because it wasn't that kind of a group. 
But you tried to make everybody comfortable; it was a very pleasant boat to be on. It was roomy, and it had the two decks. Along about the end of the first hour, you had 
figured who you would like to chat with for a few minutes, to get things rolling. And you would make that effort. My wife would be visiting with the ladies, and I'd make the effort 
to have three or four individual or two or three-member group conversations to start to get the ball rolling on whatever I felt the subject or subjects should be. We would then try 
to build on that by enlisting more discussions or conversations which might wind up with six or eight members at the prow or somewhere having a chat. But not heavy, not heavy. 
I didn't envision one of those trips as a trip where I did a head count, that hopefully positions would be altered from what I perceived to be the positions of the various people 
on that boat before the trip started. I wanted to leave a good feeling. The follow-up would be with them in their office or elsewhere, so it was a trip not where any member 
would leave and say, "Gee, that damned trip, that O'Brien or some staff guy just was a pain in the neck." 
G: You didn't try to exact a commitment out of them? 
O: No, nothing like that. 
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O'Brien --Interview I --42 
G: Okay. 
O: We'd talk about current events, current activities. You might switch it to baseball, and you might talk about any subject. And there'd be a little music playing, and then we had 
these little tables they could put up around. I think we could accommodate, for a buffet dinner, somewhere around thirty-four to thirty-six people fairly comfortably in the various 
parts of the boat. 
Then after dinner, the last hour of the trip, you'd probably stay pretty much social, because then there was a blending of the members and their wives, all sort of mixed 
together in what was truly a social occasion. Very light touch. Really what you were building was if the member enjoyed the trip, that was going to make it, hopefully, a little 
easier to talk to him about substance in a week or two. It was all just part of the "let's maintain contact" activity. 
Now, there would be times, however, as the boat approached the nine o'clock docking, where the conversations had taken a turn that I felt we ought to pursue it for 
another fifteen minutes or half-hour, at which time I would tell the captain not to dock. No one knew the difference. We'd just float out there and maybe dock at nine-thirty. The 
Captain would wait for my signal. 
Tape 3 of 5, Side 1 
G: Did the congressman ever ask to have important constituents included or was it strictly a--? 
O: No. No, I don't recall that ever occurring. I think it was a recognition that it could be only a small group. It is sort of a White House invitation. I think there were a few 
occasions when a congressman would say, "Can I bring my daughter? My wife is back home," or something like that, but not to extend it beyond their own invitation. 
G: How about important supporters of the President, say, members of the President's Club or something like this? 
O: None. 
G: It was strictly congressional, or legislative? 
O: Yes. Yes. 
G: I see. 
O: I never contemplated extending it because--maybe I was wrong, I don't know--it seemed to me, first of all, this was government property. I'm sure that we on the staff never 
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O'Brien --Interview I --43 
considered bringing anybody but the members of Congress aboard. 
G: In your own mind, as you look back over that span of years, can you recall specific occasions where you think that ride on the Sequoia might have made a member more 
favorably disposed toward a bill? 
O: I'm afraid I can't. I'll tell you what we derived from this, too, perhaps, that was very helpful, was discussion with a senator or congressman involved by committee assignment 
in the same legislative struggle. And to have exchanges of views, senator and congressman, relating to the Senate or the House, or their individual perceptions of the 
Senate or the House, or a senator's perception of the House or vice versa, while you listened in on it, was helpful. I think, frankly, conversations took place on that boat 
between houses in terms of those members that otherwise probably never would have taken place, and maybe understandings, not formal understandings, but better 
understanding of the relative views occurred. Now, that could have occurred up in the hallway on any given day, but many of these members, interestingly enough--it was like 
the media and the members at those brunches--the sort of void between the two bodies in terms of regular communication was interesting to me. Because you would have, once 
you got the discussions going, exchanges of views that clearly, as I recall them, were evidence that they hadn't discussed this before somehow, or they hadn't really had any 
in-depth discussion, if in-depth meant five or ten minutes on a boat. 
G: Was it an educational process for you yourself, finding out--? 
O: Yes. Oh, I think I got a feel of--as I say, no one was ever solicited to make a commitment on the boat. But I must say that there were nights that I left the Sequoia having probably 
a little different view of a member's attitude toward something than I otherwise would have had or that I previously had, that I didn't have it figured right. 
G: Were there ever any problems, either mechanical problems--I mean, did the boat ever break down or did you ever run aground or did you ever have problems with people 
getting sick or anything like that? 
O: No. None of those problems that I can recall. Nor did I ever have an occasion, with all of that activity, where you might have had a problem of having somebody leave the boat in 
some disrepair. (Laughter) 
G: Prematurely either. Well, now LBJ used it quite a bit, particularly toward the end of his presidency. 
O: Yes. 
G: Were you still able to use it as frequently under Johnson? 
O: Yes, I think that under Johnson, as time went on, there probably wasn't as frequent use--I 
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O'Brien --Interview I --44 
don't have any copies of logs or anything--for a couple of reasons: one, he used it more often than Kennedy. Kennedy, incidentally, would use the smaller boat quite often. 
Secondly, the Great Society program was going like gangbusters and a great deal of your time and attention was devoted to the flow. It was moving so rapidly that it wasn't so 
much solicitation but working on the mechanics of getting committee activities through, and there was a great willingness to enact the program and a great effort expended. And 
we had some elbow room, to use a phrase, in the House after the 1964 election that afforded us some degree of comfort. It certainly didn't relax us but, my gosh, at least you 
had a reasonable break there in that tenuous situation that occurred on every major roll call during the early years. 
G: Let me ask you about another form of transportation, and that's travel on Air Force One and use of presidential jets. Did you utilize this as a way to have contact with 
congressmen and senators, to get credit--? 
O: More apt to use it as a way of recognizing them. Let's cite an example. If you're going to use Air Force One and you're going to Illinois, in the course of the day, on the ground 
you're going to be in two or three congressional districts and probably two or three nearby congressional districts and you have two senators. You're apt to just focus on that. The 
accompanying legislative party would be the people that appropriately represent the areas, the state or locality that you're going to. There probably were occasions when you--well, 
for example, if you were going to view a military display, a carrier, I remember an occasion like that, or going to a dedication of a major dam or waterway of some sort, in 
addition to the obvious members that would be involved, if it were on the carrier you're really then focusing on committees. If it were with Wilbur Mills and [John] McClellan and 
those people in Arkansas to dedicate a public works project, included also would be appropriate members, bipartisanly, of the committees that were involved in the 
consideration and ultimate enactment of the legislation that brought about the project. It was a very sensitive area, and you wanted to be very, very careful to not make a mistake. 
G: How could you do that? 
O: Well, that you didn't overlook some fellow that rightly belonged--and you know, it was brought to my attention in a little conversation I had with an old friend that I visited the 
couple of days I spent in Washington a few weeks ago, Jake Pickle. It's interesting, because with all of our effort to do things right and cover every base and ensure that 
proper recognition was forthcoming at all times, Jake started to chat with me about my time as postmaster general. I was sworn in as postmaster general in a little town called 
Hye, Texas, near the [LBJ] Ranch. And Jake went over to his desk--we were sitting near it--and he had this pretty, nicely-bound book, which was really a little thumbnail history of 
every post office in this district that for some purpose at one time he had distributed. And on the cover is a picture of my swearing in, because it was [in his district]. 
We were sitting around and talking about how that was typical of Lyndon, you know, that he'd think of going to Hye, Texas. And I got into reminiscing with Jake about 
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Lyndon telling me about--the name eludes me at the moment [Levi Deike]--the postmaster in this little combination grocery store and post office in Hye, Texas, how this fellow was 
one of nine brothers and they had a baseball team and Lyndon as a young fellow was on a baseball team that played their team and they were competitors, and how finally then, I 
assume, Congressman Johnson probably had an opportunity to name a postmaster in Hye, Texas and how he named this fellow postmaster, and here he is, he's still there. This was a 
place where he mailed his first letter, and he used to love to come in as a young fellow when this fellow had this barrel cheese and you'd take this knife or scoop and take a piece 
of cheese and how he was looking forward now to going through this as part of the little ceremony, that out on the porch I'm going to be sworn in and the press, they were already 
out there. It was all lovely. 
This was going on in the motorcade getting to Hye, Texas, to the post office. So I was sitting with the President in his car, and we get out, and there's the postmaster 
standing on the porch along with the group to greet him. So the first thing, Johnson introduced me to him. He said, "Here's your new boss," you know, typical of the way the 
President would [talk]. He said, "Now, tell him who made you postmaster here." And the fellow said, "Jim Farley." 
(Laughter) 
It was unbelievable. You could not have written a script. (Laughter) The President looked at him, he said, "Well, it was great seeing you. Well now, let's go in and 
get some of that good cheese." There wasn't any good cheese in there; there was all that packaged [cheese]. (Laughter) And the President's trying to open up a package. Well, 
anyway, Jake and I were going through this, chuckling away. 
Jake says, "Look at that picture again." [Homer] Thornberry had been the judge by then, I guess, that swore me in, and there's various people in the picture. No Jake 
Pickle. Well, I don't think I ever knew or it ever penetrated with me. Jake said, "I was never so mad in my life. I wasn't invited! And it's in my congressional district!" And he 
said, "I got the word to him. He called me for two weeks; I wouldn't take his phone calls. I finally got over it, but I was bitter. That guy there was in the middle of my district. It 
was one of the biggest things that's ever happened in that area. You're swearing in a cabinet member. He's the president of the United States and, Christ, you don't invite the 
congressman!" And I thought to myself, boy, no matter how much effort you make, as we're talking about Air Force One and the Sequoia and trying to keep all of this in some 
degree of balance and trying to avoid or at least minimize the number of mistakes you make or the number of hurt feelings that you create and all the rest of it, obviously you 
don't get it all done by any means, but you try mightily to do it. 
But there was a great overriding sensitivity, and logically so, rightly so, to this whole area of recognition on the part of the White House. It was overriding. Talk about 
utilization, what did we have to utilize? The advance notices I've talked about and all the other things. And you keep looking for other ways of having this continuity of contact, 
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O'Brien --Interview I --46 
this little bit of service that can be rendered. 
And we went to the White House tours. I remember it because there was a Republican holdover that was the tour director or something, and he was the brother of a 
famous general who was the military aide to Eisenhower. I forget his name now, a nice man. And somebody said, "Gee, you ought to throw him out." We hesitated to do that 
and didn't do that. He had been around there for years and it was sort of a career for him, so we put another fellow in with him, a friend, so that we would be sure that everything 
went right. And you know, it was an important matter for a member of Congress that he would have a group coming in or individuals that were very important in his district or 
state, and one of the things they liked to do while they're in Washington is visit the White House. They had an alternative: they could get in a long line that went for blocks and 
visit the White House, or you could have the VIP tour, which was a tour that was not a formalized thing but could be arranged in the morning. Well, we were very sensitive to 
that, very attentive to it, and God knows how many VIP tours we put together, groups from two to fifty. That was very important. If a congressman or senator couldn't get 
these important constituents, and I never knew of an occasion where they overdid it, say, "Well, I've got seven hundred people," that sort of thing. These were people that really 
were important to him politically, and he'd be careful because that was all logged, that was part of our record on contact with them. But we found that was very important. Now, 
that's a minuscule, minor thing in a sense, isn't it? But for that fellow to say to Jack Smith and his wife and their friends or whatever, "I've arranged something for you that nobody 
else has." 
So there again, we had no hesitancy, very frankly, when the fellow who was not supportive at all called for a VIP tour, to tell him sorry, but we don't have the space that 
morning. 
G: Was there a genuine space problem with those tours? 
O: No. 
G: You didn't have a scheduling problem at all? 
O: No. 
G: Even at a late date you could squeeze somebody in if you--? 
O: Always arranged to do it. Now, another aspect of it, too, what else is there? There are also invitations to the White House dinners and important functions. 
G: Were these to congressmen themselves rather than to their constituents? 
O: Well, yes. I didn't get into that. I would get slightly into the big contributor list because I had a knowledge of it from my--
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O'Brien --Interview I --47 
G: The campaign? 
O: The campaign. But really what would happen over at the other wing was there would be an allocation, not just hard-bitten, but [from] Bess Abell and the people that were working 
on this. I would submit a list of a dozen, or a list of eight or ten, to these functions. No, we were allowed to fit in some--say, what would the accommodation be, seventy couples, 
a hundred and forty people, whatever those functions are--ten or twelve of our folks there. 
G: Did this element of congressional liaison, the White House dinners, change from Kennedy to Johnson? 
O: I don't recall it did. 
G: Let me ask you again about travel. How about the use of the smaller planes, the Jetstars? Did congressmen and senators want to be able to use those for travel and [inaudible]? 
O: Yes. There was travel. That was handled really on the Hill. 
G: Really? 
O: Yes. They would go to the leadership and the leadership would make the request of the Defense Department. There were occasions, I suppose, when we were involved, but 
normally these were--we had an example that was highly publicized recently, didn't we, of a fellow going to South America or somewhere, and it turned out he was the only member 
on the plane and the Speaker had submitted the request and listed half a dozen members. I don't know. 
G: Did you ever use air transportation to get members back for a vote where you really needed them to be there? 
O: Yes. 
G: Can you describe any of these? 
O: I don't remember the specific votes. It was more apt that we did it. No question about it. I can't with specificity detail times it occurred, because what strikes me the minute you 
asked me that was a sort of an en masse return, crisis returns, where members might have been back home or there was a break in the sessions. I think the Cuban missile crisis is an 
example where we had to just fan out planes across the country to get the appropriate members bipartisanly back for briefings. But there were times when we quietly got plane 
transportation from an air base or something for a fellow to get back to vote. 
G: Would that generally go through your office or would that go through--? 
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O'Brien --Interview I --48 
O: Well, yes, that would, or through Mike Mansfield because we would note that, "Well, gee, this fellow can't make it. He's got a speaking engagement. If we could only figure out 
some way on transportation we could get him back in time for the vote. Otherwise commercially he can't." That sort of [thing]. It was rare, but there were times. 
G: Now, you had, in addition, Camp David and I guess later the LBJ Ranch, earlier Hyannis Port and maybe the Florida [compound at] Palm Beach. Did President Kennedy and 
President Johnson use these other residences to entertain congressmen and senators, to lobby them? 
O: No. No. 
G: Did you ever use Camp David for that purpose? 
O: No. I went to Camp David because we were authorized to use it, so I was there a number of times, but never with any members of Congress. No. The homes or residences of the 
presidents were never taken into account. If President Johnson had members of Congress down to the Ranch that was his own doing and for his own reasons and purpose. It had 
nothing to do with me at all. 
G: But did you see him using this as a lobbying device? 
O: No, I don't think so. I doubt it. I can remember being down there on a couple of occasions at the Ranch. There might have been a couple of old Senate friends there or 
something. I don't think that--if he did, I wasn't aware of it. 
G: Another element--of course, there are all kinds of appointments, but I'm thinking particularly here of administrative appointments to regulatory agencies. For example, 
some have suggested that this was a way to get Dirksen's cooperation so often; if you would give him a certain percentage of minority appointments to the federal regulatory 
commissions that he would play ball more. 
O: Well, if that actually took place, it took place between Dirksen and the President. 
G: Really? 
O: Yes. I would relay to the President requests of that nature. It would be a judgment that would be made solely by him. If you were at a level of appointment that was presidential 
and, again, at a high enough level that invariably you had recommendations, suggestions, from various sources, and if President Johnson had a particular arrangement with Ev 
Dirksen, I was not involved in it. Where we were engaged was [in appointments in the departments], but we gave up the process after a while and I notice each president and 
their staff seems to reach [that stage]. In the early Kennedy days we would [have], as I told you, these initial meetings with the cabinet members where it was made clear to them 
that all appointments at the top probably four levels or five levels emanated from the 
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O'Brien --Interview I --49 
White House. That was all fine and that was all understood, but in no time at all you had a significant stack of folders of open appointments. We then would have a weekly 
meeting in my office that would include Ralph Dungan, Ken O'Donnell, Dick Maguire and me. I think there were four of us, but definitely Dungan and O'Donnell. And we'd take it 
on a case-by-case basis, each opening. Well, heck, our idea was to get rid of everybody that we felt didn't belong, and that would get you to a fifth level a lot of times. They were 
all schedule "C" appointments or presidential appointments, and we insisted up front, as I suspect probably every administration does and some undoubtedly have been more 
successful than I think we were, that there were two motivations. One, obviously, was these were significant patronage appointments. And secondly, we were intent that we 
were going to have our own team across government. 
Well, invariably in those folders there would be a folder, assistant secretary of commerce or even below that, whatever the title is, in commerce. And you'd have letters 
of recommendation along with outside letters of recommendation or political considerations, recommendations from members of Congress for constituent appointment. 
And you'd make an ultimate determination. You'd weigh it politically and certainly you'd weigh it in terms of competency and qualification, and that was first. Then if you got to 
that and say, well, this fellow is qualified; he'd stand the test, then you'd go to those who were supporting him, sometimes no one, if he was a thought of our own. And I'll have to 
tell you that we probably engaged in that for a number of months and [on] rather a formal basis, a weekly meeting, Friday afternoon. Hopefully we'd have a little spare time we 
could put to this. And if you had thirty or forty folders, the meeting would terminate and you still had twenty-eight folders, because you just didn't have all the necessary 
information and elements in place to make a judgment. And if it was a presidential appointment, it was going to be referred to the Oval Office, and if there was some political 
gain out of it, that obviously would have to be carefully structured. 
Also, you had the unfortunate aspect of all of this that if you were going to make a decision and it had a political element in it, there were probably four or five people, or 
maybe eight or ten people who were going to be grievously disappointed. That also had to be considered in the political context. What we tried to work out oftentimes was--if 
not top or even top three level of presidential appointments but a lot of these appointments or openings were involved--that if it was a disappointment to someone, John 
Bailey, who was national chairman of the Democratic Party, would notify the person that we're sorry but it didn't work out. If it was the favorable side of it, obviously depending 
on the importance of it, the President would notify the fellow directly or we would notify the member on behalf of the President. Then sometimes it was somewhat routine. 
All of that, in terms of its impact, very honestly, on the legislative program, in my judgment after my experience, is minimal. I think it's grossly exaggerated. It may be 
because of the way we went about it, but I can tell you that we drifted away from it. I can't honestly tell you today whether that process with that little committee--probably 
self-anointed, I don't know--terminated in any formalized sense. I think we just got sick of it. You had other things to do and you weren't accomplishing much. From Friday to 
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Friday there was no real input, and really what it came to is making sure you didn't cause some political problems if they could be avoided. 
It all added up to--there were two things happened. For example, the experience I had one time. We were not satisfied with what we perceived the degree of cooperation to 
be in the Defense Department. And it went to a level that was important to us, but yet it wasn't overriding. This wasn't the President and Bob McNamara. But I talked to the 
President about it and decided that while McNamara--[ where] this activity would come directly to his attention, it worked smoothly. And McNamara in no way was trying to put 
people in place over there that rightly should be decided by the White House. But perhaps in the branches it wasn't quite that well understood. 
So it was decided I would call the three secretaries in individually--air force, navy and army--and I did. And one was John Connally--there was no better pro around. I had 
John in. John said, "If you ever run into a problem involving my outfit, just get to me directly because I won't tolerate [it]. I know this has got to be done professionally." 
Great. We talked about other things. 
My recollection is the army and air force secretaries needed a little advice. It was just a matter of saying, "Hey, fellows, keep an eye on things." But one of them gave me a 
lecture--he was our appointee--to the effect that I had to recognize, and, consequently, the President would have to recognize that his outfit is in place today, had been in place for 
years, and will be there long after we're gone. And that he wasn't about to be involved in any activities that could be construed as politics. I told him I appreciated his views and we 
said goodbye and I reported to the President. He wasn't there long. 
Now that sounds harsh and very political. It was very political, but not harsh. Because what happens is a president, a new administration, never gets a handle on the 
bureaucracy. That fellow in a sense was right; he applied it to his own department. But that is an attitude throughout the bureaucracy. "Listen, Ike Eisenhower is over there, 
Richard Nixon is there, Gerry Ford is there, Jimmy Carter is there, Lyndon Johnson is there, Jack Kennedy is there, I'm still here and I've got certain rights and I don't have to 
implement the policies of the current administration. I was here before they came and I'll be here after they're gone. I'm not in the political arena; I'm a public servant." 
You recognize, at the outset, the overriding importance that your policies and views be the views and policies of the entire executive branch of government. It's got to 
be one policy, and there's one boss, there's one leader, and he's been elected by the people. And you must be sure to dismiss where necessary, make adjustments where necessary, 
and make replacements appropriately. So there's a bit of political involvement, too, because you're going to be recognizing people that you feel you owe something to. In 
some instances you're not. But, overridingly, you want those people in every department and agency at top levels that have any meaningful decision-making to be in tune with the 
president and the White House. And I'm here to tell you that every administration has approached it in this manner. In all candor, some of it has to do with patronage, where 
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O'Brien --Interview I --51 
you have all these nice jobs and, after all, they belong to you, or your people ought to be in them. But set that aside. Overridingly, how can you function if you don't have 
enthusiastic support for your leadership across the executive branch? And you're never going to accomplish it. 
I haven't had a conversation like this with people in other administrations that might have been in comparable positions. Indeed, obviously, I haven't had such a 
conversation with any former presidents. But my guess is that every new administration entering the White House has that in mind and feels it's a top priority--a first order of 
business and assumes that it can be done, in an orderly fashion, rather quickly--to have your whole team, at all the appropriate levels, in place across the board. Then after a few 
months, either you have a small army that does nothing else but monitor that activity, or it slips away and you go on about your business, your paramount assignment. 
Now I'll guess again. My guess is that the Reagan Administration has been more effective in accomplishing this than perhaps any administration in my time. And I say that 
because I have the feeling that there is an assigned group, clandestine if you will, that focuses solely on that aspect of government and that they have done it in a very systematic 
and professional manner. That's my guess. But I'm equally sure that short of that, having people--intimate staff, people close to you, a president--undertake this effort is doomed to 
fail. Maybe no harm has really been done, but it is not going to succeed as you envisioned it. 
G: Let me ask you about the congressional liaison representatives from the departments. Did you select those people or were they people selected by the cabinet officers? 
O: As we initiated this and I mentioned these approximately forty people across government that I considered part of our liaison process, I would say the vast majority of them were 
already in place and had been selected by the cabinet member with our approval. They would generally be at the assistant secretary level. Our concern, very frankly, was to 
upgrade their position in the table of organization because I was taken aback when we finally got to who they were and where they were in the table of organization, how closely 
they related and worked with the department head, and what their depth of competency was and all the rest. I found--and this was historic--that in some cases they were relatively 
low-level people that had little or no contact with the department head. Some worked under some assistant secretary and really didn't have the close, ongoing relationship that 
we felt was essential, because of our perception of the role of the cabinet member in the legislative process. And we were successful in a number of instances in upgrading to a 
higher level. But it was a problem. But as time went on and replacements occurred over the eight-year period, the level was raised in most instances and the quality was raised, 
because it had been built into the system by then. And you can't be a cabinet member trying to account for what hasn't gone right and go back to your office and say, "Gee, 
what's the name of the fellow that's the congressional relations guy here?" You'd better by that time have had enough sense to say, "Boy, I've upgraded and have the best man 
available and he lives with me!" 
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G: Was there a problem of getting these people to reflect the White House view as well as the view of their particular department? 
O: Not really, because the White House staff, as small as it was, was involved directly with them. Say you had a farm bill and Orville Freeman is working arduously with his people 
to promote that farm bill, and it's difficult. Orville knew that we not only shared his concern, we were direct participants. We were working together; we were head counting 
and they were working with us each step of the way--subcommittee, committee, to the floor. We were intimately involved at each step. We would expect, therefore, that Orville 
and his people, when the time came and it was the foreign aid bill or minimum wage or whatever, would respond because of their close relationship with members of the 
Congress who were on the Agriculture Committee and would pitch in with us in an across-the-board effort to promote that legislation. So Orville Freeman and the others 
knew that the President was totally alert to progress or lack of it, that there was a full commitment--it was part of the Great Society program or the New Frontier program. But 
beyond that, he could look for help wherever it could be found from other departments and agencies who recognized they had a responsibility to Orville. He in turn would be 
helpful, when his time came, with the members of the Congress that he had an intimate relationship with. So you tried not to overlook any possibility of contact, any possibility 
of an inch gained in getting that vote. 
Therefore, I don't think at any time that we could quarrel about the attitude of the team. For example, when I sat in the White House and spent three or four hours every 
week or two with the forty people and the White House staff, I'd conduct the meeting and we'd review every major legislative item. Now, everybody is involved in the effort. 
They're all listening; they're all part of it, they're all taking notes. So when it got to agriculture, for example, I would say, "Okay, let's get on to this," and everyone knew that 
whatever contribution they could make to the overall effort was not only expected, it was demanded. 
G: Let's get back to the congressional side of the appointment process. I just assumed that congressmen and senators were much more interested in judgeships than they were other 
types of appointments. Is this correct? 
O: That was very important and a lot of judgeships came about during those years. There were increases in the number of judgeships, along with the normal attrition. 
G: Sure. Well, you had fifty new judgeships here in 1961, so. . . . 
O: Yes. There would be the political input, and my role would be to make known congressional interest as it was brought to my attention. The ultimate discussions 
regarding that would be between Bobby and the President. They would have a full awareness of the political repercussions. 
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G: Did congressmen or senators ever withhold a needed vote on something or bottle up a bill until they got some sort of guarantee that their man would be appointed? 
O: I can't recall a specific instance; it might have occurred. Regarding judgeships, it might have occurred. Those were important appointments. 
Tape 3 of 5, Side 2 
O: --a humorous aspect to it. There was a congressman named Mike Kirwan in the House that was a very interesting fellow--had an interesting background. He had the seniority to 
be chairman of a subcommittee of Appropriations. He had a favorite phrase: "You get the point I mean?" That was repeated often by Mike, who I thought the world of, got 
along very well with. But Mike had one hang-up in life; he wanted to build an aquarium in Washington. I never knew and I don't know to this day just what motivated him--whether 
he was just a lover of fish or what. 
Senator Wayne Morse made a speech out in Oregon, talking about public works projects of much significance to the state of Oregon that were in progress through the 
Congress. For some reason he chose to mention Mike Kirwan and his aquarium and how ridiculous it was. Well, somebody took the occasion to call it to Mike's attention that he 
had been ridiculed by Wayne Morse publicly and Mike Kirwan immediately took steps to block about three, as I recall it, significant Oregon projects in this committee. Wayne 
Morse had learned of that and became hysterical. We were depending on Wayne Morse in the area of education and he was most important at that time. 
Well, Wayne tried to apologize to Mike. It meant nothing and, knowing Mike as I did, I knew that once he established his position, you had a case on your hands. Wayne 
Morse brought his problem to our attention and placed it on the President's desk. So we had to get to Mike, and the President agreed to sign the bill establishing an aquarium that 
Mike would get passed. Well, you can well imagine the President. He couldn't think of one reason in the world to sign a bill of that nature, but he did come up with the one 
reason. We assured Mike that he had our full cooperation on the aquarium. 
Mike, in turn, after some more considerable thought--he left Wayne Morse hang around for quite a while--allowed as though he was going to release his hold, which he 
did, on the projects. Then the aquarium bill came down and I called Mike and said, "I'm pleased to tell you, Mike, as we discussed many times, the President is signing your 
aquarium bill." I thought it would be a simple thank you, "thanks for letting me know," but no, Mike said, "When is he going to sign the aquarium bill?" I said, "Well, I'll have to 
check," because that wouldn't call for a signing ceremony. He said, "I want to be there." 
So we established the time for the President to sign the aquarium bill. Mike was there to look over his shoulder to ensure that he signed it and have a picture taken by the 
White House photographer. We did avoid a public display, however, but that resolved Wayne Morse's problem and resolved a problem placed on our desk. Of course, the 
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aquarium never was built. I cite this because it involved two very interesting and unusual characters, Wayne Morse and Mike Kirwan. 
But it's amazing what you could run into. I don't know about somebody saying, "I refuse to vote for this unless my man is appointed judge." I would think in most instances 
his man, if he met the qualifications of the bar association and was truly qualified, the appointment went forward. 
We had this foreign aid struggle, which was apparently a struggle that every president had engaged in from the time Congressman Otto Passman had control of the 
foreign aid bill. We ran into trouble, all kinds of trouble with Passman, and we found we ran into trouble with a fellow by the name of [D. B.] Saund, who was a congressman from 
California. That trouble arose because a VA hospital in his district was among those on a list to be closed, and rightly so. In fact, it was a fire hazard. But Saund was totally upset. 
He made it loud and clear that he'd do everything he could to oppose the legislation. We didn't have much of an alternative but to ride it out, but there was just an interesting little 
side bar to it. Saund had sent us a large, beautifully framed photograph that had been taken of the President and his grandson, I believe, for a presidential autograph, and it came 
to me. So Phyllis hid the photograph and Saund started to inquire about it. And we played out the string with Saund about "we'll look it up," and "sorry for the delay," and 
this went on and on and on and the photograph wasn't forthcoming. Saund became very disturbed but it wasn't really doing much for us. It was Phyllis' idea and I played along 
with it. Finally we released the photograph, but we let Saund stay upset for two or three months. It gave us maybe a little bit of personal satisfaction, but it wasn't a significant 
contribution to altering the situation. 
I'm trying to think back, but it would be pretty blatant and you might have your suspicions regarding a fellow's position on a legislative proposal. You might feel that 
perhaps he would foot-drag or maybe we'd have a problem with him because he wasn't going to get what he wanted, whether it was a project or an appointment. But, frankly, I 
don't remember an incident. Whenever it was reasonable and feasible, you'd accommodate a member. 
G: With the southerners on the Judiciary Committee in the Senate, did you have trouble getting liberal judges and black judges cleared? 
O: Yes, to some extent. Again, I can't be specific. I wish I could go back into the files that might reveal some of this, but it was difficult because we often compromised. We often 
felt that we would have much preferred to have a more liberal appointee or a black appointee, and there were times when we were stymied. More and more, as time went on, 
there was stronger inclination on the part of the southerners to go in our direction. So to some extent, belatedly perhaps, too slowly, it came about, and to some extent at least it 
adjusted itself. 
Again, I don't know of a situation when an appointment or a project became such a 
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direct confrontation that you totally capitulated to avoid the loss of a meaningful bill. I don't know of one that ever occurred in that context. Now, there may have been nuances 
of that, but it would not be good sense or good judgment really on the part of a congressman or a senator to take a stand that might become public on something like that. 
See, he'd have to be very, very careful to avoid that, and there's always tomorrow. What I found, even in despair or disappointment was that a member had the capacity to 
recognize there's always tomorrow. It is quite a decision to make on the part of a member of Congress to cut his ties, no matter how tenuous he might feel they are at the moment, 
or how disappointed he might be. It is, first of all, extremely poor judgment. Secondly, it makes no political sense, and thirdly, you have to assume he is reasonably realistic as he is 
a political animal. Consequently, that White House remains awesome at all times, and there is always tomorrow. You don't want to be in a position where you can't pick up that 
phone. 
G: Well, did you have a formula for naming Republican members of boards that required a certain split in Democrats and Republicans? 
O: Yes, we always looked for friendly Republicans or nonaligned. 
G: Did you? 
O: Yes. Where the law compels you to have a political balance on a board or commission, obviously you sought--G: 
Well, you had some Republicans in the cabinet, too. 
O: Sure. 
G: Okay. What about the problem of closing military installations and VA hospitals? You mentioned the one example. Was there a legislative relations element here? Did you have 
any flexibility, first of all? Could you leave something open--? 
O: We did, but you tried to move forward in those areas with some hope of some degree of success. Perhaps it would be piecemeal. But projects to a great extent are beyond the 
control of a president; they are often negotiated on the Hill. Until there is such a thing as an item veto, it will always be thus. The Christmas tree at the end of each session will be 
appropriately decorated. I sound like a cynic and I am in that regard. Unfortunately, I don't see an answer to all of that. I share Reagan's view regarding item vetoes. I think it's 
senseless the way this process is conducted. VA hospitals, I guess, are a good example. In the normal course of things, VA hospitals in some instances became archaic. They 
were underused. So were air bases, et cetera, and certainly I would never suggest that the maximum effort not be made to act in those areas. 
But I remember one situation during the President Johnson period. I paid my usual visit to Mike Mansfield one morning for a cup of coffee. Mike was a pipe smoker, 
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and he clenched the pipe in his teeth. I didn't discern at first blush that Mike seemed to be even more reticent than was normally the case. We had become very close friends and had 
a very pleasant relationship. I went into the inner room and his fellow poured the coffee, and Mike said, "Okay," gritting his teeth, "explain it to me." It was my good luck I didn't 
know what he was talking about, and I didn't. One thing led to another. He said, "The closing of that hospital." I still was at a loss. And the conversation went on. 
It turned out that Ramsey Clark, who was on the White House staff at some point, had been designated by President Johnson to look into waste, and Ramsey had come up 
with a list of VA hospitals that should be closed. Apparently, the announcement of the closings was made and then Mansfield was visited by somebody to inform him that a VA 
hospital in his state was being closed. Mansfield had had no prior contact, there had been no discussion with him, and Mike made it clear to me that this was intolerable. I must say, 
I was sitting with a very angered majority leader. I frankly didn't know, so I called the White House in Mike's presence to be informed. The mistake had been compounded by 
not even telling the congressional relations office in the White House about this. At least that relieved me somewhat in terms of my personal relationship with Mike, because Mike 
finally was convinced that I didn't know and that he had hit me with something that I was completely unaware of. 
So then the story unfolded. The President [decided that] despite Mike's ardent support of the Great Society program and his position in the Senate, he could not be made 
an exception and there was no way that that hospital was not going to be closed. The task of the White House was to put together a team immediately to start publicizing the plus 
factors of closing these installations, including Mike's. We were going to undertake a media effort on this. So people were assigned all over the place to contact press and issue 
releases. This got to the boiling point, and so the House Veterans Affairs Committee decided to have hearings on the closing of the VA hospitals. And lo and behold, the 
Majority Leader of the Senate arrived to testify at the hearing in the House. (Laughter) 
And this went on. We had one of our regular meetings of the congressional relations people, and the President would periodically drop in to give a pep talk or sit in 
and listen to the deliberations. But he stopped in this night and lectured everybody in the room on the need to close these hospitals, that this was intolerable, and he was going to 
bring some discipline, some cost savings to this bureaucracy. Mike Mansfield was not at all persuaded; if anything, he had become more adamant. And the end result was that 
Mike's hospital was not closed, and I don't believe the program went forward to finalization. I'd have to check the records on that. 
But it's an example, I think, of how you may become stymied. You might be well motivated, as Ramsey was, and the President receiving his report was enthusiastic. 
Ramsey had found an area of cost savings, and he was right. But it's difficult. 
It reminds me of a conversation that President Kennedy had with Al Thomas. Al Thomas came in to see me one day and he, by that time, had become a very helpful senior 
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member of Congress in terms of moving our program. We owed him a lot. He said they were going to have a testimonial for him in Houston, [honoring his] years in Congress. 
He allowed as though he'd be highly honored if the President would consider appearing. I, as Mike Kirwan used to say, got the point he meant, and when we finished the discussion I 
told him I would check it out and get back to him. I thought, he's here in the White House, why don't I just pick up my phone to the President and see if he's available and 
have Al drop by and say hello. So that happened and [they] chatted. I advised the President of Al's request and the President said that he would certainly take it into 
consideration and see if something could be worked out. 
But in the course of the chat--and Kennedy was awfully good at this sort of thing--something was said about the Hill and Jack said to Al, "Al, God, they think I've got 
a lot of power down here, everything going for me. You know that isn't the case. You know it's very difficult. But you know also I'm from Massachusetts, and I keep my eye on 
that state. I want my state to get its fair share of any goodies that emanate from the Hill. Now, you know, Al, that you can do a lot for my state now." (Laughter) And he was 
right. In that context there is a lot of power wielded on the Hill and it comes to the Christmas tree and it comes to the process. A well-placed member of Congress, House or 
Senate or both, or a well-placed group of members can get an awful lot done by way of expending federal funds for "meaningful activities" that a president can't get done. 
G: Is it fair to say that you would be much more reluctant to close a hospital or a military installation in Carl Hayden's state than you would, say, in H. R. Gross' district or 
something like that? 
O: Oh, sure. You mentioned H. R. Gross. Now I may be unfair to him, but I don't recall him in support of any proposals of ours, even indirectly. In fact, he would go to the ends of 
the earth to register his opposition in every conceivable way, often using parliamentary procedure. I would say if there was a VA hospital in Gross' district on that list, not only 
would Gross not receive the courtesy of advance notice of its being closed, he wouldn't receive the courtesy of discussing it after the fact. But fortunately there weren't that 
number of H. R. Grosses up there. 
G: Of course, Gross was not only negative but he was relatively powerless, I guess, particularly contrasted with someone like Hayden. 
O: Yes, he was. But you see, "there's always tomorrow" thinking manifested itself most significantly to me in an incident that occurred that involved the civil rights bill. If you 
needed to recall a lesson, an occurrence such as this does it forcibly. We were desperate, regarding the House Judiciary Committee, in an effort to secure a civil rights bill of some 
meaning from that committee to try to get it into legislative discussion and enactment. And we were stymied. Nick Katzenbach was deeply involved, and others in Justice. We 
were all involved in this. 
You had a situation on the committee where southern Democrats were opposed to 
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any civil rights legislation. Republicans were disinterested. Non-southern Democrats, liberal Democrats, wanted a much stronger civil rights bill than we were trying to spring 
from the committee. Manny [Emanuel] Celler, the chairman, was being cooperative, realistic, trying to get a decent bill out of there. McCulloch of Ohio, the senior 
Republican, was very much involved and very positive in his efforts. 
So now you have a situation where there's sort of a three-way split. There was a liberal congressman from Chicago who on a preliminary vote had voted against the bill on 
the basis that it just didn't do the job as he saw it. He went back to Chicago for his weekends and he'd go on interview programs proclaiming to the heavens how he was 
going to block any civil rights bill that wasn't total as he saw it. I contacted Dick Daley, who obviously had named the congressman--you don't get elected, you got named out 
there in Daley's time--and explained to the Mayor what the situation was. The Mayor said he certainly was not going to tolerate that and would speak to him directly. The fellow 
chose to defy the Mayor, or continued to talk that way and would not cooperate. I must say after a few months, he announced he wouldn't be seeking re-election. 
While that was going on and we were endeavoring in every way to build a majority vote in that committee, desperation led us to, I guess, our old friend Charlie Halleck, the 
minority leader. So I had Charlie Halleck down to the White House, and the President explained his dilemma, asked Charlie if he could see his way clear to be of some help, and 
assured him it would be deeply appreciated. Charlie, to our great surprise, said, by gosh, he thought he could help and would. He set a time to report back his findings; [that] is the 
way he put it. He said, "I'll go back and check individually with my fellows"--the Republicans on the committee--" and see what I come up with." 
The time came, and we were on tenterhooks waiting to hear from Charlie. I was in the Oval Office, and I guess it was by noontime three days later [that he was to report]. 
Whatever it was, the time came and went, and the call didn't come from Charlie. Half an hour or more went by and as you have to carry this to the last inch, the President called 
Charlie to determine why he hadn't he heard from him. Charlie apologized. He said, "I had delayed the call because I had another contact I wanted to make, but I think I've been 
able to be helpful," and he specified that there would be a few additional Republican votes in support of this compromise civil rights bill. Charlie Halleck made a most significant 
contribution to getting that bill sprung from the committee. One congressman lost his seat in Congress because of his position. The point of the story is, there is always tomorrow, 
and who knows when the time might come when a member up there might help, even though you're poles apart. 
And with Halleck, I liked him, and Halleck was a fellow that enjoyed what Sam Rayburn used to call the Board of Education. So we'd get to a confrontation on the floor 
and Charlie would grab me shortly before the vote, when you're getting to D-day, and Charlie would say, "O'Toole"--and I don't know to this day why he called me O'Toole, but 
that was his nickname for me for some reason or other--" got you this time." I'd say, "I don't think so." And this kind of conversation would take place. I'd say, "No, I think we'll 
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win by twelve." "No, you're going to lose by seven." I said, "Okay, right after the vote we'll have a drink together." "Okay." And we'd beat them every time. And we'd have the 
drink together down in the recess of the Capitol. Charlie would say, "O'Toole, I'll get you the next time." It was that kind of a relationship. You understood that Charlie was never 
going to give you a vote; Charlie's job was to block everything he could possibly block. Gerry Ford, who succeeded him as minority leader, wasn't a Charlie Halleck in that sense. 
He wasn't any more cooperative, but the relationship was a little easier and not as confrontational. And maybe there was a time when Gerry tolerated us getting something 
done that he might have been able to stop, you know, a vote here or there. 
But the only point of it all is that you never foreclosed the possibility, and when you talk about a legislative record, sure, you can do it statistically--and I did; I tried to put 
the best public relations front on it I could. But deeply and sincerely, in those first couple of years particularly, we were more than satisfied with the results stemming from our 
experience with the Rules fight and our continuing serious problems in the House. Every major vote was by a short margin. We lost a couple, amazingly not more than a couple of 
major roll calls, but we didn't win any by big margins, and it was a struggle every inch of the way. And when you do it as a statistic--and I've done it--the statistics of those first 
two years compared to the Eisenhower years were phenomenal. In fact, our first year was better than any year since Roosevelt. 
There were things you did that your better judgment should have led you not to do. There was a stage in the Medicare struggle where we--it wasn't the congressional 
relations group--were determined to light a fire under Wilbur Mills, and you lit the fire by going to the public. And you had a vehicle because you had the senior citizen 
organizations and you were going to have these massive rallies in various major cities of the country. I believe Madison Square Garden was the first stop, and we had the rally. 
The rally made little or no impact but antagonized Wilbur Mills. Subsequent rallies were dropped. The fact of the matter is that you were not going to sway Wilbur Mills, a 
congressman from Arkansas in a locked-in congressional district, by publicly attacking him. 
G: Sure. Were there other ways that you could reach members of Congress through their constituents? 
O: Yes, there were. We always were trying to enlist a constituent approach to the members. 
G: How did you do this? 
O: Well, what we did--and this was over a period of time. In foreign aid, we tried to provide every member with information regarding its impact dollarwise in his district or state. We 
then took on the task of trying to do a backgrounder on each member of the House, because our focus was on the House battles, to a great extent. It wasn't directly in our 
office; we assigned it to departments. But what we wanted to know, in addition to his bio, was what organizations he belonged to, what were the sources of his campaign 
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support, what were his hobbies and social activities, what schools members of his family attended, where were they located, what were his basic interests, his religious affiliation. 
[We wanted] basic information that might lead us to individuals or groups in the district that he had particular involvement with to enlist their support and direct contact with the 
members. 
It was a refinement, really, of what we tried to do in other areas. Its utilization was not awfully broad, but there were times when it was of some help. It was also part of 
the effort to get to know him, to know about him, and his relationship to his district. He often had labor affiliations and some labor unions were stronger supporters than others. 
Some labor unions had particular weight in his district. You would have the DNC urge the international union to contact local union reps. But while we and the departments and 
agencies were engaged, the facilities of the DNC were utilized on an arm's length basis. 
But to get back to the statistical evaluation through the eight years; I recall finally in the Johnson years we sought items we didn't win to avoid batting 1000 per cent. We 
had to seek out something to give it a bit of balance or it would not be accepted by anyone. But that brings into play the art of the possible, the art of compromise. When the 
chips are down on a minimum wage bill not totally to your liking, [are you going to] say, "We're not pleased with it; we're not happy with it, it is not what we sought?" Or when 
Sam Rayburn asks, "What is your decision?" I'm not going to call the White House and call the President. The President early on--this was President Kennedy--had made my role 
clear to the Congress. Initially, some members would call him to engage in legislative discussions. He'd ask, "Have you talked to Larry O'Brien about this?" "Well, no, I 
haven't." "Well, you should talk to Larry." It didn't take long for them to recognize Larry O'Brien was not a messenger boy from the White House; he spoke for the President. 
Well, I did. If I used my head, I could speak for the President. But God help me if I spoke for the President and it turned out that I shouldn't have. So you made those 
judgments. 
Tape 4 of 5, Side 1 
O: I wouldn't think for a moment, at that time, that I would respond as I did and have the President say later, "Why would you have done that? That isn't what I wanted, and to hell 
with them." So I said, "Let's go," and we went and we lost by one vote the next day. We recouped most of it by the time it got through the Senate and conference. 
But the point I want to make is this is the art of the possible, the art of compromise. Was this a half a loaf or more? I judged that day it was. What I didn't say 
when I said, "Let's go," was what I knew: "We'll be back for the other half of the loaf," and we were. 
So when you review the statistics, what was our record in 1961? We submitted fifty-three proposals and thirty-three were enacted. The point is that it was a good record. 
That's fine, but I don't want to gild the lily. It was an imposing, impressive statistic. It 
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showed more action in terms of legislative enactment than had taken place for a long time, under the stress brought about by the loss of the twenty-one seats when Kennedy was 
elected president and the consequent problem of trying to unravel the southern Democrat-Republican coalition, which we succeeded in doing over the long haul. 
But it isn't fair for O'Brien or anyone else to proclaim these statistics without postscripting that it does not mean that if thirty-three out of fifty-three proposals were 
enacted, they were enacted in toto. They weren't, I'm sure. In many instances, the ultimate enactment signed into law at a bill signing ceremony might not encompass all the 
elements of the President's request. But it did represent significant progress. So you put that into the equation. It isn't just the batting average. Let's evaluate the content. 
That is the way the process works and that's the way it should be conducted, because all we could lay claim to, and not by public pro-pronouncements but internally, 
[is] that we had recognized that we had to build an invisible bridge over a chasm between the executive branch and the Hill. And it had to be accomplished, as again I repeat, simply 
in human terms, always recognizing the sensitivity of what we were engaged in and the potential for disaster. The bridging was one thing, but the violation of the constitutional 
separation of powers, even by remote accusation by one member of Congress, could destroy your effort. John McCormack, Sam Rayburn, Mike Mansfield, any one of those 
leaders, or indeed any whip in the House, or almost any member could proclaim that this was unacceptable, that it should stop immediately, and that the Congress should not allow 
itself to be encroached upon in any way by people from the White House moving into an area where they didn't belong. The door would have been closed. 
That's what you were dealing with. And it took time to get to the point where no one would consider such action. And then there were days, I'll tell you, when that little 
item that's on--I don't think it was a little item, it was in a column, and I'll tell you, that caused me loss of sleep. I had to be concerned when a member might say, "Wait a minute, 
I'm a regional whip and I've got to talk to my leaders. This is just unseemly, this guy O'Brien and his people getting directly involved in our internal discussions and head 
counts." Now, if that had been picked up, we would have been out of business. 
I guess never again will that be a matter of serious concern because I'm sure people would say, "That evolved in the Kennedy-Johnson era and became part of the 
system." [Some would reply], "Well, what are you talking about; I'm sure that's the way it always functioned." When I tried to determine how it functioned and I [was] told, well, 
Tommy the Cork would go up the Hill on his own when he felt like it or President Truman would call a member, and that was the extent of congressional relations, it was news to 
me. I never knew how it functioned. I had no background or experience in this area. I'd been on the Hill for two years as a young fellow, as an administrative assistant to a buddy 
of mine that was elected to Congress. "You managed my campaign," Foster Furcolo said to me. "I don't know anything about this House of Representatives. Why don't the two of 
us go down?" and I did for two years, and that was enough for me. I didn't have any interest in continuing. . . . So I came home and stayed home until Jack Kennedy 
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remembered that we had met on a few occasions and decided he'd try to re-enlist me in politics. 
G: You mentioned at lunch that--you emphasized how much this consciousness was raised by that Rules Committee fight. Let me ask you to elaborate on that again. 
O: Well, it's probably difficult to understand--I guess it's difficult for me in reflection--that a president-elect and a new administration would engage in all the activities inherent in 
moving to president--inauguration day, cabinet appointments, establishing [or] possibly contemplating relationships in the whole foreign policy area, to have a concept of a New 
Frontier program, that basically would be advocacy of the elements of a party platform--and not focus completely on day one, recognizing that the Rules Committee 
traditionally had been the bottleneck for all liberal proposals, had successfully for years blocked every movement of a liberal nature, had to be altered in some way somehow or 
you were not going to be in business. And [you] get with your designated congressional relations assistant to the first leadership breakfast, now that you are president, and for the 
first time recognize that this change in the Rules Committee, which you are aware of is not going to succeed. You are sitting there with a whole New Frontier program that's just 
gone down the drain and you can sit and twiddle your thumbs for at least two years. 
And yet it didn't penetrate. Nobody had checked it. There had been no communication with the Speaker. There was no understanding of the Speaker's 
depression regarding the possibility of success. And people would say, "Well, how could you let that [happen]?" Sure, you had an inauguration and you went to the inaugural balls 
and named cabinet members and whatever else you were doing, but, for God's sake, why in that interim period wasn't a major effort mounted with the incoming Congress to ensure 
that there would be a change in the make-up of the Rules Committee? 
First, I didn't even know about it, I guess. I'm sure I didn't, because I didn't pay any attention. I didn't contemplate ever dealing with the Congress. After I was 
designated as the fellow who was going to deal with the Congress I didn't devote one hour to planning it, even to the point of not getting around to going over to the White House 
and meeting a fine man that I was going to succeed in that role, who had opened the door by contacting me and saying he was available to me for whatever length of time that I 
desired, to be helpful in a nonpartisan manner, because I was taking over a role that he was familiar with. And yet you sat there at the leadership breakfast and it was sort of, 
"Oh, by the way, you will be enacting this Rules Committee change." 
So the shock effect apparently was there, but it wasn't there immediately, or why did not the President of the United States say to the Speaker of the House of 
Representatives during the course of that discussion, before the breakfast terminated, "We must have a postponement of the vote." Obviously the penetration took a little more time 
than that. Then the desperation of the situation and the end result of this debacle penetrated to the point where you call the Speaker of the House and say, "You've got to 
come back down. I want to talk to you." And you have the talk, and Sam Rayburn, very 
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honestly, didn't think there was any real hope to enact that rules change. The postponement was the first request that the new President made of him and, of course, 
he'd acquiesce to it. That was a rather harmless request, to postpone it for a week, a few days. But I'm sure that Sam Rayburn left that Oval Office saying, "That poor guy's got a 
lot to learn, because a few days isn't going to make any difference." 
G: Did you consider alternatives to enlarging the committee, possibly purging [William] Colmer? 
O: Those were discussed somewhere along the route, maybe internally in the House. Who in the new administration was engaged in those discussions I don't know and never did. 
Because what we had that morning was the expansion of the committee, which differed from removal of the chairman, or reorganization of the committee--thoughts that I assume 
had been considered by the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, the Dick Bollings and the others. But if they were communicating any of that to the President-elect or his 
representatives, I certainly was not privy to it and consequently, I was oblivious. I'll tell you right now, even twenty-five years later when I think of it, when I think of what losing 
would have meant, my gosh! 
So you say, what were your reactions, what did you do? It was a scramble. I had nothing in place. The President now has this knowledge; he's gotten the postponement, 
and what do you do about it? So you have a few days before the lynching takes place. But how do you utilize the few days? And as I have described to you, I guess it just came 
to your mind to seek help wherever you might find it, and you learned a phrase that you probably never heard of in your life, or never paid any attention to, called head count. 
You learned that a head count is a dreary, difficult, tough process that you're going to be engaged in repeatedly over a number of years. There's nothing very glamorous about a 
head count. 
G: Did you have to get these counts directly from the members, or could you get it from, let's say, their legislative aide? 
O: Sometimes, depending on the legislative aide, you learned that some legislative aides could speak for their member just as the members learned that I could speak for the President. 
And sometimes many of those legislative aides could not speak for the member. There were occasions when you would get part of that count out of, for example, the AFL-CIO 
that had a real lock on some members. And if a commitment from Joe Smith was relayed to me or in the course of our meetings on the head counts, depending on who it was and 
who was giving me the message and who had made the contact and what conversation had ensued, it could be something that I would say, "Okay, let's go. Checkmark. Right." 
I'll tell you this, in every head count we were engaged in we were as conservative as we could be. I've used this cliche till friends of mine get sick of hearing me, because I 
have a tendency to do it and I'm going to do it again. I'd rather be pleasantly surprised than grievously disappointed. It's just my nature. I'm not an optimist by nature; I'm a 
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pessimist by nature. I like to think I'm a realist by nature. That's really how I rationalize in my mind, that if you tell me we're going to win something, I'm going to tell you several 
reasons why I don't think we will. It's a protective mechanism, I guess. 
The other aspect of this, too, the last thing I thought I would be involved in in the Kennedy Administration was the role that I finally had. It never entered my mind. I 
honestly think to this day it was in part Kennedy trying to envision how I could be helpful. I had an intimate acquaintance with him professionally, politically. It was probably not a 
bad idea that this little team stay reasonably intact; there were only three or four of us that had gone the distance and in whom he had total trust and confidence, and that's generally 
what happens with the White House staff. And then Kennedy is thinking, well, the Congress, that's an extremely significant element of what we're going to be engaged in, 
and O'Brien, politically, he's gotten along with people and he has wide acquaintances. I imagine that was in his thought process. Then the two of us, two geniuses, come up with 
"Well, we'll tie personnel in. Then we have the whole package and O'Brien runs the show." But if you were looking for a congressional relations guy, "O'Brien isn't suited for 
this." I think it was a matter of whatever was in Kennedy's thought process--on congressional relations, anyhow. I simply said, "Yes, well, sure, why not?" That's what it 
amounted to. 
There's one other aspect of all of this and I've tried to stay focused on it. Now that I'm in what amounts to retirement, I've tried to adjust to retirement. I think I'm entitled to 
it. My friends and associates can't understand how I could even contemplate retirement while everybody else in the world seems to be able to contemplate theirs. I don't 
understand that myself. 
But in any event, I had to compensate somehow, find a way to compensate, for basic limitations in my life. I am no great intellect. I think I'm an average guy with normal 
interests in family and in your country and what you have been taught to believe in. That is that every person is entitled to the fullest opportunity for education and progress in this 
country. There are certain basic fundamental commitments under our democracy. And that whether you are a precinct captain or a member of the school committee or the block 
committee or you're trying to erect a playground in your neighborhood for your kids, you've got to extend yourself beyond your personal ambitions and you've got to make a 
contribution. You owe it. It is a basic responsibility of citizenship in this great democracy. Both my parents were born in Ireland. They came here as immigrants. And 
my father would say to me, as much as he loved Ireland and was proud of being Irish, "Thank God that I was able to come here," and he appreciated every moment of it. And 
so did my mother, who worked hard as a young gal in Springfield. 
So you say, okay, you're no hero, you're just another guy. But recognize your limitations. Don't just accept them and do nothing about them and not try to improve 
yourself. That isn't the point. The point is that in the competition of life, in the competition of the political arena and the competition of government, you have a role and 
you must fulfill that role to the best of your ability. And there's probably one thing you 
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can do that will bring you up a notch and make you more productive, and that is work harder and longer than the opposition, and if you do that, perhaps that's a compensating 
factor that makes the battle a little more equal. Maybe that opposition may be brighter, may be more innovative, creative, or whatever, but if you tackle the job and work harder 
and longer and have a total commitment, you're going to bring your level of performance up and you'll get into a fair competitive situation. That's what I've always believed. 
So when this darn thing came along, heck, how would you ever wind up being in congressional relations? Indeed, how would you ever wind up being postmaster general? 
That isn't a career opportunity. How would you wind up being commissioner of a major professional sports league? Was that something that you contemplated? Of course not. 
These things happen because I guess the ebb and flow of life are beyond your control. You make no plans. My career plans--I suppose if all this hadn't happened at an early 
stage I would have wound up practicing law in my home town. And I'm not suggesting I wouldn't be happy and probably even happier than I have been, but that didn't happen. 
But are you going to say to President-elect Kennedy, "Hey, hold it a minute. I haven't the slightest idea about congressional relations"? God, there must be a million people out 
there that have an intimate knowledge of the Congress, how it works, how it functions, its history and all the rest. But no, what the hang, if that's what he wants me to do I'll do the 
best I can and learn it as rapidly as I can. 
But the Rules [Committee] fight, as I told you, wound up not only in a victory, but somebody up there was on our side and particularly my side, because I'll tell you, months 
might have elapsed to accomplish what we reasonably accomplished in about thirty days. 
G: Do you think that Rules fight had a similar impact on President Kennedy? 
O: Yes. 
G: Did that suddenly cause him to be much more interested in legislative--? 
O: It startled, stunned him. Believe me, by the time the postponed vote came along, nobody had to tell us what impact that Rules decision would have on us. We had awakened. We 
had put away the tuxedos and all the rest and said, "Boy, oh, boy, it's the real world." 
G: Let me ask you a little bit more about that Rules fight and see if I can jog your memory with some questions here. You did get a lot of Republican support. 
O: Yes. 
G: What was the key to that? 
O: I think that for the most part if you--and I haven't done this in years, I did it then, but I believe it was twenty-two Republicans [who voted with us]. In each instance you could 
quite easily determine the motivation for support: it was their constituency. I'm not saying 
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they didn't have a higher level of motivation, but the reality was their constituency and they tried to reflect [it]. Even though they had an R next to their name, they were what 
we would call Republican moderates. God knows what they would be considered in the context of a Reagan Republican Party. 
G: Here, I have a list of them. 
O: Yes. Every one of these fellows, I'll bet. Yes. 
G: Well, there's been some suggestion that Joe Martin was particularly helpful in getting Republican support. 
O: He could have been; he really was trying to be helpful. But I'll tell you, there are two turnaround districts in Connecticut where for several elections people were in and out like 
a revolving door. Because, remember, they had the single-lever ballot in Connecticut. Boy, did that switch that delegation. That would go from five-one one way to five-one 
the other way every couple of years. So I can see that--[ Charles] Mathias in Maryland we know. Mathias has been consistent through his whole career as a liberal. [Silvio] Conte, 
the same thing, western Massachusetts. [F. Bradford] Morse, the same thing in his district in Massachusetts. [William] Bates, I would put Bates with Martin. I remember 
these guys well. Conte is still there, and Conte and Morse were good friends of mine. It was like Javits as a Republican senator; he was a Republican because that was the 
opportunity he had to go to the House in the first place--take the Republican nomination. It was wide open there and he seized the opportunity. 
[Thomas] Curtis I can't account for. [Chester] Merrow and [Perkins] Bass, again, very heavily contested districts in New England. New Jersey, [William] Cahill; he later 
became governor, and [Florence] Dwyer. I don't recall the districts of [Frank] Osmers and [George] Wallhauser, but Cahill and Dwyer, they again were in the category of Lindsay, 
Conte. Oh, Cahill, as I used to say to him at times, "Why aren't you a Democrat?" You'll see the others: [Seymour] Halpern, Lindsay, [Paul] Fino. Those are the three Republican 
votes from districts where they had lucked out and were holding the seats and they were in the same category as Javits was statewide. 
Ayers of Ohio--knowing Bill Ayers, as I did, I can't account for him. [William] Scranton--very honestly, I thought Scranton was an outstanding legislator. He later 
became governor of Pennsylvania, and was a very classy fellow. Then he sought the Republican nomination for president and they weren't about to. . . . [Alvin] O'Konski was 
from a typical district. [James] Fulton and [Robert] Corbett, I'm not that familiar with them. 
And I'm not knocking it; there's a Joe Martin influence in here, but overridingly, of the twenty-two I think we can select fourteen to fifteen of those votes that would be votes 
that probably on several other occasions supported [the administration]. I would think all of those supported minimum wage, for example. Each one of those fourteen or fifteen 
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O'Brien --Interview I --67 
would be supporting civil rights legislation. 
G: I'm going to ask you about some southern Democrats, too. Well, would you say that Rayburn worked with Martin more than you did? 
O: Yes. Now, during the course of those several days I don't recall any direct contact with Martin. 
G: What was Rayburn's role in the fight? What did he do? 
O: Well, I think you'll find it right here. You look at that Texas [delegation list]. Now, you look--[ Olin] Teague, [John] Young--G: 
Well, [W. R.] Poage. 
O: --[ Bob] Casey. You're talking about some real conservatives in there. 
G: Yes, that's right. 
O: Now, Brooks, [Frank] Ikard to some extent, Mahon, [Wright] Patman, Al Thomas, Thornberry, Jim Wright, I'd say it's half and half. Half of these fellows would feel that 
they had had enough of this coalition and they'd like to see it more equitable, and the others would be influenced by Rayburn. 
G: Do you think Rayburn called in a lot of chits across the board in the Congress to get this thing through? 
O: Yes. I neglected to mention that we kept Rayburn fully apprised of what our findings were, and the Speaker's office was kept almost hourly apprised of what our head counts 
were revealing. We would have a lot of communication. I initially did not know Rayburn intimately, but I must say that I was very intrigued with this man and, as the months rolled 
by, I formed a relationship that became pleasant and comfortable. And he gave a lot, you know, letting old Larry hang around. 
As you know, Sam wasn't a fellow that did a lot of talking; he wasn't overly verbal. But from the time that he postponed the vote [until] the vote was taken, I have no doubt 
in my mind that he did everything he could to try to secure support. Because there again, Rayburn was not in the camp of the Rules Committee leadership. He wasn't a liberal in 
the sense that we northerners look at liberals. But by the same token, he was, despite his opposition to Lyndon Johnson [going] on the ticket in Los Angeles, a great respecter of 
the presidency. And [he] recognized that national leadership emanates from the presidency. So consequently I cannot document to you what Rayburn did on the Rules 
fight except I know that he was fully committed. At the leadership breakfast--there's no question, because I was there--Rayburn was distressed, but just felt it wasn't doable, that it 
wasn't going to happen. 
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O'Brien --Interview I --68 
G: Sure. Was there an argument that maybe we ought to compromise and try to--? 
O: There wasn't any further compromise. Where were you going? 
G: Well, Smith had evidently made some offers to compromise--O: 
Oh, I know, but--G: 
--to clear some of the bills or. . . . 
O: Yes. It would have been a big mistake to ever get into this deal with Smith involving X bills. I think I probably would have accepted defeat before I'd do that. He was a courtly 
southern gentleman and all the rest but you're going to put your destiny in his hands? Not the President of the United States that I knew. 
G: How did Smith resist this administration push to change the nature of his committee from conservative to--? 
O: Well, what he did, his observable resistance--well, I don't know as it was particularly observable; that wasn't the nature of Smith. As I say, [he was a] courtly southern 
gentleman, always very correct, but an adversary. He was like Harry Byrd; there was no way that he could intellectually or emotionally accept our concept of what was best for 
this country. And it just wasn't in the cards. In fact, I think there was a uniqueness about Virginia anyway in the political context that extended beyond just the southern Democrat. 
You know, they were in a world of their own, as was evidenced by Harry Byrd in later years. 
And yet in personal terms, it's just amazing, as I reflect. They were among the nicest people I knew down there, and I can remember flying with the President down to 
Harry Byrd's apple festival. We never missed an opportunity, even if the odds were a thousand to one against you; you might get somewhere, like the Halleck story. He 
couldn't be a nicer, more pleasant fellow, and his son [Harry Byrd, Jr.]--I saw him not many months ago; we had just a great reunion. I was very happy to see him and he 
seemed to feel the same way. So there wasn't any of this sniping, backbiting, meanness; at least overtly. It never occurred. I don't remember having a real mean argument with a 
member of Congress in eight years. But I must say--well, look at those with some of the same background, nevertheless, closer to Virginia than to liberal Massachusetts: Al 
Thomas, George Mahon, Carl Vinson. Carl Vinson became very supportive of President Kennedy. The walk in the Rose Garden was one aspect of their relationship. But Vinson, 
with his respect for the presidency, he stepped away from the B-70 fight. 
You know what really happened--after the first year you could discern it. With Kennedy, he was a really unknown with these fellows. Now, he's an attractive, youngish 
guy, and they didn't have any dislike for him, but he was a breed of cat that they didn't 
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O'Brien --Interview I --69 
know. Like Carl Albert said to me one day, "I got to know this fellow and rapidly." Of course, he [Albert] was in the leadership. He said, "I got to love him. I'd do anything for 
him! Of course, I really didn't know him before he became president." And see, we can talk--and I guess I've talked inordinately about the organizational aspect of this and the 
team aspect, but let's not overlook what in the final analysis made it work and that is one man. 
Like the observers; I remember Ted White particularly. It was one of the most interesting election campaigns in history. White reacted accordingly, and White was 
fulsome in his praise of the Kennedy people, the so-called Irish Mafia. But heck, does that amount to--I always said, "What's the number you put on it?" in terms of victory. The 
contribution to that victory, the result of it can be attributed, if you had to use a statistic, somewhere between 93 and 96 per cent, probably closer to 96 per cent, to the candidate. 
There might be 3 to 4 per cent in there that could be attributed to organizing and maximizing the potential. And the same applied in the White House, with Kennedy sitting 
there with the twenty-one seat loss and all that and a razor-thin margin of victory and no mandate of any kind. His coattails didn't mean a thing to anybody who was in the 
Congress; that hadn't helped them get there. 
So it had to be his personality, his style, the way he handled himself. And I think that members, any number of them were impressed with Kennedy's reaction to the Bay of 
Pigs, and you can compare that to the reaction that Nixon had to Watergate. I mean, this is a man who had strong gut reactions--he had courage, he'd step out there, he had no 
hesitancy to admit failure, errors. And as these members got to know him, an affection for him grew. They liked him. And that's why I used to appeal to them on a personal basis: 
"He really needs you. Don't do this to him." I remember telling a congressman one day, early on, "Gosh, out there in that press gallery"--Clem Zablocki was the congressman, and 
it was one of those votes where it wasn't going to do Clem any political good and it might even cause a little political harm. McCormack talked to him and I was talking to him, and 
I remember the last thing I said when he was leaving McCormack's office to go back to the floor was, "Gee, Clem"--because he was an early-on supporter of Kennedy and I 
thought that was the kind of appeal you could make. We didn't talk about the substance of the legislation or anything else. I said, "Gee, out there up in that press gallery they have 
their pencils poised to give it to Jack. You can't--." I mean, listen, that would appeal to me. 
G: Sure. That's great. Let me ask you about some of the lobbyist groups, pro and con, on the Rules Committee fight. On the pro side you had the ADA, the AFL-CIO, the National 
Farmers Union. Did any of these groups that I've named perform an extraordinary role here? Were any of them particularly helpful? 
O: I can't specify the help, but they were helpful. I can be more specific about the AFL-CIO because Andy Biemiller's activity was more observable to me and we were sort of in 
tandem during this effort. The other activities might be less direct. But certainly the AFL-CIO had a real impact. 
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O'Brien --Interview I --70 
G: Well, did organized labor have more machinery for involvement in this sort of legislation? 
O: Yes. Well, they do; it's the nature of their organization, a Washington-based organization, but Andy was a former member of Congress and a very hard-working, dedicated fellow 
that enjoyed widespread support on the Hill. He was well thought of and I found him consistently supportive on the subsequent fights--and there were many of them involving 
the AFL-CIO obviously--and he had a staff that was broader-based than the others. Of the lobbying groups, the AFL-CIO effort with Biemiller would probably have to be ranked 
as probably more effective than the others. I can't really document that but it would be my judgment. 
G: The newspapers indicated that LBJ did some lobbying as well. Do you recall what he--? 
O: I don't recall the specifics but there's no question about it. He shared our concern and recognized what the end result could be. 
G: What did Bob Kennedy do for the effort? 
O: He had a lot of contact with the AFL-CIO, with various labor officials--Tape 
4 of 5, Side 2 
O: --he traded on. 
G: You're talking about Stu Udall? 
O: Yes. Concentrated on some long-time friends he had as a member of the House. Really, Bobby would be a natural for us, "Come on, Bobby. Boy, we're in another battle. Here 
we go. We thought we had a little honeymoon here, and bang." With Stu, he'd be thought of, as we sat there and tried to figure this out, because he was one cabinet 
member who was a former member of the House. And in trying to get a breakdown of the House, you went to people that already had a close friendship and relationship with the 
President and were--well, two of the three of them were from parts of the country where they could be effective. Elliott and Jones--they could be talking to their southern 
colleagues and see if they could pick up a vote here and there. 
G: On this particular issue did you get any complaints about the lobbying? 
O: I think everything happened so fast, frankly, I don't recall any complaints. It would be pretty hard to complain because those of us involved hadn't even been to the Hill yet, and 
it was moving so rapidly and that vote was coming, so there wasn't an interim period where people could start criticizing. 
G: Okay. Here is--
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O'Brien --Interview I --71 
O: Let's hold that for a minute. 
G: You see the list of southern Democrats that supported this enlargement. As you look it over, there were what?--four from Alabama, none from Mississippi, quite a few from 
Kentucky, quite a few from Louisiana. 
O: Yes. Yes. 
G: Are there any names there that you recall a little personal arm-twisting? 
O: Yes, I talked to a lot of them personally, but whether you'd call it arm-twisting or not, I don't know, but any number of them. First of all, on the Alabama list you have Carl Elliot, 
right? 
G: Yes. 
O: Who was intimately involved, along with Jones. You see that one presidential call was nonproductive, to Cooley in North Carolina. Oren Harris of Arkansas, it must have been 
instinct with him. Not all of these, but just about every one of them were talked to individually by us as part of that several-day effort. 
G: How about Mills? How did you get Mills? 
O: I don't know. [Dante] Fascell, he's a little different, you know, Florida and that district; there'd be an inclination. He wouldn't have been part of the so-called coalition, anyway. 
Vinson was a stick-out because, see, Vinson had become intrigued with the Kennedy candidacy when we campaigned in the South, and he had appeared with Kennedy at a 
couple of major functions down there. And that's the nature of Vinson, a class fellow in every sense. On Kentucky, I knew them all. [Frank] Burke would be the most obvious 
supporter. The rest of them, I can't account for them other than their individual decisions on the basis of their personal views. 
I'm not suggesting that we turned all these people around. Our guess was that if the vote had taken place in the first instance, we would have lost by seven to fifteen 
[votes]. The best we could hope for was by seven, so really what you're talking about in this whole effort is that we switched a dozen people. And so, consequently, a good 
number of these people we're looking at now, these names are people that intended to vote in the first instance for the Rules change. Boggs, of course, was part of the 
leadership from Louisiana. Albert, part of the leadership from Oklahoma, and I'm sure [Ed] Edmondson would have supported us by the nature of his district. But with [Tom] 
Steed and [Victor] Wickersham I'm sure Albert accounted for that. Tennessee, well, [Ross] Bass might have been there. I think there's a combination in here and Texas. The 
most impressive part of this break-out is that it brought a third of the so-called southern Democrats to us, which we had to have. It was almost a third, as I recall. And a good 
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O'Brien --Interview I --72 
portion of Texas would be Rayburn and Johnson--because that's a darn good vote for a rules change out of the Texas delegation. You turned [?] one, two, three, four, five, six, 
seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen. 
G: You've mentioned that Elliott was intimately involved in this. How do you mean? 
O: Well, he had been one who agreed to sit for hours with us from the outset in evaluating each member of the House. That was a session I had over in the Mayflower Hotel and 
Elliott was supportive from the outset. He had been very strongly supportive of Kennedy in the election campaign. So Elliott and Jones, as I recall it, and Topper 
Thompson--Frank Thompson from New Jersey--were fellows that had had a direct involvement in the campaign. Elliott and Jones were southern. I guess our judgment 
probably was these were three fellows that would be hopefully willing to sit down and go over every Democrat in the House of Representatives, giving us an evaluation of what we 
could anticipate or what their pluses or minuses were in terms of our program. So that kind of detailed evaluation that took place was a clear indication that these fellows, Elliott, 
Jones particularly, Thompson obviously, would be most supportive. 
G: The lobbying against the enlargement, the NMA, the National Association of Manufacturers, real estate boards, and the chamber of commerce, anything extraordinary 
here about their lobbying? 
O: No. Frankly--we're talking about six days, I guess, from the time of awakening--I'm sure that I knew [but] I have no recollection of paying any attention whatsoever to what they 
were doing. Because first of all, whatever they were doing, so be it, there wasn't much we could do about it. To counter any inroads they might be making was something that we 
didn't have the luxury of time and manpower to do. So our total thrust was in terms of garnering enough votes for passage. I would think that probably the opposition lobbying 
groups were in the same position as the key players on the Hill that were in opposition to change--that they shared Rayburn's view, or Rayburn shared their view, that this was 
going to be relatively close but it would go down to defeat. So perhaps that enforced, brief period of intensive lobbying on our part didn't make that much of an impact on the 
opposition. I really wonder whether they caught up with it or recognized that it was creating some change. 
G: At the time of the vote did you think that you had the votes? 
O: At the time of the vote my recollection is that we thought we would squeak by. Now, I probably would have said, "We'll settle for one; we may get two, we could get five." And 
I might have even said there's a shot at getting a majority of seven to ten. It landed about where we expected it would land. We felt that with the question marks up to the last 
minute we could have a ten-vote margin, but we also were not totally confident we were going to prevail. If we felt we could get up to a ten-vote margin and we wound up with 
five, obviously we thought we might lose by a couple. It could be that kind of a. . . . 
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G: Was there an awareness on your part of who would go on the committee once it was enlarged? 
O: I don't think we even got into that, because we had assurances that people would be on the committee that would be favorable to us and interested in our position. As it turned 
out, we had one fellow that went on the committee that became very difficult in another struggle at a later date. 
G: Was this [James] Delaney? 
O: Delaney, yes. 
G: What was Rayburn's reaction to the victory? 
O: He was, as his usual Rayburn style, low key, a little smile, a slight chuckle, pleased. 
G: Did he ever say anything to characterize what it meant to him or what it meant in terms of the Congress? 
O: No. No, I don't think we ever got into that. 
G: How about Kennedy? What was his reaction? 
O: Relief. A great sigh of relief. 
G: Really? 
O: Yes. And my best recollection of his comment [is], "Now we're in business." 
G: Is that right? 
O: Yes. 
G: Any other memorable reactions to it that you recall? 
O: Not that I can think of. I think the overriding reaction remains my initial reaction to learning about all this. (Laughter) I think probably while it was uphill after that, it in a 
sense was a little bit downhill. As far as my personal reaction, I didn't jump up and down with joy. I think my reaction was a melding of pleasure and relief. 
[Interruption] 
G: Let me ask you about the omnibus judgeship bill. We talked about this briefly in setting up the legislative agenda. This should be on the first page [of the outline of legislative 
issues] there. Do you have that? 
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O'Brien --Interview I --74 
O: Oh, I see. Wait a minute. Yes. 
G: This was the opportunity to name almost sixty judges. Did you see this as a political advantage? 
O: Yes. We saw it as an advantage because we were anxious to adjust the courts, if we possibly could, to the fullest extent possible in terms of attitude and thrust. The additional 
judges would afford an early opportunity to bring to the bench people that would be--I hate to use the word because sometimes it isn't appropriately 
descriptive--conservative-liberal or people that have a point of view that would more closely approximate the President's point of view than those who were currently sitting, 
for the most part. It isn't something that is discernible in specifics; it's just something that would have an impact on what we accomplished in terms of interpretation and 
implementation. Therefore, the importance was there, the reality of being able to name a large number of new judges. It seemed to be eminently doable, frankly, because obviously 
many of the people voting for this increase would see in it some advantages for them down the road when the actual appointing process went into effect. 
G: Sure. Eisenhower had tried to [pass a similar bill]. 
O: So it's the type of legislation that you have a feeling political reality, if nothing else, will dictate its enactment. 
G: Sure. This brings me to the question of the division of judicial appointments in Texas between Johnson and Yarborough. Were you privy to this or did you help negotiate or 
accommodate? 
O: I was privy to it certainly. I heard a lot from Ralph Yarborough concerning it. We had a number of discussions. 
G: What was Yarborough's position? 
O: Well, Yarborough's position was that we should adhere to tradition, and the input of a senator who would participate in confirmation was tradition. And it was hard for Ralph to 
quite conceive of the role of a vice president, if he incidentally happened to come from Texas, in this process. It was a very touchy situation. As you know, the 
Yarborough-Johnson sensitivity was something that existed right to the end, the end being Dallas, and I suppose beyond. But just to focus on that period, it had a lot to do with 
much of the planning for the Texas trip. Al Thomas was pre-eminent in that decision to visit Texas, but Ralph's position was certainly well known to us and repeatedly voiced by 
Ralph. 
G: He had been a Kennedy supporter before Los Angeles. 
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O: That's right. I wasn't in a decision-making role in terms of allocation, but I was dealing regularly with Ralph Yarborough, seeking his support, and trying, in my own way, to 
accommodate his sensitivities to the best of my ability to bring about some kind of equity. But I came to the end of that particular road in Fort Worth when I had the discussion 
with President Kennedy up in his room and found that the early [news] stories, the first day of the trip, had been headlined Yarborough-Johnson. I decided, with Kennedy's 
knowledge and acquiescence, to see if I could find Yarborough before the motorcade formed to go to the airport to go to Dallas. That's all part and parcel of my involvement in 
all of this. It went to the legislative program; it went to the patronage, it went to the perceived slights, from Yarborough's point of view, and perceived unfair handling of some 
of his problems, and that was all an ongoing situation. 
I stepped outside the hotel door and he was there; he had come down early. So we talked and I told him that I recognized his affection for the President, his support of 
the President, his high regard for the President, all the rest, but what he wasn't recognizing was he was doing the President harm and would continue to harm the President during the 
course of this trip by his actions in not sharing the car with the Vice President. There were several buses of press, and the press were already aboard waiting for the principals 
to come down and form the motorcade. And I said to Ralph, "You just look at those buses and you're the story. There's no way you'd want it, I wouldn't think. And that's 
grossly unfair to the President." Yarborough didn't say too much, kind of mulled it over in his mind, and he said, "Well, fine, I'll get in the car." That was about it, and just within a 
moment, the Vice President came out and I quickly stepped over to him to advise him that Yarborough would be riding with him. 
G: What was Johnson's reaction to that? 
O: He nodded, but I don't think he said anything. 
G: I wonder if he was surprised. 
O: I don't know. You had to get this done quickly and, of course, what happened as a result of all that is that when I got off the plane at Dallas and the Vice President and the 
President were working the fence, handshaking, Ralph sort of standing there, I did not go to my designated car. I hung back to be sure that I saw the two of them back in the car, 
the Vice President and Yarborough, for the trip into Dallas. But then again, I guess, with my approach to things, I wanted to see it with my own eyes and hope that nothing might 
have occurred in the intervening half-hour that had changed it. And they got in the car and then I had to hasten and jump into a car that was handy, one of the open cars, and that 
car contained three or four, maybe five--it was crowded--members of the Texas delegation. 
G: Oh, congressmen? 
O: Yes. 
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G: Who did make the decision about the division of those judgeships? 
O: I don't know. 
G: Was it Kennedy? 
O: I don't know. I don't know how it was worked out. 
G: Was there ever any consideration of letting Yarborough name all of them? 
O: I'm not aware of that either. I don't recall--and it's pretty vague in my recollection--that there was a feeling on the part of the Vice President that he was prepared to accept that 
kind of a solution, to let Yarborough name them all. I think that Lyndon Johnson hung in there somewhat through this, and I know this much, that the President was very anxious 
to accommodate the Vice President while recognizing the really inherent historic rights that the Senator had. It was a tough one. 
But as to the ultimate resolution, I was not involved, I don't believe, or I would recall it. I was involved with Yarborough from time to time on other patronage. I don't 
even remember the details; it might even have gotten to postal patronage, you know. He was very alert to what he felt were his rights. You did have a man on the one hand that 
was a staunch early supporter and a United States senator. On the other hand, you had a fellow that had agreed to go on the ticket and made one significant contribution to victory. 
Somehow, somewhere, you had to reconcile all that and come up with some kind of a solution that might have both sides kind of reluctant regarding the conclusion, but 
nevertheless, even if it was with reluctance, accept it. 
But overall, the omnibus judgeship bill was not a matter of over-riding, desperate lobbying in a priority sense. There was a strong feeling from the outset that this would 
work itself out as it did. 
G: Okay, you've talked about the foreign aid bill at some length, and you did write about that in your book [No Final Victories]. 
O: I think it's worth adding a postscript--because Otto Passman was a chore. He aggravated the President no end. He aggravated the leadership no end. John McCormack would 
become totally exercised regarding Otto. He was elusive in terms of pinning him down. There were a number of occasions when we thought we had formalized an agreement and 
found that Otto didn't recognize that to be the case. He was emotionally involved to a high degree. He was downright impossible. I don't think there was a more difficult 
exercise in my years in the White House than the exercise that took place regarding foreign aid and Passman. He was no different with President Kennedy than he had been 
with his predecessor. And I'm trying to recall, and I can't, a meeting we had on this subject where there was bipartisan attendance over in the White House in the living 
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quarters when we were trying to work this out. I can't recall a Republican leader present at that time that made the comment, perhaps it was Senator Dirksen, but the comment was 
made that he recalled vividly being at similar meetings with Eisenhower regarding Passman and that he drove Eisenhower completely up the wall to the point where 
Eisenhower had told the Republican leaders that he never wanted to see Passman's face again. He said he just drove him crazy, just exactly what he was doing with Kennedy. 
So it wasn't a matter of selecting Kennedy out for any reason. It was the terrible misfortune to have a man, by virtue of seniority, in control of legislation that he detested 
and who felt that his role was not to organize the legislation and resolve any problems attendant to it. Somehow his role was to kill it all if he possibly could someday, and that 
made for a very, very difficult situation. If you asked me to select one member of Congress, House or Senate, that caused the President and the White House the most 
difficulty, interestingly enough I'd have to designate a democrat--I think small "d"--named Passman. 
G: How did you deal with him? 
O: I don't know as I ever did. I had a lot of contact with him but I never felt that I was dealing with him. I guess it's like anything else. When I first became acquainted with him 
I anticipated being able to deal with him, and as time went on he wore me out, too. He was impossible. There was a bright moment with a Charlie Halleck, and there were other 
things that happened, and you never, as I've said repeatedly, foreclosed a possibility, but with this man it was just an intensive, almost bitter struggle to the end. It just complicated 
our lives, because he accused us of all kinds of activity to exert pressure on him. I don't know whether he construed us to be a bunch of devils incarnate or just the horrible enemy 
or what. As for John McCormack, who was in many ways a living saint and who somehow could find good in everyone, the worst thing I ever heard him say was, "I hold 
him in minimum high regard." Passman just drove him up the wall, too. 
G: (Laughter) Was there any pressure that you could apply in other respects? 
O: None. None. He was in a world of his own. Why a man who had that view regarding foreign aid wouldn't at some point say, "I don't belong here in this discussion and debate 
and I can better serve my constituents in some other area." But I think that he would never contemplate that because he really, truly felt that he was driving nails into the 
foreign aid coffin and someday he'd secure the lid. 
G: Did Passman have a counterpart in the Senate that was troublesome? 
O: No, I don't recall, no. See, there were two areas that you had to confront on a regular basis. Foreign aid was one. There wasn't really anybody that I know in the House that 
was voting for foreign aid because he really was enamored with it. It was well understood by all, including your loyal supporters, that foreign aid was a burden, that nothing was to 
be gained by way of constituent support or political support out of supporting foreign aid. 
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What everybody had to weigh was to what degree it was adverse to their political interests. That didn't mean there weren't a lot of members that didn't recognize its validity 
and the necessity. But it was a burden. 
The other burden was the debt ceiling. And the debt ceiling is where the opposition party would have a lot of fun with you. The only thought you had through that 
miserable exercise was that sooner or later there had to be an increase; they couldn't avoid it. But no one wanted to vote to increase the debt ceiling, and my guess is that roll calls 
would reveal that we may have been close to zero on Republican support for a debt ceiling increase. But those were the two areas that had built-in problems and you had to work on 
those two necessary legislative actions, recognizing that there was no real constituency. 
G: In foreign aid President Kennedy did introduce the concept of a multi-year approach to it, and this was criticized as back-door spending. 
O: Yes. 
G: How did you deal with this issue? 
O: Well, actually our motivation was obvious. Was there some way you could avoid this battle regularly? It started all over again about a week after you took a breath, it seemed. 
That's the way it was and it was awfully frustrating, so you felt at least you could take a shot at maybe trying to avoid an annual fiasco. That was our motivation and our 
approach. (Laughter) 
G: On issues like this, did you ever ask for more than you thought you could get, thinking that they were going to cut something? 
O: Sure, within reason, but you'd always go on the up side because you just anticipated that at best you would be in an area of dollar compromise ultimately anyway. 
G: The creation of AID was that year, too, and again you had the multi-year funding question. 
O: Yes. Well, actually, multi-year funding you approached as sort of what have we got to lose and, who knows, maybe you might luck out, at least in part, because it was the route 
to travel anyway. It made sense. But that didn't mean that it was persuasive. 
G: There was a very close vote in the Senate on that AID measure, an amendment by Styles Bridges to prohibit any military aid to any countries that traded with communist countries. 
O: That's right. 
G: And you defeated that by a two-vote margin in the Senate. Do you remember that vote? 
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O: I don't remember the specifics of it, but Bridges really put in a major effort on that. He really did. He fought for that vigorously. I don't recall Bridges during that time being so 
totally involved in anything comparable to the effort that he expended there. He really made it very difficult. 
G: Did you sense the China lobby at work here? 
O: Yes. Because he pulled out all the stops that he was capable of pulling out. The record shows that he came awfully, awfully close to achieving his goal. I don't recall whether we 
anticipated it to the degree that it unfolded at the outset. Maybe we did, but I doubt it, because it became so intense it was surprising to us, as was the close vote. 
It's funny, when you mention Bridges and ask for recollections of someone, and this is no personal reflection on Bridges, but the one area of Bridges' activity that 
immediately comes to the forefront is this very exercise. I don't recall anything else particularly. While Bridges was obviously not a supporter, I don't recall him playing 
important or decisive roles in opposition. I mean, I don't think that he had that much weight in the Senate. But in this instance, he had, as it turned out, a very appealing 
argument. 
G: Well, he must have died shortly thereafter. I mean, he died during this period. 
O: Yes. 
G: Okay, you talked about Saund of California and the closing of the VA hospital there on AID. Passman evidently made a point of criticizing the administration lobbying on that 
measure, and even cited that LBJ had brought in Ayub Khan from Pakistan to give pep talks. Was this the case? 
O: I don't recall that it was the case at all, but I must say, anything that came to Passman's mind, I'll tell you, he articulated it. Passman could envision that the entire administration 
had dropped everything that it was engaged in and its sole effort was to defeat Passman. You could have suggested anything to Otto Passman and he would be a believer, saying, 
"They're doing this, that, or the other thing." I mean short of--G: 
He said Shriver visited every congressional office on the Hill. 
O: He's right. 
G: Shriver did? Why Shriver, because of the Peace Corps? 
O: Yes. And Sarge Shriver applied to this effort every fiber of his being. I had become acquainted with Sarge way back in 1952. At that time he worked for Joseph Kennedy in 
the Merchandise Mart, and he was on leave to us in the Massachusetts Senate campaign. And I recall very well that he was a man of inordinate drive and capacity for work. He 
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O'Brien --Interview I --80 
had a high degree of enthusiasm for whatever he was engaged in. And I will say this, that Sarge was as effective an administration official on the Hill as anyone I can think of. He 
was indefatigable. As you see, I'm a great admirer of his, because not only did he do that on the Hill, which I personally observed and was involved in, but every assignment that 
he's had. I've also noted that through his private sector life, he's applied the same effort. He and his wife have done just an outstanding job of organizing and directing the Special 
Olympics. It is one of the best programs for the disadvantaged that's ever been created, to the degree that I made a point, as commissioner of the NBA, to ensure that a major 
portion of our public service announcements that we had available to us on national television were devoted to the Special Olympics, along with contributions that players and 
coaches and others in the NBA made over the years. 
I wanted to say all that because Sarge Shriver to me in a lot of ways epitomizes what is termed a dedicated public servant. It was brought into focus in this effort, and that 
wasn't the only time Sarge tramped through the corridors up there. 
G: I'm sure we'll get to a lot of his help later when we get to the poverty program and other things, but in addition to this foreign aid measure this year, can you recall any other 
lobbying that he did? 
O: Well, on the whole Peace Corps obviously. I think a great deal of the success is due to Shriver and the reaction to him on the part of the members up there. There would be any 
number of occasions when I would be chatting with a member and he would reflect on his contacts with Sarge and how impressed he was with him. I think that, you know, if you 
could have had twenty-five Sarge Shrivers around, life would have been probably a lot more comfortable. 
G: Did both Presidents Johnson and Kennedy recognize this talent? 
O: Yes. Very much so. I think that President Johnson had his difficult moments trying to evaluate the various members of the Kennedy family, but with Sarge he saw early on a 
fellow that was outstanding. He held him in high regard. 
Tape 5 of 5, Side 1 
G: --purged from the subcommittee. 
O: In the first place, as far as the White House was concerned, we weren't in the business of issuing threats or encouraging purges. If, indeed, we would ever contemplate something 
like that, the last fellow that we would involve ourselves with in that regard would be Otto Passman, because it would have given him great joy; his martyr complex would have been 
further spotlighted, and he would have had great pleasure in making public pronouncements in this area forever. 
So, no, Otto Passman was, as I said, a very unusual guy. He was unique; he was 
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O'Brien --Interview I --81 
not well regarded among his colleagues. He was considered a bit of an off-beat character. He had this foreign aid hang-up and he had a great deal of control over foreign aid 
legislation. I have no knowledge that Passman was a contributing factor in any meaningful sense in any other area in the Congress. 
G: Did LBJ ever have any formula for dealing with him, or did he--? 
O: Not that I recall. I don't think there was a person in Washington who had a formula. Obviously the Republican administration had tried, and if he could aggravate Ike 
Eisenhower no end, then similarly aggravate his successor no end, and aggravate his own party's leadership in the House no end, I think that was it. There wasn't any formula to 
deal with Otto Passman. 
G: Okay. You mentioned the Peace Corps. Let me ask you briefly, apparently there was a little opposition to the Peace Corps, is that right? 
O: Yes. 
G: Where did the title come from, do you know? 
O: No, I don't. There was little opposition. It fitted in terms of the launching of the administration, the pronouncements of the new President, his aspirations and goals, and 
interestingly enough, it cut across the spectrum on the Hill. Members were early on, up front, intrigued with it. Which, incidentally, I must say was surprising to me. I don't 
remember specific members who expressed support for the Peace Corps, but I do recall that I was very much surprised with some of the early support and the sources from which 
it came. But I think you would again have to make reference to Sarge. I think that the reaction to Sarge personally was a very significant factor. 
G: How did Shriver end up with that assignment, do you recall? 
O: No, I don't. I don't [know] what conversations might have taken place within the family. I think that his reactions would be extremely positive in an area such as that. Re the 
members of the family--Steve Smith was in Washington for a while. I believe he had an assignment in the Defense Department, and there might have been another assignment. 
But I recall a conversation with Steve; Steve just didn't feel comfortable in Washington, in the administration. It wasn't his bent, and Steve really was anxious to go back to New 
York and the Kennedy Foundation. I remember having dinner with Steve one night, just the two of us. Our wives were on vacation. And you know, Steve is a very able fellow. 
But it was of interest to me that as he had a brother-in-law who was president of the United States, Steve could have carved out a career that would be meaningful in his 
brother-in-law's administration, but that didn't fit with him. 
G: Well, there still have been suggestions that Shriver was an outsider for the family, though, because he was an in-law rather than a--do you think there's an element of truth in that? 
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O'Brien --Interview I --82 
O: Well, the family, that's--we could spend several hours on the family, because obviously I had ample opportunity over many years to closely observe the family, and that's a story in 
itself. But I think when you're talking about in-laws, male or female, you have to remember the Kennedy family is a very closely-knit family with a very strong-willed father 
who had views that he had no hesitancy to express. I think it was a natural evolvement that if you married into the family, you were expected to become part of the family's way 
of life, whether it was touch football or whatever. 
So in that sense you're an outsider, and you accommodate yourself to the family, and you become a full participant in the Kennedy family life, which was a very active life 
among all of them. They're all active in sports and all that sort of thing. I think Sarge would come by that naturally anyway, because he was an excellent tennis player--I 
shouldn't say was, I assume he still is. And Steve Smith was athletically inclined, had a great interest in sports, so the fit is there. 
I think where I saw resistance to being encircled by the family was with Jackie. And I can remember occasions sitting on the porch at the compound in Hyannis with 
Jackie, with touch football going on, male-female participation to the fullest, and other physical activities, and Jackie felt very relaxed not participating. I would be a 
nonparticipant and sit with her. And Jackie had an independence of her own in terms of what her interests were. She did not drop all her interests and assume all the interests of 
the Kennedy group. 
So you can get into a lot of discussion; that's why to say Sarge was an outsider, I don't accept. I think that that was a marriage, he and Eunice, that couldn't have been more 
perfect. You know, there aren't many almost perfect marriages. I remember at their wedding over at the Waldorf, while Sarge was an employee of her father, they had mutual 
interests from the outset in the Special Olympics and in other activities they have engaged in together. They are both very religious and, you know, it was just a darned good fit. 
G: You didn't see, then, any kind of cleavage between Shriver as an in-law and the Kennedy brothers as natural siblings? 
O: That became a matter of public discussion at the time that Sarge was selected as a candidate for vice president by George McGovern, and inasmuch as I was one of the two 
or three, whatever it was, being considered by McGovern to take over the role of Tom Eagleton, I had a very close look at all of that. And there was a lot of talk about how the 
Kennedys would feel about Sarge seeking public office as a candidate for vice president. I never found that there was any concern on the part of the Kennedys. But that was when a 
lot of people suggested that perhaps the Kennedys feel that only Kennedys seek public office; that if you're not a Kennedy, even though you're a member of the family, that's 
probably not appropriate. But I never saw any evidence of that. 
And Sarge did what he always does: as a candidate for vice president he never 
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O'Brien --Interview I --83 
stopped running for vice president. He just devoted every waking minute for months to that effort. I don't know, it's hard for me to listen to all the stories, because some of these 
stories are repeated and repeated until they become, supposedly, factual. And I've often sat and thought, well, that isn't the way I saw it. And I felt on many of these occasions 
that I was in a position where I could view it, and that isn't the way it was. But that's the way media portrayed it and so be it. 
End of Tape 5 of 5 and Interview I 
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    [ Part 2: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--67 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview II*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
Project. In addition, some interviews were done for the Library under the auspices of the National Archives and the White House during the Johnson administration. 
Some of the Library's many oral history transcripts are available on the INTERNET. Individuals whose interviews appear on the INTERNET may have other interviews available on 
paper at the LBJ Library. Transcripts of oral history interviews may be consulted at the Library or lending copies may be borrowed by writing to the Interlibrary Loan Archivist, LBJ Library, 
2313 Red River Street, Austin, Texas, 78705. 
1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW II 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview II, 10/ 29/ 85, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
For Electronic Copy on Diskette from the LBJ Library: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview II, 10/ 29/ 85, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or 
3
loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out 
herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-13 
4
INTERVIEW II 
DATE: October 29, 1985 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 4, Side 1 
G: Let me start with a couple of general points that were raised by your papers. One, the problem of a congressman who is following a project through the various stages that it has 
to go through in the cabinet department and agency and BOB, and so he's fairly well abreast of each stage. Is it possible for him to learn, just through keeping abreast of it, the 
outcome before the White House does, or before you do, or the member that you want to notify first? 
O: Well, depending on his seniority in the Congress and, obviously, his direct relationship to the project by virtue of his committee assignment, that was conceivable and undoubtedly 
occurred. We made every effort to husband all of this information to impact it to the best of our ability and to the point where we worked out a program with the Bureau of the 
Budget, as well as all the departments and agencies, to try to get that first notice in there and to have the member--the friendly member--have the opportunity to make the 
announcement prior to the department, agency or any other governmental source. I think even the fellow that might have been tracking a particular project by virtue of his 
committee assignments, even under those circumstances, would probably not go public until there was a definitive, on-the-record decision. But I must say that if that were the 
case and he had the knowledge that you suggest, then our call to notify him would not have the impact that we'd like it to have. 
But I think those were unusual situations and I must say that it was a dangerous area in a lot of ways. I think our concern really went to a public discussion of this 
procedure. There was nothing basically wrong with it. We were not, in that process, endeavoring to dictate every decision in government. It was purely an effort to maintain 
and improve this individual relationship with these people. 
But you always had to be concerned that this could become a matter of public discussion and it could be reported in such a way that it would look devious. We had that 
occur. As I recall, it might have been the Wall Street Journal that made an effort to dig into these procedures and failed. There were a lot of denials of procedures internally, I'll 
admit to that. We carried it to a considerable extreme in the case of the two senators from Maine, Ed Muskie and Margaret Chase Smith. Bob McNamara became very exercised 
about this procedure, particularly when he was confronted by Senator Smith and accused of giving advance notice to Ed Muskie. Ed Muskie seemed to have statements in the 
Maine newspapers regarding decisions that were affecting the state of Maine; military 
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O'Brien --Interview II --2 
projects, bases in Maine. 
She was on the committee and McNamara became so concerned about it that he went to the President and said that he thought that this procedure should be closed out 
because it was embarrassing. The President discussed it directly with me, and the President and I quickly agreed the project would continue, the effort would continue, the 
procedure would continue. It was obviously very helpful. But, in order to pacify Margaret Chase Smith, we set up a situation in which Ed Muskie sent us a letter objecting 
strenuously to some procedure under which Margaret Chase Smith, in his judgment, was given notice ahead of him when it should have been joint. That was made known to 
Margaret Chase Smith--Ed Muskie was concerned because he felt that she was getting preference because of the committee on which she was serving. That closed that out and 
we heard nothing further. 
But that one media effort to delve into this procedure, which didn't cause any waves, was just about all I can recall that occurred. Now, it depended on the district, too. 
Coming from Massachusetts--I was from the Second Congressional District--there was a congressman by the name of [Edward] Boland, who was a lifelong friend of mine, as a 
matter of fact. Just to apply this to the individual congressman, Boland would receive this twenty-four or forty-eight-hour advance notice and he would contact the newspapers and 
media in his district with a statement. And that would be page one news usually. Now, that was the nature of the district. The largest city in the district was one hundred 
seventy-five thousand, the city of Springfield, [and there were] a lot of smaller cities and smaller communities. And the impact was there and it, obviously, was of great assistance 
to the Congressman. 
However, you could be one of fifteen congressmen in the city of New York, and perhaps there's very little of this that was of any great help because in New York, just as 
any other major metropolitan area--but I think New York is obviously a good example--congressmen get lost in the shuffle. And their effort to get into print in New York is a 
very difficult one. So perhaps some project affecting Greater New York would be shared by so many members of Congress that it would very much lessen the potential impact. 
But overall it was a resource, it was as simple as that, and a resource that we [used] on a trial basis in 1961. [We continued] refining it operationally and indeed, 
mechanically, so this was an automatic, day-to-day procedure and encompassed everything we could put our hands on in the executive branch of government. As we 
refined that and noted how meaningful it could be in most instances, we were not going to relinquish that because of Senator Smith, or indeed Bob McNamara, who in fairness to 
him, did not have a political background. He was not as sensitive to the PR value of this in terms of an open door up on the Hill, if not the actual vote of a member in a given set of 
circumstances. 
But it was of concern to some of the people in the administration. I think an example was referred to in a memo [by] Elmer Staats. Elmer was a career fellow and he 
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O'Brien --Interview II --3 
was at Budget and that would be a source in that you could be advised and counselled by Budget, [which] in turn would probably give you a little lead time in some departments 
and agencies at times so you could anticipate these opportunities. But there was a recognition on the part of the people there that this was something that we valued, that it 
was not in any sense suggesting to Budget or anyone else that they take action in any way. It was just after the fact that we wanted the information, but before the general 
procedural announcement and that was all. 
G: Yes. 
O: And they accepted that and recognized it and, consequently, even people that would not be politically oriented or not perhaps have direct concern about the legislative process 
were very cooperative and understanding. The guidelines were established and were confidential. As time went on and it became more refined, it became an adjunct of the 
operation of the Congressional Relations office in the White House that was as automatic as opening the doors each day. 
G: Well, how specifically did you bring all the departments and agencies into line in following this procedure? 
O: Well, you started with a basic premise, and I'm sure I'm going to be repeating myself on some of these things but editing will take care of it ultimately, I hope. But where was the 
starting point, what was the concept? First of all, and I think every president-elect and his associates go through this process and take it very seriously. Now that you have the reins 
of power, you are going to make every effort to ensure that the executive branch of government reacts to your interest, your goals. That means that you want to put in place 
in every important slot in government people who a) are competent and b) very importantly, share your goals. And that, over a period of time, has frustrated every 
administration in my judgment; actually placing these people in position. It frustrated us. But in the excitement of an approaching inauguration, the day the President named his 
cabinet and the rest, we were not oblivious to this. We didn't have it refined or in some documented form. But the President and I, and the President and all of us--the President-elect--
knew where we wanted to go and that the control aspect was going to be extremely important. We were going to exercise every effort we could to bring it about. 
For example, and I think this was without exception, as the President designated his cabinet members on the steps of his home in Georgetown, or whatever form was taken 
to make these announcements, immediately, that designee was advised that his first order of business was to sit down with me. At that time I was staying in the Mayflower Hotel, 
and I had arranged, whether it was just a one-on-one session or dinner in the suite, that there would be a solid, in-depth discussion of the goals and the aspirations of the 
administration and what we would envision from the White House to be the team role of each cabinet member. And it varied somewhat. Stew Udall would be very familiar with 
the procedure; there's no need to try to outline it or detail it to Stew, so you chat with him rather informally. With Doug Dillon or Bob McNamara, it would be necessary to review 
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O'Brien --Interview II --4 
all this very carefully. These were men of high quality; you wanted to be absolutely sure they weren't, right at the outset after they're appointed, receiving suggestions that could 
remotely be construed as anything but a proper manner of doing things. 
But you really took off from one premise--everything focuses on the President. Every action taken, every department and agency must focus on the President. It's the 
President's program; the President is the boss; the President must at all times be cast in the best light possible. When negatives occur, the responsibility must be absorbed as much as 
possible by the cabinet member or whomever. There's only one program, and, while the effort will be expended by each cabinet member obviously in behalf of the program that 
directly involves his department, he has the responsibility to be part of the overall effort to bring about the enactment of the New Frontier program. It is essential that all top-level 
appointments be cleared by the White House. If the cabinet designee has an interest in making a recommendation in a given instance, it certainly will be looked at, and looked at 
carefully. There will be times, however, when the cabinet member will be informed as to who the President would like to see in a designated position in the departments and 
agencies, and that has to be an accepted procedure. And all of that, of course, was the beginning of an effort to bring under the direction of the White House as much as you 
could of the executive branch of government in the interests of the President. There were a couple of isolated instances that I recall where there was some slight resistance, or some 
resistance, to this procedure as time went on. 
G: Can you give specifics here? 
O: Well, interestingly enough, if a cabinet member had a political background--some did--there was an acknowledgement of this and acceptance of it. This wasn't anything 
surprising at all; this is the way the procedure would be and certainly should be. But if you did not have that political background and you were not probably as sensitive to this, 
then you had to adjust to it. The adjustment process wasn't difficult, because there again, you know that there's one boss and it's the president. Everybody is on the team, but it's 
the president you look to at all times for leadership. Your responsibility goes to the president in every aspect of the performance of your duties and responsibilities. That's 
nothing that isn't obvious. But the adjustment to it in a couple of instances was not immediate and there was at least what we perceived to be some foot-dragging. I think one 
member of the original cabinet of President Kennedy that had difficulty with it was the Postmaster General, Ed Day. Ed talked to me on a number of occasions and to others in 
the White House and he felt that "White House staff," quote, unquote, were interfering with the conduct of his office by making suggestions to him of one sort or another which 
he resented. 
G: These were like where to build the post office or jobs or--? 
O: Some of that, but even to the point of suggestions as to commemorative stamps. You can picture the pressures being exerted in that area at that time, and I learned it directly later 
on as postmaster general. I understood it, but it became part of my own direct activities 
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O'Brien --Interview II --5 
for which I took certain steps by way of forming committees that were helpful. But if you, as the postmaster general, receive a call from Larry O'Brien, and it is suggested by Larry 
O'Brien that it would be in the interest of the President and the administration and our relationship with the Congress to have a stamp, of the fifteen or so commemorative 
stamps that were issued each year, and the Postmaster General felt that perhaps there was somebody else or some other entity that perhaps should be so honored, I think that 
perhaps Ed Day would feel, "I don't understand this, there seems to be politics in this." Well, of course, there was politics in it. 
But I mention Ed because he came from a business background. He was a senior officer in a major company. He came from the West Coast. He had a close association 
with Adlai Stevenson initially. He was an early Kennedy supporter. He was recommended to us when we were sorting out cabinet suggestions by some people on the 
West Coast. The President-elect had an interest in having a businessman in the cabinet to achieve balance. Anyway, as the process unfolded, Ed Day became the designee, to his 
utter surprise and amazement because he never sought the post. And I remember rather vividly Ed being asked to get on the earliest plane he could to come to Washington for a 
discussion with the President-elect, and [he] had no idea just what was to be discussed. 
Well, that was the background of it. Now, Ed Day was a very able fellow and, as a matter of fact, I believe stayed pretty much in postal activities in the private sector after 
he left the Post Office Department. But some of Ed's stated concerns became a matter of general knowledge in the White House and of specific knowledge to the President. There 
were discussions regarding Ed to the effect that he seemed to register more objection to this procedure than others and, after all, the Post Office Department was a source. 
G: Sure. 
O: But Ed I don't think really enjoyed being in that position. I can understand that. That was contra to his experiences in the private sector in the high-level positions he had held in the 
business community. He did not, of course, have the political background that would probably help in bringing him along on this process. Whatever the reasons were--and 
there was nothing personal and there was respect for Ed and I respect him to this day. I knew him probably better in later years than I did at that time, because we were in touch 
with each other on a number of occasions in postal matters in later years. But Ed chose to leave the cabinet. And I suggest that there were probably a couple of other situations 
somewhat similar, that you do have a little of that. I don't know whether arrogance was shown toward Ed. That would not be my way of doing things. 
As part of this communication process, it was well understood throughout the administration that a cabinet member would make himself available promptly in response 
to a Larry O'Brien telephone call. Now, that didn't mean that everybody on that White House staff could pick up the phone and call a cabinet member. Maybe others did and 
made attempts in their own way to exert pressures of one sort or another; I'm sure things like that probably occurred. And that would aggravate me. It would aggravate me, 
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O'Brien --Interview II --6 
because I was in that position in later years. But if it was held to the President and his immediate designee, so to speak, the cabinet member should not react adversely. He 
might want to discuss it or he might even object to a particular appointment. If so, that appointment may not be made because, after all, you weren't going to foist upon a member 
of the cabinet an assistant secretary or deputy that was not going to work effectively with him. 
So a lot of give and take took place. This was not a matter of just calling him in and saying, "Here is your deputy, and here are your assistant secretaries." That was a 
matter of discussion and oftentimes those decisions were made jointly. I don't want to belabor that. I don't want, also, to suggest that we were all just nice folks, that we weren't 
a little hard-bitten, a little driven. After all, there was an overriding objective and every resource had to be put into play to achieve that objective. 
So I would say without question--and that applied over the years that I was involved with both Presidents, Kennedy and Johnson--that the understanding and 
cooperation at the cabinet level were good. There was a rare occurrence when--and I have certainly understood--for example, when Bob McNamara became concerned. After 
all, if I were up there before Maggie Smith--and Maggie Smith starts to berate me for a procedure that obviously was in place--and I'm sitting there saying I'm doing the best I can 
and "Well, I'm not quite familiar with that, I'll look into it," sort of thing, I can understand that if a fellow has had a long political background, he probably can play that one out. 
But if you don't and you don't really like the procedure anyway, you're apt to have strong views concerning it. 
But that was part and parcel of the initial effort to try to have as clear an understanding as you could, [but] that was a role the President-elect did not want to 
undertake. If he were sitting with a fellow who was ultimately his designee for a position in the cabinet--probably after consideration of any number of others and after the decision 
was made and the announcement was made--it wasn't seemly for the President to say, "By the way, Joe, I want to be sure you understand how this works and how it's played out." 
That was a role I could undertake. I had an understanding with the President-elect that it was simply in the context of explaining how we envisioned relations with the Congress 
and how efforts in the legislative program would play out and, also, that we had political responsibilities in terms of appointments and assignments. No one was going to be foisted 
on any of these people who was inept and not fully qualified. 
G: Well, in the case, let's say, of the Labor Department where you had a large interest group that was close to the Kennedy campaign, would they have more influence in the naming of 
subcabinet positions? 
O: If they chose to exercise influence, they could have more influence to some degree than perhaps other private sector entities. But interestingly enough, there wasn't that pressure. 
I think that went to the basic feeling of organized labor as reflected in George Meany's style--and he was the fellow that was in place during our years--and a desire on the part of 
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O'Brien --Interview II --7 
Meany and organized labor and COPE to preserve an independence. And, also, when you think about it, [to] be able to react as they saw fit without being inhibited by favors 
rendered to them. There was not, as I recall it, any pressure points involving labor that impacted on the top-level designees in the Labor Department. I'm not suggesting that the 
President-elect might not talk to George Meany about who he had in mind as secretary of labor. I'm sure that you would not be naming people at the top level of the Labor 
Department if the AFL-CIO, or indeed the UAW, had strong objections to that individual. But that never occurred, because we were in a friendly climate and there were 
opportunities to name people that labor would have no objection to. 
As time went on, labor preserved its rights. We weren't at all times in accord. Even in battles over amendments to legislation, whether it was minimum wage, the whole 
Taft-Hartley efforts and all the rest over the years, there were times when labor was not enamored with our decisions or our actions. But Andy Biemiller, who was George 
Meany's key representative in the legislative process, was a former congressman who had been long with the AFL-CIO, was respected on the Hill and a fellow I found very easy to 
work with. He had a good understanding and he was a dedicated labor man. [Alexander] Barkan is another example of a fellow who fought labor's battles. They fought them with 
everything they had, intensively. But I don't think they wanted to be inhibited by any even indirect suggestion that "Hey, you shouldn't be in strong opposition to this particular 
action that's being undertaken, because look what we've done for you. You've got your pals in place in the Labor Department." They preferred it otherwise and that's the way it 
was. 
G: On the point that you mentioned earlier, the relationship between the White House staff and the cabinet officer, you've been both. And I want to ask, on the basis of both 
perspectives, was it ever a problem to establish whether or not the White House staff member was in fact speaking for the President rather that just himself or his own office? 
O: Not that I recall. While I can only speak for the Congressional Relations staff, or I guess I could speak generally, certainly, it seems to me--and I'm sure this occurred in any number 
of ways--that, for example, Ken O'Donnell, because of his acknowledged close proximity to the President, calling a cabinet or subcabinet member would be understood by that 
person as an authorized call. Certainly any call I made to the cabinet members, or they made to me, probably 90 plus per cent of those calls related to the legislative program, to 
requests of cabinet members to do certain things, make certain contacts, or discussions about progress or lack of progress in a given instance. Each cabinet member, I'm sure, or 
agency head, would not consider that a discussion with me was not a presidentially-approved discussion; that I was [not] in a role that was totally accepted as a spokesman 
for the President. That applied after a relatively brief period of time on the Hill, and I've reflected on that before. 
G: Yes. 
O: The operation on the Hill was far more sensitive than operating with your own colleagues 
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O'Brien --Interview II --8 
in the executive branch. That kind of activity within your own group was no problem at all, but certainly on the Hill you had to be very concerned about how this would unfold. 
And certainly, if I were a member and if I had known Jack Kennedy while we had been colleagues and now he is the President, it would be kind of nice, if I wanted some action in 
a given area or I wanted to suggest legislation or get concurrence on some action I was going to take as a committee chairman, to just pick up the phone and call the President. 
Now, obviously, the reality is that no president is in the position to be constantly engaged in that sort of activity. But by the same token, if you're up there on the Hill, you want to 
test the procedure. You want to at least find out about this fellow O'Brien, who may not be very well known to you, indeed, determine if you can get a definitive answer on 
whatever you're seeking. And if he is totally supported by the President, you don't have any qualms about it, so there's no need to be going to the President. 
President Kennedy early on was sensitive to that, too, and he started to receive some of those calls and he would give them the same response, "Have you discussed this 
with Larry O'Brien?" "No, I haven't." "I'd urge you to do it because Larry is in the position to work it out with you and certainly he'll report back to me." There was only a 
very brief period of time when bypassing Congressional Relations and going directly to the source was really the case. There was an acceptance of that, and it was evidenced in a 
variety of ways, so I felt comfortable. By the same token, once that was established, another responsibility was placed on me and the people that worked with me. When you 
did make a statement or take a position you'd better be able to back it up, and you had to be sure of the President's confidence in you and your judgment. So you reflected on those 
factors when you made any comments or responses. 
But, initially, how do you go about something like this when, at the outset, you try to determine what resources you have, how broad and deep a team you can develop to 
carry on this task of promoting a program with five hundred and thirty-five members of Congress? You just try to ferret out these elements of resource and coordinate them. 
But, as I said, in the climate of the sensitivity of separation of powers, there lies the difference. You can exert pressure in the executive branch, and, if a fellow wants to defy 
you, then that's too bad for him. I would hope you wouldn't be arrogant in the process, because we were all on the same team. But there's that separation up there on the hill, and 
what you're trying to do is move in with people who are decision-makers who, hopefully, at no time will feel you are just being too wise, too smart, or too forward. 
That was really what it was all about, and a lot of it was trial and error. On reflection, I can't tell you when we decided that we would have regular meetings during 
congressional sessions in the White House with the top congressional liaison person in each department and agency. It happened relatively early, but it didn't happen Day One. 
And all of these other refinements--were we thinking of the use of the Sequoia in January, February, March of 1961? These refinements came bit by bit as you tried to implement 
the process you had established. 
Before discussing the role of the President, let me reiterate that the Congressional 
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O'Brien --Interview II --9 
Relations process started with a president and a staff member he designated who were unsure of how it should be undertaken and unaware of the limited informal activities in 
this area in past administrations. From Day One, the need to husband the President's time and safeguard his influence became self-evident. You could not allow the effort you were 
undertaking to reach the point where direct contact with the President was simply a routine matter on Capitol Hill. Presidential contact had to be something that impressed a 
member of Congress and happened on rare occasions. When he received a direct call from the President or an invitation to come down to have a meeting with the President that was 
impressive and the Congressman or Senator reacted accordingly. If a member reached the point of saying, "Oh, hell, there's another call from the President," then you lost the single, 
overriding resource you had available to you. 
G: Sure. Was LBJ more inclined to have a day-to-day contact with members of the Congress than Kennedy was? 
O: I would say yes. With Kennedy I would try to husband his time by very carefully developing the effort that I'd like to have him make in a given instance. If that meant 
having six members of Congress to the White House because we have clear, definite information that they are very much in question and that only presidential effort could 
bring them into line, then I would make that request to the President. I would be very, very careful to make it only when I had determined we'd exhausted every possibility and 
there was one last opportunity and that was the President. I would make that request, and I would not be hearing from President Kennedy saying, "I haven't heard from you in a 
week about calls you want me to make or some social occasion or some meeting with a member. What's going on?" It was quite different. He would hear from me, and I would 
make the request. On every occasion, sometimes perhaps a little reluctantly, the President would undertake it. I think he felt that these contacts were kept to the absolute minimum, 
and he knew the motivation would have to be one of last resort--that there was a need for presidential participation. 
Now President Johnson would inquire. As we talked about legislative struggles and I would give him a current version of a head count, he would note that there were 
members who were not listed right and they should be, in his judgment. My job then became somewhat different, because I would want to keep him removed from direct 
contact as much as possible, again feeling if you do that around the clock there's no impact left after a period of time. While I knew that Johnson's intense interest in a program, 
obvious-lei, was motivating him and that there was no time day or night he wasn't prepared to charge in, I think his readiness to participate created a different kind of 
responsibility for me. And I tried with some degree of success--
G: Did you succeed in this way? 
O: Yes--
Tape 1 of 4, Side 2 
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O'Brien --Interview II --10 
G: You were saying that there were times when you would even ask him if the President wanted you to make a call. Is that right, or he would ask you if he--? 
O: No, he would ask me if I wanted him to make some calls. I had to fight it a little bit because of his intense interest in the progress of the legislation. 
G: Was he more inclined to make calls that you didn't know about than President Kennedy would have been? 
O: He might have, although I must say that, to my knowledge at least, I don't know what personal or old friendship calls he might make from time to time, but calls that were aimed 
to the process, to vote-getting and the rest, he would talk to me about them first. He recognized this, and we had candid discussions. I'd say, "Mr. President, you just can't do 
this. There are twenty-two more we're working on, and we haven't exhausted this yet, and I don't want you [to] because it just isn't right, and I'd argue with him about it. And he'd 
say, "Well, okay, but let me know now. Don't let it go by if you want me to call, or you want to call those fellows down, okay, I'm ready." 
I guess the extent of it was epitomized by my call to him one morning, which I guess I referred to, in the early hours of the morning when I knew he was just awake. I 
had been up all night, and we had lost a battle in the House. But anyway we lost it in the early hours of the morning in a very tough struggle, and Charlie Halleck had prevailed. 
And you're depressed and you leave the Hill, it's four or four-thirty in the morning, and you're heading home and then you decide to not go to bed at all. But you owe it to the 
President to advise him of the negative as well as the positive, and so you wait dutifully till six-thirty, a quarter of seven, whatever it was, and you call the President and advise him. 
Then President Johnson is saying, "When did this happen?" I said, "It was the early hours of the morning." And he said, "Why didn't you call me? You should have called me and 
told me about it." Then I'll never forget, he said, "You know, when you're up there bleeding, I want to bleed with you. We have to share these things." I never got over that. 
G: Isn't that amazing? 
O: Of course, the last thing in the world I would have done is wake him up to tell him. (Laughter) I'm sure it was momentous at the moment, important and significant. It was 
so important and significant I can't recall the specific incident. But I think it typified the intensity of our effort at all times. He was just great that way, and obviously when a 
fellow says that to you, your boss, the President of the United States, you're not about to change your practice and say, "Well, now he has told me, 'Why don't you call me at three 
or four o'clock in the morning and wake me up. '" No, you're not going to do it, but I think it just underscored his personal involvement and his strong support for what you 
were doing. 
G: You were an old friend and ally of President Kennedy long before he assumed the 
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O'Brien --Interview II --11 
presidency, and much less so with Lyndon Johnson. Were you as comfortable arguing with LBJ or trying to persuade him to do what you thought ought to be done? Was he as 
approachable to you in this sense? 
O: In a way probably even more so. 
G: Why is that? 
O: I think the nature of the fellow, his style, his personality. I think, as I keep referring for want of the use of a better word, the husbanding of presidential involvement. On the 
Kennedy side, I think that it was probably something that President Kennedy never gave any great thought to, that even on the group events and all the efforts we made to ensure 
communication that I've referred to in the past, I would try to work out a schedule where he would meet for social hours or with an entire group in an important matter. And I 
would try to schedule those well in advance and put them into his overall schedule. And it would have been a rarity--there were some occasions, but rare occasions--when I would 
disrupt his schedule and say, "You've just got to move into this now, and calls have to be made, or you have to see Charlie Halleck." Because that incident is one that stays in my 
mind, on civil rights. 
But with President Johnson I would not--let me go back a little bit. I don't recall that at the end of a day, you know, when you get to six, seven o'clock in the evening, or 
whatever, that President Kennedy was apt to call and say, "Well, I know all this activity has been going on. What's it look like?" With President Johnson, he would similarly 
know there was a lot of activity going on involving a vital piece of legislation on the Hill. But he'd call and want to know what's going on. And that would generally lead to saying: 
"Come on in. You've got to come downstairs." I was one flight over the Oval Office. You go down there and you might spend several hours discussing that and a myriad of 
other things until Mrs. Johnson would keep pleading with the President to go to the living quarters and have a bite to eat. 
So I felt very comfortable. I think that I enjoyed him, for one thing. I hadn't known him well, but in very short order I liked his openness. I was not a Johnson fellow. 
After all, after Dallas, you had two layers of staff for a while, until things melded reasonably well. Now, that didn't affect me at all on the Congressional Relations side, but 
I think that there were [conflicts]. You know, Ken O'Donnell was the appointments secretary, Jack Valenti was sitting right in the hallway there, and there was Walter Jenkins. 
The President's feeling in the transition was retain the Kennedy staff, but I also want my own people. I would think that in Ken O'Donnell's role, outside the Oval Office door and 
with a new president in there, it probably wasn't very workable. While with me, the fellows, the Johnson people, no matter what their assignments were, joined me at his 
urging in participating in the legislative effort. That applied to every Johnson person in the White House over the years that I was there. 
For example, Bob Hardesty became a key fellow. We worked out a system of 
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O'Brien --Interview II --12 
trying to load down the Congressional Record with pro-Great Society comments of all sorts, placing them on the Hill for insertion. Well, that was another dimension. And Bob, 
who was an extremely able guy who had been at the Post Office Department, was very knowledgeable. Not only was he an excellent writer and very quick in developing 
statements for the Record--statements that we'd ask members to enter--but he also was good at seeing that they were properly disseminated. And as you know, our old friend 
[Jake] Jacobsen had a role in the White House which we didn't have in the Kennedy White House. He received delivery of that Congressional Record in the wee hours of the 
morning at his home, and had that Record completely reviewed and duly noted with clips so that the President could take an early-morning look at the results of all these efforts 
we're making. 
Now, you reach that point and then what else is there you can do? There's always something more you can add to this overall effort. But we'd get into head counts in tough 
times when it appeared close and it was a real drive to bring about success. The President would, for example, look over the head count of the Texas delegation, because he was 
always interested [in it], and he'd have very forceful and candid comments about everyone, particularly if there was a question mark or a "no" next to the name. (Laughter) Then the 
next thing you know, Marvin Watson and others would be on the phone calling old Texas buddies. You know, all of this was going on. There was no limit to the effort and no limit 
to what you might undertake within some degree of reason, to get back to my old phrase, to maximize the effort. 
Now, that was the Johnson White House and that was the Great Society program, and consequently, what did I want? I'm a member of the staff in one area of activity and 
you want presidential support for your efforts? Boy, you had it coming out your ears! (Laughter) You had all you could cope with and more by way of support. There was an 
army. 
G: President Johnson, though, did have a reputation for berating his staff. Was this a tendency that at times made you reluctant to confront him with something that you felt 
was wrong? 
O: Not at all. I guess there will be disbelievers, but I can tell you that in my years associated with Lyndon Johnson I never had anything remotely like a confrontation. 
G: Really? 
O: Now, having said that, I think people wouldn't believe it. But I would hear he had some heated discussion with Bill Moyers or George Reedy or whomever. Never in my 
presence. I mean I never was a witness to any of that. And I assume that I heard enough about that sort of thing that such occurrences took place. I can't recall meanness or 
nastiness expressed by the President. 
I must say that because of his personality and his openness--I've always had the 
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O'Brien --Interview II --13 
reputation of being rather verbose myself and, Lord knows, Lyndon Johnson had that reputation, so the two of us together, on a matter that could be resolved in five or ten 
minutes could result in an hour of discussion. But it never posed a problem to me at all. 
I can say this: that whatever did not go right regarding the Great Society program and its enactment certainly was not due to any failure on the part of Lyndon Johnson to 
devote maximum effort to it. I'd have to take that responsibility myself, and there may have been occasions when perhaps I should have said to the President, "Why don't you 
make these calls?" which he would have done without hesitation. I really had followed the same procedure I did with Kennedy, that you go to the President and insert him into a 
battle only when every other possibility has been exhausted. 
I do remember--it was a discharge petition on District of Columbia home rule--I ran into that buzz saw one night. I was sitting in the outer office, the small office outside 
the Oval Office, with the President and we were going over this discharge petition. At this point the liberals, the Joe Rauhs and the rest of them, had given up on the Hill. They 
claimed there was no way you could get the necessary signatures on the discharge petition. Each time you came close, some people would withdraw their names. But I 
guess I mentioned the twenty-two--I don't know why it sticks in my mind--but there were twenty-two nonsignatories to the discharge petition that had no good reason not to sign. 
In the conversation with the President, I revealed this to him. We were talking and I had the head count in my pocket and here are these twenty-two. Now, these are twenty-two 
liberal Democrats. And this could make the difference. Well, I couldn't stop him. He proceeded to pick up the phone and gave the White House telephone operator the names 
of the twenty-two and chased them all over town. I don't recall he had caught all twenty-two by the time I went home, but he stayed with it. He'd have some conversations with 
them, I'll tell you. I thought, now we're going to have presidential involvement in this matter when there were probably other occasions when it could have been more significant 
and I had not [asked him]. But this was inadvertent. But once he saw those twenty-two names and reflected on a few of them, nothing could stop him. 
G: What would he say to them on the phone, for example? 
O: [He'd] say to them, "Come on, you can't do this. This is ridiculous. Listen, I'm putting you down. I'm sitting here with Larry and we're talking about this and there's no way you 
can. . . . Is that right, you'll do it tomorrow? Come on now." There would be little or no conversation on the other end; it was always sort of one-sided. He just worked them over 
and it succeeded. But the fact of the matter is, I thought later, "I don't know. Perhaps I should have picked my spots a little better." (Laughter) As I say, I didn't go to him. 
There's no way I would have gone to him and said, "Here's twenty-two names. I'm going to sit with you, and let's make twenty-two phone calls." Why, I wouldn't have deigned to 
do something like that! That's probably as good an example as I can cite of my association with him and the personal effort he would undertake. It was amazing to see it 
all unfold. And his conversations were figuratively nose to nose. If it was in person it would have been nose to nose, hand on the shoulder and whacking the back. He was 
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O'Brien --Interview II --14 
verbalizing the same sort of thing on the telephone, and it was an example of the need to husband his activities. Because if he did that every night of the week, there might have 
been people on the Hill that didn't want to take his phone call. (Laughter) 
G: Let's go again to the question of notification of projects. It's clear from your files that this is something that members of Congress were keenly interested in, having that notification 
so they could get what you described as that front page story in the Springfield newspaper, something like that. I notice that sometimes even when you did give them 
advance notice that they might not get the word out before some of their competitors did. Was this a problem? 
O: It was a problem at times. 
G: And they would blame you, or they would blame your office even though they got the advance notice. They might not react as quickly--
O: Every minute of the day there's something happening somewhere, in some department or agency that can impact on this and be helpful. So you're doing all you can to keep your 
hands on every aspect of it. These calls became routine. And Claude [Desautels] or somebody in the office would call the member's administrative assistant and say, "Now 
we'll have the following information--just jot it down A, B, C, D--and your boss can make the announcement. He ought to make it promptly." And not to excuse inadvertency at 
times, we found that a lot had to do with the reaction of that person in that office. And then a member would learn that some colleague had made some announcement where they 
had adjoining districts or the mix was such that it involved more than one member of the House and, of course, you'd have the Senate. If you had a Democrat in the Senate, of 
course, he could be making the announcement on a statewide basis as the member was on a district basis. 
When those occasions arose, interestingly enough, it was often due to the inadvertency of the member's office, the failure to recognize the immediacy of it. 
Sometimes there was a scream from the member. Then the member would recognize that this called for action on his part to ensure that when that call was received, [the 
announcement was made]. After all, there were days when you might be making fifty calls and you had to spread it out. The person designated on our call list was the one that 
would get the message, and we'd advise that member, "That call was made at such and such a time"--it was logged--" and the information was provided." And it wasn't unusual 
for the member to check it out in his own office and find that's where it occurred. Now, there may have been times where there was failure on our part; I'm sure those situations 
occurred, too. But it was again to the best of your ability. And I would say the overall impact of this procedure far overrode any failures on our part or the member's office to 
follow through. 
G: Some Republicans accused you of more or less being secretive or withholding information from them. This was the charge that they made in this connection. 
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O'Brien --Interview II --15 
O: Well, I guess the charge was valid. If withholding meant their office wasn't called, then that was withholding. 
G: Okay. Now, another dimension of this, and we talked about it last time, was the matter of patronage. I have a note that Dick Donahue handled a lot of your patronage. 
O: Yes. 
G: Tell me how this worked. 
O: Well, patronage, it took a wide dimension; it might even go to trying to get some clerk in an office promoted. There were many of these little items that might have been somewhat 
meaningful to the member or probably just a pain to the member that he wanted to get rid of in terms of some constituent pressures on him. It could run to all kinds of--it 
oftentimes had to do with postmasterships, rural mail carriers, lower-level positions in departments and agencies at the regional level, all over the lot. 
Much of it would be a congressman or a senator responding to a constituent by sending you a letter. And you had to make judgments, and Dick Donahue was excellent in 
this area. If that member sent a letter saying, "I am pleased to recommend John Smith, who is a most deserving constituent of mine, for consideration to be deputy assistant 
regional something or other in Omaha," Dick could--and that was as a result of conversation between Dick and me--pretty much construe that it wasn't of overriding 
interest. You would put it into the mix and you'd make an inquiry about it--I'm really talking about an amazing variety of recommendations. [If the check revealed that] it didn't 
make sense or was unfair to other employees or there'd be jumping a [grade], you wouldn't have any hesitancy to send a letter back or make a phone call, whichever way 
Dick wanted to do it, and say, this just isn't going to work. And you found that it was only the rare occasion that that member would put up a fight, but he wants something in 
writing saying that we've seriously considered [it]; there'll probably be another opportunity for John Smith in the future. Then he can send the copy of the letter, and so his 
constituent got a negative but at least the constituent knew that the member had made a plea for him. You might not think that would be the case, but most of the fellows on the 
Hill were realists. 
Now, if the fellow on the Hill said, "When you get a chance I'd like to have you drop by. I'd like to talk about a constituent of mine that you're just going to be so 
impressed with." Or which was more often the case, the fellow said, "I want to drop down. Can I set up an appointment and come down and visit you in your office to discuss 
this?" Then you're dealing with a serious case in terms of the interest of the member. Accordingly you may have to nudge this a little bit. Perhaps, if everything else is equal or 
close to equal, then it's going to work. However, in much of this our referral would be to the Democratic National Committee. While we retained the active interest in making a 
determination, we would be quick to say, "This is being referred to John Bailey." If the 
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O'Brien --Interview II --16 
decision was negative and it was in an area other than just routine, a notch or two beyond or higher at times, John Bailey would be the one that would have to notify the member 
that this wasn't doable. 
So you're not really sitting with a documented, written check list of procedure. You're making political judgments, always having in mind the retention of friendship, the 
improvement of friendship and contact. And weighing all of this sort of thing, it's a difficult area. But often you would find that whether John Smith or Joe Brown in a 
regional office of the Small Business [Administration] or whatever was given this new assignment, it was not significant. Either one could qualify so why not do it for the fellow 
that the congressman was interested in? 
G: Did you ever have a situation where you desperately wanted a guy appointed because that was the formula for, say, getting an important piece of legislation passed? If you could do 
something for this congressman or senator, you felt like he would be right on an issue and--? 
O: No. I'll tell you, however, situations somewhat like that did occur from time to time. If it was clear to us that the appointment should not be made, the qualifications just weren't 
there, and it was just counterproductive to satisfy the member of Congress, we made that determination up front. We stayed with it. There were any number of times that we 
would deny the request. That just was part of the procedure. And you would try to do it in the best possible manner. You would always have it reflect some serious 
considerations, some thought, and you would be candid. You'd say, "Listen, it doesn't add up; the department head"--or whatever it might have been--" says that this man has been 
interviewed early on for this position [and] has been turned down for the following reasons," or whatever. 
If you ever allowed yourself to be lulled into that sort of procedure, it would be counterproductive and the wrong procedure to follow in the best interest of the President. 
Because invariably, even at somewhat lower levels, this is going to come back to haunt you and you shouldn't do it. It just isn't right to do it, and you just have to bite the bullet. 
We were biting so many bullets in that area, in patronage, all the time that you were inured to a return call saying, "I can't understand this." Inured to it, you had to be, because with 
that fellow up there on the Hill in that particular instance the answer is no, it's not going to be done. You're just hopeful that in follow-ups there'll be other areas, patronage or 
whatever it might be, where he's going to be pleased with your answers and judge you've been fair to him. You're talking about quality in government and competency and if you 
can't fulfill that to the best of your ability despite pressures, then you have failed. And you couldn't have a Dick Donahue or anyone else sitting there feeling that his job was to put 
the square peg in the round hole because some guy yelled at him from the Hill. You just couldn't do it. 
G: Did you ever want to effect an appointment and have John Bailey or the Democratic National Committee say no, that--? 
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O'Brien --Interview II --17 
O: No, they weren't in a position to say no. 
G: Is that right? 
O: And that's no reflection on John Bailey. That was an area I had a great sensitivity to because, coming from political organization, I felt that the role of the Democratic National 
Committee should be enhanced, we should be supportive. I'll have to say that just wasn't the case. I think unfairly in the Kennedy period, and I'm trying to recall the Johnson 
period, the Democratic National Committee was cast in the role that the party entity seems to have been in historically. When you are the chairman and your party is in the White 
House, there's a world of difference. I was chairman of the Democratic National Committee when the party was out of office, and there's a role that you can develop in 
terms of being a spokesman on the attack of the incumbent administration. Obviously, there's no patronage involved if you're out of office, and you can perform that role. It's a 
role somewhat like the current role of Paul Kirk--trying to always seek harmony and develop programs as an out party. But once the party is in, [that role changes], and I've 
never quite understood that. I remember at that time at the early stages I was trying to make an effort--I don't suggest it was a very vigorous one--to be sure there was a 
continuing recognition on the part of the staff of the existence of the national committee and the need to have it a viable, functioning entity. 
But as time went on, you just sort of forgot the national committee was there. The national committee became a vehicle when we needed to cover something of a negative 
nature that John could take the rap for, or when we would feel that conceivably the national committee could have some impact, for example, in developing party interest and 
support out in the field for the legislative program. I think the committee was in a position to be helpful in that area, and I also candidly admit that we never utilized it as we should 
have. 
G: Let's talk about some specific kinds of appointments: ambassadorships; was this a part of the patronage process as well? 
O: Yes. 
G: Tell me what the criteria would be here. 
O: What you tried to do was to achieve a degree of balance between career appointees and non-career appointees. It's part of the attitude in the White House, and I don't know 
whether this had been the attitude of other administrations. If you had a fellow who had played a significant role in your campaign, he probably had a resume that would reflect a 
considerable degree of success in the private sector. Secondly, the fellow was expressing keen interest in being recognized, perhaps a direct request to be considered for an 
ambassadorship. Yes, the answer is that there were a number of political appointments to ambassadorships, reflecting the President's appreciation for efforts expended on his behalf. 
21
O'Brien --Interview II --18 
G: Well, what if the--? 
O: On the career levels, there was resentment. If you're a career foreign service officer and your ultimate ambition is to reach the ambassadorial level and you find that your 
opportunities are cut by 50 or 60 per cent by virtue of political appointments at the ambassadorial level, you don't appreciate the process. By the same token, those in the 
White House haven't any great concern about your lack of appreciation. So how much are you willing to take by way of adverse criticism generated by the career people or 
generated by the academicians and the rest that frown upon this process? You can take a good deal to fulfill what you think is your role in the appointment process. 
G: What was President Kennedy's view of this dilemma here? His own father had been an ambassador, and I dare say a political appointee. 
O: Yes. I think anyone that is not career is political, and whether it's because he was a heavy donor or whether he has great connections in the private sector, whatever it is, it's 
political. And there are only two designations: either career or political, and I don't think there's an in-between designation. 
I don't know as I ever had a conversation with President Kennedy as to his views in this area. You have in a secretary of state an understanding fellow; you'd better have an 
understanding fellow or he shouldn't be secretary of state. I don't envision it reaching the point in the foreseeable future where that level of appointment is based solely on career 
service. If you had no patronage at all, you'd be better off, let's start with that. And I think very frankly that any president would say, "I don't want to be bothered. I don't want 
to hear from anyone that has a personal interest in being ambassador or people advocating his or her appointment as ambassador, because that's a burden I don't want to carry." The 
fact of the matter is that the two presidents I knew were not that persuaded that the foreign service produces the quality and competency at the ambassador level that it thinks 
it does. 
So it goes beyond patronage. After all, the president can appoint anybody he darn pleases, subject to confirmation, and ignore the foreign service entirely. I think presidents 
have wanted to maintain some balance to have in some of the sensitive, key ambassador spots people that share his view on foreign policy [who are] not bogged down in the 
bureaucratic aspects of things. Now, there are small country ambassadorships that oftentimes are purely political, where you weigh it and say, "Now, there are no great 
conflicts that exist or will occur and this fellow wants to be an ambassador." I hate to even name a country, but some way-out place where he's never going to be heard from 
again until he sends in his resignation. 
To summarize, any president would prefer that there is no such thing as patronage. It's an overall pain in the neck; it may have an occasional plus factor but there's a lot of 
negative in it. You've got to remember the old saying in politics: every time you make an 
22
O'Brien --Interview II --19 
appointment, you've made one ingrate and created at least ten enemies. But it's there, it's part of the process. I think when it comes to the State Department, a president doesn't 
necessarily look at it that way. He is just not, and I think rightly so, that comfortable with the bureaucracy of the State Department that he's inherited. He's just not that sure the 
State Department is going to reflect his policies. It's the old story: presidents come and go, and I'm still here. When I advocated the removal of the Post Office Department from 
cabinet status, I realized, as a politician, all these thousands--
Tape 2 of 4, Side 1 
G: --I think [?] that was all for the good. 
O: You might say, "Look at this list of openings where we can assign our friends and supporters to positions." I have never felt there was a plus factor in patronage. It's a way 
of political life. It's there. Somebody has to designate people to hundreds of positions at the third or fourth level. That has to be done, but as to the political benefit derived from 
it, I think it's minuscule. 
If you look at it coldly, I think a member of Congress would be reasonably willing to just forego all of this. I know that when I made the recommendations regarding the 
Post Office Department, surprisingly there was very little adverse reaction on the Hill on the grounds of patronage. I don't recall any great uproar in that regard, because I think 
most of those members feel as I do, "If I could only get rid of all of that nonsense." How in God's name do you ever name a postmaster in Yanktown, Ohio, without creating a 
bunch of enemies? Then the animosity extends to their relatives and friends and you gain nothing. It's something that you were kind of forced into and you have to do, and so one 
guy thinks you're a hero. You say for just the exercise of some kind of power, look at the price you paid. And it isn't worth it. 
G: Yes. Well, now, on the matter of ambassadorships, did members of Congress exert influence or pressure to have friends or supporters of theirs named to ambassadorial 
posts? 
O: I don't recall specifically. At least I wasn't involved. There might have been instances of that. Actually when it comes to ambassadorships, if there's a presidential preference I 
think there's a widespread recognition that this is the president's patronage. 
G: Yes. 
O: Subject to confirmation. You might get into a ruckus somewhere, and I'm sure there were occasions when the president couldn't care less who the ambassador was; he had nobody 
particularly in mind. I'm sure there must have been some senators that had people in mind and hoped they would be considered by the President. This is a presidential appointment 
in the real sense. You have a right to object to it in confirmation. 
23
O'Brien --Interview II --20 
G: You sound like it was a fairly isolated case. 
O: Yes. Now, you know Matt McCloskey was appointed by President Kennedy as ambassador to Ireland. Matt McCloskey was treasurer of the Democratic National 
Committee. He was an extremely successful contractor, had developed a major construction business in Pennsylvania. He was a dedicated Democrat. He was a 
significant fund raiser. He was a thoroughly decent, honorable fellow that deserved recognition for the services he had rendered and the efforts he had expended in behalf of 
the election of President Kennedy. And Matt McCloskey was of Irish heritage; that was incidental, but it sort of fit. How do you recognize your indebtedness and responsibility to 
Matt McCloskey? Matt isn't at your doorstep demanding anything, that wasn't his nature. But it was pleasing to suggest to Matt that he might enjoy being ambassador to Ireland 
for a period of time, and Matt reacted very favorably to it and went to Ireland, and incidentally was loved over there. 
But there you are. So that's patronage? Should some foreign service officer have gone to Ireland? Ireland is an ambassadorship, incidentally, that's widely sought for 
obvious reasons. One, it's a friendly country. Two, it's a country that does not request anything of the United States. Three, it has to be one of the finest embassies in the world. 
It's just a very pleasant place to be, with people that love America and Americans. Controversy and problems are almost nonexistent. It can be an enjoyable experience. So 
that was the story of Matt McCloskey. 
Now, some fellow might be designated ambassador to a newly-emerged Third World country with a population of a million, two hundred thousand people in desperate 
poverty. And you could have a fellow who is anxious to be an ambassador and has credentials. He might wind up there, because if he wants to be an ambassador that's where 
you feel you could comfortably and safely place him without being concerned. 
So what you get to is, do you sit there with a formula: X per cent will be career, X per cent will be political? No, I don't think so, but I think in the general weighing of this 
over a period of time, it has a degree of balance, never the way it should be in terms of the foreign service or on the political side, because suspicion of the State Department is rather 
strong in the political world, as you know. It's shared widely, fairly or unfairly. That is one department that the people who have political backgrounds have looked at with a 
jaundiced eye. That may not exist to that degree today. What I remember are members of Congress in key positions on the foreign policy side in their committees--I can think of 
John Rooney--who felt they were striped pants cookie pushers. And that's what you've got and really you're antagonistic to them. You exercise your power, because you just 
don't buy them, and that's unfortunate as the devil. 
So when you talk about patronage affecting ambassadors, you're saying, "Wait a minute. I'm not going to be overly concerned about some career guy whose nose is out of 
joint, or some of the third or fourth level State Department people who were there long before I got here and will be there after I've left. They can talk to some of these 
24
O'Brien --Interview II --21 
columnists and try to stir the pot, but I'm not going to buy it." 
G: If there were a really sought-after post like this Irish ambassadorship, would you get involved and help analyze or distill the competition, say if you have two or three people in 
the running for this job, and help make a decision on which one would be the most suitable? 
O: No, not really. My experience with that was Matt, but we had others over there. I could have injected myself into that sort of thing, but I really didn't. I remember a fellow calling 
me after Jimmy Carter was elected saying he wanted to be ambassador to Ireland and would I contact Jimmy Carter in his behalf. It was clear to me I didn't have that kind of 
relationship with Jimmy Carter. I was in the sports world at that point. This fellow was making a valiant effort to secure this post. If he were calling me, he must have been 
calling every living Democrat. And I don't recall who it was, but I do recall he wasn't named. 
But I think, in dwelling on Ireland, I'm talking about something that's unique, it's different than some of the others. I didn't sit with the President to urge the appointment of 
an ambassador or urge that a candidate not be appointed. Now, obviously I have gotten requests and I relayed them, but I did not insert myself into the ultimate decision-making 
process. I just didn't bother. 
But I do recall, though, President Kennedy naming an ambassador to Vietnam. He was trying to determine what to do with Vietnam and he came up with a brilliant idea: 
why not call in Henry Cabot Lodge, who he had defeated for the Senate, who was a Republican and a nationally-known figure, and see if he could convince him to go to 
Vietnam? He figured that would be helpful, having a widely-known Republican as ambassador to Vietnam. He's having these problems with Vietnam, and [it would] give it 
some political balance. Get him in, and it's taking a little gall on my part to even suggest it to him--I'm paraphrasing. The feeling among us is that Cabot would certainly not accept 
it, and I remember the President's reaction after he met with Cabot and he did accept. He was absolutely amazed that he would accept it. 
G: But it was your idea to--? 
O: No. 
G: Oh, it wasn't? Whose idea was it? 
O: I don't know. I assume it was the President's idea. But the reason that I recalled it was that Lodge went to Vietnam and shortly thereafter I received a call from Dean Rusk and 
Averell Harriman to tell me that Cabot had been in contact with them and wanted them to urge the President to send me to Vietnam to assist him in organizing the situation. Thank 
goodness they were friends of mine, and we agreed the message was not going to be relayed to the President because he might think about it for a minute! (Laughter) So that 
25
O'Brien --Interview II --22 
was as close as I came to foreign service. 
(Interruption) 
G: We were talking about ambassadorships and diplomatic patronage and there was a case that you did assist in with a Mr. [Salvatore] Bontempo, is that right? Bontempo, B-O-N-T-
E-M-P-O. 
O: I recall the name, yes. 
G: This was a more minor position, but it was something that was apparently important to the Italian-American members of Congress. I think it was a deputy assistant secretary for 
something, and you--
O: Yes, I do recall that. 
G: --did advance that appointment. 
O: The background of that was that the Italian-American members on the Hill on a number of occasions had expressed their concern about, as they saw it, lack of recognition of Italian-Americans 
in important levels of the administration. And Bontempo was a name put forward by, I think, Pete Rodino and some of the others up there. That would be an Italo-American 
appointment. And I did react to their interest directly to the President, and this was worked out and he was designated. That really was not reacting to the thrust of the 
complaint. It was a rather localized appointment. It certainly did not impact on establishing a record of recognition. You have to label that as not so much an Italo-American 
appointment as an appointment that resulted from intense lobbying on the part of Pete Rodino and probably some others that were Italian-Americans, but that was about 
the extent of it. 
But this continued to be a problem. Not that we were reluctant at all to react to it. It was the old story: to find an appropriate appointee for an appropriate position. A 
fellow who had achieved some significant recognition was Tony Celebrezze who was mayor of Cleveland. Tony had become well known around the country and, certainly as 
we saw it, well known in Italian-American circles. The opportunity did finally present itself and my recollection was that it was secretary of HEW. And we, feeling that the 
record was going to show definitively that we had recognized the Italian-American in a significant way, carefully structured the appointment of Tony Celebrezze. 
To maximize this appointment and its impact on the Italian-American community, we should make sure that selectively we made confidential phone calls in advance to some 
of our friends, staunch supporters, to advise them of this. I believe it was probably Pete--obviously Pete Rodino would have been one of the [supporters]; he probably would have 
been first and foremost in terms of these phone calls. I talked to Pete, advised him of this upcoming appointment, which would be announced within a day or hours, asking that the 
26
O'Brien --Interview II --23 
call be kept confidential. And I was somewhat taken aback because Pete's--and this was also stated by others--reaction was "Tony is a fine fellow, but he's not really well known; 
he's not a national figure. He isn't really well known in the Italian-American community nationally." Well, talk about puncturing the balloon. Perhaps they felt "We're not going 
to succumb to this single appointment to the cabinet. We want to come back for more." That would be totally understandable. But, fortunately, when the appointment was 
announced and he took over, it was widely recognized in the Italian-American community. 
But I think our congressional friends just were not that impressed and I really anticipated this was going to be one of the most pleasant calls or series of calls I'd ever 
make, because there would be widespread approbation and I could even envision wild enthusiasm. But that wasn't the case. It sort of fell a little bit flat. But it wasn't the wrong 
thing to do by any means; Tony was a very able fellow and acquitted himself well in his post. So forgetting the ethnic aspect of it, it worked out well in any event. But it didn't 
get the job done. I think you had to have a sense of humor at that point and say, "Well, gosh, we sat around here really thinking we came up with a blockbuster and it turned out 
that it wasn't accepted as such." 
But there again, that's not an ambassadorial appointment. But what goes into the equation? We've been concentrating on appointments as ambassadors. We want to have 
our administration representative of our supporters and the party as a whole. And those in the Democratic Party are ethnic groups, whether it be Polish-Americans, Italian-Americans, 
German-Americans, various ethnic groups, they're in there, too. So you're not confined in that sort of patronage process to saying, "Well, who are the largest donors to 
the campaign?" In one instance it might be a fellow that donated significantly to the campaign in terms of money or of effort. Or it might be someone who didn't necessarily 
play a significant role in the campaign but is representative of a group, and that way we're honoring the group. However, I think if you didn't have to be engaged in this at all, 
everybody would be better off and you could go about your business and not be making the enemies that you do make in the appointment process. 
G: Were appointments ever made to remove someone from the position that they were currently in? Let's say, if you had a member of Congress or someone who was a problem 
where he was, did you ever, say, offer him a judgeship or ambassadorship or something like that in order to get him out of the way? 
O: I don't recall a specific instance, but if there was an opportunity to do that, you would, and maybe we did. 
The name eludes me at the moment, but we had a fellow in Louisiana who had played a key role in the election process. There was a threat--and you take all threats 
seriously--that there would be a problem in terms of finalizing the electoral college vote of the state of Louisiana. I was at Palm Beach with the President-elect when we had this 
called to our attention. Someone in that delegation had decided to try to have some of the electors avoid voting for Kennedy and create some disruption, and that might cause some 
27
O'Brien --Interview II --24 
kind of legal fallout. We certainly didn't need that sort of thing. This fellow played a key role first in notifying us of the existence of this and then in resolving the situation so this 
didn't take place. In addition, he also had been a staunch Kennedy supporter from the early days in Louisiana, and that wasn't easy to be. 
But the aftermath was this man was named head of the civil defense. He took on his duties and he had some ideas on civil defense that there was nothing basically wrong 
with except that we couldn't supplement his ideas financially. This sort of drifted on, and then one day this fellow was discussing with me again some of his ideas for fallout 
shelters. He contemplated visiting the Pope to discuss the utilization of churches in the United States as potential fallout shelters. This was getting a little bit beyond us. He was 
well motivated and all the rest and he rightly felt we weren't paying enough attention. And I guess it would be hard to quarrel with that. He became disenchanted with his role, and 
we became somewhat concerned about the scope of the role he had undertaken. The net result of it all was he left that post and became a federal judge and, as far as I know, may 
still be sitting. 
So patronage can take all kinds of forms, but I don't recall saying, "Let's pull out from the group this individual in the Congress that is in a key position who is very 
troublesome and let's give him the high honor of promoting him to the judiciary or to an ambassadorial post, because then that will either create an opening that can be better filled 
or eliminate a problem." 
G: Did you ever consider an ambassador to the Vatican while President Kennedy was president? 
O: I don't recall any consideration. I not only have no recollection of that, but I would assume that that was not in our thoughts. I would also assume it was not in the 
presidential thought process either. If you reflect on our difficulties in education legislation on the private school issue and the sensitivity to it in the White House, I can't 
believe that anybody was sitting around talking about the Vatican. 
G: This was an issue you didn't need. (Laughter) 
O: There's an issue I don't think we would have touched with a hundred-foot pole under the circumstances. 
G: Okay, now let me ask you about patronage from a negative standpoint. Did you ever get pressure from members of Congress to try to get you to remove someone who was giving 
them problems in their district or someone that they found obnoxious? An enemy, a political enemy, in an important position either in their state or in their district that was 
causing them problems? 
O: Well, I don't recall anything like that at the national level. So going to the state and district [level], something tells me that situations like this probably did occur. In the 
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O'Brien --Interview II --25 
normal evolvement of transition, you've tried to focus on the national level--departments, agencies, Washington-based, at the top and down three or four levels in these departments 
and agencies--and you haven't succeeded in completing that task, you [will] have holdovers at various regional and state levels of the federal bureaucracy that you haven't 
gotten to. In fact, [you] probably don't even know [they] exist. 
So, again, I am sure that there were situations of that nature where we were reminded by members of Congress that certain people were in place for a year or longer 
after we had taken office that should have been replaced. And you would act accordingly to replace these people. But the reason for the existence of that situation was just the 
enormity of the whole thing. But, yes, a congressman or senator would be very sensitive to that, because he or his staff, who had dealt with these people over a period of time, had 
found that they had no cooperation. And then to see that person still in that regional office in the bureaucracy at a level where the person could be removed and replaced, there 
would be cause, in political terms, for complaint. At the national level I don't have any recollection of senators or congressmen charging into the White House saying, "You've 
got to get rid of so-and-so, he's causing us great difficulty." 
But when you get to a lower level of the bureaucracy, where the appointment process still exists on a regional or local level, clearly when that was called to our 
attention we took action to replace that person with a, if you will, friendly person. But that would be something called to our attention and I'll tell you, with the limitation of two 
terms for the presidency, those people called to our attention would probably have remained in place throughout the terms of both President Kennedy and Johnson. As I've 
indicated earlier, we found it downright impossible to clean house across the board at the levels we had envisioned. 
Now, I think later administrations would probably have attacked that problem more efficiently than we did. By the end of the first year the effort we had undertaken, 
including filling existing openings, had not succeeded because we were unable to come up with qualified persons. It drifted away from us. We went into that second year saying, "I 
just can't devote any more time to that." It just disappeared and those people continued in place in many instances. If you couldn't fill obvious openings at the third or fourth level 
and you left those openings there month after month, clearly you couldn't get to removing people that should have been removed. 
G: You've mentioned earlier, I think, working at a government salary, and apparently salary was a consideration because Robert Kennedy in 1961 introduced legislation to raise the 
allowable salary for some attorneys in the Justice Department. Do you recall that legislation and--? 
O: Yes, vaguely. My recollection has been aided by a memo that I've seen recently. Bobby's motivation in trying to adjust salaries of lawyers in the Justice Department is something 
that I didn't quarrel with. But the reality of it should have been pretty obvious at the outset. There are hundreds and perhaps thousands of lawyers in government, and I found 
29
O'Brien --Interview II --26 
that when I became postmaster general there were some twenty-five or thirty full-time lawyers on the staff of the postmaster general, which I didn't realize until I arrived there. 
So to single out Justice Department lawyers and to try to adjust their salary just opened a Pandora's box. 
G: Yes. You indicated, too, in the memorandum that there were some jurisdictional problems in this issue in terms of what committee it would go to, I gather, and the Civil 
Service. 
O: Yes, that existed, too, but the whole idea. If I'm a lawyer over in the State Department or in Commerce or wherever and I see this effort to adjust the salaries and levels of the 
lawyers in Justice--lawyers in other departments are doing legal work, too--how do you justify something like that without it affecting the whole executive branch? And I assume 
if I'm an accountant, then I couldn't understand why lawyers should be singled out either. At a minimum, it's going to cause a great deal of rancor. As to the jurisdictional aspects, I 
don't recall specifically, but there were problems in that area, too. 
G: Do you recall the civil rights aspect to this, too, with the time of the Freedom Rides and--? 
O: Well, that was a part of it, too. There were people on the Hill that felt that you wanted to upgrade a bunch of folks that were busily engaged in monitoring their districts, as they 
saw it; that, of course, was very sensitive. And in reality, of course, there was a great thrust on the part of the department under Bobby, great emphasis placed in this area. And 
a great number of lawyers were engaged, and there was a flow of them all through the South. I suppose if you're sitting there and you're a conservative Democrat from the 
South and you've had a lot of comment from constituents regarding this activity, you're resentful. Then to compound it all, it is suggested that we ought to upgrade these fellows. 
I think reality eluded some people at that time. Taking a particular group of lawyers and upgrading them in terms of salaries would be disturbing to some members of Congress and 
many government attorneys. I don't know how you would expect to get widespread approbation. 
Tape 2 of 4, Side 2 
G: [Did you] talk with the Attorney General about these problems? 
O: I don't recall specifically. Certainly some of the fellows on my staff and Nick Katzenbach or others over at the Justice Department must have discussed it. Because while it wasn't 
one of the primary legislative items on our agenda, clearly the problems that it was causing and the reactions that were emanating from the Hill would indicate there had to be some 
discussions of it. I don't recall them specifically. 
G: What tack would you take when you were having to deal with some of the conservative southerners about these issues? 
30
O'Brien --Interview II --27 
O: I think we never had any hesitancy to--there was never a thought that we not move vigorously to pursue equality and justice. That was a given. 
G: Even the southerners accepted this? 
O: No, not necessarily. They knew that we were engaged; they knew the position of the President and his brother, the Attorney General. He's a vigorous attorney general and 
hard-hitting. 
G: Well, yes, but--
O: That afforded an opportunity to complain about--
G: To err the other way. But you were the point man for the administration in that you were the one on the Hill, and when someone let's say like Jim Eastland or Jamie Whitten or 
someone would complain to you about working with the Freedom Riders or something like that, how would you respond to them? How did you handle the touchy issue of civil 
rights? 
O: Well, the fact of the matter is that it wasn't that touchy in that sense, because the Jamie Whittens and the rest of them at that stage, I'm not suggesting that they accepted all this 
or they were at all pleased. It was politically troublesome to them and all the rest, but it was within the framework of existing law and procedure and was the responsibility of the 
administration. Go back to that period--you're talking about 1962. The whole battle between southern Democrats and the liberal wing of the Democratic Party was ongoing, 
but there wasn't yet any meaningful civil rights legislation. 
You would sit there and say, "This is going on, but there's a limit to how much they can do or how they can do it, and they'll be fought every step of the way. We're not 
yet engaged in a major civil rights struggle in the Congress." That came later. Let's face it, the Democratic Party claimed to be a national entity, but party platforms were but a 
piece of paper. If you're a southern Democrat, you made your views known regarding the platform of the party. But all of that had not caused the ultimate disruption. The 
Democratic Party got away with that for a long time. They could have the semblance of liberalism, pro-civil rights and all the rest, the commitment, the pledges, the platforms, the 
enunciations on the part of northern leaders and liberal leaders. But the reality was it hadn't resulted in any meaningful action. 
So the stymying was effective and continued to be effective, and it resulted in a big brawl before it finally was brought about. So you had defections in the South, but the fact 
of the matter was in 1960 Jack Kennedy was an advocate of civil rights, meaningful civil rights. That was one of the commitments he made, and in addition to that he was a 
Catholic. And with all of that, he carried six southern states. 
G: Yes. 
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O'Brien --Interview II --28 
O: You have to remember that at the time we went into the White House in January of 1961, there was a long record of southern Democrat-Republican coalition opposition to national 
Democratic policies. By that, I mean policies enunciated by the Democratic Party as a national entity. And that was an accommodation the coalition had reached and it was very 
effective, and they had, in addition to civil rights, stymied the progressive legislation in many areas and had done it very effectively. When we arrived, having won the presidency 
by a paper-thin margin after eight years of Eisenhower, that coalition was very much in place. We found that out in a hurry in the Rules [Committee] fight. And it took a lot of 
doing, over a period of time, before that opposition began to erode. 
G: While we're on the matter of civil rights in this early period of the Kennedy Administration, the 1961 period, was there a policy that cabinet members and others in the 
administration would not appear at segregated functions around the country? 
O: It was well understood. 
G: Really? 
O: No. 
G: You felt free to--? 
O: No, I don't think we ever approached that in those terms at all. 
G: Because I saw a memo in your files to indicate that someone--I don't think he was a cabinet member, but he was perhaps someone who was high up in the administration--
[was] wondering whether a function he was going to attend in Louisiana was integrated or whether it was segregated, because there seemed to be some question about. . . . 
O: I don't recall that, but I think it might have been in another context. I don't know. Perhaps he might have been tentatively scheduled to attend a function that was segregated. 
I say that only because I so vividly recall our problems in Louisiana, the northern vs. southern of Louisiana. It was awfully tough territory for us in the presidential election. 
And the degree of opposition to Kennedy in northern Louisiana probably was not surpassed anywhere else in the South. 
G: Really? 
O: Perhaps. I'm saying that because of my personal recollections, because I remember being in northern Louisiana as part of our campaign effort and finding that it was very clear that 
the animosity toward Kennedy was wide-spread. Not that anybody tried to hit me over the head, but it was obvious and affected those who deigned to support us. Our hope in 
Louisiana was that in New Orleans and the South, we'd be able to overcome what was significant opposition to Kennedy. So if we're talking about a possible visit to Louisiana 
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O'Brien --Interview II --29 
[by] somebody in the administration, it might have been by a member of Congress to address an audience that might have been a segregated group. That would be a sensitive 
area to have one of our people appearing before a redneck group. It should not have happened, if it did, but I don't recall it. 
G: Back to the story of campaigning in north Louisiana, was the opposition an anti-Catholic opposition, do you think? 
O: Yes. 
G: Was that the key issue? 
O: Yes, very much so. 
G: Well, why did they support you anyway, or at least the state--? 
O: The state did. 
G: The state did, but why did--you even had people there who were willing to support the ticket but not--
O: Yes. Well, there were some. And again there was a meeting as part of our travels. I recall being present. I recall that the meeting was not particularly impressive. I recall that 
I spent little time there following the meeting. There wasn't anybody that suggested that I didn't have a right to be in northern Louisiana. But it was clear to us that we had a coterie 
of staunch supporters that were really putting it on the line by even acknowledging publicly they were supporting Kennedy in that particular area. And that was reflected, as I 
recall, too, in the Rules fight. [There was] a congressman from that area that was really berated by the press and had a cross burned on his lawn over his support of us in the Rules 
fight. So that was the intensity of it. It was strange to be in the same state and travel through the rice country and through New Orleans and have the enthusiasm and great 
crowds when Kennedy was there, or going back organizationally and having great meetings. It was as though you were in a separate state. But that was the situation there. 
G: I had one more question about patronage, and that regards a note that the patronage in New York City was done through the Mayor's office. Mayor [Robert] Wagner had a role 
in that, and Congressman [Leonard] Farbstein was very upset that the Mayor was controlling, or at least influencing--having a role in the patronage process. 
O: Yes, well--
G: How did it work in New York? 
O: Well, the Mayor had a role in it, that's my recollection. And the Mayor was very supportive. More than that, however, the party organization in the state of New York and 
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in New York City was not, other than [in] isolated areas of northern New York--Buffalo is a good example--very effective. In many parts of the country the organization was in a 
state of disarray. That was not confined to the city of New York. To have some kind of organizational support, a mayor of New York is by virtue of his office in a strong position. 
He can put resources into a campaign effort. And if the city Democratic committee of New York is not strong, I think there's a tendency to move toward party leaders who are 
not dependent on party organization but have their own capabilities. And as I recall Bob Wagner, that would be the case. 
There's another aspect of that, too. On patronage, again--I reflect back to my home district to make the comparison--if Congressman Boland up in the Second District 
of Massachusetts had patronage of whatever degree in those various federal entities that might be located in his district, that was a very simple procedure and you were dealing 
with Eddie Boland. You might get a little touch of a Democratic senator. But you deal in New York [City] on any level of patronage and you don't--these congressional districts are 
all melded. No congressman in New York had anything more going for him than whatever seniority he had in the House, certainly at the local level. It is my recollection 
there were probably fifteen members of Congress in the city of New York, and there's one mayor. And the mayor is pre-eminent in terms of local politics. The congressmen, in 
several instances through the party structure in New York, the borough structure and all the rest, are designated like Cook County. And the mayors had an input into the 
designation. It would have been very natural, without recalling the specifics, for Bob Wagner to have input on patronage in New York. And the criticism of a particular 
congressman probably didn't impact greatly on us, because the political reality is obvious. We had six, probably, congressmen in New York that had seniority in the House that 
made them important in terms of the Congress. But there's little meaningful patronage involved that didn't cross congressional lines there and you didn't have a strong-man 
congressman saying, "Hey, you can't come into New York," or "You can't make a determination on appointments without me, and I insist that I make the appointments." 
You're very apt to look to a friendly mayor. 
G: Were New York City and Chicago fairly typical then of the mayors' involvement in the--? 
O: No, not really, because [Richard] Daley had both: he had control of the city in the elective office of mayor, and he had control of the city in the organizational office of chairman of 
the Cook County Democratic Committee. And he handled both jobs simultaneously. He spent time in the mayor's office and time in his office in the Cook County Democratic 
Committee headquarters. 
The only comparable organizational situation to Cook County would have been in Philadelphia with Bill Green who, as a congressman, really controlled the congressional 
delegation, controlled the activities of the city, and worked in close harmony with David Lawrence, who at that time was governor of Pennsylvania. I think, including Cook 
County, Philadelphia was the most effective Democratic Party organization in the country. It was the first organization, to my knowledge, that had everything on computers, that 
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registered voters three hundred and sixty-five days a year, and had a million or two million dollar-budget for the operation of the city committee. I remember going to a meeting at 
Bill Green's request during our campaign and finding at that meeting that there were people at the door at desks and everybody attending had to check in, and that included 
every judge in Philadelphia, to be sure that his or her attendance was duly noted so that Bill Green would know who was present. There was nothing like that in New York. 
There was Joe Crangle and his predecessor up there in Erie County, Buffalo, and the Mayor of Albany who were extremely well organized and I must say well controlled and 
local patronage was fully utilized--not federal patronage, local patronage--to maintain an organization. But in the city of New York it was rather an amorphous situation, so if 
there was anybody in New York that could call shots it would be the Democratic mayor. 
G: But did you rely on the mayors quite often for this purpose? Were they--? 
O: I think when there were potential appointments coming up or openings of some degree of significance that would be based in New York that it would be very probable that--I don't 
think we would rely on the mayor or the mayor would have the final and only say. But certainly we would encourage the mayor's input and give it serious consideration. 
G: Now, I have another note on patronage that indicates that you avoided judicial appointments, that you yourself did not get involved in that. Is that accurate? 
O: That's right. Yes. 
G: Did you nonetheless have this pressed upon you by members of Congress? 
O: Yes, there were occasions, and I'd simply relay their requests or suggestions. I had no direct involvement, nor did I want any. Now, that was something that I did not envision 
as part of my activities and that I was far better off having it well understood on the Hill that I didn't have any significant input in these areas. 
G: If ambassadors were not considered congressional patronage, judgeships were--
O: Yes. 
G: --I suppose to a large extent. They really did take an active role in--
O: Well, sure, because of the tradition that you have a senator up there that would either put that slip in the slot or take the slip out of the slot. And you could have one of your 
appointees spend a long time in purgatory before he'd ever serve on the bench. So there was some give and take in that area, obviously, but that was not incorporated in the day-to-
day patronage activities or an area that we might be engaged in Congressional Relations. 
G: It's amazing that you could keep out of that area. . . . 
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O'Brien --Interview II --32 
O: Well, I think that it was understood. See, in both of those areas you did have the element of Senate confirmation and that makes a difference. Patronage beyond Senate 
confirmation is one thing, but when it entails Senate confirmation, then again you're going to make ten enemies to every one [friend]. I think the less it's related to Congressional 
Relations the better off everyone is on our end, or was. And it wasn't planned that way, it just evolved that way. 
G: And did it remain this way under Lyndon Johnson? 
O: Yes, as far as any involvement on my part was concerned, yes. 
G: Was it handled primarily through the Justice Department, is that the--? 
O: In the Kennedy period, the major input was Justice, yes. 
G: Did it vary under Johnson? 
O: I don't know. I say Kennedy period because Bobby obviously took an active interest in this whole area. Under Johnson, I'm not even sure how it evolved. 
G: Let's move on to public works as another, I guess, example of the carrot, and the carrot and stick Time magazine cover. How did you use public works as part of your--? 
O: Not nearly to the degree that people would envision, because we well understood that, overridingly, public works was an element of congressional maneuvering. We had limited 
say. That reminded me of a conversation that the President had with Congressman Al Thomas, and I think that pretty much summed it up. It was very pleasant and really in a 
humorous vein, but nevertheless accurately described the situation. The President pointed out to Al, in his key role in the House in Appropriations, and Mike Kirwan, in his key role 
in Public Works, he would hope that people like Al and those at a similar level with similar power in the House would keep him in mind because he came from Massachusetts and 
he'd like to think that Massachusetts would get a fair shake now and then in terms of projects or what have you that could be designated to a state. He would hope that Al and 
his associates would look upon him kindly and remember he came from Massachusetts, and they might from time to time just give him a little bit of the crust of that pie. 
You had probably ways of stalling implementation and you probably could find ways through failure to utilize funding that sort of after the fact could have some impact. 
But as far as the initiation of projects, in fact the congressional provision for funding projects, the whole story of public works and analogous items up there, we had limited 
impact. I think people didn't see it that way, and I read article after article about the heavy hand in the White House, the rubber stamp in the Johnson period, the rubber stamp 
situation in the Congress, and this was all supposedly due to some great power of the presidency that impacted directly on all these members, and that they just had to sit and 
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worry and nervously play these things out because they'd have to fear that the President would come right down on their head. In the real world that wasn't the case. 
So when you're talking about the carrot and the stick, I'd heavily weight it to the carrot. I think that that was the way we approached it, because if you're a colleague and 
I'm taking care of you, you're taking care of me, and the next one's taking care of both of us, and it's all within the confines of the congressional process. It's pretty darn hard to be 
sitting down at the other end of the Avenue in the White House and suggesting that a particular project not be approved or that it not be funded. And all you have by way of a 
tool is you can do some things in the White House after the fact that would cause a member of Congress to finally wake up to the fact that you weren't overly happy with him. 
But that bore on the delaying aspects of it and other related areas. But I think, to sum it up, what should be understood by students and observers, particularly those that 
report much of this, I always separate out the viewers and the doers. I always did. I guess because the viewers used to disturb at times, because they had simplistic answers as 
to how government should function. They, also, to a great extent, had a misconception of the power of the presidency in terms of wheeling and dealing with the Congress. I always 
felt many of them never understood that a great deal of the motivation had to do with the substance of the legislative proposals and the innate good of the proposal in terms of its 
impact on our fellow Americans, and that part of that equation was the attitude of the Congress, individually and collectively, toward the president of the United States who was 
the advocate. They were finally the people that would dispose. So there was a stick of sorts, but not nearly as large and as heavily weighted as I think most of observers construe 
it to be. 
G: Was there a noticeable difference under Johnson as against Kennedy? Did Johnson tend to rely on the stick more than Kennedy had? 
O: I don't know. I don't think he had any more going for him with the stick. The stick was the same stick. Maybe he utilized it a little differently, I don't know. What is the stick? 
I've said this before, but I think it's a prime example of the weight of that stick and the effect and impact of it. And you go about closing VA hospitals and you proceed in such a 
way that the Majority Leader of the United States Senate is not advised in advance that a hospital in his state is on the list of the sixteen, seventeen, or whatever it was hospitals that 
were to be closed because they were archaic or under-used. Good, solid reason to close them. And the President of the United States and the Majority Leader of the Senate are in 
conflict immediately. I'm not suggesting that Mike Mansfield would have accepted that decision if he had been notified in advance, but the fact that he had no notification at all, 
and to proceed, as he saw it, arrogantly and arbitrarily to announce the closing of a hospital and leave him in the totally embarrassing position of being a senator and majority 
leader and not knowing it, incurred his enmity no end for a period of time. 
Well, it also got the President's back up, and the President made up his mind that those hospitals were going to be closed come hell or high water, and he devoted an 
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inordinate amount of time and effort to bring that about and failed. And I think it's an example of presidential power in terms of the stick. Sure, if somebody on that Hill is 
causing you problems, and by gosh you're just sick of it, and that obviously happened on any number of occasions, the opportunity might present itself. And what form could it 
take? Maybe that fellow did get around to a very important constituent with a great deal of influence in his district, wanting certain recognition that you could give that fellow on 
behalf of the congressman if you cared to, and you denied it. Now, that's a stick. But, see, that sort of thing is there. That's probably an example. 
But I noticed in going over some notes, some reference to Jennings Randolph and a project being derailed after he had failed to vote in our interest in a very important 
matter. That occurred, I'm sure, and probably there was some indication that was rather blatant. And maybe if it was blatant at that time, and I don't recall the details, it probably 
wasn't the--it may have been counterproductive. So it's not that simple. I know that Jennings Randolph incurred our enmity to a great degree at a time. I know that we did 
everything possible emanating from the state of West Virginia to convince Randolph otherwise in that particular vote, and it failed. We know that it was a significant vote 
because if Randolph, as we saw it, had voted with us in that instance, the President of the Senate would have been able to cast the deciding vote, because it was that close. And we 
lost, and when you lose by a very narrow margin you're apt to take it to heart more than you would otherwise, dwell on it more and be more disturbed. I know that Jennings 
Randolph was not held in high regard in the White House for a period of time, and if that lack of regard because of that vote was reflected by derailing a project that embarrassed 
him and caused him problems, sort of so be it. But I'm not at all sure that it had a positive impact and probably was more our venting our spleen than being practical people, saying 
Jennings overall hasn't been that bad a guy and has voted with us more often than not and we haven't any great problem with him except in this instance, and the best thing for us to 
do is swallow this and go on and we'll have Jennings the next time. Now, that would be our normal procedure. So there were probably occasions when we, in fact, maybe even 
[acted] in a fit of pique. We were human, too. 
But I never got over--I repeated it ad nauseam to my own people, to the Congressional Relations people and anybody that ever cared to listen to me--that you 
never, never go to that Hill and try to convince a member of Congress to commit political hara-kiri. Every one of them had been elected to office. There's one guy downtown that's 
been elected; none of us had been. And have that in mind; whatever the elements are available for persuasion, do so in that context. If it's not in his interest in his district but 
not overridingly adverse to his interest, there's always the possibility that you can persuade him, or we can persuade him, or the President can persuade him. But if it is clearly 
something that's going to cause him serious political difficulty in his district and he tells you no, carry it out to the end, but try to understand. And there's always tomorrow. 
Tape 3 of 4, Side 1 
G: --a problem with a VA hospital in Florida. 
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O: I don't remember that. 
G: I don't know whether it was one that [Spessard] Holland was interested in or what, but it was a question where you had a difficult political problem there with a public work. 
O: With a project? 
G: Yes. 
O: It was a VA hospital? 
G: I think so, yes. 
O: I don't remember it. 
G: Okay. I notice in going through the files--
O: Before we get off this subject, I hope I've made it clear what I think of patronage and the real impact of patronage. I did have a situation one time regarding a senator that I 
thought was quite interesting. That was when Strom Thurmond left the party. He was, of course, a member of the Senate but he was no longer a Democrat. Strom came to see me 
and couldn't understand why he would be discontinued as a source for recommendations for postal appointments in his state and sat there and actually just refused to accept it. He 
had to finally, but I couldn't get over the fact that he would feel that, having left the party, he should remain on the roster. That was one fallout from patronage that had its 
humorous aspect. 
G: I read about an occasion in which President Kennedy appeared on a platform in California at a speech and simply wouldn't allow the local congressmen, or a local congressman, to 
be on the podium with him, because this guy had voted against foreign aid or had not been supportive of the administration or something like that. Do you recall that incident? It 
was a very deliberate--
O: I don't recall that incident, but we did have trouble with a member of Congress. I believe it was on the foreign aid program. It was of a serious nature. He went out of his way to 
oppose us and be of assistance to Otto Passman in his annual exercise. And that was due to a VA hospital. 
G: That was [D. S.] Saund, I think, S-A-U-N-D. 
O: Yes, Saund. We were limited in the use of the stick there, too. But that was very aggravating, because from our position this was a totally justifiable action we were taking. 
There was no merit to Saund's argument in opposition to this thing. And then to have Saund to go to your underbelly where anybody can take a shot at you--that's an easy one, 
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that's a free one. And our resentment was strong. If that's the congressman that wasn't on the platform, I don't know, but it could well have been. 
G: Yes. 
O: Incidentally, you might overlook members at times. You didn't do it very often but one aspect of that would be who is going to fly on the president's plane. He's going to 
California and you're going to have a number of members of Congress. You would start with the Democratic senator or senators, the congressmen from the district or districts 
each instance that he was going to stop in. Then beyond that, of course, you have some leeway and you make some judgments. We would put together the list and try to 
recognize support beyond the call of duty. And then the reverse, there might be times when we neglected to think of somebody that might have enjoyed the trip or gotten some 
exposure from it, because we felt he hadn't earned that right. Now, there again, it's a rather small item, but there were times when it could be quite significant, because that was 
an area in which there was great congressional interest, no matter how they were voting. There was overriding interest in being part of the traveling party. There are a myriad of 
other things of that nature: how often you were invited to White House functions might have something to do with your voting record. But there again, those are the elements of 
the stick; it isn't a very large, heavy stick that you can wield. 
G: One memorandum involved Florida again and I think it was a request from the Hill to have the President come down to Florida to dedicate something or be there, and it was 
something that Holland was interested in. Holland I gather was even trying to piggyback on the President's friendship with [George] Smathers, and you, or someone on your staff, 
wrote that the President gets to see Smathers when he's in Washington, that that's not an excuse to go to Florida and dedicate this thing. And besides, Holland hadn't supported the 
administration at all. He hadn't been helpful at all so [you were] recommending against the trip. 
O: Yes. Well, we'd do that. In fact, that probably was construed by us as an opportunity to send a message. And we'd have no hesitancy on that. That was one where there was no 
real negative to it, you're right, because Senator Holland was a nice, gentlemanly fellow who I don't recall supported us in any meaningful way during my experiences with him. 
G: Now, last time you did talk about the foreign aid bill in 1961 but there are a couple of other items related to that that I want to ask you about. One concerns Wayne Hays; I 
have a note that he was very helpful on the floor in that fight. Do you recall specifically what he did? 
O: Well, that's what I recall, is help. Wayne was a colorful figure in the Congress. He was an outspoken fellow. He received quite a good deal of attention; he was quite aggressive. 
And when he got into a battle or showed an interest in getting into something to be of assistance to you, he could be helpful. He was the kind of a guy you'd just as soon have 
on your side rather than in the opposition on that Hill. I don't recall the specifics of his 
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help; I recall that he was a help. Wayne would rather enjoy involving himself in debate and discussion in that battle because of the position of Otto Passman. 
G: Oh, really? 
O: That would be right up Wayne's alley; he'd enjoy just taking Otto on. You didn't have to go far to determine Wayne's views or positions. And if Wayne registered enthusiasm, it 
would be our tendency to enlist him in the battle and play some role in it. 
G: Kennedy evidently, as part of his strategy, sought quite a bit of help from the GOP on this piece of legislation. 
O: You had to. Foreign aid was a nightmare. Innately you're dealing with an item that comes up to haunt you regularly. It is a classic example of a responsibility to request legislative 
action when there's hardly a member of Congress that would have any concern about negative political fallout by opposing. Foreign aid was generally referred to as a 
giveaway. It was ridiculous. It's like the debt ceiling--a vote against increasing the debt ceiling, that's as safe as voting for motherhood. You vote against foreign aid, that's great, 
too. You can demagogue the devil out of both of those, and a lot of people did demagogue the devil out of them. 
So, consequently, in approaching foreign aid and the debt ceiling, but the focus on foreign aid, your appeal really came to "Hey, you can't do this to me. You can't do that to 
him. Come on, he may in some ways feel as you do about a lot of this, that there are elements of softness in this program and there's a lot of unfairness in terms of 
distributions." 
I think I mentioned it before. Our efforts in foreign aid even reached the point where we actually took the foreign aid dollars and broke them down district by district. 
We concluded that probably eighty cents of every dollar went into products or into services that were helpful and created employment in congressional districts. And we just 
took all the four hundred and thirty-five congressional districts, broke them down, and determined just where the money flowed. We provided this to members looking for a 
handle where they could say, "Yes, I voted for it because--," then try to get the local media to publicize the benefit to that district that might push the congressman a little bit. 
This was motivated by some degree of desperation. How do you handle a legislative item that hasn't any constituency really. 
G: No base. 
O: Compounding that, you had a person who had the reins of foreign aid in his hands, Otto Passman, who detested foreign aid but could not and would not step aside and let 
somebody else handle it. So you had an issue that had no constituency, a general tendency to ridicule it as a giveaway, and you had a fellow that had your destiny in his hands who 
had every intention to do what he could to destroy it. You put all that together and you've 
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O'Brien --Interview II --38 
got a problem. 
G: Yes. 
O: I remember one of the meetings we had, a top bipartisan leadership meeting. [We'd] try to get away from the demagoguery and have the Dirksens and Hallecks say, "Oh, come on, 
we'll have a little fun with you and push you around, but there has to be a foreign aid program and we'll try to help work it out or at least not stand in the way of it." I think it 
was Ev Dirksen who told the President, "I remember a similar meeting, bipartisan, with Eisenhower. Eisenhower said, 'I want to tell you one thing. Don't ever, any one of you, 
suggest to me that I allow Otto Passman in this building. I never want to see that man again in my life! '" So there was that understanding that Otto Passman wasn't being a 
partisan at all, he was just against everything and everybody that was involved. 
G: I noticed that Kennedy did get a message of support on foreign aid from former President Eisenhower. Do you recall how that evolved, or was this part of--? 
O: I believe that in this area, as well as in other areas, the former President was helpful. There was a very pleasant relationship in the White House between my predecessor, Bryce 
Harlow, and all of us. And Bryce Harlow remained very close to Eisenhower. Eisenhower had a great deal of confidence in him. It was apparent to us that if you 
wanted to communicate with Eisenhower--of course you could president to president--just to feel things out or determine an attitude or potential area of help or assistance, Bryce 
Harlow was the appropriate person to contact. He was in that role on occasions. I communicated with Bryce Harlow, not specifically on the Eisenhower contacts, but on a 
variety of matters. We became friends and remained friends throughout those years, and I can't answer to this day but what I think of it. It was the night of the 1968 election and I 
was in Minneapolis. It was in the early hours when what was unanimously agreed by media to be a lost cause before the polls opened was turning out to be something 
otherwise, a relatively close election. 
G: Very close, yes. 
O: I was with Hubert and a call came which I did not receive immediately. In fact, there was a considerable delay before I received a note that this person wanted to talk to me, and it 
was Bryce Harlow calling from Nixon's headquarters. My curiosity was aroused but by the time I got the message, it was all over and in that mental state I never got back to the 
call. Several times afterwards I thought of it in terms of running into Bryce and saying, "I've just got to know why you were calling me that night." I'd still be curious about it. 
But Harlow was every inch a gentleman, and extremely bright. He had close contacts in the Nixon Administration. 
G: Yes. He served a similar transition function. 
O: Yes. So in response to the foreign aid and the Eisenhower support, I don't remember 
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O'Brien --Interview II --39 
specifically asking Harlow to intervene with Eisenhower, but somewhere along the line you can be sure he was involved in that expression of support. 
G: Another element of this bipartisan support evidently was President Kennedy getting some of his high-level Republican appointees to help in the matter. Do you recall that 
component of it? 
O: Yes. You had some, not an inordinate number, but there were some acknowledged national figures that were Republicans that were in the administration, and they were 
communicated with regularly. I had occasions to talk to them, the President did, and we tried to utilize their potential whenever we could at their discretion. It was never an effort 
to push them into anything, but they were very willing people. An example of that is Doug Dillon; he was an active participant in some of our legislative efforts. 
G: I mentioned the note of the one example of the congressman who wasn't on the platform with President Kennedy. Apparently there was another one who, after not supporting 
foreign aid, found a federal project missing from the budget subsequently. A new federal building or something was deleted from the budget after that. Do you recall who that was 
or the specifics? 
O: No, but I certainly would not suggest it didn't happen. 
G: One interesting aspect of this whole executive-legislative relationship that I hadn't considered before was the navy. I noticed that you wanted to be notified of which 
congressmen were getting these trips by the navy to Guantanamo or places like that so you could keep tabs of what kind of perks they were getting, presumably. 
O: It wasn't confined to the navy. 
G: (Laughter) Well, why do you say--? 
O: The air force or--yes. 
G: Tell me what the range of these activities were. 
O: Traditionally the majority leadership will authorize travel. We said, wait a minute, the Defense Department and those airplanes and ships aren't part of the legislative branch. 
And while we were not going to go so far as to establish a procedure that there was no way a member of Congress could be on a boat or a plane without our approval, we were 
sure as the devil going to try to come up with some idea, some procedure where that fellow was made aware--by the leader that he went through, whether it was [John] 
McCormack or whoever it might be at the moment, [Carl] Albert--that the trip was approved or his presence was approved only because it had been relayed to the White 
House for consideration. I don't recall an instance where we denied it, maybe we did somewhere. But it was just another little piece of the action to remind him that, if we care 
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to, we could have a procedure at the snap of a finger where the navy or the air force had no authority to designate and that it had to be approved at the White House level in the 
Commander in Chief's office. In other words, we are watching a little closer than you may think we are. 
G: Well, there were apparently a lot of congressmen taking these naval cruises to--I guess they were inspection trips or something of that nature. 
O: Still are. 
(Laughter) 
O: Yes, that was the extent of it. I wouldn't suggest that there weren't times that we didn't react, as I said, in a fit of pique or just a little bit of arrogance. But I don't really think that 
there was--there could have been but not to my [recollection]--a time when you carried it to the extent that you had really caused a problem that would be counterproductive and an 
enemy was made. I'd put this in the category of the VIP visits to the White House or social visits or inclusion in formal dinners or the Sequoia or the rest. We realized that a 
great deal of this went on and there was no White House involvement, they--the members--dealt directly through the naval liaison or air force liaison until they duly got a memo, 
"Get a plane in place and we're going to six countries in Europe." And we all know they're junkets and we all know that it goes on I think probably to a greater extent than 
ever despite the fact that there's been a lot of focus of attention on this over the years. 
G: Well, presumably this would be something that the leadership would exercise some discretion on in terms of--
O: Yes. 
G: --who deserved to go and who didn't. 
O: Yes, and we left it up to them. 
G: Is it correct that Sam Rayburn was very much opposed to a lot of these junkets, that it was very difficult--? 
O: Yes, he was. First of all, Sam Rayburn didn't take junkets. Secondly, he was a firm believer in constituent service, constituent attention. He'd say these "fellers" that become 
enamored with the Washington social life or seeing their name in some society column, by God, they'll keep doing that and overlooking their [constituents] back home and they're 
going to pay a price. This traveling around the world, doing all this sort of thing, no, he was very much turned off on all that. It wasn't because he didn't travel; he just didn't 
believe in that. He just thought it was a rip-off--most of it. I'm not suggesting that there aren't times when it isn't justifiable but, boy, there are a lot of times when it simply isn't. 
He felt very strongly about that. 
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G: Do you think he felt that it reflected badly on the prestige of the institution, too? That that might have been--? 
O: Yes, that was part of it, too. The institution, in the final analysis, was Sam Rayburn's life--and his overriding pride in it and his great desire to at all times protect it. So anything of 
that nature that he considered negative concerned him. And I don't know what he said to his colleagues, but he never had any reluctance to being candid with me. We'd chat about 
it. He'd sit on his porch and see those constituents in his home district, and, by gosh, that's what it's all about. They've sent you here, you respond. 
G: The question of congressional travel, could it work in reverse? For example, if you wanted a member of Congress or the Senate out of the way for a vote and you knew he 
was wrong on an issue and it was a close vote, could you concoct a trip for him, an attractive trip to get him out of the way? 
O: Not really. That would be pretty obvious. But the reverse of that, however, happened often; we'd provide transportation for them to get back. 
G: To get back. 
O: Oh, yes. We utilized the military in that regard. If a fellow had a speaking engagement--of course, there was a lot of negotiation with the Congress, the House and Senate, in 
terms of the scheduling of legislation and the checking and rechecking on potential attendance in close votes--there were occasions where we'd provide military 
transportation to get him back. There were rumbles on the Hill at times regarding that, but we chose to get it done and worry about the fallout afterward. And there were times 
where we had no hesitancy to have it public knowledge--that was in crisis times. If Congress was not in session or something, there were occasions when we arranged rather 
massive military movements to ensure that those that the President wanted to meet with were available--the Cuban Missile [Crisis] would be a good example. [It occurred] at a 
point when they were out of session, and we had planes all over the skies making sure they were back. But on an individual vote basis, there were times we did that. 
G: On the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example--we'll get to that and I want to ask you about that in detail--but for now, how did you present it to them, or whoever called them present 
it to them? I mean obviously they wouldn't go into great detail over the phone. 
O: No, it's very simple. There was a situation that has arisen that just demands your presence, and the President has asked me to contact you directly and say that you must be 
here. Not an order, "you must be here," [but] "in your interest and the national interest, you must be present." And I never had anyone--I can think of a Republican senator from 
California. I remember it because a fighter plane brought him in from California and he had never had that experience with the helmet--
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O'Brien --Interview II --42 
(Laughter) 
G: He what--he--? 
O: With the helmet on--
(Laughter) 
--and everything, whatever kind of plane it was. Kuchel. 
G: Thomas Kuchel. 
O: Yes. But they wouldn't question me on that. They knew that a call was not made unless it really, truly was urgent. And we'd make every effort with both presidents, but that sort of 
crisis occurred at times in the Kennedy period. And it was essential, as the President saw it, that the appropriate members of Congress be briefed and that each person present be 
solicited to express his views and comments or recommendations, if nothing but for the record. Not the public record, but the record, because we knew that when something like 
that occurred, you knew that the only comments would probably be, "Whatever you decide, Mr. President, we support you." 
G: I have an impression that perhaps Lyndon Johnson did, on occasion, plan a trip to a congressman's district to coincide with the need for him to be away from a particular vote 
or something. 
O: That could have happened, I just don't recall it. 
G: It was not a pattern? 
O: It was a pretty sophisticated operation, but it wasn't a pattern. It could have happened. It's intriguing. 
G: Well, I think in particular when some of the poverty legislation was up and civil rights legislation, didn't he go to Appalachia and take some of those members that might have 
been wrong on--? 
O: Yes, I do recall there was a trip of that nature. 
G: Was that a coincidence there? 
O: I don't know. It's a little intricate, really. I mean, people see through that pretty easily. If you have them in Appalachia today, you might find the vote has been postponed until next 
week. 
G: Yes. Okay, let's see. Let me ask you about the Bay of Pigs in April 1961. Were you 
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O'Brien --Interview II --43 
involved at all in any of the administration's discussion? 
O: No. 
G: How did you learn of the invasion? 
O: I learned of it just prior to the President advising congressional leaders regarding it. I was present with him when it was in process and a debacle was imminent. I was not involved 
prior to that. And I became involved again because of the need to advise and the need to inform. So--
G: Well, describe the occasion where you were with him when it became evident that the plan was not working. 
O: I was in the group in his office. It was one of those informal things. It had reached the point where it was clearly a debacle. And my reaction was a pure political reaction, I'm 
sorry to say, but that was my gut reaction: "My God, we've been around here a brief period of time. We've just gotten our feet wet. We're trying to move things. The 
President is trying to exercise leadership, and this blow to the solar plexus has got to be politically devastating. [It] will set him back and the administration back significantly in 
terms of public approval." 
The CIA and the Defense Department before we arrived had been staunch advocates. I'm not suggesting, and I don't know, whether there was any great reluctance 
on the part of the President to go forward with it, but certainly their presentation to him was very, very strong. Their evaluation of it was all on the positive side from "highly 
professional people," quote, unquote. They had devoted a lot of time and effort to putting this into place. There had been communication between [Allen] Dulles and the top staff of 
the CIA and a half a dozen of us, the top staff of the White House. We had dinner one evening in a restaurant in Washington. This wasn't the subject, and it was sort of just to 
get to know each other. That didn't indicate there would be continuing communication, but this was a new administration, a new White House, and I think the CIA people wanted 
us to know who they were and they wanted to at least meet us. And that's all I knew about the CIA. 
But I did feel we were in for a devastating political situation in terms of public reaction. Jack Kennedy met difficulty and potential disaster in an extremely courageous 
way. He did what came naturally to him. Not due to any suggestion on my part, he figuratively stepped up to it almost like standing on the White House steps and saying, 
"My fellow Americans, I've completely goofed. I've really made a terrible mistake," wrong judgment and what have you. No indication he was totally disturbed with the 
advisers that he had inherited and the advice they had given him. 
Tape 3 of 4, Side 2 
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O'Brien --Interview II --44 
O: He was extremely candid in accepting full responsibility. And to our utter amazement the next Gallup Poll showed a significant rise in support for him, which was a real lesson to 
me that I reflected on years later. I'd like to think I would react the same way in his position. I don't know. Who knows? But I think I'd be trying to figure out how, 
politically speaking, you could handle something like this. It's amazing about the public generally, and how they react. They reacted to his candor and his admission, if you will, 
of guilt, and it was a plus. Not planned that way, not conceived that way, and certainly not envisioned that way by me. 
On a later occasion, I saw a president in a position of his own doing, but nevertheless a position that was devastating: Watergate. And I've always felt, and I 
remember thinking about it at the time, as I was personally involved. I was the victim of Watergate. If this man had the guts, the innate character, to step out on those White 
House steps and say, "My fellow Americans, this is what I did and all I can say to you is I deeply regret it. I hold myself accountable for my staff or anybody in this government that 
did wrong, and I can only commit that I'll never allow something like this to happen again," he would have completed his presidency. 
We're talking about all kinds of procedures and patronage and negotiations with the Congress, but you cannot divorce the human element from all of this in the final 
analysis. It comes right back to that. 
G: While you were with President Kennedy was there any discussion of supplying the air support that was evidently canceled, the second round of that? 
O: No. I wasn't involved. 
G: Did you feel like there was a division within the White House with regard to how to handle the Bay of Pigs once they saw that it was not working, or whether some people 
who advocated--? 
O: No. No, I can't testify to comments that might have been made by other members of the staff. I certainly didn't have any specific suggestion. And it was a little bit like the 
meeting I described with the leadership of the Congress, the President, in the time of crisis. No one is going to suggest or urge that the president take this action or that action. 
I think you feel comfort in saying, "It's your baby, Mr. President." There's a tendency to reflect that Bobby directed Jack's mind. I can testify that wasn't the case. Jack was well 
able to make his own determinations and decisions, and he made them on so many occasions where I had involvement. He had great respect for Bobby, appreciated his 
advice and counsel. In the final analysis, he would make his decision, and, of course, into the equation would be Bobby's views. He greatly respected him, but Bobby didn't make 
his decisions. He made his own. 
G: What impact did the Bay of Pigs have on President Kennedy's own thinking about the reliability of CIA and military questions? 
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O'Brien --Interview II --45 
O: He became quite cynical. He felt he had been entrapped. I think it left--not because we spoke about it at any great length however--an imprint in the sense that he had a degree of 
cynicism regarding recommendations that were forthcoming in the future. He had learned his lesson. 
G: Yes. 
O: "It's a fait accompli. Let's go forward." 
G: His explanation to the members of Congress during this period, any insights on that? 
O: No, it was no different than his explanation to the people. 
G: There's an indication that it may have even helped him in one respect in that the House did, right after that, approve a six hundred million dollar special fund for Latin American 
development, which I gather had not been considered that feasible before. 
O: Yes, that's right. I don't know as you could document that, but it clearly indicates that his handling of the situation was helpful. To what degree, no one will ever know, but there 
was a plus element in it. They read the Gallup Polls, too. 
G: Yes. Was Kennedy surprised by the Gallup Poll when it did show--? 
O: I don't recall any specific conversation. We were. I would assume he was. 
G: Let's talk about education legislation, which is a big item in each of these years. Do you recall the problem of sorting out all of the various elements, the higher education 
component, the parochial school aid, the medical school aid, and the public school aid at this point? 
O: What do you mean by sorting out? 
G: Well, keeping the different elements separated so that you could pass the ones that had the chance, and the priorities, which ones should come first, or packaging them. You had a 
tremendous range of--
O: Yes. 
G: In fact, this was one of the criticisms, that there were too many, rather than focusing your efforts on one. Let me ask you to discuss this whole area. 
O: Well, the reason there was such diversity goes to the depth of commitment of the president in this area, the very strong views he had regarding the federal role in the field of 
education, which all of us shared. I felt very, very strongly about it. But there were two 
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O'Brien --Interview II --46 
areas that--there were a couple of others, but two--I sort of focused on: one was what we could accomplish to ensure reaching the goal of full educational opportunity; second was 
Medicare, for personal reasons, my own family and the devastating costs. You had that additional element in your thought process. 
The strategy on what came first and how it was segmented I don't think was really an initial strategy. It naturally evolved. You wanted to propose in just about every 
meaningful area of education. Could you encompass this in an omnibus package? Could you segment it and some pass and some not? 
I'll have to say that the impact of the religious problem was not confined to elementary or secondary [education]. My guess is I didn't envision the depth and 
seriousness of that impact initially. I recognized there was this sensitivity and we were not going to include any aspects of private aid and assistance. But how that would impact and 
undermine much of what we were proposing, I did not sense. We should have understood that if Kennedy, in launching this far-reaching program, had avoided any private [school] 
assistance and was not a Catholic, it would not have hit the way it did. We were not totally sensitive to it, because we didn't really dwell on any of this. We didn't say, "Isn't it 
a shame?" or "Shouldn't there be--?" We simply were constitutionalists. If you were tempted to work out something in this area, you were in no position to do so in any event. 
We were the beneficiaries of the expansion of the Rules Committee, for example. Out of that Rules Committee came at least one member that wouldn't have been there if we hadn't 
had an expanded Rules Committee, and he turned out to be a key to this problem. 
G: This is [James] Delaney, isn't it? 
O: Yes. I think we should have recognized it. Delaney's opposition, obviously, was constituent, and understandable. And yet he had a great affection for the President, total 
supporter of the President. Couldn't he overcome this in terms of saying, "In some way I'll go the route on this but you have to advocate next year something more," something by 
way of negotiation. But he was totally adamant. And part of that had to be that Delaney resented that this fellow Kennedy would ignore this entire area purposely because he was 
a Catholic. There was something very negative in all of this, from Delaney's perspective. And yet you have a tremendous commitment in this area. This is one that you are 
emotionally involved in--this whole education situation. So no matter what strategies were considered the fact of the matter is that the cloud over the whole exercise in my 
recollection--and I may be exaggerating this, there were other problems, of course--basically and fundamentally was that a guy had purposely ignored his own people, because 
he was embarrassed. And your defense, "Wait a minute, the Constitution is clear, the Supreme Court decision, everything is there," so it made no sense to try this. Oh, no, 
they're not going to buy that. They would have bought it from John Smith, but they weren't going to buy it from Jack Kennedy. 
It began to cause problems extending far beyond Delaney. The National Education Association public comments that were being made just exacerbated the 
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O'Brien --Interview II --47 
problem. That then brought the private school sector, Catholics predominantly but others in the private school sector, into play with barbed debate and all that. It didn't create a 
schism perhaps because there probably wasn't unity of purpose. But it certainly eliminated up front any hope of a united effort on the part of the organized people in the field of 
education. You had a battle ongoing. There weren't that many of the same religion as Kennedy in the White House, but I think there was a perception probably that the White 
House was loaded with people like us, so-called Irish Mafia. But the fact of the matter is, if you looked at our representation, it probably would be comparable to previous 
administrations. But nobody ever paid any attention--we didn't, we never took a head count or anything like that. Who cared? That was our attitude. But I guess I have 
mentioned this before and I'm repeating myself, but I had to, even in the high good humor of Cardinal Cushing. 
G: [Richard] Cushing, wasn't it? 
O: In the very pleasant way that he delivered the message to me one night in Paul Young's Restaurant. He came over to my table, and you know the accent, you probably recall 
Cushing. 
G: Brogue, yes. 
O: I stood and greeted him. "How's Jack?" I said, "He's fine." "Well," he said, "I haven't seen him in a while." I said, "Oh, gosh--" "Well," he said, "I like him; you know, we've 
known each other all our lives. But I want you to tell him something. I don't want to embarrass him. I am in and out of Washington every now and then and sometime I'd like 
to drop by just to say hello, and he can bring me in the back door so nobody will know I'm there." He said, "Billy Graham visits quite often, and he should come in the front door 
and I think that's great. But just tell him not to worry about it, that if I could come by and say hello sometime at his convenience and he doesn't have to explain my presence." You 
know, laughing, kidding, sort of arm around my shoulder. 
So that ended the conversation. Cushing was never going to publicly cause any problem. There was none of that. It was just that he had a feeling that perhaps Jack was a 
little sensitive in this area. And not too long afterward the Cardinal was in and we all dropped in to visit with him in the Oval Office. All I'm saying is, and I don't want to 
exaggerate it in terms of the education battle, but I think that we were a little insensitive to reactions of people that were in significant positions. Not to dwell on it or make it the 
overriding issue, clearly it would be a mistake also to simply dismiss it, because it did have an effect. 
I don't remember the details, we had occasion I think the following year to extend some education programs. I found myself in my White House office with the 
representatives of the National Catholic Welfare Conference and the National Education Association and the AFL-CIO, and we were sharing assignments on head counts. 
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O'Brien --Interview II --48 
G: Is that right? One follow-up question on the Cardinal Cushing story. Did that subsequent visit to the White House that he made result from--? 
O: Not really. 
G: I assume that you told President Kennedy about this. 
O: I mentioned it to him, and we had a chuckle over it. It wasn't that serious and, as far as Cushing was concerned, there was a very warm friendship between the two of them. And 
it's like everything else. You're in there in the White House, you don't sit with a chart up on the wall, "When was the last time I saw Cushing?" or this one or that one. 
G: But do you think Kennedy was reluctant to bring him in? 
O: No. I think it was a matter of the Cardinal not contacting the White House. He hadn't contacted the White House in a period of time. If the Cardinal wanted to come in and say 
hello to Kennedy, he would have been ushered in immediately. I think it was a combination of that and the Cardinal giving me a little ribbing about "Gee, Billy Graham 
walks in and out of the front door, so tell Jack I'll go in the back door just to say hello." 
G: Now, [Francis] Cardinal Spellman was heavily involved in this education issue as an adversary. He was on Delaney's side. 
O: Yes. 
G: How did you deal with him? 
O: We didn't. I didn't. 
G: Did you get any help from Cardinal Cushing on this matter? 
O: I don't recall his involvement. I don't think the hierarchy ever really got to the point. We weren't really getting this job done in any event. Did it come to the point of massive 
confrontation, I think that really the way the dice rolled in this thing, you had a Delaney, you had a Hugh Carey that was trying to figure out ways to build a bridge, which was the 
way you'd try to handle this or any other matter. 
As far as Spellman was concerned, Spellman was known to be a conservative. He was assumed to probably be a Republican, although those fellows I assume don't walk 
around with their party designation on their sleeve. The only contact I ever had with Spellman was in terms of stamp collecting after I became postmaster general. But others 
might have talked to him. But I'll tell you, if you said to me at the outset, "Well, obviously there's some trouble brewing and why don't you see if we can't get hold of Spellman or 
have the President contact Spellman," I would have suggested, "Forget it." Spellman would have been in opposition to much of the Kennedy program that had nothing to do 
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O'Brien --Interview II --49 
with the private schools and education. That's his track record. That wouldn't be Cushing's track record. He made no bones of being an avowed liberal. 
G: Two very different. . . . 
O: Oh, yes. 
G: John McCormack was known to favor the parochial school element. How did you come to terms with McCormack? 
O: Well, John McCormack did everything he could to try to bring Delaney into line. What would be overriding with John McCormack was the innate need for the program. And 
this was a Democratic Party program, and John McCormack at no time evidenced the concerns that Delaney evidenced. John McCormack was every inch a team player, every 
inch the supporter of the president; that applied to Johnson or Kennedy or any Democratic president. And he was not, and he always told me that, a person that would go public in 
opposition to a president even of the opposite party, [because of] his great respect for the office. But with Kennedy, he was just a dedicated advocate. So with McCormack and the 
other leaders up there, the effort was to convince Delaney to give us what we construed was the decisive vote. 
My recollection is that on one evening when we invited Congressman Delaney down to visit with the President that Tip O'Neill came with him. And the Delaney I knew, 
very honestly, he was a very forthright guy. He was a fellow that didn't quibble about position. You had it up or down with Delaney on any issue. And in this instance this 
fellow was adamant. Wilbur Cohen must have this in great detail. Wilbur, as I've told you before, was most aggressive, and had an innate knowledge of the subject and all its 
intricacies. We sat in my office on different occasions trying to develop strategies including a time when Hugh Carey was present with several of us and talked about loaning 
textbooks. 
So Delaney was a loner, because even those that shared his religious convictions were just intensely interested in moving this legislation. 
G: I have a press account that indicates that during this period there was a showdown between McCormack and Rayburn; McCormack wanting some inclusion of parochial 
school aid here, and Rayburn determined to get the public school aid to a vote first and get that cleared--
O: That could have happened. 
G: --and reportedly McCormack acquiesced. Do you have any knowledge of that meeting? 
O: No, because I had no problem with McCormack in this area. That would not foreclose McCormack, if he thought of it, going the route of Hugh Carey, for example. 
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McCormack has strong religious convictions. And he followed his convictions to his credit. I'm not suggesting that McCormack would not have embraced the Hugh Carey 
proposal or similar proposals. He was not a constitutionalist in this. I think the reality of whether or not you could get enactment of education [legislation] was apparent to him. 
So I would not suggest that he and Rayburn didn't have that discussion. But what kind of inclusion? See, that's really what you were up against. What kind of inclusion? You have 
the religious aspect of this but let's face it, that isn't any different than conflicts that exist in any legislative proposal. How do you bridge them? If you sat and said, "Well, let's have a 
significant inclusion of private school aid." At that time you're going to lose the support of the NEA totally and a good piece of the Congress. So how do you build a bridge that 
keeps people in place for a roll call so you can get legislation enacted? That's no different than the effort to have a meaningful civil rights bill. It's all part of the process. 
G: One of the press accounts blamed Secretary [Abraham] Ribicoff for not being clear-cut in advocating the public school rather than public and private, and also for vacillating on the 
administration's view that there was a constitutionality of across-the-board aid to public schools. 
O: I don't recall. 
G: You don't feel that Ribicoff was a problem at the time? 
O: I don't recall him as a problem. 
G: How in the world did you--? 
O: What may be in some people's minds and what they say and do may be two different things. It's a program that we all had embraced up front. That's where you are. If you 
have some problems with this and you see some overriding negatives in terms of impact on the President as a result of a road you're going to travel, you should up front include 
that in the equation when the decision process is in place. You've put this on your agenda and there you are, and you have a variety of education legislation, you have a chairman of 
the committee, Adam Powell, that you may or may not find on any given day and you have all the rest of this. 
But I said perhaps it was my insensitivity or failure to recognize the dimensions of this problem as it would unfold. And I'm not trying to place my light conversation with 
Cushing in that category at all. I'm just saying that there were elements in here that I should have understood better than I did. And I had no problem with advocacy of 
education legislation that didn't include private schools. I'm a realist, and I might feel there ought to be some way to be helpful to private schools, but that wasn't what we were 
involved with. We had a proposal; it did not include private schools. Now you've got to make every effort to enact [it]. In the process of compromise, if somebody says to me, 
"Well, maybe we can get away with a little bit of private school," I'll buy that. It's the old story of maybe I haven't the whole loaf or maybe there's part of it that you prefer not to 
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O'Brien --Interview II --51 
have, but, my God, does the end justify the means? And I'm sure I'd sit there, as I did with Hugh Carey that night, saying, "Great, I can see where this might help us move this." 
G: Well, there was even at the time a formula being discussed whereby you could, say, under NDEA money allocate some to private schools for science and medical research and 
things like that? 
O: Yes. Yes. They weren't buying. (Laughter) 
G: Was this offered at the time to get some of these advocates of parochial school aid to go along or wait--? 
O: We thought we were stating the obvious, that there was this area of potential assistance. 
G: Yes, but they didn't buy it? And what you're saying is you should have just been more explicit, is that right? 
O: I think that there should have been a greater attempt up front, and it would have called for the creativity of everybody. There should have been two things: one, the anticipation that 
this area could be very troublesome, and, secondly, a full exploration of any possibility of bridging in any conceivable way at the outset. It was difficult; it probably was impossible, 
but it wasn't completely explored. And I'm not faulting anyone. I fault myself, I guess, because as a Catholic I should have anticipated some of these people that I knew very well 
could be very adamant on this subject to the point where even their affection for the President wouldn't be enough. I don't think I envisioned that--that doesn't mean that we 
would have scuttled the program. But I think that we should have been a little better in tune with what we could anticipate, and conceivably the Hugh Carey type of proposal 
might have been in the equation in some earlier stage and that might have had some impact. 
But who knows? The fact is that the President was in an impossible situation in which to negotiate anything. Sure, you could say, "There's funding in another area that 
can be [used]," but that really. . . . And we all know that constitutional provisions, court decisions, are always subject to interpretation and review. You know, you're not really 
totally leveling--it's a little bit of a cop-out. And there are times when that's all right and it works, but in this instance it didn't. And I think really what's interesting about it is that it 
did bring into focus the power that could be exercised by a handful, indeed one person, at a given moment and that you had underestimated his strength of purpose--his 
commitment. 
Tape 4 of 4, Side 1 
G: --ironic in a sense because the fight over the Rules Committee had been launched to eliminate that one-person control. 
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O'Brien --Interview II --52 
O: That's right. But there wasn't any real fallout that I would call mean or bitter or rancorous. In fact, that includes Delaney. Delaney wasn't in there screaming or hollering; 
he was in there as a soft-spoken, adamant fellow that was not going to be--his view wasn't going to be affected no matter who talked to him. That's all, and accept it. Because there 
were other problems, you know, that the committee--so much of our legislation then and later was funneling into the Labor and Education Committee. 
And Adam Powell was certainly an extremely interesting guy to know. I got to know him intimately. But he could be an exasperating fellow and he could be particularly 
exasperating to a man like John McCormack, a straight-arrow fellow that was very businesslike concerning the function of the Congress, its various committees, its timetables 
and all the rest. And to find that one of his committee chairmen was elusive and difficult to pin down in terms of schedules tested John's temper on a number of occasions. But 
McCormack would, in meetings we'd have in his office that attempted to persuade Adam to a) schedule hearings; b) have a timetable for mark-up; and c) be supportive and 
available on the floor as an advocate when it was scheduled, all of that was in the context of the reverend. John would always refer to Adam as reverend. And he'd say, "Now, 
Reverend, this," and "Reverend, you must do that," and "Reverend, I ask you or plead with you to do this." (Laughter) And there was a little bit of humor to it all. 
So John McCormack found himself one Sunday morning in my office at the White House with Carl Albert and me because we can't find Adam Powell again. Through the 
White House switchboard we finally located Adam Powell in Bimini and really got him on the telephone, and there's the Speaker of the House of Representatives--I guess he was the 
speaker by then, he might have still been majority leader--pleading with Adam Powell to return from Bimini and saying, "Now, Reverend"--( Laughter)--and then saying to me, "He 
says he can't, hasn't any transportation." I said, "We'll provide the transportation." "Reverend, we'll have a plane waiting." (Laughter) And this is on a Sunday, and Adam 
was down there, whatever he was doing down there--( Laughter)--[ he] couldn't care less at the moment. And yet when he would focus, he was great. When he would focus, he was 
an impressive fellow. He really could conduct committee hearings and do his job. The problem was getting him to focus. And the net result of it is there was a lot of heavy 
leaning on the part of us in the White House on Jim O'Hara on that committee. 
G: Oh, really? 
O: We leaned on Jim excessively and Jim tried in a lot of ways to fill in for Adam in trying to move things along. And there were some stalwarts on the committee, too, several. 
G: There were strong personalities. One of the attributes that is accredited to Adam Clayton Powell was that he was able to keep Edith Green in line to some extent, to get her 
cooperation. Was this a problem and was he able to do--? 
O: Well, Edith had very strong views in this area. She was one of the original supporters of Jack Kennedy, as you know, and couldn't have been more staunch in her advocacy from 
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day one regarding his candidacy, but in this area it was very troublesome to Edith to have any private school aspects to this. And there were other areas, too, where Adam--Adam 
Powell had a capacity to disarm you. He really did; he did with me. As aggravated as you would get, as frustrated as you would get, when you finally got Adam into the office or 
you were in his office, after a half an hour of Adam's storytelling you found you were warm friends all over again, everything was going to be halcyon, everything was going to 
go on schedule until the next time. But he had that capacity. He had some real leadership qualities and he had a great sense of humor. And he knew he was driving everybody mad 
and rather enjoyed it. 
G: Can you give me an example of his sense of humor? 
O: Yes. I had an experience with him one day. He came into the White House. For some reason, he was in my office--and I should divert for a moment. Adam, to my knowledge, 
was the only person that I ever knew that addressed the President as Jack. And he did on a number of occasions, which always startled me. I don't know whether it startled the 
President or not, but it startled me. But Adam had a purpose in most things he did. But he was sitting there and he smoked these long, thin cigars. He was talking about his 
church in Harlem. I guess in membership it was the largest church in America; I don't know, my recollection was something like ten, fifteen thousand, fourteen thousand, 
whatever it was, members of the church. And he said, "Of course, I have a semiannual census." 
G: Oh, a census of the congregation. 
O: Yes, a census. And he said, "I have this semiannual census," and he had just thousands of members. And I said, "Why would you have a census twice a year?" He said, "Well, 
there's a five-dollar fee when they do a census, and the church has to be supported." And he did, he had a tremendous following and [was] a tremendous preacher. And he would 
meld his Sunday services, and I think every cabinet member wound up preaching at Adam's church at one time or another. He would just really demand the appearance of 
these people. 
Then he got into some other area and it was obvious to me--he had a big smile on his face throughout all this and he knew that he was titillating me a little bit. I don't know 
how much of it was an exaggeration or just--and then he wound up, he said could he say hello to the President before he left. Well, obviously, he could say hello. I wasn't about to 
tell him the President was otherwise engaged. And we dropped in the Oval Office to say hello. To this day, I've never quite understood, or maybe I misunderstood, but he said to 
me, "Larry, let me finally say something to you. Always remember, where there's smoke, there's fire." And I remember I sat there and I thought, "I must have misunderstood what 
he just said." On the other hand, the son of a gun, I probably didn't misunderstand what he said, because he burst out into laughter. And he's laughing and I'm sitting there 
absolutely thunderstruck and I had no comment; I didn't know what in God's name you could say. And that ended the conversation. We went in and [said], "How are you, 
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O'Brien --Interview II --54 
Jack?" to the President. (Laughter) And he gave him one of his thin cigars. 
Later on when I was out of [the government] and he was a former congressman, I'd see him occasionally. He was a sports buff, basketball buff, and I'd run into him in 
Madison Square Garden here. And even then he was wearing the T-shirt and the big medallion and chain. He always was an impressive-looking fellow and he always attracted 
attention. We would just kid around for a few minutes. He loved to tickle you, kid you, get you off balance. You didn't know quite how to respond to him. If you responded in 
kind, you might be in a real trap, so the best thing to do is just not say anything. But I thoroughly enjoyed him, with all his aggravations. 
G: What was Kennedy's attitude toward him? 
O: Liked him. 
G: Did he? 
O: Yes. 
G: How did he assess him? Do you recall what he--? 
O: Basically he understood, he knew what the problems were, what we were going through. He was kept fully abreast of all of this. But he couldn't refrain from a big grin, and some 
kind of kidding would take place. It was awfully difficult to have a serious conversation with Adam. 
G: Really? 
O: Yes, I mean he wasn't going to focus that long on anything serious. He brought his son in occasionally to White House ceremonies. He was a big, good-looking young man. I've 
lost track of him, but he was anxious to have his son get a feel for government, but I don't think the son ever followed that course. I don't know. 
G: LBJ and Adam Clayton Powell--
O: I don't remember about that. 
G: Did you ever hear Johnson talk about him? 
O: No, I don't recall. I think that there was a different situation, too. I don't recall also how much of the Johnson period Adam bridged. Do you? 
G: Well, let's see, I think--
O: It could have been all of--
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O'Brien --Interview II --55 
G: --at least through 1966. Well, I think Perkins took over in 1967 or something like that. 1966 or 1967, some time in there. 
O: When was he defeated? Powell was defeated at some point by Charlie Rangel in the primary here. 
G: Well, I don't--but he was removed, wasn't he, as chairman of the committee and I think that took place--
O: Oh, he got in all kinds of--
G: --about 1966 or 1967. Perkins took over. 
O: No, I don't recall. Also, I do recall that the period we're talking about was an extremely difficult one for us, you know--always that handful of votes margin if you prevailed, 
always just on tenterhooks on anything major, and that applied in committees and the floor of the House. So the attention directed to Adam, and the role that we had to seek from 
Adam was so significant. He was the focal point at times of White House discussion and leadership discussion. Now, perhaps I'm not recalling Johnson's reaction to Powell only 
because perhaps it wasn't as significant a situation as it was in our days because of the change in the Congress. 
G: Sure. We'll take up that later. In this particular year, though, in 1961 you did get him to refrain from adding that antisegregation rider to the education bill. How did you do that? 
O: I honestly don't remember. I was trying to think of what we gave him, but I don't recall that we gave him anything. Maybe if you jog my memory on that. I think he played that 
out for a while--he wasn't a spoiler. Really, when everything is said and done, all the Adam Powell stories and all of his unusual behavior and all the rest of it, he wasn't innately 
a mean fellow at all. He could articulate his views very well and he was truly at that point one of the black leaders in this country. But he was not a spoiler, he was not mean, and 
his tendency was to be on the team, when you finally got him to focus. It was more focus than anything else. Now, he would take something like that, play out the string, just to get 
everybody into an uproar and then he would make a determination probably not to include it because that would kill the legislation. So he'd let it go. What did you give him? What 
was the quid pro quo? I haven't any recollection of a quid pro quo. 
G: I have a note that indicates here that perhaps he felt that Kennedy would withhold aid from segregated schools through executive action. 
O: Could be, I don't remember. 
G: You don't recall this being discussed? 
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O'Brien --Interview II --56 
O: No. I'll say this. The more I think about it, there had to be a quid pro quo. It would have been foolish of Adam to let go of that weapon or just drop it without some kind of 
compensating factor. And that could be in the area. 
G: Well, he had brought up that rider every year, every time the school bill came up. 
O: Yes, I know it. He did a lot of things every year. But it's interesting, isn't it. There are people you meet such as Adam, who are unique in their way, in their attitudes and their 
actions and can be a source of concern and aggravation to you. But I think the absence of real meanness or deviousness makes if easier to put up with those people. There were 
people that I didn't overly respect, a handful of them. There were people that you were not overly impressed with. By the same token, there were many people that you were 
most impressed with. But I don't recall that I became embittered with any individual up there. And I think in the case of Adam Powell, in the final analysis, when you really focus 
on the record, Adam Powell made a real contribution. I really do. 
I think he outlived his position with the blacks in Harlem. I always equated, interestingly enough, the attitude of the blacks toward Adam to the attitude of the Irish 
toward James Michael Curley. So I related to a lot of this because we recognized, if we allowed ourselves to think about it, that James Michael Curley might be a rogue, but we 
refused to accept that or acknowledge it. We were very defensive concerning him, and we remained loyal to him, and why? Because with all of these aspects of Curley, he had great 
leadership qualities. He arrived on the political scene in Massachusetts at a time when people of my heritage were seeking someone that would have the courage to speak up and 
fight the establishment. And he did all that, and it was a breakthrough. But the very same people that admired [him] for all that, in a period of time lost admiration for Curley. They 
admired a new type of leader by the name of Jack Kennedy. But the man at the moment, at the time, performed a role in terms of breakthrough and recognition. 
That's exactly what happened with Adam Clayton Powell. He might have been somewhat of a rogue, as Curley was to some degree, but the fact remains that at that time 
and place he spoke out, he took on the establishment, he took on the anti-black members of Congress head on. He defied them. He did unusual things. He acted in an unusual 
manner. He did not conform to the precepts of the establishment. All of that was applauded by his constituency. And then the breakthrough to some degree occurred and 
then they turned elsewhere. A Charlie Rangel became the congressman from the same district, an entirely different kind of fellow with whom they are very comfortable in terms 
of representing them. So it's the man at the time, and I often--and I think I might have even mentioned it in my book--in my association with Adam would think of Curley 
because there was a lot of similarity in terms of--
G: He was really the product of an earlier era, wasn't he, and outlived that era? 
O: That's right. And outlived it. Yes. 
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O'Brien --Interview II --57 
G: Describe his relationship with the southerners, particularly the older--this was at a time when segregation was still in. 
O: Yes. I was not privy to any relationship he had with them upon arrival in the Congress. I've heard a lot of stories about that. 
G: What? Can you recall any? 
O: Well, only that [when] Adam arrived, he was a very imposing individual on arriving at that scene. There was nothing about Adam--he had no reluctance whatsoever to step right up 
there and say, "Here I am, boys, take it or leave it, and that's your problem." (Laughter) "And I'm going to be here a while and you're going to hear a lot from me." (Laughter) I 
think perhaps by the time I got around to knowing Adam that some of that had toned down. I don't know. I never had any of the southern Democrats that I dealt with, and the 
senior fellows in the House or Senate, refer to Adam in any racially derogatory sense at all. I think by then they had become sort of accustomed to him around there. They might 
kid about Adam and Adam's travels and his social activities, but it was never in a racial context that I can recall. Even with all the problems that the leadership had with him, it 
never was in a racial context. None of that. It was more the fellow as he was, chairman of a committee, and he was unique. 
G: Did Rayburn ever talk about him when you had these talks with Rayburn? 
O: I don't recall, no. 
G: Could Rayburn, or later McCormack, employ any devices to keep him on the job and keep him from taking these treks to the islands or wherever he went? I noticed this was a 
problem even in 1961 and 1962, having him in town for an important committee session. 
O: Oh, sure. The President of the United States or no one else could contain Adam or handle him. But, see, Adam never resented your trying to find him and all that. (Laughter) He 
just remained aloof. So even when you found him, he just laughed. I can remember I chased him all over Washington night after night, and of course he had a staff all geared to 
avoidance. 
G: Really? 
O: Oh, sure. They would get messages to him, or they didn't really know where he had gone, or perhaps he was out to dinner. Nobody ever knew where he was. Nobody ever could 
find him, and you'd leave messages in every place you could imagine, and if Adam chose to, he might get back to you in a day or two, or he might not get back to you at all. You'd 
have to start all over again. (Laughter) And everyone obviously worked at it, but, as I told you, I think the best example of our inability to handle him was that Sunday when I looked 
around my office and saw the people sitting there, one purpose in mind: to get Adam Powell, find him in Bimini and get him back to Washington for the following day. 
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O'Brien --Interview II --58 
No, I don't know how the senior southern Democrats felt about him. They never expressed it, nor did I detect any individual or collective effort to go after him in any way, 
either. 
G: He seems to have really run his committee with a strong hand, too. Was that the case? Did he--? 
O: You bet. Listen, Adam Powell was a very intelligent man, very bright when he put his mind to it. That was all, just put his mind to it. If that fellow didn't run off to Bimini, 
believe me, he would have gone in the history books as one of the great powers in the Congress, because he had the tools. When he utilized those tools, he was impressive. 
And again, I've repeated it often, but it's amazing, because it's an absolute reality. It was only when you could get him to open the kit of tools and use them, and it was hard. Hard, 
difficult as it could be. 
G: Was there anyone, say, a professional staff member on the committee that you relied on to help with Powell? 
O: No, there was no one on the committee that had any control over him at all or any authority to speak for him. He had an interesting office, the lights would be down low and 
music in the background if you walked in. He had a lifestyle of his own. 
G: (Laughter) One of the newspaper assessments of the first session of Congress stated that it was a miracle that the education bill emerged from the House committee intact. And the 
same article cited your efforts to get the bill through the committee. Do you recall what you did in working with different members of that Education and Labor Committee? 
O: Not in any detail, as I reflect on that period. It was a basically strong committee. There were some very able people on that committee. I don't know, I never tried to analyze or 
evaluate that. But if you think of a couple of the people I've mentioned, and there were others. . . . The communication with the committee was constant, not necessarily with the 
chairman, but constant. And as far as moving the committee one-on-one and head-counting the committee and that sort of thing, that wasn't the problem. There was a lot of 
work involved in sensitive but very meaningful areas. The committee had quite a plateful in those years. And it was necessary to have an inordinate amount of contact with the 
individual members of the committee, again because of Adam. You obviously couldn't depend on Adam to maintain full contact and personally head-count his own committee; 
he wouldn't devote the time and attention to that. And that's why I mentioned Jim O'Hara and mentioned Hugh Carey. And there were others; if I looked at the makeup of the 
committee it would refresh my memory. But I think probably necessity dictated that you handle that committee even more intimately than you normally would because of the lack 
of communication on a regular basis with the Chairman. So, other than that, I don't think there was any-thing unique or unusual, it was just a matter of degree in terms of the effort 
to spring that legislation out of the committee. 
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O'Brien --Interview II --59 
G: Do you recall the issue of advancing the elementary [school] aid first and then the aid to higher education? 
O: No, I don't recall it. 
G: Do you recall Edith Green's position here? 
O: Not really. Reflecting on Edith, the only area that was troublesome to us was Edith's position on the issue we talked about. Edith otherwise was a stalwart in this area and 
widely recognized as an expert in the field. I don't want to call it an aberration, it wasn't; it was the strong view she had in the one specific area. But as far as the commitment to 
education that we envisioned, she shared that and very strongly. 
G: The strong view with regard to parochial school aid? 
O: Yes, but she also had a strong view toward education, toward legislation in the field of education as long as you weren't discussing parochial school aid in that context. She was 
very well thought of in the field of education, too. In organized education across the country she was held in very high regard. 
G: Well, I guess the teacher groups were very supportive of her, too. 
O: Yes. Well, that's really where you get to the NEA. 
G: You had an element of opposition from the southern conservative congressmen, the Dixiecrats, throughout the Congress on this. Did you have any strategy for making 
headway with them? 
O: Not any overall strategy, no. Some of that was basically opposition to the program generally, and there was a continuing sort of negative or opposition aspect involving some 
of those fellows that over an extended period of time you kept working on. But applying it to a specific proposal such as this area, there wasn't any unusual strategy. We used to 
maintain our batting average with them and I'm sure you probably have noted that it became almost a statistical concentration on our part. How many were there at the 
beginning? How many were there as time unfolded? And there was the knowledge that you had to reduce that opposition to a certain number before you would have any comfort 
in terms of a majority vote, and it really was reduced to that number, utilizing everything available to us, all the things we have enumerated. 
But the fact of the matter is, and I think that's worth reflecting on again, you have a President that went into office and the members of Congress were not, with rare 
exception, intimately acquainted with him. Granted, he had spent fourteen years in the Congress, but it was split between the House and Senate. His absenteeism in the House 
was well known. The senior members in the House really didn't get to know him well. 
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O'Brien --Interview II --60 
Obviously, a John McCormack knew him but not because he was a member of the House. But there were very few exceptions. And as time went on and leadership breakfast led 
into leadership breakfast, week after week after week, you could just see the change. 
Sam Rayburn is a good example--the warm relationship that ultimately developed between those two fellows, the sharing of concerns about their physical well-being, the 
things that finally become subjects of conversation among people that feel comfortable with each other. Now, that's a long way from the Sam Rayburn in Los Angeles. Carl 
Albert right up front. The President took to Carl Albert immediately; he didn't know him well, he didn't know these people well, other than John. He knew Mansfield a little better. 
Obviously, he knew Hubert Humphrey more in combat than. . . . But I remember Carl Albert as an extremely impressive fellow, awfully, awfully able, and in no time at all we 
recognized that. The President would repeatedly say to me, "Carl Albert is such an impressive fellow." He says, "God, I'm really impressed with him." And there was 
nobody more supportive of Kennedy in those early troublesome days than Carl Albert. 
But, you see, that's where you came from, and how do you get to a point where Carl Vinson takes a walk through the Rose Garden and then has a change of heart, and he 
really had been placed in that position by a fellow on his staff. I remember sitting with him after the Rose Garden visit and he pulled back that demand he had in--
G: This is the RS-70? 
O: Yes. I mean that's the sort of thing that was happening every day. I keep referring to Al Thomas because of the tie-in to the visit to Texas. But these fellows became acquainted 
with Jack Kennedy. They really had never known him. He had three terms in the House. He was just another guy that came by once in a while--didn't hold any key position in the 
House. And as time went on, it was heartwarming to me to see this unfold, as he got to know these people. And that had so much to do with the progress we made. Like you 
say, you made a reference to some comment about my activities or the staff activities with the committee--the Labor and Education Committee. If there was any degree of success 
in that effort, I can tell you that I was dealing with people that liked the guy downtown; they liked him personally. 
G: There's one story that I read, perhaps you can put it in context and maybe amplify it. The story goes that President Kennedy would call a southern congressman after each wrong 
vote and not reprimand him or upbraid him, but simply say that he understood that the congressman had to vote that way and he realized that his constituency required him to do 
so, et cetera. And they would talk amiably. Then one time when President Kennedy really needed the fellow's support--he was heading a subcommittee--then Kennedy called him 
and elicited his support and didn't get his vote, but did get him to help clear the bill by getting other members of the subcommittee to do that. Does this sound accurate? 
O: Yes, it was accurate. 
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O'Brien --Interview II --61 
G: Can you tell me who it was and what the--? 
O: I don't know in that instance; it could have been Mendel Rivers. But this was on a very selective basis, not a mass production sort of thing. Some of the more senior southerners 
were not people that were in opposition because of some deep distaste for the White House or anything like that. It was basically a reflection of constituency. And we felt 
there had to some day be breakthroughs with a number of these people. And on a very selective basis I would give a list to the President to make those calls. 
G: These would be calls after a vote to just chat with them and get to--? 
O: Yes, and in the cases where they voted against you, because you always kept looking down that road. You knew you had to break through sometime. You could sit and react 
adversely that day, but that wasn't going to cure anything, because there had to come a time when there could be breakthroughs. I mentioned Mendel Rivers, because Mendel 
Rivers had a very close and warm relationship with John McCormack. Mendel would say to me at times, "Well, in the final analysis, Larry, I'm a McCormacrat." And he liked the 
President. He was one of many who said, "I like that guy. I run into him, I see him down there at the White House. He invites me down, we shoot the breeze, and he doesn't push 
me around, or try to." And that was all the equation. You might have it reflected in a pair. You haven't gotten these fellows to the point where they're going to vote on the 
record in that roll call. There can be an abstention, something can happen. It wasn't an up or down "vote for me," or "if you vote against me, that's it." There were ways they could 
help if they had a mind to, and you had to cultivate that willingness to be helpful. And it was done in a variety of ways. The fact of the matter is that a fellow like Rivers, there 
were any number of others, could be of some real meaningful help and it would not be reflected in the record. 
G: Yes. 
Tape 4 of 4, Side 2 
G: --perhaps a teller vote or something of this nature? 
O: Sure, all kinds of things. But in the Rivers situation particularly, that was a very close friendship, he and McCormack. And it was interesting, because Mendel was a mercurial 
sort of fellow. But he made no bones about his admiration for John McCormack and, as time went on, he acquired a very pleasant attitude toward Jack Kennedy, too. 
G: Well, I assumed that a pair was fairly automatic, that it was almost a courtesy that one member gave to another. 
O: Yes, that's right, but listen, a pair, there are ways where it can work. You bring that other member into interaction in terms of an ultimate roll call. It's an intriguing parliamentary 
procedure. You can do an abstention--you had commitments at times to await a vote after 
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O'Brien --Interview II --62 
the second or third go-around. This was before the electronic devices and "if needed." Oftentimes the "if needed" didn't occur because we would survive without it. But if a 
fellow said, "I'll vote with you only if needed," then you've made some progress. 
G: That's an interesting concept, because in your papers, on your little tally sheets, I saw that a lot, "if needed." 
O: Yes. Now, who knows? The call went out "if needed" on occasions. On occasions it didn't. It was a gamble on the part of that member, too, who didn't want to vote with you. 
If the call came, and those people were all spotted on the floor, everybody knew what their role was. To hang back on roll calls, that's a usual procedure anyway. It took forty-five 
minutes for a roll call in those days in the House. And the fellow would step up and could make the difference. But more often than not, the need didn't arise, so the test 
wasn't ultimately given. 
G: Was there a tendency at all to overuse that and to say to a member that his vote was needed when in fact you had a pretty good margin? 
O: No. No. You would try like the devil not to overuse it, because you wouldn't try to call a fellow off the floor. This is operated out of the speaker's office. And you have the 
running count from the gallery and we have our people there, and then you'd call them off [the floor] and say, "It's clear that you're needed." I mean you don't use that just to 
position a fellow. And that was all you had a right to expect of them. 
So really what you needed was a Carl Vinson or someone to persuade a couple of members on his committee to get a bill out of committee in the form we wanted; to go 
along while not even putting himself on the spot. Because of his position as chairman, he could get people to do that. I guess that minimum wage struggle that I discussed at some 
point--I don't recall whether it was here in this context or otherwise--was a prime example of working together to try to salvage a meaningful bill. 
We could talk about the House almost exclusively, but the Senate was there throughout all this. But your problems in the Senate were less penetrating than in the 
House. So you had some elbowroom that you didn't have in the House, for one thing; the head-counting was much easier in the Senate than the House for the obvious [reason]. 
You had the same kind of leadership situation--intimate, close-in, mutual effort leadership in the Senate as you did in the House, with Mansfield and Humphrey and Smathers over in 
the Senate. You had the same kind of access and exchanges of information and all the rest of it, and you had, to some extent, the same situation where there would be the occasions 
when members of the Senate were not going to vote with you, that there was no way you could persuade them to, and you understood it. But there was some way somehow, and 
you'd sometimes suggest it. Because you didn't want to walk away empty-handed, so you'd suggest whatever might come to your mind. 
So oftentimes it was a little bit of informal assistance that was hardly discernible, 
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O'Brien --Interview II --63 
but it was another grain of sand because you can't get away from it and it will carry on throughout our discussions. As I've said repeatedly--something I learned early on--there 
are a lot of bodies up here on the Hill, and it's awfully hard to keep track of them all, awfully hard to adequately service them in whatever way you can be of service. It's 
impossible to become intimately acquainted with every one of them, so you do have to determine focus as time goes on. 
But in the final analysis, the substance is important and nobody is demeaning that aspect, but the difference can be the attitude toward the president reflected by assistance 
in some form, minuscule as it may be on occasion, because of a general atmosphere of willingness to help if it's realistic politically to do so. No one among those we dealt with 
regularly up there--and that was a broad-based group, both the House and Senate--had any motivation other than to try to be helpful if they could, as long as you did not become 
arrogant, would not try to be self-important, and that you recognized their political problems. That was overriding--that you were sensible in your dealings with them and 
you weren't excessive in your efforts to persuade them. All of that comes into it, and how do you put that into a procedural manual. It's dealing with people--certainly it wasn't 
unique with us. Every president has engaged in the same activity to some degree, but what we did was broaden it, deepen it, and formalize it, and keep him abreast of the 
progress we were making, one-on-one or one by one. 
G: The outcome of the education measure, of course it was defeated that session, and Congress did extend aid to impacted areas and National Defense Education funds for two 
years. President Kennedy had wanted a one-year extension only. And he signed that measure with extreme reluctance. Can you recall that--? 
O: No, but that wasn't the only measure he signed with extreme reluctance. I don't recall the specifics of it. It really didn't represent that old cliche about "Well, we had to settle for 
half a loaf." I think we considered this a very modest portion of the loaf to the point where you wonder whether it was worth a damn and maybe you ought to rise up on your 
haunches and give it to them, hit them with it. But anyway. 
End of Tape 4 of 4 and Interview II 
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    [ Part 3: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--64 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview III*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
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LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW III 
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
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(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
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(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
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Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-14 
4
INTERVIEW III 
DATE: October 30, 1985 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 4, Side 1 
G: Yesterday we were talking about President Kennedy and the southern members of Congress. Let me ask you to elaborate on the administration's relationship with Carl 
Vinson. 
O: I think the relationship as it progressed with Vinson was somewhat typical of the improvement in relationship that took place involving several senior southern Democrats. 
George Mahon would be an [example]. The better acquainted the President and these members became, the greater the tendency was on the part of the southern Democrat to at 
times even seek opportunities to be helpful without violating his established record and his constituency attitudes. Vinson in a sense epitomized the courtly South, the total 
gentleman who was at all times courteous to you, at all times willing to listen to your point of view, at no time react negatively. He was invited, as many of them were--senior 
southern Democrats--to the White House in various formats. So as the months progressed, Vinson and the President really got to know each other, and it was good, 
because the President admired Vinson greatly. 
I can recall Carl Vinson sitting in a discussion in the Speaker's office--Sam Rayburn was speaker--regarding the minimum wage bill. There was Carl Vinson, a senior 
member of the House, an important member of the House. His being there and participating in the discussion, trying to determine how you could amend this bill so that it 
could achieve passage in the House, was an indication of what was transpiring in a climate that was conducive to this kind of rapport. We made a decision regarding that bill and we 
lost by one vote on the House floor, and then recaptured most of this in the Senate and in conference. But I think when you had reached the point where Carl Vinson and others 
would become active participants in this, it was an indication of a growing attitude that "We'd like to find some areas where we can help this young guy downtown. We like him 
and we want to support him wherever we can." 
Now, this was not in the climate of an intensive, difficult, civil rights fight. On the civil rights legislation, as we were saying earlier, I think you have to say that while civil 
rights was in the fore-front over an extended period of time, the reality was the improbability of actual enactment of civil rights legislation that would impact 
tremendously on what was perceived, at least, to be southern attitudes that had been in place for decades. That's a somewhat different climate. 
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O'Brien --Interview III --2 
You were operating in a climate where you're talking about education, setting aside any religious aspects that were involved in education struggles, where you're talking 
about medical research, or you're talking in terms of minimum wage or things of that nature. They were not individually and collectively proposals that were accepted with 
open arms by southern Democrats, certainly. They were proposals with a heavy liberal tinge to them. They did reflect the national party and the platform of the party. But [we 
wanted] to get these fellows involved rather than just in direct opposition, as in the old concept of the southern Democrat-Republican coalition. And now you have fellows, 
whether it's the [Albert] Thomases, the Mahons, the Vinsons and others--there were any number of them--with whom one way or another we're communicating and we're sharing 
problems. Not totally, however. They're not going to march to the House floor and stand up and wave their arms in support. But they had reached the point where they didn't want 
to be opposed for the sake of opposition. Rather, they didn't mind the President achieving some record of progress, and in that context and within those guidelines, let's 
communicate and maybe we can help. 
Now, we've talked about varieties of help and it took a variety of ways, but you get Vinson, and it became widely publicized, the walk in the Rose Garden. And it was for 
several hours, probably twenty-four hours, a very touchy situation. Vinson had made it clear that he was in opposition to this presidential request, that he was going to be sure 
that it wasn't carried through. The President was extremely upset, and you had a confrontation. Now, the confrontation is taking place after a period when there's a 
pleasant, friendly relationship that has developed. And the Rose Garden walk was a walk undertaken by the President and Vinson with no one else. But following that there was a 
determination to try to resolve this problem. I don't remember the details of it, but I remember that it was "let's draft a letter." Ted Sorensen was involved in that process. 
Then it was determined that Ted would accompany me if there was need to discuss the language and the wording and I would visit with Carl Vinson. Really, now in retrospect, 
you wonder why this was so significant and overridingly important, but in any event we all thought it was at that time. 
But I remember being in Vinson's office and he was the same Carl Vinson I had gotten to know, courteous and low-key. We discussed this. He had a staff man with him 
and it was Ted and I. And the conversation led to presenting the letter. I at least, and I think Ted shared that view, realized that the staff representative, and I can't even 
remember his name, who was a very key staff fellow with Vinson, was the adamant one. He was the one that was just absolutely adamant about any kind of compromise or 
adjustment, and even as Vinson talked, this fellow would move into the conversation in very strong protest. In fact, almost to the point where I didn't appreciate it. His views 
were unequivocal and there was no way of compromising it. Frankly, after a lengthy conversation, Vinson started to debate with his own staff fellow. As I recall it, the 
ultimate conclusion was that Vinson overruled the staff member, said that he found this acceptable and we would shake hands on it. He was pleased that this had been resolved in 
this manner. 
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O'Brien --Interview III --3 
So we resolved that, what could have been a very serious setback for us in terms of our relationship with Carl Vinson. But I think it was a lesson, too, because it's an 
example, I guess, of what you would run into occasionally. You rarely could be sure of it. Because of the scope of the activities of members of Congress--particularly in the Senate, 
incidentally--there is a tendency over time to have great reliance on the fellow or gal who is close to you on the staff, a great reliance. It grows as time goes on because you haven't 
the time to be as deeply immersed in these issues as the people on your staff. That was a good example of it. In the low-key discussion phase--now also let's reflect back--we 
didn't accomplish that with Vinson that meeting; obviously the President had accomplished that with Vinson in the Rose Garden. Vinson had left the Rose Garden clearly having in 
mind, "I'm absolutely open to try to work something out and I want to." And the staff fellow felt this was his ball game and he didn't want to see it closed out this way. It 
became an ego trip for him. But there you are. The relationship continued to be a warm one between the President and Vinson. 
G: What did President Kennedy say to him in the Rose Garden? 
O: I have no idea. 
G: He never told you what they [discussed]? 
O: No, we never got into it, other than he said, "Well, you know, we had a pleasant chat." But I certainly didn't get the indication from him at all that Vinson had said, "Prepare a 
letter and let's close this out." Not at all. What he had gotten from Vinson was a willingness to consider some proposal that he might make. It was a darn important walk. 
G: There were two levels of issues on that. One was the suitability of the aircraft, I gather, whether it was any good, and the other was the prerogative of the President to advance 
this program rather than be directed--O: 
That was the key aspect of it, and that was what was so disturbing to the President. Vinson had confronted him in terms of presidential prerogative and he was going to see to 
it that the President was not able to exercise his prerogative. That's a dangerous area; that's touchy, that's difficult. And in the process perhaps the quality of the plane got a 
little bit lost. 
G: When you talked with Vinson later with the staff man there, did Vinson seem aware that the plane was not what it should be? 
O: I don't recall that we really got into the quality of the plane particularly. It had gotten to the point where this is now sort of public knowledge, this will be overblown, as Carl 
Vinson saw it. He wasn't trying to cause personal problems for the President. He respected the presidency and the office. But it would be misconstrued and it really got to, 
without verbalizing it, a man sitting behind a desk who it became quite clear was prepared to [say], "Let's just get away from this, let's smooth it over and go on. I don't want to be 
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O'Brien --Interview III --4 
labeled in this way, and the President obviously is very disturbed with this matter. And my ego isn't flowing at all. Let's work it out." And to have him have to debate his own staff 
fellow to work it out was what I recall most vividly. I thought to myself, "God, if I were sitting with President Kennedy in a similar staff role, I'm not at all sure the President 
wouldn't look at me and say, "You've been around too long." It was clearly the role that this fellow had achieved with Vinson that hit me, that he could deign to keep insisting and 
rebutting his boss and basically refusing to acquiesce. It became a matter of Carl Vinson having to persuade his own man. 
G: Do you recall whether the staff member was on Vinson's personal staff or whether he was on the committee staff? 
O: I don't recall, and in fact I wouldn't be able to identify him now. I sure as the devil could have identified him for several years, though, and recall his name, but it eludes me now, 
because I never quite got over the role he was playing that day. Your fear was that this fellow's attitude and the position he insisted on maintaining can blow this up. 
G: How common was it for staff members to exercise this kind of influence over a member? 
O: Well, it was hard to identify but it was not uncommon. It was not uncommon, because we would try to identify staff people up there, committee staff people particularly, of course, 
as to their role and the extent of their authority and that went to their relationship with the chairman of the committee. And there were any number of very senior staff people. They 
were very much included in our regular contact on the Hill, and of course there would be times when you would deal directly with a staff person. It wouldn't be a common practice, 
but it really wasn't that uncommon for a staff person to [meet with us] if you were developing language or developing an amendment. It was generally in the context of the 
chairman's willingness to have it done and just work out the details. Very often this would be between the congressional relations person and others in the department or agency and 
the staff person. 
I think it would have been a mistake to ignore the role of senior staff people on some of those committees, and we tried to avoid that. As you know, some of them are 
very much career people and, interestingly enough, in the minority-majority aspect, you didn't get it in the House very often. But the minority staff member could be very senior, 
too, and obviously very knowledgeable regarding the activities of the committee and the legislation under consideration--more knowledgeable perhaps than any member on the 
committee, including the chairman. 
That remains the case today. I had an occasion not long ago on a matter of some interest to me and to the sports world to go down to Washington. I was asked if I would 
visit some old friends. So I went down and I selectively, because I could [only] spend one full day, had seven or eight appointments. I obviously went on seniority on the 
committee. But the prior evening, I took occasion to have dinner with the senior staff person of the committee, which was very helpful in terms of getting a feel of things. So I 
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O'Brien --Interview III --5 
hadn't changed my practices. 
G: One of the press accounts in 1961 stated that Vinson was absolutely the key to the administration's success in that whole session of Congress, 1961. 
O: I wouldn't go that far, but I would place him right up there in the front ranks. I could count on my fingers the people that were key. I don't think you could go that far, because 
I don't think there was [any] one member of Congress that that should be attributed to. 
G: Are there any other areas where he was essential in legislation? 
O: I think, in general, on the legislation for which he was included in the leadership meetings on the Hill. And, interestingly enough, we've talked about a rather unique relationship that 
Mendel Rivers had with John McCormack. First of all, at that period in 1961, obviously the relationship that Vinson, et al., had with Speaker Rayburn was a very close one. If 
you look back on the record of McCormack's rise in the leadership--and he was very proud of this and repeated it constantly to me--his rise in the leadership up to and 
including the speaker's position was to a great extent due to the tremendous support he had from southern Democrats, even though John McCormack in his entire voting career 
had never voted against a Democratic Party proposal. But in personal terms, he had this great relationship and it was duly recorded in the support he had through the ranks as a 
leader. 
So with Carl Vinson, you had the obvious Carl Vinson-Rayburn relationship, but you had sort of a--I shouldn't say amazing; it's not amazing. But what you wouldn't 
anticipate [is the] relationship that McCormack had with all these senior southern Democrats, which carried on through McCormack's speakership. I think the surprise 
factor was if there was a consistent liberal Democratic voting record in the entire House of Representatives over thirty years, it was McCormack's. But it didn't seem to affect his 
relationship at all with these people; in fact, they supported him strongly. 
G: With regard to Vinson, do you think that his support of the administration was advanced somewhat by that Lockheed plant in Marietta? 
O: Well, certainly it wasn't adverse to progress. I don't know as I place a great deal of credence in that. Again, it goes back to our prior discussion and the whole broad 
so-called area of patronage and power. Carl Vinson's position in the Congress was such that he could exercise a great amount of power. That probably is a little comparable to Al 
Thomas putting the space program into Houston. I don't think anybody in the White House could claim that they placed the space program in Houston. 
So again it's the tendency to seek out. And I'm sure there were people in media saying, "Well, why is Carl Vinson"--particularly after the Rose Garden when everybody 
was just waiting for this big, total blowup--and, oh, the press in Washington would just have a glorious seven days at least out of this. I'm sure there are people saying, "Well, 
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O'Brien --Interview III --6 
why? What does Vinson owe Kennedy?" Well, he didn't owe Kennedy anything in that sense. 
You have to remember one thing, and it's a statistic that I had brought to my attention on any number of occasions. I remember having dinner with Senator [Herman] 
Talmadge at his house one evening, just the two of us. We had a nice, pleasant evening, and with great glee he reminded me two or three times during that evening of the vote 
Kennedy received in Georgia in his candidacy for president re the vote in Massachusetts, and the statistic, I don't recall it now, but it seems to me he had a 60 or 62 per cent vote 
from Georgia as against a 58 or 59 or 60, whatever it was, in Massachusetts. You might say that was an aberration, but the fact of the matter was that he was very, very proud of 
that and so was Carl Vinson. 
See, these Georgians, they were southern Democrats, but there was no way you could suggest that those fellows in Georgia, or the people in Georgia, had any animosity 
to or any ill feeling toward a Catholic Jack Kennedy. By gosh, the record showed that they strongly supported him. So that was a little different than the statistics you could cite 
elsewhere, you know. So you didn't have these fellows sitting in the Congress with a concern about a constituent attitude toward Kennedy. Maybe his program and policies, 
but not in any--G: 
In discussions with President Kennedy, did he consider the Lockheed plant, though, a means of improving the relationship with Vinson? 
O: I don't recall that. I don't know what he considered, frankly, but we never deluded ourselves. We might try to get a little piece of the action or that sort of thing, but you 
were naive if you thought you were going to a Carl Vinson and remind him of the great progress he had made in behalf of his constituency which we could have derailed or that 
"he could not have done it without us." Even if there was some of that, you never tried to utilize it; that would be blatant and it could very well be counterproductive. The reality of 
the situation was that we recognized our limitations in this area, or put it the other way, that this whipping members of Congress into line through patronage, through public 
works, through this, through that, was a grossly exaggerated situation. 
G: Well, would it be fair to say then that the administration in the case of the Lockheed place really didn't have any discretion to put it anywhere else, that Vinson was exercising a 
power that he had? 
O: The only discretion you could have had in a case of that nature is if someone similar to Vinson was fighting Vinson. Then conceivably there might have been a grain of effort that 
could have been expended on behalf of one or the other. But I think what you would have done in a case like that, if there was a big battle being waged regarding Lockheed and its 
location, was to keep as far away from it as you could. 
G: Well, you did have another Vinson in a sense in the Senate, but he was also from Georgia, 
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O'Brien --Interview III --7 
Richard Russell. Let me ask you to describe President Kennedy's relationship with him. I'm talking about during this early period, before the civil rights [legislation]. 
O: Yes. Well, Russell was a giant in the Senate. There was something about his demeanor. He was different than Vinson. 
G: How would you contrast them? 
O: Well, I think Russell was more reserved. I would not say in any sense that he was blunt, but you didn't have the easy conversational relationship with Russell--I'm applying it to 
myself now--as you would have with Vinson. You had the same degree of courtesy and all the rest. 
But my feeling now, looking back on Russell and the many times he was in the White House, he was a leader in the Senate and any crisis situations included Russell, his 
committee position. I think that President Kennedy looked upon Russell as somewhat of a giant in the Senate. I wouldn't suggest that President Kennedy was in awe of him, but I 
would suspect that he had the same reactions that I did, that it was easier to deal with Vinson than with Russell. I'm not too sure that if you had a similar situation and walked in 
the Rose Garden with Russell, that it might have worked out the same way. Russell was not an antagonist, none of them were. But Russell was sort of in a class by himself. 
G: Was he less likely than Vinson to support progressive legislation? 
O: Yes. Yes, that's true. I guess if you want to use the word, he was to some degree more conservative than Vinson. 
G: Was he ever helpful to you in your liaison role? 
O: On general legislation or specific legislation, I don't recall anything unique or unusual about his voting habits. I think, again, in the off-the-record, if you will, activities and his 
key role in the Senate and his key committee position in the Senate that he was not a negative force. I think if you got to the military in terms of legislation, you found that 
Russell was a solid fellow and was not negative or obstructionist. I think, without question, he took his role very seriously, and that was really his area. That was really 
what I think to a great extent absorbed Russell. So on the general day-to-day, week-to-week legislative activities, the head-count process and the rest in the Senate with 
Mike Mansfield, Russell was not a key factor. I mean the contact with Russell directly in all of the promotion of our program was limited. 
G: Was the Vice President used for his long associations with some of these southern committee chairmen? 
O: Yes. You know, we've touched on the Vice President's role, but I think it's worth considering it again, because I'm trying to be as objective as I can and I'm paying the price 
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O'Brien --Interview III --8 
of trying to recall two decades ago. I don't think you can overlook the Vice President's reaction to what was an attitude on the part of the Senate as a whole toward him as vice 
president at the outset of the Kennedy Administration. I have to conclude that it was disappointing to him and a setback to him. He had to be surprised, because I don't think 
he would have tried to travel that route if he had anticipated the attitude that would be expressed. 
Then you go on from there--these are little things, but I think they go into the equation. The majority leader's office that he occupied in the Senate was a very elaborate 
office. He, as vice president, retained that office. I hadn't been on the Hill prior to all of this, but he not only retained that office, he spent a lot of time in it. Now, perhaps the 
record would show that that was phased out over a period of time, but I'm just thinking about my first neophyte reactions to all this when I went to the Hill. 
Mike Mansfield, as the majority whip under Johnson, occupied the appropriate office of the majority whip. He really was, I assume, designated by Johnson as majority 
whip; he was very much the number-two man, accountable to the Majority Leader at all times. But then you have to go beyond that, however, to Mike Mansfield's style, his 
nature. Mike was a very reserved gentleman, who I admire tremendously. I hadn't met a fellow who had served in three branches of the armed services, who had joined the service 
when he was underage and then came back from all of that and vigorously sought an education and became a teacher. He had no ego, none. I'm recounting this because I 
arrive up there to get acquainted and try to determine how all of this works. I guess my first reaction was, dropping into the Vice President's office, I thought it was the vice 
president's office traditionally, [and] dropping into Mansfield's office, that that was the majority leader's office traditionally. After a short period of time I became aware that 
wasn't the case. And you would get the nuances of some of these developments as time went on. 
While we are talking about Mike Mansfield, [I remember] I had occasion to go out to Montana with the President. I don't recall just what the purpose of the visit was; it was 
part of some trip. But that gave me the opportunity to meet, I recall, a brother of Mike Mansfield's, who I believe was a fireman in the town. The very modest lifestyle that was 
his background, the serious economic problems of the whole mining industry, all of this unfamiliar to me. You had to be impressed. And I was also dependent upon him for 
support and guidance, direction. I received that to the fullest and we achieved a very warm friendship. 
When we would get to a serious discussion regarding pending legislation, initially we would be meeting in Mike's inner office and we would always make the point of 
ensuring the presence of the Vice President. It was touchy. You would meet in the Majority Leader's office and then you'd advise the Vice President that this meeting was 
going to take place, it was going to include the following, and if his schedule allowed, would he join us? And he did. We would sit there; it would be probably Bobby Baker 
and a couple of other senators [concerned with] whatever the subject was at the moment. 
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O'Brien --Interview III --9 
We'd discuss strategy and then go through a head count. I can remember there were those occasions. And the Vice President would participate, but certainly did not at any time 
take over any leadership role of the meeting. He made no attempt to do that. He would defer to Mike. In other words, he was participating like a key senator that had come into 
the office to discuss the specific legislation. I think it was fortunate, with the potential sensitivities that could have existed between the two men, that nothing like that ever 
occurred, because you didn't have a Mike Mansfield who really gave a darn where his office was or what kind of chairs he might have or anything else. It obviously meant 
nothing to him. 
But I think there had to be some feeling on the part of Lyndon Johnson of some degree of discomfort. I don't know. I obviously had no discussion with him and what I 
received any time I requested it from him was every effort he could expend, and that included conferring with former colleagues on important matters legislatively. So as a 
participant, whether it was [at] the leadership breakfast downtown or whether it was in the cabinet meetings--where of course at all times the legislative program and its progress or 
lack of it was a major item of discussion and always on the agenda--he was there and involved. I probably shouldn't dwell on this as much as I am because, frankly, I didn't 
consider any of that my business. I was not acquainted with the history and the personalities in the Senate. All I was aware of was that there had been some disturbance 
on the part of some people up there regarding what they perceived to be Johnson's idea of what his continuing role should be. 
I guess I've referred to it before in these early stages. I don't have the date, but I spent an evening with him at the home he had recently acquired. 
G: The Elms. 
O: And Bobby Baker was there with his wife, my wife and I, and a Texas congressman--Brooks. 
G: Jack Brooks? 
O: Jack Brooks and his wife. We spent the entire evening discussing strategies and how to go about congressional relations in a very pleasant session that extended into a very late 
evening. Clearly we were invited, along with Baker and Jack Brooks, who was an old friend of his, so the Vice President could give me a feel of things and an opportunity for 
briefings from a fellow who obviously knew the Senate intimately, Bobby Baker. But I'm not at all sure that the Vice President's comfort level was as high as it should be from that 
early stage of the changeover on. 
Tape 1 of 4, Side 2 
G: In your papers there are reports from Mike Mansfield's office, I think from Frank Valeo, of these key meetings with Senate leaders to really thrash out divergent views on 
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O'Brien --Interview III --10 
legislation. I was impressed with simply the fact that you obtained those, that you were privy to all of that information. 
O: That's another indication of the relationship that was established between the White House and both branches. That's a good example of it. I can't envision something like that 
taking place in earlier administrations. It wouldn't take place because nobody would conceive of the meeting notes in the Majority Leader's office being transmitted to the 
White House. It was unprecedented. 
But the fact is that Valeo, when he took over from Baker, conceived his role to be a bridge between the Majority Leader's office and the White House Congressional 
Relations office. There was constant communication. Mike Manatos would spend time with Valeo regularly, but you can be sure that those notes were not sent to the White 
House without the approval of his boss. Mike Mansfield just became intimately involved in the whole procedure. We had a share in--you know, this was one ball game. Mike had 
an approach to all of this that was interesting, and there may have been times when this kind of set me back a little bit because his approach was manifested--I don't know whether 
these notes reveal any of this or not--by Mike instructing Valeo to go out on the floor and bring in Senator X, Y and Z. And then [he would say], "Larry, you talk to him directly," 
and Mike would sit there. But he would leave it to me; it was my responsibility to carry the ball. 
That would be extended on occasions where there'd be greater significance attached to whatever we were engaged in. And I'm sure on more than one occasion Mike 
would say, "Here's what I'll do. Tomorrow I'll get all these fellows"--and we put together a list--for lunch in his office. I don't remember what the subject was, and it might have 
been the first occasion this occurred because I must say that I was a little nervous about the whole procedure. Here's a guy that's on a staff down at the White House and all of a 
sudden there are twelve or sixteen senators at this long table having lunch; Mike is on one end of the table and he places me on the other. We'd have one of those very mediocre 
quick lunches and Mike would say, "Now, you know what the subject is," or "We asked you to come in, and now I'm going to turn it over to Larry. Larry, you go ahead now." 
My preference, I guess, would have been for Mike to go ahead and I could chip in here and there. But that was his style. People might say he did it by committee, sort of, but 
everybody was included. There was no gossip, no secret, behind-the-wall stuff. You have a pitch to make, you're trying to get these votes, you're trying to get some unity, or trying 
to get this amendment adopted, or you're trying to get the feel. "Let's get them in here. Let's sit them down. Now you go ahead and talk to them and ask them." 
G: Did these luncheon meetings take place fairly often or was it--? 
O: That would be when it got to the point where the people that Mike felt should be involved in the discussion would be ten, twelve or sixteen senators. Most often [it was less]. I 
remember that little corner of his inner office, which was a large room. This fellow would serve coffee, and it was [at] a round table in sort of an alcove that would accommodate up 
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O'Brien --Interview III --11 
to--there'd be Mike and I and three, four, maybe up to five or six senators as you spread the circle a little bit. 
The luncheon was not a normal procedure, but that was when you've got to communicate with twelve to sixteen members and you might as well get them all in. 
"Now, I'll get them in for you and have them sit down. I'm in accord with what you're trying to do and I will so state, but you've got to speak on behalf of the President." It kind 
of put me to the test a little bit, and I must say that I was a little tense about that sort of thing in the earlier days. And there was the basic problem that you could inadvertently or 
indeed stupidly cross that line one inch and not be suitably deferential and all the rest, and all of a sudden there might be some fellow saying, "Wait a minute, what is this? What's 
going on here?" 
G: Did that happen to you? 
O: No. 
G: Did President Kennedy believe that Mansfield was too pessimistic on legislative matters, too cautious? 
O: He knew he was cautious. Mike was a fellow that wanted to have things in place and have a total understanding they were in place before you took the next step. But I don't recall 
that President Kennedy considered that a negative at all. That again was part of his style. What he had in Mike wasn't an overly verbose fellow. With his pipe particularly, he might 
respond in rather clipped sentences. But he was a very direct fellow. You need not be concerned about Mike's attitude or position. If you asked what he thought the status or 
the hope or expectancy was, he would tell you. Now, there were times when that wasn't what you wanted to hear, and I think that you could construe that as meaning he's a 
pessimist by nature and he doesn't wage battle as aggressively or in the style that we'd like to see. I think what you would do anyway with a fellow like that is accommodate to his 
style and act accordingly, because you never had any question in your mind about his dedication and commitment. That was his style, and let's face it, the record we had on the 
Senate side would indicate that there was nothing wrong with his style. 
But his sensitivity, and we'll get to it later, regarding the White House role, mine specifically, was that I was totally accepted by Mike Mansfield. Whatever hour of the day 
or night I was in or out of his office, Mike was available and we'd chat, even if it was just discussing the weather or some sporting event, have a cup of coffee and chat. But I didn't 
realize until the situation occurred with the trade bill that Mike wasn't about to have his office overrun or the corridors overrun with White House or executive branch people 
charging around the place. That turned out to be a sensitive matter at one point. 
G: On the trade bill, is that right? 
O: Yes. Mike directed me to order our private-sector citizen trade people to remove 
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O'Brien --Interview III --12 
themselves from proximity of the Senate Chamber, and [he] was not going to allow them to have the use of his inner office for discussions, as I had that use. I dutifully calmed all 
that down. There was nothing these fellows were doing wrong. They were all gung ho and aggressive and they were inadvertently making their presence too widely known, and 
their efforts were just too obvious and in too close proximity. It was all right for me to have the access I had, but I had to under-stand that just didn't include some army. 
Obviously I attended to that as diplomatically as I could, as quickly as I could. There was no further reference to it. But that is just an indication of the fellow's style. 
G: After LBJ became vice president, how important was Bobby Baker to the Senate operation? 
O: Well, first, Bobby Baker was known to the President-elect. Bobby Baker had, as I guess the record will show, a very unique role in the Senate. If you needed a head count, Bobby 
Baker would have a head count for you in a matter of hours. If you needed a projected attendance count for next Thursday, Bobby Baker would be able within an hour to tell you 
who's going to be present, who wouldn't be and why. 
G: Did this involve an extraordinary talent in itself? Was it simply a mechanical operation? 
O: No, I think it had a significant degree of talent in there. Obviously I didn't know Bobby Baker at all until I was introduced to him. But his role, which I did assume was the role 
he had under Johnson, was an interesting role. I was very interested in this fellow and these titles in the Senate, staff titles, although at first they meant nothing to me. You pick 
up a little bit each day and you try to keep as quiet as you can and be as observant as you can and try to put the cast in place. There wasn't any briefing session for me in all of this 
sort of thing; you had to pick it up as you went along. But the Baker role, for example, with Mansfield, that's when I met Baker, obviously. Baker was a fellow still doing what 
he always did. Mike would say, "We have a partial roll call; we have ten members who we have no idea where they stand on this," and Baker would be assigned to check them 
out during the day and come back with whatever intelligence he could to determine our follow-ups. And that was an integral part of the activity. I don't remember in the time 
frame when Baker departed and Valeo came aboard. You might jog my memory on that, but I don't know--G: 
1963, I think, was when he left. 
O: Was it that late? 
G: Yes, I believe that's right. 
O: Because Baker got into all the problems he had and a change took place. I think it was Mike Mansfield's nature, too, that if he took over a post, took over as majority leader, that 
he took over staff accordingly and there weren't any decisive changes. 
16
O'Brien --Interview III --13 
Incidentally--the comparison between the two--Valeo carried on in basically the same task, but Valeo was, if you can put it this way, more of a student of the legislation, 
had a keen interest in the substance. I don't know what his background was, but he came across to you as a fellow that was quite knowledgeable regarding the legislative program 
in detail, while Bobby Baker was not that way. Bobby was more interested in the game, the way it was played, the ebb and flow and the give and take of votes and amendments 
rather than any great involvement in the substance per se. 
G: Did you have any opportunity to observe some of his extralegal activities, practicing law, or misuses of office while he was--? 
O: No. I don't recall--I'm sure I met Baker's wife on a few occasions. 
G: Dorothy, I think it was. 
O: Yes. But we didn't have any social contacts. Beyond his role and my role, I have no recollection of ever having dinner with Baker or having a drink with Baker off the Hill. I 
had no idea what Baker's extracurricular activities would be, if any, I'm sure during that period. I think as I discuss Bobby now, I do recall that he had a very close relationship, 
I'm not saying confined to one senator, but certainly with Bob Kerr. I remember it came across very quickly to me that his relation with Kerr and I'm sure others--and I don't know 
why I cite Bob Kerr but I think probably that's accurate--that while he had this relationship with a number of senators with his ability to communicate with them, that the relationship 
with Kerr seemed to be much more intimate than with the others. And let's face it, in dealing with the Senate, Kerr was a powerhouse up there. 
G: Why was he a powerhouse? 
O: I think through his own personality, frankly. He was very aggressive, somewhat dictatorial, demanding--not that he demanded anything of me--but all of this came through 
in terms of the personality of the guy. We made efforts to establish a relationship with him as we did with every-one else. I think it was more difficult; we were more uncertain. It 
wasn't to convert him to a liberal Democrat, but you just didn't get to the intimacy or the relaxed atmosphere that we did with many of the conservative Senate Democrats. 
I was not with the President when he visited Kerr's ranch on some occasion, but I remember Ken O'Donnell telling me--I think he and Dave Powers accompanied the 
President. I'm sure it was part of some trip. I would normally be on a trip involving congressmen or senators, but what-ever occurred, I wasn't there. But apparently Senator 
Kerr pointed out to them that he owned everything looking to the horizon and as far as the eye could see. Then the concern of Ken and Dave--I guess they probably stayed 
overnight--was that there would not be a drink available. I'm not too sure that one or both of them didn't sneak a little drink in with them in the anticipation that they wouldn't have a 
chance to have a cocktail. But Kerr was known to be a total abstainer. I guess he was probably a Baptist; I don't know, but followed rigidly the precepts of whatever his 
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O'Brien --Interview III --14 
religious convictions were. 
All of that was in it, so I can't suggest to you that I established a high comfort factor with Bob Kerr. I tried. There was nothing negative, but I didn't have that feeling. 
I could deal with a lot of other senators much more easily than I could with Bob Kerr. But I guess Kerr's name came into this discussion because of Bobby Baker's relationship 
with him. 
G: Yes. Kerr seems to have been quite close to the financial institutions and also the oil interests. Of course, he himself was an oilman. 
O: I'm sure it's Kerr I'm talking about. I can remember a conversation with him and his describing his earliest stages as a lawyer and how he acquired his obviously significant 
wealth. As a young lawyer, in these early explorations, he became a recognized expert on the legal documents necessary to acquisition of these potential oil sites. But the key to it 
was that a lot of these--what they call them, wildcatters?--needed to have this legal work done and in most instances didn't have money to pay for it. So Kerr established early on 
this procedure that he would do probably hundreds of these agreements, and in lieu of a fee take a percentage of the action. And the law of averages played out over a period of 
years. It was quite interesting, and he was very proud of his approach to the practice of law and how he was thinking way ahead though he, too, didn't have any financial 
resources. 
G: One more question about JFK and the southerners: in terms of appealing to the South, the Democrats in Congress, he did increase price supports for cotton and rice and tobacco and 
some of these products. Was this a factor? How did this come into play in enlisting their support? 
O: Well, it was helpful. The record of the White House regarding southern senator interests was a pretty good one. We went along; we were sensitive to their interests. We worked 
with them and we achieved some pluses. I could not say we had a specific plus that resulted in a specific vote, but it helped in a general climate. 
But, you know, it's interesting. You're talking about Kerr and talking about Dick Russell, but you could talk about a number of others who by dint of seniority had achieved 
significant positions in the Senate. Envision the living quarters in the White House as part of our practice of having a group of senators invited in, perhaps ten or a dozen, carefully 
selected because of what might be pending. Obviously included, if it were ten or a dozen sitting in a semicircle in one of the living rooms of the quarters with the President sitting in 
a rocking chair, would be the Dick Russells, generally, the Bob Kerrs, sometimes bipartisanly there'd be the Ev Dirksens along with them. And there's going to be hopefully 
a sales pitch, because there was a purpose in having this meeting. You can socialize just so long and then get to the subject at hand, because these meetings probably wouldn't last 
more than an hour or an hour and a half in the late afternoon. 
18
O'Brien --Interview III --15 
The President would state his views. Now, here's a president of the United States sitting there who was, indeed, a neophyte in the Senate, very much junior, not in the 
power structure of the Senate. And here are all these fellows that he knows, but not intimately. It created a climate. At least in his mind he found it, I think, difficult. He 
would espouse his views and he could always articulate his views well, present his case, exchange some comments around the circle, but the bottom line to even informally 
head-count them, you wouldn't reach that point. He probably would have been more comfortable if he had never known them. I think that's natural. There was a slight 
reticence. I'm mentally pushing him because I want out of it all I can get, in terms of doing a little more head-counting tomorrow. But he would not attempt to put them on 
the hook. 
G: Did Mrs. Kennedy play a role in building bridges, ties to these senior members of Congress? 
O: No, not any individual effort in that regard. She followed the basic first lady procedure. She visited the Hill on rare occasions. I know she paid a couple of visits to the Senate. 
What do they call that, where they all get together and sew or whatever they did? There were carefully orchestrated invitations to White House functions, and she was always 
briefed as to the attention that should be paid. She did that extremely well with these members of Congress and their wives and would devote a good deal of attention to them. 
But on an individual basis, to seek or maintain contact, unlike Lady Bird, there wasn't that to any great degree. There again, she just didn't know these people, didn't know most of 
them at all, while of course Lady Bird knew them all intimately. But her role was basically confined to the traditional first lady role and there wasn't anything in terms of my end of 
the business that was unique or unusual, other than in the social concepts. 
For example, these meetings I'm talking about in the living quarters, you'd always make a point that she would be knowledgeable as to who was going to be there, and at 
some point generally [she would] come in briefly to say hello and shake hands with everyone and welcome them, but not participate in the discussions. There wasn't any time 
in my organized legislative relations efforts that I put her specifically into the equation. 
For example, I just thought about it, we were talking early on about the involvement of Mrs. Johnson, not only in beautification but her general considerable 
interest in the legislative program and its progress. It was not at all unusual for me to be chatting with her about matters at the moment which interested her a great deal, even little 
personality clashes, that sort of thing, a little scuttlebutt regarding the legislative progress. And it was not unusual for her to call me when she would be noting something transpiring 
and ask me what I thought or how was it going or was that factual that she had just read, something of that nature. I don't recall Jackie Kennedy engaged in that kind of activity. 
G: I suppose the tradition of first ladies was really more like Jacqueline Kennedy than Lady Bird Johnson. 
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O'Brien --Interview III --16 
O: Yes, I would think so. And, of course, you go to Jackie Kennedy's interests: the arts, refurbishing the White House was a great interest to her. Her background and her areas 
of interest were such that they really didn't get to what she might have construed a little bit mundane, things such as head counts. (Laughter) 
G: You've discussed that minimum wage bill and have written about that in your book as well, so I won't ask you to repeat that, but--O: 
I'm not going to repeat any of it other than just to underscore once more that I think I used it often. I used it in the book and we've discussed it in great detail, because it 
contained just about all the elements in a legislative struggle, including a one-vote loss after all of the manipulation and maneuvering. I think it's a microcosm of efforts we 
undertook. It had all the elements in it. 
G: The Republicans charged that three of the Democratic conferees, [William] Ayres, Adam Clayton Powell and James Roosevelt, who had supported the administration bill, failed to 
fight for the House version. Do you recall that and what the problem was there? 
O: No, I don't recall specifics on that. That was the accusation and what was the ground for it? Was there a suggestion that they had some reason to drag their feet? I really don't 
know. 
G: I was going to ask you what the reason might have been. 
O: Yes. I just don't know. 
G: The bill in its final version did exempt federal workers, but I noticed that Kennedy included federal workers under an executive order. Do you recall that? 
O: In the various phases of compromise, exclusions became part of com-promise. Clearly one of the most difficult areas of exclusion that we were forced to accept were laundry 
workers. I don't recall specifics on federal employees other than the recognition that you could do a give-up in that area because you had a way of compensating for it. So that 
wasn't too tough. Or the persuasion on the part of friendly people trying to help us enact legislation that if we would accept that, it would be helpful in moving the legislation. We 
did have a recognition during the course of this that there was a way to resolve it. That was probably a little easier to give up than the laundry workers. 
G: Yes. 
O: Actually, when the bill was completed we probably had a half a loaf, maybe a little better than a half a loaf, but that was the philosophy we followed. We're not walking down from 
the Hill without taking a half-loaf, with the total commitment in our minds we'll be back for the rest of it. 
20
O'Brien --Interview III --17 
G: Was this strategy of using an executive order to get what you couldn't achieve in legislation fairly typical of President Kennedy? 
O: If the opportunity presented itself, there was a distinct awareness of it and no reluctance to utilize it. That was our view, and I'm sure that view was implemented on occasions. But 
we all had a pretty clear understanding of that. You might be stymied in a lot of ways and this great power of the presidency wasn't quite what observers thought it was. It can be 
awfully frustrating, but if you have this procedure available to you, you're going to utilize it without hesitancy. That was our attitude, and the actual implementation I haven't any 
great recollection. But I do have a distinct recollection of not only our awareness of it, but our desire to utilize it. 
G: Did members of Congress object to this? 
O: Oh, yes, that's one area where they'd give you a little bit of heat. But that was an area where we weren't going to listen particularly. 
G: Did they have any recourse? 
O: Well, I suppose long range in a variety of ways they could have some recourse, but that was the gamble you took. There was always a tendency of, sure, listen, if you've tweaked 
somebody individually or collectively or put their nose a little bit out of joint and they're not pleased with what you've done, a) they have to recognize you have the authority to do 
it. Secondly, to get even in any form is an indirect procedure that might manifest itself in some way somewhere down the road. But your expectancy was that--really in any 
important way--that would not occur, because there's always tomorrow and there's another subject to discuss. 
G: Richard Russell seems to have been one of those who was especially sensitive about government-created things that were not a result of legislation. 
O: Well, that's part of the Russell I was trying to describe. You have to remember that Russell was not unique in the sense that he did feel that, indeed, he was very well qualified 
to be president of the United States. I think the record shows that he had that feeling early on. But I think that is played out on the part of some senators by being inordinately 
sensitive to the executive branch activities, retaining, at least in their mind, the power of the Congress, the authority of the Senate, and the need to achieve advice and consent, 
approbation and approval in just about every instance. The presidential powers were limited to a greater degree than actuality in the minds of some of them. That's by the very 
nature of their seniority and their position in the Senate, and perhaps a little bit of feeling that they'd do a better job if they were there. 
G: One of the criticisms of using this form of action, executive order rather than legislation, is that it does not achieve for the measure the same status that an act of Congress would. 
21
O'Brien --Interview III --18 
O: Well, it's sure as the devil better than nothing. It might not achieve the same status, but there's a real probability it will achieve the same goal. 
G: Two other examples: one, the Peace Corps was established initially through executive order. Why was that? 
O: The Peace Corps bordered on the revolutionary in concept and initial reaction to that concept. If you think back on the Peace Corps, that was a little bit far out to a lot of 
people. If the opportunity presented itself to put it in place, you were going to seize that opportunity, because I think extended discussion on that proposal in legislative terms 
could have doomed it or severely restricted it. If you had a starting point, you could get into a position of saying, "Listen, here it is. Now let's talk about implementation and 
procedures" Even in terms of very liberal New Frontier legislative program, this would have to be termed unique. 
G: But once it was set up and once you did have the legislation, it was not apparently that controversial. I mean it passed easily enough. 
O: Amazingly so. It wasn't [controversial]. I'll give you my own reaction. I was surprised at the broad acceptance of it once it was in place. I felt it would be subject to conservative 
opposition and controversy. I think the early reporting of Peace Corps activities was very upbeat. I think it really extended beyond somebody saying, "Well, I'm a conservative," or 
a liberal. The uniqueness of it and, as far as I'm concerned, its progress and its record were surprising to me and very pleasing. But I must say there was some trepidation when 
we were first at the concept stage. 
Tape 2 of 4, Side 1 
O: I don't know the current status [of the Peace Corps], whether it's at the level of involvement and intensity that existed during those early years or just where it is now. Do 
you? I don't know. 
G: No. Your papers reflect almost a struggle within the administration on the Peace Corps in behalf of its advocates to get it considered among the top priority programs to be enacted 
and an attempt to get the President to embrace the Peace Corps as really a top priority. 
O: Yes, that's true. 
G: Do you recall this issue and how it--? 
O: That's true. It wasn't a split with the administration in terms of whether or not there should be a Peace Corps or whether the proposal had great merit. It went to those that 
like to describe themselves as realists--that would include me--and those that we construed to be a little bit dreamers, and that would include a number of my colleagues. 
The problem with the Peace Corps within the administration was to upgrade it or have it 
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O'Brien --Interview III --19 
at the level that the staunch, enthusiastic advocates wanted it and the level that we envisioned in terms of how many battles can you wage. There was certainly a difference 
in the temperature on the part of many of us, and I must say that I think I probably fitted in the category of the fellow saying, "Hey, I think it's great. It's just as impressive as the 
devil. Marvelous idea. But now, how do you get it into formulation?" And what are the priorities here? How many battles can you take on? I can remember Ken O'Donnell and I 
discussing this, because we were both practical; hard-bitten perhaps a little, saying, "You wouldn't quarrel with anyone about the merits of something like this but, gee whiz. . . ." 
So that was resolved by the procedure that was followed putting it in place. And I must say there was total accord on the part of all of us, no matter what our concerns were 
about putting it in place at the outset or the form of putting it in place. Indeed, it was a shining star in the firmament of our accomplishments. 
G: There was the issue of whether or not to include it as a part of AID or within the State Department or to establish it as a separate agency. Do you recall this? 
O: Yes, I recall discussions concerning it, but I don't recall specifics. I'm not persuaded even now that there was a great weight placed on putting it in the State Department. I think 
there was a feeling of independent status pretty much from the outset even in general discussions of the pros and cons. 
G: I have a note that Mike Manatos had been quoted as saying that LBJ had not helped to advance that legislation and that was very disturbing to Johnson, and he even called 
Manatos and called Bill Moyers. Do you recall that? 
O: No. 
G: Was he helpful on it? 
O: My recollection is he was. I have no recollection that Johnson didn't share the general view regarding it. It's conceivable that Johnson might have shared my view that this was a 
difficult task. But I would wonder about the supposed Mike Manatos statement. 
But when you think of the Great Society programs and the general attitude that Lyndon Johnson had toward matters of this nature, there's no question in my mind that he 
was in total accord with the concept and pleased with the results. But if he had stated that we might have some difficulties with some people, I could have been quoted accordingly. 
G: One of your memoranda indicates that [Sargent] Shriver and Moyers were practically living on the Hill, lobbying for--O: 
That's true. I've said this before, and I think it's worthy of [repeating]. 
G: You've talked about Shriver, I think, yes. 
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O'Brien --Interview III --20 
O: Yes. Shriver and Moyers made a great team in this effort. My view [is] that these are two men of exceptional abilities. Shriver was the leader. What was so pleasing was you had 
two men that were extremely aggressive in promoting their views. You can have people that are wedded and dedicated, but then do you have this aggressive promotion and ability 
to communicate that can be so important in moving something in the Congress? And Sarge Shriver, I don't think I ever have a conversation with Sarge that I don't walk away 
renewing my admiration in his enthusiasm for whatever he's involved in. As you know, I give him high marks. And when you talk about Bill and Sarge on the Hill, I'm sure they 
wore out a couple of pairs of shoes in the process. 
G: A note indicates that they even made some progress with Otto Passman. Do you recall that? 
O: I would suspect the record probably doesn't indicate that, but then I'm saying that off the top of my head. But I'll give them high marks for trying. 
(Laughter) 
But if they made more progress with Passman than we did in foreign aid--well, any progress they made with Passman would be more than we made with foreign aid. But you 
know, it's worth commenting on that. That's an example of the activities of those two fellows. You'd have difficulty finding a couple of fellows in Washington, knowing Otto 
Passman and knowing his record and background and his attitude, that would deign to make the effort. And they made the effort, obviously, but maybe I'm being a little cynical 
and maybe the record shows otherwise, but if they persuaded Otto Passman in this area, I should have been back to Sarge and Bill Moyers to take over the foreign aid effort, too. 
They were a good team, those two fellows. 
G: Moyers was terribly young at the time. 
O: Oh, God, and I don't think--and there are exceptions to this--but that is drudgery, what I was engaged in. There were even attempts somehow that I've read or heard over those 
years to glamorize what I was engaged in. I was engaged in gut, hard work that hardly allowed you to ever sleep. You know, I loved it; I loved every minute of it. But if it were 
not an effort expended in the promotion of the New Frontier and Great Society programs, and you put it into another context and suggest to me I make a similar effort, there's no 
effort I can imagine in life that would have intrigued me to do what I did during those years. I lived and breathed it. You had setbacks and pitfalls constantly. You sweated out 
every darn vote on the Hill. It was endless. One struggle of that nature in a year would have been enough, but yet you were back to it day after day after day. And when Bill and 
Sarge were up doing what they did, that represented total dedication. That represented a complete commitment. To recognize that if you could only get the darn thing done and 
get a presidential signature on it, it was going to make a contribution to progress affecting a lot of people. My gosh, for any other reason, you'd say, "You've got to be crazy. I can 
24
O'Brien --Interview III --21 
find a better job than this." 
G: Let's move to the Area Redevelopment Bill. This has always been described as a fulfillment of a campaign pledge that President Kennedy made in the [1960] campaign. 
O: I'm sure it was one of a number of pledges that were made; a recognition of the problems that ought to be attended to in these areas. 
G: I was going to say, did it come out of that West Virginia primary? 
O: I can tell you that his commitment to West Virginia was total. Come hell or high water, he was going to repay the people of West Virginia a debt he owed to them because of the 
support they had given him, the confidence they had expressed in him. It was a topic of conversation on the part of the President constantly. 
G: Really? 
O: I don't think I can exaggerate his depth of commitment, and that there was going to be area redevelopment. There was going to be a focus on West Virginia. He would have the 
record show that he was responsive and recognized their problems. But the element of appreciation of their support for him was very much a significant part of all this. 
Of course, while you focused on West Virginia, you took it as extending through a whole region, and to other regions that equally merited some special attention. 
G: Paul Douglas was, I guess, the chief sponsor of the bill and the head of a task force to resolve this. Do you recall working with Douglas on this? 
O: Yes. I recall working with Douglas on this and on a variety of other matters, I think probably truth-in-packaging, truth-in-lending and other matters of that nature. I want to 
say that I've just described the drudgery of the job, but if you wanted to point to a significant element of pleasure in the job, becoming acquainted with Paul Douglas and 
working with him was one of the highlights of my experience in congressional relations. We've talked about unique and unusual people and I guess you would anticipate that in an 
entity called the Congress of the United States you're going to run into more than the normal number of unique and unusual people. That's how a lot of them got there. But 
Paul Douglas is a stick-out. 
There was one problem he had in the Senate, incidentally, and we might as well talk about it. It was a little bit perhaps the problem that Hubert Humphrey had in politics. 
Paul Douglas was construed by some people to be too soft because he was so nice and so decent and so honorable. And maybe that lessened his impact. He was not a 
wheeler-dealer. I might have discussions with other members of the Senate I wouldn't have with Paul Douglas on things we might do to bring certain things about, not of a 
devious nature but more the give and take of the political arena. But Paul Douglas was a 
25
O'Brien --Interview III --22 
man that rightly was on a pedestal as a human being. He was a marvelous human being and it was an absolute pleasure to go into Paul Douglas' office, whatever the 
circumstances were, to visit with him, to meet with him, to discuss the business at hand with him. It was an absolute pleasure. And if I had to sit down and list people that left a 
lasting impression, he'd certainly be on that list. 
G: On the Area Redevelopment Bill, there were several issues. One was whether the administrator would be directly responsible to the president or under the secretary of 
commerce. And Douglas did agree to accept the latter arrangement. Do you recall that? 
O: Not specifically. My best recollection is that initially you had a decided preference in that area. Now, if that was going to be compromised away in some form remained to be seen. 
But I don't recall Douglas--it might have been the case--objecting particularly to that. You put it in the context that he accepted. I don't know whether Douglas had a 
preference, but I don't recall Douglas having any serious objections. 
G: Now, the other controversy surrounding the bill was a question of back-door spending, direct Treasury financing rather than congressional appropriation. Here it seems that 
President Kennedy reversed himself in initially going along with the congressional appropriation and then seeking a direct financing. Do you recall that? 
O: I recall that there was a reversal, and the motivation for it or what was entailed in bringing it about, I don't recall. But that's correct, that the initial approach was--G: 
Do you think he felt he could get more money if he didn't have to--? 
O: I don't know. You could make some assumptions, but I don't recall it well enough. I think that you probably would have a preference to go in that direction anyway. And why 
he initially didn't attempt it and then reversed himself, I don't know. It's a little cleaner from the executive branch point of view anyway. 
G: One press account indicates that the success of this legislation was due to the way the southerners were handled. 
O: Well, I don't know that the way they were handled would differ particularly from the way we attempted to handle them generally in legislation. I think that you have an element 
here, though, that differs probably rather significantly from some of the other proposals where we attempted to work with the southerners. I think you had a lessened degree of 
concern; there was some, but a lessened degree regarding the fallout from implementing this legislation in terms of equal rights, civil rights and the rest. It was a different 
dimension, a different category. It really went to regions; it went to need, it went to programs. Regardless of what your views might be on some social legislation, you 
certainly would have a common interest in the need for federal involvement in areas like West Virginia, for example. My recollection was that this was a more comfortable battle 
for us than some of the others. 
26
O'Brien --Interview III --23 
G: Another legislative issue that I wanted to ask you about was the temporary unemployment compensation fight. Here you had the principle of pooling or sharing the resources among 
the states and then using the funds where they were most needed for unemployment situations. This was a real close battle; I think you won by two votes in defeating the 
[Harry] Byrd amendment to throw out the pooling principle. 
O: Well, that was the heart of it. You know, if Byrd had prevailed, what have you got? You've got a shell. 
G: That's right. 
O: Sure. And you know it isn't human nature to share. (Laughter) You have to get over that little hurdle. But without that pooling principle, really, what did you have? 
G: Describe what you recall of that battle. 
O: I think I just did, perhaps to the best of my recollection, because the battle really was focused on how do you convince people they ought to share. It's a basic human attitude 
that has to be overcome. And what are you faced with? It was a pretty simple process: listen, if you don't have pooling, we had nothing. We probably wouldn't be interested in 
the shell, because the implementation would be nonexistent or the possibilities of implementation. And Byrd was going to kill that bill. I don't know how you would 
describe it, but Byrd didn't envision anything particularly of interest [in it] to him and the state of Virginia. And Byrd would gravitate in that direction philosophically. I'm not 
talking about the sharing side or the pooling, but even though I've said it's a different climate, you're really not into social problems directly. You're talking about regions. You 
have a lot of automatic support from places that you wouldn't get support for other legislation. 
So you're starting to add that up and weighing it, and so it made it a little tough. It was more than a little tough. But the possibility of succeeding--you look at that roll call 
and you'll find it a very strange one, odd, for obvious reasons. You had people on this program that probably weren't working on anything else that you engaged in. And for the 
obvious reasons. Once you get into area or regional programs, then you quickly in your head count, just put them down right. Even though if you went back to the same fellow 
the next day, he might not even talk to you. (Laughter) 
G: The note I have indicates that there was considerable administration pressure to get this. 
O: You bet. As I told you early on, there was presidential motivation that extended beyond the ordinary. 
G: Labor Department estimates showed that nine states would really benefit from this, and these included Alaska, Kentucky, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon, 
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O'Brien --Interview III --24 
Pennsylvania and West Virginia. Is this where you focused your efforts to get the--? 
O: You bet. And you'll note in that list we would have liked to have had a few more large states, but we had some pretty large delegations in that list. 
G: Well, you got [Jacob] Javits and [Kenneth] Keating and [Hugh] Scott and [Clifford] Case and [Thomas] Kuchel. 
O: Yes. That, coupled with our established friends, squeezed it out. That's about what it amounted to, but even with those you list, however, we shouldn't let the record suggest 
that Javits and Kuchel and Case didn't vote with us on other occasions. But you take a thing like that. If you could have made the case that dire need would relate to nineteen 
states, you would feel that this wasn't any big battle; you could get this accomplished. But it was a close one. 
G: But you did get thirty-nine Democrats on that bill, and that's, I would say, a fairly high--O: 
That was probably a high-water mark. Not necessarily true, but when you consider the opposition and the closeness of the Byrd amendment, obviously you needed them all plus 
a few that joined the team briefly. 
G: Did you have much contact with Byrd? 
O: Yes. A fair amount of contact, pleasant and nonproductive. 
(Laughter) 
The contact extended to flying with the President in a helicopter down to his apple orchards or whatever it was and everything else imaginable. (Laughter) But not 
productive. 
By the time Johnson was dealing with him and we got him positioned on Medicare, that was probably the highlight. And the President positioned him very beautifully. Harry 
wasn't sure just what direction he was going or what had happened to him, but--G: 
This was when LBJ had the press conference and--? 
O: Yes, yes. Which had to be one of the most pleasant experiences I ever had. 
G: What did he do? 
O: Well, he just put the words in his mouth and left him on the record. And we chuckled for a good while after the fact. No, I don't think that [Harry Byrd] Sr.--I don't recall that he 
ever relented. Harry Byrd, Jr. was a carbon copy of his dad, with the additional factor that he was a little more with this century. But his personality was somewhat the same. Harry 
28
O'Brien --Interview III --25 
Byrd could be as pleasant a fellow as you'd ever want to meet, and he had fine apples, but he was in another world. You talk about conservatism. You have the epitome of it with a 
facade of pleasantness and courteousness. 
G: I wonder by the time of the Kennedy Administration how much he controlled that committee, his committee. 
O: Well, there was slippage. 
G: Who did you rely on in the Finance Committee? 
O: I don't recall anybody as a stick-out. I think that we combed that committee frequently. It was one-on-one almost across the board, because we were never naive enough to 
anticipate that there would be the slightest movement on the part of Byrd. So you had to go around him. That was a committee where you made no attempt to hide the fact you 
were trying to go around him. 
Now, there were other occasions where you tried to be very diplomatic and very careful because you didn't want fellows back-stepping any more than it was. That sort of 
thing was awfully hard to weigh at times. But with Byrd, as pleasant a fellow as he was, we had no illusions at all, and we knew that to work with that committee you had to work 
around Byrd to put together committee views that were difficult, because in almost every instance you were trying to convince members of that committee to override their 
chairman. And to a far greater extent than I think exists today, that was an awfully, awfully difficult thing to do. 
You're always faced with that dilemma. Knowing all that, recognizing all that, not being naive, you never allowed yourself to pass up an opportunity. You didn't say, "My 
God, why spend a whole Sunday after-noon down on that darn farm of his?" You know it isn't going to do a thing for you. But yet you say, "Well, if you don't come out, the day 
might come when you'll wish you had." I guess you just never foreclosed anything, but that was way out. Give you a basket of apples and that was about it. Or what was it, 
apples we were eating? Apples, and it seems to me we were eating strawberries or something, too. I don't know. I think probably the visit was worth it. I may have gone 
down there a couple of times, but I remember being there and leaving saying, "Now I've just been in another world. This is just beyond my comprehension and never the twain 
shall meet." 
(Interruption) 
G: Okay, I have two pieces of legislation here, the Juvenile Delinquency Act and the Youth Training Bill, which included the youth conservation corps that Humphrey was so 
enthusiastic about. Do you recall those measures? 
O: I don't recall them in any great detail. Those are measures that really were, to some 
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O'Brien --Interview III --26 
extent, a carryover from the Democratic Party traditional position that almost goes back to New Deal concepts. I don't recall them in the context of the legislative struggle. They 
were in there, obviously. They had some priorities, but they were on a list of several measures that we were working on and it did reflect a particular point of view of Hubert. 
He was a very strong advocate and very much involved. But in the nitty-gritty of the legislative struggle, I have very little recollection. 
G: Okay. In the case of the Juvenile Delinquency Act, Robert Griffin, the Republican, wanted to limit the project to a pilot program in Washing-ton, D. C. His amendment was 
first accepted on a teller vote and then defeated on a roll call, a much larger vote; you had practically double the number of members voting. Do you recall bringing in the additional 
members? 
O: I don't recall the specifics, but it would fall in a normal procedure. The teller vote generally reflected just what that reflects, and if you lost a teller vote, you obviously had a 
prior head count. Teller votes were very, very troublesome to us always. It was always the problem of getting people involved. The member back in his office just was not going 
to react to anything other than the bells for a roll call, and even then you'd have to sweat out whether or not he broke off that constituent meeting in time to dash over and be 
recorded. I would say on that that the defeat--I'm sure there were other incidents of that nature--on the teller vote would not have shook us, that we had done our job in advance 
in terms of a roll call, that we had assurances, that we had the votes and that it would come to efforts that we did undertake--and they were very difficult--to check out 
absenteeism as quickly as possible, even right in the Speaker's office. And it was not unusual for people to jump on the telephones and call offices and all this sort of thing. 
But it was a tough one, to cover that whole army quickly in a matter of a forty-five-minute period. And I remember the forty-five minutes because we used to time 
some of these roll calls and they averaged about forty-five minutes. And that's all the working time you had on absenteeism or vote change. So rushing off the floor and having 
somebody grab a member and shoot him into the Speaker's office and try to convert him, you were up against a very difficult time frame. So on the vote side of it, I have no 
recollection of the vote. But, as you mentioned, the teller vote and the size of the ultimate roll call and the margin of the ultimate roll call, that would not have been an unusual 
occurrence. 
G: How did you know how a member had voted on a teller vote? 
O: Really didn't, except observation. You always had staff people in the balcony. We didn't have computers; you'd have a fellow with a pad, or more than one at a key moment. 
Observation and quick notes and dash down the stairs and into the office off the floor and do a recap, and try to come up with as much intelligence as we could. Hit or miss I guess 
is the answer to it, but you did the best you could and we never came up with a more sophisticated way of handling it. A teller vote, that was the toughest of all. 
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O'Brien --Interview III --27 
G: Another measure passed by both the House and Senate was aid for dependent children. This was an emergency anti-recession measure proposed by Kennedy to make families of 
unemployed workers with dependent children temporarily eligible for public assistance. Did the administration, while billing this as a temporary anti-recession measure, view it in 
terms of a possible long-term, permanent reaction to--? 
O: Not that I recall. No, it was a reaction to the circumstances of the moment. In fact, my recollection would be pretty clear in that regard. I recall that measure and I have no 
recollection that it was envisioned as a foot in the door. 
G: Really? 
O: There might have been some people that envisioned it, but I didn't. 
G: Anything on the give and take of getting that through? Social Security benefits were broadened as well, and the reduction in the retirement age [enacted]. Do you recall that 
struggle? 
O: Well, I'd place that in the category--in terms of the breadth of the effort expended--that was major. That did go to short-term and long-range and had all the elements of a major 
effort. My recollection is this included a heavy involvement with Wilbur Cohen and his people. I think I'm accurate on that. But it was a broad-based effort with involvement to 
some degree of department and agency people that were not directly involved in the legislation. This was one where you broadened your base of operation as much as 
possible in terms of member contact. A lot of planning, a lot of thought went into that one. It was pretty far-reaching. 
G: Anything on the key to its passage? 
O: No, I don't think there was any magic there. I think it was launching as major an effort as you could, but I don't recall anything magic. 
Tape 2 of 4, Side 2 
O: I know I'm accurate in this regard. Not because of your commitment but because of the realities of the situation, you couldn't put into play a massive effort every time. You had 
to weigh that somewhat. There were times when you carried out your effort as a team effort, and you did not call on people that normally wouldn't be in the process. Having 
said that, you feel, well, you had a lessened effort in some instances than others. I think it was just the reality of how much you could get done and how best you could do it. Also 
you weighed it on the basis of the opposition, actual or anticipated; the difficulties in the committee, the delay in getting a rule, all of those things went into it. 
So you would find times when you would have a legislative proposal that seemed to grow in urgency and attention through the span of the struggle, because the struggle 
31
O'Brien --Interview III --28 
itself engendered more effort and broadened your activities, and it became more intense. But sliding between the cracks from time to time were proposals of merit--obviously we 
considered all of them of merit--that missed at some step of the process and got lost in the shuffle, because of the very fact that you just couldn't cope with it all. 
See, our problem--and we keep talking about the House and rightly so. There was never an easy struggle. There wasn't when it came to the Great Society where you had 
some elbowroom and you had this massive program. There were some things that sort of just took care of themselves. And then you had the support side on the Hill that was 
greater than probably in the Kennedy period. And what we were faced with is, if you had fifty or sixty proposals, the chances were good that none of them, none of them, for a 
variety of reasons were going to walk through. So there is no such thing as an easy battle. There's no such thing other than a tough battle that will be decided on the House side by a 
paper-thin margin, that your only elbowroom or moment of relaxation would be in handling it in the Senate or in conference. 
So to suggest that what we tried to put in place--the utilization of manpower that I talked about originally--was effective to the fullest and it was maximized to the greatest 
possible level in every instance would be just gilding the lily. That wasn't the case. We just had one hang of a problem keeping up with all of this and finding ourselves sometimes 
trying to juggle four, five or six balls in the air. And when you're in that kind of a situation, you just sweat out every single darn thing. You're not nearly as effective as 
you'd like to be. That's why that Congress, even though the margin wasn't as great in the off-year election, all we did was get out of it even in terms of past statistics. In that 
Congress, under those circumstances it was just a major struggle in the House, and [even] with all the problems that we had in the Senate, in retrospect it was a smoother road for 
us. 
So it sounds cynical to suggest that if you're talking about a youth training program or whatever you're talking about, it's obviously meaningful or you wouldn't 
undertake it in the first instance. You're vitally interested in succeeding, but to suggest that it was subject to the same degree of effort and intensity as, say Social Security, is not 
an accurate reflection on what actually occurred. And really, to pinpoint specific meetings, specific negotiations, one-on-one contacts, and the ebb and flow of all this two 
decades later, without the benefit of all kinds of documentation is tough to do. 
I think what we are overlooking, too, is something like a trade bill, where you formalize the citizen effort. In reaching out for support throughout all this, we were 
constantly reaching beyond the administration, whether it was with the AFL-CIO or the National Education Association or various organizations around the country that had 
lobbying entities in Washington. We never overlooked that factor. Depending on the circumstances, the item of the moment was very detailed. There's nothing unusual about 
that, I'm sure. It was unique in the sense that we tried to do more than probably our predecessors had done in that regard. 
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O'Brien --Interview III --29 
And you adjust to the circumstances. When we get to the trade bill, for example, obviously your citizen effort has dimensions that wouldn't exist in most of the other 
legislation you were advocating. That was an entirely different team. There were individuals that were involved directly in that activity that you would probably never see 
again or had not worked with at a prior time. There's nothing very glamorous in all of this, or very exciting. 
G: Let me ask you about Medicare. That was brought up in 1961, and there's some indication that one of the reasons that Medicare did not advance farther was because the 
Ways and Means Committee was taking up other pieces of legislation. Is this [accurate]? 
O: Yes. That's right. They had a pretty full plate. They generally do, so that wasn't unusual. But from day one on Medicare, never did I envision ultimate, final failure. It was only a 
matter of time. 
G: Really? 
O: Because the guts of it, the substance of it demanded favorable action. It was inevitable, and the AMA could scream until hell froze over about creating a socialist state and this 
sort of stuff, but let's face it, you were getting to ultimately confronting Medicare. Off what? Not off a recently developed thought process that brought about area 
redevelopment and a number of other things. This was a carryover of three decades. There's nothing new about this, and it had taken three decades, as it did with Social 
Security before it was enacted. And under our process that occurs. Some of the most demanding areas of challenge at the federal level can be areas that take the longest to 
attend to. 
Then the other part of Medicare--you had Kerr-Mills, and you had the pride of authorship with Kerr and Mills. Bob Kerr had no interest in Medicare, and Mills would 
not have any interest in Medicare until we had the full-court press and he had the head count to show that it would be enacted. And that would be down that road. Meanwhile, 
Wilbur Mills wasn't making any admission that Kerr-Mills wasn't getting the job done or that it wasn't progressive legislation. So it wasn't that there was a nonexistent program 
and you're trying to fill a tremendous void. You had these other elements. You talk about the AMA. If we could overcome lobbying efforts in other areas, which we did, then the 
AMA certainly wasn't going to stop us over the long haul. 
So I don't feel that the agenda of the Ways and Means Committee at that time necessarily contributed to a delay in Medicare, because it was going to take time and 
effort and it would be prolonged. And we knew that, before you would get to D-day on Medicare in any event. So if there was an excuse that because of the heavy agenda of the 
Ways and Means Committee we hadn't gotten to Medicare, that would not be the reality of the situation. 
G: I saw some reference to the point that President Kennedy was even more eager to press 
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O'Brien --Interview III --30 
Medicare after realizing how much his own father's medical treatment had cost after that stroke, and thinking that people of more modest means would be literally wiped out by it. 
O: Yes, that impacted on him. 
G: Do you recall your discussion with him on it? 
O: I recall a general discussion, because I had a discussion with him involving my father. I could relate to it even more than he could. But it happened in my family that my father 
had a prolonged illness extending over a period of some years, which financially devastated our family. It took all our resources. But we lived through that, continued our 
little business, and all the resources that we had ultimately went into my father's care. It was an experience that I had gone through, my family had gone through. So what more 
do you need to have it indelibly impressed upon you that this [is needed]? Because I could [relate to it]. Everything is relative, and Kennedy could, at his economic level, say, 
"People at a lower economic level must have a terrible time." At our economic level, there were any number of millions of people below our economic level that couldn't do 
what we did. It was impossible and it was destructive in terms of the family and, oh, it just was a devastating thing. 
It happened with Jack in his own family, and to his credit he was very sensitive to this. With Jack, it wasn't that "It cost the Kennedy family a great deal of money to take 
care of Joseph Kennedy over a number of years." No, his reaction was, "My God, it isn't going to financially devastate us, but what do other people do if they have a similar 
problem?" 
You know, there are things you get caught up in, and nothing impacted on me more in terms of my total involvement in it than Medicare. As a generalization, I was 
always vitally interested in education legislation for the basic reasons that I have described before, but Medicare was highly personalized with me and certainly personalized with the 
President. 
G: You've mentioned the AMA and their lobbying effort. Anything specifically that they did to--? 
O: Yes, the name eludes me, but there was a doctor in the AMA and I wish I could come up with his name. He was the point man and he became nationally known. He was an 
extremely articulate, persuasive super-salesman. He was constantly on radio and television and in the press carrying on the role of the opposition. He had a lot of impact. 
He got a lot of ink. I remember that specifically because it was an extreme aggravation to me. 
G: Really? 
O: Well, I never met the man, but he would cause me fits when I would read his views and 
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O'Brien --Interview III --31 
philosophy, because not only was it totally contra to my beliefs, it was contra to the real world. It made no sense. So he got to me. Probably motivated me even more. 
G: When you would talk to members of Congress about Medicare during this period, did you feel like that they were under pressure from the AMA to--? 
O: Yes. The AMA was well organized. I think that if they put their mind to it, the medical profession can do an effective lobbying job. There's a relationship, a patient-doctor 
relationship, that's sort of traditional, and respect for the profession, maybe not to the degree today that there was then. A doctor was, at least when I was a kid, an eminently 
respected member of the community; you looked to him for help and assistance. And I think to put together, in the context of the AMA, a national effort that was a heavily 
financed, in those days certainly heavily financed, with an articulate spokesman along with all their regional and local activities, was very--they were tough adversaries. 
They didn't, however, have the capacity to expand to any degree beyond their own entity. I mean, as far as mass public reaction or mass support of the AMA position, that 
wasn't happening. 
But I think you'd have to say that at this stage of our discussion of Medicare, we're talking about the Ways and Means Committee agenda. And having stated our [position], 
there couldn't have been a greater commitment in our legislative program than our commitment to Medicare. Nevertheless, at that stage we had a long road ahead of us and 
we knew it. And it wasn't the AMA position, it was the fact that prior to our arrival, the Congress had made an effort to attend to this problem in some form that resulted in 
Kerr-Mills. You have Kerr-Mills in place and you have the very people that you're going to have to convert to Medicare that have their names on a program and pride in 
authorship. Even in a defensive context, you're selling a program, or trying to, where in a sense you're saying to them, "You failed." And I don't suggest that they were motivated in 
Kerr-Mills, frankly, because they felt it was a fair and equitable measure to attend to a major social problem. I think it was rather an attempt to divert. You often heard, 
"You've got to give it more time to prove itself." 
Well, that's an additional roadblock and a significant one. So forget the AMA but concentrate on the Congress and how you were going to overcome these roadblocks; it 
was a difficult path. Regardless of Wilbur and Kerr and the AMA, somehow, some way this was going to happen. It was inevitable. And I guess I used that phrase at that time, 
"as inevitable as tomorrow morning's sunrise." 
G: You mentioned the opposition lobby for the AMA. Who lobbied in behalf of the bill? 
O: Well, there was a group. There was the labor lobby, the liberal lobby and the various elements of it, the senior citizen lobby. It wasn't an army that had to be developed. You 
were able to edge it on to further activity, but it was in place. So on the lobbying side, the AMA was outnumbered from day one. 
35
O'Brien --Interview III --32 
G: Yes. Did you coordinate this whole lobby? 
O: Yes. And if we're getting to Medicare, we'll get to our attempt in the private or public sector, whatever you want to call it, to exert pres-sure on the Congress, which was a 
failure. 
G: Let me ask you to go into that. This was the speech at Madison Square Garden? 
O: There were several people in the administration who became involved. It was discussed, obviously, with the senior citizen groups, who are well organized. And despite my saying 
that it was inevitable that this would be enacted, they were suggesting to us that we weren't moving aggressively. We were getting little favorable reaction from Wilbur Mills, 
and certainly no favorable reaction from Kerr. There's an army out there; there's a constituency that's broad-based and national in scope. And we're not talking, again, about 
programs that might have civil rights sensitivity. This is in another framework. 
So there were those among us, some of them colleagues of mine, who became persuaded that you had to have this grass-roots, highly visible, figurative march on 
Washington. And, by gosh, Wilbur Mills or none of the rest of these people could resist that, and we'd just sort of roll over them. I was not one of that persuasion, but there was 
a strong view, and finally it came to actually formalizing a program that would entail a number of mass meetings across the country. 
I remained concerned about its effectiveness in terms of the people that we had to convert. And if you looked at the states these people represented and the districts they 
represented, this massive effort could conceivably not shake them at all and might harden their resistance. You might build a resentment toward this rather blatant effort to push 
them around. It was rather overwhelming within the administration. More and more, the people that were not engaged in congressional relations were of this mind. And there was 
enthusiasm for it among the groups that would be involved. Ultimately we signed off on it, and I did not register formal opposition to signing off on it. I had reservations, but no 
formal opposition. And I must say that I had to be impressed with what supposedly was in place and the organizational effort, which was separate from our congressional 
relations. The organizational effort, as at least was reported to me, indicated that this would play pretty well around the country. 
So we launched it in Madison Square Garden, and we may, I don't recall, have had a few other meetings of a similar nature. A well-organized New York effort produced the 
bodies; the speeches were made and a fair amount of publicity emanated from it. I tell you, it was less than a pebble in the ocean as far as the Congress was concerned and might 
be counterproductive. They had taken on, these well-motivated people, a task that was beyond them, frankly, to replay Madison Square Garden in twenty cities across the 
country. It faded quickly. All of a sudden I found that there was no one around urging this continuity, and it disappeared and was never heard from again. 
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O'Brien --Interview III --33 
I think it taught some folks a lesson. There were times I was a little resentful of the attitudes of some of the observers. I'm not talking about media observers. I'm talking 
about administration observers that would have their own views on why we weren't making more progress, what was wrong with our operation and what they would do in its 
stead. Once in a while it was a little bit aggravating. 
This effort fell of its own weight. And because it fell of its own weight and the impact was minimal, it blew over in terms of concern I might have had about people's 
having their backs stiffened because of the arrogance of the administration in trying to push them around in this way. 
I think a lesson probably was learned, too, that if you're going to go to the people to try to stir the Congress, there are ways of doing it, as long as you decide up front that 
you're not going to put a cover on it. Harry Truman did it very effectively. President Reagan has done it rather effectively. I think a president can have some effect because he 
has every right to make his appeal to the people on behalf of his program. And he can hope that that would have an effect on the constituents or the member level. But in the 
organized concept we launched, the lesson learned is that it's somewhat of a dream. It is a massive undertaking and you'd better be absolutely sure there's no way it can fall of its 
own weight, because you're just going to self-destruct. 
I think most of my friends that were involved in this didn't really understand what it meant to march fifteen to twenty thousand people into twenty arenas over a period of 
six or eight weeks--the cost factor, the sheer organizational factor. If you did put on a pretty good show and you looked for the reaction over the next seven days and you 
couldn't find any, that's pretty bad. In congressional relations, we'd reach out to the entities that have a common interest and have some resources in place in lobbying the 
Congress. 
G: Who organized it? 
O: I believe that there was a national committee involvement in the organizing of it. There was a fellow named Dick Maguire who was probably one of the key fellows. I don't recall 
that it was a formalized group, but I think it emanated probably from Dick and some people that had made the recommendations to Dick. That's the best of my recollection. 
And it had the full approbation of the senior citizens groups around the country. 
G: What was President Kennedy's reaction to the Madison Square Garden speech? 
O: I don't think he had direct involvement and I don't think that he directed a great deal of attention to Madison Square Garden, frankly. 
G: Do you think he felt that it was not a success? 
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O'Brien --Interview III --34 
O: I don't really know. It was a program that he had no objection to. It had been passed by him and that was fine with him. That would be just about the extent of it. I found no 
reason to even discuss it with Kennedy after the fact. 
G: Really? 
O: No. 
G: Well, was the administration sensitive at the time to the difference between speaking to a large arena full of people on the one hand and speaking to a television audience on the 
other? 
O: They felt that you were getting a little of both because they felt that it would be covered by local television. And if you went across the country, you probably came within the 
range of local television nation-wide ultimately, and there would be an extensive amount of coverage of the events and the planning of the events and local press conferences to 
announce the events. It just didn't play out that way. 
(Interruption) 
O: If you're talking about farm legislation in just about any of its aspects, you're talking to a fellow who considered farm legislation somewhat similar to a foreign language. I found 
myself basically substantively out of it, and I leaned heavily--we all did--on Orville Freeman and his people. We carried on our responsibilities. Henry Hall Wilson had some 
basic understanding of farm legislation and its intricacies. But I'll say as a group we on the Congressional Relations staff were lost. We could discuss substance on just about any 
piece of legislation. Most of it went to a reasonable understanding of the legislation and a sense of compromise that goes with the job. So you could get along, and you could get 
into some basic, substantive amendment agreements. But when it came to farm legislation, I just never felt comfortable with it. 
I decided that the best thing we could do on the White House staff in this area was to do our head counts, "Are you for us or against us?" without getting too far into the 
complexities, and then rely on Orville and that very good staff he had. I wasn't going to be around long enough or have enough time to become sufficiently knowledgeable in this 
field to be effective in the substantive side. 
G: Did you have to balance the interest of the various state delegations in the Congress, like the tobacco states--O: 
Oh, yes. 
G: --and the rice-producing states and cotton? 
O: Oh, yes, there was a continuing give and take--one hand would wash the other. There 
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O'Brien --Interview III --35 
was a lot of that. 
G: What could the administration do for the farm state congressmen? 
O: Not a great deal beyond being advocates of what they believed in and sought. On executive action in the Department of Agriculture, there were areas where Orville could 
be helpful. Our advocacy didn't often conform with the Farm Bureau's views, but there's the other farm organization and the representatives of the farm areas in the Congress. My 
recollection of farm legislation is that all legislation would incorporate discussions in advance with the people that you were going to be dealing with after submission of the 
legislation, and you'd work on the message jointly. Oftentimes the messages were worked on jointly by staff people--our staff people and staff from the appropriate committees--to 
see if you couldn't get it into a shape that would be palatable. But on the farm legislation, I never participated in the development stages of the legislation. And I rather suspect that 
if you went back and checked it out, you'd find that a good deal--and this is what we considered a unique area of legislation--rested very much on the lap of the Department of 
Agriculture. 
Tape 3 of 4, Side 1 
G: The measure requested by the administration was the supply management, an effort to implement some control over production. The agricultural interests, particularly the large 
ones, seemed to be opposed to it. 
O: Well, I think the problem continues. Corporate farmers re the family farmer? The interests of the large corporate farmer probably were best served by tax legislation rather 
than farm legislation. What do they call it, agri--? 
G: Agribusiness? 
O: Yes, it's called agribusiness. At that time, too--you're going back two decades--there were far more family farms than exist today. There was truly a farm constituency of significant 
proportions which was very vocal, very effective. The march on Washington of the family farmer is a tradition, and it can be awfully impressive. I saw it different times and I've seen 
it since. When they emerge en masse on Capitol Hill, it not only clogs the corridors, but gets the attention of the Congress. The lobbying power, and that's reflected in farm 
legislation, of the American farm community is extremely significant. We are now living in a period when there's great hue and cry about the demise of the family farm. Mortgage 
foreclosures appear on national television constantly. It's just amazing when you look at the statistics as to the percentage of farming in this country that is attributable to family 
farms and the tremendous change in agriculture in this country. 
This change was certainly in place, but I can't envision the corporate farm, the agrimanagement or whatever they call it. Often now these farms are simply 
conglomerates; it has little or nothing to do with the history of farming in this country. It 
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O'Brien --Interview III --36 
has nothing really to do with the family farm, nothing to do with the city folks' envisionment of farming. But at that time it was more in the traditional concept, with a 
constituency that was highly vocal, well organized, and had a broad base of strong support on the Hill. Farm legislation had taken on all kinds of connotations. You get a little 
tobacco and a little cotton, a little bit of rice and you've got some mix. 
As I said, [there were] all kinds of give and take and one hand washing the other. How can you explain how you can have tremendous public concern regarding smoking, 
and at the same time have continuing concern that tobacco be subsidized at the taxpayer's expense? 
We've heard all these stories, but when you're dealing with farm legislation and what our role in the White House in congressional relations would be regarding farm 
legislation, it wasn't that it was insignificant. It was foreign to us and you had to look to those that were experts in this field to carry the burden. That made it different than the 
normal legislative struggle. 
G: You had a one-year extension of the emergency feed grains program that year, and this bill was passed in the House by seven votes that reportedly were obtained at the last minute. 
Do you recall that one? 
O: Who were the seven? 
G: I don't know, but there were four GOP members that voted for you and I know who they are: [Robert] Dole, Phil Weaver, Carl Andersen, Odin Langen. Also, you got the support 
of a lot of the Eastern Seaboard Democrats who normally opposed this kind of legislation. Do you recall--? 
O: Yes. I recall that it was another indication of the degree of support for the President that existed among eastern Democrats. I do recall that there were some of those fellows who 
had never voted for a comparable farm bill. This was a first for a number of them. Some of the other votes represented the effectiveness of the farm lobby. The farm lobby would 
have no effect on the Eastern Seaboard Democrats, to any extent. Frankly, it is easy to say the seven that were needed were finally there--they were converted--but it would not 
have succeeded without the support of the Eastern Seaboard Democrats who had no constituent interest to speak of in this area and had traditionally not been supportive. That 
was to support the President, it was as simple as that. Those votes really had little or nothing to do with the substance of that legislation. 
G: One of the press accounts noted that you ran into a last-minute revolt from patronage-hungry northern Democrats on this bill. 
O: Well, that would be an appropriate time for them to discuss patronage with me, because the pitch that we would be making to them is "you have to help the President on this one." 
You were not in much of a position to be persuading them on the merits. This was a 
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O'Brien --Interview III --37 
matter of loyalty, of support for the President and that would be appropriate. 
It is an excellent example of votes from sources that have no constituent interest. On the basis that "You've got to help the President. This is the President's program, and 
now come on, it isn't going to hurt you any, and you can go with it." And that would inevitably in some instances lead into "Hey, okay, but wait a minute. What have you done 
for me lately? This is a two-way street." That's totally understood; that's part of the process. And, Lord knows, there might have been a few people tucked into position 
somewhere as a result of those votes. Or maybe we reopened some old files that we'd put on hold. 
(Laughter) 
But that was an acceptable practice. You didn't resent it at all. Fair enough. 
G: Was President Kennedy sensitive to this, too? Did he understand the need for this kind of give and take? 
O: Oh, sure. I'm not suggesting he lacked farm knowledge to the degree I did, but by the same token I don't think he ever would present himself as a farm expert. He'd know that 
the only way you could piece this together was to get some solid friends up there to give you one that was of no benefit to them. But, of course, it wasn't that tough, because you 
weren't asking them to give you one that was adverse to their interest. That was where you got into the tough situations. This wasn't nearly as tough to vote as foreign aid. 
G: Another measure that year was the Mexican farm labor law that was extended. This was a very close vote in the Senate, I think a one-vote margin. It was basically a measure to 
protect the wages of American farmers while providing for this imported labor. According to the press reports, LBJ worked actively for the defeat of the amendment 
which had the administration's support. Does this ring any bell? Of course, he was coming from Texas--O: 
I was going to say, "working actively" might be an exaggeration in the press report. I would accept that he was trying to be helpful on a regional basis. It's a difficult area and, 
as we know, remains a difficult area to this day. This wasn't an initiation of a program; this was something you're faced with on a calendar. This is a form of extension that we 
would like to have, and if even friends wanted to do a little adjusting in that regard, I don't think it would be of overriding concern to us. That's probably a pretty callous statement, 
but that's the reality of it. 
G: Was it unusual for him to take a position that was officially not the administration's? 
O: I can't recall any similar circumstance. In that case, you have to remember that he was reflecting constituent interests that he had been supportive of for a long time as a member 
of Congress. 
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O'Brien --Interview III --38 
G: Yes. You've talked about the NASA program to the extent that Albert Thomas was interested. In 1961 here you started out with a smaller amount of money and it would get 
larger. Was this a purposeful approach, to expand it over a period of years rather than go in front asking for--? 
O: It was trying to recognize the possibilities. You wanted to establish a policy and build on it later. There were those curbstone observers who would suggest that's lacking in 
courage. But it would be a judgment, and in that case is a pretty clear one, that it would be far better to establish this and build on that. Because you could darn well wind up with 
no loaf otherwise. That's a very practical approach to it. 
That was weighted in a variety of ways from time to time. There were those that would suggest probably when we get to civil rights, that's the best example in the history 
of the legislative process, are you to be faulted because you did not demand the absolute, 100 per cent, strongly developed civil rights bill? And there were those that did just that. 
We got a lot of heat in that regard. Or do you open up this difficult area by some realistic approach that can ensure that you will accomplish an objective and you can build from 
there? That was the judgment that went into this equation and went into a lot of them. 
Incidentally, that fight would go on with regularity within the administration. I was involved in those struggles often. Just how far, how much of a bite are you going to 
attempt to take? And I guess there were those, frankly, colleagues of mine that felt, "Gee, O'Brien is always sort of backing up or compromising even before we start." You have to 
weigh those things. 
Now, I did it in the opposite direction when we got to the trade bill. Do you have an extension or do you have a new program? Frankly, the State Department was in favor 
of an extension. George Ball and I discussed it directly with the President and had it out. It was my judgment that it was doable, that we just cut out this nonsense, trying to stay 
alive--let's bite the bullet. And we did. So it isn't that on every occasion I was for withdrawal or limitation. I would be perfectly willing to carry on, just to get the adrenalin 
flowing, if I felt that was the appropriate approach. 
G: Any insights on President Kennedy's attitude toward the space program here? 
O: Yes, very early on he was awfully concerned about progress or lack of it in the space program. He became very much personally involved and committed. It intrigued him, 
attracted him, and again it's the old Jack Kennedy syndrome: the challenge. It wasn't the Houston Ministers Conference or the Texas delegation or Humphrey debates or what have 
you. This was a challenge: "Those Russians, we're going to get this job done and we're going to have national pride." I'm personalizing it because, as president of the United 
States, Jack Kennedy very early on was upset. He was intrigued, upset, enthusiastic and looking forward, and his enthusiasm, of course, was most pronounced when some 
accomplishments received national attention. 
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O'Brien --Interview III --39 
G: Did he view it as a military potential as well as a scientific--? 
O: I don't really think so. Not that he was specific with me, but I think that there was a significant element of, "By God, they're not better than we are. They can't do this better 
than we can. I'm not going to sit here and be second class." And I think that would be the motivating factor. Then you go into the scientific. On the military side, I never heard any 
indication that he had focused his direction into this area because he felt that there was significant military fallout. Certainly the scientific potential was well understood by him. 
But knowing him as I did, I want to emphasize that. Everything was a fight and he loved to win. It was almost like a direct confrontation. It was, "Those guys are doing all this 
bragging, and I keep reading about how inept we are. I'm not going to stand for it." It got his adrenalin flowing. Oh, yes, he was very much involved in that area. 
G: Do you think the military would have liked to have had a larger role in the program than they had? 
O: Yes. Only by the nature of the military. 
G: Did this ever come up when you were--? 
O: Not in terms of our activities. I guess to some extent never the twain shall meet. I never felt that the military was really aboard. Maybe there were a lot of civilians in government 
that weren't aboard regarding the New Frontier program, but I never deluded myself into thinking anybody in the Pentagon other than our own people at the top gave a darn. So I 
think that it would be our natural tendency really to be reticent about accepting military demands in most things. We tried to keep them a little bit at arm's length. 
G: Your files seem to reflect by 1962 an increased White House interest in the NASA contract activities. That these contracts were getting larger and there was a lot of 
potential for political considerations there, because in some cases it apparently didn't matter who got the contract. Do you recall that aspect and can you elaborate on that? 
O: Yes. I'd like to elaborate on it. I can tell you that there was a recognition of the political potential. And once there was a recognition of it, there was an attempt to implement 
where we could and be helpful where we could, and we became very much involved and probably to an inordinate degree, because that isn't an area you're supposed to get that 
much involved with. But we didn't consider that sacrosanct or untouchable at all. In fact, it was very much a part of discussions regarding contracts and how they might relate to 
legislative progress. 
G: How did you get this recognition to begin with? How did it come to your attention that NASA was awarding all these contracts? 
O: It came to our attention because it represented a relatively new area. This not only 
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O'Brien --Interview III --40 
showed rapid growth, but it would have continuing rapid growth and we're going to be up front and keep a close eye on all of this. And this could be a meaningful tool. We just 
can't sit idly by and let all this happen without seeing if there isn't some fallout that's advantageous to us. So we were very sensitive to it. 
G: Did you meet with Jim Webb and educate him on it? 
O: We met with Jim Webb often. Not necessarily me all the time, but Jim Webb was a constant visitor to the White House. The communication was regular over that period of 
time. 
G: Did Jim Webb make a lot of these decisions in terms of contracts and location of facilities? 
O: Well, he had input, and Jim Webb was a very able guy. He was a good administrator, very attentive, and we were impressed with him. And I think what impressed me was that he 
had a sensitivity to our problems and a desire to be helpful. It was like John Connally saying to us, "If my department isn't functioning in the best interests of the White House 
and there are some ways that we can do better, all I need you to do is tell me." And Jim Webb was of that school. 
G: Do you recall how Webb was selected as administrator? 
O: No, I really don't. I don't think I knew Jim Webb prior to selection. 
G: Was there ever any discussion of an alternative to going to the moon, or should we go to the moon, or anything of this nature? 
O: I don't recall any discussion about whether or not we should go to the moon, no. As far as I was concerned I knew that's where we were headed and that was our objective. And 
I don't know as that was a matter of great debate. I would not have had any doubt in my mind about the President's view. 
G: He shared that? 
O: Well, the President's commitment to the whole thing. 
G: Let's see. We've got--( 
Interruption) 
O: --the extension [of the Civil Rights Commission]. It didn't turn out to be just a simple process. There was an effort to dismantle this in a sense. There was a variety of efforts in 
that regard, because the opportunity presented itself, at least in the minds of some of the fellows on the Hill. So we had to fend off a variety of suggestions and efforts that would, 
if not eliminate it, leave it ineffective, certainly diminish any activity. My recollection is 
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O'Brien --Interview III --41 
we succeeded in fending all that off. 
G: Yes. 
O: I don't think we wound up with anything overridingly negative in the extension, although there were probably some pretty close calls there, though. I don't remember the details. 
Does the record reflect that? 
G: Well, the Republicans seem to have been in favor of a longer extension, a four-year extension. Was the administration, on the other hand, concerned with keeping the 
Democratic Party relatively united on this? 
O: I mean, I don't think we wound up with any overridingly negative aspect in the extension, although there were probably some pretty close calls there, though. I don't remember the 
details. Does the record reflect that? 
G: Well, the Republicans seem to have been in favor of a longer extension, a four-year extension. Was the administration, on the other hand, concerned with keeping the 
Democratic Party relatively united on this? 
O: That's right. I think that some of the Republican support for the extension was callous. This afforded an opportunity to play some games, and games were played. When you 
think of extending an existing com-mission, the Civil Rights Commission, why should that create serious problems really? But it did. Weren't there attempts to restrict the activities 
of the commission? There was something else in there, too. There's no indication of that? 
G: I don't see it here. I'll check it though. 
Anything on the reorganization of the regulatory agencies? The White House submitted a whole--I guess Newton Minow and some of the others, maybe Jim Landis had 
come up with a series of reorganization packages. 
O: Actually, Jim Landis was brought into the White House for that express purpose. He was a long-time associate of Joe Kennedy's and had quite a reputation in the general field. 
That was launched as a broad-based attempt to correct and reorganize and improve. It was very broad, and Jim's mandate was to go right at all the regulatory agencies and come 
up with an overall omnibus proposal. He devoted a good deal of time to that. And what was the motivation? The obvious. There was a dire need. It was pretty messy. Very 
messy. 
G: Some of these proposals encountered a terrible time on the Hill, didn't they? 
O: Oh, sure. And we were not naive about that. Listen, you're getting into the territory of fellows on the Hill, their little prerogatives. They're comfortable with a lot of these things, 
and all of a sudden you're trying to shake the tree. That inevitably was going to be a very 
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O'Brien --Interview III --42 
difficult situation and that motivated at the outset [our plan]: let's not go at this piecemeal. Let's get the best fellow we know or can find and give him free rein. It really is going to 
be spinning wheels if you're going to do a piece of this or a piece of that, or correct a measure here or correct a measure there. You've got to go to the regulatory process in all 
its dimensions and evaluate it and recommend what action should be taken to improve or correct. So you have taken on some task [inaudible]. 
G: Yes. Newton Minow had referred to the television programming as a vast wasteland and said there was nothing sacred or permanent about a broadcast license. Did this give you a 
little bit of heat on the Hill to work with? 
O: It gave us some heat on the Hill, but I loved it. 
(Laughter) 
Because he was stating a fact. I think I've had an innate sort of resentment--well, it isn't resentment, but I don't think I appreciate some of the arrogance of the communications 
industry. It was clear to me that [if] you receive a television license, you've received a right and a privilege that is revocable. So in the commercial context you derive a great 
deal of profit from this, but you should never feel that you have an exclusivity that isn't subject to periodic scrutiny and under certain circumstances revocable or think that you 
are General Motors--you're not in the private sector. You've got a license to use the public airwaves. I see CBS people down there testifying as though somehow or other 
they created the airwaves and somehow or other they have a corporation that's analogous to the automobile industry and that there is no continuing public right in this or no 
governmental right in terms of this authority granted to them by license. 
So having said all that, you can picture that as Newt made this comment, he couldn't have been more accurate. 
G: But the plan was defeated something like 320 to 77. 
O: (Laughter) I think that's one instance that [we thought], let's put it to a vote and we anticipated defeat. I think some of us were motivated, a little differently in that instance. I 
know I was. I just don't appreciate the granting of public usage of public property, and then have people after a period of time determine that it's exclusively theirs. And 
somehow my right as a citizen to the airwaves has been just eliminated. I don't accept that sort of thing and I do resent when I see somebody testifying in an arrogant manner that 
somehow ownership was acquired by simply a piece of paper given to them as a privilege they have as a citizen. That is not subject to inheritance. Each time this crops up I have a 
tendency to get my dander up a little bit. 
Tape 3 of 4, Side 2 
O: --beyond the normal corporate procedures. 
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O'Brien --Interview III --43 
G: Yes. Did President Kennedy share your attitude? 
O: I'm not sure that he did. I know this, that President Kennedy thought very highly of Newt Minow, and his regard for Newt Minow wasn't dissipated in the slightest as a result of that 
comment. 
G: The SEC plan, which was opposed by the New York Stock Exchange, was rejected in the Senate by a roll-call vote. Here apparently the opposition centered on the commission's 
delegating some of its decision-making power to subordinates so that you would have lower-level people making [decisions]. Do you recall your efforts to clear this 
reorganization plan? 
O: The problem with the contention of the opposition was that there was some merit to it. I think there's always a resistance to delegating authority down. I think there was a valid 
criticism. Now, maybe structurally and administratively it should be done. I'm not suggesting that it wasn't meritorious in that regard, but I think the very concept that 
there's going to be significant decision-making down three or four levels is a matter of concern. I think at that time, our advocacy was obvious and we did what we could on it. 
You think about it and there's an argument that can be presented. It's not in the context of "How can we find a way of gutting the administration?" Now, maybe I'm exaggerating 
that, and I'm not suggesting there wasn't that motivation. I repeat it only because it is a little different than most things you were faced with. There was that element that to a lot 
of people made sense. It's a little hard to argue. You can argue it administratively, but how far do you go in creating little kingdoms? 
G: The Republicans seem to have been relatively united in opposition to most of these reorganization packages. 
O: Yes. I think that came naturally. [It lacked] the inherent appeal that you need in some of these things to shake solid opposition. This wasn't an overriding, major attention-getter in 
the political context or in public dimension, and [there was] sort of [the feeling], "we're going to stay with tradition." That came rather naturally and I think brought about the 
unity you described. 
We didn't have much of a constituency, other than claiming that it would be more effective; it's more businesslike, it's a better approach. There's a big yawn out there while 
you're engaged in that kind of an effort. In fact, on something like that, the New York Stock Exchange would not be considered part of the constituency of a liberal Democratic 
administration. I think there would be a tendency to view the New York Stock Exchange as supportive of a reorganization process. I wonder why they couldn't be more effective 
than they were. 
G: Yes. 
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O'Brien --Interview III --44 
O: After all, the New York Stock Exchange, that's the heart of the business community. That was Jim Landis' area of greatest expertise, of course, the SEC. 
G: You had the highway bill that year which was passed. 
O: Yes. You could put that under the general category of public works. 
G: Was there any way to promise or suggest where the highway funds might be spent? 
O: No, just a general conversation that would always be in the context of a number of alternatives, nothing specific. You could always anticipate and hope. 
G: Did members of Congress make their support contingent on their getting a federal highway or--? 
O: Not observably. And if they had that in mind, some of those members were in a position to get it done whether we liked it or not. 
G: What was Wilbur Mills' role here in the highway bill? 
O: I don't recall. 
G: One of the press accounts indicates that he deserves a lot of the real credit for the passage of this legislation in 1961. 
O: Well, I think just being supportive of it would have a real plus factor. And that would indicate that he was more than supportive of it. I don't recall the specifics, but when 
Wilbur Mills was aboard, you always remembered two things. One, you were on the verge of success or it appeared that way, and you could prove the case to Wilbur that you 
had done your homework and the ducks were in reasonable order. And secondly, he had a personal commitment and personal reasons for being supportive or helpful. He was very 
much a realist. 
G: The administration proposed continuing a four cents a gallon tax on gasoline and increasing the taxes on heavy trucks and excise taxes on tires. And here you were 
opposed by the trucking industry. Do you recall this? 
O: I only recall one aspect of it, that prior to formalizing the proposal we were clearly aware of where the opposition would come from and to what degree it would impact. That that 
proposal was going to have widespread opposition from the industry, and traditionally always has. So that was all part of the equation. 
G: You did have some regulation of billboards in this measure, which--
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O'Brien --Interview III --45 
O: Rather modest, as I remember. I think, again, there was a little bit of the "let's get the foot in the door," maybe you could get your foot in the door. The billboard [issue], even at 
that stage, was becoming a matter of some discussion. Not only in the administration, you'd hear a lot of negative comments regarding the proliferation--and rightly so--of 
billboards all over the highways. We were sensitive to that and person-ally felt that way. It was sort of a natural reaction, and at some point we decided that maybe we'd see if we 
could get something started. 
G: Senator Kerr opposed this effort to limit or control billboards. 
O: Yes, and you know something, we couldn't understand it because he didn't have a billboard in sight out where he lived. 
(Laughter) 
I'm only being facetious. 
G: Was he regarded as a supporter of the billboard industry? 
O: Yes, it was understood. 
G: Why was that? 
O: I don't know really. You know, it takes strange turns. The billboard industry has muscle. There's a lot at stake and it's a big business. Also, they know they're in an area that 
people aren't particularly enamored with. Most people don't get overly excited about it. But certainly you're not going to have a lot of people jumping up and down and saying, 
"Gosh, I'd love to see more billboards." I'm not sure that there's been a complete handle on that to this day. Certainly Mrs. Johnson had very, very strong views in this area. 
G: Was this apparent while LBJ was vice president? 
O: I don't recall that. 
G: Okay. I have a few miscellaneous things I want to ask you about: JFK's trip to Europe in May of 1961, his meeting with de Gaulle, his meeting with Khrushchev, the summit in 
Vienna, meeting with MacMillan. Did you have any involvement in any of these? 
O: No. 
G: Okay. 
O: No, that was a rather natural evolvement in the context of our recognition that his election had brought about the beginning of a new era. For example, when you think that when 
Kennedy became president of the United States, he was truly representative of a new 
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O'Brien --Interview III --46 
generation. He, among the world leaders, was of a new generation. You have de Gaulle and Khrushchev and MacMillan and Churchill and the rest. And at some point in terms of 
your leadership role in the whole policy area, you have to make your presence known. And it was carefully orchestrated so that there would be this exposure to the established 
leadership of the western world and the establishment of Kennedy as not only a world leader by virtue of election as president, but a world leader in terms of his own personality 
and presence. 
G: Did you ever talk to him about his meetings with these people later and his attitude toward--? 
O: No, other than fleeting comments about the Khrushchev meeting, which was quite disturbing to him. 
G: Oh, really? The Vienna [summit]? 
O: Yes. 
G: What did he say, do you recall? 
O: Well, I don't think he felt particularly comfortable about it, was a little taken aback with this fellow. He had a negative reaction to the meeting and he had a newer view of 
Khrushchev as a result of it, and didn't feel that the meeting accomplished. 
G: Did he ever talk about de Gaulle? 
O: No, not to me. 
G: The Berlin Wall, were you involved in any of the deliberations there? 
O: No, I joined the last leg of the trip in Ireland and only because he--see, this wasn't a trip that had any involvement with the legislation or congressional activities and I had no role 
in it. He suggested to me, however, that in view of my heritage, why didn't I meet him at the airport in Dublin and travel the three days in Ireland with him. That finally resulted in 
a whole planeload of people going over. 
G: Really? 
O: Everyone that could actually or remotely establish any Irish heritage wound up getting his or her name on the roster. It probably was Air Force Two because it did have some 
sleeping accommodations, and [the roster] included one or two of Jack's sisters. Jack Anderson got hold of the--G: 
Manifest? 
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O'Brien --Interview III --47 
O: Manifest. And published the names of all of us in his column as another example of squandering taxpayers' money. 
But I did join him in Ireland and stayed through the trip. He went on to Italy and I went there informally, stayed with the Italian side of the trip, too. But I was not on the 
major aspects of the trip. 
I must say that the appearance in Berlin has had staying power to this day. It was one of the most remarkable public appearances of any figure in history. And I don't 
believe that those that were involved envisioned that kind of impact. 
But that was the highlight to him, I think. And in personal terms, not as president, the highlight was clearly his visit to Ireland. He became emotionally caught up in the visit. 
I was with him throughout the visit in the helicopters at each one of these stops, including the homestead of his forebears, an aunt still living there in this thatched-roof cottage. At 
the end of that trip he never got over it. He continually brought it up. 
G: Really? What did he say about it? 
O: Well, the wonder of it all. There must have been more people that saw Jack Kennedy in Ireland than the entire population of Ireland. The smallest little by-way stop that you 
helicoptered into, you'd find thousands of people grinning and roaring and screaming and this went on for three days. Then it culminated as he departed the airport. It was 
Shannon. And they had this youth choir sing "Come Back to Erin." It just absolutely broke him up. He got the recordings of all this. He'd play the record and reminisce. He 
was probably third-generation Irish. It wasn't as intimate as my relationship with the country would be. But his pride in his heritage just overwhelmed him. It had nothing to 
do with foreign policy; it was highly personal. I got a kick out of him. He loved to reminisce about those days. 
But the major attention-getter was the Berlin stop. 
G: What did he say about Berlin? 
O: Not much to me. I mean, it was all pretty obvious; there was nothing much to say. The comments he made to me regarding the trip were on two or three occasions in reference to 
Khrushchev and his experience with him and his reaction to it. It was quite negative. They were later on to confront each other, in any event. 
G: Yes. Did he feel that his Berlin speech was a big success, though? Did he [comment on that]? 
O: Yes. Nobody anticipated he wouldn't be enthusiastically welcomed in Berlin, but the extent and depth of it was remarkable. That's one of the best pieces of film I've ever seen. 
I've noticed in any retrospective involving that Kennedy era, inevitably they have that 
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O'Brien --Interview III --48 
sixty seconds in there. 
G: Do you recall his sending LBJ to Berlin to receive the troops as they marched--? 
O: Yes. Nothing other than the schedule aspect, and his unavailability for a period of time in the legislative side. Nothing in terms of the sub-stance of the trip. 
G: The Vice President also went to the Far East that year. 
O: Rather extensive travel that year. 
G: That's right: Vietnam, China, Indonesia. Was Johnson reluctant to go to Vietnam? I understand that the President had to persuade him to go. 
O: I really don't know. I can tell you this. After the fact, the President was extremely pleased with the Johnson trips, both trips. He felt that he had acquitted himself well. There was 
never any second-guessing or any criticism of any aspect of it. And some aspects of that trip were quite sensitive. 
G: Which ones in particular? 
O: The Vietnam end of it. That whole trip. You had to be very careful and very diplomatic in the way you handled yourself. 
G: Was part of that mission to press reforms on the South Vietnamese government, on [Ngo Dinh] Diem? 
O: Yes. I couldn't say that that was the overriding factor, but certainly that was one aspect of it. 
G: Do you think that that trip changed LBJ's attitude toward Vietnam or toward Diem? 
O: I don't know. I just never had discussions with him that would qualify me to have an opinion. I don't think we had any extensive discussions after the fact. 
G: Yes. The President's sister and brother-in-law [Jean and Stephen Smith] went along on that. Why did they go, do you know? 
O: I don't know as I can comment on that either. Other than the participation of the family in a variety of ways in the administration was apparent: Bobby as AG; you had Eunice 
[Shriver] quite active in making appearances here and all the members of the family. Again, you have to reflect on the Kennedy family. It was that way in the campaigns and it 
was inevitable that it would follow a similar pattern in the White House. In the campaigns every member of the family played a role, and it was not just a routine or a cameo role. 
They were very actively engaged. We know Sarge Shriver's role and for a relatively brief 
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O'Brien --Interview III --49 
period of time, Steve Smith's role. Jack Kennedy's approach would be to afford them an opportunity to participate and have experiences. I don't think I'd read anything more 
significant than that into it. 
G: Anything on Kennedy's trip to Latin America in December 1961? 
O: No, I wasn't on that trip. I didn't travel with the President unless it related to congressional activities. That was of my own choosing. I would have enjoyed going on 
some of those trips, but I knew that that would impact adversely on my own activities. 
But I do have to make one side-bar comment about that Latin American trip. Lo and behold, sometime after that trip, I believe it was the National Review, which wasn't a 
periodical that I was in the habit of reading [carried a piece on it]. 
A clipping from the magazine was brought to my attention in which Buckley stated that Larry O'Brien on the trip to Latin America had embarrassed the President no end, and 
that he had chosen to visit nightclubs in off hours and rather raucous activity. I haven't been to Latin America in my life, with the President or otherwise. Well, it's a rather 
minuscule item, but by the same token it was so highly personalized that I thought that this man Buckley would regret making this error; somebody had misinformed him. So I'll drop 
him a courteous note. And I did. I was sure he would want to know that I was not with the President, nor indeed have I ever been to Latin America, and I would appreciate 
whatever he thought was appropriate in terms of correcting the record. And that was it. Never heard from him. Never had the courtesy of saying, "Well, I'm sorry that that 
happened." So that's my recollection of the Latin American trip. That's as close as I came to being involved with it. 
G: As long as we're on the subject of your press coverage, I want you to recount the occasion in which you received that Time magazine cover story and the background of that. This 
was September 1961, I believe. 
O: Yes, I guess so. Well, that resulted from the observations of the Time magazine journalist that was assigned to covering the Congress. He had been in place for some time: Neil 
McNeil. He and an associate of his had on their own--and I had had no discussions with them--apparently concluded the new or differing congressional relations activity involving 
the White House, the thrust of it, was worthy of some in-depth review. I learned later they would have a group meeting in New York projecting their Time covers well ahead, 
and making a group decision as to the cover. 
My first recognition that this was in the offing was Neil asking me if I would join him for lunch at the Time magazine building. I had a pleasant lunch with a group of 
people on the magazine. The discussion was informal, related to congressional relations, what it was about and how we engaged in it. I noted an artist was doing a sketch. He 
worked on this sketch pad during the course of the lunch. I guess about that time they started developing a cover story, because I was questioned by Neil at some length. I had 
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no knowledge of who else he was talking to, but obviously there was a great deal of contact with various people as part of the cover story. They devoted what seemed to be 
an inordinate amount of attention to that activity, because it seemed to go on for a period of weeks, to the point where at a given weekend Neil asked me where I would be on 
Saturday and Sunday. 
In the meantime, Newsweek decided to do a cover story on four of us in the White House. They set up some camera work for a cover photo, and it included Ken O'Donnell, 
Ted Sorensen, I can't recall who the fourth one was--it might have been Mac [McGeorge] Bundy--and me. We went through that process over at the White House, out on the lawn. 
I was told that the cover of Newsweek was to appear in a certain issue. It turned out that the issue Newsweek contemplated for that cover was identical with the issue that Time 
contemplated for my cover. And Newsweek dropped their cover. 
G: Sure. 
O: I have to assume that they decided to drop it at least for the time being because it would relate to the Time cover. 
And it turned out okay. When you get a number of follow-up calls and the questions that you're asked become unbelievable--back to your birth--you begin to have 
real qualms. Therefore, when the magazine came out, it was with great relief and I imagine that's a normal reaction, that you found nothing really devastating and accepted it 
at that. 
But it was surprising what Luce had accomplished in that, because the aftermath, it went into the thousands of Time covers mailed to me for my autograph. I was asked if I 
had some idea how many, because they kept record, I guess. And I forget, Phyllis [Maddock] or whoever was just loaded with them for months. It turned out these are 
people that had a hobby of accumulating [autographed] Time magazine covers. In fact, as recently as six months ago I had a cover sent to me. Somebody had forgotten to take care 
of it in their portfolio." 
Neil's such a marvelous fellow and as a result of that involvement we became well acquainted, and we would anyway on the Hill as the years unfolded. So he went out of his 
way to do something that I really appreciated. He got the original painting, had it framed suitably, and had a little luncheon at a restaurant in Washington and presented it to me. 
And I recognized later on that that was not the usual procedure. I received a request from Time for the loan of the painting because they were going to ship a number of original 
covers to some traveling display of Time covers in South America. My recollection is I didn't send it to them; I was fearful I wouldn't get it back because I knew that I didn't have 
the right of possession in the first instance. 
There was another fallout later. At a leadership breakfast with President Kennedy and Hubert Humphrey, there was an exchange between them. The President said, 
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O'Brien --Interview III --51 
"Hubert, have you that invitation to go to this Henry Luce soiree in New York on the fortieth anniversary of Time magazine? All the cover subjects." Hubert [said], "Yes, I 
got that." "There's no way they would get me to go to that--the way they've treated me." Hubert, of course, was in total agreement with him. 
G: This is President Kennedy? 
O: Yes. And it was just sort of a passing comment, but it alerted me. I had received the invitation. I had not acknowledged it, but I'm sure at that point contemplated that this 
would be a nice experience, to spend three days as the guest of Henry Luce in New York in the variety of functions. But Hubert was in total agreement with Jack Kennedy that 
they weren't going to honor that occasion by being there, and that was enough for me. So I declined. I think the only surprising thing about the cover was that the activities in 
congressional relations in the judgment of the Time magazine people justified a cover. 
But there was one other fallout, and this has another humorous aspect to it. 
Tape 4 of 4, Side 1 
Within a couple of years of the 1961 [cover], it couldn't have been any longer than that, I received a call from Neil McNeil and he said, "We are going to be discussing 
upcoming Time magazine covers and you will be under consideration for a Time cover. Where are you going to be in"--a certain time frame. I said, "I'll be in Rome at that time." 
He said, "I'll give you a ring, because I'm sure you'll be curious as to the decision on a second cover." So I said, "That's nice, Neil," and went about my business. 
Sure enough, I got a phone call from him. And he said, "You're not going to be on the cover. We had quite a discussion in-house. It came to a choice between you and 
another person, and it was decided that we'd go with the other person, which would be an entertainment cover rather than a political cover. So you were a finalist. Are you curious 
about who beat you out?" I said, "Yes, who is it?" And he told me it was a very prominent actress, a singer, movie star, I think British--Julie Andrews. 
So I had the satisfaction, if I were being beaten out of a cover, to be beaten out by an attractive and talented young lady. That was the story of the magazine cover. 
G: There was another element that you mentioned when we discussed it before, that Neil did give you the raw file on that--O: 
That's right, too. At some date after this appeared, Neil sent me the raw file. He thought that I might enjoy [reading it]. Whatever number of words are used in the cover, then 
obviously there's probably five or ten times that number in what is submitted for consideration. He sent me the raw file, or a copy of the raw file. I'll have to say that I 
don't recall really reading it carefully. I filed it and I'm sure it was included with the material I forwarded on. I guess I would have liked to have read it recently just for the 
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O'Brien --Interview III --52 
fun of it, but I haven't, and maybe I'm better off. Maybe there were some comments in there that I wouldn't have appreciated. 
But anyway, I think the painting, the raw file, and being an advocate of a second cover were a reflection of Neil's reaction to the activities we were engaged in, which he 
was obviously in a position to closely observe on a day-to-day basis. And that certainly was appreciated, because Neil did on many occasions tell me that he thought it was 
effective, and you always appreciate a comment of that nature. So let me say that I consider Neil a very objective reporter. 
(Laughter) 
G: What impact did that Time cover piece have on your work on the Hill? 
O: Well, there was a widespread recognition of it. I don't know what the impact is of Time covers currently, but it had become something that did attract attention. The Time people 
had placed so much emphasis on it over the years and had so many of these related events that tied in with the cover. Of course, they have a large readership. So there were a lot of 
humorous, pleasant comments around the Hill for a brief period, just a fun sort of thing. I don't think it had any particular impact in terms of the business at hand. 
G: Do you think it advanced your work, or do you think it was--? 
O: I don't know. It may have given a little credibility to it. I don't know. There wasn't anything discernible that I can recall. 
G: What did President Kennedy say about it? 
O: He made reference to it when it came out, just sort of a positive comment. He thought it was awfully good or something to that effect. He also made an additional comment. As I 
reviewed in my book, we had had a Kennedy-Furcolo-O'Brien situation years earlier that was rather sensitive, and a Kennedy-Furcolo confrontation which was indirectly part of my 
involvement with Furcolo at an earlier time, at least it was construed to be. It was widely reported in Massachusetts on that occasion and left a lingering of animosity between 
Kennedy and Furcolo. That had long passed, but Jack's reaction to the cover was, "I bet Foster Furcolo will love this when he sees it." 
(Laughter) 
He got a big chuckle out of that. In any event there was nothing unpleasant about the whole thing, no fallout in terms of what was written that would cause any concern. 
G: I don't know what the circulation of Time was at the time, but I assume it must have increased your public recognition just on the street. 
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O'Brien --Interview III --53 
O: I suppose so. 
I think the mere fact that Luce developed this fortieth anniversary concept--it obviously included a tremendous number of true notables, not the Larry O'Briens. It was 
a major event in New York. It was a major attempt and an expensive effort on the part of Time to further promote that cover concept. Imagine calling all these people in from 
around the world, and getting a number of them. Neil told me that he thought this was one of the great ideas of all time, to have the Time cover become almost part of the 
language. That of course had a lot to with the general promotion of the magazine. 
G: So my impression is that President Kennedy did not insist that his aides have a passion for anonymity. 
O: No, there was never any discussion of that. You came to your own conclusions that applied to me and my staff. We had a responsibility to communicate with the press, 
because, after all, we were promoting a program and you had a lot of press contact. But you did not take speaking engagements or go on talk shows or that sort of thing. Media 
attention, if it was directed to you, was of no great value to the President or to the program. So you had to weigh that. Obviously, with the political writers, you had 
constant communication with them, but it was rare to accept a speaking engagement. Certainly you did get into the profile stuff. That would happen from time to time. The 
Time cover would be an example, and your concern on the Time cover--conceivably it might even help promote the program, depending on how it turned out--became rather 
personal. You go through this sort of period and you just hope that it doesn't turn out badly. That's about what it amounted to. 
G: On a different type of publicity, I noticed from your files there was a question of cabinet officers and others in the administration appearing on Kenneth Keating's television 
program in New York. A whole list of cabinet officers and administration officials had participated in this program, and there was a decision made that this was not in the best 
interest of the Kennedy Administration, to advance Kenneth Keating's--O: 
Actually that decision was made as a result of comments emanating from New York Democratic politicians and some on the Hill. But there was a building resentment and it 
eluded us because you're not paying that much attention. And actually if a cabinet member can find a forum somewhere to advocate the program, he ought to be doing it. 
We were really pushing them to be out there as advocates. Some of them didn't care much for that kind of--some had to go to some remote areas and make speeches and 
submit themselves to terrible travel problems in order to fulfill some of those obligations. But we felt--and incidentally Lyndon Johnson felt--that's part of the job of the visible 
members of the administration, the cabinet members. 
But in the Keating instance, that was not a remote. We had no objection to cabinet members going on the program and that would include a congressman or senator's 
back-home television or radio programs. That went on all the time. But in that instance 
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O'Brien --Interview III --54 
with Ken Keating, the Democratic Party people in New York would find administration officials as guests of Keating, and complaints were registered with us. And we reacted to 
the complaints because, after all, in the political context they were valid complaints. 
G: I have about three appointments I want to ask you about. One, John Connally's appointment as secretary of the navy. Do you recall where the impetus for this 
appointment came from? 
O: No, not really. I made an assumption, obviously, that the impetus came from Lyndon B. Johnson. Now let's assume that, and that's a valid assumption, that Johnson would be 
interested in Connally having a role in the administration and Connally would be interested in that. John Connally was a worthy adversary at Los Angeles, as Hubert Humphrey was 
a worthy adversary in West Virginia. 
In the early stages of the administration I was living at the Mayflower Hotel. John was staying in the Mayflower on a long-term basis. We saw a fair amount of each other. 
His entrance into the administration was a natural evolvement, as far as I was concerned. I had input in a couple of cabinet appointments, because I had objections to what was 
contemplated. If I felt that something might develop not in the President's best interests, then I would fulfill a responsibility in that regard. 
With Connally, there was no element of great surprise that he was entering the Kennedy Administration. Those of us who were political intimates of the President 
thought it was a good move. John's role, until he chose to leave to take the governorship, was just what you'd expect--a cooperative member of the team. 
G: There was opposition to his nomination on the Hill: Yarborough, [William] Proxmire and Wayne Morse. Do you recall dealing with that? 
O: No, not particularly, nor do I recall that we were overly impressed. I do recall the objections, particularly the Yarborough one and it was obvious why. That was part and 
parcel of that continuing problem. But it wasn't anything that shook us at all. 
G: How about Robert Kennedy's appointment as attorney general? Did you have any consultation role on that at all? 
O: No. I was aware of it before it was announced. My reaction to it was one of some surprise. And I'm not sure that I totally accepted it as the appropriate thing to do. That 
would be in the context of what kind of general public reactions you would get to appointing your brother to the cabinet. I anticipated that there would be some adverse 
reactions. Bobby was willing and enthusiastic about doing it, and I didn't question his competency. But I did wonder, again in the political context, whether there might be 
some adverse reactions. 
It was like the concern that the President had expressed to me when Teddy was 
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O'Brien --Interview III --55 
going to run for the Senate. We discussed that at the time. Jack had some concern regarding that. He felt that perhaps Teddy should consider some other office initially. He 
did not want to suggest to Teddy that he refrain from a political career. But he wondered about reactions, and that was a quantum leap, to go into the Senate. He was going to 
have a primary contest that would again renew the old McCormack-Kennedy problems. And the President did discuss that with me and wondered if Teddy might seek some 
statewide office, state treasurer or secretary of state or what have you, as a stepping stone. 
But it wasn't an overriding concern. He kicked it around: "What do you think; what adverse aspect might there be to this?" It was hard to determine, and I didn't see any 
great difference; if you seek an office, you seek an office. If it's a statewide office, it's not the United States Senate but it's the secretary of state of the Commonwealth or whatever. 
Sure, there's a great difference in the level of the office, but by the same token it's got some of the same elements, too. 
So he said that perhaps I could chat with Teddy regarding the matter. And I'll have to tell you that I decided not to; I never did discuss it with Teddy. I think it was too 
personal. It involved members of a family and that, as Eddie McCormack used to say to him, "If your name had been Edward Moore, you wouldn't be in this position." His name 
was Edward Moore Kennedy. If it didn't involve members of the same family, of course, it was an obvious thing for the fellow that's engaged in the political side of things to do. 
So he didn't evidence an overriding concern, but he did say that he wondered whether that was the right thing to do from Teddy's point of view, to make that quantum 
leap, that there might be some resentment. Teddy went on, went through a vigorous, hard-fought primary and then was, as we know, elected. 
But at the time that Bobby was named by the President, I had no discussion with the President. Obviously, the President, if he did consider reactions, it didn't dissuade him 
at all. And there wasn't, as I recall, anything of any significance. 
G: Do you think that the President's father had input into any of these cabinet appointments? 
O: I would think not. I'll tell you why. Because the President's relationship with his father was one of mutual admiration. It wasn't long after I became acquainted with the family 
that I realized Jack was the senior member. He was first among equals because of the date of his birth and the death of others in the family. He was obviously, in Joe Kennedy's 
mind, the heir, the man of destiny. He was the fellow he was looking to in terms of the presidency. 
I had an experience that brought into focus how each one handled the other or dealt with the other. Joe Kennedy was a strong-willed fellow who voiced his opinions 
without any hesitation, had definite opinions in business matters. He had definite opinions in political matters, too. And he was very protective of Jack, and I got into a conflict on a 
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O'Brien --Interview III --56 
matter with Joe Kennedy. It was in 1958. 
My judgment on this run-through election against a fellow named [Vincent] Celeste in 1958 [was] that it would be useful to have the largest margin of victory in the 
history of the state. In other words, put in a major effort. We could do it, because we had retained contact with the Kennedy organization, a massive organization of people across 
Massachusetts who were still relatively young, aggressive, and interested. We could move that group into a campaign comparable to the 1952 campaign against [Henry Cabot] 
Lodge, and mount a campaign that would establish that record. That in and of itself might be usable when you got to the primaries and the presidential election. My motivation was 
primarily that we could utilize these people who had been sitting for six years with their affection and commitment to Kennedy maintained at a high level. And why not? 
So I developed a campaign in detail. It would include a carefully planned, perceptibly vigorous, aggressive campaign on the part of the candidate. The overall view 
of the campaign would clearly indicate that this fellow had taken nothing for granted, that he appreciated the sup-port in the state and went out and made appearances. It was 
carefully put together and what it amounted to was ensuring the activity of all these people and responding to their activity by more than a token appearance on a part of a candidate 
who was going to be re-elected. 
Jack and Jackie were in Europe, but he knew that I was going to have a presentation to make to him immediately upon his return. It would be very close to the 
kick-off of this campaign. We were to meet in an apartment here in New York in a building that Joe Kennedy owned. Jack and Jackie were returning by boat in New York. 
Well, that morning, in anticipation of his arrival, Ken O'Donnell was there and there could have been one or two others. Joe Kennedy was there and we were sitting 
around chatting. We got to the subject of the campaign, and I told Joe Kennedy that I had this campaign program that as soon as Jack arrived and was in the mood to do it, we 
could all go over it and get comment. He said, "Could I take a look at it?" I gave him his copy and he looked at it. He said, "Oh, my God, you're going to kill him." He reacted 
very strongly. He said, "God, you can't do this to him. You know, this is just unfair to poor Jack," and this went on. He wasn't violent, but he was certainly very strong in 
registering his objections. 
Well, I wasn't about to accept his objections. We had the arrival time of Jack and Jackie and Ken O'Donnell and I decided to go down and meet them. So we greeted them, 
and quickly briefed him on what had transpired. He had no idea of the program, hadn't seen it. And I said, "I just want you to know this so it doesn't hit you straight out. This is 
going to be a topic of very serious and prolonged discussion. I'm not asking you to react at this point; you don't know what I'm talking about, but I did want you to know that there 
are storm clouds." So he said, "Fine, I'll see you in a while." 
So we met, and we started to go through the campaign outline and Joe Kennedy 
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O'Brien --Interview III --57 
again expressed to Jack what he had expressed to me, that this just can't happen, it'll kill you; why go through all this effort and so forth. So Jack is sitting there and he's not 
commenting, but he's thumbing through and finally gets to his decision. He said, "Dad, why don't we try out the first phase of this, just to see how it goes? We won't go public 
with this overall program. We'll just go through the first couple of days or phase of it and see how it goes and then we can get a better feel for it and I'll have a good feel of whether 
I agree with you or not. Let's do it that way." It was a compromise, obviously. So with great reluctance Joe Kennedy was kind of forced to accept his son's decision. 
We're going to start to implement it. It called for the visit to the high school, the high school auditorium and the school band at 10: 00 a. m. and then move on at 11: 15 to 
the next community. It was a pretty busy first day. Lo and behold, we got to the first stop not far from Boston. This first day or two would be just in communities around 
Boston. I look up in the balcony and who is sitting there but Joe Kennedy and Frank Morrissey, who later became a judge, very close to the Kennedys. [They] literally had 
gone out to this town to observe directly what transpired. And I'm sure he showed up at the next event, or the third event of the day where he was spotted in the crowd. 
Well, whether it was the first night or the second night of this--we did it in stages; then you'd have a break. And, really, it looked imposing on paper. It would do the job; 
the perception would be there, but it had been very carefully handled to husband his time and yet leave the impression we wanted. 
They had an apartment in Boston, and we're going to all just wind up in the apartment that evening at the end of the day's activities. So Jack said to me, "Larry, don't 
get into an argument with Dad. Whatever he says, just listen it out and we'll all stay calm." And sure enough, we got in the apartment and Mr. Kennedy was there and he 
made a couple of snide comments, but nothing more than that. And I stayed briefly and left. Jack went on and we did the whole venture. But I told that story because I think it 
gave you a sense of Jack's respect for his dad and his dad's affection and total commitment to Jack. But in the final analysis Jack had reached an age in life, and accomplishments in 
life, where he'd be willing to listen but his dad wasn't going to direct him or make his decisions for him. And I wasn't going to make any decisions for him either. He'd make 
his own judgment on whether or not he felt that he wanted to go through this task and that would be determined by whether or not he thought there was any real value in it. We had 
a replay of the 1952 campaign and we accomplished that modest objective. 
I guess I'm repeating myself, but we're on the subject. At a later date I was taking a swing through the state to have contact with our Kennedy secretaries and some of their 
Kennedy committee members in the various communities. There's a score of communities on Cape Cod, and we always made a particular point that you went everywhere. That 
didn't mean that Jack Kennedy went to twenty communities on Cape Cod; he'd go probably to Hyannis and we'd have a regional meeting. But I would, in fairness to these 
people, show up and chat with them. It was part of the political, public relations aspects of the campaign. It was suggested, by Joe Kennedy, why not stay at the Compound rather 
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O'Brien --Interview III --58 
than a hotel? He was going to be there and the family was away. 
So I stayed there and Joe Kennedy was there and I received a few phone calls before we went to bed, just check-out calls on my travels for the next day around the 
Cape. I'm not an early riser and I hadn't scheduled myself to start at dawn, but Mr. Kennedy was an early riser, and I was in a bedroom on the ground floor off the foyer 
which was actually Jack's bedroom. I could hear through the door around six-thirty Mr. Kennedy on the telephone with someone; maybe it was somebody calling me. "As far as I 
know, he's not up yet. I don't know what time he gets up, but he's got to be up pretty soon, because I know he's going to travel a lot today. I expect to be talking to him soon." 
Well, the voice was so loud it got me up, and after I got dressed he was waiting to have breakfast, so we had breakfast together. You have to picture the breakfast table. It 
was the dining room, and he was at one end of the table and I'm at the other, and there's a void of several feet in between. We have a pleasant chat before I depart for the day, but 
what left a lasting impression on me was one statement he made. He said, "You know, Larry, Jack is destined. He will be president of the United States. He is destined to be 
president." I accepted that, except as I'm wending my way around the towns that day, it did enter my mind that if destiny is the determining factor here, I'm wasting a lot of my 
time, because there's no need for any of this. 
(Laughter) 
But I found Joe a very interesting fellow, and I don't pretend to be privy in any intimate way to the relationship between Joseph Kennedy and Jack Kennedy, other than these little 
fleeting incidents. That gave me a feel for Jack's respectful acknowledgement of any comments his father was making. At all times, he was very respectful to him, and 
appreciative, but he had reached the point in life, which his father should recognize, too, that he makes his own decisions and he'll make them rather independently of anyone else. 
"I appreciate your point of view, but--" he makes the decisions. And that was an instance of it, and all he wanted from me was not to be a wise guy or get into any kind of exchange 
because there was no need for anything like that. 
Tape 4 of 4, Side 2 
G: --in the father's sense of destiny for his son, did Jack Kennedy have a similar sense of destiny? 
O: I never detected that. Jack Kennedy was very much a realist. There was no question about ambition and that ambition was far from fruition. It was a long, long road and you 
couldn't even see the road signs from where you were at that point. But the effort would be made some day. I'm sure he did not for one moment conceive of himself as a man of 
destiny. 
G: But that ambition itself translates into a certain level of that, just the fact that--
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O'Brien --Interview III --59 
O: Yes, but it's an ambition that has been shared by many others through history. It wasn't that unique. 
G: How about you? Did you feel that Jack Kennedy was destined to be president? 
O: I didn't feel he was destined to be president, but I had two thoughts. One, I felt that he was well qualified to be president; I'd have no concern about that. And secondly, I felt 
that he would be an eminently attractive candidate in every respect for the presidency. And I was persuaded that with all of that, like any quest for the presidency long range, it 
has an element of a long shot in it, and everything has to work right or it isn't going to happen. So I had no feeling of destiny. You just go on the roller-coaster ride and you're 
going to come to the finish line and don't be concerned about arriving there. I wouldn't even deign to think along those lines. 
G: A couple of other appointments: Robert Weaver to head the housing agency. Some of the extreme conservatives raised questions about whether or not he had ties with left-wing 
communist organizations. Do you remember that? 
O: Yes, I remember some of that. My recollection of Bob's background is somewhat vague, but I do recall that an appointment of this nature required very careful review--all the 
aspects of normal consideration plus the sensitivity of a black coming into a very key cabinet post. This man met every check-out. There were some mean, carping comments 
made regarding him. We were not only extremely comfortable with Bob, we were extremely pleased that he had come to our attention and he was joining us. That was a 
feeling we all shared. 
G: Sarah Hughes' appointment as federal judge. Here was a case where she was actually over the age limit, the informal age limit I guess, that had been set up. 
O: My only contact with Sarah Hughes was at the swearing in on Air Force One. I don't believe I knew of her existence prior to that. That was a historic moment, also in personal 
terms for Lyndon B. Johnson, a moment that he, his family and friends would always remember. Why was Sarah Hughes selected by Lyndon Johnson? I don't know the 
background of it, but clearly his regard for her was to a degree where he had no compunction about overlooking the age problem. 
G: You don't recall Rayburn pressing for that nomination either? 
O: No. 
G: One other thing. In August of 1961 President Kennedy and LBJ reached an agreement on the vice president's assumption of duties in the event of presidential disability. Do you 
recall that question and their discussions on that? Were you involved in that in any way? 
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O'Brien --Interview III --60 
O: Not directly. I do have some recollection of being present or to some degree a participant when some general discussion took place regarding that. I'm sure that occurred, but 
nothing beyond that, no. 
End of Tape 4 of 4 and Interview III 
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    [ Part 4: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--52 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview IV*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
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LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW IV 
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-15 
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INTERVIEW IV 
DATE: December 4, 1985 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 1 
G: Let me start with one note that I have from last time that you were going to talk about, and that is a discussion you had with Joe Kennedy in the Oval Office about the New 
Frontier programs. 
O: Actually, it was a brief discussion, and it was en route from the living quarters over to the Oval Office. Joe Kennedy expressed some concern about his son Jack's liberalism. He 
suggested to me that I ought to keep an eye on things and do what I could to make a contribution to steering his son right. Obviously Mr. Kennedy had begun to focus on the 
New Frontier program and its elements and he wasn't that excited about some aspects of it. He never got into any specifics, but I got a kick out of the discussion, because it 
reflected probably Joe Kennedy's innate conservatism. It was now divorced from a political quest, a battle for the White House, and had gotten to the reality of attempting to 
enact a specific program. 
I made no specific comment that I can recall, and the conversation terminated when we reached the Oval Office. That was a passing commentary that I thought was 
indicative of some concern that the father had about the direction his son was taking. If you reflected on it from the outset, that was the direction we were all going. So Mr. 
Kennedy would not be influencing that direction in any event. 
G: Was the President aware of this concern, do you think? 
O: No. I never made any reference to it and it wasn't important. I think it was just a little indication that father and son weren't necessarily on the same wave length in terms of a 
domestic legislative program. 
G: Throughout the administration, did Ambassador Kennedy have any specific concerns or interests, do you know? 
O: No, I had no contact with him of any meaningful nature, other than that commentary that he made during that walk. What contact he had with his son at any time regarding his 
son's activities I wouldn't be aware of, and there was never any reference to Mr. Kennedy in any discussions about our programs. 
G: Okay, in 1962 you had a change in leadership in the House with Sam Rayburn's death, and 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --2 
I have a note that indicates that it was difficult for you at first, because you did have a less experienced leadership in the House initially, and you had to cultivate new intelligence 
sources and develop a closer working relationship with John McCormack. Is this correct? Can you elaborate on it? 
O: No, I don't think it probably is, because basically there was continuity. Our activities with Sam Rayburn were really part of day-to-day involvement with the leadership, and you had 
McCormack, [Carl] Albert, [Hale] Boggs. Then at the death of the Speaker and the succession, you have McCormack, Albert, Boggs, and I don't recall there was any 
difficulty. I think it moved along quite well. 
As I may have mentioned earlier, I think there were two or three surprise factors, all pleasant, that occurred when we entered the White House. One was Sam Rayburn's 
support of President Kennedy. We shouldn't call it a surprise; it was a pleasant turn of events, because it happened quickly and despite Mr. Rayburn's concern about the ticket 
back at Los Angeles. The second was John McCormack's acceptance of my role immediately, even though I had some involvement in some political conflict back in 
Massachusetts at an earlier stage. So I was somewhat concerned about John McCormack's reaction to my presence. And that posed no problem. Well, then I think 
the third, as I mentioned before, was the emergence of Carl Albert in terms of his leadership role and Jack Kennedy's recognition of his abilities. They quickly achieved a 
warm relationship, and the President was very impressed with Carl. Carl from the outset became a very key person in the movement of our program. By the time McCormack 
succeeded Rayburn, we were well in place. We were working effectively with the leadership and with the members generally in the House and the Senate. 
The [Mike] Mansfield-[ Hubert] Humphrey situation had worked out extremely well, along with George Smathers, so we were quite comfortable, and if there was any 
adjustment after Rayburn, it probably would have been solely the open-door access to the Speaker's office, which continued under McCormack. That probably gave me a little 
thought when McCormack succeeded Rayburn, because I had reached the point where Speaker Rayburn and I had what I construed to be a very pleasant relationship. It was 
extremely comfortable. John McCormack moved into the Speaker's office, and that relationship continued, and McCormack's activity on behalf on the program was total. So 
we spent many, many hours in the Speaker's office working on the program. 
G: Were the administration proposals in 1962 more liberal and more controversial than they had been in 1961, do you think, as a whole? 
O: I don't know, I'm just trying to reflect on the movement of the program. We were subject to attack in varying degrees by liberal entities of the Democratic Party. I don't know 
whether it was monthly, but it was a newsletter the ADA [Americans for Democratic Action] developed that was attacking the President specifically in the area of civil rights. 
They felt there hadn't been any movement. But when you consider the commitments to civil rights, Medicare, and other proposals, the movement through 1961 into 1962, up to 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --3 
the 1962 congressional elections, was a continuing movement into more difficult areas in terms of ability to enact the legislation. So in that sense I suppose you could consider 
1962 more difficult than 1961. 
G: I notice from your files that your operation even lobbied to get administration supporters on key committees. For example, Representative [John] Riley died and there was a 
vacancy on one of the key House committees. Your office helped find the appropriate guy to fill this slot and even looked around for someone to run for Riley's seat back home. 
Was this fairly typical? 
O: Yes. I don't think by that time we had any hesitancy in becoming involved in matters of this nature, and we certainly didn't feel that we should be inhibited in any political activity 
we might engage in. How effective it was might be questioned. Certainly we had a very great interest in committee assignments, because throughout this period we were walking 
a tightrope and it was essential for us to take advantage where we could of every opportunity that might give us a little additional strength on the Hill. 
G: Certainly one of the biggest successes you had was the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 
O: Yes. That represented a tremendous amount of effort over an extended period of time. You would have to consider it a major success, and it did entail the utilization of all the 
tools that we felt were available to us in moving a legislative proposal. 
G: That was an example where you really mobilized public relations. Can you elaborate on that? 
O: My recollection is that we formalized a citizens' operation, and I say "formalized." This wasn't a matter of utilizing existing entities that might have similar views, which was a 
more typical situation if you were dealing with the AFL-CIO or other entities, i. e., teachers' groups. They were in place, and you shared a common interest and you would 
try to work together as effectively as you could. In this instance, it was a matter of developing from ground zero a major private-sector effort, coordinated fully and 
organized completely in the advocacy of this legislation to supplement what we were able to do. 
This is in actuality the best example, I guess, during that period of the extent of effort that was involved in trying to bring about a favorable decision in the Congress. It 
was major in every sense, and my best recollection is that from the start there was some serious question on the part of some members of the administration regarding any 
movement of this extent. I hope I'm not recalling this in the context of some other activity. But I think there was an up-front State Department concern. My recollection is 
that George Ball, I believe, was in the forefront as far as State Department advocacy was concerned. This initially called for a decision by the President on whether we would go 
the distance or whether we would try to simply have an extension of existing policies. Is that correct? 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --4 
G: Yes. 
O: Because I do recall, up in the living quarters, a decision-making meeting regarding the administration's approach. George Ball strongly advocated that we seek simple extension. 
I had attempted to make some preliminary checks on the possibilities in this area. There had been some informal discussions. And I felt, while I wasn't seeking any more problems 
than we had, that this did have potential for success if we bit the bullet and went for a complete new approach and package. So that left Ball advocating simple extension and 
O'Brien advocating to the President that we move into this with all the vigor that we could give it. And the President, I guess, mentally flipped a coin and said, "Okay, let's go." 
That, of course, was the launching of what turned out to be a very extensive effort, and that brought into play the organization of this committee. The man that headed it was 
Petersen. 
G: Howard Petersen? 
O: Yes, Howard Petersen. He had wide recognition as an "expert" in this field. He had prior experience that would lead you to feel he could develop the kind of organization that was 
envisioned. He was given a lot of leeway: "Go ahead, it's yours." He had a staff that he developed, and ultimately, in the context of the battle in the Senate, this citizens' group 
became an integral part of that battle and brought into play individuals and entities around the country as advocates. 
It became sensitive, however, and you can't ignore the human element in any of this, I guess. You can sit and draft it and develop it and organize it, and then you have to 
consider the reactions of people that are key to ultimate success. I was placed in a rather difficult position as this unfolded, because the vigor of Petersen and his cohorts reached a 
dimension that antagonized Mike Mansfield, and that made it difficult. This apparently went on for a period of time and I didn't focus on it or relate to it; I probably was 
oblivious to the whole matter. But Petersen and his people were on the Hill a great deal; they were in the offices a great deal. That was fine, but they were also in the corridors off 
the Senate Chamber a great deal. And finally Mansfield pleasantly but definitively told me that he didn't appreciate their involvement in the corridors on a day-after-day basis. While 
I had access to his office, and my staff had access to his office, he didn't feel the activities of this entity were appropriate in terms of decorum, I guess, or attitude. Perhaps there 
were some personality clashes. 
In any event, it was necessary for me to try to wind this down, to diplomatically suggest to the folks involved that they lower the temperature, that they use a great deal 
more discretion, that "pulling lapels" in the corridors outside the Senate Chamber was not acceptable to the Majority Leader or the leadership generally. It worked out, but it did 
exemplify that, with all the activities you might engage in legislatively, you had to be sensitive to the personalities involved, the people you dealt with. And in that case, I had 
not given it enough attention. Obviously we were very pleased downtown to have all this 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --5 
support and, as aggressive as it could be, it was fine with us. But if it was going to cross a line that might make it counterproductive, then that was a danger signal, and we 
consequently had to attend to it. 
I don't recall specifically any confrontations with Petersen or his people, but I do recall that I alerted Mike Manatos, who was up there regularly, to see to it that people on 
Petersen's staff were advised to be more low-key, and I had a conversation with Petersen at one point on this matter. It was not overriding, but it's just an indication that's worth 
citing that this isn't all push button. It never was. You did have this separation-of-powers situation that might crop up sometime, and it might be harmful. After all of the 
relationships that had been established, you never were in a totally assured position that it could not be disrupted overnight by virtue of some key person becoming disturbed with 
your activities. That was always scary. In that instance it had the potential for a real confrontation, but that sort of drifted away and we went on about our business. 
G: Was this the first time you had organized this sort of support group? 
O: As I recall it. Really, the motivation there was that while there were groups and key individuals around the country that would be supportive, you didn't have the 
long-established, broad-based organization to incorporate all the private-sector activity that could be put into play. So it lent itself to establishing a private-sector group, but yet 
it was under the aegis of the President and the executive branch. It received full support from us and became sort of semiautonomous, and it was given a lot of leeway. It was an 
attempt to ensure that every possible area of support was brought into play in what hopefully would be a coordinated manner. 
G: Wilbur Mills was a key player in this legislation. Can you recall your conversations with Mills with regard to it? 
O: Not in any detail. Wilbur Mills was a key player, period, through all our years there, and you were always aware of the absolute need for us to keep in total and constant 
communication with him, and probably more than that--keep him apprised of what you were doing. There again it gets to the sensitivities, although there was never any problem 
with Mills in that regard. There was a problem with Mills at times in convincing him of our positions. Mills was always an extremely conservative fellow in terms of legislative 
movement. I don't recall the degree that Mills embraced this proposal at the outset, or whether he moved into support of it on a gradual basis; that pretty much eludes me. The 
fact is, he was very key to it, and clearly what was at stake called for us to give Mills every bit of attention we could. 
G: How about Bob Kerr on this issue? 
O: Yes, there again, Kerr was very key in the Senate. Our relationship with Kerr I cannot say was as intimate as, say, with Mills. I think again it was just the nature of things or the 
style of the fellow. I don't know as we had many let-your-hair-down, deep philosophical 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --6 
conversations with Kerr. It was more maintaining contact, recognizing his role in some areas of the Senate. And, of course, we have the whole Kerr-Mills situation as part and 
parcel of our relationship with him. I think, clearly, that was an area where the private-sector group, the Petersen group, could develop a great deal of contact and did. 
G: How did you get organized labor to support this measure? 
O: Persuasion. I think, on balance, there was a recognition that this had the potential of being a plus factor. Labor looked on this proposal early on with a jaundiced eye, and that was 
understandable. But as it was pursued, labor came to the conclusion that, in general, enactment could indeed be favorable to their position. 
G: There was an adjustment assistance section of this bill. Was there an accommodation there to make it more--? 
O: Yes. I have no real recollection of any negotiation in that area, but that was a form of accommodation, sure. 
G: Were there any other key compromises that advanced the passage, anything for, say, the lumber industry or the oil industry or textile bloc? 
O: Oh, I think that there were some adjustments made as we moved along. I also don't recall that it was that unique or unusual in terms of major legislation. As you moved through the 
legislative process and the amendment process and, as you say, the adjustment process, that was a pretty normal approach to any legislative proposal. As we're talking, I think of 
what's transpiring down there now in tax reform. That would be pretty typical of the legislative process and the executive-legislative combined roles in a major area. 
G: Okay. Let's talk about the farm bill. This was one where you lost a close vote in the House by ten votes and had some of your administration Democrats absent. Do you recall 
that? 
O: I don't recall it in detail, but I know, as I think I've mentioned before, farm legislation kind of eluded Larry O'Brien and the staff. It was pretty foreign to us, and we had a tendency 
to lean more on the department than we probably normally did. I mean by that, have the department take the leadership on the Hill--Orville Freeman and his associates. That was 
because we didn't feel that comfortable with the substance of farm legislation. We found that you could get very deeply involved in highly technical aspects of farm legislative 
proposals that made you somewhat uncomfortable. You could negotiate and deal on amendments and changes in language on just about everything with some comfort and 
with some feeling of understanding and knowledge of the subject. But when it came to farm legislation, maybe I'm only applying it to myself, I found that no matter how much 
research I did or how much study I put into it, I still didn't feel comfortable with it. 
In addition to that, Orville was a very aggressive secretary. He knew his subject, 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --7 
he knew the substance, but individually he was very aggressive and worked arduously as an advocate. When I think of Orville Freeman I think of the word guts. He sort of 
epitomized that. He would go charging into the fray, never deterred by the odds. His commitment was complete and he carried out his commitment personally. So you'll find 
that in the ebb and flow of legislative activity, House and Senate, farm legislation would be construed by us to be to a considerable extent in Orville's hands. We would become 
the supportive element, while in other major legislative proposals we were in the lead and the department would be supportive. 
In terms of that particular battle and the loss in the House, I do recall it, because you recall any loss of that nature; I don't think you ever forget them. That isn't in the 
forefront of my mind to the extent of the loss on minimum wage, because that was a one-vote loss. But it continued to haunt us, nevertheless, because there was absenteeism, 
as you pointed out, and there was a ten-vote, something like that, loss. So that's hard to take. It's hard to take on the part of the chief executive and everybody around him. 
G: You had a united Republican opposition in the House; I think [Phil] Weaver was the only Republican that voted for it. 
O: Yes. It took on some of the element of Republican opposition to the debt ceiling or foreign aid. I guess our largest margin of Republican support in the House was in the 
vicinity of twenty or twenty-two votes, and that was on the Rules [Committee] change. I don't know as we ever achieved that level again on hard legislative proposals. We could 
count on about a dozen House members who, because of their constituency, would be supportive. But when you get to a farm bill, that constituency has eroded. For example, I 
think of a liberal Republican, John Lindsay, in those days, and there were others, about a dozen. And yet you get to a farm proposal and that affords them an opportunity to record 
themselves with their Republican leadership with no adverse political effect back home, so it makes it even tougher to put a majority vote together. And it did. Farm legislation is 
very, very tough. 
G: The big problem seems to have been the defection of a number of liberal Democrats. 
O: Well, there again, I never could quite understand it. You had the Farm Bureau, which we construed to be conservative and a powerful entity, clearly representative of the big 
farmer, the corporate farmer. Then you had the other farm group, which really was representative of the small farmer. I mean, that's probably an oversimplification, but that 
was basically what you were coping with. The Farm Bureau had a real impact on the Congress. Historically, it continued to have and it was very difficult to put a majority 
together with the Farm Bureau on your back. 
On reflection, maybe that was part of my concern about farm legislation at the outset. It was built-in opposition to our concept of farm legislation that was well 
organized and effective and it could chip off in strange ways in strange places. Yet you step back from it and you could see that, if you were a liberal congressman who perhaps 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --8 
would like to balance your voting record, this was an opportunity. If you were a, as we called them, moderate Republican, this was also a splendid opportunity to balance your 
voting record. The constituency, while it was a significant constituency, when you broke it down by congressional district, the blood and tears over farm legislation was 
geographically limited and it all added up to a difficult process. You didn't have your natural private-sector constituency or any enthusiasm. You didn't have COPE and the rest 
of them hustling around. So it was tough. 
G: Do you think that the defection of these liberal Democrats was related to anything else, such as disappointment with not getting some other program or projects advanced? 
O: I don't recall any specific instance of that, but I can tell you that you were always alert to and sensitive to those problems. The realities of the process were that you were not going 
to maintain total enthusiasm on the part of every actual or potential friendly member at all times and you were not going to just have a massive cave-in and have your decisions in 
the White House dictated by the Congress or members or groups of members of Congress. So there were times when some of our best friends on the Hill were disappointed, and 
perhaps instances where they were grievously disappointed in our decisions. That could go to advocacy of a project or it could go to appointments in the administration. That's 
what you had to live with. We've reflected on some of those, on foreign aid, and I'm sure they occurred. And we never had any great difficulty. If everything was equal and it was 
a matter of making some decision--say it was an appointment and you did have what we construed to be a choice that was basically a coin flip--we would mentally flip that coin in 
favor of the member. But there were any number of occasions when that situation didn't exist, and we didn't have any hesitancy making the decision against the member's interests. 
[We would] explain it to him in the hope that he would go on to continuing support. There was always tomorrow and there might be another occasion, and most members 
reacted that way. 
G: Otis Pike complained that his arms ached because they'd been twisted so much by the administration on this bill, so there must have been some pretty good lobbying going on. 
O: Oh! Listen, that was a valid complaint, I'm sure, on the part of Otis. Otis was a very bright fellow, very able fellow, very attentive to his duties. I became well acquainted with 
Otis Pike over the years, and I'll agree with you. Otis also was an extremely candid fellow, and you could anticipate from Otis some expression of exasperation if you were 
overly persistent. But it was generally in a pretty friendly atmosphere, it wasn't mean. But Otis--he would be a good example of a fellow we were trying to convince. Why not? No 
harm. Nothing adverse back home. You won't pay any political price and you can be helpful to the President, the usual approach. And, frankly, that's just an isolated example 
of what went on all the time. There was an acceptance of vigorous arm-twisting, I guess, in general. But to suggest that we ever let go, no. We couldn't let go. Otis could 
ultimately say no, but he'd have to say no a dozen times perhaps before we accepted it finally as no because we couldn't afford the luxury of doing otherwise. 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --9 
G: The point that Pike seems to be making is that there was perhaps more aggressive lobbying on this measure than there was normally. Was this the case? Did you put more 
into it, do you think? 
O: It could be, for the reasons I've cited, because we knew that the uphill struggle was a little steeper than in most cases. The elements that we could depend upon, that were hopeful in 
climbing that mountain, were simply not there for the most part. And as I say, Orville would have been aggressive. Otis could actually be reflecting probably a series of Orville 
Freeman visits and you could be accused of acting too aggressively. I'm sure there were those that felt that from time to time, but I think that you'd rather take that gamble--Tape 
1 of 3, Side 2 
O: If Otis felt that there was a greater degree of aggressiveness, if you will, in this instance than perhaps in other efforts with him, I'd accept that, because obviously in many other 
areas there would be no need to be that aggressive with Otis. And perhaps we did cross that line. But you're dealing with five hundred and thirty-five individuals, and you can 
eliminate a number of them up front. Once you did that, you pared down the number of people that you were going to work on or with and accepted the realities of 100 per cent 
opposition on the part of a number of members. You didn't spin your wheels, you accepted that. That left you with X number of people to deal with, which was still a very 
large number. If you reflect back on the southern Democrat-Republican so-called coalition that existed and had been in place for some time, the record shows that you did 
pare back that southern Democratic opposition little by little, and you probably eliminated about a third of that opposition over a period of a couple of years. That was reflected in 
roll calls; more reflected, however, in behind-closed-door activities. But say you add to that the lack of interest or concern for farm legislation on the part of many members, then 
you've got a major problem. 
G: You've discussed the nature of farm legislation, but here did you have to balance the various farm blocs or farm state groups, like the wheat farming, tobacco farming, cotton, 
and all of this? 
O: Yes, that further complicated the whole procedure, though. What was in it for the tobacco farmer? What was in it for the cotton farmer or the wheat farmer? How did they 
fare in terms of the package? And putting all of that together and trying to enlist support, well, it's not any more complex really than some other legislative proposals as you move 
along. 
Our approach to the legislative process was one where we were accused at times of being too soft. Trying to use your continuing day-by-day head count to give you a base 
of expectancy, how much were you going to have to negotiate in order to enact the legislation? The fact is that rarely is a legislative proposal that emanates from the White 
House totally enacted without the change of a word or a comma. And how much of the original proposal was actually in place by the time the President got to either vetoing it or 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --10 
signing it? 
We felt you measure it in terms of a loaf of bread. You went up seeking a full loaf. [If] you returned with an enactment that presented you with a half a loaf or maybe a little 
more, were you going to say, "I refuse to accept that half-loaf," or would you pull up your socks and say, "Okay, that's a half a loaf that we have in the pantry. We'll go back on 
another occasion, the next session or whatever, to seek that half that we missed the first time around." And I don't think there's any other realistic approach to all of this, because 
if you sat there adamantly refusing to accept basically in toto the proposal you had made and you prefer to settle for nothing, then that isn't a very realistic approach. But in the 
process of doing that, of course the administration from time to time was accused by the observers as being too willing to accept partial victories. We didn't look at it that way. 
We knew it was a partial victory, but we also did not foreclose completing the circle at some future time, and that was part of the ongoing, continuing process. 
G: Did defeat on this close vote affect your procedures any? For example, were you more inclined to do last-minute head counts, or check on absentees before a vote, or--? 
O: Well, I don't recall specifics regarding this, but the checking on absentees in the House was much more difficult than in the Senate because of the numbers involved. The effort 
was a major effort on our part. With all the other problems that you were faced with, the assurance that the timing of a vote or the scheduling on the floor would coincide with an 
attendance check-out so that we'd be assured of maximum attendance was all part of this process. And to a great extent you were dependent upon the leadership. If the 
information through the whips as to attendance was accurately compiled and every effort was made to do that, then Rayburn, in his time, McCormack, Albert, et cetera, even whips 
would go to work on individual contacts to ensure attendance. It was difficult and, of course, that got you into pairings and things like that ultimately. But on the Senate side, 
not that it wasn't difficult, because how do you persuade a member to skip some speaking engagement, particularly if it's a fund-raiser or a long-time commitment? And to try to 
develop a schedule that minimizes absenteeism was always haunting us. 
But we had the full cooperation of the leadership in both the House and Senate in that regard, so that contributed to limiting this problem. Also, it wasn't unheard of for 
members to decide to be absent, and no matter what you might say to them, whatever excuse they were going to give for being absent really went to their desire not to be 
recorded. If you were faced with that, you never accused them of that directly. But [if] you had a feeling that was the case, then forget it. That's a loss to you. 
G: But after this vote, was there a specific recap of what you needed to do in order to be successful in the future? 
O: There was always a recap and we had very few losses. You know, as we're talking, the interesting aspect of this is that we didn't lose many roll calls up there, in fact, a handful. 
That's why it was always a shock, because there were very few of them. That would get 
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us into our Monday-morning-quarterback state. We would immediately go over in great detail where we went wrong, what happened and why did we fail. We could do that in 
great detail because those occurrences were very rare. 
On the farm bill, as I say, there were unique aspects to farm legislation. It went to constituencies; it went to looking at those districts, looking at the farm population and its 
locations across the congressional districts, across states, and its potential impact politically, recognizing that you were somewhat more limited in your potential in farm 
legislation than you were in most other legislative proposals, because the area of disinterest was a little broader. And after that defeat, I do recall that we dwelled on it to 
perhaps an inordinate degree, because we considered any defeat devastating. 
G: I'm just wondering what came out of this experience in terms of the evolution of your operation. 
O: I think, again, it's like going through a schedule if you're a sports team. What went wrong? It's almost comparable to looking at the films. You didn't have the films to look 
at, but you sure as the devil had your head counts and records and details as to degree of contact and effort and all the rest to review. And a setback such as that would alert you 
to the fact that you weren't doing the job to the fullest. I don't think it brought about the introduction of new elements of contact and effort, but it certainly brought a great 
sensitivity to utilizing this kit of tools more fully than we had been. 
G: How did President Kennedy react to the vote, do you recall? 
O: I don't recall, no. I don't recall any conversation with him particularly on it. 
G: Now, later that year you won, by almost an equally close vote, the vote in the House on the conference report on the farm bill. 
O: Yes. 
G: And this was a very narrow vote; I think it was 202 to 197, with a lot of late voting and last-minute switches. Do you recall why you were successful there? 
O: Yes. On the conference report you're back in business. Now, what did the conferees decide? What is the package at that time? But there again your goal was enactment. But 
on the conference report, you have the opportunity to go back to fellows that were reluctant or departed the scene or were negative. You've got another dimension there 
because they already, some of them, have a recorded vote. Now they've got a nice balance in the voting record. To persuade them on adoption of the conference report, you 
have a little more elbowroom, and it's reflected in their roll call. And I think if you went over the roll call one by one and went back to the original roll call, you would find that 
there were some conversions. There again, John Smith at that point, who voted against House passage of the farm bill, could, with a degree of comfort, vote for the conference 
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report. 
Now, why? The conference report contains elements that didn't exist in the original proposal. It's been subject to negotiations between the House and Senate 
conferees. There are some things in there that he can latch onto for justification, and he can ultimately come down on the side of adoption. That means that that ten-vote loss on 
the first go-around can be converted into what turned out in that instance to be a very narrow approval of a conference report, because there was just that much elbowroom. 
There's the opportunity for fifteen or twenty possible conversions there. 
G: When a conference committee is shaping the compromise, is it mindful of what it takes in each legislative body to get it to pass, do you think? 
O: I don't think that's overriding, except [among] friendly conferees. But it's compromise, that's what a conference is about. There's an ultimate compromise of some sort. And, of 
course, you're very attentive to the conference. You're leaning on those in the conference that are friendly. You're on the phone a great deal, you can be in the corridors a great 
deal, you can be in members' offices a great deal, working on elements of compromise, whether it's language, whether it's drop this or accept that, quid pro quo. All of that goes 
into play. But in following the legislative proposal, it's just as important to be on top of the conference and the conferees in order to get the best package you can. So it's an 
endless process of communication that started with the initial committees of the House and Senate as this moved through the legislative process. 
But on the conference, you'd have it in mind, and sure, friendly members might say to you, "Well, if we give on this it might be helpful in getting the report adopted." You 
hear a little of that, but you hear pretty strong advocacy. 
G: Was it more difficult for your office to keep track of the legislation when it was in conference, or how would you--? 
O: No, we would focus on the conference. 
G: How would you do that, through the--? 
O: Direct communication with friendly conferees. And actually, now with your resources, you're in a better position than you are generally with the legislative process. Now you 
can focus on a relative handful, and you can focus on the friendly fellows that are going to break their butt for you in conference, and you can work directly with them. You really 
can pare away, phrase by phrase, word by word, section by section, and battle it out. And you're in an awfully good position because your communication is almost minute by 
minute, because it was not unusual for conferees to take a little recess and call us or we'd have somebody in the corridor to talk to them. 
G: To what extent were, say, House conferees bound by the version of legislation as it was 
16
O'Brien --Interview IV --13 
passed in that body? 
O: Well, they feel constrained, obviously; that's the normal approach. But there again, how constrained does a friendly conferee feel? And that fellow that's friendly doesn't have 
great difficulty in edging beyond. You're generally not in bad shape in a conference. You can make some gains. 
I think the minimum wage bill as it finally turned out is an example. You come back to the House and Senate with the conference report, and you can have a conference 
report adopted in the House that may be closer to the bill that was defeated than you would envision. That's all a matter of intensive negotiations. As I said, it's something that 
can be extremely meaningful when that final legislation is evaluated. Even with a defeat, you should make some gains out of a conference. How significant, of course, is 
dependent upon all these things I've said, but there should be a plus factor in that conference. 
G: This carries the process back a step farther, and that is the naming of the conference itself. Tell me how that worked in reality. 
O: There again you're dependent upon the leadership [and the] committee chairman. If the committee chairman is friendly your chances of having a pretty decent representation are 
quite good. He can't jump all over the lot; he can't go to the lower rung of this committee and go past some fellow with seniority who has the desire to be a participant in the 
conference. But he can make an adjustment here and there that can be helpful. But it's not overriding; he can't stack the conference. 
G: He can't do that? 
O: No. 
G: Does it have to reflect basically the vote? 
O: Well, from his point of view, it better be reasonably acceptable or he's in for some problems with his own committee members. But he can make a judgment here and there 
that could give you a little edge. But he can't stack it and say, "Okay, now we're going into the conference; we're going to fix everybody's clock. We're coming out of conference 
with our initial proposal." If you did that, you'd probably be subject to defeat on the floor again anyway. 
You're aware of the designation of conferees, if you're doing your job, the moment the designations are put into effect. 
G: Did your office have any input in suggesting conferees? 
O: We wouldn't be reluctant to, no. But there again it would be informal. 
17
O'Brien --Interview IV --14 
G: Would you usually be successful in this respect? 
O: There again, if you're dealing with the committee chairman, and you could have a little leadership impact in that, the speaker, majority leader and all that communicating with the 
committee chairman, it all could add up to having an impact, yes. 
G: Do you think that conferees would be chosen with the notion that they would support a particular aspect of the measure? In other words having some sort of conditional 
appointment to the committee: "You're being named to the conference, but it's understood that you will help us out on this one." 
O: We would recognize what the expectancy was, the potential of a conferee's involvement in our interests on the basis of our record with him, which has been established through a lot 
of communication, not only the voting record. You may have a fellow in conference with whom you feel fairly comfortable but who opposed you on the record. He may be a little 
help in terms of developing the conference report. You never foreclosed that. How many members are you dealing with that had their feet in concrete in total, complete opposition 
to your proposal? The variations of opposition are always there; the degree of opposition is always there. The constituency problem involving the member must be recognized. So 
in that context, a little grain of additional sand in that glass might be forthcoming on the part of a fellow who was not committed to total opposition to you, even though the 
record shows that he voted against you. 
(Interruption) 
G: Okay, we finished the farm bill. There were some amendments to the Sugar Act in 1962, and here you had a case of lobbying by representatives of foreign governments. Was this a 
problem? 
O: Really, what it came down to, as I recall it, is the basic allocation out there in the Senate that I don't recall having any particular input [on], except in one situation. In talking to 
the President one day, it was brought to his attention that Ireland should have a quota. I never knew the details of it, but he thought he'd like to do something that would be 
helpful, as he put it to me, to a country that never asked for anything and you had no problems with. 
So the key activists in establishing the quota on the refining--that's a good word for sugar, I guess--package were Bob Kerr and Clint Anderson. They were among the 
key ones, in any event, and I met with them in Mike Mansfield's office. I thought I was attending a tennis match, because they were on opposite sides of the table and I was 
sitting between them. They were bouncing back and forth various quota allocations and fairness in distribution. I injected the President's interests in including Ireland in the list for 
quota. I don't remember what the quota was that was suggested, but in any event it was approved and Ireland was included. And that was probably about the extent of my direct 
18
O'Brien --Interview IV --15 
involvement in those negotiations. As for other countries and all the lobbying that was taking place, I don't recall any particular contact with us. It is conceivable that Mike 
Manatos might have had some involvement. 
G: Yes. The percentage for domestic producers was increased also, do you recall--? 
O: I don't recall any specifics, no. 
G: I've always heard that the politics were fairly intense on sugar quotas. 
O: Oh, yes. I don't think that Senators Kerr and Anderson were awfully concerned about what, if any, White House interest there was in a country by country quota. It was more a 
matter of a great pile of sugar and how you are going to allocate it in the number of segments that would bring about what would be considered basically a fair quota 
determination. The only new element that was introduced into it by me was the Irish quota. 
Interestingly enough, I don't recall what the quota was, and I am assuming as I'm talking to you that it was put in place and remained in place. I guess I'd have to check the 
record for that, but I'm pretty sure that's what the ultimate result was. 
G: Did some of the congressmen and senators have a personal interest in one particular quota or another on sugar? 
O: Yes. That wasn't the only conversation I had on the subject, but other conversations that I don't recall specifically were obviously very general. I wasn't negotiating quotas directly 
with them up there. But among themselves they certainly were, and it was very important. I remember that, even in that meeting I referred to, this was an extremely important 
matter to Kerr and Anderson, and they were not alone in that regard. But I don't, as I said, recall that we got into the parceling out particularly. There might have been some 
State Department involvement along the route. 
G: Was Harry Byrd involved in--? 
O: I don't remember. But I should emphasize that this was not the exclusive domain of Kerr and Anderson, but they were in senior positions. They had obviously a personal interest in 
this, and it was clear to me that they had been contacted by any number of sources in the process. 
G: Okay, the Manpower Development and Training Act was a program that was passed this session. Do you recall that? 
O: I recall its passage. You'd have to jog my memory, I think, on any aspects of it. 
G: Let's see, I have a--
19
O'Brien --Interview IV --16 
(Interruption) 
O: The House passed this Manpower Development and Training Act overwhelmingly, and I was interested in noting the vote of 354 to 62. I guess that to some extent the 
overwhelming vote was due to some changes that were adopted, recommended on the Republican side, which really went to state-level contribution to funding and cost. That 
cost-sharing probably contributed to that aspect of it. But it was voice-voted, the conference report, and clearly there was relatively smooth sailing for the proposal 
throughout. I don't recall that there was any overriding problem. Of course, it was subject to amendments, but the President when he signed it called it the most significant 
employment legislation since 1946, and that was probably accurate. But at least it was very significant, because it was a three-year program to rehabilitate unemployed workers, 
which incidentally seems to be a continuing problem. It's never-ending because we are faced with that problem currently. But it was one of the easier tasks that we were faced 
with. I don't recall the Senate action, but it was obviously comparable to the House action in terms of strong bipartisan support, and it was bipartisanly proposed in the first instance. 
G: The Philippine War damage bill was defeated, 171 to 202, in the House; that was a close one. Do you recall that? 
O: No, I don't, really. 
G: Well, there are indications that many of the bill's supporters were confident of its passage but that you were not, that you thought it was going to run into trouble. Apparently there 
was a problem with the tobacco area congressmen, [Harold] Cooley and others. Evidently there was some interrelationship in the tobacco states not supporting this measure and 
something that had happened there in the Philippines. Do you recall--? 
O: No, I don't recall that. I don't think I have any notes on this. 
G: No, I don't think there's anything there. You did have a post-mortem on that one and drew three lessons from it, which I'll quote: 1) a full last-minute whip count, even on 
minor bills; 2) don't allow debate to be separated from the vote; and 3) be more wary of bills left over from a previous administration. So would you focus on those three 
conclusions? 
O: Yes. I suppose when you look at a heavy legislative schedule, there's a tendency probably to place a level of involvement and interest on each legislative proposal on the basis of 
what you construe it to be in terms of importance to the overall package. For example, the New Frontier program. In this instance, I would have a feeling that it fell under that 
category, that there was a late head count, there was a lack of attention, and perhaps when you refer to tobacco interests we probably weren't focusing on that or were totally aware 
of it. But we got derailed where I'm sure we felt we shouldn't have been derailed and that proper attention would have avoided defeat. Again, it's a matter of never foreclosing the 
20
O'Brien --Interview IV --17 
extent of effort you put into every legislative item. If you have several balls in the air, there is the natural tendency to focus on the basis of what you conceive to be the relative 
importance of each measure. 
This would conceivably be in the category of one that we would in the overall picture be considering of lesser importance, therefore, we gave it less attention. But if 
that were the case, and defeat would indicate it was, then clearly we failed to bring into play the various elements of the executive branch that could have functioned in this area. 
Beyond that, I don't recall any specifics. It was one of the rare defeats. I do recall that it did not bring about a great deal of negative press comment, which might be the case with 
another piece of legislation, but it certainly would be of concern to us. Having a defeat of that nature, in a sense, was probably unpardonable, because in the big battles and the 
major struggles you knew that you were in a paper-thin situation at best, and you should have been able to pick up some of the slack on things such as this legislation and not have 
it become a negative in terms of your record. 
But it happened, and I am sure as time went on I like to think that our activities improved and that our programs to bring about enactment were better administered. And 
if you didn't focus on defeat when it occurred, then you were making a terrible mistake, because you should learn some lesson from it. It's bad enough to be defeated; if you 
haven't learned any lessons then that compounds the error. 
G: What was the hazard of separating the debate from the vote? 
O: I think that separating the debate from the vote probably had to do with the broad range of foreign policy to focus exclusively on the legislation, not to have it as a vehicle for a broad 
discussion in other areas. 
Oftentimes you get into discussion and debate and you're up against the subcommittee, committee, Rules Committee [in the] House, and Senate committees. It's 
an involved process. You get to conference, conference reports and what have you to bring about ultimate enactment. If you get it bogged down in not directly related 
discussions and debates, it can lessen the possibility of enactment. And that was always a problem because a great deal of the debate and discussion oftentimes was not directly 
related to the subject at hand. 
For example, on the sugar bill, you not only had this great Senate interest, but you had House interest, you had Harold Cooley and people in key committee positions 
involved. You had the domestic side of it on the allocation and the way the program would evolve. Something involving the Philippines could get into a great discussion back 
to the very beginning of recognition and the current relationship, which is a continuing problem. 
We tried to stay with the basic proposal and not allow it to get unwound. 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --18 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 1 
G: Let's talk about the Communications Satellite Act. This you did discuss to some extent in your book, the phenomenon of having to break a liberal filibuster rather than--O: 
Yes, that was a very interesting experience, and that's in reality what we were doing. We found some of our traditional friends were in an adversarial position. And our advocacy 
did fly in the face of views of our liberal friends--the whole private-sector aspect, independence of operation, lack of what some considered to be essential oversight, giving 
a lot of authority and decision-making to what amounted to be a private entity comparable to a major American corporation. And you know, that just flew in the face of some of our 
friends. 
I can understand, and I understood then, why some of our liberal friends would say that this is really a giveaway to AT& T. This is not a Democratic Party position or a 
liberal position and some of them became very exercised about it. 
G: Kefauver introduced another bill calling for government ownership. 
O: Yes. Well, Estes Kefauver obviously belongs in that group we're talking about--staunch administration supporters who felt that this was an aberration and who would be disposed 
to correct this mistake in judgment and this error that we were attempting to compound. 
G: Did you get involved personally in the battle for cloture on this? 
O: Oh, yes. This, of course, is a good example of working very closely with the leadership and key members. Mansfield's involvement was really total in this. In fact, this caused 
internal conflicts among Democrats in the Senate. One fellow that was particularly incensed and was extremely active in opposition was Wayne Morse. And there were 
moments when Wayne Morse and Mike Mansfield exchanged some pointed comments. It was very unique in the sense that the opposition we were trying to overcome included a 
number of the staunchest supporters of the administration. 
G: Ralph Yarborough was against it, too. 
O: Yes. And of course Morse was a fellow that if he was going to take a position in opposition, you could expect he would be totally involved. 
G: Did the administration consider revising its stand to--? 
O: No. I think any revision of any significant degree would have just altered the whole concept. What could you have done to ameliorate the situation or to tone down the 
opposition of Morse, Yarborough, et al.? You would have to go back to the basic, and that is that it should be a governmental entity and not related to private-sector 
administration. Short of that I don't know whether there was really an area of real 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --19 
potential compromise. You went to the basic thrust of the proposal, and if there's opposition to the basic thrust of the proposal--and that was total opposition--where do 
you compromise? You had to carry it. Once you were in this battle and committed to it, then you had to go the distance, even incurring what you hoped was the temporary enmity 
of some friends. 
G: Now, it seems like the [National Aeronautics and] Space Council had recommended this course, and Lyndon Johnson, as chairman, was involved in that stage. Was he also 
involved in helping advance the legislation? 
O: Yes. He was very much involved, because not only was it an administration proposal, but he had an early involvement through the entity he headed. So it got to the point where he 
considered that he had a personal stake in this. 
You realize that cloture was invoked under those circumstances, and just glancing at a note, it was the first cloture, I think, since 1927. So it was a rather historic occasion 
and, as I say, it had that additional dimension that you were trying to run over some traditional friends. 
G: I believe you mentioned in your book that southerners, many of them had a habit of not voting for cloture, but that you did persuade a number of them to not vote at all. Can you 
recall this effort? 
O: I don't recall the specifics, but that was part of the effort. Those people were quite strong in their support of this concept. But you got to cloture and that was another matter. 
There was an awful lot at stake. If you were going to succeed in invoking cloture, you were altering the course of history significantly, and the southern Democrats for the most 
part were obviously strongly opposed to that. Any efforts that were made in that area generally were efforts to move legislation that they were opposed to, and they 
weren't--some of them--about to participate on the record to invoke cloture, because they would rather be able to point to their historic position regarding cloture at a later date on 
another matter. But if you could adjust the numbers to being it about and some of these people that were very strongly in support of the legislation could avoid having a record or 
breaking, if you will, their record of opposition to this concept of cloture, then that was the route you could travel. 
So, consequently, you had two elements: you had some southern Democrats in strong support of the legislation, but strongly opposed to cloture in principle. Could they 
now be helpful in moving the legislation and still avoid breaking their long record of opposition? That made it tricky. This was extended beyond a normal head count. This 
was really in another category, and it required the involvement of the proponents and the leadership to a great extent. And it wasn't a typical Mike Mansfield approach to get into 
public debate in opposition to some of his own senior party members. Yet he took that on and engaged in this battle directly. Mike always attempted to achieve a consensus and 
avoid these conflicts that might leave scars. In this instance there was only one route to 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --20 
travel. But I think in that context you have to also remember that Wayne Morse was not a member of the team, so to speak, in the Senate. He was--what's the word that's eluding 
me? 
G: Kind of a maverick? 
O: A maverick. Wayne, in the strong positions he took in the discussions--and he debated this matter interminably--wasn't necessarily drawing additional support to the opposition. 
In fact, it probably was lessening that to some extent. So I wouldn't want to suggest that we considered Wayne Morse at that time to be a fellow that had a power structure built 
into the Senate. He didn't; he was a maverick. He didn't bring to himself support because of strong relationships in the Senate. So you were dealing with a maverick and that was 
undoubtedly helpful. 
G: We have the UN bond election that year; there was a deficit of $113 million. I guess the UN, a number of members, hadn't paid their assessments and you also had the fact that the 
UN had had those operations in the Gaza Strip and the Congo. 
O: Well, I think back to that time. There was not a deep commitment to the United Nations in the Congress. There's always that concern that we were paying far beyond our fair 
share. I'm not saying there was some overriding opposition to the United Nations, but certainly there was an attitude in the Congress that we were doing too much, being taken 
for granted, paying far more than our share, and UN results were not very impressive. And, as you point out, we were concerned about some UN activities in that period. 
Adlai Stevenson was deeply involved, and I recall cabinet meetings where Adlai Stevenson was--I don't know I'd call it emotional, but bordering on it--an advocate that 
we should not make waves, that we would be totally committed to the United Nations, that it was not in our interest to cause any ructions, that we should avoid that. And that 
did not impress everybody in the administration. I don't know as it impressed me particularly, sitting there listening. But in any event, I think our approach to this was 
somewhat like our approach to foreign aid--that you couldn't present a case of total justification. But on the other hand, no matter how put upon you might feel, in the final 
analysis you had to go along. 
G: You had another effort to invoke cloture that year, which was unsuccessful, and this was with regard to a bill to bar literacy tests in voting in federal elections. Do you remember 
it? This was something the Justice Department was sponsoring. 
O: Yes. Perhaps we felt we had established the precedent for cloture and that we could carry on in that area. I think you'll find, however, that the Justice Department advocacy was 
strong, and the leadership from the Justice Department was such that an effort was made that probably otherwise would not have been attempted because it was not very realistic. 
But, nevertheless, it was undertaken and we failed. But Bobby Kennedy and Nick [Katzenbach] and the rest of the fellows in Justice felt very, very strongly. 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --21 
G: Do you think they were unrealistic about its chances of passage, or do you think they simply wanted to take it as far as they could in establishing a record? 
O: I don't know. I think it would be unfair to say it was a matter of callously attempting to take it as far as you could to establish a record. The motivation was pure. I think the 
unrealistic part of it was that you could carry it the distance and follow the route of cloture. It just wasn't in the cards, but I don't think that suggests that they didn't make a 
major effort, and I wouldn't suggest that any of us felt that it was unimportant in any sense. It was very significant; it was very meaningful in our view. That view wasn't wide 
enough. 
The Justice Department under Bobby during that period was very aggressive. As we in the White House looked at the departments and the advocacy of legislation, there 
was never anything but an all-out effort expended from Bobby through the top staff level in the department on the Hill in all matters pertaining to the department. Of course, this 
was what we saw, in most instances. But it varied from department to department, depending on the leadership of the department, just how aggressive some departments 
were as related to others. But Justice was right up there at the top in terms of promotion of programs. 
G: Do you think that Kennedy thought that this bill might in fact pass? 
O: Yes. While we were being attacked by the ADA and others for failure to move aggressively in the broad area of civil rights, we were playing around the edges. This 
would be an example of our knowing during that period that we were not as yet in a position to take a real shot at an overall, broad civil rights bill. We were trying to chip 
away, and we tried to do it through departmental actions, executive orders, pieces of legislation that did involve civil rights, and we moved more in that direction while the 
major civil rights struggle was still on the back burner. 
G: How about the effort to establish the Department of Housing and Urban Development, HUD? 
O: Well, that was a major effort. That had a high priority, and it was a full commitment on the part of the administration. 
G: Was it generally known that Robert Weaver was intended as the head? 
O: I don't recall that up front it was. I think that it had become generally known on the Hill before the matter was closed out, and it was of concern to some of the members up there, 
obviously. I think there was some recognition at the outset that this might be a position that would be filled by a black, and I think that had gone beyond an early stage of 
discussion to a feeling that indeed that was the case. If this department was created, that would be what would happen, and in that context Weaver's name came into play. 
25
O'Brien --Interview IV --22 
G: At one point, didn't President Kennedy make an announcement that Weaver was his--? 
O: Well, I believe he did only after it became so widely known that you either made an announcement or you issued a denial, that you couldn't just let it simmer. 
G: You were unsuccessful in the Rules Committee, and there you had two people that normally would have voted with you, [James] Trimble and [Carl] Elliott. Do you recall 
that? 
O: No, and particularly in the case of Elliott I don't recall what his problem was, because Elliott was an early-on supporter. In fact, you'll recall that we leaned on Carl Elliott a 
great deal all the way back to the original Rules fight. So I don't recall what his opposition was. 
G: My note here indicates that because of the reapportionment decision, all the congressmen in his state were having to run at-large, and that--O: 
Yes. That's exactly right. 
G: Do you recall that being a factor? 
O: You're exactly right that Carl had to pull back in his advocacy, and his support of the administration lessened because he was in for a battle for survival. He felt reasonably 
comfortable--he was an awfully solid fellow anyway--with his district in terms of being one of the first southerners to come into observable strong support of the administration. 
But you're right that it came to that point, and it coincided pretty much with this. 
G: Did Elliott demonstrate a similar pullback on other votes as well at this time? 
O: I don't recall that he did. I do recall this, now that my memory has been jogged in terms of the at-large problem, that we had fully understood Elliott's problem, and there was not an 
attempt to pressure Elliott during that period. This fellow had shown his support in so many ways, strong support, that we were anxious that he continue in the Congress. We 
were not going--and that was understood among us--to attempt to twist his arm inordinately under those circumstances, and we had a great deal of sympathy for his 
problem. 
G: My note indicates that Trimble would have voted for you if his vote would have made a difference, but without Elliott you couldn't--O: 
Yes, that was the case. 
G: Was it? 
26
O'Brien --Interview IV --23 
O: Yes. But that's something you take at face value. There were instances where a person would tell you he would vote if his vote made the difference. You accepted that, and I'm 
not suggesting that wouldn't have been the case. But I think we would have felt a little more comfortable if he had just voted, whether it made the difference or not. 
G: Did you have examples where someone said, "I will give you my vote if it will enable it to pass. I don't want to give it to you if you're not going to win with it," and then have them 
turn around and not give it to you if it was pivotal? 
O: That's interesting. That, I think, goes to the heart of the matter in terms of the human element, the professionalism. [With] the understandings that you had, the handshake 
agreements, no record of a commitment, a person could walk away. If the chips were down and this commitment had to be carried out, we always felt very comfortable about 
that. 
It's very interesting to go through those years--and that's a good example--and I should have no doubt that Trimble would have been there. I have no recollection, I'm sure 
the record will show that, of a person going back on his commitment. And that's awfully interesting, when you think of the makeup of the Congress and how representative, really, 
the House of Representatives is in actuality of America as a whole. It runs the spectrum; you have some rogues in there and some dedicated people and a lot of people in between. 
But, you know, it was always understood that a commitment is to be fulfilled and your failure to fulfill it would leave a terrible mark on you that might carry over beyond even 
the administration you made the commitment to--that your word would be in question. And that's the last thing a member wanted to have happen, among his colleagues or in 
dealing with the White House--that his word was not kept. So I have no recollection of anybody going back on his word. 
G: Did the reapportionment decision affect other congressmen as well as Elliott, do you recall? 
O: I think it had a particular effect on Elliott, because Elliott was unique in that delegation. The fact of the matter is, he was generally regarded as the most liberal member of that 
delegation and, therefore, in terms of a statewide contest would be low on the totem pole and have a difficult time. Certainly it didn't apply to a similar degree to anyone else in the 
delegation. 
(Interruption) 
G: Okay, we've got the administration's tax revision proposal, which was an issue both in 1962 and the following year, in 1963. You had the investment tax credit provision and the 
defeat of an administration provision for withholding interest and dividend income at the institution. This was an issue of some controversy. Do you recall that? 
O: Yes. That was very controversial. 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --24 
G: Why was it so controversial? 
O: The normal tendency is to avoid imposing further regulations and rules. In that period it wasn't quite comparable to what occurred in later years. I don't know as it was, for 
example, a matter of widespread concern that there was a great deal of tax cheating, nonreporting, and it took many years after that before rules--in fact, very recent 
rules--started to be put into effect that would provide this information to IRS. I guess many of these recent rules and procedures have been brought about by the computer age. 
The ability to garner this information was pretty much nonexistent at that time. That was a far-reaching proposal. 
G: The opponents included Paul Douglas, [Albert] Gore, [William] Proxmire, Harry Byrd, at least in opposition to the investment tax credit. 
O: Well, this was construed by some of the liberals as a pro-business proposal. It was, and they reacted to it. It was in the form of some sort of a handout to business. 
G: This bill did have both pro-business and--O: 
Yes. 
G: --non-pro-business elements to it, I guess. 
O: Yes, it did, and it was construed to be that. Hopefully it could attract support from a variety of quarters, and in each instance the proposals made economic sense. Good 
government hype in the business sense. 
G: Anything else on this particular bill? How about dealing with the--? 
O: No, the withholding and the investment tax credit were the key. 
G: Anything else on dealing with Harry Byrd here? 
O: No, I don't recall anything specific on Byrd. 
G: Okay. Padre Island National Seashore in Texas was a measure sponsored by Ralph Yarborough. Anything on that? You also had a broader land conservation fund program 
that was proposed that year that you had some trouble with. Do you recall that? 
O: I recall having trouble with it. Beyond that I don't recall. 
G: I think that this was designed to set aside and while it could be purchased at a reasonable price, and one of the sources was the tax from motorboat fuels, and I guess some of the 
marine lobbies were opposed to it. It was also the question of states acquiring their own 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --25 
comparable lands. 
O: Well, of course, you not only had this boat fuel tax, but you also had the Highway Trust Fund concern, and that caused problems, too. 
G: This was something that in later years was successful and expanded significantly. 
O: Yes. Well, there again you were plowing new ground, bringing forcibly to the attention of people what was happening regarding public lands, park systems, the wilderness. The 
interesting thing is that it became more and more a matter of national focus and serious attention, and a lot of things happened while we were still in Washington. It's hard to 
believe that boat taxes and the highway fund would be destructive in terms of invoking meaningful legislation, but I don't think that would be necessarily the case anymore. But 
at that time what you were faced with was the lack of commitment to the concept of preservation. Therefore, these peripheral private-interest areas could have a great impact, 
far less impact in succeeding years, succeeding administrations. You didn't have an army out there charging into Washington to preserve wildlife, parks, wilderness. I don't think 
there was an understanding at that time that gave you a terribly strong lobbying group. You had the traditional lobbying elements, but not a public awareness. 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 2 
O: --effort has always been expended and was expended by us to bring a concept into being. Even if it were not an overly impressive package, you opened the door and you got inside 
the door. And you would build on that, and that was what you had in mind. I think if you had a proposal of this nature and you were talking about land conservation and wilderness 
and you said something to the effect that this was a national program to seize land, for example, and used words of that nature or have some eye-catching title, then Mrs. 
Johnson would be absolutely right. That could be counterproductive. So blandness was an acceptable procedure. 
Actually, your advocacy in areas such as this often extended beyond what you realistically thought could be accomplished. You tried to keep the proposal as broad as 
possible with the idea in mind that the potential for enactment is there. If that should succeed, then you could always build on that later on. 
G: The National Wilderness Preservation System did not pass either that year. Do you recall that? 
O: I recall that we ran into all kinds of problems. I recall nonpassage but I don't recall much beyond that. 
You had in this, too, some deep concerns about presidential power, executive branch power, re congressional power on the decision-making aspects if the legislation 
was enacted. The Congress generally granted authority with reluctance, preserving 
29
O'Brien --Interview IV --26 
elements of oversight or elements of actual decision-making with the Congress. You had to anticipate that because that was natural. You could have the administrative 
responsibility, but you probably wouldn't get all the authority. The Congress would be interested in retaining at least a portion of that authority for its own purposes. So you 
were always flying in the face of that. 
Actually, Wayne Aspinall, who was key in the House, gave up on this at some stage. The opposition was too overwhelming. 
G: President Kennedy also promoted the acquisition of Point Reyes National Seashore in California and Sagamore Hill National Historical Site in New York. Anything of 
legislative interest on either of those? 
O: It was the incorporation of proposals that obviously had met with favor on the part of the members of Congress that were directly affected. It would have been no more than that. 
G: Okay, another area of fairly new legislation was the Drug Amendments of 1962 that increased government supervision of the drug industries to ensure safety and effectiveness 
in both prescription and over-the-counter products. 
O: Well, this was a reaction to a lot of concern in this area. 
G: The thalidomide problem and--O: 
That's right. And that attracted a great deal of attention. It imposed upon the manufacturer reporting procedures and controls that hadn't existed. There was a time 
frame to allow the government to review and make determinations on the use of drugs, and there was drug labeling to have it less complex and more easily understood by the 
consumer. Then there was the research side. It was an all-encompassing proposal that reflected serious problems and a growing public concern in this area. 
It was, frankly, overdue. There hadn't been enough attention directed to this problem, and we tried to put together a proposal that would reassure the public and 
provide much better surveillance, control, and decision-making. The drug industry was in the position of having a pretty free hand at that time, and it was just not in the public 
interest. 
G: Kefauver charged that there had been a secret meeting between HEW staff and staff members of the Judiciary Committee to soften the bill. Do you recall that? 
O: No, I don't recall a meeting. Of course, Kefauver was in the forefront of advocacy and was there long before we were. I think he went back to the prior administration in this 
area in attempting to bring about legislative action. So he was deeply committed. I'm not suggesting he exaggerated the possibility that a meeting took place or what transpired at 
that meeting. I just don't recall ever being privy to any such meeting. 
30
O'Brien --Interview IV --27 
G: On the Senate side, Margaret Chase Smith supported you. 
O: Yes. 
G: She was the only Republican to do so. 
O: Yes. 
G: Do you recall her--? 
O: Her reason for support? 
G: Yes. 
O: No, I don't. I don't know whether she had personal experience that would bring her to that position. She was there, and that was a rarity, for Margaret Chase Smith to be in 
support. And my recollection is that Senator [James] Eastland was probably the leader of the opposition throughout this effort in the Senate. 
G: Did you get a feeling that the drug industry was lobbying--O: 
Oh, sure. 
G: --hard on this one? 
O: Yes. They were very, very much involved. They put the full-court press on. 
G: How did they do that? What specifically--? 
O: They wrote to their friends in the Congress, and their friends oftentimes had business relationships in their district, their states, or drug manufacturers in various states, their 
own national organization. It was a rather strong lobbying effort. But the advantage was clear. The advantage was that the climate was right. It was pretty darn hard for the drug 
industry to make a case that this was undue imposition upon their rights and privileges. There wasn't a national crisis, perhaps, but certainly there was a great deal of attention 
being directed, media attention and general citizen attention, to the drug industry and these problems. So we were in good shape in that regard. The climate being right can be 
very helpful, but generally you can't plan that. The ebb and flow of public concern is to a great extent beyond your control. 
G: Another area that pitted business against the administration was the steel increase that year. Do you remember that? Were you involved in President Kennedy's deliberations on 
how to deal with that issue? 
31
O'Brien --Interview IV --28 
O: Yes. You talk about poor public relations and the occasional, at least, ineptness of big business in its failure to not only recognize the public interest but to defy the public 
interest. That's as good an example as you can cite. To go through intensive management-union problems over an extended period of time, which resulted in really no 
increase in income for the employees, and management then proceeds to raise prices on steel is about as defiant an act and as poorly conceived an act as I can recall. There was a 
very strong White House reaction to all that. 
G: Tell me how President Kennedy reacted to it when--O: 
He was--how best to describe it? He was incensed. And I think that's probably mild. 
G: Really? 
O: Yes. 
G: Were you around him during this time? 
O: Well, yes. The temperature kept going up. 
(Laughter) 
G: Let me ask you to go into this in detail and describe it. 
O: Well, you have to remember this would be the gut reaction of a Jack Kennedy. All he could see was [this happening despite] all his efforts to suggest to business that he wasn't 
anti-business, that he represented all elements of our society, that he had made efforts in a variety of areas to prove that case, and that wasn't because he was trying to kowtow to 
business but he felt that he was the president of all the people. And to have a major industry--and focused on one individual in that industry, really, Roger Blough--and to 
have them defiantly, as Jack Kennedy saw it, upset the economy and have no consideration whatsoever for anyone but themselves. Now there aren't many do-gooders 
around, but I think the way this was done, the dictatorial, arbitrary, defiant, go-to-hell attitude of the industry, just aroused him no end. It concerned him personally, as much as 
it concerned him as president, because he just couldn't envision that people could go that far. And if, by God, he was in any position to do anything about it, he was going to try. 
And I recall that resulted in a confrontation. 
G: Was he surprised that this had happened? 
O: Oh, yes. 
G: He didn't expect it? 
O: He reacted like many of us did at that time: "What kind of characters are these people?" 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --29 
In addition to everything else, it was completely uncalled for. If they wanted evidence of the arrogance of some in our society, you had it in this instance. 
So the presidential concern was obvious. You didn't want steel prices rising at that time. And there was no need to increase them. But on a personal basis he resented the 
attitude and the arrogance of the industry. You had a fellow that was quite exercised about the whole matter. 
G: Had he had a good working relationship with Blough before this, do you recall? 
O: I don't know as you would call it a good working relationship. Blough and his associates were apt to be adversaries. The administration had not shown any anti-business bias, in 
fact, had been very responsible. And that was considered true by many of the leaders of the business community. You had the Business Council, which the President made an 
effort to upgrade and have play a significant role. That all deteriorated as a result of this. 
G: Blough was a member of that. 
O: That's right. It became clear that our effort to work with the business community had been jeopardized. 
G: Were you with Kennedy when he discussed the range of alternatives for response in this instance? 
O: This was a matter of not one single discussion; this sort of permeated the atmosphere. 
G: Well, was he just furious that they had done it? 
O: Yes. I think it was impossible for any of us to come up with a justifiable reason to take an action of this nature under those circumstances at that time. Completely uncalled for. 
G: Yes. He did denounce the action publicly, and did he talk to Blough privately, do you recall? 
O: My recollection is he did. 
G: Can you recall that conversation? 
O: No. My recollection is quite clear that he did. 
G: How did the Congress feel about the hike in the steel prices? 
O: Well, it basically followed the party line. The more liberal members of the Congress reacted pretty much as the White House did. Others didn't react particularly. It just 
followed the pattern that you'd anticipate. 
33
O'Brien --Interview IV --30 
G: Sure. 
O: If you did not have blinders on in terms of recognition of public responsibility or good economic sense, you couldn't find an iota of justification even on the business side, other 
than pure greed. In the Kennedy Administration and later on, despite the sincere efforts of Democratic presidents to take into account all elements of society--and that obviously 
includes the business community--you found that that didn't eliminate rather strong opposition to the party. But you could not with any great confidence just join hands with 
the business community. You always had to remain at arm's length. 
G: Anything on your own advice to President Kennedy on this matter? 
O: No, I don't think there was any need for advice from anybody. 
G: Really? 
O: I think his gut reactions were shared by all of us. 
G: Was this the sort of thing that would get under his craw for a long time, or would it be just a--O: 
Not for a long time, because--G: 
--temporary explosion, or what--? 
O: I think as we go along and we discuss the personality differences between Johnson and Kennedy, as exercised as he became, it was rather typical of Jack Kennedy. The feeling in 
the cold light of another dawn was, "So be it. Let's go on." He did have the capability of becoming quite exercised in any incident which he construed to be unfair press. There 
was an occasion in the days of the [New York] Herald Trib[ une] in which he instructed Pierre Salinger to adopt a policy of avoidance and lack of cooperation. If you knew Jack 
Kennedy well, you wouldn't carry out that mandate, because a few days later if you did carry it out, and he learned of it, he would become exercised again that you would have 
taken him seriously, as that was an explosion of the moment. He did not have the tendency, in my fourteen-year relationship with him, to dwell on a matter that he 
considered unfair. 
With Lyndon Johnson that was not the case. He had comparable experiences, but he had a tendency to retain them in his mind, not to forget quickly and dismiss totally. 
There was a difference between the two men in that regard. Lyndon Johnson at times would react more in sorrow than in anger. Maybe he erupted; he never did in my 
presence. But it would not be unusual for him to bring up the subject at a later date. With Jack Kennedy, the chances were that he would go on to other things and you wouldn't 
hear anything further from him on that particular subject. In this instance I don't recall 
34
O'Brien --Interview IV --31 
that it was a subject of discussion over a long period of time. There was an eruption, there was an action, there was a reaction, and there you are. 
G: What did he say privately, do you recall his words? 
O: No, I don't. I wouldn't deign all these years later to recall his words, but I do have a clear recollection of a fellow that was damn mad. And when Jack Kennedy was damn mad, his 
words could be rather sulfurous. 
G: Nothing else on the congressional attitudes in this regard? 
O: No. 
G: Okay. How about LBJ on this issue, did he get involved in this matter at this time, when he was vice president? 
O: I don't recall, no. 
G: Apparently there was a jurisdictional argument between Carl Hayden and Chairman [Clarence] Cannon over who would call the conference committee meetings with regard 
to the Kennedy budget, and it delayed this budget for about three months. Do you recall that issue, if he did anything to help it along? 
O: No, I don't recall any of the specifics. 
G: Okay, let's see. We've got the Medicare bill that year. Of course 1963 was really the big year; 1962 was the year of that rally in Madison Square Garden. You've discussed that 
and the problem with Wilbur Mills. Do you think that more rallies, perhaps local rallies in key places, would have been more useful in selling this legislation? 
O: As we were commenting a short while ago about the climate being right, you can't anticipate that you don't have that kind of weather reporting facilities. The judgment had 
to be whether this would build a fire under Wilbur Mills. After all, that was the concept of rallies and senior citizen organizations. This was to impress Wilbur Mills, and you had to 
have concern that would be effective. What do you weigh on that scale: a) Mills' position in the Congress; [b)] his overriding importance to you as chairman of the Ways and Means 
Committee? Then you weigh his political status back home, and if you look at Wilbur Mills' district, Wilbur Mills' repeated re-elections to Congress, without any meaningful 
opposition, you're faced with a fellow who is knowledgeable, has been involved in this area and he has pride of authorship in the Kerr-Mills program. 
You've got a heavy weighting of a scale on the side of don't undertake anything that might incur the enmity of Wilbur Mills. The objective is to have him on your side 
someday, and maybe you can bring that about. But can you bring it about with a blockbusting effort that hits him over the head and forces him into a position of having to 
35
O'Brien --Interview IV --32 
acquiesce to your views? Does political reality indicate that is a goal that can be achieved? From my perspective, the legislative perspective, I would weigh the scale 
heavily in that direction. 
You had a large army of senior citizens organized around the country who were totally committed to Medicare. You had political leaders who were wedded, as we were, 
to this proposal and were dedicated to bringing about enactment. 
So I'll have to say that it would reassure our Medicare constituency that we were not floundering and our commitment was total. Hopefully in that process we would not 
incur the enmity of Wilbur Mills or have rallies where people would be standing on their chairs denouncing Mills, that sort of thing. 
It was pretty tricky, and I guess the way it balanced out, the decision was to go with the rallies. Really where it floundered was in the organization. The obvious 
launching would be in New York in Madison Square Garden. It fell of its own weight. Two things happened: it did not have any great impact in public recognition, and it had no 
impact on Wilbur Mills because nothing much occurred that would be brought forcibly to his attention. So it sort of faded out. 
But it was an example of our deep concern, our frustrations, that we weren't moving more rapidly. It took decades to enact Social Security, which was a Democratic 
Party commitment, and it finally was enacted. It didn't do much for me to say repeatedly, "It's as inevitable as tomorrow morning's sunrise. We're going to enact Medicare, come 
hell or high water, while we're here." 
In any event, that aspect of the effort was not very productive. 
G: You by-passed the Rules Committee that year ultimately by having Clint Anderson and Senator [Jacob] Javits add the Medicare rider to a welfare bill. 
O: Yes. 
G: Was this common, to by-pass a committee by using this rider technique? 
O: No, it wasn't common. That effort represented evidence of the commitment of Clint Anderson and a handful of others. With our support the effort was undertaken, because at 
that point there was no other discernible road to travel. 
G: Was it Anderson's idea, do you recall? 
O: It probably was. It depends on which minute you're talking about, who suggested or who reacted. It was a joint procedure, probably initiated, by Anderson. I would suspect that 
we would not have been attempting to urge Anderson to take that action. It would be rather Anderson suggesting that was a role he was prepared to undertake it with our full 
36
O'Brien --Interview IV --33 
support in the process. 
Tape 3 of 3, Side 1 
G: Do you recall any other instances where that was done? 
O: No, I don't. 
G: Do you think that there were other instances where--? 
O: In our time? I don't recall. 
G: What were the hazards of doing it? 
O: Well, there was little loss factor there. Again, the hazard was an obvious one--incurring the enmity of Wilbur. Our judgment was that that wouldn't encourage enmity, that in his 
own way he would appreciate the effort we were making. You were really, let's face it, trying to by-pass him, too. But that was not fraught with any great danger. I think that is 
evidence of our frustration throughout that period. It was thought out, we were all in accord, and the effort was made. 
Throughout this Medicare struggle it has to be recalled that the AMA [American Medical Association] was extremely active and heavily financed. There was a real view in 
the medical profession--it's hard to believe--that enactment would bring about a socialist society and that they would become, as doctors in Great Britain, under the control of 
government. The scare aspect of it as promoted by the AMA and its lobbyists was far-reaching. You would find during that period, in a doctor's office, all kinds of literature 
in opposition to Medicare. This was a tremendous effort. 
As it turned out, it wasn't adverse to the medical profession. You have to recognize that doctors generally speaking are not political activists. They're not that 
involved, they're not that knowledgeable, frankly, about the political process. They can be easily persuaded by their own organizations that this is horrendous. The exaggeration of 
the ultimate impact of this was ludicrous, but there were thousands of doctors across this country that felt otherwise. When you're talking about the Anderson move and talking 
about the rallies and all the rest, we were engaged in one whale of a battle. You had to credit the opposition with a well organized, heavily financed war against it. Obviously 
they had been effective, because they had derailed this proposal for one long time. 
G: You lost by just a few votes. Apparently Jennings Randolph, as you described in your book, was the key to this. 
O: Yes. I know I've described it in the book. There was a great deal of resentment. We reacted very strongly to Jennings Randolph. And as I indicate in my book, we tried to 
respond in kind. So that's evidence of the strong reaction you had. 
37
O'Brien --Interview IV --34 
G: Randolph evidently wanted very badly to have some appropriation for West Virginia, help out some money there. 
O: Yes. 
G: I have a note here that indicates if you could have gotten Randolph to vote with you, you would have gotten Hayden, too. 
O: Yes, that's right. With Carl Hayden there's no question in your mind that he would fulfill such a commitment. At that point, Senator Hayden lived in close proximity to the Senate 
and arrangements were carefully made for transportation of Hayden to the floor, if needed, all with his approval. There were those who suggested afterward that that was an 
exaggeration of the situation, that Randolph's action didn't cause a total disaster because if he had supported us we still were short. And certainly Mike Mansfield was personally 
involved; this was all in place. 
G: What do you think would have happened if Randolph had voted with you? Then it would have gone back to the House, I suppose, in some form. 
O: Yes. 
G: What would have happened then? 
O: I don't know as we would have brought about enactment at that time. I would say the odds did not favor it. 
G: Had you done any study on--? 
O: Not a great deal. That would have been a direct confrontation with Wilbur. Our anticipation was that if we were ever in that position, then we were going to just shower 
Wilbur with everything we could in terms of the high regard we held for him and his opportunity to take a historic action that would benefit millions of Americans then and in 
the future. Wilbur's power in the House was such that until there was a personal willingness to go forward, there was no way it could be accomplished. The House wasn't 
about to fly in the face of the Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. 
G: Okay. 
We've got some education legislation, and the first one I want to ask you about does deal with medical colleges. This was a bill to provide aid for medical school 
education, both in terms of facilities and in terms of scholarships for medical students. 
O: The scholarship aspect of it was the most controversial. And the unavoidable was present, too: church-state. It never was easy. 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --35 
G: I have a note that Judge [Howard] Smith refused to release this bill until the college aid bill was dead, that he just bottled this one up until the other one was defeated. Do you 
recall that? 
O: No, but I'm sure that could well have been the case, because in the college aid proposal you not only had construction aid, you had heavy scholarship potential. And that, of 
course, underscored the church-state problem. While that would not be directly reflected in this program, I'm sure that Smith would not want to have the precedent that favorable 
action be taken. That would seem to me to open the door on overall college aid. Smith's thought process was "I don't want to let this go to favorable action until I'm assured that 
college aid bill is dead." 
G: Apparently the college aid bill was also tied in with the vocational aid, too. 
O: Yes. You know, there were people saying it's an endless series of proposals in the field of education. We're getting sick these proposals hitting us in different directions; it's an 
overload. That was a form of cop-out on the part of some. There was an expression that we were too heavily involved in this area and that we ought to focus our attention on one 
meaningful aspect of it and not be trying to cover the waterfront, which I guess was a valid suggestion, but that wasn't the way we approached it. We had these various 
programs in mind, [they] had been on the drawing board, and our decision was that they called for specific legislative proposals. I think if you got into an omnibus situation, it 
would have just complicated the process further. 
G: Within the House Education and Labor Committee, was there a split with regard to which measure would be brought out first? 
O: I recall it was Jim O'Hara, who was as knowledgeable as anyone on the committee and as committed. There were others. Hugh Carey was on that committee. I don't know about 
a split, but certainly there was a great deal of discussion about what kind of a timetable should be developed and how these items should move out of committee. I don't recall 
the specifics of it, but there was some confusion and concern relative to this. 
G: Okay. Anything else on the education matters that year? 
O: No, I think, as we continued our attempts to move in this area into all levels of education, we had taken a swing at just about everything we could in the field of education. The 
overriding frustration was the obvious one, that you just continued to have elements of church-state. It didn't have the impact it did at the elementary, secondary [levels], but it 
was there. You were also faced with, in trying to peel back opposition, additional opposition which went to basic, fundamental government involvement and encroachment, 
as some saw it, in the field of education. It had some civil rights connotations, at least indirectly, too. It was all part of the mix. 
39
O'Brien --Interview IV --36 
Our areas were the areas of civil rights, Medicare and medical research. We had firm views and strong commitments in all those areas. How to fulfill them was the 
difficulty. And the roadblocks--you could anticipate some of them. I'm sure it was no surprise to us that Judge Smith decided not to allow that rule to come forward until 
college aid was dead. But you'd battle it out on a day-to-day basis. Setbacks, yes. But progress, yes, too. 
G: Was it frustrating to have a bill lingering in a committee throughout the session and then not have it brought forward in time to pass it? 
O: Very much so. 
G: Tell me what you did to get around this problem. 
O: We were very much concerned at all times about the timetable. That was always a subject of discussion with the leadership at every leadership breakfast, with every committee 
chairman. We tried mightily to spring legislation out of committee and Rules, or out of the Senate committees on a timely basis to avoid having it move to another session or to 
another Congress. When you got toward the tail-end of a session--and those sessions were prolonged in just about every year I was around there--they were prolonged in some 
instances through Christmas. That imposed great difficulties. 
There again, cooperation with the leadership was an important element. While we might directly be dealing with the chairman of a committee, the leadership would move 
into it, and that was awfully important to us, to have Rayburn in the early days, McCormack, Albert, call the chairman in, the senior members of the committee, and have 
us meet with them about schedules. Schedules, schedules, schedules. That took as much time and attention as any other aspect of the process. 
G: I guess in the Education and Labor Committee it was even more of a problem with Powell being absent all the time. 
O: Yes. We've discussed Adam. Our friends on the committee would do everything to be helpful. But doing everything they could couldn't get to the point of tying a rope around 
Adam Powell and dragging him into a committee session. That frustrating aspect never ended, because you might have it out of committee and have a rule and you had to be 
concerned about Adam being on the floor. I don't remember the specific bill, but I do recall that there was one, at least, where Adam was not on the floor for debate and O'Hara 
had to take over. 
G: Could you get a bill out of a committee if the chairman was not around? 
O: Oh, it's possible. But it was not in the process. 
G: Did you have a magic date by which time you had to get a bill out of committee in order 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --37 
to get it passed before the end of the session? 
O: If you're asking what we would do if we passed the date whereby it was realistic to get a bill passed before the end of the session and would that mean we would drop our effort to 
get the bill out of the committee, the answer is no. 
G: Really? 
O: Our approach was to keep plowing ahead, even if you reached the point of saying, "Well, we're making this effort, we're on the verge of getting it out of the committee. But if we 
get it out of the committee and get a rule, or we get it out of the Senate committee to get it on the calendar, it's probably not in the offing during this session." That would not deter 
us in our efforts to move it anyway. There's got to be some value in that movement that could be utilized later on. 
G: But generally in terms of the span of time, by what date would you need to have something out of a [committee]? 
O: There really wasn't any specific date, because inevitably, as each session started, the session hardly got moving when people would start talking about when it was going to 
close out. And there were always the projected dates when it would close out. Of course, those are the days when you didn't have the August recess, but you had all kinds of 
informal, unofficial vacation periods--and they still have them, despite the August recess--of Lincoln's Birthday, which meant another week; Easter, which meant another 
week or ten days; Washington's Birthday, which would be another week; Jefferson-Jackson Day dinners, which would be another week; Lincoln Day dinners, which 
is another week. It was just terribly frustrating. So if they'd say, "Well, this session should end by Labor Day," we never sat there anticipating that it would end by Labor 
Day. And you never, therefore, established a calendar and said, "If you don't get a rule on this or get it out of committee and Mike gets it on the calendar by August 1, you have to 
forget it this session." Heck, you could be in that session on New Year's Eve. Those projected dates for closing out a session were never met. 
It was interesting, because there were two elements you have to bear in mind. One, this was all prior to the reorganization in the House--reform in the House. The 
position you were talking about, getting a bill out of a committee without the chairman's approval or presence, the position of a chairman was totally by seniority. He was 
all-powerful. That was what you were faced with. That was the case and remained the case until there was some elements of lessening of power. The unbelievable situation, 
unbelievable to us at that time, finally occurred where a member with the seniority was not chosen by the caucus as chairman of a committee. That was all part of reform. So that's 
an important element to keep in mind as you discuss the legislative process through those years. 
G: Did you often obtain a discharge petition or attempt to obtain one? 
41
O'Brien --Interview IV --38 
O: Oh, there were some attempts. The one that comes to mind that we worked on arduously was in the period of President Johnson, the District of Columbia home rule [bill]. The 
President was deeply involved in that discharge petition. That one comes forcibly to mind. There were obviously other discharge petitions attempted. But the weakness of that 
effort was the obvious one--not only were you trying to secure signatures on a discharge petition, but you were trying to retain signatures on a discharge petition. It wasn't that 
unusual for someone to sign a discharge petition and then at a later date remove his or her name from the petition, so to get the required number of signatures at a given moment 
was a monumental task. 
G: You had a foreign buildings act that year that died when the House and Senate couldn't get together in the closing days of the session. Do you recall that, and did you make an 
effort to get that cleared before--? 
O: Refresh my memory on it now a little bit. 
G: I don't know if I have a note on that one. Okay, you had a welfare reform bill that was an important legislative achievement that year. 
O: An important element of our legislative efforts that year. Of course, this is the one where Abe Ribicoff took the lead and we achieved a solid final result. This is the one where 
someone suggested that maybe it was Bob Kerr [who] slipped a little deal for Jennings Randolph into the bill to compensate him for his vote on Medicare. 
G: Do you think that was accurate? 
O: Probably. We probably had to swallow hard at that time. 
G: One of the big controversial changes was an increase in the federal share of the welfare payments. Do you recall that? 
O: Yes, that's right. Well, you know, along with that we also wanted to tighten the rules and procedures [in order] to lessen abuse. So it was a balanced proposal. We would play a 
greater financial role at the federal level, but by the same token we would try to significantly tighten up the abuse area. That was the balanced approach. 
G: How about the acceleration of public works? Do you recall that? This was a measure designed to boost the economy. 
O: That was the basic idea. At that point, we felt this could be helpful, because the economy was not in great shape. There had been some sagging, and this was a proposal on our part 
to help strengthen it. 
G: I have a note here that says that John Blatnik, who was chairman of Rivers and Harbors 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --39 
subcommittee, was postponing hearings on the omnibus rivers and harbors authorization until after the public works bill was sent to the White House. Was this a common 
development? 
O: Yes. That wouldn't be an uncommon procedure. Again, it reflects the role of a chairman. 
G: Okay, there were some important appointments that year: Byron White to the Supreme Court and Arthur Goldberg to the Supreme Court. Do you recall why those men were 
selected, how they were selected? 
O: Well, "Whizzer" White was very much involved in the Kennedy campaign. He headed a Citizens for Kennedy effort and was part of the team effort in the primaries and the 
convention and the election. He'd become a close associate of all of us and had become socially close to the Kennedy family, particularly Bobby and Ethel. The staunchest 
advocates of the appointment of Whizzer White to the Supreme Court, in my recollection, were Bobby and Ethel. Of course, we were all in accord. I had nothing to do with his 
appointment. It was a Kennedy family appointment. I remember we were all very pleased with it because we held him in very high regard. 
Arthur Goldberg had performed an important role with the administration from the outset. He had acquitted himself well. He had a fine reputation not only in the legal 
community, but he was well thought of by labor. He had therefore broadly based support. I don't recall the ultimate decision on Goldberg other than, as in the case of White, 
Goldberg's appointment was widely applauded. Neither one of them presented any difficulty in confirmation and they were considered appointments of high quality. 
G: Was there anyone else that the President considered as an alternative to either of these two, do you recall? 
O: I don't know. I can't recall anyone that was considered as an alternative to Whizzer White. On Goldberg there might have been others considered, but I don't recall because, 
again, that was an outstanding appointment and widely accepted. Obviously, those that weren't enamored with the appointment of Arthur Goldberg would be those of a 
conservative bent that recognized his liberal tendencies and his pro-labor positions. But neither one of those appointments created any meaningful controversy. 
G: Thurgood Marshall was appointed to the Second Circuit. This was after a recess appointment in 1961. Do you recall this move and the significance of it? 
O: The significance was apparent. There again, I think the President had the luxury of having a potential appointee in that position who was extremely well regarded and had achieved a 
national reputation. Consequently, there again, it would have been very difficult to register any significant opposition to Marshall's appointment. 
G: Some of the southerners opposed him. 
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O'Brien --Interview IV --40 
O: Yes. I mean other than the obvious. 
G: Was this an effort to get him in line for a Supreme Court appointment, do you think? 
O: Not to my knowledge. If it was, I was unaware of it. I think it certainly was part of the effort to bring recognition to blacks at a high level of government. That was an effort that 
was part of our commitment. 
G: You had three other appointments of some interest: John McCone as CIA director. McCone had refused to divest himself of a million dollars in Standard Oil stock. Do you 
recall that? 
O: Other than that controversial aspect of it, no. 
G: Matt [Matthew] McCloskey as ambassador to Ireland, do you remember that? 
O: Yes, I remember that because Matt had been treasurer of the Democratic National Committee and the campaign. He had been an early staunch supporter of Kennedy. He 
was of Irish heritage. He had achieved great success in the private sector, had developed a major construction company in Philadelphia and expressed a willingness to serve as 
ambassador. We thought that it was an ideal appointment. There again, I don't recall anyone registering any unusual objections to it. 
G: How about [J.] Lindsay Almond to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals? 
O: I have no recollection of that appointment. 
G: Okay. We also had the Billie Sol Estes case breaking that year. 
O: Yes. 
G: You've got something there on that. 
Tape 3 of 3, Side 2 
O: Billie Sol Estes and the problems attendant to him became a matter of great controversy, raging controversy I guess you could call it, and had attracted the attention of committees 
of both the House and Senate. It was focused on by John McClellan in depth. There were all kinds of accusations. There were attempts to tie Estes to Lyndon Johnson. There was 
the feeling that these hearings brought about the ultimate defeat of a couple of senators [congressmen], [H. Carl] Andersen of Minnesota and [J. T.] Rutherford of Texas. Orville 
Freeman came under fire. Freeman had appointed him to some advisory committee even after some of the charges had been explored. The whole thing took up a great deal of 
time and brought a lot of attention. There was the suggestion that there might have been a 
44
O'Brien --Interview IV --41 
death [murder?] involved that McClellan dwelled on. All this added up to a lot of media attention. And while neither committee came to any final specifics on their investigations 
to prove, or disprove for that matter, a lot of the theories and a lot of the accusations, it was a matter of great interest. And it was not very helpful in terms of the administration. 
This is in 1962. Of course, there were subsequent activities involving Estes at a later date, but at that time it was a media feast. 
G: Did you ever meet Estes? 
O: No. I never did. 
G: What was President Kennedy's attitude toward this situation? 
O: I don't recall ever having any discussion with him regarding Estes. It really didn't fall into my area. Pretty much what occurred concerning Estes through that period was a matter 
that I too read about and heard about rather than having any direct information. I certainly received no guidance in terms of the committees or anything else; this was 
completely out of our area. 
G: Did you have an indication of how Lyndon Johnson was tied into this, to what extent? 
O: No. And I'm sure I never had any discussion with the Vice President on this subject. 
G: Do you think LBJ was concerned about it? 
O: I just don't know. 
G: Some people have said subsequently that this was one of the things that made him vulnerable to the administration, the fact that he was tied into it, if only marginally. 
O: "Vulnerable" meaning that the President was concerned about his possible relationship with Estes? 
G: Right. 
O: I have no awareness of it. It certainly never came to my attention if, indeed, the President did have that view. 
G: Anything on Jerry Holleman's resignation here? 
O: No, other than the fact that he acknowledged receipt of some kind of a contribution or payment by Estes and resigned. That's all that I was aware of. 
G: Anything else on the Estes [case]? 
45
O'Brien --Interview IV --42 
O: No. As I say, that phase of Billie Sol Estes, and indeed subsequent phases, I had no direct or even indirect involvement with that I can recall. I never met the man and it was out of 
my range. 
G: You were on the political side as well as the congressional side. How do you screen out someone like Estes who is making a lot of contributions and trying to establish friends in 
the administration? 
O: I not only did not know Estes, I was not even aware of his contributions. Estes never came to my attention during the campaign or subsequently. What motivated Orville 
Freeman to designate him as a member of this advisory committee or who recommended him to Orville, I have no awareness of. I would say that if this fellow and some of the 
activities had been known to me, I would certainly have been very leery of involving Estes in the administration. But I can say that by virtue of knowledge that I acquired at a later 
date. The chances are if Estes' name had been presented with background that indicated he had agricultural expertise and there was an opening in that area and he was a significant 
contributor to the party, I think those would all be matters that you would look at in a favorable light at the time under the circumstances. 
G: It does seem to have been somewhat easy to acquire inscribed photographs and warm letters of thank you--O: 
Oh, that's easy. The photographs particularly are easy. I always thought that there was too great a tendency on the part of public figures to distribute their photographs with 
personalized remarks. The use of those photographs can be potentially devastating, depending on the circumstances, I guess. I always thought that it was too free and easy to 
respond to a constituent who requested the photograph and inscribe "To Joe, with warm"--and I've done this myself--" warm personal regards" and sign your name to it. [If] 
it winds up on the wall somewhere for the scrutiny of somebody that the constituent is dealing with, it can certainly be misinterpreted. We found it to be the case with 
correspondence generally. 
That can be [true] at, I guess, the congressional or any political level, but certainly at the presidential level it can have particular sensitivity and calls for great caution. The 
way we proceeded with a great deal of the White House mail was by use of autopen and acknowledging receipt of letters that would be supposedly referred to the President's 
attention at some time and [thus] avoid the presidential signature. And the presidential signature as an actual signature was rare. That's not done necessarily to have somebody, 
like Estes apparently, utilize anything and everything by way of presenting himself. It was partially the problem of maintaining communication where you have massive amounts of 
mail, and secondly, having in mind the sensitivity of misuse of acknowledgements of letters or photographs or autographs. 
So if you're saying that Estes accumulated a fair amount of this material, he's not the only one I've ever heard of who did that. I've been in offices where it astounded me to 
46
O'Brien --Interview IV --43 
find the walls replete with autographed photographs that would make you wonder whether the person sitting behind the desk really had that intimate an acquaintance with all 
those people or whether it was a matter of active solicitation. I have always refrained from having photographs of public figures on my wall. 
G: Do you think that there was an attempt after Estes to tighten up on this and check out people? 
O: I don't recall. Where we were directly engaged--by "we" I'm talking about Dick Maguire and Ken O'Donnell and there were others who had some role or involvement in this 
general process--we tried to be sure of the facts before we got involved with any individual or got involved to the point where we were suggesting the individual be 
considered for a position in the administration. That's a very sensitive area and you wanted to be awfully sure that you had done a good job in that regard. 
G: Let me ask you about the 1962 congressional elections. 
O: I think that as we approached those elections, with the significant loss in 1960 and our efforts in 1961 and 1962 to establish communications and associations and friendships on 
the Hill as part of the legislative process, we were not looking forward to the off-year elections with any great anticipation, because we all recognized the historic record that 
incumbent administrations suffer losses in off-year midterm elections. We made a great effort through the [Democratic] National Committee, in association with House and 
Senate campaign committees, to be helpful to friendly members seeking re-election or friendly candidates seeking to oust unfriendly members. 
Our role in that regard was to a great extent the role of providing, where we could, visible support. There were occasions when that would mean direct presidential support 
of a candidate. There was the effort to provide the candidate with all the background and material we could that might be helpful to him in promoting his candidacy. There was the 
assignment of any number of members of the administration to functions in states and congressional districts across the country which might be helpful to the candidate. There 
was the attempt to come up with highly visible speakers at the candidate's fund-raising functions back home. There was a good deal of that, and we tried to orchestrate it, 
organize it and implement it to the best of our ability. 
We did not have any significant funding for all of this. What we had to offer was to do everything we could as an administration to be helpful in every conceivable way. 
We received innumerable requests of that nature, and we tried to acknowledge all of those requests to the best of our ability. With all of that, we looked toward the election with 
some trepidation, because if it was going to follow the historic path, we could darn well be back to where we were before the Rules fight. 
So that brought us to election day, which was another work day for us in the White House and for the President. But, obviously, we were anxiously awaiting our fate 
47
O'Brien --Interview IV --44 
as an administration. The first returns came in from Kentucky, and a friendly congressman in the Kentucky delegation was defeated. I believe it was [Frank] Burke. That was a real 
cold shower, because he was an excellent representative--very bright, very able, very progressive, and very supportive of the President. That was the first news we had of that 
election that night. I went into the President's office and advised him of the defeat. There was about an hour's lapse, because Kentucky had an early closing. Those were the first 
results you'd get around the country. The President shared my concerns, saying, "This is a bad start. This would indicate we may be in for a long and very troubling night." That 
didn't turn out to be the case actually. When the smoke settled and everything was reported, I believe we did suffer a very minimal loss, perhaps four or five, which we 
accepted. We had been fearful throughout that it would be a greater loss than that. So we found ourselves in approximately the same position we had been in over the first two years 
going into the next Congress. I think there were some slight adjustments that would indicate we might have a slight overall gain by analyzing and evaluating the switch in 
membership in the House. But there was nothing to give us great comfort that we had achieved any elbowroom that hadn't existed. Nor was there anything by way of a setback 
that made us feel we were out of business. 
G: Yes. I think the GOP picked up two seats in the House and there were four additional Democrats in the Senate or something like that. 
O: Yes. It was a wash from our perspective. We didn't suffer a loss and we didn't have any significant gain, and in the face of the normal off-year situation we fared okay. 
G: Did President Kennedy participate in some of the primary races where Democratic incumbents had been helpful to the administration? 
O: Regarding his participation directly in the congressional district or within the state, there was some of that, but I must say that I'd have to go back and check records. As to 
general participation, the answer is yes. We did a film, and my recollection is that each member could participate with the President and do a quick film that could be utilized 
back home. We also developed statements to be utilized by the candidate in his printed material. We did everything that you could imagine that was available for us to do. The 
direct presidential participation was limited, but there was some. I don't recall specifically just where he went and what appearances he made. The first year he did go to New Jersey 
in support of [Richard] Hughes, who was the candidate for governor. That was an election in 1961. He was in Connecticut in support of Abe Ribicoff, and there were other 
trips, but I'd have to go back over his schedule in order to refresh my memory on those. 
But, in summation, whatever was available to us by way of advocacy and support was not only freely given, it was brought to the candidates across the country. And the 
President's willingness to participate to the fullest [degree] possible in support of our friends in and out of the Congress--potential friends if they could oust incumbents--was all 
done, and it was done on a reasonably organized basis. 
48
O'Brien --Interview IV --45 
G: Where did you draw the line in deciding whether or not to support an incumbent? 
O: You would not decide not to support an incumbent unless there was something overriding, and I'd like to cite an example but I'd have difficulty because an incumbent was 
an incumbent with a D next to his name almost regardless of his record of support. First of all, an incumbent who had been nonsupportive was not interested in taking your 
suggestions in his re-election campaign. Now, a person who at times might have frustrated you, disappointed you, but [who] had an interest and felt it was a plus for him to 
have publicized presidential support, that was given to him. We always figured that if he came back he'd do better the next time around. 
G: Did this ever put you in the position, though, of supporting sort of an old-guard Democrat against a reformer or someone that you might have found more to your liking on issues? 
O: No, we'd take an old-guard Democrat as against a Republican. 
G: Well, now I'm talking about a primary here. 
O: Well, we had no involvement in the primaries that I recall. I don't think there was an incident of a really heavily contested primary involving an incumbent that was brought to 
our attention. There might have been an isolated instance. But when you recognize that [of] the four hundred and thirty-five members of the House, a realistic appraisal of election 
prospects will bring you clearly to no more than and probably a little less than one hundred contested congressional districts. That's where all the focus is. It is extremely difficult, 
bordering on the impossible, to oust an incumbent in a party primary. I would say in just about every instance of a contested election there was an urgent request for presidential 
support, because those that didn't care about presidential support probably didn't have any contested election in any event. They would be conservative to ultraconservative southern 
Democrats who would prefer the President not say anything favorable about them. So, therefore, you weren't really in any difficult situation in making judgments and decisions. 
But it's of interest, I think, that an analysis of the House of Representatives in elections every two years over the last probably several decades, certainly over the last 
two or three when I became directly involved in national politics, shows the contested districts you have to reach to say, "All right, here are the hundred districts we're going to 
focus on, up or down, in or out." In other words, it shows whether you could oust the Republican incumbent or whether the Democratic incumbent was in for a difficult fight to 
survive. So that's where you are. In the Senate, it can differ, and, of course, in the Senate only one-third of the senators are up for re-election every two years. So to be of help isn't 
that difficult because your area of focus is considerably narrowed. You're talking about a maximum of thirty-three senators, and probably ten of those [are] in a meaningful contest 
either way, to oust or to re-elect. You're talking about a hundred congressional seats either way, to oust or re-elect. That's why when you get a loss in an off-year--an 
incumbent administration loses a significant number of seats in the House--you've lost those seats out of a hundred. That's some turn-around because if you lose twenty or thirty 
49
O'Brien --Interview IV --46 
seats, you've turned around a third of the contested seats. 
G: One of the senators elected that year was the President's brother. Let me ask you to recount what you know about his candidacy and how it evolved and your role. 
O: I didn't have any meaningful role, but I followed it with interest and had one discussion with the President at a very early stage. 
G: Can you recall that discussion? 
O: Yes, early on when there was some comment or some indications that Teddy was going to seek a Senate seat, the President did discuss it with me quite briefly, but he expressed a 
concern. His concern went to the obvious. First of all, Teddy was very young; he was just at the age where he would comply with the constitutional provision on age in the 
Senate. If he ran, he was going to get into a hotly contested primary with John McCormack's nephew, and here we go again. The President had no objection to Teddy 
pursuing a public career. He considered that a rather natural evolvement. But he did wonder aloud if maybe Teddy shouldn't consider running for a state office in 
Massachusetts, secretary of state or state treasurer, whatever, as a starting point rather than the giant leap effort into the Senate. He suggested to me that perhaps I should have a 
chat with Teddy and explore that aspect. I dutifully listened and departed the scene and made up my mind before I closed the door that I wasn't about to discuss this with Teddy. 
This was a family matter pure and simple and I didn't feel that I should inject myself in it, and I didn't. 
The result of it all was, of course, that Teddy did get into a hot primary contest with Eddie McCormack. As that unfolded, the President became a very, very staunch 
advocate and followed it very closely and, typical of the family, hoped for a victory and forgot, I'm sure, any concerns he might have had about launching in the first place. 
Teddy was, of course, successful and he came to the Senate with an initial problem of acceptance because of the circumstances entailed in his election and his relationship 
with the President. Teddy, to his credit, did everything possible, one-on-one throughout the Senate, to present himself, to become acquainted, and to seek acceptance. And he did 
it. I wasn't present at these meetings, but he devoted just about every waking minute until time to take his seat in the Senate to making these contacts, establishing these 
relationships, having these conversations, social visits and what have you, with every member of the Senate, with, of course, emphasis on the Democrats. In no time at all, 
interestingly enough, I would pick up from the Senate very favorable reactions to Teddy and a broad base of acceptance. I think it was due really to his own personal effort to 
become an accepted member. It certainly was helpful to him and to his future in the Senate. 
G: Did you have any role in the campaign at all? 
50
O'Brien --Interview IV --47 
O: No. 
G: Did President Kennedy fear that it might alienate McCormack? 
O: I don't think that probably was a fear [after] our experience with McCormack off the prior confrontation we had over the state chairmanship of the Democratic Party in 
Massachusetts. John McCormack's reaction to all that and his attitude concerning it was so upbeat and so pleasing to all of us that we would anticipate he would not react any 
differently in this instance, and there wasn't any differing reaction. These two young fellows just went and fought it out. One of the great lines from that primary was [from] 
one of the debates when Eddie McCormack said to Teddy Kennedy, "Your name is Edward Moore Kennedy. If your name was Edward Moore you wouldn't be here 
tonight." I guess that was quite accurate. 
G: It seemed that the White House likened its role in that campaign to the sending of advisers to Indochina. Had you heard that expression? 
O: No, I hadn't heard that expression, but I could tell you there wasn't any even arm's length involvement on the part of the White House. 
G: Really? 
O: Not to my knowledge. 
G: Okay. Is that the way that Ted Kennedy wanted it? Would he have appreciated some [help]? 
O: Oh, I don't know. I was not party to any discussion of this nature, but it's just stating the obvious--there should not be a discernible presidential role in the election because that 
would certainly border on, if not bring about, a counterproductive situation. 
G: Now, was there also a voter registration campaign tied in with the 1962 congressional elections? 
O: Yes. We put together what we considered a major effort that was in cooperation with COPE and others. The problem of the party historically, to go right to the heart of it, is 
voter registration and voter turn-out. Overridingly the majority party in this country for a long period of time [was] the Democratic Party, and you lost impact if you didn't maintain 
a vigorous voter registration drive. The problem with the voter registration drive is it just has to be grass-roots to have an impact. The most impressive voter registration that I ever 
saw in the country in my political years was in Philadelphia where the Democratic city committee conducted a registration drive that went on every day of the year. It was 
budgeted, financed, professionally handled, and the end result was obvious. That was the best organized voter registration I had seen anywhere in the country, to this day. And it 
has to be grass-roots because it is probably the least interesting aspect of politics. It's 
51
O'Brien --Interview IV --48 
grubby work; there's nothing exciting or glamorous about it at all, but it's vital. That, coupled with maximizing your voter turn-out, is the answer to victory more often than 
not. 
Of course, that was part of my upbringing from the very first stages: how do you show strength and achieve results if you can't involve people in the election process? In 
order to do that you just have to go out and work at it one-on-one, door-to-door, not only to get them registered but to get them to vote. So there's always an effort undertaken, and 
the O'Brien manual from its beginning emphasized voter registration. But the reality of voter registration is manpower and willingness to do grubby, detailed, nonglamorous 
work, and the ability of people to direct that kind of work and enlist people to do it. 
So it's never something that you feel that you fully accomplish. There's always a big gap between objectives and goals and the reality of accomplishment, and that remains 
the case to this day. That's why really at the national level on voter registration, your efforts are to lessen the restrictions on registration, make it easier to register, like 
post-card registration, which have always been Democratic Party advocacies and always been opposed by the Republicans for the obvious reasons. So any attempt--and we were 
engaged in many of them over the years politically--to increase voter registration was conducted vigorously at the local level and continues to be, I'm sure. 
So the answer is that we were involved in all elections--and that would include 1962--in voter registration efforts, but for the most part at the national level. The 
Democratic National Committee was to provide programs and ideas and try to persuade people to initiate or enlist them in carrying out programs of this nature at the local level. 
End of Tape 3 of 3 and Interview IV 
52
    [ Part 5: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--51 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview V*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW V 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview V, 12/ 5/ 85, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
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(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
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(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-16 
4
O'Brien --Interview V --1 
INTERVIEW V 
DATE: December 5, 1985 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 1 
G: Okay, I want to start with some miscellaneous topics to finish up 1962. 
O: All right. 
G: Let me ask you first about the John Glenn space flight. Anything on that from your perspective that you recall? 
O: Not from any direct involvement, but I was intrigued with the reaction of the President, Jack Kennedy. The pride as president that finally we'd accomplished something in our 
quest to move up to the Russians and his personal reaction was one of great excitement. 
The result of that was John Glenn became a personal friend and was involved with Bobby and Ethel [Kennedy] socially. When John was initially seeking office, it coincided 
with a period when I was [Democratic national] chairman, and he came to me to talk about the role of the Democratic National Committee. I had to advise John there was no 
financial support; we had no resources for that. That was a surprise to him. 
Over a period of time we became well acquainted. I toured the state and John toured with me. John was very disappointed that he had not received strong support from 
the Kennedys in this quest. It surprised him; it disturbed him. I felt that there was a degree of political naiveness being shown by John at that stage of his career. He had, 
from his space period to his political launching, been successful in the private sector. But he presumed that friendship and association automatically brought political support and he 
didn't seem to understand that there are political conflicts, that Kennedys are oftentimes caught in situations where there are others seeking a nomination, where there are other 
interests. And there has always been a reluctance on the part of the Kennedys to step directly into the campaigns of others. Perhaps these people exaggerated what value there 
would be in it, in the first instance, and secondly, if you become deeply involved with one, you must become deeply involved with others. All of that was understood by me but not 
by John. 
G: Was this primarily with regard to a primary? 
5
O'Brien --Interview V --2 
O: Yes, it was in the primary, as I recall. The fact is that the Kennedys generally and the President specifically became very much enamored with John. He was very much a hero 
to them. Whizzer White had an outstanding background as a scholar and as an athlete, and that was the kind of style the Kennedys admired, the hero thing. I think that was part 
of the quick and ready acceptance of Whizzer into the inner social circle, and with John Glenn even more so, obviously. So he became very much a part of their social life. 
G: Were you around the President at the time of the space mission? 
O: Yes, I was, but I don't have any specific recollections. It was a big moment for the President. The President was very much concerned about what he construed to be our 
failure to recognize the realities of the future in space and that we had been derelict in that regard. And of course there was the other element, too; he resented the fact that the 
Russians had made the progress they had made. 
G: Did these successes in the space program help you on Capitol Hill in terms of selling the NASA budget? 
O: It was of help. Could you measure it? I couldn't measure it, but it was, because there was a change of attitude. An upbeat situation was created and it was to a considerable extent 
because of Glenn, and that was helpful in general. The success of this particular venture was a contributing factor to creating a better atmosphere. The foot-dragging aspect 
seemed to lessen to a degree. 
G: LBJ was accused of grandstanding for publicity during Glenn's subsequent trip to New York and the ticker tape parade. 
O: Yes. 
G: Do you have any thoughts on that? 
O: Oh, I don't know. I remember that he was--I don't think that was the only time he was accused of grandstanding. He had a style and a flair that lent itself to critics' fault finding. 
I think there was an occasion when he visited the Pope in which some people criticized his approach to the visit or the gift. But that was his style, and I don't think Lyndon 
Johnson ever was reluctant to envision where the camera locations were and he had a way of moving front and center. It came naturally to him. I could see nothing wrong in it. He 
wasn't alone in that regard in the world of politics by a long shot. 
G: The White House did not resent his efforts to--? 
O: No. If there was any resentment I never heard it, and I have a feeling that I would have picked that up. As I've mentioned before, whatever the motivation, Kennedy was totally 
committed to ensuring Johnson's involvement in all phases of activity--as I pointed out an incident where he wasn't present at a meeting, and there had been a failure to notify him 
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O'Brien --Interview V --3 
and the President was very disturbed about it and gave orders to all of us that this could never happen again. I don't know whether Lyndon Johnson felt that he was totally 
involved. I never had those kinds of conversations with him. But his assignments often were basically--it's true today [of] the role of the vice president: you do some foreign 
travel; you are the number-two fellow that fills in the gaps, you're called upon by the president to engage in a lot of activities, including membership on various committees and 
commissions. Some of it I imagine isn't awfully exciting or indeed pleasant at times, but that's some of the--it's a terrible way to describe it--somewhat grubby tasks that a vice 
president is charged with. 
And Johnson had always been number one. As majority leader he came across as number one, and whether number two was something he accustomed or adjusted himself 
to, I don't know. But I do know the President's view regarding the Vice President and what his role was to be. And it came out later, after Dallas. Some of those resentments 
on the part of some of the Kennedy people toward Johnson probably didn't exist, or if they did, were kept close to the vest. My close associates, some of whom resented Johnson 
after Dallas, were rather negative about him. I don't recall them having that attitude [before], or if they did, they didn't express it when he was vice president. 
It's hard for me to determine, because I had a difficult time--I've discussed it before and it will probably crop up from time to time--following Dallas. I had to cope with some 
strong views on the part of close associates which, in my judgment, really made no sense. There was no ground for some of the attitudes and some of the views expressed. It went 
on for a period of time. It was bothersome, because I on the one hand wanted to retain these friendships and long-time associations. On the other hand, I felt a sense of 
responsibility. However, if you're feeling that way and you're not comfortable, then get out. Hell, there was nothing to lock you into having to go through with something that 
was bothersome to you. 
But in the vice presidential period, as I've said repeatedly, my personal association with the Vice President was a pleasant one without any rancor or difficulty. In fact, my 
association with him as president was similar. But what he might have inwardly thought about his role or about us, I have no idea. 
I read with interest an excerpt you have of a conversation that he had with Ted Sorensen, and my impression of that--I glanced at it last evening--was [it was] an attempt 
on the part of Johnson to place on the record his concerns about the lack of progress legislatively. I thought it was a very interesting document because there wasn't one 
complete sentence uttered by Sorensen throughout. It comes across to me as a calculated move on the part of LBJ to place on the record his views and his willingness to cooperate, 
and his feeling that perhaps he isn't being fully utilized. There was a series of statements which sounded to me as though Ted wasn't afforded an opportunity to make any 
comment. 
G: Was that typical of a conversation with LBJ during that period? 
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O'Brien --Interview V --4 
O: Not that I ever had with him, no. 
G: He didn't tend to--? 
O: And interestingly enough to me, I think much of what he was saying to Sorensen should have been directed to me. Some of the area of that discussion really was an area in which 
he and I should have had the discussion. But I never had that kind of a conversation with Lyndon Johnson. We had any number of conversations, obviously, over the years, but I 
don't recall anything like that, and I have to assume that conversation was held in his office because it was recorded. 
G: It was a telephone conversation. 
O: Oh, was it? Yes, I noted that. Anyway. . . . 
So what hit me is that perhaps during that period, unknown to me, he was concerned about his role and concerned about the Kennedy people not treating him 
properly. I don't know. 
G: He does seem to have been restive. 
O: Yes, he was restive. As we have said before, he was troubled by the attitude in the Senate at the outset. It left him with a nonrole up there, and yet he had clearly decided to have 
his base of operation continue on the Hill, his vice presidential office. That would be his main headquarters. As time went on, it just wasn't working out. 
G: I wanted to ask you to talk for a moment about his role as chairman of the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. This was a situation where apparently his 
budget was drawn from various departments and agencies, rather than an appropriation from the Congress. 
(Interruption) 
Okay, we were talking about the President's Commission on Equal Employment Opportunity and specifically the nature of funding for that operation, since it didn't go 
through the appropriation process. Was this a source of irritation to southern members of the Senate and the House? 
O: To some degree, as I recall, yes. It was a unique procedure. It was doing an end run. I don't think it affected us particularly or deterred us, but there were some expressions of a 
negative nature. I would think that Lyndon Johnson in that kind of a role would find it challenging and interesting. I was always impressed with his obvious sincere commitment 
to equality, and I guess people thought back to his youth, his experiences during the Depression, and would understand his commitment. There was always a tendency on the 
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O'Brien --Interview V --5 
part of many liberals to question Johnson's commitment to civil rights. Yet every action he took during my years with him, every effort he expended, and every word he ever 
uttered, even with just the two of us, clearly underscored his total commitment in that area. It used to be a little bothersome to me, frankly, to have people question it. I 
remember, for example, in the District of Columbia home rule discharge petition effort, that Joe Rauh and other ADAers gave up that fight on the Hill, and I could understand it. 
They had worked it over and couldn't get to the necessary number of names and finally threw up their hands. Lyndon Johnson didn't throw up his hands and, to the utter 
amazement of Rauh and his cohorts, put it across the line. And it was his personal effort that brought that about. 
G: What did he do specifically? 
O: I followed the usual procedure in all legislative struggles. You worked on a discharge petition as you would a head count, and you made efforts to secure signatures on the 
petition just as you would try to secure votes. Somehow or other we couldn't get there and I would always avoid direct presidential intervention until there was no other 
alternative, following the policy of husbanding the President's time and effort so that it would always have an impact and not become just a widely accepted, day-to-day situation 
on the Hill. So I finally had my list of twenty-two--I believe that was the number--members who should be on that petition and weren't. And typical of that list was 
a woman named Edna Kelly, who was a congresswoman from New York. She hadn't signed. And it was a carefully put together list. These were twenty-two who, if this were 
a liberal legislative proposal, you would fully expect to be supportive, but in this instance there was an avoidance, for whatever reasons. 
I happened to be in the outer office [to] the Oval Office, talking about things generally, and I mentioned that we had found liberal friends were sort of throwing in the 
towel and yet we had these twenty-two targets that we were still working on. He wanted to know who the twenty-two were, so I pulled it out of the inside pocket of my jacket and 
showed it to him. He promptly called the White House operator, the names were all given and the directive was to get them on the phone promptly wherever they could locate them. 
I don't know whether he went through the whole twenty-two, but I suspect he did, because he had gone through half a dozen. He was frustrated because this was in the 
evening, it was difficult to locate some of them. I remember Edna Kelly particularly, because with Edna there was no way that she was ever going to avoid signing that petition 
once he had her on the phone. There was a rather lengthy conversation with all the pleas that Johnson could make and all the cajoling. 
But that was kind of effort the President of the United States was expending on a discharge petition involving home rule for the District of Columbia when he should have 
been over in the living quarters having dinner. But it underscored, to me, once again his commitment in this area. This wasn't civil rights but it had all the elements of it, 
obviously. So there was no question about his commitment. I felt very strongly about that over the years, because I think to this day there are people that would suggest 
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O'Brien --Interview V --6 
otherwise, despite the record. But I guess that if they still suggest otherwise, there's no way you could ever convince them. They don't care to be convinced. They've made up 
their minds. But this man has never received the credit he deserves in this area. And equal employment was something that fit him. 
G: How would you assess the work of that committee? 
O: Well, my recollection is awfully vague on the results, but my recollection is it was spotty. Maybe that was due to the structure. 
G: Let me ask you about the administration's effort to do away with discrimination in the Defense Department. This was an area where Adam Yarmolinsky in particular was 
involved. Can you elaborate on that? Do you recall that? 
O: Other than state the obvious, that there was a keen desire to put a real effort into it and that was undertaken. There again, as in all matters involving the federal bureaucracy, you 
found yourself frustrated, and I don't remember the details other than we found over the years that it was difficult to get a handle on the bureaucracy. Our system didn't provide 
for assured continuity that would have the appropriate people administer as they should, because they'd feel that you wouldn't be around and they'd still be there. And that affected 
you constantly, to the point where you turn your back on the whole thing and accept the inevitable. 
That can go to equal opportunity as well as to any other aspect of the conduct of government. To build a fire under departments and agencies of the government is a 
difficult process, and I don't think any president has ever had anything but a lot of frustration regarding it. But if you're looking at a defense establishment; you're looking at 
the military, you're looking at millions of people involved in and out of uniform. You had to try to do it administratively or attempt to. You knew that you were going to have great 
difficulty and frustrations, but that shouldn't deter you from making an effort. 
G: Did the southern members of the Congress object to the effort? 
O: I don't recall widespread objection, but I do recall nit-picking and questioning. Members of Congress would attempt to put roadblocks in your path, seriously questioning some of 
the activities. It didn't become a war, formalized by resolutions or committee actions to block activities. 
G: The President signed an open housing executive order. Do you recall that? 
O: I don't recall the details of it. Everything you could do in the executive branch that could circumvent or avoid the legislative process and bring about progress in the general civil 
rights area was undertaken. It was a matter of how creative you were. You knew you were still not in the position to bring about civil rights legislation. You were resorting to 
executive orders and other actions, faced with a lot of negative comment from liberal 
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O'Brien --Interview V --7 
friends who construed activity of that nature to be an avoidance of the civil rights struggle rather than an effort to do whatever you could while you waited your time. 
G: Did President Kennedy pursue the executive order because he felt like it was not feasible to get the same thing accomplished legislatively, was that the--? 
O: Yes. As that legislative program unfolded--and we've discussed it [before]--the reality of meaningful civil rights legislation, the reality of the problem was recognized. Now, we 
could have demagogued the hell out of that, and there were people that suggested it. There were people who you felt you could ultimately persuade to join the cause when the 
time was right. And if you focused on a civil rights bill early on, you were doomed to defeat at that stage. 
A lot unfolded which was not in existence at that time. You would carry on this struggle and not succeed and in the process derail most of your legislative program, 
because it became a single-effort legislative struggle focused totally in one area. 
So we resented suggestions from the observers on the curbstone that we were not committed. That's a bit like how far do you pursue the rallies to build the fire under 
Wilbur Mills on Medicare? Those are judgments. Our judgment certainly proved to be correct, because we had a reasonable degree of success in some very important areas over 
the first couple of years, and we hadn't unduly antagonized a lot of people. You're trying to create friendships. But to suggest that the administration wasn't committed to this 
ultimate goal was grossly unfair. The struggle went on and on. As we know, it even became a major struggle in the House Judiciary Committee ultimately, and that was with a 
much improved climate. 
G: On this particular area, for example, of open housing, had you done a fairly extensive head count to indicate what your chances of getting legislation approved or not getting it 
approved were? 
O: I don't think we had done an extensive head count. We had discussed this with key people on the Hill, committee and leadership people, but we didn't get to a head count, and it 
would have been difficult if not impossible to get the head count without something to count, something in hand. 
G: Yes. But you got a sense from that that the legislation wouldn't work? 
O: Oh yes, coupled with a feeling that something could be accomplished through this device. 
G: The leadership made the suggestion for an executive order? 
O: I don't think they made the suggestion, but the leadership was in accord. There was a feeling that this was a good move to make and it could be productive. 
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O'Brien --Interview V --8 
G: Was there any fallout from the southerners after the executive order? 
O: I don't recall. I think if we were able to pursue the record or go back to the Congressional Record or to old clips, you'd probably find there was. Inevitably there 
would be some negative fallout. But there again, you felt pretty comfortable down there with that sort of thing. So there was griping from sources that you'd anticipate. And we 
had a little arrogance, a little "so what, this is a procedure that is available to us and we're utilizing it and you can gripe if you want to." 
G: You've discussed the University of Mississippi crisis in your book, but let me ask you to elaborate on that, if you will, and describe your own conversations with the President 
about that, also any conversations that you had with members of the Congress. 
O: Well, I don't know as there's much beyond what I said in the book. My direct involvement was minimal. The involvement, again, would relate to maintaining communication with 
appropriate people on the Hill as this unfolded. I don't know as there's much I could add beyond that. 
G: A couple of the points that you stressed in your book: one, the fact that the President felt like he had been misled by the authorities there in Mississippi, I mean specifically the 
Governor. 
O: [Ross] Barnett. 
G: And two, the long delay in getting troops on the scene. 
O: Well, those were the elements that I was familiar with. I was there. I guess it's time to introduce again the human element. All of these well conceived, organized efforts that are 
undertaken depend on proper implementation. I remember two aspects of it: one, the President was persuaded that Barnett had not leveled with him and was attempting to 
manipulate him; and secondly, the military establishment was ineffective. I guess if you did it in the form of a movie or a play everybody would roar with laughter, because here's 
the President of the United States trying to find out where the troops are, where the general is that's responsible, and almost desperately trying to find somebody in authority to 
give him an answer. While this well-laid plan is supposed to be unfolding, it's in complete disarray and you have the main actor in the cast down there giving you a total con game. 
You put all that together and you're in a pretty frustrating situation. There's the President of the United States who everybody assumes pushes buttons and things happen. But for 
the life of him he couldn't find the troops and he became completely disenchanted with Brother Barnett in the process. So it was a mess. (Laughter) 
G: Was he in contact with Secretary [Robert] McNamara during this? 
O: Yes, he was in contact with everybody he could think of. I forget the general's name, but there was some general who was supposedly superior to the general missing on some 
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O'Brien --Interview V --9 
highway somewhere, and the explanations became ludicrous. The fact of the matter is that the Pentagon couldn't find the troops either and the threats of what was going to happen 
down there if Barnett didn't straighten out were rather meaningless, because we were removed from implementation. Through those hours, you had a fellow sitting in the Oval 
Office with all this power supposedly, commander in chief of the armed forces, trying to cope with a bureaucracy that just had been put to a test and was in complete disarray. 
Tape 1 of 5, Side 2 
G: Did you think that the delay was intentional at all or that it was simply incompetence? 
O: I don't think they could read highway signs. (Laughter) It was that bad. I can laugh about it now, but I'll tell you, there wasn't any laughter in the Oval Office while this was 
unfolding. 
G: Was Robert Kennedy involved? 
O: Yes. 
G: What was his role in this? 
O: Well, he was just going along. I think Ken O'Donnell was there and probably a couple of others, and we were just beside ourselves. We decided to remain relatively mute, because 
anything we would say would probably cause the President to become even more disturbed. It went on and on. In the meantime, as each phone call ended, there was a roar 
in the office about "where the hell are we and where are they, and can anybody get me somebody that can give me an answer?" 
G: What was McNamara's explanation? 
O: I don't recall. I don't know whether it was. . . . (Laughter) Nobody had an explanation. I think everybody was running for cover. 
G: Did the President explore other alternatives for getting a quicker response, like trying to get men from another military institution? 
O: No, I don't recall that--G: 
Was there any alternative? 
O: I don't think there was. The assignments had been made. That general has been assigned his task. He has his troops. God, if he can't find the location, who can? 
G: Was there a lesson that came out of this? Or was there any modification in order to lessen the response time? 
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O'Brien --Interview V --10 
O: I don't recall that. I think the lesson that came out was similar to the Bay of Pigs lesson. Just don't dream that, with all the charts they put up on the wall and all the game plans 
that are developed, it's going to work out the way they tell you. It just doesn't seem to happen. And you've seen it occur. It occurred in Carter's effort to get the hostages out. 
It seems that every time you get into one of these engagements things go awry. I think it's sad, but maybe it's the size and scope of the whole thing. The bureaucracy is so 
overweighted that it's beyond. . . . 
G: Were there any discussions with the Mississippi delegation in Congress during this time? 
O: I don't recall that. 
G: Or Senator [James] Eastland or [John] Stennis? 
O: Not at this period I'm talking about. There couldn't have been, because the President was otherwise engaged, and we all were. There was an effort to keep in communication with 
the people on the scene down there, the Justice Department side of it, and assuring them that things were going to work out, while [Nicholas] Katzenbach, or whoever, was 
peering out into the horizon. 
G: Okay. Another episode that you discussed in your book was the Cuban Missile Crisis. But let me ask you to focus specifically on the congressional briefings and the discussions 
among the members of Congress. 
O: That was a fast-breaking situation over a very brief period of days, I guess, going back to the first awakening on my part, first knowledge I had that something was amiss. I was 
with the President in Chicago and our schedule called for us to go on to Wisconsin. And the President did not make me aware of this crisis at that point. 
G: Why do you think that was? 
O: He was keeping it very close to the vest. It unfolded rather rapidly and became serious quickly. His determination was to cancel the rest of that trip and return to Washington, 
and he came up with the excuse that he had a cold. And in my presence he called Pierre Salinger in and said to advise the press that "We're going back to Washington. I just don't 
feel well; I have a bad cold." And that's all Salinger knew. I went back with him, and I was on the helicopter with him from Andrews [Air Force Base] to the White House. He 
was very pensive en route, had very little to say. And when he alighted from the helicopter, he charged into the living quarters. I went about my business. And whether it 
was hours or a day, I became aware of what was transpiring. 
G: How did you first--? 
O: It must have been in general conversation in the Oval Office. When the military aide to 
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O'Brien --Interview V --11 
the President was instructed to carry out the procedures of the movement of government to the Catoctin Mountains, there were a number of days involved there. I was designated 
as one that would go with the President and I was allowed to designate one other person who would go with me. 
Things were worsening. The surveillance of Cuba was being carried out. There were meetings in the Cabinet Room. McNamara was doing the briefing, and others were 
called in by McNamara to assist. There were blowups of the installations. There was the evidence of the further shipments toward Cuba. This unfolded hour by hour. It is my 
recollection the Congress was in recess. To have the leadership and the appropriate committee members briefed and alerted to all of this became a logistical problem. You 
were, on the one hand, unable to indicate even the nature of the crisis or refer to it as a crisis, but yet you had to impress upon Ev Dirksen and the rest out there in the hinterlands 
that there was a need for immediate return to Washington. 
G: Did you make these calls? 
O: I made some of them directly and my staff [made] others. 
G: Tell me how you could persuade them to come back without revealing the urgency of it or the nature of it. 
O: Simply, they'd have to accept that I was making the call on behalf of the President and it was imperative "that you return to Washington immediately in whatever manner will get 
you here the fastest, and I'm not in a position to discuss it any further, but the urgency is underscored and therefore the President must have your presence." Nobody would 
question beyond that. 
G: They were all quickly [inaudible] in response to--? 
O: Well, they knew this was a very unusual procedure and they came in from around the country. One member was a senator from California--G: 
[Thomas] Kuchel. 
O: Kuchel never got over it because he was put in a fighter plane and brought to Washington. The Congress is going to be informed in detail of what has transpired, where we are and 
what the end result can be. So the briefing was full in terms of the blowups of the installations and the recounting of the current status of the freighters that were moving 
further missiles into Cuba. All of that was detailed without withholding anything. This was the President conducting the meeting. 
G: He did the briefing himself? 
O: No. He just called on people to brief. And this went on for a fair length--it took a while 
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O'Brien --Interview V --12 
to complete this briefing and to ensure that you hadn't left any element out. This was a complete briefing. And then as you would in other briefings, you would go around the 
table, and there were a number of people in the room, because not only were the cabinet chairs occupied but chairs were pulled up to the cabinet table and there were people sitting 
along the wall. So you had probably twenty or thirty people in the room. Then the President went around the table and asked each member to comment. He would 
appreciate their advice and counsel. The comments varied. Most of it was noncomment. Most of the reactions were to the effect that "Whatever you decide, Mr. President, you 
have my support." There was some reference to "Is there any way of moving the marines into Cuba?" and that got into a discussion about where they were and what would it take, 
and my recollection was you were talking about fifteen thousand or something marines. To move them into Cuba would take X number of days, which you could conclude meant 
perhaps more than X number of days before they'd ever see the shores of Cuba. That sort of drifted out of the conversation. 
G: Was there also a fear that once you got them in there you might have a hard time getting them out? 
O: Well, [we] never pursued it because it was clear you couldn't get them in there anyway and this wasn't a realistic approach. It sounds a little ludicrous, but actually there was a 
serious discussion. I don't think the President took it seriously, because obviously the President had given thought to the marines going into Cuba or what courses do you have? 
But in any event, it was a repeat of what I had seen or heard before. In that setting you're going to have collective reaction that will be "I support you, Mr. President. I have 
confidence in your judgment and decision. Whatever your decision is, you have my support." You don't expect anything more than that. Interesting to me is, with all the 
carping criticism of the White House and the president on the part of the Congress, under those circumstances there isn't any desire on the part of members of Congress for a share 
of the burden. This is the role of the president of the United States; this is the awesome responsibility we give him. You're perfectly willing at that point to say, "He has that 
responsibility. All I can do for him and am willing to do for him is support him in whatever he does. I'm not otherwise involved." 
So to a considerable extent those kinds of meetings are pro forma, even though at that moment you have as serious a matter as you could have on the table. It still follows 
the same pattern, and it's interesting to observe that and to recognize and understand it. There are times when that would happen, when I'd say to myself, "Yes, but boy, you don't 
hesitate to criticize and second guess the President or to complain that he doesn't communicate with the Congress, and that he should have the advice and consent of the 
Congress on all these matters. It all disappears when it's the moment of crisis." And that was the moment of crisis. It was not exaggerated. 
G: This was a briefing with the House and Senate leadership? 
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O'Brien --Interview V --13 
O: This particular one, yes. But there were other briefings and meetings in the Cabinet Room. There were a number of them, and they flowed together finally because you had 
the cabinet in; you had staff people sitting in. However, there had to be some planning before this period I'm describing, because General [Chester] Clifton was responsible for 
the movement, and he talked to me and to each key member of the staff directly, and we were given our orders. But I do recall that Clifton suggested that perhaps I'd want to take 
a trip out to see this installation under the mountain and have a better idea how business would be conducted, and I chose not to. I felt it didn't make much difference what it 
looked like; if that's where you were going, you were going. (Laughter) You didn't have an alternative, so why bother to spend several hours looking at it? But anyway, that 
certainly didn't occur overnight, making the determination how there would be an orderly movement by helicopter into this installation that was in existence for that express 
purpose. 
But to get back to that meeting, I will have to say it concluded with expressions on the part of every member sitting there in support of the President. Certainly every one of 
them recognized the seriousness of the situation. They were united bipartisanly when they left that meeting and appeared before the press. They were not discussing any details of 
the meeting or any aspects of the meeting, just that it was a matter of great import, extremely serious and that they had told the President they supported whatever steps he 
took in the national interest. 
G: Were there any in that meeting that proposed an alternative course of action? 
O: There might have been one other alternative of course. I envision Senator [J. William] Fulbright had some fairly extensive comment, extending beyond "you have my support, 
Mr. President." Not any lengthy comment. No one had any lengthy comment. I think probably Senator [Richard] Russell did. But one or the other may have discussed the 
marine aspect. 
G: What about the surgical bombing alternative? 
O: I think that was handled in terms of the briefing itself. In discussing the briefing, the situation at the moment was documented by the photos. They were briefed on what 
approaches were viable or could be considered or would be considered or have been considered. That was all in the briefing. 
G: Did any of them favor a bombing strike? 
O: I don't recall that. I don't think anyone, other than whichever members favored a land strike. 
G: Do you recall who brought that up? 
O: No, I don't. In fairness I think I recall who brought it up, but I'm not that sure so I better 
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O'Brien --Interview V --14 
not attribute it. But that was the extent of it. The time frame eludes me now, because obviously the "crisis" was over a period of time--if you go back to General Clifton's 
instructions to prepare for movement of government and to Chicago, when the crisis had escalated while the President was out of the White House for a brief period. How many 
days unfolded before Khrushchev blinked, I don't recall now. 
But really that was the only solution. I think that a first strike on the mainland of the United States and its effect were clear on the basis of the briefing. It would affect 
about a third of the country. What would have been the result if Khrushchev didn't blink? You'd have to conclude that if he didn't blink the result would have been devastating. But 
it became a matter of leadership, strong leadership and courageous leadership. We got over the hump, but I think that in historic terms the President's handling of that situation 
and what resulted from the Bay of Pigs is worthy of comparison in terms of leadership and the way you respond, having a firm grasp and totally accepting your responsibility. After 
all, that's not unique with presidents. Harry Truman is still recalled as the fellow who made the decision on bombing, and they're still Monday-morning quarterbacking Truman 
forty years later. 
G: Critics have charged that because the President brought the nation to the brink of thermonuclear war that it was a reckless decision. 
O: Well, I dismiss that charge out of hand. The fact of the matter is that there was a concerted effort on the part of the Russians to mount this procedure in Cuba, and at some 
point you would have to make an effort to stop it. Other than taking it to the brink, I don't know what alternative you had. If that's the brink, it certainly wasn't reckless 
because those ships didn't turn around. The immediate next step obviously would be to turn them around. Would that result in action on the mainland of Cuba? Probably. But at 
what stage did you cross into being reckless? They were in place. They were detected. It was a proven case. This was the initial stage, but there was more to come and they were 
en route. I don't know when you say, "Well, now I'm going to have to be reckless." I think that falls of its own weight. 
G: There was a comparison of the U. S. missiles that we had in Turkey. Do you recall how this tied into the decision-making process and ultimately the decision to--? 
O: Not really. I vaguely recall the references to it. 
G: Did the President wrestle with his decision at the time? Do you think he had doubts about it? 
O: Throughout that, my observations--obviously I wasn't in the Situation Room--were somewhat peripheral. Because of my role, I happened to be present during some phases 
of this and I was able to observe him directly, and I have described his reserved attitude coming from Chicago and on the helicopter. I also remember vividly his general posture 
at that meeting and other meetings through this crisis. He was very much in command. 
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He was not exhibiting outwardly any emotions. He clearly accepted his role and he knew where he was headed. He was going to see it through and there was no hesitancy. This 
man was in total control and total command. There was no sense of wavering at all. He had to see it through and he had to act in the best interests of the country, as he saw it, 
and he was totally prepared to do it and did. 
G: What was Robert Kennedy's role in this crisis as you observed it? 
O: I think basically a close relationship with his brother and considerable presence in the White House. 
G: Did he participate in this leadership briefing? 
O: I don't recall that, and because I don't recall it I would suggest he didn't. 
G: What was LBJ's role, do you recall? 
O: Well, he was obviously kept fully abreast of this throughout. What conversation took place between him and Kennedy during the course of this, I don't know. But his 
role--observable--was the role that Kennedy had carved out for him from the outset. He was very much on the inside of the whole situation. 
G: Did he have any discussion in the briefing? 
O: I don't recall that he did have any. 
G: When the crisis ended, do you recall President Kennedy's attitude then? 
O: No, other than it was business as usual very quickly and there was a sigh of relief. Everybody went about their business and quickly put the crisis aside. 
G: Did he see it as a trial, do you think? 
O: I don't recall that he did, and he never by any indication or conversation with me placed it in that category. 
G: I believe you've indicated in your book that you felt that although he, because of the crisis, was unable to complete his campaigning for congressmen, that the successful resolution of 
the crisis was a benefit to those who were running with his support. 
O: That was an assumption we made and the record would indicate it was probably a fair assumption. I don't recall what the polls reflected after the Cuban Missile Crisis, as I 
recall what the polls reflected after the Bay of Pigs disaster, only because I was far more interested in what would occur in the polls after the Bay of Pigs than I was in this instance. 
In this instance there certainly wasn't a minus factor, while in the Bay of Pigs there was a 
19
O'Brien --Interview V --16 
gaping hole which I thought was going to be disastrous to us. It proved otherwise in terms of public opinion. I think the qualities of leadership go to the perception of the 
individual, oftentimes not his actions, but his attitude, his ability to communicate, his acceptance as a leader by the public. Generally all that is in the equation, and Kennedy 
had the benefit of that despite the Bay of Pigs. There was a growing support for the President across the country. It was wave after wave and there was no question in our 
mind that he was going to go into a reelection drive in awfully, awfully good shape. 
G: I have a couple of items that I just want to wind up with relating to general aspects of your congressional relations. There's some indication that Pierre Salinger really didn't 
include enough on the status of legislation there and suggestions that perhaps you should give more regular press briefings of your own. How did you handle this? 
O: Yes, that did come up. I think there was neglect on our part in filling Pierre in, frankly. The role of that press secretary is such a unique role anyway, and we would have meetings 
that related to congressional relations with the leadership, not only the breakfast meetings but other meetings in the Oval Office. There were times when you'd say the meeting has 
ended; somebody ought to call Pierre and fill him in. 
We had a tendency, and that I think led to some of this criticism, of bringing key people into the White House privately. A Wilbur Mills coming in to visit the President 
would not be on the schedule. And we did that because we just did not want to have undue focus on some of these efforts, and oftentimes there was an effort to try to persuade 
Wilbur or whoever in a given area, and it could be counterproductive if it became a matter of public attention. So we went along that way and sort of drifted into that procedure. 
There was not in the Kennedy White House, at least in the early months, an impact on the staff generally regarding congressional relations. Not only was it new to me, it was 
new to everyone else, and it wasn't their department. This movement can take all kinds of directions and at various steps in the process can probably be a little bit newsworthy. If it 
is, the news emanates from the Hill in committee action or committee vote. So consequently, Pierre was not given a great deal of background for use in his briefings 
regarding the progress of legislation. It was more one-on-one interviews with members of the press that I would conduct, and that would be on request most of the time. Members 
of the press would call and you'd set up an appointment. Many of those discussions took place, and we never thought about it in terms of Pierre. 
That wasn't the only area in which Pierre lacked substantive knowledge; much of what occurred in the Oval Office was not relayed to Pierre. He was left hanging time after 
time after time in his briefings because he simply didn't have background information that would be helpful to him in making a response. There were members of the press that were 
very well aware that somehow or other he wasn't privy to the extent that a press secretary probably should be. That certainly applied to what activities we were engaged in in the 
legislative process. But there again, it isn't very sexy, those activities, and you weren't trying to block him off. What you were failing to do was utilize at appropriate times an 
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O'Brien --Interview V --17 
opportunity to get press support for an effort you were engaged in. That was undoubtedly overlooked. 
But as time went on, that was corrected. Pierre and I would sit down and I would update him and suggest to him certain things that he might introduce into a briefing. And 
that would happen periodically when the circumstances indicated it. Perhaps there were some advantages to be gained on the press side that we weren't utilizing. 
The interviewing aspect was rather difficult, because about every reporter that I would meet with would conduct an interview on the basis that there apparently isn't 
anything happening, and put you totally on the defensive. There was that general attitude and it wasn't the case. Neil McNeil up on the congressional side saw that a lot of things 
were happening, and he was dutifully reporting it to his magazine. There were others like Neil, but they had to seek it out a little bit. We weren't really doing the job of informing. 
And I think we rather preferred it that way. My feeling was that if we were to develop over the long haul these relationships that we envisioned, the less public 
involvement in this, the better. Wilbur Mills comes in and you try to convince him of something, and you didn't convince him but he's going to think about it. Do you tell Pierre 
Salinger, "Well, Wilbur Mills was in and we were discussing Medicare again. He hasn't indicated movement in our direction, but he's still trying to keep an open mind and we'll 
talk about it again"? What's the value of all that? And if you do that, it's duly reported. Wilbur Mills is then questioned on the Hill about what took place, and I couldn't see any 
value in it. 
The negative side of it was that you got to the wrap-ups on what transpired or didn't transpire during the session. You were up against a press generally that had not 
closely observed the activities on the Hill, if they weren't on the Hill particularly, or you had columnists like Joe Alsop, Walter Lippmann, people like that. So there was a 
tendency to sort of pass it by or say, "Gee, I don't think there's anything really going on." You'd get a headline out of it, a feed on a minimum wage bill in the House, but you 
wouldn't get a lot out of a conference report on minimum wage ultimately being adopted that turned out to be very close to the bill that had been defeated. 
So that went on, and it was not exclusively on the Congressional Relations side. It was White House procedure and the President's approach to press relations and the role of 
the press secretary. And Pierre had a real problem, because Pierre was an able, aggressive guy that was generally liked by the press. He was darn good at his job. But you left him 
hanging more often than not. And Pierre would from time to time say to me, "I had that thrown at me and I couldn't respond. I don't even know the substance of the question 
because I've never heard about the subject." 
G: Did Salinger and his successors have the same problem under LBJ, do you think? 
O: As the records will indicate, we made a conscious effort to promote legislative progress in 
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O'Brien --Interview V --18 
every way we could, and that was through the press office, too. But it was also through releasing memoranda to the President by me, a joint report to the President by [Joseph] 
Califano and me at the end of a session, contacting press people and inviting them in to discuss--Tape 
2 of 3, Side 1 
G: --in to discuss the annual wrap-up, you say? 
O: Yes. This became bothersome to us. We had a lot to be proud of; we had made significant progress. A dispassionate, objective look at the record would bring a reporter 
to the conclusion that it was a substantial record. 
That was being reported in those terms by members of the press from the Hill. But we finally at some point, Ted Sorensen and I, had a long session one evening at the home 
of one of the members of the press. There were probably about twenty press fellows there. We went through an entire evening presenting our point of view. There was a 
considerable degree of opposition, cynicism or skepticism to our point of view as the evening progressed. It got quite late and Ted became somewhat exasperated with some of 
those present. Finally a few of them departed and then Ted departed and I stayed. Things cooled off and calmed down, and I thought that night had been very worthwhile. My 
recollection is it was productive. 
I remember that occasion. There were others, but I remember that specifically, because I think what hit both Ted and I was that their opinions were in concrete. Yet as I 
went back over some clippings not many months ago, there were any number of favorable stories. 
I do remember a fellow that I had a great admiration for--we became very close friends--confessing his error, and that was a fellow named Pete Lisagor. Pete was class 
personified; he epitomized to me all that was good and great in journalism. Pete did his midterm story and it was quite negative. There was no progress, nothing seemed to be 
developing, and consequently it would be a nonmeaningful session. He got to the end of the session and just turned totally around on his own and contacted me and said, "My 
failure was not to be an observer, not to follow things more closely, just to listen to scuttlebutt and not pay much attention. Once I focused on the session and devoted some 
time to it, I recognized that my midterm story was not a fair one. I've corrected the whole thing and I'm going with the story. I think you had quite a year." 
Well, you appreciated that. As a White House correspondent, you're more apt to be concerned about the ebb and flow in the foreign policy area, in crisis areas, rather than 
this slow-moving, rather disjointed legislative process that requires a great deal of attention on a day-to-day basis in order to keep abreast of it. You're not doing that, nor is 
that your assignment. You're covering the White House, not the Congress, and it was looked at that way. Nobody was saying to Pierre, "Why don't you tell us more about the 
22
O'Brien --Interview V --19 
legislative process?" 
G: As time went on, did you increase your contact with the DNC? 
O: Not particularly. Both times when I was chairman of the DNC, we were the out party. The contact with John Bailey in those years was somewhat limited. John's role was a 
useful role to take the heat, and let you off the hook to some extent when you had to say no. Bailey at times would be the fellow that would say, "This can't be done or won't be 
done." When it came to the off-year elections, there was a great deal of contact with the DNC because John and his staff were looked to as people to implement activities involving 
the candidates. In 1962 they were very much involved and during that period John would be over to the White House in discussions with us. 
There was a time when someone suggested that we consider having the chairman of the DNC attend cabinet meetings. It never happened, but there was some suggestion 
along those lines with the feeling that it not only was unfair to the chairman, but it was not in our best interests not to utilize the entity more. 
Now, you have to remember also that the DNC was considered by the President to be a bit of a yoke, because the DNC was in serious debt. John would be hopeful that the 
President would get involved in fund-raising activity that would be helpful to discharge the debt. And that's a subject that the President chose to ignore. It would not be in the 
forefront of his mind. He had other things on his mind. So there's a tendency to consider the DNC a separate entity, although it could probably be utilized in some way that would 
be protective or helpful to the President. But short of that, it did not have an ongoing significant role in the administration's activities. 
That's basically, I think, wrong. From my own experience at a later date, if I were chairman and my party had the White House, I would fully expect that I would have a 
meaningful role and be a spokesman for the party. We had a tendency to go along with the nonrole in the administration of the party entity. I don't think it was devastating, but I 
think we could have shored up the party structure and probably have a greater impact at the state and local level than it has had over the years, if we had given some evidence that 
there was direct presidential interest and involvement and support of the chairman. But that wasn't forthcoming, and it was just ignored. 
(Interruption) 
G: Okay. At the beginning of the 1963 session of Congress, Senator [Thomas] Dodd criticized [Mike] Mansfield's kind, gentle leadership, contrasting it with LBJ's. Was the 
kindness and gentleness of Mansfield's style at all a handicap? 
O: No, it wasn't a handicap. Mansfield was a consensus fellow. He, to my knowledge and I certainly had a great deal of involvement with him over those years, would not attempt to 
dictate in promoting legislation or persuading his colleagues. He rather liked to have 
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O'Brien --Interview V --20 
luncheons with them in his office or visitations in the afternoon. He was low key in that regard. He was very supportive of the congressional relations process from the White 
House. He looked to us to a great extent to carry out some of these efforts. It was just basically a matter of style. As far as we were concerned: a) we recognized it as his style 
of operation; b) he afforded us tremendous opportunity to carry out our activities in close proximity to the Senate. He was totally supportive of everything we were engaged in, and 
he was tremendously supportive of the President. 
So as far as our work on the Senate side, we felt Mansfield was a tremendous plus. Mansfield's procedures, which I alluded to on a previous occasion, would be, "I'm going 
to call the appropriate people in, we're going to have lunch, and then you'll present to them the President's views." And it would be done that way rather than Mansfield trying 
to hit them over the head individually. So I'm sure there was a great contrast between Mansfield's approach to his position as majority leader and Johnson's. I was not involved 
with Johnson as majority leader, so I didn't have the opportunity to observe the contrast, but clearly they were two entirely different kinds of folks. 
As for Dodd's comments, he would not necessarily be privy to all of the efforts that Mansfield undertook quietly and privately to move legislation. But as far as we were 
concerned, we were very comfortable with Mike. As I said, he was very supportive and extremely helpful, and our relationship was total--communication at all times candid and 
open. Along with Mike in those days, you had Hubert [Humphrey], who was very active up there regarding the program and its progress. So I don't share Dodd's point of view, 
but I must say that he would come from a different perspective than I would because he was making comparison between two leaders that he had been involved with while I was 
dealing with the one leader that I had come to know. 
G: Okay. Certainly one of the major measures that was submitted that year was the tax bill, a combination of a tax cut and tax reform. 
O: Well, yes, that was major, and it had a surprise element to it: a Democratic president making the proposal and the fact that he felt that enactment of a tax cut would be a 
stimulus to the economy. It was not the normal Democratic Party approach. But, of course, he was trying to bring about additional revenue by cutting off and reducing certain 
tax benefits, but it didn't come out as a wash really. It was basically in the final analysis a tax cut. And then--G: 
Excuse me. Why do you think that Kennedy did decide to take this route instead--? 
O: I think he accepted the view of some of the economic advisers that this was the best approach. It reflected a point of view that differed from the traditional among Democratic 
economic advisers. I don't recall what led him to this message, because when I came into the picture we were developing the message, and the thrust of the message was clear in 
the President's mind. I'm not an economist, and I was never wedded to any particular economic philosophy. I found, in the years I spent in the White House, I became less and 
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O'Brien --Interview V --21 
less interested in the views of economic advisers because I found there were no two economic advisers that agreed on anything. And I think most presidents probably become 
frustrated because you never get a clear consensus. Basically, presentations are somewhat in disarray and you just don't know where to turn. So I think you have to probably use 
your gut reactions in making some economic decisions. 
You're advocating a tax cut in the midst of what at that time was considered a very serious deficit. And there were the conservatives on the Hill who said, "This makes no 
sense at all. You're reducing taxes and that is going to increase the deficit." Even if your judgment is right, this is a serious matter and they can't accept it. And it drifted along to 
the point of a tough fight and a close margin to avoid a mandate to reduce the budget. I think that as Mills tried to move this along, he got to a statement of policy saying, "Now, 
of course, the enactment of this legislation would bring about a presidential budget request to Congress that would be reduced." Ultimately that is really what happened, because by 
the time that we got to the end of 1963 the record indicates there was a feeling that you better not pursue it any further during the remainder of that session. But Johnson's budget 
presentation did reflect a several billion dollar reduction over the prior budget, which was responsive to the arguments that you bring about a tax reduction in the midst of an 
increasing deficit. So that was a major argument. 
G: Was Wilbur Mills the primary exponent of this? 
O: Yes. Whether he was initially or not, I don't know, but he certainly carried the flag. 
G: You organized an effort to get prominent businessmen signed on as a committee, a citizens' committee to promote this. I gather both [Henry] Fowler and Luther Hodges 
were doing the recruiting--O: 
That's right, yes. 
G: --and that they were having trouble finding distinguished business leaders who were in favor of both the tax cut and the tax reform, that they would favor the tax cut perhaps but 
not the reform. Let me ask you to elaborate on this idea of developing a citizens' support group and the problems you had. 
O: Well, we felt that could be an essential element in this as, first of all, this was not a normal Democratic proposal in terms of the Democratic Party and its posture traditionally. You 
felt that it should afford some support from the business community, and that there would be leaders in the community who would be in accord with this economic approach. You 
also recognized that that would probably turn out to be essential in garnering some bipartisan support on the Hill. So it was decided that it was worth a very serious effort, 
and the expectancy was quite high. You would have a rather impressive roster, blue ribbon, from the business community in support. 
The obvious people in the administration to undertake this task would be Luther 
25
O'Brien --Interview V --22 
Hodges and Joe Fowler, and they proceeded to undertake it and, to their surprise, ran into some serious difficulty in carrying out the effort. I frankly don't recall the end result or 
just how successful they were in garnering any prominent names. I think that everybody ran for cover. Nothing has changed; it's still the case when it comes to tax reform. 
I can remember having a conversation with Henry Ford on this subject and I don't remember that it was particularly productive. I remember there was a business dinner put 
together for Wilbur Mills to which I was invited. I was probably the only outsider there. It was hosted by Henry Ford and a few others. There were probably a hundred or so top 
business executives in America with Wilbur as the honored guest. I remember trying to circulate around that room, though most of these people were unknown to me, and trying 
to get acquainted. I suppose I did contemplate the possibility that we might find an occasional friendly voice there, but I don't recall that there was any success in that regard 
either. 
G: You did win a crucial vote on changing the 4 per cent credit for dividends over fifty dollars to a hundred dollars. Do you recall that vote? 
O: I recall it was close. Probably it was a one-vote margin. 
G: Yes, I think so. How did you get that [vote]? It was on the committee; it was 13 to 12. 
O: I think credit for that vote you give to the chairman. That's where the credit lies. But it's an indication of how difficult that effort was. To have Wilbur coping with a one-vote 
margin would indicate that he was having serious difficulty himself. 
G: The Republicans were launching a campaign of their own for cutting the budget, making speeches. Your paper seemed to indicate that you organized a counter to this with people 
like Carl Albert and others, talking about the hazards to national security, et cetera, if the budget was cut. 
O: Yes. We put an effort into that. That wasn't the only effort of that nature. It became more and more sophisticated as time went on, getting the leadership and appropriate 
members into the debate discussion, releasing statements. Rather than take that type of opposition, you began to further refine your legislative activities. 
It was a feeding process, however. You couldn't expect the Carl Alberts of this world to close their office door and start dictating a statement or issue a press release. 
You had to prepare all of that, and you should. They were willing to carry out the task, but you had to make it as easy as you could for them. We sort of moved into it as time 
went on. You could undertake a lot of things like that after a period of time. In 1961, if you were saying to the fellows up on the Hill, "Here's a statement I'd like to have you 
make; you could put it into your newsletter or you can put it in the Congressional Record or you can issue a press release," you'd have been gambling. This couldn't be something 
that was going to happen in twenty-four hours. It had to move along and time had to 
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O'Brien --Interview V --23 
elapse until you felt reasonably comfortable saying to key people on the Hill, "Will you go an extra mile and make an additional effort?" Or say to them, "Can you be there during 
floor debate? I'd like to have you have some input on floor debate." Well, heck, you're reaching the point where you've got to be a little careful. You're trying to dictate the guy's 
life for him. And so you did that inch by inch, and if that inch worked out, then you'd contemplate the next inch. It wasn't crass or callous, it was a matter of a willingness to 
fully cooperate, and your end of the bargain should be to make it comfortable and easy to cooperate. 
So a lot of that, even by that stage, had begun to come into our thought process, and in this instance it's an example of the beginning of that kind of activity. As Bob 
Hardesty and others can testify to, it became part of the operation that Bob and his cohorts were busy preparing material to be funneled on a daily basis all over the Hill for 
insertions where you could get it. 
G: When do you think that operation really got into high gear? 
O: I think in the Johnson period after the 1964 election and the additional elbow room. We had gone around the circle a few times by then and become more sophisticated, more 
understanding. You've developed relationships. Now a few years have gone by. You just keep expanding. And when we get to the Johnson period we get into detail on a lot of 
this. 
G: But would you say this Albert speech, for example, was one of the first efforts here? 
O: Yes. 
G: You did have an input there? 
O: Yes. And with Albert, if you and I were sitting at that time saying, "Gosh, we'd like to have somebody speak up from our side on this and not let these fellows have this free 
ride," or "All right, who's the somebody you start with?" I'll tell you, without a moment's hesitancy, you'd say Carl Albert. Carl Albert's position regarding the President and the 
White House, by that stage, was such that our admiration for him and our recognition that this fellow was a dedicated member of the team had grown tremendously. In addition to 
that, Carl Albert had a quick mind. I saw so much evidence of that, and so did the President, at an early stage. His grasp of the substance of legislation was remarkable. I 
have known Carl Albert to spend an evening before floor debate on a major legislative proposal that he's not familiar with substantively and play a key role in that debate the next 
day on the floor, all because of his desire to be helpful and his desire to aid the program. Others had the desire and the heart, but they didn't have that other dimension. Carl could 
engage in vigorous debate on a matter that he had really little knowledge of twenty-four hours earlier. 
G: Was that fairly uncommon in terms of abilities of--? 
27
O'Brien --Interview V --24 
O: Yes, and understandably so. You know, when you think of the amount of legislation in progress, the tremendous number of subjects under discussion, and to have a fellow that 
had this ability to absorb. What's little known about Carl is that he was a Rhodes scholar. He had been the national oratorical champion. You'd get the finalists to Constitution Hall 
and this was a national contest involving thousands and thousands of high school students across the country. You got to this oratorical contest, and Carl Albert had won that. You 
know, there are qualities to this fellow--he was sort of small in stature, as you know, and not a blowhard at all. Very pleasant, rather reserved fellow. And yet there you had a real 
man. No one did more to help both presidents than Carl Albert. 
G: I would assume that his constituency was relatively conservative. 
O: That's right. 
G: Was it difficult for him to take this stand? 
O: I don't believe so. I don't know as he thought about it in those terms. The love and affection for Carl in his constituency was most impressive. I happened to go out there to 
dedicate a building at Carl's request, and I must say, I never spent such a day. This man was almost revered by everybody I met. By that stage, the highway in from the airport 
was the Carl Albert Highway. His voting record would not have adversely affected Carl's political career. That would be my judgment. I did have a very pleasant overnight out 
there, being presented by Carl at various functions. The people just loved him. 
G: Was this later when you were postmaster general? 
O: Yes. 
G: Well, let's focus on some of the reform aspects of this legislation. First of all, you had oil depletion; there were a number of people in the Congress that favored cutting back on the 
oil and gas depletion allowance, which was not done or at least to any extent. Can you recall this dilemma? 
O: There were no surprises. Those that favored and those who strongly opposed, you could have head-counted that up front before you ever submitted the message. 
G: Did the administration have a preference here? 
O: No, I think that what it came to was where would the votes land. There would be a give and take in that area and how did you come out with a plus? 
G: Did President Kennedy have any particular view of his own on this depletion? 
O: I don't really recall. I don't believe that he had any overriding view or I would have been 
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O'Brien --Interview V --25 
aware of it. It was in an area that could be negotiated. 
G: Now, another reform that was proposed was the proposal to limit itemized deductions. Do you recall that? This was one where the administration was defeated on its proposal. 
Do you remember? 
O: Yes. Well, oil depletion would be in that category, too. But it went to what can you do in the context of tax reduction. You're going to reform some aspects of existing deductions 
to see if you can't increase the revenue side to partially compensate for the revenue loss. The drafters of the legislation would be seeking a laundry list of areas that you might work 
on and this would be one of them. You were adding to your up-front difficulties if you didn't show some reform, and that reform had to go to an increase in revenue. At no time 
do I recall we envisioned a package where the reform end of it would compensate for the loss in revenue through tax reduction and you'd come out with a balanced proposal, but 
you had to show some significant reform aspect. You ran into people saying, "My God, you've got an increased deficit and you're going for a broadly-based tax cut." 
G: The administration was criticized for backing away from the reform side of this. 
O: That's right. 
G: Wilbur Mills was evidently just furious about this. Do you recall how this evolved? 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 2 
O: I don't recall in specifics, but I don't want to sound callous. If you back away from reform, it isn't because you were not strongly in support of reform, whether you're talking 
about oil depletion or any other aspects. Oil depletion could be focused on, and you try to present your case in the best light possible. On this you're going to get into the private 
interest and pressure group areas. The old story of the art of the possible: how much are you going to have to give in order to come out with a meaningful bill that accomplishes 
your initial objective to bring about a reduction in taxes to bolster the economy, in the climate of an increased deficit. 
So you can't tell up front how much of this you're going to have to negotiate. Wilbur Mills could say, "Listen, let's stop all this. I don't want any other changes in this 
package, and we're going to go the distance with it." But our experience with Wilbur would be when you got to the committee head count and you weren't there, that bill could 
drop over the side in a hurry. And then if you couldn't present to Wilbur up front that you had a more than reasonable head count that came close to ensuring passage, you would 
not have a bill on the floor. Wilbur Mills was noted as a fellow who did not go to floor action until he was assured he was going to succeed. So on the one hand, Wilbur might 
say, "You're giving away too much." On the other hand, you'd have to weigh that on the scale that was part of the process. Obviously you'd love to have a bill that remained intact 
and arrive at the President's desk, but that's not the reality of the legislative process. 
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G: Did you talk with Mills about this aspect and the fact that he was disturbed? 
O: My recollection is that I did know he was disturbed. I can tell you it wasn't inordinate, or if he were that disturbed he would have told us where we could go. I remember sitting 
with Mills on any number of occasions. He was a baseball fanatic. He had game balls encased on the shelves. That was one of his great areas of interest. He was an enigma to 
many. As Gene Keogh, who was a senior member of the Ways and Means Committee, said to me, "The day is going to come when I'll best Wilbur Mills at some point on some 
issue," and I said, "You never will, Gene, as long as you spend your weekends in New York and Wilbur spends his in the office, because he'll always know more about what's 
going on than you do." (Laughter) And that's the kind of a fellow he was. 
But I had the experience at a later date with another chairman, and at that point I was in the sports world. I was lobbying on behalf of the National Basketball Association 
on a bill that had something to do with tax on sports tickets, in the Ways and Means Committee, and I had Wilbur Mills' successor asking me if I could provide him with a head 
count of his committee so he could determine where his committee stood. Well, that really stunned me, because [in] my years with the Ways and Means Committee and with 
Wilbur Mills, that wasn't the way it [was done]. You might work a head count on his behalf but, believe me, he would never say he didn't know what was going on. He never 
allowed that to happen. 
I would say that perhaps off that eleven to twelve vote, Wilbur Mills might have concluded that this was subject to a little more negotiation. So I would not place too 
much credence in the suggestion that Mills was awfully disturbed with us. 
G: Some of the administration supporters in the tax reform voiced the com-plaint that they had gone out on a limb for the administration and had the limb sawed off when the 
President backed off. Was this a valid argument, do you think? 
O: Yes. It was unavoidable from our point of view. 
G: Can you tell me where and how the decision was made to cut back on what you could go with on reform? 
O: I can't in detail, but you never cut back or negotiated away anything unless you were persuaded that was necessary in order to ensure progress of the overall legislation. That 
was your motivating factor. You would regret that if in those negotiations you had staunch supporters who had been up front for an entire package, including all the reforms, 
and found that the limb of the tree, not the tree but the limb might have been sawed off. You had to live with that because ultimately it was an essential step to take in order to 
ensure success. 
G: There was a note in your papers after one vote on the tax bill in which nineteen of the 
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twenty-one Democratic members of the Texas delegation had voted right, by your standards. The note was to congratulate LBJ and members of the delegation for having 
shown that degree of unity. Do you recall that effort and what was done? 
O: I don't recall the note, but I do recall that that was a case where there was direct LBJ involvement with the Texas delegation. 
G: What did he do? 
O: He communicated directly or indirectly with the delegation in an effort to garner support. That was an area in which he felt that he could be of some real assistance, and I'm sure 
that probably motivated my note. We probably never got the Texas delegation to that degree in support of our proposals; I would think that was probably the high-water mark. 
G: Do you think it was at all tied in with the oil and gas depletion allowance? 
O: I don't think that support would have been there if there had not been some give-back or withdrawal from the oil depletion side of it. 
G: But do you recall a specific accommodation? 
O: I don't recall. 
G: Okay. Anything else on the tax measure? 
O: No. 
G: Shall we go on to the civil rights bill? This is an area which you've discussed in your book, specifically Charlie Halleck and his role. 
O: Well, you see, we've discussed civil rights during our conversations and I think I made reference on a number of occasions to the right time, the right climate. As I recall it, we 
started that year with a rather modest civil rights proposal that was significantly strengthened in subsequent months. You can relate that to what was occurring out in the 
countryside. You're beginning to sense that this grassroots activity, this tremendous media attention, the leadership of Martin Luther King and the activity of others were 
beginning to build. You had Birmingham in there. You had all of this going on. So you started the year by saying, "We're going to take that further leap into the civil rights field." 
Then you no sooner had gotten that done than you began to note that there was a rapidly growing public interest, and that got you to strengthening your proposal. 
But with all of that, you haven't found daylight yet. And you got into a terrible impasse in the House Judiciary Committee. You had Congressman [William] McCulloch 
of Ohio, the ranking Republican, who to his everlasting credit as far as I'm concerned personally committed to meaningful civil rights legislation and actively engaged in bringing 
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it about. You were flying in the face of the longtime supporters of civil rights that were on the committee, the liberal Democrats, saying, "Wait a minute, this is in our view not a 
total civil rights proposal, and we're opposed to it. We're going to have the entire civil rights pack-age as we see it voted on favorably, and we're going to vote against anything 
short of that." That fell right into the hands of the southern conservative Democrats on the committee, and the Republicans. They could see civil rights legislation of any 
meaningful kind would be blocked in the committee. You had Manny [Emanuel] Celler, who was chairman of the committee, not enamored with what was construed by the 
liberals as a fall-back position. 
G: He favored a more aggressive--? 
O: Naturally, and so did we. That wasn't a point of argument. Now we're getting to the realities of civil rights again. As this unfolded and it became a very heated matter, we 
went to extremes in our effort. 
Our position was if you don't spring a reasonable civil rights proposal out of that committee, where do you go from here? You've spun your wheels again. You've had this 
rise in temperature in the countryside in this area. You had hoped to benefit from that legislatively. There you have this tripod, if you will: you have the Democratic liberals in 
opposition; you have the southern Democrats in opposition; you have the Republicans basically in opposition. How do you ever bring this about? 
There was one congressman who was listed in that category who came from Chicago, and not questioning his commitment and his motives but questioning his 
judgment, we resorted to contacting Mayor [Richard] Daley. I called the Mayor and explained that--you're not a congressman from Chicago unless you were designated by 
Mayor Daley, and if you think otherwise then you're making a horrible mistake; you're going to be an ex-congressman in a hell of a hurry--we needed this man's vote for this 
compromise proposal. The President was in dire need of it if we were going to move civil rights, and the Mayor assured me that this would be relayed to the member. 
The member was a fellow that went home weekends. Another week went by and this is smoldering. He took occasion to go back to Chicago, and it was reported to us that 
he was on a television program in which he repeated his strong objection to what the administration was doing and he'd have no part in it. I don't recall that he voted with us, 
and I had no further contact with Daley and I had no knowledge of what transpired, but I noted a little later that the congressman announced he would not be seeking reelection. 
Whether that could be attributed to his failure to be supportive of his leader in Chicago, I don't know. I rather suspect it had a lot to do with it. But in any event, that's an example 
of just what we were faced with. Finally--G: 
But let me ask you, do you remember his name? Was it [William] Dawson? 
O: No, no. I don't remember his name. If I check the record, I'll find his name and if I check 
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the voting record, I'll have his name quickly. I'm not reluctant regarding his name; it's eluding me at the moment, but my recollection is it was an Italian name. [Roland 
Libonati] 
Then it came to the point where Bobby Kennedy, Nick Katzenbach and everybody else involved, everybody is pounding doors and becoming awfully frustrated and we can't 
seem to get over this hurdle. McCulloch is being cooperative and so is Manny Celler. How do you get a majority vote out of the committee? Clearly you had to find some 
Republican support to go along with the moderate Democrats and overcome the handful of liberal Democrats. How could you piece this together? You needed several votes. 
The President and I discussed this. Our decision was to have the President contact Charlie Halleck. Now, Charlie Halleck was the minority leader; he was a conservative 
Republican. He was a worthy adversary. He was an aggressive, hard-hitting adversary. He and I had a pleasant personal relationship, but that had not deterred Charlie from 
opposing us at every turn of the road with a great deal of glee. Charlie had a nickname for me: O'Toole. To this day I've never known how that came about. We'd have little side 
bets supposedly, of a quarter or something, which were never paid off anyway. Charlie would say, "Well, this bill is coming up tomorrow. I've got you this time, O'Toole." And 
I'd say, "Well, Charlie, I'll make a bet with you that we'll beat you by ten," or something like that. Or "We'll get together after the vote and have a drink." "Okay, fine." Well, 
we'd beat him. I don't think we ever lost to him. Maybe there was one occasion. And Charlie would just come back for more, however, so we'd have to have the drink. Well, I 
had no interest in having a drink in the recess of the Capitol, but I'm not about to suggest to Charlie I'm not interested, so in I'd go. And Charlie would pour the drinks, a very 
heavy drink, and I'd always get into a chair where I could put the drink down behind the chair and forget it existed, and we'd have a conversation about the activities of the day and 
then we'd handshake and say, "Well, there'll be another time, and I'll get you the next time." Well, that was the background. 
There certainly was not anything I could look to in terms of potential support from Halleck on civil rights. But we have no alternative. There's nothing left. We've exhausted 
every possibility. So the President called Charlie, and he put it to him pleasantly. He said, "I need your help, need your support, and I wonder if you could see your way clear to talk 
to some of your colleagues on the committee and give us a hand on this." To my surprise and the President's, Charlie responded very well and said that he needed a little time and 
he would check the members of the committee and see if he couldn't persuade some of his Republican colleagues to join us. He even set up a time frame, "I'll get back to you by 
noon." Maybe it was noon the next day, maybe noon two days later, I forget, but I remember there was a deadline of noon. Well, I don't think we jumped up and down with 
joy, but that was a modicum of progress. Charlie at least had told us whether he would really do it or not. Who knew, but he told us he was going to make an effort to help us in 
this instance. 
The deadline came and I was in the Oval Office with the President and no call from 
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Charlie. We let the deadline go by and we were really on edge. It went by probably a half an hour to an hour, and finally we were looking at each other and what are you going to 
do? You might as well place the call to Charlie. And so he did. And Charlie apologized first for not getting back by the appointed time but said he had been delayed in being able 
to make his contacts, but he could now advise us that several members of the committee had seen it his way and would help vote the bill out. Well, we were just amazed. I made 
reference to it in my book because I thought it really belonged there. The Charlie Halleck I knew over those years I always recall in that context. That to me compensated for just 
about everything else that he might have done in opposition to us, which he did rather unsuccessfully anyway so we were never embittered by it. And it was voted out in 
committee. 
G: What led you to seek out Halleck to begin with? 
O: Desperation. Absolute desperation. You've done everything--everybody was involved, the department, the White House, and God knows who else, civil rights leaders, you name 
them. Everybody involved had been on this case, and you can't put the votes together. I will say, undertaking a presidential call to Halleck on this subject under those 
circumstances was not motivated by any feeling on our part that we were going to have any success; it was in desperation. What else is there that we could conceivably do that 
we haven't done? And that's what motivated the call. The bill was reported, and I say to this day that was the moment when you could say, "You're going to have enacted into law 
in this nation meaningful civil rights legislation. It's now unstoppable." 
There was the feeling that it never could emanate from the House anyway, that someday maybe you could convert Ev Dirksen to civil rights and that you could get some 
kind of movement in the Senate. Somehow this would be worked out in a different direction. But once the House committee had acted, the record had been established, and 
the road was forward and it was just then a matter of how long a trip you had. But there was no going back. 
(Interruption) 
G: Okay, we're on the civil rights bill. Richard Bolling introduced a discharge motion which was criticized as a political move since there was an agreement, apparently [between] the 
Democratic leadership and the White House, to furnish enough GOP votes. What do you recall about that discharge? 
O: Well, we didn't favor it either. 
G: Why do you think Bolling did that? 
O: I don't know. Bolling was a very active member, was looked to by liberals for leadership, and he was probably responding to his own constituency. But it was not a move that we 
favored. In fact, it was of concern to us, because rightly, McCulloch and Halleck and 
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some of those people could say, "Well, what's going on? Now you're making a partisan issue out of this when you wouldn't have a bill if it hadn't been for us. We understood that 
this bipartisanship that was shown in the committee would carry on through the process." All of that was valid. I don't remember having any conversation with Bolling. I may have, 
but I do know that that was a subject of discussion in the White House and that we were concerned about it. I remember specifically McCulloch reassuring him, telling him that we 
were not party to it. 
G: The motion failed, as I recall. 
O: Yes. That had to be a little bit of showbiz anyway, because at best discharge petitions, as we found out, are extremely difficult. I can't believe that a knowledgeable fellow like Dick 
Bolling would have any feeling that he could do this and have a success. So it had to be a part of establishing a record of some sort. It didn't make any political sense or legislative 
sense in our terms. 
G: You also had the dilemma of whether to tie the public accommodations section to the Fourteenth Amendment or to the interstate commerce clause. Do you recall the 
arguments here? 
O: No, I really don't. I recall the problem and, as you say, the dilemma, but I don't recall the proceedings attendant to it. 
G: It seems that your Republican allies favored one approach and the Justice Department favored the other, I guess the commerce clause. 
O: Well, the committee voted it out anyway, with the commerce clause, and that was a close vote, too. 
G: Okay. The liberal Republicans attempted to force a vote by bringing it up on the Calendar Wednesday--do you recall that?--in order to get the Democrats on record I guess for a 
vote. Albert adjourned the House to block that effort. 
O: I do recall, now that you've jogged my memory, that occurred, but there again, that's a little bit in the category of the discharge petition. You know, there's a little gamesmanship 
being played. That procedure, that Wednesday procedure, was doomed to failure from the outset and those that were participants knew that. Carl Albert had a simple procedure 
available to him and that was that. So I don't think that was of any moment to us. 
G: Okay. Now, in the Senate the public accommodations measure was referred to the Commerce Committee rather than the Judiciary Committee. Do you recall that? 
O: I recall its referral. How that came about I don't recall. 
G: How much discretion was there in terms of what committee a bill, particularly a 
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O'Brien --Interview V --32 
controversial bill, went to? 
O: Well, you go to leadership again. Some of those decisions were beyond our control, our significant input. Oftentimes they had to do with committee chairmen; they had to do with 
members of committees, they had to do with the leadership. Unless it was going to cause undue harm, it was more jurisdictional, more of an internal matter you'd leave alone. 
G: Okay, let's look at some of the related events that you've outlined as impacting on the expansion of the legislation and the focus of the legislation. You had the confrontation 
with George Wallace at the University of Alabama. Were you with President Kennedy at any time during this phase and recall any of his own deliberations on how to deal with 
that? 
O: I recall being with him, but I don't have any recollection of anything specific. Not being with him through the whole course of it, but being involved in the sense of being present 
during some aspects. I don't have any specific recollection beyond that frankly. Obviously I recall the occurrence, but I don't recall anything that would add to the record. 
G: Okay, how about the developments in Birmingham? 
O: Well, that was really a Justice Department area of responsibility and it was vigorously pursued. There was significant presence and immediate action. The record was being 
established that Bobby and his associates were going to act as decisively as they could in matters of this nature and everyone should understand it. 
G: You've mentioned how some of these events helped shape the legislation. Let me ask you if they helped shape the President's own attitudes about what was necessary. 
O: To some extent unspoken but reflected in the President's actions is a sensitivity to events as they developed in terms of adding a dimension to the possibilities of enacting 
legislation. How much evidence did we have that this was enhancing legislative progress? You're dealing with a subject that has gotten a maximum degree of public attention, and 
when that occurs it should mesh. 
This was an added dimension that was not anticipated at the beginning of 1963. It certainly had to enhance the possibilities. As you go back over the record of 1963 on the 
House side, you have to conclude that it may have enhanced but sure as the devil it underscored the difficulties you had prior to January of 1963 and the impossibility of 
getting anywhere, which was what our view was in 1961 and 1962. We certainly at the outset of 1963 hadn't taken the total plunge. We were trying to move in the right 
direction. Then as events unfolded, we became more and more aggressive. 
G: Do you feel that President Kennedy was shocked by the violence that took place that spring and summer? 
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O'Brien --Interview V --33 
O: Well, I know he was--I guess shocked would be fair, very much disturbed--because he made reference to this in conversations, his deep concern about it in human terms and as 
president. He was deeply concerned. By the same token, he and those around him recognized that it might in a strange way be affording an opportunity. But it was very 
disturbing and it was becoming more and more disturbing because it was getting out of hand. It was bringing about a national crisis. Obviously you couldn't sit around and 
tolerate this. You had to take whatever action was available as aggressively as you could. 
As far as Bobby was concerned through that period, I doubt that he devoted his attention to much of anything else. His strong right arms in this area--well, there were 
really two: Nick Katzenbach and Burke Marshall. All their time and attention was devoted to this mounting problem because confrontations were beginning to crop up 
regularly. I don't think at that time we were considering this as in the waning moments of a longtime struggle. It sort of had some of the elements of war to it. 
G: In August you had the March on Washington. How did the President react to this? 
O: Well, there again, as that March on Washington unfolded, it was an extremely dramatic presentation of concerns in an historic manner. That was the general attitude in the White 
House. This was an extremely important event in terms of American history. 
Tape 3 of 3, Side 1 
G: The March on Washington and a number of the other events that summer reflected the leadership of Martin Luther King. How did President Kennedy regard King? 
O: He greatly admired him. Bobby articulated his admiration of King more than Kennedy did, and that doesn't mean they didn't share equally this admiration. But he saw in King a 
true leader. I think the effort that Bobby made on the President's behalf is a clear indication in what regard they held him. There were those trying to undermine King 
during that period and later, up to his assassination. There were all kinds of rumors and stories around Washington regarding King. There was a major effort to try to destroy 
him. I'm not talking about killing him, but destroy him, destroy his reputation. 
G: Was this the FBI primarily? 
O: Yes. It seemed to emanate from the FBI. I never got deeply into that area. It didn't involve me directly, but I would pick it up and you'd find people on the Hill suggesting 
that they had been made privy to information the FBI had regarding King. The White House itself supposedly had been made privy to information regarding King. That 
information could have only been from one general source. To some extent, I think it probably was encouraged in some quarters on the Hill. 
G: But since the FBI was at least nominally under the control of the Justice Department, couldn't the Attorney General have done something to eliminate this? 
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O'Brien --Interview V --34 
O: I don't know how much evidence the Attorney General had of actual FBI involvement. Leaks can be, as we all know, carried out in ways that elude securing evidence. I don't 
really know what Bobby, what discussions he had with [J. Edgar] Hoover or what discussions Hoover had with the President. On rare occasions Hoover would ask to visit 
the President. Was it on that subject or just a courtesy call, I don't know. 
We have to remember, going way back before this period, Hoover's position in the FBI, which I was aware of back in the late forties. I was with a freshman congressman, 
Foster Furcolo, and we did the usual thing. You have this opportunity to do a little film for back home use in reporting to your constituents, and you want to get some dignitaries 
on with you to show that you are a person of influence. The first name on the list that we developed was J. Edgar Hoover, and J. Edgar Hoover was never reluctant to come to that 
recording studio on the Hill and do these bits for member after member, and every member wanted them. That kept improving his situation with the Congress. He was in 
one unique, unusual position. When he had reached retirement age, I never had in my mind the thought that some president was not going to announce that he was prepared to 
reappoint him. He had gotten beyond the norm; it was really a dangerous situation in a lot of ways, because he was beyond authority even from the White House. He was in a 
position that was downright scary. 
I probably met the man six times in my life. I had never had any discussions with him of any substance. As a young guy, I remember being present at that taping and being 
awfully impressed with him, and I think that was a view that most people had regarding this hero that was in every Crackerjack box. He was in a position to gain a great deal of 
information about a great number of people. Whether he ever utilized that information in his interests, which he was accused of often, I don't know. 
But going back to Martin Luther King, I guess that it's pretty clear. I always hesitate to report matters on the basis of learning third-or fourth-hand without evidence, 
then recounting it as fact, when I really don't know whether or not it's fact. I guess in this instance with Hoover re Martin Luther King, there's enough evidence on the record of FBI 
interest in King to indicate that Hoover was making a particular effort in that area. 
G: Did President Kennedy ever explore the possibility, do you think, of trying to retire Hoover or put him out to pasture? 
O: I'm not aware of it. No, I never had any conversation with him about Hoover. 
G: How about Robert Kennedy? Did he ever--? 
O: I never had any conversation with him either. I just don't know. 
G: Why do you think LBJ didn't share President Kennedy's admiration of King? 
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O'Brien --Interview V --35 
O: I don't know that either. I'll have to say that I was not directly aware of the fact that he didn't share his admiration. It never came into a conversation I had with LBJ as vice 
president or president. But there was some undercurrent there I never tried to explore. 
G: It seems almost as if LBJ considered King a rival or a threat, whereas Kennedy did not? Is that possible? 
O: I don't know how it could be possible. It seems to me there would be no reason because of my conviction regarding LBJ's civil rights commitments. I can't conceive of a reason 
why he would not look favorably upon King. After all, he was engaged in what amounted to a peaceful revolution. I think some of King's activities helped contain other possible 
activities that could have been very disruptive. And his constant plea for peaceful actions within the law certainly was helpful. Something is eluding me, because I really don't know 
how Johnson could have envisioned that King was a rival; it's beyond me. 
G: Let me turn it around the other way. Did you see any evidence of an alliance or friendship between Johnson and King? 
O: No, but it could exist and I wouldn't be aware of it. I know that I never had any discussion with Johnson regarding King that I can recall. I never, therefore, had any 
recognition that Johnson might not feel kindly disposed toward him or supportive of him. I'd have no reason to think otherwise. And if indeed that were the case, I just honestly 
can't figure out why. Obviously, if he did feel that way there were reasons. What could they be? Just speculating, I assume Johnson was privy to whatever information Hoover 
had regarding King. Maybe that turned him off on King. I don't know; I have no idea. 
G: I wonder if it could have at all been a generational thing and the fact that Johnson was quite a bit older than King, whereas Kennedy was younger. 
O: I don't know that. But after all, there was a great change on the part of all of us. I mean, Negroes referred to themselves as Negroes in those days. There was a rapid change and 
there was a great sensitivity to how you reacted to black people, how you communicated with them. I've lived through it all; I'm old enough to have lived through it from the 
beginning. There was a matter of adjustment, and there was a sensitivity on the part of whites, a great sensitivity. Just how do you relate, how do you avoid any misunder-standing, 
and what is proper use of the language to the point of the proper handshake? I wound up with an organization that was over 70 per cent black. I would never have 
called a Negro a black as a young fellow; I would probably feel that if it ever came to my mind that was an insult. So I really didn't know just what the rules were, and you had to 
learn as you went along. So that could be a generation gap. And if you refer to some of the other leaders of the civil rights movement, some of those were not people that I felt 
comfortable with. 
G: Who, for example? 
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O'Brien --Interview V --36 
O: I think the group in which--I can't even think of the name of it--the fellow walked around in overalls and disrupted my meetings in Miami and was belligerent and boisterous. He 
and a couple of others like him were floating around the country and I was not at all impressed with them. In fact, as John McCormack said, my position was I held them in a 
minimum of high regard. 
King was different totally. King exuded leadership. He could articulate his positions. He was a responsible leader. King could have lit a match any day and you 
would have had a national conflagration. He chose to go in the other direction and be very tolerant and even-handed as he pursued his course. I never knew King intimately. I 
may have shaken hands with him twice in my life, but I had to be impressed. I think part of being impressed with King was my feeling toward some of the others who were 
traveling a different road entirely. 
G: Do you think that King's opposition to the war in Vietnam was perhaps a factor in estrangement from LBJ? 
O: That would make sense because obviously, where the President sat, opposition to the war in Vietnam could disturb you and cause you to be damn mad. I for one did not appreciate 
King's view on the war in Vietnam. It had nothing to do with Johnson. I resented it. As long as King confined himself to the area that I accepted as his area of leadership, I was 
supportive. But when he decided to move into a so-called peace movement and articulate that aspect of his views, he lost me. But that was personal; I had a son in Vietnam and I 
wasn't about to accept all this garbage, whether it was Jane Fonda or King or whoever. 
Of course, there was a time frame here. If that attitude toward King existed before Johnson was president, that's another thing, if it was a longtime position he had. But if it 
was evidenced during the period of Vietnam and King's position on the war, then it does make sense. 
G: Looking over that civil rights bill that was ultimately passed the following year as the 1964 Civil Rights Act, I want you to contrast President Kennedy's approach to the legislation 
with President Johnson's. I'm going to load the question to a certain extent, because it seems, particularly from looking at that Sorensen phone call, that Johnson was much more 
inclined to press it in terms of a moral issue, whereas President Kennedy would advocate it in terms of a legal or an issue of justice. Do you think this is an accurate reading of the 
difference? 
O: I think President Kennedy would have had no difficulty pursuing civil rights legislation as a moral issue, as long as he never overlooked the reality that he was not going to get 
legislation at that time under those circumstances. There's a certain judgment that goes into this, but I think with Lyndon Johnson and his suggestions on pressing the issue come 
hell or high water, do or die, that's all well and good if you're trying to reinforce your position with the public generally in a political context, but if you are trying to envision 
just how you bring about legislation, I would argue with Johnson in that regard. And I 
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O'Brien --Interview V --37 
would say that I don't think anyone can lay claim to having stronger views than anyone else in this area and this administration. 
It's a matter of how you accomplish it. How often have you seen the parades and the waving of the banners and chuckle and say, well, that's nice, and there'll be a lot of 
media attention and we'll see it on the evening news, but hell, it doesn't mean anything. It's not going to get the job done. I think his view was that if you pressed it as a moral 
issue and you were aggressively out front, that could lead you to legislative success too, so you'd have the best of both worlds. I would like to have shared that view. That's the 
natural course to follow, but I think if you have a responsibility to do everything that you can to bring about a law of the land in a meaningful sense, you have to carefully carve out 
that course and not be overly antagonistic to those that you hope someday may see it your way. And that's difficult. That's not the easy road, that's the tough road. 
It's all right to think back and conclude what was best to do and I'm not questioning his motives, but I would say to him, "Mr. Vice President, realistically I don't 
think that's going to get us where we want to go. In fact, it may delay where we want to go and may be counterproductive." 
G: Did you notice any difference in tenor from one president to the next on this bill? Was Johnson more inclined in his own mind to see it as a moral cause rather than an issue of 
justice or law? 
O: I would have to lean to concluding that he saw it more as a moral cause than just a law. I think he saw it as a crusade. It had the elements of a crusade, this great battle being 
waged for right and for justice. There's nothing wrong with that. And I don't think that was a point of view he adopted after he was president. There were clear indications from 
this memo that it was a view he had early on, that he was disturbed the administration wasn't reacting accordingly and that the President was not out there waving the banner in 
that crusade. I don't think it was political motivation. You could debate the pros and cons of this ad infinitum, but on the one hand I wouldn't for a moment question, and I'll 
repeat it again because I had all the evidence any man ever could have, I could never question Lyndon Johnson's commitment in this area. He was wedded to this cause. But 
by the same token, I would also not question Kennedy's commitment to this cause and that he was wedded to it. 
G: My question really addresses more what it says about each person's frame of reference rather than their goals or their commitment. It's basically their perspective and how 
they're thinking on this issue. 
O: I don't think I'm equipped to make a judgment on that point. Regardless of how the issue was approached or how it was handled, I don't think there would be an iota of difference 
in terms of the bottom line between the two men in that regard. I really don't. 
You know, it's a little like Jack and Bobby. If you were talking about this issue 
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when you met with Bobby, you'd find Bobby bordering on the violent. He would be exercised and committed and you'd say, "That guy, he's going to go through ten walls to 
be sure this is finally accomplished." You would sit with Jack Kennedy and it wouldn't be the same conversation at all. Jack Kennedy would be far less emotional. But there 
wouldn't be one iota of difference between the two of them in terms of their attitudes and views and commitments. I think it's the personality of people more than anything else. 
Kennedy was the kind of a guy--it took me a long time to realize how much physical suffering he went through, with all my intimate acquaintance with him over 
fourteen years. In my early days with him when he was a candidate for the Senate, I would see him on crutches and then I would see him without the crutches. I would see 
him in a hotel room, when we were in the midst of a day of many events, obviously not feeling well, and I'd say nothing and he'd say nothing. He never had a conversation with 
me about physical problems other than on one occasion, and I never forgot it. Way back when he was in the Senate as a freshman and that back problem continued to cause him 
great difficulty, I wasn't aware of it until we had lunch in the Ritz Hotel in Boston--I believe it was probably a Saturday--when he told me that he was leaving after lunch for 
New York and he was going to be operated on against the view of his family, his father and others, who felt that he should not undertake anything as dangerous as that. He had 
been advised by the Lahey Clinic not to be operated on, but he wasn't going to live with it. Well, heck, I'm sitting there with my mouth hanging open, because I don't believe the 
extent of his problem had totally penetrated with me. I was taken aback that this man was saying to me, "This is it." I was just shook, and we parted and it was that following night 
on national news. It was announced that he had been operated on and had been given the last rites of the Catholic church. And off my conversation with him at lunch, I sat there 
thinking, "This is it." 
It took months to overcome that and go about his business. I mean, a fellow living that way is apt to be different. He wasn't a fellow that complained. I realized that over 
those earlier years I must have imposed upon him all kinds of activities, i. e., standing in receiving lines for hours, where he must have been suffering inordinately, and yet I didn't 
have any evidence of it, nor did he ever communicate it with me. And what had happened in the hotel in Springfield was that he caved in and I had to get a doctor to fit him for 
crutches. I made an announcement to the press that he was called back to Washington and canceled the rest of the schedule. That's when it began to hit me. 
Well, with all of that you have a fellow who comes from a little different direction than we do. Lyndon Johnson's nature was to be out front, articulate, and espouse in what 
was a colorful manner at length at times. You'd never have a conversation with Kennedy to the extent and length that you'd have with Lyndon Johnson on any subject. It wasn't his 
nature. 
When I was doing my book I couldn't understand why I could put together a long list of Lyndon Johnson anecdotes and stories, a man with whom I had a shorter 
association with than I had had with Jack Kennedy, and the Jack Kennedy side of the 
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O'Brien --Interview V --39 
column was almost nonexistent. How could I know Kennedy fourteen years and have difficulty giving a balanced anecdotal aspect to this book? Well, it finally hit me that 
Kennedy was a great listener; he loved stories and he loved anecdotes. He loved to laugh. But he did the listening. That's why a Dave Powers was repeatedly asked to tell those 
stories, because even though Kennedy had heard them a hundred times he'd laugh again. But Johnson was the storyteller, Kennedy was the listener. 
And you get to civil rights and whether it's a moral issue. You can't avoid the very different personalities. I don't think that you necessarily come to the conclusion that they 
had different points of view. 
In the activities of these two very different people, we've reflected on the fact that Johnson would retain grudges, while Kennedy would do his thing with whatever grudge 
he had and then go on. Johnson rather enjoyed confrontation, but in a much different way than Kennedy. Kennedy enjoyed confrontation because he loved the battle. Whether it 
was a physical battle or a mental battle he wanted to wage it. And I have all kinds of evidence of that. I don't think Lyndon Johnson would approach a battle in that sense. He 
might try to persuade the Houston ministers; he might seize the opportunity to meet with them and hopefully turn them around. Kennedy would approach the Houston ministers in 
the sense of defiance saying, "Hell, I don't care if it's the Houston ministers, the Texas delegation, or whoever. Let me at them." And he would not dwell on the result; the 
action he was engaged in was satisfying. 
G: Whereas Johnson might dwell on the outcome? 
O: Yes. So what are you going to do with these two guys? We're trying to evaluate, analyze, try to come up with scraps of evidence or perceptions that might give us a lead, 
and all we have in common really is the two fellows held the same office. 
G: When you were discussing how Kennedy repressed, in this case, physical pain, I think what a contrast it must have been to LBJ, who seemed to just wear his heart on his sleeve 
and be pouring out all of his problems. 
O: Yes. 
G: Is this the case? Was it a--? 
O: Never with LBJ, and believe me, I never felt uncomfortable; I never felt uptight, I never felt in any kind of awe. I enjoyed him and I felt that as far as I was concerned we 
communicated well. I admired him particularly for his tenacious efforts in the legislative area, and the extent he would go to get across to you that he was supportive of you and 
that you could depend upon him. He wanted to be a participant and to share your problems as he expected you to share his. That wasn't Jack Kennedy. 
G: How so? 
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O'Brien --Interview V --40 
O: Well, Jack Kennedy wasn't that kind of a fellow. I can imagine if I had called Jack Kennedy at three o'clock in the morning, as Johnson suggested to me. If I had done it 
Johnson would have thought nothing of it. It would have appalled me if I had contemplated doing something like that. Nevertheless, Johnson gently reprimanded me 
for delaying until seven-thirty to give him bad news. I should have called him so he could have bled with me, as he put it. (Laughter) Now, with Jack Kennedy, the greatest 
emotion I probably saw him [express] in the legislative context was the day I told him we lost the minimum wage bill, when he took the letter opener and stuck it like a dagger into 
the top of the desk. But that was highly unusual for Kennedy. 
Now, the Kennedy I knew may not have necessarily been the Kennedy that his social acquaintances knew. You have to remember that I was comfortable with my 
relationship with him--what I would have to term a professional relationship. There was no question that we had common interests and we shared common views and he knew the 
regard I held for him, because I wouldn't have made the sacrifices I did personally on his behalf if I didn't feel strongly. The other side of that coin is that he respected me and what 
I was engaged in or he would not have indirectly taken on his father, as I recounted one time, who objected to what I was doing. He wound up supporting me rather than caving 
in to his father. 
G: Well, let me ask you to go into this one area a little bit more. Who were his social friends? 
O: His intimate friends were fellows he had been in the service with. Red [Paul] Fay was one of them, and there were two or three others that I met. Red Fay I met often because he 
became involved in the political scene. The other friends were--the longest and closest was Lem [Lemoyne] Billings. I say the longest and closest because Lem Billings was ever 
present, and it was obvious that Jack enjoyed his companionship. There were a handful of others that went back to Harvard and his days at Choate. I believe Lem went to Choate, 
and there was a fellow from my home town I believe probably went that far back with him by the name of Reed [?]. They were truly longtime friends. 
Now, there's nothing unusual about that. Beyond that, you're talking about friends sought out by him who went to the PT boat, a little bit of Choate, and a touch of Harvard. 
But the PT boat was very important. I think that's what occurs, because it's interesting in my own son, who went to Harvard and was in the service, that the friends that he's 
retained over the years are apt to be the fellows he had an intimate association with in the service rather than the fellows he went to school with. Maybe the experiences you share 
are more deep and abiding than perhaps the experiences of school. 
I would be invited, my wife and I, to the compound from time to time. We visited there quite often, down at Hyannis. We would visit with Jack and Jackie after they were 
married, on occasion, and stay at their home in Washington. But I was not on the regular list of invitees for various social events. 
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O'Brien --Interview V --41 
G: You mean at social events at the White House or before this? 
O: No. The social events at the White House were never social events; they were all business. We went to more White House black tie dinners than you could shake a stick at 
until we were so sick of them that we'd be the first ones out, down the back stairway through the rear entrance of the White House. I remember one night running into one of 
the cabinet members dashing with his wife--we bumped into each other. We had to laugh because we were both making a hasty exit before the entertainment of the evening. 
So, no, I'm talking events that would take place in McLean with Bobby and Ethel or things of that nature. That's the way it was and that's the way I liked it. I'll have to say 
that I didn't find much in common with some of those peripheral social acquaintances he had. The fellows that I met--the PT boat fellows and Lem and a couple of the others--I 
liked and I could readily understand why they were close friends. But when you got beyond that, whether somebody was being dumped into the swimming pool was of no 
interest to me and I would much prefer not to be involved. 
G: Was Johnson different in this regard in terms of--? 
O: I didn't have the longtime association with Johnson that I had with Kennedy and yet Johnson and Lady Bird reached out to Elva and me in a variety of ways. 
Tape 3 of 3, Side 2 
G: You say you were included in activities that you--O: 
It was a relaxed atmosphere. I was in the living quarters with the Johnsons very often. I did obviously spend a lot of time with the President because he was a late night guy, in the 
office or over in the living quarters. Because of his keen interest in the activities I was engaged in, I would be with him. Mrs. Johnson was very thoughtful and kind to Elva; that 
was her nature. She would make a point of having contact with cabinet wives and staff wives. You shared their excitement at the weddings of their daughters. The same with 
Kennedy weddings, but I'm talking about a fellow that I didn't know nearly as well as I knew Jack Kennedy. So the whole thing was a very pleasant experience that Elva and I 
treasure. Elva, also, always enjoyed Jackie's company. 
But on the Johnson side the difference is that I was not a long-time acquaintance; I was not an intimate, yet you felt totally comfort-able. There was a sensitivity to staff 
people and a recognition of what they were engaged in. When I would sit around with him up in the Mansion, I didn't experience the high emotional levels that were attributed to 
him, flaring up at staff people, that were recounted often. After Dallas you had a Johnson staff and a Kennedy staff side by side in the same building. They could never be totally 
melded, and in fact there was an excessive number of employees, too. But I don't recall that Johnson could flare up and strike out. 
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O'Brien --Interview V --42 
G: Was this something Kennedy was less inclined to do, do you think? 
O: Yes. I don't think perhaps you could find two more different people, the more we talk about this. 
G: Was Johnson more likely to involve himself in your personal life than Kennedy was, would you say? 
O: No. 
G: I'm thinking of all sorts of things ranging from your wife's activities to maybe in one case helping select a tie or showing you how to part your hair or something. 
O: No, there wasn't that closeness. I had to adjust myself to Lyndon Johnson. One of the early occasions--I never forgot because it was so unusual--was a dinner at his home where 
there were Jack Brooks, Bobby Baker, their wives, Elva and I, and the Johnsons. It was a cold night and I remember it started by Johnson feeling that we should see the house and 
the grounds. I recall he put floodlights on, and the grounds were barren and it was cold. We took a stroll around the grounds and he had music coming from the trees. That didn't 
end the tour, for we went through the house, through every room in the house, including every bedroom. As this went on, he pulled out a sport shirt with LBJ on it, and he said, 
"Now I want you to have this." Then he had a bottle of perfume for Elva and then he had something else from another room. I remember that whatever collection we had of these 
gifts, I put them on the table in the foyer and I felt uncomfortable about them. 
The evening progressed and it came time to leave, and he caught me. He was right, I didn't admit it, but the collection was all on the table. I didn't make an attempt to 
pick it up. He said, "Well, aren't you going to--?" "Oh," I said. He said, "No, you were going to walk out without them. You just were going to avoid"--or something to that 
effect. The son of a gun had me figured. So I hauled off and brought them home. 
(Laughter) 
Then I guess it was after Christmas--yes, Christmas of 1963--I forget who said, "The President wants you to have this as a little memento of Christmas." There was a 
beautifully wrapped box. It was a wristwatch, engraved. It was very nice. 
Then there was another occasion when I was at the Ranch and the President said something about the deer. Well, I had been able to avoid entrapment in hunting deer, and 
I was congratulating myself because some others who had no interest in hunting deer had been entrapped. I think he realized that he had not gotten me out on the early morning 
hunt, but I had to see the deer. He's driving the car and you go out bouncing over the fields. Finally we pull up and there are some deer in a little distance, and he said, "Now, 
give me a cigarette." So I gave him a cigarette and he opened his window a little bit, stuck the cigarette out and the deer came over and swallowed the cigarette. So we kept 
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O'Brien --Interview V --43 
putting the cigarettes out and the deer just loved the cigarettes. You're sitting with him out there, well, I mean, who have I known in life that I'd. . . . 
This sort of thing was not that unusual, like the swimming pool incident, he and I debating some issue, and [Dan] Rostenkowski to his dying day will never forget the two 
of us standing there belly to belly discussing something intensely. Well, hell, forget the fact that by that time you had become--I hadn't, I had never known anybody like that 
among my friends and acquaintances. (Laughter) But you had to take it in the spirit in which you assumed it was meant. And I think the leavening factor in all that was Lady 
Bird. She was always so pleasant and so interested in things and so apparently happy to see you. It was just a very comfortable situation. 
G: Was he more inclined toward gift giving than Jack Kennedy, do you think? 
O: Oh, yes. In our early days there were a couple of occasions where Jack and I exchanged Christmas gifts, neckties or something, but that wasn't the norm. Nor did you even think 
about it in those terms. You might send each other a Christmas card and that was the end of that. It was a different atmosphere and a different approach. 
G: Do you think that regional differences explain part of this, Johnson being from the South or the Southwest and Kennedy from New England? 
O: Yes. I wouldn't be able to document it because I come from the same region that Kennedy came from, but I think that's part of it. I think there was a basic lifestyle that was 
different, too, and background, in terms of here's a fellow that had worked for the NYA. Jack Kennedy never worked for the NYA or anyone else. The Johnson family wasn't as 
large a family as the Kennedy family, spread out over the landscape. I never knew Johnson's parents, but I did know Kennedy's parents, their family activities and their 
approach to things. I suppose that if both of them hadn't been president you wouldn't think anything of it. But when you get a query about these two fellows to relate the two 
of them--your observations of them in the same position--it does bring you to the contrast. 
Another thing--and I think he more than half meant it--we had occasions where Johnson was pretty much persuaded that we had pulled a lot of fast dealings--we, the 
Kennedy people--in terms of the nomination in 1960. He had assurances from his staff people traveling the country, delegate counts and the rest, and he found that they were 
completely out of whack. Where he had delegate commitments, somehow we had gotten with those people and gotten the delegates away from him. And it was always in the 
context of admiration, despite my repeated assurances to him that I would be glad to claim that if it were accurate, but it wasn't, and we just weren't that skillful or politically astute. 
Lady Bird one night was reading The Last Hurrah, and she mentioned it to me that she was in the midst of the book. She said, "I've got to ask you. This is a novel, but 
I'm told that it's an accurate portrayal of politics with a significant Irish tinge to it in that era in Boston. Is that true?" I said, "That is factual. That's not a novel." She was disbe-
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O'Brien --Interview V --44 
lieving; she said, "Gosh, that's a bunch of colorful characters and all this stuff that went on." She said she was enjoying the book. 
Johnson was in awe of Dick Daley. Jack Kennedy could understand Dick Daley; they had a relationship. It was a natural evolvement in the political context. Daley could 
deliver; Daley expected in return to be duly recognized. But with Lyndon Johnson, a telephone call from Dick Daley was about as important a call as he could receive. He 
would be concerned about Dick Daley's area of interest at the moment and that Dick Daley would be pleased and satisfied. Johnson would be sure that whatever request was 
made was carried out. He said to me, "You know, I'm persuaded that you Irish politicians, you and Daley and those fellows, get together and you have one of those 
secret societies. You have one of these clubs somewhere and you meet regularly." (Laughter) "You've got this sort of communication network," and I'm sitting there 
laughing and I think he was half serious! He thought there was some additional element in the fact that we shared a common heritage that brought us into some kind of a clandestine 
organization. I thought it was awfully funny. I assume he was pulling my leg, but I think that there was a little touch of, I don't know, "there's something strange about you people, 
there's something I can't quite grasp." 
G: But do you think that ethnic heritage or political experience enabled Kennedy to, for example, understand Daley better than Johnson did? 
O: I think it's probably not so much understand him but know how to handle him. 
G: He'd been dealing with Irish politicians all his life. 
O: The difference with Daley--most Irish politicians would be a little more like Johnson, outgoing, story-telling, back-slapping--was that Daley was a Buddha. You could sit and 
talk with Daley and his voice level wouldn't alter. The communication would be somewhat limited because he would speak in brief sentences. He could express his 
position in about three sentences, no more than that necessary. He was a fellow that you looked at not necessarily with awe, but you saw that he was truly a boss, and you'd better 
believe it. 
G: Was Johnson really one of a kind or were there similar personalities among the senators and congressmen who were from the same region that he was? 
O: I think that some aspects of Johnson would be similar, but I think he was really one of a kind. Now, the average southern senator--I dealt with them and southern congressmen--I 
found that, running through my dealings with them, uniformly there was a level of--how do I best describe it?--they were always most courteous, always attentive to what you 
were saying, always ensuring that you were comfortable with them. The fellows that I would know best, in the Northeast, you walk into their office and they might neglect to 
ask you to sit down. But with a southern representative in the Congress, you were greeted by the staff with the utmost courtesy and pleasantness. You were always brought 
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O'Brien --Interview V --45 
to the member without any undue delay. The member would express concern that you were comfortable and did you want to have a cup of coffee. And I think that's probably 
part of the makeup of the South, not only elected representatives. I enjoy them thoroughly, and to me, in the early days, this was a relatively new experience. I had 
gotten to know a number of these people in the political context but that was pretty much a rush in and out sort of thing. You didn't get to know them in the sense of having a 
lengthy conversation or a cup of coffee with them. 
Johnson had all of those elements, but along with it he had this style that certainly was not typical of southern members. He was one of a kind. He was a very unique guy. 
But the courtesies and the extension of effort to be sure that "have you had enough to eat?" or "would you like another drink?" or "are you comfortable there?" or "Elva, what 
would you like to do?" that sort of thing, I think you see much more of it in the South and Southwest than you do where I come from. Now, I'm not suggesting my own kind of 
people geographically are not courteous and kind and considerate, but it's just a different approach. It's a more relaxed [approach]. This doesn't apply to Johnson necessarily, but I 
always found it--well, not long ago I was in with Jake Pickle. I hadn't seen Jake in quite a while. Gosh, it's just sort of like old times. You walk in and Jake [says], "Oh, sit over 
here. Let's have a cup of coffee," and he did some reminiscing and we chatted. He was busy, I knew, and I wasn't trying to delay him but we had just a pleas-ant half-hour. 
That's the way they are, even when they were saying no to you. (Laughter) 
G: Do you think that the age difference between Johnson and Kennedy was part of the fundamental differences between them? Was Johnson more old-fashioned? He was older 
than Kennedy. 
O: I think there's some of that with all of us. I find that I'm having that experience now. I find that the arrogant wise guy I was during a period of my life I see in others of a 
comparable age now. Now I'm looking at it from the position of the elder and I'm very tolerant of it, in fact, without realizing that I'm one of the elders. I've had it happen in the 
NBA where my own staff was very young. I've always had a young staff over the years and in the NBA particularly. I was building a staff and I was looking for the young, 
vigorous bright guys that have a sports interest, and so consequently I wound up with a top staff that was different than my predecessor, all young. But this slipped every now 
and then. Concerning somebody in the league in my age group, every once in a while they'd say, "Oh, Christ, that old so-and-so. What does he know?" or "He's bordering on 
senility if he hasn't arrived." I'd see one of them look at me and realize, "We forgot the old man was sitting here." 
I think every young person has an element of that in him and it's natural. As you get to middle age, you begin to balance it out a little. Then when you get older, you are 
sensitive to the fact that you've got something to overcome in communicating with someone thirty years younger than you are. Life changes and lifestyles change and points 
of view change. Everything changes. My God, look at the changes I've seen in my years. 
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O'Brien --Interview V --46 
G: As you moved from Kennedy to Johnson, did you feel like you were now working for someone who had perhaps a more old-fashioned view of the world around him or a less 
modern view? 
O: I don't think it entered my mind, because my view of the world around me might not necessarily be totally Kennedy's view of the world around him. We came from a different 
background. The only tie that Kennedy and I would have is a comparable ethnic background. He was a third generation and I am a first generation, so I didn't even think 
that was comparable. 
G: You don't think the generational difference was a factor in terms of--? 
O: I don't think there was a difference there. Jack Kennedy was in his mid-forties. He and I were only six weeks apart in age. We were con-temporaries. That brought us into the 
White House at, what, forty-one, forty-two?--something like that. How old was Johnson at that time? 
O: Let's see, he was born in 1908. 
O: 1908. God, there was only nine years difference, ten years difference between the two of them. 
G: Was Johnson a less secure individual than Kennedy, do you think? 
O: Probably so. But I think when you say that you have to quickly focus on the position he held, because I found insecurity apparent with Hubert Humphrey re Lyndon Johnson. 
And I'm not at all sure that that isn't the nature of things with the unique system we have. I'm sure that Lyndon Johnson would often wonder about whether or not Jack Kennedy 
was happy with him or happy with his performance. Now, under a different set of circumstances would he exhibit that kind of insecurity, I don't know. I think not, because 
he was, after he joined the Senate, pretty much in a position of being first among equals. But I can bet as we're talking that George Bush every day gives a thought to whether or 
not Ronnie Reagan is happy with him. Is there anything he did that might not please the President or anything he's going to do that day that might not please the President? I think 
there's a considerable sensitivity there. With Hubert that was his nature, the kind of fellow he was. He'd say to me, "Do you think the President feels I'm doing a good job? Does the 
President have any problems with me that you're aware of?" But I'll bet that that would be in the mind of anyone in that position. 
G: Did Johnson seem to have a less cohesive political philosophy than Kennedy? Was he more fluid or more perhaps. . . ? 
O: Johnson's political philosophy, his general political outlook and his views generally would coincide with mine. We used to say in Massachusetts, "You're born a Catholic and a 
Democrat." I think with Johnson we were both born Democrats, and Kennedy as 
50
O'Brien --Interview V --47 
well--traditional to the FDR concept and approach to social problems and belief in and commitment to the party. I would consider Johnson and Kennedy in that mold. You 
exchanged views with Johnson about the NYA and the CCC and Roosevelt and those weren't discussions I had with Jack Kennedy. I could equate with those. After all, I lived 
through the era of the WPA and I imagine our economic level in life was somewhat comparable. That wasn't the case with Kennedy. 
But there are people to this day that are disbelieving when I recount my period with Lyndon Johnson and recount it in the terms I do--what I considered a good working 
relationship, the way he and his wife treated me and my wife, the enjoyment I derived from the involvement, the effort and the results, the sharing of concerns and sharing of 
problems in a very warm and outgoing manner. I add it all up, and I'll have to tell you that I have no reason to ever remotely share the views of some regarding Lyndon Johnson who 
claim they had a long acquaintance with him and were negative regarding him. I don't think that you make judgments on that; you can only make them on your own experience. 
Now, if I had a limited experience with Lyndon Johnson and he was a casual acquaintance, I'd probably accept a lot of the stories I heard. After eight years of 
involvement, you certainly can make judgments. You're probably in a far better position to make judgments than a lot of people and it comes out a significant plus. I had this 
discussion with an old acquaintance--this goes back a few years now--a few years after his departure, and the bitterness had grown in this man, and there was no discernible reason. 
It just eluded me. 
G: This was a Kennedy man? 
O: Yes. We spent an evening on this subject. We didn't wind up in a mean confrontation, but we weren't far from it, because he could not for the life of him accept my evaluation of 
Lyndon Johnson and my recounting of my experience with him. He wasn't going to accept it, never would, and as I continued to recount he became more and more negative. 
I'm positive I'm right. And I think it's unfortunate, frankly. My reaction the next day when I told my wife about the prior evening was it depressed me and I felt sorry for him. 
I thought it was a sad commentary. But I guess Lyndon Johnson had the capacity to elicit strong views pro and con. 
G: Others have noted the difference in style between Jack Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. 
O: Sure. There was a total difference in style. It went to dress; it went to areas of interest, it went to social life, the whole thing. They were completely different. I don't think you 
probably could find two more different fellows. Kennedy was idolized by many; he was a handsome guy, admired by women to an inordinate degree. He exuded that Harvard look 
and air, at least what people discerned as a Harvard look and air, and he had an accent that fitted into the pattern. Johnson came from Texas, from a little town, the basic farm belt 
originally, I guess. A world of difference in style. 
End of Tape 3 of 3 and Interview V 
51
    [ Part 6: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--61 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview VI*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
Project. In addition, some interviews were done for the Library under the auspices of the National Archives and the White House during the Johnson administration. 
Some of the Library's many oral history transcripts are available on the INTERNET. Individuals whose interviews appear on the INTERNET may have other interviews available on 
paper at the LBJ Library. Transcripts of oral history interviews may be consulted at the Library or lending copies may be borrowed by writing to the Interlibrary Loan Archivist, LBJ Library, 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW VI 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview VI, 2/ 11/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
For Electronic Copy on Diskette from the LBJ Library: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview VI, 2/ 11/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
3
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-17 
4
O'Brien --Interview VI --1 
INTERVIEW VI 
DATE: February 11, 1986 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 4, Side 1 
G: [Let me ask you about some] issues in 1963. 
O: Yes. First of all, [I'll try] to summarize Kennedy and then we'll go to LBJ's style. 
The Kennedy I first knew was a fellow who had decided to run for statewide office in Massachusetts. As he traveled the state to become acquainted beyond his congressional 
district, he had a set speech, and this came off some world traveling. He never seemed to be at ease. As time went on and he made this speech more often, he seemed to relax a 
little more. But from the outset you could detect that communication didn't come easy to him. Of course, he was put to the test with Henry Cabot Lodge and he became much 
more politically expert. But in campaigns, in the primaries, and even later he had to work hard at the backslapping, handshaking phase of politics and the one-on-one outside of 
plant gates. While he became more adept at it and actually became widely recognized as an extremely capable communicator, particularly when he got to the presidential press 
conferences, the point I want to make is that from the outset it did not come naturally. In fact, it was a difficult task for him to accommodate himself to a relaxed attitude toward 
the street-corner campaigning. 
That reflected itself in the White House, when we were engaged in legislative struggles and had these various meetings. Jack Kennedy could not bring himself to 
strong-arm, members of Congress to secure their vote. He'd make his presentation and he was relaxed in that regard. He knew his subject, they liked him, and he had a great asset 
there. But you would finish one of these sessions with twenty or thirty members of Congress, and everything was fine except that you couldn't take a head count when they 
departed. There was one line you didn't cross and that was to say, "Now, let's go around this room, and where are we, and where are you?" 
Now, to Lyndon Johnson. I don't know how Lyndon Johnson was in his younger days or as a member of Congress. I didn't become acquainted with him until he was on 
the ticket with Jack Kennedy. But I heard about his efforts as majority leader and how hard he worked at it. I remember I was particularly impressed on election night when 
Kennedy was elected to the Senate that one of the first out-of-Massachusetts calls was from Lyndon Johnson, lining him up to support him for majority leader. Others have to 
5
O'Brien --Interview VI --2 
testify to how Johnson actually functioned as majority leader. I can only assume that it was reasonably accurate to say that he worked awfully at it; he knew where the bodies 
were; he wheeled and dealed in terms of getting legislative enactment; and he was considered very expert at it. He had achieved a great reputation as majority leader. 
Then as vice president, he of course had to adjust. He didn't have the muscle that he had as majority leader. That was made clear to him from the outset. He was in a 
different category and he was no longer really a member of the club. As we've discussed before, he felt that he would maintain basically the same leadership position with the 
Senate that he had had as majority leader. That was reflected in his early-on commitment to spend a great deal of time up in the Senate and to retain his majority leader office. In 
due course it became apparent that that wasn't working as he had envisioned it. So he had to adjust. 
His efforts in the legislative program were intense. His involvement was as full as could be. He enlisted everybody possible. There were times in the White House when 
just about everybody on the staff was involved in one way or another in some legislative struggle. [They would] have assignments from him or from me to work with individual 
members. I remember the Texas staff people in the White House working on the Texas delegation at various times. 
The leadership breakfasts would be comparable to the Kennedy period and were the same in terms of those present. Johnson's style didn't change, although there had been 
the vice presidential period when he had indicated to me on occasions that he didn't feel he could move people as he used to. He would try and he'd try mightily, and he'd get 
frustrated. But then as president, with great vigor, he moved back into the fray and started to devote a tremendous amount of his time and effort to the legislative program. 
If you had a Kennedy meeting in the White House residence with the appropriate members of Congress to sell them on support of a particular legislative proposal, you have 
the Kennedy meeting conducted the way I described it. The Johnson meetings, however, would move to that last mile, where Johnson would make an effort to individually 
determine the position of members present. And that would happen in the Oval Office. He was keenly interested, on a day-to-day basis, in progress. He and I had a tremendous 
amount of personal involvement. It was day and night, more than I had had with Kennedy. 
He would devote an inordinate amount of time to the sales pitch, and he would put it on a truly personal basis: "I'm pleading with you. You've got to help me. You can't 
walk away from this. Come on, you've just--" And that would get to the arm around the shoulder, the close proximity and the pitch that could be lengthy at times. A member 
would be pretty exhausted. And that was basically the difference in style. 
Johnson had that experience as majority leader, did not have the impact he envisioned as vice president--and no vice president really does--and in the role of president 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --3 
he had the kit of tools--a bigger kit of tools than as majority leader--and he used them to the fullest. Through all that, he did have a tendency to take things rather personally. If 
someone on the Hill who he felt should be supportive [and] wasn't, that was a personal affront. He dwelled on it. That was his nature, as he dwelled on Vietnam and 
personalized Vietnam to the last pilot. Did he get back safely? It was similarly the case with the legislative program. 
I think probably the best example was the loyal support of Mike Mansfield for the program, and the conflict we got into with Mike Mansfield over the closing of veterans 
hospitals. Johnson became very disturbed with this. Those hospitals were going to be closed; the decision had been made that they were inadequate. But the pure politics of it 
was that one of the hospitals was in Montana, and we had a similar experience with an air base or some kind of a military installation in Montana. Johnson had White House staff 
busy preparing statements to be issued wherever possible, contacting press to see if you could get favorable editorial comment, all of it added up to exacerbating the situation with 
Mansfield. 
Mansfield wasn't going to take it. He was the majority leader and this was a constituency matter. And this went on and on. It was an example of the intensity of the 
Johnson effort, which would be reflected in the legislative program. Here, however, was an incident that was not a legislative matter, but a confrontation with a fellow who was in 
a key position in terms of your legislative program, and yet there wasn't a tendency to adjust or fall back. I guess you certainly can't fault the man for that; he was on the right 
side of the issue. But the reality was that you probably weren't going to be a winner, and that, I recall, was the way it turned out. 
Because of his nature, Johnson was not a fellow who was very well organized. He would put in hours and hours and hours, without any regard to mealtime, bedtime, or 
anything else. Mrs. Johnson was constantly trying to keep him reasonably in line, fearing for his health. But he would not hear of it. And that was something I observed directly, 
because I was with him very often, from wake-up time to bedtime. 
G: Typically, how would this occur? Would Mrs. Johnson simply come in and say it's time to have lunch, it's time to take a nap, or something like that? How would she do it? 
O: Yes. There was one incident which was typical of many. It was rather late in the evening, and we were in the small office off the Oval Office. I don't know what we were engaged 
in. She called a couple of times from the residence, urging him to come home; he hadn't eaten. Finally she came over--I remember she just had a sweater on--and said, "Now, 
Lyndon, you've got to break off. It's now 9: 00 p. m.." It was not a normal time to be busily engaged in something, and she was really pleading with him. He'd say, "Oh, Bird." 
And then finally she resorted to, "Lyndon, you know Larry's got a wife at home, and I'm sure she's waiting for him and it's now well past dinner time. Why don't you let him go 
home and you come on?" He passed that off; that didn't end it either. And that was not unusual. If we were in the residence she'd oftentimes come in and say, "Well, guys, it's 
7
O'Brien --Interview VI --4 
time to [quit]." And there were occasions when I would find myself in his bedroom while he was going to bed and we were still talking. That was the intensity of the whole thing. 
When you couple his total commitment to the Great Society program and what came naturally to him in terms of working with the Congress with the growing specter of 
Vietnam and his total concern regarding Vietnam, he had imposed upon himself a tremendous burden, without any semblance of programming. 
Kennedy would go over and take a nap or take a swim in the pool, take a couple hours break during mid-day, and he was pretty well organized. But Lyndon Johnson 
wasn't at all, and his tendency was to deal directly with everyone whenever possible on all matters. He had a great desire to be constantly informed. In comparison, Kennedy would 
leave things to his confidence in whoever was handling it. You move along, keep him informed, and use his involvement whenever you felt it was essential, but be very sparing, 
and careful and don't do it unnecessarily. 
On the other hand, you had difficulty keeping Johnson out of a lot of things that should be done on a staff level--our staff, the departments and agencies, cabinet members. 
The President need not be personally involved, but he would never accept that. 
I found myself carefully structuring my utilization of President Kennedy in terms of the New Frontier program, and he was never reluctant to participate. But I would go to 
him, or I would go to Ken O'Donnell and they'd go over his schedule and allocate specific times for various meetings on the program. With Lyndon Johnson it was the reverse. He 
felt that I ought to be using him more, that I ought to have him more deeply involved, that I wasn't informing him on an hourly basis. I guess it was summed up one night when we 
had a loss in the House in the wee hours of the morning. I've told that story. But I think, again, it's like Lady Bird with the sweater. You're drifting home, you're rather depressed, 
it was unusual to lose, and it was an all-night session and we lost it at three or four o'clock in the morning. And I remember wending my way home and stopping in a little sandwich 
shop and having something to eat, just sitting there at the counter, and then going on home. I didn't need anything to eat, it was just a matter of trying to unwind. Then I 
waited until 6: 30 or 7: 00 a. m. to call the President, knowing his habit as an early riser, and I wanted to wait until he would have awakened. I remember telling the President, and 
having the President ask, "When did this happen?" I told him, and he said, "God, you should have called me right then and there. When you're bleeding up on that Hill, Larry, I 
want to bleed with you." Now that is a good example of his involvement. 
There was an affection for Kennedy that grew. First of all, most members of Congress really didn't know Kennedy. He had been there only a short period of time, even 
though he had been in both the House and the Senate. His absentee record was well known, particularly on the House side. He never really was that interested in the House, 
and was anxious to move on when the opportunity presented itself. You would find people like Carl Albert, or indeed Mike Mansfield, who didn't know Kennedy intimately, 
had not had that kind of relationships with him. They knew Johnson intimately and they 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --5 
had had years of intimate relationship with him. I think that that made a difference, particularly on the Senate side. If you had a group of senators--[ Robert] Kerr or [Clinton] 
Anderson, fellows with a lot of seniority--for a meeting in the White House Jack Kennedy as president was very junior to those fellows and he did not have a close relationship with 
them. Maybe that caused him to be a little reticent in and urging and pressing and pleading and cajoling. On the other hand, with those same people Johnson had known for 
a lifetime and had had all kinds of dealings, he had no compunction whatsoever to try to push and shove them. 
G: On that meeting in which Mrs. Johnson came in and pled with him to call it a night and come have dinner and let you go home, typically would he be discussing going over some 
strategy? Was it really a productive session, or was he just, do you think, holding court? 
O: No, he could get wound up and it might not by that stage be productive at all. It could be a matter of reminiscences, conversation, projections, and talking about individual 
members, perhaps. 
G: Did you have an impression that he just didn't like to be alone, that he just wanted people around him? 
O: Some of it was that, I'm sure. But I think more than that, he was so involved personally. It was almost as though he didn't want to have any sleep because he'd be missing 
something. He was completely involved. A conversation with Kennedy in my area of involvement would ordinarily not be overly long. You'd present the facts, he would 
respond accordingly, and that would end it. It would stay with the business at hand. With Lyndon Johnson it could drift off in all directions in terms of the conversation. 
An example again: leadership breakfasts. If you take Kennedy and then Johnson, you had the same leaders on Tuesday morning. Each president has had the same briefing 
from me the prior night for his night reading and then with me prior to breakfast. They would be businesslike breakfasts. You'd go over the program and projections. Now, at a 
Johnson breakfast--and after all, Johnson attended all the Kennedy breakfasts as vice president--it wasn't long before we were trying to come up with ideas to press the 
leadership harder. That got to flow charts and progress charts and memos on progress or lack of it, questioning them as to what the program would be the following week. They 
became more detailed, more intense. Johnson's style was to exert as much pressure as possible, while Kennedy was reluctant to go that distance. 
G: How much of this was the result of Johnson's personality and his style on the one hand, as opposed to your own seasoning in the job and the fact that you were each year gaining 
more experience and--? 
O: That was part of it. From the outset--the typical, I guess, O'Brien oversimplification--you're assigned to a job that you know nothing about, to deal with 
people few of whom you really know, and you are told that under the table of organization 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --6 
you can have a three-or four-person staff. Well, you didn't have to be very bright to figure out from day one that you needed all the manpower you could develop. You very shortly 
recognized the sensitivity of what you were trying to do. That was overridingly important. You could commandeer the manpower in the departments and agencies, and 
you did have a power base in the White House. You could direct what people were going to do and how they were going to work with you, and that included cabinet level. 
Nobody was interfering with that; you had total support to do that. But by the same token, as you were making those moves and getting into these relationships with the 
leadership, ultimately leading to joint head counts, you were violating the concept of separation of powers, inherent and historic. And yet you had to get the job done. 
Well, Johnson was part of that. He saw it unfold. He'd be at the leadership meetings, he'd be involved all the way. All memos or anything involving legislative 
struggles, he was privy to. I don't think Johnson ever said to me, "Develop a flow chart." As time went on and you felt more and more comfortable with your relationships on the 
Hill, your concern lessened about having them bust wide open some morning because John McCormack or Carl Albert or Mike Mansfield or, in the early days, [Sam] Rayburn, 
would say, "Hey, wait a minute. You don't belong here." That would end it; there was no appeal from that. There were a couple of murmurs from time to time that had to concern 
you. Well, you'd gone past that. Now you have acceptance of a procedure that nobody was reflecting on being a potential violation. It was an accepted procedure. We were 
comfortable in the Speaker's office, in Mike's office. 
Now you have the Johnson style, and that leads you to be a little more daring. I'm not too sure that the first time we put up the flow charts that those leaders didn't sit at that 
breakfast and look and probably in their own minds say, "What the hell is this? Who do these people think they are?" I didn't hear any applause for the charts, but there you were, 
pointing to those charts, "This is what didn't happen last week that should have," and they accepted it. 
Johnson loved the charts, and he felt that kind of visual aid, if you will, can have a far greater impact than verbiage. I recognized that, but I wouldn't have dared the first 
couple of years to attempt something like that. 
As we moved along, it became more and more detailed and [there was] more and more pressure. At every cabinet meeting I would be recognized by the President to go 
over the legislative program. At the Johnson cabinet meetings, I'm devoting more time to going over the legislative program, and I'm getting more personal, talking about the 
department that doesn't seem to be moving that bill, and then the President [would] pick it up and ask that cabinet member why. All that happened when I became a member of the 
cabinet was that instead of sitting along the wall and then moving up to the table when it was my turn, I had a seat at the table and it was my turn. 
The individual effort expended by Johnson goes to his style. That was his nature. He was reputed to be a fellow that could blow his stack, to use the vernacular, regarding a 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --7 
member of his staff. Interestingly enough, in all those years I never saw it. 
G: Really? 
O: Never once. I'd hear about it, and I don't know whether those stories were exaggerated or not. But it never happened in my presence. And I think there was a reason for that. I 
think with me, and probably other Kennedy people, Johnson wouldn't allow himself to get into that kind of a frame of mind. He would be interested in your wife and that she was 
included. Elva got to really love Lady Bird, and she was very much involved, which was not the case with Jackie. The situation was considerably different. 
G: In summing up this aspect, would it be fair to say that the refinement of your role would not have been as complete if Kennedy had lived and stayed on as president? 
O: Yes, well, I don't know whether I'd have ever gotten to flow charts. I don't recall how all this began to unfold, but I'd have to conclude that it was the Johnson participation in the 
legislative struggles that gave me the nerve to move into the increased pressure being exerted on the leadership, pressure being exerted on the cabinet. 
The presidential effort was so extensive, and the presidential style of Johnson was such that if they weren't going to challenge him when he was pushing them around, or 
trying to, then maybe I could be more aggressive than I had been. It's refining the procedure as months and years went by, and obviously to a great extent it had to do with 
the personal attitude of the President toward the legislative program and congressional relations activities. 
G: Was LBJ less secure as an individual than John Kennedy? 
O: Yes. 
G: How did this manifest itself? 
O: Is it fair to say insecure? I think that when you live with all of this, and you have two men back to back and you're really in the same role with both of them, you're probably there 
analyzing or evaluating. It just flows. But Kennedy was a fellow who I don't think sought confrontation, but he sure as the devil would never walk away from it. And I rather think 
that when it occurred, he enjoyed it. And he handled it very, very well. It was a family trait, and we've talked about it. 
With Lyndon Johnson, when the press would attack him--you'd get these negative pieces, mean [ones]--his reaction was one of great hurt. But it would reflect itself in 
conversation, "God, why would that fellow do that to me? I've always treated him well. I thought I was always fair to him. How could he be that unfair to me? It's just terrible." 
He wouldn't say it in those words, but that's the way he'd come across. He'd dwell on it and it bothered him inordinately. I guess we're all the same in that regard, we all like to be 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --8 
loved. Maybe it's his outgoing nature that he'd let you know in his own way that he was personally hurt because somebody was attacking him. 
Jack Kennedy, in similar attacks--and he got his share of them---his reaction was more to say, "That son of a bitch. Who's he think he is?" He would be more aggressive 
on the attack, and spout it out with sulfurous language. But he always had that key word that I'd always wait for: "However--what's next?" With Lyndon Johnson it could come up 
time after time over a period of weeks perhaps, the same, "I still can't understand why he would do that to me. It's so unfair." I don't know, is that a difference of style or just a 
difference in personality? 
G: Do you think part of it could reflect a difference in understanding of the press, that perhaps Kennedy had a more--O: 
I don't think so. 
G: --realistic attitude toward the press than Johnson? 
O: No, I think Johnson felt that he had been kind and considerate and socialized with these fellows, he had done a good job of establishing friendships, and then to have one of them, 
as he saw it, turn on him, was a terrific affront. While with Kennedy, I think he was more realistic. In his own way, believe it or not, Jack Kennedy was tougher and harder. While 
he would have the structured press conferences and have the little sessions in the Oval Office with selected press from time [to time], I don't think Kennedy ever considered the 
press other than [as] worthy adversaries that you dealt with, and you succeeded because you were expert on your side of the table. 
The greatest contribution to that was Kennedy, with some reluctance, initiating that new phase of presidential press conferences, and finding from the first press 
conference that there was a terrific plus factor in it. It gave him confidence in dealing with the press that he was capable of engaging in what is a historic struggle and that he had a 
lot of confidence in his ability to succeed in it. While it wasn't that press conferences came easy to him--he was thoroughly briefed; he had a slight degree of tenseness in him--as each 
press conference succeeded the last one, you could see the comfort factor grow. 
I don't recall Johnson being inordinately uptight about press conferences, frankly. He had a great concern about his own personal projection, public projection at press 
conferences, where we got into teleprompters, which set of eyeglasses looked the best, and selecting a pair of eyeglasses backstage before he went on. 
G: Did you get involved in this, too? 
O: Not really, no. I'll have to tell you, I saw a certain amount of humor in the whole thing. There'd be a fellow with a case of eyeglasses backstage, and it became a big decision as to 
which pair. No, I didn't get into that. He never discussed his mode of dress with me that I 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --9 
recall. 
And, of course, you work with what you have. Lyndon was a big sort of garrulous fellow and Jack was sort of neat and tidy. (Laughter) Let's face it, we've seen more and 
more of it since the days of Kennedy and Johnson and the advent of television, going all the way back [to] the Nixon-Kennedy debates, and the realization of that new, rapidly 
growing medium and what an impact it was going to have and how it would become the single most important vehicle in American politics. It sure has. Of course, it's gone the 
whole spectrum now; I think there's a certain amount of cynicism about a lot of this. But you have a president, as we're talking, who in that context, addressed the joint session the 
other night and said nothing, but said it awfully well. I sit and watch him with my wife and, after thirty minutes, my wife is really impressed. I didn't deign to suggest that maybe 
she and I could discuss what did he say, or what did he--( Laughter). I let that alone, because it's communication. 
Tape 1 of 4, Side 2 
G: You say this ability of Kennedy's to communicate was not apparent at the outset. 
O: No. I think there were times in our smaller meetings, two or three hundred at a Kiwanis luncheon in Massachusetts in those early days when he was thinking of running for 
statewide office, that you would not have people leave and say, "Wasn't that an impressive performance?" I think that the first indication--and there again it was gut reaction on the 
part of Kennedy--of what this fellow was capable of was a confrontation with Henry Cabot Lodge in a debate. I remember it very well, because we never saw Henry Cabot 
Lodge again in the campaign and the three or four debates that were scheduled never took place. 
That was Kennedy's strength, and it was his good fortune that it was never detected until after he was president. Hubert Humphrey fell into the trap in West Virginia 
of debating him, and Nixon fell into the trap. So you have his capacity in one on one--he had complete confidence in himself. Then you add to that his ability to handle press 
conferences, which were a form of debate, and that's where his strength was. Frankly, if you go back and look at some of the tapes, I'm not sure you'd say in formal speeches there 
was great oratory. 
G: How did Johnson and Kennedy differ intellectually? 
O: They came from differing environments, and yet they had really the same sincere commitments. Kennedy was probably--not necessarily, but probably--more of a student. 
But I didn't see, if you go back over Kennedy's life, any great indications of that. He was involved in writing a couple of books. He was involved as a young guy with the formation 
of the United Nations. He did travel extensively. He did go to the London School of Economics. He was an above average, but not beyond that, student. 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --10 
With Lyndon Johnson I don't think you had that kind of involvement. Lyndon Johnson had a clear, total understanding of the impact of a social program on people who 
were in the lower level economically of society. I think that was a gut, heart feeling he had, because how many times did I listen to Lyndon Johnson talk about the New Deal 
period and his personal involvement. 
Kennedy didn't have personal involvement in that sense, but Kennedy had sought knowledge. There was another element which was reflected in the friendships that 
Kennedy had. They varied, which was interesting to me. Some of them, a handful, were by way of lasting friendships from school or the service. On the social friends--I don't 
know whether you describe friends as social friends--of which I wasn't one, they were apt to be in that kind of Harvard style, if you will. Yet on the other hand, intimate friends 
who he retained for a lifetime were in some instances rough-hewn, interesting guys that I thoroughly enjoyed meeting, although I met them only fleetingly, and those were the 
people he was in the service with in the PT boat program. He had experienced war and he had experienced a great deal of physical setback. He had physically suffered for many 
years. He had contained that in terms of anybody really knowing, including me, how much pain and suffering he went through. And that creates a different guy in a lot of 
ways. 
G: After your years working with Kennedy, would you ever be surprised by a decision that Johnson would make, or some of his reasoning or his intellectual thought processes? 
O: I don't know as I'd be surprised. I think that there were times, perhaps, when I felt that his personal involvement in legislative struggles had to do with the win and loss column. But 
I would be brought up short if I thought that. 
G: Can you give an example of being brought up short? 
O: While there's a pattern of this sort of thing, probably that one instance made more of an impact. It's a little bit like Lady Bird and the sweater that night; that was not unusual but 
it just stayed in my mind. I've mentioned it before and I'll mention it again. It was the District of Columbia [home rule] battle to try to spring legislation from the Rules 
Committee. His complete involvement had to transcend win and loss columns. It was gut. It was a strong personal view he had. He wanted to move all civil rights legislation 
in any form, and he devoted all of his energies to those struggles. 
When you got into that sort of thing, there was an added dimension to Johnson's effort. And I think it goes back to his background; he knew the Depression. The age 
difference was not that great between Kennedy and Johnson, but it bordered on two generations. It was, really, in a sense. All the way from birth to your experiences, your 
education, your involvement. After all, Kennedy was a product of the eastern prep school, Harvard, and Johnson was the product of a small college in the Southwest, an aide to a 
congressman, a fellow who worked for a living, and who was enamored with the political process. Both of them were. But from his perspective he came up through the chairs--he, 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --11 
Johnson--the hard way. 
The conversation I had with him when he named me postmaster general underscored that, as he reminisced about his efforts on the Hill. He ran an elevator and 
then he worked in a congressional office and he cited the comparison to what I had done. I had gone to night law school, I was not part of the Eastern Establishment, I had worked 
for a congressman as a young guy, I had struggled in the boondocks of politics, in the nuts and bolts of politics. I had worked arduously and I had made a contribution to the 
legislative program, and it was high time that the record recognize me by title. That was really his whole pitch, and I think he really felt that way, that he and I did have a lot in 
common, and we did. I was the son of immigrant parents. He wasn't the son of immigrant parents, but his years as a youth and the economic struggle and all was very much 
comparable to mine. 
G: Do you think he had a inferiority complex, particularly around the well-educated Kennedys, the New Frontiersmen? 
O: I don't know. It could be. But there again, I couldn't discern that because I wasn't in that category. I don't think that Lyndon Johnson ever looked at Larry O'Brien and said, "Gee, 
he's one of those Harvard types and comes from money and all this background, and he's had a pretty easy life of it." 
G: To what extent did the Kennedy White House, perhaps not the President himself, but the others, regard Johnson as a social or an intellectual inferior? 
O: There were those in the Kennedy White House who had a tendency to discuss him in a rather demeaning manner. But when I say "they," there were a couple of them and no 
more than that. The [Kenneth] O'Donnell-[ Pierre] Salinger-O'Brien-[ David] Powers White House didn't have that attitude. 
G: Really? 
O: Let's face it, though. There was a sensitivity to the Vice President's sensitivities. 
G: Will you elaborate on that? 
O: I think I have in the past. That was a reflection of the President's feeling, and I think again it was underscored by the President's anger when we had a meeting one day and the Vice 
President wasn't there. He inquired and found that he hadn't been notified. That's an incident, but that was the pattern. So I think you'll find there was a recognition that this 
big fellow was quite a sensitive guy and you wanted to be very careful not to hurt his feelings or incur his enmity. 
G: Did the hostile feelings to Johnson relate to a crudeness in manner or language or--? 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --12 
O: As I'm responding to you, you probably detect a certain attitude I had toward the Eastern Establishment. And it is troubling, because we did have--not in key roles, incidentally, in 
the White House--fellows who looked with disdain on just about everybody and everything that wasn't Eastern Establishment. And it happened that in a couple of 
instances they were able and prolific writers. 
G: Okay. Let's go on into some of the issues in 1963. Last time you talked at length about the civil rights bill. I have just a couple more questions about it. First of all, there's an 
indication that you feared that the civil rights bill would cause a brawl in the Congress that would hamper other legislation. Is that right? 
O: Yes. I'm repeating myself, but you can't get away from this because that was the reality of the situation. I think the experience we had at the very outset of the Kennedy 
Administration in bringing about a change in the House Rules [Committee] had great penetration with us. Even with that five-vote margin allowing us to have consideration of 
our program, we were going to be walking a tightrope for two years at least, until a midterm election. If we were going to fall off that tightrope and mangle ourselves in the 
interest of pleasing some people who were supporters of ours, that was a totally unrealistic approach to legislating. Consequently, as the program was pressed, we often 
discussed the realities of a meaningful civil rights bill and what should go into ensuring that you would have one in due course. That really came to timetables, to testing other 
comparatively less meaningful legislation and our successes or failures. And we particularly resented the ADA in those days. There were others, too, questioning our 
commitment or our courage because we were endeavoring to be realists. 
It's like Medicare or anything else. We sat there in those first two years envisioning we were going to be there for another six, and envisioning that we're going to 
get to 1964 and knock the ball out of the park. We're going to be riding high, and we're going to get this whole job done. We're not going to get it done tomorrow or in the next 
few months. But we've got to establish a record of progress and a batting average that shows we're good at the plate. And if we're going to strike out half a dozen times on 
major issues right out front, then we might as well pack up our bags and go home. 
So I think the resentment went to these fair-weather friends who had no understanding of the process, couldn't care less, and are still doing the same thing and 
always have: issue their curbstone proclamations and demands. It's the difference between the viewers and the doers. 
So that was inherent in what we were attempting to do, and if you look at the timetable and if you look at the efforts expended up to 1963 and then later, we did it the 
right way. 
G: What was Robert Kennedy's role in the 1963 civil rights bill? Do you recall his confrontation with John Lindsay and--? 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --13 
O: I don't recall that, no. He had a great involvement, but I can't really come up with specifics on it. His involvement was total, which I guess is the only way you could 
describe it. And remember, just as a sidebar, Bobby was not as patient as his brother Jack at times. 
G: Did he anger members of Congress, do you recall? 
O: I don't recall him angering members of Congress, but I do recall conversations with Bobby where he felt the Congress should react favorably more quickly than they were, in a 
number of areas. He found it difficult to hold, not his temper, but himself in in terms of the legislative struggle. He also found it difficult that you had to keep moving inch by inch 
and that you had all this opposition. It was such a task when right was on our side. 
G: Okay. Let's talk about the area redevelopment bill. Do you recall that? This was really transformed from one that was designed for the rural areas to one for urban areas. Do 
you recall that? 
O: Not specifically. 
G: Nothing on the area redevelopment? 
O: No, I'd have to go back and review that before I could discuss it. 
G: Okay, let's talk about foreign aid. You've talked about the opposition of Otto Passman in the previous years. Here you had a 34 per cent cut, the largest in a long time. President 
Kennedy had appointed a ten-man committee headed by Lucius Clay to advise him on foreign aid, the economic and military programs. 
O: The 1963 foreign aid? 
G: Yes, I've got some notes on it on pages 9 and 10 there. This was evidently tied in particularly with the Export-Import Bank and the wheat sale to Russia. 
O: Yes. Actually, when you look over the discussion of foreign aid that led to this big cut, it follows a pattern. While it goes into differing areas where a cut could be accomplished, 
the fact remains that foreign aid was something a lot of people wanted to take a meat ax to. And as I've said before, the two legislative proposals that basically had no sex appeal 
were the debt ceiling and foreign aid. There were no political pluses for members and it was fair game. Public interest in it, if any, was negative. Yet you had a responsibility to 
continue these programs. I think [with] this particular battle you can underscore the problem by the appeal that Kennedy made to Eisenhower. Eisenhower had lived with 
foreign aid, too. He had faced up to the same responsibility, only in his day it was the Democrats for the most part leading the fight. So my guess is that Bryce Harlow was 
involved in communicating with Eisenhower in this area, and it did some additional support. 
17
O'Brien --Interview VI --14 
But my recollections of foreign aid are all negative. I told you that at some stage we decided to break down foreign aid dollar for dollar and see what application could be 
made, district by district, to try to build friendly member support on a personal basis and give him something that he could use by way of a press release back home to justify his 
support. You had an impossible situation with it--I assume that was the Eisenhower record on foreign aid and it was the Kennedy record. Both had [Howard] Cannon and 
Passman. Until such time as you could break that logjam, you were doomed to using all the muscle and all the leadership involvement you could muster, and still, after the smoke 
settled, your reaction was never one of saying, "Now, we've passed a foreign aid bill." It was more, "My God, we'll get rid of that problem and think about some other things." 
I don't think we settled into a position of comfort until Cannon was gone and [George] Mahon replaced him. Mahon wouldn't play Passman's game. But, boy, you had 
a mess. I can remember, I think it was [Everett] Dirksen, when we had a bipartisan meeting at one stage in the White House, saying, when it ended, "This is a repeat of 
meetings I attended when Eisenhower was president. The very same thing, word for word almost, and the same name comes up constantly: Otto Passman. We had a meeting that 
Eisenhower called on this subject. The last thing he said to me was, 'Never, never will I allow Otto Passman to sit and talk to me again. I don't want to ever see him again, and 
I'm telling you, regardless of whatever happens to foreign aid in the future, I'm not going to go through this with that man. '" And we were exactly in the very same position, and 
that's why Eisenhower was willing to be of some help. But I was not directly involved in eliciting the Eisenhower help. Maybe this was the one year we did; maybe there was more 
than one year. But that really should never have been a matter of partisan debate. It deteriorated to a great extent because of one man who chaired the subcommittee and who 
had one goal in mind: destroy it. 
It was a nightmare. Even a John McCormack finally threw up his hands. I remember John saying one day that "This man has lied to me. I can tolerate anything. I've 
been in this House all my life. But a man abides by his word, and that's the tradition of the House. This man has lied to me." I remember John McCormack being so upset. He'd 
tolerate anything, but don't lie to him, don't make a commitment, which went to the numbers that were going to be agreed to, if you can't keep it. And Passman turned around 
and double-crossed him. 
It was terrible, frankly, to be dealing with foreign aid and the debt ceiling, because they were so time-consuming. You knew the debt ceiling was going to be raised, but you 
also had to fight the battle of significant cuts in foreign aid. The debt ceiling would be raised sometime, somewhere, somehow, because the government couldn't function 
otherwise. Yet you had to go through hell with the opposition to raise the debt ceiling. You devote so much time and effort to something that was inevitable. On the foreign aid 
side, a man was devastating the program, and what comfort did you get out of passing a foreign aid bill with a 34 per cent cut? It came perilously close to dissolving the program. 
18
O'Brien --Interview VI --15 
I don't think there was a better example of the influence and impact of one member of the House of Representatives at any time I can recall comparable to the Passman 
influence on foreign aid. You were dealing with an impossible person, a person who intensely disliked the program and, probably just as importantly, had no basic 
understanding or knowledge of what the program meant or what an effect it had. You were dealing with a person as described by John McCormack, and you're dealing in an 
area where you have, really, no meaningful constituency. 
G: Was there any attempt to remove Passman from a position in which he could--O: 
No. 
G: --frustrate the administration? 
O: No. Seniority was deeply embedded in the House in those days. That would have been a leadership effort. I don't recall any attempt to remove him. 
G: Okay. Anything on the test ban treaty, any recollections of that, your involvement with it? 
O: No, I wasn't involved in all the effort that brought about the agreement--[ Averell] Harriman-[ Andrei] Gromyko activities--until it got to the Senate. This was really not a 
legislative process as you would normally have. By the same token, interestingly enough, it was one of Kennedy's finest hours. He had made a couple of widely noted speeches in 
this area, and I think the Senate action that followed bordered on unanimity. 
G: Yes. Do you think that was partially the result of the effectiveness of the speeches? 
O: I think it led up to presentation to the Senate in great shape with a heavy emphasis on presidential leadership. 
G: I notice in the case of the civil rights bill in 1963 you were bringing to the President feedback of his speech on the constituents of members of Congress. Did you also do that 
on the test ban treaty? 
O: I think there were, to the best of my recollection, little or no overt, if you will, congressional reactions that were worthwhile. This was almost in a different area. It was 
followed avidly, but I think that the Senate simply stamped approval of a job well done in presidential leadership and I don't recall any negatives. The civil rights survey was entirely 
different. 
G: How characteristic was that, though, in terms of your monitoring the constituents' reaction to a presidential address? 
O: This would be unique. 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --16 
G: Really? 
O: Yes. Normally, when it was going right, anything that the President spoke publicly about that affected domestic programs we would make an effort to monitor and to elicit 
reactions. In this area, this was really foreign policy and almost non-legislative. 
G: Okay, let's talk about the education legislation. This year the administration used a new strategy of submitting an omnibus bill with twenty-five education proposals in one bill. 
How did this evolve? 
O: Well, we found ourselves wallowing to a great extent in the field of education, sort of taking a bite here or there. If you were going to have public support or lobbying support, 
rather than playing one off against the other, if you could get an omnibus bill where you could bring together the various private sector groups, you'd ensure that each entity had 
some pluses in the bill. If you could avoid separations, you could have reluctant support for portions of the bill and enthusiastic support for others. And you'd have a reasonably 
united private sector effort. 
You were spread awfully thin in education, approaching it on a piecemeal basis, and how could you get to some sort of consensus on education legislation with the 
conflicts that existed, i. e., the NEA [National Education Association], the National Catholic Welfare Conference and other various groups. That'd be at least in part a 
motivating factor. 
G: Do you recall who originated the idea in this case to bring it in one bill? 
O: If there was one individual that originated the idea, it eludes me. I think it was a consensus that this was good judgment and common sense. 
G: [Adam Clayton] Powell introduced the measure in the House but later said publicly that he thought it had only a slim chance of passage. 
O: That was our Adam. Adam could say that one day on the spur of the moment, and he might be a different Adam a week or two later. 
G: What led you to abandon the omnibus approach and support separate measures? 
O: The real world. 
G: Really? 
O: Yes. It wasn't going to fly. We had given it a whirl, but we were going to have to break it up. They weren't buying. 
Tape 2 of 4, Side 1 
20
O'Brien --Interview VI --17 
G: Okay, eventually, though, five major bills were enacted, education bills. Let's talk about the college construction aid bill first. The big issue here was whether or not you would 
have aid to private institutions as well as public ones, isn't it? 
O: Yes. 
G: There seems to have been not only disagreement over that, but disagreement over whether or not to allow individuals and institutions to sue to test the constitutionality of it. 
O: Well, no matter how you tried, you just couldn't avoid this kind of conflict. It reared its head with regularity, and it's of interest that at least the NEA withdrew its opposition, but 
only if there was an agreement to a court test. I don't know whether that was progress or not, but I think it's an example in this college construction of the difficulties. 
G: There's also an indication that the Senate conferees held up the Senate consideration of the bill because they disagreed with the House conferees on the vocational bill, which was also 
under consideration, and LBJ was reportedly involved in securing a compromise here. Do you recall that? 
O: Well, I recall that we had an inordinate amount of discussion in this whole area, and this was an area of great interest to him. 
G: Was it? 
O: Yes. 
G: How so? 
O: I think education generally, and vocational education appealed to him, too. Go back to his background and his own experiences. I found that there were areas of Johnson's interest 
as vice president. But I found as vice president and president that his interest in the whole field of education was very strong. He was a firm believer that there was a governmental 
responsibility at the federal level to provide opportunity for education to the fullest degree to every American. The fact is that he was a total believer. 
Interestingly enough, and probably for the same reasons, I also felt very strongly about education. I would get caught up emotionally. Obviously you would in civil rights; 
obviously you would in Medicare. But with civil rights, Medicare, and the general field of education, that's where it extended far beyond a job, as far as I was concerned, or trying to 
achieve legislative success. As a youth the limit of educational possibilities was so great I had concluded before I ever got to the White House that those opportunities would not be 
opened without federal involvement and not limited to the state or local level or private sector. It was a little like Medicare. In my family we had actually experienced what the 
lack of Medicare would do to a family economically. You experience that and the time 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --18 
comes when you can possibly add a grain of sand, you're motivated even beyond your commitment to a program. 
Lyndon Johnson and I had any number of conversations regarding education. With his experience in acquiring an education, my experience in night law school acquiring 
an education and seeing the effect of lack of education which is still the story today, I think you're apt to be involved beyond the norm. I know I would not have achieved the 
level of education that I did achieve if there hadn't been a little school on the second floor of the YMCA in Springfield, Massachusetts, where I could go nights and work days. 
Let's face it, as you read the stories of the city of New York and see the dropout rate at the high school level, you realize that millions of these kids will never have a 
chance. It all goes to education. Because of my religion and the sensitivity of people regarding any private or parochial school involvement in these federal programs, I didn't 
resent it, I understood it. But I was constantly trying to find people who could come up creatively with ideas, forget the religious aspect. Close it out as fully as you possibly can 
but don't close out every kid in America on religious grounds. There must be some way of providing opportunity in education and not violate the constitution. So that was always 
in this mix. 
We ultimately got to a united effort in the field of education. That was one of the great moments I experienced, sitting in my office doing a head count with the NEA and 
the representatives of the Catholic Welfare Conference in the same room, working on the same head count. 
G: Was this on ESEA [Elementary and Secondary Education Act] or [the] Higher Education [Act]? Which one? 
O: It was in lending the textbooks. That was the [Hugh] Carey proposal. It reared its head--the religious aspect of this--at every level. So it didn't make much difference 
whether you're talking bricks and mortar or you're talking about lending textbooks. Well-meaning people worked arduously on both sides of this issue, and 
not-so-well-meaning people, of course, opposed you consistently along the route. But I do think in the final analysis we got into a posture, ultimately, of providing some 
meaningful educational benefits that blurred those lines and didn't cause a constitutional breakdown. 
G: On this vocational bill, there was a disagreement between the House and Senate conferees, as I noted, and the House evidently favored a distribution of funds on the basis of 
population, whereas the Senate wanted to use the per capita income basis. The other difference was evidently in the amount of money to be appropriated. The Senate wanted 
to appropriate more than the House. Do you recall these differences being adjudicated? 
O: Yes, they were compromised. I think it's fair to say that this was an area of involvement on the part of the Vice President. It stems from the conversations I recall he and I had in 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --19 
the general area and his particular [interest in] vocational education. If you haven't worked with your hands, you've known people that did, in order to have some feel for 
vocational education. I really think it comes to that; there's nothing esoteric about all of that. 
G: I think this was something that LBJ pushed after the assassination. I think he was in the White House at the [time]. 
O: Yes, I think you're right. 
G: I was just trying to remind you of any discussions you may have had with him on this, in arriving at that compromise. 
O: No, I don't recall specific discussions. It's rather crass to put it this way, but I recall that efforts were made in a number of areas to get legislative movement in the climate 
following the assassination. It sounds crass, but I think a somewhat isolated item that had been pending for some time was the [cultural] center in Washington. We were not getting 
anywhere and yet there was a Kennedy commitment to this. It was a strong one, and he had committees working on it. I remember coming to the conclusion that we ought to 
name it the Kennedy Center, and that was what was advocated, and it went through the Congress. I don't think that the center would ever have been built otherwise. I felt if he 
were sitting there, he would have been in total accord. It was a practical, realistic approach. 
I cite that as an example of a climate. There was a little more feeling of accommodation, particularly for programs that were in process or were in advocacy. 
G: How did you implement this idea of naming it after President Kennedy? 
O: It was formalized that we were, effective immediately, advocating a center for the District of Columbia to be named after John F. Kennedy. We'd picked up on the pending proposal 
and just named it by presidential directive. Now you were dealing with a legislative item with the name Kennedy on it. 
G: Did you talk to the family about that at all? 
O: No. 
G: It does seem like an appropriate memorial. 
O: The fact is that it was an eminent fit. It was absolutely appropriate. But the cold reality is that's what assured success which otherwise probably would never have occurred, or if it 
had it would have been years later. 
G: We have the Manpower Training and Development Act for the training of hard-core 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --20 
unemployed. The Republicans were attempting to reduce the funding for this program, and Sam Gibbons introduced an amendment that would cut the appropriation the same 
amount but actually very little over the following fiscal year and reserve the cuts farther into the future so that they could be amended later on. 
O: Yes. 
G: Was this done in concert with the administration, too? 
O: Yes, that's right. Actually that's one example of compromise, but sensible compromise. You're right that the motivation for the Gibbons amendment was that we could assure 
ourselves of first-year funding and that we could always come back. And that blunted the opposition to some extent. 
G: Was this a fairly common strategy? 
O: Yes. There were all kinds of variations, but that would be a good example of what I like to call the art of compromise. 
G: The Gibbons amendment was accepted by a teller vote, about a sixteen-vote margin. This was after it had failed on a standing vote by a very narrow--I think three votes. Do you 
recall that and how you were able to--? 
O: I remember I was up there. There was a lot of movement back and forth from the floor to the Speaker's office during that activity. That was not unusual, but in this instance this 
was ideal, because you were dealing with standing and teller votes and you could make those moves back and forth across that short hallway to the Speaker's office and prevail on 
people and talk to them, the Speaker, the leadership, Gibbons, and everyone else. And I believe that is a good example of making the difference. 
G: In this case, what would be the difference between a standing vote and a teller vote in terms of putting a majority together? 
O: If you fail on standing, you go teller. 
G: What is the difference? I mean, they're both unrecorded votes, aren't they? Or was the standing vote a recorded vote in some way? 
O: No, the Speaker could declare from the chair. 
G: Oh, I see. 
O: But if it's overwhelming, you've got a problem. Then there's always an appeal from the floor. And what's interesting to me on all of this is it never went to roll call, in my 
recollection. It's just normal; the opposition is ultimately going to carry this to roll call. I 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --21 
was watching one the other day on the floor of the House, and it was clear that they were losers. When they got to roll call they were going to be more significant losers. But they 
wanted to build a record so they take it to roll call and absorb a lot of time in a losing cause. 
In that teller vote, you do have an actual count. You have go to the well, and there is somebody up there with a gavel making a judgment, counting around and saying, 
"Yep!" 
G: But there must have been an actual count on the standing vote, too, wasn't there, or how--? 
O: Yes, but you're counting from the podium. 
G: I see. It's not as precise as having--? 
(Laughter) 
O: Yes. And you make your ruling. When you ask for a teller vote, well, you file down and you count it. 
G: Is a teller vote more anonymous in that it's harder to tell how a member votes? 
O: Yes. It's harder than what, a roll call? 
G: Yes. Or how about a standing vote? 
O: Yes. With a standing vote, you're not going to be able to tell; it happens too fast. But on a teller vote, in a situation like that, there'd be at least two staff members in the 
gallery--my staff. And you're going to know. A fellow isn't going to be able to tell you afterwards that he voted for you if he had voted against you in a teller vote, because we 
were by that time accomplished enough. 
G: Now, another difference in this standing vote and the teller vote was the number of people voting was significantly more. What, almost fifty more members? 
O: Yes, because you were getting them out of their offices. 
G: I see. 
O: Sure. Now, in the normal vote, the presiding officer called for a division or a show of hands, really, or a voice vote. You could have forty or fifty people in the chamber. But in 
those days, it's not like today. The roll call could extend over forty-five minutes and you could hustle in those who hadn't voted, calling their offices. Now, of course, its the 
electronic procedure, which takes a roll call about fifteen minutes as against forty-five 
25
O'Brien --Interview VI --22 
minutes. 
G: Okay, next we have the proposal for a national service corps, a domestic peace corps proposal, and the provision passed narrowly in the Senate but was apparently not brought 
to the floor, or at least even to the full committee in the House, for fear because of the narrowness of the Senate vote it wouldn't pass. Is this correct; is this the reason, that it 
wouldn't pass? 
O: I don't know if that's correct. It could be. I don't recall it specifically, but that would be a judgment call. The best you've been able to do is move it to the subcommittee level, and 
you've got a long way to go in the House. Are you going to be able to expend that effort over a period of time or do you move on? That would be a judgment call. 
G: But how often did the vote in one house influence what you did in the other house? 
O: Not often. It was very unusual. Again, there must have been a hard Senate count to come to this conclusion. And as I say, I don't recall the conclusion, but if that were the case, 
that would be very unusual. There had to be other aspects to this that elude me at the moment as we review it, because a close Senate vote would not deter us from making a 
major effort in the House. There's something missing in this. 
G: Two Republican senators, [Jacob] Javits and John Tower of Texas, sponsored an antisegregation rider to this provision. Do you recall their motivation for doing so? 
O: It would be differing motivation. Jack Javits was unique in the Senate. He had been a Republican House member and Republican senator, because he originally went into 
politics [by] seizing a Republican nomination that was open in New York and was elected to the House. He was a nominal Republican with an "R" next to his name through his 
whole career in the Congress, but in reality he was a liberal. And that cost him in terms of influence in the Senate. He was not looked upon with favor by his Republican colleagues, 
and he was not considered really part of the Democratic liberal wing because he had the "R" next to his name. 
Now, in this instance, the Javits amendment would be from the heart. I think that John Tower would be realistic about it and understand how adverse an impact it could 
make if enacted on final passage. 
G: He thought it might kill the bill, if they could get it. 
O: Sure. So that was a strange duet in that instance. 
G: Aid to medical schools: here the administration substituted a provision for scholarships with a loan program. Do you remember that? 
O: I remember it was a feeling that would fly better, because there had been some indication 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --23 
on the House side in committee that there might be potential for stronger advocacy on a loan program than scholarship. It's the idea that you're going to get the money back 
someday. However, the record doesn't quite show that. In the field of education, loans have been a troublesome aspect. Yet you can see that in terms of trying to legislate, it's 
conceivably more palatable to be saying, "Well, we're not just handing dollars to people under a scholarship, but we are simply loaning them the money and we have the legal right 
to have it returned. 
G: Initially the Rules Committee blocked action on the bill with a tie vote. 
O: When you have a member absent. The Rules Committee was never one that we didn't have to keep a close eye on, even after we had expanded it. 
G: [Howard] Smith and [William] Colmer voted with the Republicans against the bill and--O: 
They voted against just about everything, and we just had the eight-to-seven margin. You had to have eight bodies present at all times to--G: 
President Kennedy commented that the seven Democrats voted yes. 
(Laughter) 
Do you recall that statement that he made? 
O: Yes. That statement was widely publicized, and it was quite accurate. 
G: Was there any reaction to it on the Hill? 
O: No, not really, because, you could make a statement like that without fear of adverse reaction. The record was very clear. 
This reminds me of a senator that I hadn't thought about for a long time--Lister Hill. He was a committed fellow for whom we had great admiration. I say that because 
taking some of the positions that he did, particularly in this field, weren't necessarily reflective of his constituency. It's interesting because while some names come readily to 
memory, there are others that don't. Seeing the name Lister Hill just jogged my memory. You know, the guy was a big help at times and he was a statesman. 
G: Here you also had the question of whether or not to separate this measure from the other educational provisions, and some of your supporters objected to it, presumably because it 
wouldn't help the other ones pass if it were not part of the same package. 
O: In the ebb and flow of the legislative process, that's the way it worked. You go back to the beginning and you're talking omnibus. Then you're ultimately talking about splits, but 
what you're really talking about is the art of the possible. Those are judgment factors, and 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --24 
those judgments are made as the story unfolds. If you had stayed wedded, you would have gone with an omnibus bill and gone down to defeat and said, "Okay, that's that. 
We'll try again." But if you're on the salvaging side, you look over the elements that were enacted. You have pretty good progress there, even though your initial idea was to have 
it omnibus. Yet that didn't work. 
G: Okay. Medicare. You wrote in your book that just before the assassination Henry Hall Wilson reported that an accommodation had been reached with Wilbur Mills, thereby 
allowing the Medicare bill to go forward. Do you recall that in more detail? Can you--? 
O: That's about as detailed as I can make it because Henry, as we had planned as part of our continuing effort, had this scheduled meeting. He told me after the fact that he had 
endeavored to contact me and then failed, obviously, to give me the good news so I could relay it. But contact wasn't made at that time. 
G: Was it the same formula that later allowed the bill to pass? 
O: Yes, basically. It was a significant turn. When he initiated that call, I'm sure Henry was beside himself with joy. It unfolded basically that way, but the coincidence stayed in my 
mind and Henry's mind. 
G: Did you feel during the course of that year that Mills was flexible or that there was a possibility--? 
O: It was hard to tell with Wilbur. I think if--and this is a big if, obviously--you had not had to cope with [the] Kerr-Mills [Act], it probably would have been an easier road. But 
having Kerr-Mills in place, the pride of authorship created additional difficulties. We've discussed before Clint Anderson's and others' efforts to try to resolve this in conference at 
one time. You had to almost get to the point of Mills concluding that Kerr-Mills wasn't effective. 
And you're asking a lot. You have the early-on power of the American Medical Association. You had Kerr-Mills as a stopgap effort to divert a major national effort. 
That was the motivation of Kerr-Mills. But when we had become acquainted with Mills--let's put it that way--and as time went on, we had quite a road to travel to get Mills 
to the position he had taken with Henry that day. But I always recall that--and this was consistent throughout in our dealings with Wilbur Mills--he would not allow a bill to go to 
the Rules Committee and the floor without being totally assured of passage. And our head-counting on Ways and Means legislation was as intensive as any head-counting, 
because it was subject to very careful scrutiny by Mills. 
There were two problems with Mills: one, to change his mind, and two, to assure him of adoption. But the other side of that coin was we always respected and understood, 
too, that you had assurance of passage with Mills as the floor leader. He invariably would have a closed rule. Thus, the major effort took place prior to floor action on a Mills bill, 
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or a Ways and Means bill. 
Now the first and obviously major step was to motivate Mills to develop a growing interest in the legislation. Wilbur Mills was not about to allow anybody else to lead the 
parade if there was going to be one. I respected all of that. Mills was as bright a fellow as there was in the House, as knowledgeable as any committee chairman in the House on 
legislation in his domain, and as hard-working a chairman as there was in the House. So he was among a handful of members of the House who it was absolutely essential to have 
in your corner. However, don't sit around dreaming that you're going to run over Wilbur Mills. That was totally understood by presidents and staff. 
When we were talking about educational legislation and the religious problem, it was conceivable that you could go on and on and not have meaningful educational 
legislation because of that problem. It isn't inevitable that you're going to resolve it to the extent that you have something meaningful. In Medicare it was different. We had felt for 
a long time that it was inevitable, and that the AMA did not have the muscle or the strength to block Medicare. Whether it was next month or next year, it ultimately was 
going to happen. That included Mills, being the practical, realistic guy he was. The time would come when he would have it our way. 
G: Alluding back to the pride of authorship, did Senator Kerr's death that year affect the legislation? 
O: I don't know that it did. You mean did it affect Mills' attitude? 
G: No, the chances of passage in the Senate, let's say. 
O: It's like civil rights. We felt in the final analysis that the chance of passage in the Senate would be greatly enhanced by first having passage in the House, and once you had that 
you were going to achieve ultimate success. With Mills aboard and House passage, Kerr was not going to stop the ultimate victory in this. 
Much has been written about Mills, some of it negative because of Mills' activities of a later date. From time to time Wilbur and I have a chance to say hello; it's on rare 
occasions now. But he was one of the most unusual members of Congress who I was ever exposed to. He had an impact on the Congress to a degree far extending beyond being 
chairman of the Ways and Means Committee. That was to change with his successor. His successor didn't control or [have the] hold on that committee and on the House of 
Representatives that Mills had. Wilbur is still practicing law in Washington. 
G: Oh, is he? 
O: Yes. Still admired greatly in the Congress, in the Treasury Department. And as you know, once he got over his personal problem, he has devoted the last number of years, on 
a voluntary basis, to trying to be helpful to people who have a similar problem. He travels 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --26 
the country speaking with no fees trying to help. 
Tape 2 of 4, Side 2 
G: --and we have the Hill-Harris bill, and a five-year program of matching grants for construction and staffing of community mental health centers. Here the staffing issue was 
a hurdle. Do you recall that? 
O: I thought it might have been related to the Senate action, the Javits amendment denying funds for segregated facilities, but I don't think it probably had any relationship to that. I 
really don't know what the staffing problem was. 
G: How about the Reorganization Act? 
O: That aroused concern to some extent from the previous action involving Bob Weaver. 
G: Did you have a sense on the Hill that this was an obstacle? 
O: Yes. The way the President announced who would fill the role really positioned a lot of people. And I think there was fallout that was somewhat lasting, and there were certain 
resentments. Of course, it was a sensitive area and continued to be, even when we're talking about the Javits amendment. You know, you have amendments constantly being 
defeated that would try to eliminate segregation but you hadn't reached that point yet. 
You want to create a new department, and then [when] you advise people who will be appointed to head that department, you get into a racial situation. Bob Weaver 
was carefully selected; no one could attack him on competency. So you get into a basic reorganization, and you get into conflict. And [it] came back to haunt you in a sense; I 
guess that's the only way to describe it. So you didn't get very far with it. 
G: How about the mass transit bill? 
O: I think actually, as is pointed out, the [Wayne] Morse amendment was very interesting, and I think it was interesting that it passed, under the circumstances. In any event, you 
had Senate enactment, and while you could press the House leadership to put a bill on the calendar, you could press them just so much. If there was a leadership feeling that the bill 
couldn't fly and you didn't have proof positive to the contrary, then there were times when you'd accept the leadership's decision. In this case, their decision was accepted. There 
must have been some overriding reasons for it, otherwise the leadership would have moved with the bill anyway. It wasn't a matter of reluctant leadership, it was a matter in 
this case of a leadership decision that was based on reality. But that was it; that was the end of the road for that battle at that time. 
G: Okay, the settlement of the rail dispute, do you remember that? 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --27 
O: Yes, there were efforts made with labor to try to set this aside for a while. There were efforts to get a concurrence on arbitration, and what it amounted to was that you were 
trying non-legislatively to bring about a resolution of this. You know, Wayne Morse played a key role in this. 
G: This was the first time that Congress imposed compulsory arbitration to settle a dispute in peacetime. What did Morse do, do you recall? 
O: I'm trying to recall why Morse was so opposed. There was a lot of contact with Morse during that period and I don't have the handle on what the motivation was, other than 
Wayne Morse not needing a lot of motivation at times to be involved. The name Wayne Morse just permeated the atmosphere through this whole process. In any event, the effort 
succeeded, and it was strange to have two votes in opposition: Tower and Morse. 
G: Yes. It's an odd match. 
O: There were times when Wayne could get pretty far afield, but there was no question about it, he was an aggressive, articulate member of that Senate. That didn't make him a 
powerful member of the Senate, however. He marched to his own drummer, and we never felt we had a real handle on Wayne Morse. If it happened to coincide that he 
favored something that we favored, then you had a staunch advocate and probably at times too much advocacy. When he opposed you, he was a staunch opponent, and 
generally over the long haul you would find that he overplayed that hand, too. He didn't seem to be able to deliver on his positions, and it could be aggravating. 
In this instance, whether it was in principle or whether there was some other motivating factor, I don't recall. But I do recall that Morse was very much in the forefront 
of this whole struggle and debate. He became very much a minority in opposition, as the roll call shows. 
G: How did Morse's relationship with President Kennedy differ from his relationship with LBJ after the assassination? 
O: I don't recall that it differed. Morse was insistent and persistent actually, in being out front in any legislative matter of interest to him. There might be times when it would coincide 
with our position and there were times when it didn't. But Wayne was a victim of his own style. I did reflect in detail on his problems with Congressman [Michael] Kirwan 
regarding projects in Oregon and the price that Morse had to pay. But in the final analysis we had to pay, in order to resolve the situation, when we became mediators between a 
senator and a powerful congressman. 
Wayne at another time was interested in becoming president and ran in the Maryland primary, supported by the Teamsters. 
G: Did he and Johnson get along well? 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --28 
O: I don't recall anything unique about their relationship. 
G: They had served together in the Senate. 
O: That wouldn't impact on Wayne Morse. He had his own views, his own ambitions, and his own view of his role. Basically, Wayne Morse was a liberal who under most 
circumstances would be supportive of your programs. And when you got into something like this, he was a problem. 
G: Johnson seems to have been less irritated by Morse's defections than those of other senators. Is this true or--? 
O: He'd be accustomed to them. 
G: Really? Because they happened more often or--? 
O: No, I think that prevailing upon Wayne on a personal, one-on-one basis would not be similar to trying to prevail upon most members of the Senate. Wayne was a different 
breed of cat and the usual efforts of persuasion would not be effective with Morse. Obviously Johnson understood Morse very well and realized that you had to take him as 
he came. 
G: Did you have any strategy for appealing to Morse yourself, or working with him? 
O: No, we've run into that one situation which I thought would have brought Wayne Morse onto the train for the duration. But that was just wishful thinking. In that situation you 
had Morse directly pleading with the President to intervene, to resolve a problem he had created himself. We did intervene, and in actuality Mike Kirwan never would have 
changed his view without us, because his affection for Jack Kennedy was tremendous and our relationship with him was a very warm one. He had his eccentricities, but he was a 
team player. But he also was very proud of his role as an important member of Congress, and no senator was going to impose upon him. I think once the problem had been 
resolved, Wayne went about being Wayne Morse as usual. 
G: You also had the extension of the temporary feed grain program. The bill passed in the House by a vote of 208 to 94 with all of the Republicans opposed, and in the Senate by a 
ten-vote margin after the Republicans attempted to amend it. Norris Cotton tried to filibuster it but could only get three senators to support him. Do you recall the give and 
take here? 
O: Other than Dirksen's role, to shut off debate. Javits once again, you'll note, contemplated an amendment, a civil rights amendment, which had become a pattern with Javits over this 
period. He either made such a motion or contemplated making such a motion on a number of legislative proposals. He had established that to draw attention to segregation 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --29 
at every opportunity. In this instance he refrained from presenting the motion, as the record shows, because of the nature of the legislative proposal. I think the most 
interesting aspect that was the farmers rejected it by referendum after all that effort. (Laughter) This was the first time, I guess, historically, that [had happened]. 
G: Really? 
O: Yes. We had gone through the effort and the farmers rejected it. 
G: The first major House action after the assassination was on the cotton subsidy bill--O: 
Yes. 
G: --and McCormack, who reportedly pressured urban Democrats to show support for the President. 
O: Now--I had referred to it before--you're in the post-assassination period, and this reflects it. Even the passage in the House and the way it was handled in moving it to the floor 
reflects the leadership position that there was some value in urging support for the new President, and it was shown in the roll call. But by the same token, the Senate took no 
action other than routine hearings. 
G: Okay, let's talk about some appointments. Any insights you have on these: first, John Gronouski replacing Edward Day as postmaster general. Do you recall why Gronouski 
was selected? 
O: There were two aspects of this. I think I had made reference to the problems with Edward Day not understanding team role of a cabinet member. Ed came out of the business 
community--he was an officer of a major insurance company, an early supporter of Jack Kennedy and a long-time friend of Adlai Stevenson, which made his support of Kennedy 
all the more impressive at Chicago--and it was our desire to have a business-type member of the cabinet. 
This was either the last or near the last appointment made to the cabinet, and there was a lot of scurrying around to secure that appointment. I became awfully concerned 
about some people who were being urged upon Kennedy as postmaster general. I believe it was a state senator in California who was in the forefront, and it was anticipated that he 
would be named postmaster general. This would take care of a geographical balance. In fact the governor, Pat [Edmund] Brown, had actually prematurely announced the 
appointment of this man. 
It was my view, shared by Ken O'Donnell, that this was not an appropriate appointment. I think it fell back to Ed Day on the basis of our conversations and going to 
the President at the last moment and saying, "We have a Californian who is a business type, who was an early supporter, and this fellow fits the requirements." A call was placed 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --30 
to Ed Day, who had no knowledge of any of this and was not a candidate. He was asked to get on the first plane he could, as the President-elect wanted to talk to him. The result 
was that Ed Day came to Washington, was offered the postmaster general position and accepted it. That satisfied me because I felt it was, whatever my motivations, a more 
rational approach to finalizing the cabinet appointments. 
It wasn't long before Ed Day felt there was an inordinate amount of White House involvement in the activities of the Post Office Department. I think he was taken aback 
when he was advised that certain people would be named as assistant postmasters general. He was taken aback when he was advised there would be a basketball stamp that I urged 
upon him. 
G: Was he seriously--? 
O: Yes, because he couldn't see any justification for it. But he was advised that we would have a basketball stamp. In fairness to Ed Day, he had not been exposed to this sort of 
thing. He was not a politician and he had little understanding of how the game is played. He became disenchanted. I don't know how long he served, but it was not a long period. 
In fact, you have 1963, September, that Gronouski was confirmed. He was appointed, certainly, well prior to that, which brings you to the length of time that Ed Day [served]--a 
couple of years. He became disenchanted and laid down the gauntlet that either he was going to run the Post Office Department without anybody involved or he wasn't going to 
stay. And that was his decision. 
So it came to, again, the political factors. A Polish-American was not highly visible in the administration. John Gronouski had achieved a considerable degree of 
recognition in Wisconsin. He checked out very well, he became high on the list rather quickly, and we were unanimous about him. And John became postmaster general on two 
counts: one, he was a highly respected and highly regarded fellow, and, second, he had a Polish name which we felt was politically helpful. So putting them both together, it 
seemed to be a very easy appointment to make, noncontroversial, and that's what it turned out to be. 
G: How about Henry Cabot Lodge as ambassador to South Vietnam? 
O: Well--G: 
An old adversary. 
O: Yes. Vietnam, even at that stage, was troublesome. It was growing in concern with the President and the White House, and this [appointment] was the President's idea. He 
thought back to Henry Cabot Lodge, and the President thought it would be good to have a highly visible Republican as ambassador. He mentioned it to me, and we concluded it 
was a great idea but that Henry Cabot Lodge would not accept it. In any event, the President called him in and to the President's surprise, Lodge accepted. Lodge was a very 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --31 
decent fellow who had a sense of public service and obviously reacted to Vietnam as a challenge and an opportunity. Our prior judgment was that the fellow would not allow 
himself to be dragged into this mess, but he did, and he became ambassador. 
He wasn't there very long when he decided that the election process should be undertaken in a very democratic manner and you should work on stabilizing the 
government, I received a call saying that Lodge had, through the State Department, initiated a request that I be assigned to join him in Vietnam. I received this call, I 
remember, on a Sunday morning; it was either Averell Harriman or Dean Rusk. Dean Rusk, of course, was knowledgeable regarding it, and it was agreed that we would put a 
quietus on that in a hurry, that that [request] made no sense. I wasn't about to follow Henry Cabot Lodge to Vietnam to organize the political process. 
G: Did he want you in order to organize a campaign or to oversee an election or--? 
O: Yes, all of that. As it turned out, Lodge had become impressed with my abilities in those areas, and he thought it would be ideal if I would be working with him in this great effort. 
But it died aborning and the President never made reference to it with me. 
G: When the President was discussing the possibility of appointing Lodge, did he weigh also the merits of the appointment in terms of Lodge's abilities, or was it--? 
O: Yes, he was comfortable with Lodge and his experience in government. The most intriguing aspect of it was that Lodge was a Republican and a highly visible one. No one 
would suggest, "How could you ever come up with the idea of sending Henry Cabot Lodge to Vietnam?" People would say, "He's a respected public figure, he's known to be 
a Republican moderate, he achieved a good record of public service--." That was our problem, incidentally, in running against him in the first instance. It was hard to attack 
Lodge on his record, because his record reflected Massachusetts in those days. He had been defeated by Kennedy for the Senate, but he had also been the candidate for vice 
president. I don't know of anyone else that would have been superior to him on the record. 
But that's how it came about, and the only surprise factor is that he would accept it, because it was a difficult assignment, if not bordering on the impossible. 
G: How did you derail his request to have you go out there? 
O: It ended with that phone call--it might have been two calls; it might have been both Rusk and Harriman. But one or the other or both were kind enough to alert me that this request 
had been made, and if it had gone any further I would have declined. But it never did come to any point of discussion and it was just dropped out of hand. 
G: Anything on Homer Thornberry's appointment to a judgeship? 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --32 
O: Other than the combination of Homer's very close friendship with Lyndon Johnson that went back for a long time, coupled with his general interest in leaving Congress and going 
on the bench. Homer was a very thoughtful member of the House. I found him a very pleasant person to deal with, and there were any number of occasions when he was helpful 
to us. I knew that Lyndon Johnson thought very, very highly of him and they were very close. 
Incidentally, he was selected to swear me in as postmaster general, which he did, on the basis of Johnson's friendship with him and also my friendship with him. 
G: Why did he want to leave Congress? 
O: I don't know. That's not unusual, to leave Congress to go on the federal bench. I think you'll find there's a record of a number of those appointments over many administrations. 
I think if you have an inclination to leave and try something else, either go back and seek higher office or go to the federal bench, if you're still interested in the public service 
aspect. 
G: Was it normally, do you think, tied to desire not to seek re-election, or if someone thought they were going to have a difficult race, that this was a way to continue to serve without 
going through those elections? 
O: It could be that. I remember a fellow, [Abner] Mikva, in more recent times who became a member of the federal bench. He was a congressman from Illinois. He was very much 
interested in public service, a very bright and able fellow. If the opportunity presented itself, he'd rather serve on the bench than serve in the Congress. Now, there could be a 
question of a close election, and there have been times, I can't point to one right now, when former members of Congress have been appointed to the bench. Let's face it, it's 
basically a patronage situation, and it's a high level of the judiciary. It's rather an interesting area of lifetime service and you don't have to be concerned about campaigns. 
G: How about the ambassadorships? You had Carl Rowan appointed ambassador to Finland. 
O: All I can say about Carl Rowan is that he had a long-time relationship with Lyndon Johnson, long before Johnson was in the White House or vice president, as I remember. I 
didn't know Rowan well. But I did know that the Vice President held him in high regard. In fact, I believe Carl Rowan did some work over the years in speech writing and 
assignments on commissions. But he was a fellow who everyone agreed was eminently qualified for this post. I don't recall any controversy at all about that. 
G: George McGhee, to West Germany? 
O: I'm not familiar with that. 
G: How about Chester Bowles replacing Ken Galbraith? 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --33 
O: Chester Bowles was a highly regarded elder statesman who had the financial resources and the desire to continue in public service and was ideal for that kind of a role. It wasn't 
political debt, it was just a man who would be widely accepted in that role. 
G: FDR, Jr., [as] under secretary of commerce? 
O: We owed him. Not to go through the whole West Virginia primary again, the fact was that he was a great asset to us in West Virginia. We were, as I've said before, very alert to 
and sensitive to the affection and respect for the Roosevelt name throughout West Virginia. You could hardly go into a store or a home or an office without seeing a picture 
of FDR. FDR, Jr., joined us early on in the difficult period of that primary, and if he was interested we'd like to recognize his contribution in some form. 
G: Okay, you had some military positions. George Anderson was not reappointed as chief of naval operations, and Curtis LeMay was reappointed as chief of staff of the air force for 
one year rather than the customary two, and both of these men had disagreed with Secretary [Robert] McNamara in congressional hearings. Was this a case of disciplining 
two military figures who had been outspoken against the administration? 
O: It was a case of accommodating the Secretary of Defense. 
G: Really? 
Tape 3 of 4, Side 1 
O: We were realistic enough to understand that the military was not going to conform totally with the views of the president. They had the same attitude you found to a great extent in 
the federal service, that presidents come and go. It would be disturbing to the secretary of defense to have someone go to the Hill and disagree with the secretary. That was our 
code. You could disagree with the secretary in the privacy of the secretary's office, but what we applied to civilians we didn't attempt to apply to the military. However, our code 
was that if you were in disagreement with the President, and his positions are overridingly contra to your views, you had no problem. You resigned. 
But in the military it's somewhat different, obviously. But that did not mean a person in the military was totally forgiven. That really was a reflection on the White 
House and, as we saw it, his loyalty to the commander in chief. Obviously I was aware of that and aware of the feelings that existed in the White House and the Defense 
Department. So this was a form of chastisement. 
G: Did these two men have support on Capitol Hill? Did you catch any flak on the Hill or get any opinions from--? 
O: I don't remember any great flak on the Hill, because it's not a usual situation for civilians in 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --34 
the political world to extend themselves inordinately in support of military people. You don't have the same zest for fray that you would if this were some political figure who was 
being affected. And, of course, we know about Curtis LeMay in another context at a later date. 
G: Let me ask you about the TFX investigation. Here the Government Operations Permanent Investigating Committee in the Senate had been looking into this for most of 
the year. Did you have any insights on the awarding of that contract and pressures? 
O: Not on the awarding of it. I was familiar with the controversy and the whole [Roswell] Gilpatric-Fred Korth aspects of it. They were, I always felt, somewhat victims of that in 
terms of a very exaggerated effort to claim conflict and to muddy the waters. And there were conversations about the two of them, involving people on the Hill; I was not directly 
involved. That was really a battle between titans. 
It's worth noting, though. I bracketed Gilpatric and Korth, and my memory's been jogged. The accusations regarding Korth were of a much more serious nature, much more 
serious than Gilpatric. And of course the aftermath of it is that Fred Korth resigned. 
G: Anything on Lyndon Johnson in this connection? 
O: No, not that I recall. 
G: Let's talk about the Bobby Baker investigation. Here you had someone that had been in the employment of the Senate for a long time. 
O: Yes. 
G: Did you have the feeling when you were working with the leadership in those years that Bobby Baker was misusing his position? 
O: Let me track the Bobby Baker situation as I saw it. When I first became acquainted with the Senate, Bobby was front and center. He had continued the same role with Mansfield 
that he had with Johnson. He was reputed to be the most knowledgeable person regarding the Senate, its makeup and the characteristics of each of the members. He was a fountain 
of information, and he conducted head counts, jointly with us. I think the role of Baker would be underscored when, as I recounted, having dinner at the Vice President's home 
one night with Baker and his wife along with Jack Brooks and his wife, and the evening's discussion indicated clearly to me how key Bobby Baker was in the Senate. 
You'd be in the Majority Leader's inner office discussing a legislative proposal, head counting, possible amendments, scheduling, anticipating absentees and Baker was 
very much involved. I recall vaguely that Bobby, to maintain his relationships, would have all kinds of contact with senators in all kinds of ways. I recall that Bobby invited me to 
participate in a Sunday picnic, but for whatever reasons, I didn't attend. And that was the 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --35 
closest to having any involvement with Bobby Baker off the Hill. 
The time came when the Baker situation was percolating. The initial stories were causing concern regarding Bobby. I was not aware at the time of what motivated the 
President, but at some point in a conversation I was having with the President, he started to question me regarding Bobby Baker, whom he also knew, obviously. 
G: This is President Kennedy? 
O: Yes. It was a discussion that led to, "Well, how often do you see him off of the Hill?" "Not at all." I was a little bit apologetic about one event that Bobby put on that I had 
neglected to participate in, because that would have been part of congressional relations. I didn't think much of it one way or another. All I thought was that the President was 
reflecting a keen interest in Bobby Baker, motivated more by curiosity than anything else. 
At a later date the President mentioned it to me again, and then told me about a fellow who had come to him to suggest to him--he was a journalist--that I had a 
relationship with Bobby Baker that should be looked into. The journalist was a friend of Kennedy's, and I thought a friend of mine, but whatever his motivation was, clearly it was 
to reflect on me without any evidence to sustain it. So it wasn't a matter of having to explain anything or apologize for anything and the whole matter was dropped. But I think 
the President felt that after he had had that first conversation with me he owed me an explanation. It wasn't that significant, but it was disturbing after the President revealed to 
me why he had questioned me. 
Bobby ultimately paid the price, and wrote a book in the process. If I had been associated with Bobby Baker for six or eight years rather than a relatively brief period of 
time, I probably would have gotten to know him much better than I really did know him. It would have been a very natural evolvement to have social contact, but it just hadn't 
happened. 
He was a very unusual fellow. He had built a strong base in the Senate. He was a caretaker of senators, which is part of the role. He was very sensitive to their travel 
needs, their habits and attendance or lack of it. They would oftentimes go to Baker and say, "Maybe we don't have to have the vote on Tuesday on this because I have to be in 
Cleveland." Then adjustments would be made, and protection of their record in the Senate. It was quite a role, and a role that had evolved, I assume, over the years, and it's 
interesting because his successor was a professional. He was a fellow who actually did the job as the job is outlined in the job description, and without any extracurricular 
involvement. 
G: Baker evidently used a little more imagination in the job. 
O: Yes. 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --36 
G: Do you think the administration was aware of Baker's activities before the roof caved in on him? 
O: You mean the Kennedy Administration? 
G: Yes. 
O: No. First of all, Kennedy as a member of the Senate never became that well acquainted with Baker. He wouldn't be in Baker's province, in that sense. Baker played the strength 
of the Senate, the power structure, so Kennedy would know Baker, obviously. He might have contacted him to say, "I'm going to be absent. Could we vote some other [time]?" 
But he didn't know him intimately and had no preconceptions about him any more than any of us did. On the Kennedy side, none of us had had any involvement with Bobby. 
Obviously, in the campaign we had no involvement with him because he was one of Lyndon Johnson's field men. So we really didn't know him. 
G: There apparently was some degree of investigation and information from the Justice Department and the FBI regarding Baker's supplying senators with hideaways for their 
mistresses, and things like that in the Senate. Did this come to your attention or the administration's? 
O: No. It seems to me if that information was available to the Attorney General prior to all the public disclosures on Bobby, it either would have been made known to me or it 
damned well should have been made known to me. In any event, I never heard of anything. My guess is that whatever the Justice Department learned was all part of the 
investigation that broke early on with a connection with some company. I think, also, there would have been a responsibility on the part of the Justice Department to advise the 
Majority Leader if they had had any knowledge. 
G: Well, I think perhaps they did discuss it with Mansfield--O: 
They might have. 
G: --but I don't know. 
O: I don't know at what stage they would have. 
G: You know, there's a theory, particularly among Johnson supporters, that Baker hadn't really gotten into a lot of this trouble when Johnson was still majority leader because he 
was kept so busy by Johnson that he didn't have time to do all the extracurricular stuff. That Mansfield had a more passive, less aggressive style of leadership and therefore Baker 
had more free time to use this imagination of his. Do you think there's any validity to that? 
O: That could have been, I suppose. I can see that Mansfield's style differed from Johnson's 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --37 
style as majority leader, and that might have afforded Baker some spare time. But I don't know, because if there was ever a straight arrow, it was Mike Mansfield. I can testify to 
that in all my dealings with him. I think that Mansfield inherited Baker passively. Baker had the job and he wouldn't throw him out any more than he would demand the majority 
leader's office and ask that the Vice President remove himself from it. 
G: How about Baker's law practice? Did you ever get any sense that he was using his private practice--? 
O: I'm not sure I was even aware he had one. 
G: Really? 
O: I have no recollection. Did he have a private practice? 
G: He had a law office, apparently. But you didn't see any conflict of [interest]? 
O: Supposedly the position he held in the Senate was full time. I assumed that was the case, and if he had a law office I wasn't aware of it. 
G: Getting back to his association with Senator Kerr and also his handling of campaign funds, political funds, there's some evidence that that money that he had, a hundred thousand, 
three hundred thousand [dollars], whatever it was, that it was actually campaign funds that he was distributing to various senators. Is this plausible, do you think? 
O: I don't know; I don't even recall that, frankly. I was trying, when you posed the question, to recall who the chairman was of the Senate Democratic Campaign Committee at that 
time. I don't even remember that. Do you? 
G: Was it still Earle Clements, do you think? Or was this after Clements? 
O: No, I think it was after Clements. Russell Long? 
G: Maybe so. 
O: Russell Long was chairman at one point. What his role was with the fund-raising aspect of the Senate Campaign Committee and how money was raised and distributed, I have no 
knowledge. 
G: Did the administration see the Bobby Baker scandal as making Lyndon Johnson vulnerable in terms of the ticket? 
O: I don't think so. I think the Bobby Baker scandal, as it was so-called, had no adverse impact as we saw it on Lyndon Johnson. It certainly didn't impact on us. 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --38 
G: There were discussions that fall with regard to the 1964 campaign, and you participated in a meeting on November 13, 1963, with the campaign group. I think Steve Smith was 
there, and RFK, and [Theodore] Sorensen, O'Donnell, [John] Bailey, [Richard] Maguire, and [Richard] Scammon, to discuss the 1964 campaign. Do you recall that and what--? 
O: Yes. Sure. 
G: Let me ask you to talk about that meeting and what you remember about it. 
O: We met informally to discuss the possible timetable to start seriously considering the 1964 election. The time had come and we would be carrying on the same campaign in 1964 as 
we did in 1960 with the same cast. Scammon would be there because of his expertise on polling and registration. I don't recall it as an intense meeting or a meeting with an 
agenda, for if there had been an agenda it would have been my job to produce it. It was a reasonably relaxed situation. Things were looking fine, the polls looked good, but we as 
always would not take anything for granted, and it would be necessary by the first of the year to start implementing our campaign re-election organization. We would get to that 
over the holidays. 
That was basically what the meeting was about. If it were any more than that I would be as sensitive, if not more sensitive, than anybody in the room as to the subject 
matter and the requirements for the future. It was construed by some, as an organizational meeting. It was construed by me as conversation of a general nature, and we would in 
rapid order be getting into the nuts and bolts of putting a campaign together. 
G: Were there any decisions about the 1964 convention itself, where it would be held or anything like that? 
O: I don't recall. 
G: Was it decided that Steve Smith would head the campaign or actually run things? 
O: I don't know about formalization. Steve's role in the prior campaign had been basically a fund-raising role. Steve monitored expenditures, monitored the fund-raising aspects of the 
campaign, and became involved directly in expenditures in terms of purchasing television time. That role would probably have been formalized in 1964 by Steve being designated 
chairman, because my best recollection is that Steve at that point had left the administration. 
G: Yes. 
O: He would be the obvious person in the room who could be designated in the campaign context, who was not involved in the administration and, therefore, who would not stand 
accused of participating in a campaign while on the federal payroll sort of thing. 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --39 
G: Was there any discussion at that meeting of changing the ticket for 1964 and not having Lyndon Johnson as a running mate? 
O: No. If anybody mentioned that I don't recall it, and if anyone did, I would have thought they were a little bit off the wall. I never had any doubt in my mind about what the ticket 
would be in 1964. There were others who claim otherwise and have written otherwise, but it's just not factual. 
G: Did you ever hear any substantive discussion to the effect that Johnson wouldn't be on the ticket or shouldn't be on the ticket, by the White House? 
O: No. 
G: Did you on the other hand hear discussion that he would be on the ticket? 
O: I don't think I heard either way. That meeting was the first to focus on a 1964 campaign. There were people who were not keen about Lyndon Johnson and were not very realistic 
in political terms, who were part of the administration, as I've indicated before. Those people weren't in that room. 
G: Did you have any indication that Johnson might not want to run again in 1964? 
O: No. 
G: That he might want to retire? 
O: No. I don't know how disenchanted Lyndon Johnson was with the office of vice president. I say disenchanted because I can't envision a vice president not being somewhat 
disenchanted. Hubert Humphrey was to some degree. I'll bet every fellow who's ever held the post has found it a rather difficult area to function in, but how deep that was in 
the then-Vice President's thought process I have no idea. He certainly never indicated anything to me along those lines. 
G: Anything on the indictment of Jimmy Hoffa that year, in June? 
O: No, that was out of my area. All I knew on the Jimmy Hoffa situation went back to the antagonism between Hoffa and Bobby, back to the [John] McClellan Committee, back to 
Bobby's activities as attorney general, and the role of Edward Bennett Williams representing Hoffa. But the Hoffa matter and Bobby's role in it did not relate to the 
legislative process at all and never became entangled with it or had any impact on it. 
(Interruption) 
G: Let me ask you a little bit about South Vietnam in the fall of 1963. You had in November the assassination of [Ngo Dinh] Diem and his [brother]. Do you recall that and the 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --40 
reaction to it on the Hill and in the White House? 
O: Yes. By that time, and the assassination underscored it--that's why I hope I'm reasonably accurate in my recollections--contrary to the prevailing view historically, there was a 
rapidly growing concern regarding Vietnam in the White House. It was not, as I recall, reflected particularly on the Hill. There weren't any great demands being made or 
expressions of deep concern. That came much later. 
There had been a growing involvement in Vietnam on the part of the Kennedy Administration. It was reflected a little, I think, in increased troop strength. There was a 
feeling of uneasiness on the part of those directly involved, and this continued right on to the end of the Kennedy period. It's not therefore accurate to suggest that Kennedy had 
made a decision to extricate himself from Vietnam, nor had he made a decision to escalate. But clearly there was concern, because somehow things weren't working out as 
anticipated even then. 
That was internal in the administration, and I don't recall any increasing concern or expressions of serious concern on the part of the Congress. That was the climate at that 
point. I think the significant part of Kennedy's motivation in getting Lodge to Vietnam was the way I described it--he was concerned about retaining bipartisan support, he was 
concerned that bipartisan support be highly visible. It is something that I can't carry on beyond that because it was having, at least in my recollection, no effect on my activities in 
terms of the Congress and the domestic program. It didn't relate. 
McGeorge Bundy was down in the White House basement, Dean Rusk was over in the State Department, Bob McNamara was over at Defense and the others in the 
foreign policy end who were involved directly in Vietnam, and they were all about their business. I did not have any direct involvement. What I'm stating is what I perceived to 
be the attitude and the concerns at that time, and I paid little attention to it, other than a citizen's concern of where this is heading and what we are going to do. Then you have the 
assassination. 
It's not in defense of Lyndon Johnson but this slowly evolving policy had a continuity to it. Of course it escalated and escalated and escalated. But when you suggest 
the President had reached a decision that right after re-election you pull the plug on Vietnam--he could have reached that decision unknown to me. I didn't discern such 
contemplation at that time. 
G: What was Kennedy's attitude toward Vietnam? What did he say about it? 
O: Not much to me, obviously. Probably as close as I came to any direct involvement was the Henry Cabot Lodge appointment. In cabinet meetings it was touched upon, but it was 
not the overriding item in cabinet meetings. It was much more than a burr in the saddle. I know Kennedy reflected on Vietnam a good deal, but all I'm saying is that whatever he 
might or might not have done if he were re-elected none of us will know. In terms of 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --41 
history and accuracy, I have always felt a little uneasy when I hear these former colleagues' assumptions and statements and flat pronouncements that a game plan was in 
place to extricate ourselves totally and pull the plug on Vietnam at a given date right after the election. 
G: This is a what-might-have-been question, but in your own mind--and I'm sure you've wrestled with it--what do you think Kennedy would have done if he had lived? 
O: I really think that if it played out the way it did, over the succeeding couple of years, he would have found a way out. I think he would have found a way of disengaging before it 
became all-out. I really do. But that's only the nature of the guy, that he would have come to the conclusion at an early date that it was a lost cause. By the same token, that 
would mean that he didn't succumb to the blandishments of the military, as he succumbed to the blandishments of the military at the Bay of Pigs. 
As this was played out by Lyndon Johnson, he was a victim of a situation. I don't know what I'd do if I were sitting in that office. You keep having the [William] 
Westmorelands of this world, the acknowledged experts, the CIA, and your Defense Department with a game plan that isn't succeeding and claiming there's a need to add 
additional troops, but there's no question about the end result. Now you're getting that from your own people day in and day out. This became obviously the major topic of 
discussion at cabinet meetings, and I'd listen to the Secretary of Defense. 
In human terms, Lyndon Johnson was not looking for a fight; he wasn't looking to kill people. It was eating him up personally, but the fact remains that it was an utter 
failure. It was brought about by destruction of public support, and a massive job was done in that regard. Was it justified or did it border on the unpatriotic? I don't know. 
The fact is that the American people lost faith and lost heart. Beyond that, you have to have serious doubts that it would have ever succeeded even with the support of the 
American people, and I think that's the tragedy. 
Tape 3 of 4, Side 2 
O: To state as a fact that Kennedy would have extricated himself from Vietnam the day after re-election is not valid. To say that Kennedy might at some stage of escalation decide that 
enough's enough, that's very possible, indeed it could be probable, knowing the fellow as I knew him. To say that Lyndon Johnson allowed it to escalate too far and it fell of its own 
weight, that's a statement of fact. But what motivated him to do it? What motivated him is what any man sitting in that Oval Office had to depend upon: advice and counsel of 
trusted advisers. And I don't think you can say, "Despite the unanimity of opinion at certain stages of this involvement of your advisers and counselors and experts, you should 
not have moved forward." You know, that's a hang of an indictment and I think it has a significant element of unfairness in it. That's all I'm saying. 
G: Were the cabinet meetings under Kennedy in late 1963 the same upbeat discussions of 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --42 
Vietnam that you just recounted under Johnson? 
O: There were limited discussions. It was not considered an overriding element of discussion in the mixed group called the cabinet. 
G: But you talked about knowing Kennedy as you do and what you regard as his instincts, perhaps, that would have caused him if he had lived, to, at an appropriate time, if the 
situation deteriorated, find a way to get out. And yet earlier you described a confrontational tendency that he had to really face a problem head on. Can you elaborate 
on this instinct or whatever it was? 
O: All it would be is instinct. I wouldn't be able to get into his head then or now in terms of what he ultimately might have done. But I think when you relate this to his actions on the 
Bay of Pigs on the one hand and the Cuban Missile Crisis on the other, it is probable that something dramatic and decisive would have taken place, even though his natural 
tendency was to not only enter the fray, but see the battle through. 
G: I wonder if the projection can be related to a difference between his [and Lyndon Johnson's] association or relationship with the right wing or the more conservative 
elements that would have reacted differently, or would have reacted, to a pullout. Do you think that he had less apprehension of a conservative reaction to a pullout than Johnson 
would? 
O: Kennedy? I can't believe his thought process had gotten to that point. The fact is that during that period Kennedy was having little problem with public perception of Vietnam. 
I don't think he was under great pressures from the right to escalate beyond what he was doing, and he was not, as I recall it, under any great pressures from the left or the center 
to refrain from what he was doing. It was not the overriding problem that it became with Lyndon Johnson. 
G: Did Johnson later feel specifically that a pullout might encourage a new round of McCarthyism, such as losing China, a parallel, losing Vietnam? 
O: Johnson had a sensitivity to the degree of congressional support he had for his policies; which was reflected in the [Gulf of Tonkin] Resolution. They claimed afterwards that this 
was a charade and, of course, Johnson continued almost hourly to reflect on the vote in the Senate. What was it, two votes in opposition? 
G: Yes, Morse and [Ernest] Gruening. 
O: Yes. Sensitivity would go to any loss of that supposed support which was reflected in this overwhelming vote. He would constantly refer to the vote, finally to the point where it 
became less and less acceptable or less effective, not only to the public generally but to the members of Congress who were scurrying away and hiding in the woodwork. 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --43 
G: Was he implying more to the vote in terms of significance than was actually--? 
O: I think the constant repetition reached the point where it was counterproductive. 
G: Do you have any insights on the administration's knowledge of and approval of the assassination of Diem or the CIA's role in that? 
O: No, I don't have any. 
G: Never talked to Kennedy about that? 
O: No. 
G: What was Kennedy's reaction to the coup? 
O: I don't recall. 
G: How about the Hill's reaction to it, do you recall any? 
O: If there was a great uproar I would recall it. 
G: Did you ever have the impression that Johnson was more supportive of Diem than Kennedy, or thought that--? 
O: No. 
G: Really? Okay. 
Now, you have written about the assassination itself in your book, and we've talked about the events that led Kennedy to Texas, the Albert Thomas commitment and 
things of this nature. But is there anything else that you want to add about the events themselves? 
O: I don't believe so. While I treated the assassination and the events surrounding it rather briefly in my book, that was a reflection of a problem I had in writing about it and I 
reached the conclusion that I should be as brief and as factual and specific as I could be. I have reviewed it and I concluded that there was really nothing I would add to it. Anything 
I could add now would be really peripheral, have no importance, and would be very incidental. 
G: Let's pick up at Love Field when you were returning from Dallas to Washington. You did cite in your book the instances that led to a lot of friction between the Kennedy staff and 
the Johnson staff, particularly one decision: the decision to take Air Force One instead of Air Force Two. You indicated that both planes were identically equipped. Do you have 
any explanation for why Johnson decided to take the plane that he did? 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --44 
O: No, I don't, and at that time I don't think I reflected on it. I recall all of that period vividly. I did not react adversely to Air Force One. In fact, I don't think that Air Force One and 
Johnson's presence on it impacted on me particularly, due to our situation in the corridor in the hospital bringing the body onto the plane. Someone had taken the necessary step of 
removing seats opposite where Jackie, General [Godfrey] McHugh, Dave Powers, Ken O'Donnell and I were to sit, so that the coffin could be strapped onto the floor of the 
plane. Mr. and Mrs. Johnson on the plane had an element of surprise, in the sense we hadn't even thought about the successor. Our concentration was totally on what was 
transpiring at the moment. So there was an element of surprise. 
I am sure my surprise was not in a negative context: why isn't he over on Air Force Two. I'm sure Air Force Two wasn't in my thoughts at that moment. 
G: How about the decision to have the oath administered there, to wait for Judge Sarah Hughes and have it administered on the ground in Dallas instead of in Washington? 
O: First of all there was no need for an oath, under the Constitution. No one was thinking of that at the time, but that is the reality of it. Lyndon Johnson was president. Secondly, it 
was not a suggestion made by any of the Kennedy people that the oath be administered on the plane. That emanated solely from the Johnson people. They were in one part of the 
plane, I was in another for several minutes. The question was therefore not whether the oath need be administered. The question came to the specific language of the oath, and 
that was garnered from the Justice Department and transmitted. Then the decision to administer the oath before the plane took off caused the problems between the Kennedy 
and Johnson people. 
I don't recall any yelling or screaming. There was a feeling that "let's get out of here as rapidly as we can," and that feeling was based on the unknown. None of us 
obviously had any idea whether this was a conspiracy, whether Johnson was the next victim. That's why the plane was in an isolated part of Love Field. And now we've got 
the body on, let's get out of here. That was the overriding feeling. 
Johnson was adamant that the oath be administered by Judge Hughes. 
G: Why did he want Judge Hughes? 
O: I have no idea. I didn't know Judge Hughes from a hole in the wall. That caused delay, getting Judge Hughes to the airport, and that delay caused concern expressed by some, 
but I don't recall direct discussions. During that period is when I checked on Jackie, who was in the bathroom, to determine how she was coming along. When I went to check on 
her, in the bedroom there was a Bible that I picked up. People have said to me ever since, "Why did you--?" I don't know why I did it. There's such a thing as being out of it and 
not realizing what you're doing or why you're doing it. I've never had an experience comparable to that. 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --45 
G: You picked it up and took it out to Johnson, is that--? 
O: Jackie said that she wanted to come out and join the group. 
G: Was this in response to a request that she come out there? 
O: Yes. I asked her first how was she feeling. She said, "I'm all right," or something to that effect. I said, "Do you want to step out here? Would you?" She said, "I'll come out." By 
that time I guess enough minutes had elapsed so that you're approaching the moment that the Judge has or momentarily does arrive, and this happens quickly because there's the 
card with the oath, and I simply handed the Judge the Bible. I never opened it or never knew whether it was a Bible or a missal. It had a cross on the cover. 
G: It was a Catholic missal. 
O: Yes. She took it, and he put his hand on it, and the oath was administered. I don't know how many minutes elapsed from the time it was determined that an oath was going to be 
administered and [the time] the oath was actually administered and we did take off. I'm sure there's a record of how long a period, but I never checked it. 
G: When you said that Johnson was adamant about having the oath administered by Judge Hughes in Dallas before you left, did you approach him about leaving right away, and did 
you try to get him to--? 
O: The subject of "let's get out of here," I don't know as I initiated it. I was part of it; I was standing there. Then there was a reluctance to leave, there was adamancy. It became 
clear that the oath was going to be administered on the ground. It seems to me that General McHugh was involved in some aspect of getting off. The crew was extremely 
anxious to leave and it would have been his responsibility to notify the crew. He was the military aide aboard. 
G: Did you speculate with LBJ on the possibilities of a conspiracy or an international thing on the way back or--? 
O: No. I don't recall that I did. 
G: What was your own thought? At the time, did you feel like it might be a wider--? 
O: I shared the anxiety of many of us to get out of there. It certainly made eminent good sense to be airborne as quickly as possible. After all we had gone through, a hassle in 
removing the body from the hospital in the first instance; we had gone through some horrible experiences and you were completely beside yourself. You had no knowledge of 
how this happened, who, where or what. We were in a state in which Ken O'Donnell and I knew the President was dead probably a half hour before we allowed the announcement 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --46 
to be made to the world. We just stood there, refusing to believe it. So you can't be held accountable under those circumstances. Then to have a coroner decide the body can't be 
removed from that hospital until he okays it was just too much. So he was shunted aside physically, and we moved the body out of the hospital, into the hearse, jumped into a car 
and off we went to the plane. 
G: What was Johnson's demeanor, aside from the adamancy about getting the oath administered? 
O: I had a couple of conversations with him during the flight. I had a conversation in the corridor of the plane with Bill Moyers who acted, as you would anticipate, in a very 
responsible manner. Bill expressed his concern for Mrs. Kennedy and those of us in the rear of the plane and wondered what could be done or what he could do to be helpful. 
Bill tells me that my response was that our concern should be solely what is best for the country, that's our responsibility. Bill mentioned that in a public appearance; it took me 
aback one night while I was sitting in the audience. 
I was asked if I would come up and talk to the President on at least a couple of occasions. The conversations were general expressions of sympathy, regret and concern. 
Mrs. Johnson had a brief conversation with Jackie, at least one conversation as part of the swearing-in, and probably at one other time during the flight. 
Ultimately the flight settled down to those of us with Jackie sitting with her for the remainder of the trip, and Jackie expressing her concern about us, which was amazing to 
me. I think I mentioned that, because I'll never forget it. I couldn't believe that under those circumstances she would say, "You were the closest to him. What's going to 
happen to you?" What do you say? 
G: Were there any important decisions that were made during the flight that you participated in? 
O: Not that I recall. 
G: Johnson's statement at the airport or anything like that? 
O: From our perspective: you land, get the coffin off the plane, get it to Bethesda Naval Hospital. As soon as the plane landed, of course, the rear door was opened, and what was 
not available in Dallas was available there, and that was a fork lift. Bobby came charging through the plane, and the Secret Service put the body into the hearse, and off we went. 
G: Did you go with the hearse or did you--? 
O: Yes. 
G: Did you? You went to Bethesda? 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --47 
O: Yes. 
G: Were there any other ingredients during the trip back or when the plane landed that exacerbated, say, the friction between LBJ and RFK? 
O: That resulted in exacerbating after the fact? 
G: Yes. 
O: I don't recall. The one action that was reflected upon by Bobby subsequently and did exacerbate it was Bobby learning of Johnson's insistence that despite the desire of the 
widow that we depart immediately, his insistence on staying to be sworn in on the ground, which was unnecessary. That bothered them a great deal. It seemed to Bobby, and to 
some others, to be rather callous and unfeeling. I don't recall talking to Bobby specifically, but it bothered him, and probably in his mind caused him to have a very strong 
feeling about the new President. 
On the flight back, which I assume was a couple of hours, you really had two groups. You had the group up front beyond the President's quarters, who were members 
of Congress and staff and others who were Johnson people, and you had this little group in the rear with the widow. 
G: Did Johnson come back to be with you at times? 
O: No. 
G: You were asked to come forward. 
O: Yes. I think Lady Bird came back; I'm pretty sure, as I recall it. 
G: There have been some recollections that Johnson's reference to Mrs. Kennedy as "Honey" was something that irritated some of the Kennedy staffers. Do you recall that? 
O: Probably. They didn't voice it, but it probably did, because that would be an irritant. That's not a word that they use. 
G: Yes. Did that bother you, or did you hear him use it? 
O: I don't remember hearing him use it. The expression of concern and sympathy and understanding was really from Mrs. Johnson, woman to woman. 
I think it was a gut reaction to be negative toward or antagonistic to Lyndon Johnson under those circumstances on the part of some Kennedy people. This terrible 
thing, this man has replaced him, and there's something awfully unfair about what 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --48 
happened. This man has been killed. I don't think you probably dwell on the Constitution. The mere fact that he succeeded Jack Kennedy was an irritant to some Kennedy people 
from then on. Somehow or other there was some degree of responsibility on Johnson's part, as irrational as that might seem. 
I think that you're faced with abnormality in terms of human reactions. When I noted that the handles on one side of the coffin had been broken or bent, and you're in a 
hospital for several hours and an autopsy is being conducted, what would motivate you to say to Ken and Dave Powers, "God, we have to have a proper casket," and proceed to 
contact the Gawler's Funeral Home, get into a car and go down there, walk in and say to a man, "I want you to take us to your display room. I want you to take us to the 
middle-priced caskets in your display room." You get on the elevator and go up. "Now, show us the most modest, in terms of appearance, casket among these middle-priced 
caskets. The least--" What are you doing? Then you select it and say, "Have this delivered to the hospital immediately." And that's the casket he was buried in; that's the 
casket we got a bill for later on. 
People say, "Why did it come to your mind to say middle-priced, not the lowest-priced or the highest-priced, but the middle-priced?" I think what you were 
grasping for in your mind was he was one of the people; he was America. He was sort of typical of America, an average American. 
Then you get to the East Room, and Bobby is saying, "I'll leave it"--this is to Ken and I--" up to you whether it's an open coffin." So you walk into the East Room; you 
never open the coffin. You can't get yourself to do it. All of those things occurred, but are you dealing rationally under any normal [circumstances]? Of course not. 
G: Did Ken agree with you? 
O: Yes, we just walked away from it. Yes. 
So the handling of Mrs. Kennedy throughout this period in the living quarters and the Oval Office all played out, and there were those who felt rather strongly that it was 
mishandled by Johnson. I don't remember the details, but something about the furniture was removed too quickly from the Oval Office, despite the President's statements that she 
should stay as long as she pleased and there was no hurry. My guess is that at a minimum they were matters of perception. I think there again, you go through a situation where 
perhaps you had thoughts of that nature and didn't express them, and later in the light of dawn dismissed them because they weren't valid. 
But the situation existed and continued. On the staff level Lyndon Johnson made all kinds of efforts to try to meld a staff and to ensure the Kennedy people of his interest in 
them, and his total desire not to do anything that could be construed as unfair or unseemly. He went through that process to the best of his ability. But there was no way 
he was going to go through that process without people either privately or perhaps 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --49 
publicly concluding otherwise. 
G: It was inevitable. 
O: Yes. 
G: Did you handle any of the liaison work between the Kennedy family and LBJ during that period in terms of the stay in the [White House]? 
O: No. What happened was that when we had the mass in the room near the East Room, at some point Mrs. Kennedy asked Ken and I if we would stay in the White House. Of 
course we immediately agreed, and we stayed through the funeral, at her request. 
G: Yes. Did your family come as well, or did you just stay? 
O: No, just Ken and I. 
G: Let me ask you about the conspiracy theories that have evolved around the assassination. They range from all kinds of theories. Are there any that you feel are plausible or have 
any--? 
O: No. I've never felt that it was plausible to contend there was a conspiracy. You can discuss the background of the assassin, his contacts and connections in his past, and you 
can discuss his motivation. That's all subject to all kinds of discussion, always will be, I suppose. But as to the act itself, I have always firmly believed it was the act of a single 
person, a single individual, who was clearly a marksman and did the job effectively. All the other theories notwithstanding, I've had no evidence ever remotely submitted to me 
that merits changing my view. 
Tape 4 of 4, Side 1 
G: The recent one in particular puts forward the notion that the pathological evidence was altered during the autopsy at Bethesda. Anything on that? 
O: No. Our problem with an autopsy in Dallas was obvious. There was no way we were going to tolerate staying there one moment longer than was necessary, and that went to 
the swearing-in aspects. Our thought was overridingly, "Let's get out of here. Let's get our leader out of here." In that instance that was a normal human reaction. To have 
someone interfering with it was not acceptable, when you had a woman who had blood all over her suit, who had just lost her husband, and you're demanding that she sit in a chair 
somewhere. They said they wanted to get to some military installation where they could control the autopsy. My God, what difference did it make at that point? What were you 
trying to do? 
G: There's some speculation, of course, that the assassination was a retaliation for attempts 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --50 
on Castro's life. Do you have any thoughts on that? 
O: No. You can debate the background of the assassin and his prior involvements and contacts until hell freezes over in support of that theory. I have no knowledge or evidence 
of that. That's my own personal conclusion--this was the act of a single individual. 
G: Did you ever talk to Johnson about that, the relationship between--O: 
No. 
G: --the Cuban operations and [the assassination]? Okay. 
When did LBJ ask you to stay on? 
O: On the plane. 
G: On the way back. 
O: It wasn't in that context. It was in the context, you know that I really need you and the country needs [you], which was an exaggeration. But it was very strongly presented to 
me that "we just have to go through this transition, you've got to be with me throughout this and we've got to fulfill our responsibilities. I have mine now, with the oath of office, 
but you have yours." My comment that I can recall was, "We can talk about all that later, or some other time." 
G: When did you decide to stay on board? 
O: I don't think that it was a matter of decision. It was a matter of going through a funeral and a burial, and recognizing that the following day there was pending legislation in the 
Congress, and I had the responsibility to monitor it. I came back from the service and took off the striped pants and the suit and got into a business suit and I made a real effort 
to apply myself immediately, not with any question of a long-term or anything else, but to apply myself. And Hubert Humphrey and Mike Mansfield, because it was a Senate matter, 
reacted the same way. 
As the weeks went on, along with Ken and Dave Powers, we devoted a lot of time and attention to Jackie, visited with her every evening over at the Harriman house. There 
was no help we could render other than companionship, which she seemed to appreciate and urged that we come by as often as possible. And we did, and that was daily until she 
was able to secure another home, and then we helped her with that and continued to see her regularly. 
I had a full understanding that you should fulfill your responsibilities. After all, you were still in the New Frontier program, and the appropriate time for decision, which 
the President could make or you could make or jointly make, would be when he was, as 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --51 
we used to say, on his own, elected president of the United States on his own. Then it's his total ball game, this interim period is closed out. And that's when Ken and Dave 
Powers and I decided to submit our resignations. 
The result was that Dave was offered the position at the [Kennedy] Library, Ken decided to go back to Massachusetts and seek the governorship, and Johnson basically 
said, "I refuse to accept your resignation." He and I had several discussions and came to the agreement that I have recounted: that I would stay through one more session of 
Congress. This was on the basis of his urgent request, coupled with his argumentation that with the opportunity presented by the election and the additional seats in the House, 
we could now complete the New Frontier program and go on to his program. 
On reflection, and even when I committed this to writing I thought how arrogant I was, because he was the president of the United States and I said to him, "Under two 
conditions. One, that it is publicly known that I submitted my resignation. That's important to me, that in good spirit and with a handshake we'll close the book. And two, 
that it must be stated up front that I have agreed to stay for one session, the next session of Congress, and you and I have an understanding that we will not discuss any extension 
when the session ends, and there'll be no further conversation regarding the stay." And he agreed. 
It wasn't a pitch he was giving me that convinced me. I did see the opportunity to make a contribution to the completion of the Kennedy program, and it meant a lot to me. 
I really was convinced that I could make a contribution. That wasn't arrogance, it was trying to evaluate, after the experiences of the past years, dealing with the new Congress. 
Clearly he was right. I was in a position to play a role. 
By the same token, as I told him, "It's essential, as I see it, Mr. President, to put your team in place, to get past this band-aid Kennedy-Johnson staff and have a Johnson 
team that fits your needs, that's totally yours and is not a hangover from a prior period." And I think he agreed with that, but in my case for his own reasons he felt that he wanted 
me to stay, and it was clear he was anxious that I stay. It was also clear that I could make a contribution if I stayed. It was the appropriate time for the Kennedy people to leave, 
and leave with a good feeling all around, which I was fully prepared to do. This man had treated me eminently fair through that intervening year, and I found it easy to work with 
him and I found him very responsive to all aspects of the pursuit of the domestic program. I did feel very strongly and it made good sense to appropriately depart at an obvious time. 
There had been an obvious time after the assassination. But this most obvious time would not be subject to any second-guessing or wherefores, it was just an obvious step to 
take. It never entered my mind that it would result in my staying for any further period of time. 
I thought it was fair and my responsibility to him to state it. I went in to see him immediately upon his return from Texas. He talked to me on occasions on election night. 
I had toured the country, which we'll get to later. And we had discussed the election 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --52 
returns three or four times during the evening of election. I didn't bring up the subject, obviously; it was simply, "I'll see you soon." And he was back soon, and I took the first 
available moment to meet with him. 
G: You said the discussions took place over several meetings. Did it take him that long to persuade you to stay? Did you initially--? 
O: No, I didn't say over several meetings, but there was more than one meeting. The discussion I just reviewed was the basic discussion. It was more than one meeting but it 
wasn't a lengthy period of time. The several meetings and lengthy period of time occurred a year later, at the end of that session. (Laughter) Or toward the end of that session, 
when he came up with an approach that did not violate the gentlemen's agreement we had reached with the handshake, because he never did discuss "now you've got to stay longer 
in congressional relations." This was a matter he decided during the course of that summer in anticipation of the end of the session, another dimension, as he saw it, a 
different area of discussion. Of course, afterwards, he reminded me that that also entailed staying with congressional relations. But that was later on. 
G: You described these daily visits with Mrs. Kennedy in the post-assassination period. What would you talk about? Would you reminisce about Jack Kennedy while you were there? 
O: Yes, some, but small talk. 
G: It must have been terribly difficult. 
O: Yes. She was great; she contained herself well. It was clear to us that right from the time we were on the plane, with Jack's body and through this, she truly wanted our 
companionship, and frankly, her comments on the plane as to her feeling toward us and how much we meant to Jack was a conversation that had never taken place at any other 
time. Her feeling was strong in that regard, and it continued until she moved to New York. 
Actually, it was my doing that communication lapsed. I remember being with my wife in New York on different occasions after she had moved here, and Elva would urge 
me to give her a ring. Meanwhile I had read about her effort to get out and around to the theater and what have you, different people escorting her, and I felt I would be intruding. 
I was wrong, as in later years I learned it was a little thickness on my part. I just didn't feel that she would want to be bothered, or [I felt] I'd be bothering her. I was very 
sensitive to the whole thing. Then the months and years rolled by, and we had a reunion at Ken O'Donnell's funeral. 
During that period we're talking about, Lee Radziwill, her sister, was with her at the Harriman house. I remember being with her one evening when a Johnson daughter 
came to the door with some gifts. 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --53 
G: Christmas presents. 
O: Yes, they were Christmas presents. 
G: Anything on the renaming of Cape Canaveral to Cape Kennedy? Was this a personal wish of hers? 
O: I don't recall. I don't know how that came about. 
G: Did she have any requests of the new President during this period? 
O: Not that I'm aware of. She was remarkably thoughtful and concerned about others. If anything stayed with me through all these years, it's been that aspect of Jackie Kennedy, 
because I went with her to Arlington to visit the grave. 
G: It was shortly after the burial? 
O: Yes. Within two or three days, I guess. I went with her to visit the grave, and then she gave me a set of the American and presidential flags that were on standards at the time of 
his death. I guess with the various locations of the flags there were probably six sets of them. She gave a set to me, to Dave Powers, to Ken O'Donnell, retained sets for her two 
children, and I think there were maybe one or two other sets. I have those, and I thought that it was extremely thoughtful of her. That's the way she was; that's the way she reacted 
to all of this. 
I had limited social involvement with them over the years. There were a number of occasions, but it wasn't a regular sort of thing. I became acquainted with her before she 
married Jack, and Elva and I liked her very much. We were at the wedding, and we were with her when she got her engagement ring, and we stayed with them on occasions at their 
home in Georgetown when we'd go down to Washington. There was another world of social activity that I not only wasn't part of, I had no interest in, and so I think I was a 
little taken aback with the intensity of her reaction to me, along with Ken and David after the assassination. And [we] obviously felt the same in turn. As difficult as it might be 
conducting a conversation, it certainly was no chore to visit her evenings. I was anxious to do it. 
G: On the matter of staying on at the White House, did your decision to do so earn resentment from some of the Kennedy crowd? 
O: Yes, it did, as a matter of fact. There were three or four people who had some involvement in the administration and had been Kennedy loyalists over a long period of 
time from Massachusetts. It took the form of berating my administrative assistant. I was never confronted, but it was clearly there. 
G: Berating your administrative assistant? 
57
O'Brien --Interview VI --54 
O: Yes. I remember one incident. His name was Claude Desautels, and he was with me for years. He was in Duke Zeibert's restaurant having lunch, and probably in the general 
climate of a couple of cocktails at lunch, they told him what they thought of him and me in terms of staying with Johnson. Claude was very distressed when he came back and told 
me. That indicated that this was a subject of conversation, and there was all of a sudden a lack of contact from these old friends. It became a matter that troubled them 
considerably, because Bobby came to me and said he had heard or knew about some adverse comments being made. I respected Bobby greatly for it. He said he wanted to 
come by and see me, and he did. He said, "You have done absolutely the right thing and I would have thought little of you if you had done otherwise. I just want you to know my 
strong feelings on this. You're the custodian of the New Frontier program." It was appreciated. 
G: Was this while he was still attorney general? 
O: Yes. When O'Donnell was leaving, and there was a party for him at Duke Zeibert's. Bobby came by again and asked me if I'd join him and go to the party, which I did. 
What happens in life is interesting. Invariably that sort of thing occupies those on the periphery or who are not directly involved, because Ken O'Donnell and I had a 
continuing relationship. I was interested in his campaign, met with him on occasions, was a contributor to it. While we weren't the bosom buddies we had been for a lot of years, 
we had gone our own way and he never gave any indication of any disturbance. After all, he had chosen to seek office and I had chosen to stay. I think when anything like that 
occurs, it becomes a matter that seems to involve those who are not direct participants. The principals can generally handle matters of that nature while others seem to have 
difficulty. That's exactly what happened in that instance. 
Years went by and out of the four of these same people, three of them spent an evening at my home at Cape Cod. 
So it's no big deal. If your conscience is clear and you've done the right thing and you have not hurt anybody in the process and you wish everybody well, that's all you can 
do. I did wish Ken well and I did carry on. Reaction was part of the anti-Johnson feeling which had developed among some of the Kennedy supporters and stayed with them. I 
became part of that by virtue of just being there. It had no adverse effect on me, nor did it become some big confrontation. The only time it even came indirectly into focus was 
when they chose to take on poor Claude Desautels. If they felt that strongly about it, they had ample opportunity to take me on, but they never got around to it. 
G: How would you assess the performance of the Kennedy White House personnel after the assassination? 
O: Under the circumstances it went quite well. I had the easiest adjustment. There was a 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --55 
task to do. It was ongoing, it was an unfinished agenda. And you were dealing with the Congress. In some roles, where you would be dealing almost exclusively with the 
President, great difficulty obviously would occur. A good example was the role of Ken O'Donnell, who was the appointments secretary just outside the door of the Oval Office, 
and you had Walter Jenkins, Jack Valenti. It was sort of a dual staff. At my end there was none of that. The Johnson people and the President just moved heaven and earth to 
make themselves available and be as helpful as they could. That was true of any number of Johnson people in the White House. 
It didn't pose a difficult personal problem at all. It just evolved and went on. But with Ken, Dave Powers--whose roles involved spending a lot of time with the President--it 
could not go on. And it made no sense. That's why I went in to him, when he was elected. (Laughter) I said, "Now it's all yours, your staff in place. It was just great, and 
the best to you." And frankly, it made all the sense in the world, and there wasn't anybody trying to hang on. There had been resignations prior to his election. There were 
departures from time to time. It was a matter of adjustment to a full-fledged Johnson staff, ultimately. 
It was a difficult period, and I think it was particularly difficult for Ken, because I know the President was concerned about him. He talked to me because Ken and I were 
very close, and I talked to Ken, and Ken found that at times it was very difficult. The President went as far as he could to try to keep this on an even keel. 
I remember he had a cold. He called me to the living quarters and said he was altering my salary. You could see a little humor in this, particularly the salaries in those 
days. He said, "I've made up my mind, you should be the highest salaried person on the staff. Now you're going to receive $29,500 a year, and the next one to you on the staff is 
at $27,500." I recognized that he was trying to further emphasize his acceptance of your work and his desire to have you continue it. I remember that on my desk at Christmas, 
that Christmas after the assassination, was a beautiful watch inscribed to me from him. And the $29,500, I think that's what it was, had its element of humor to it, because then he 
promoted me further to the cabinet at $35,000. 
(Laughter) 
By the same token, when I went into the White House with Jack Kennedy, the top staff salary was $21,000. If you were there because of salary, you were a pretty sad 
character. That never was a matter of discussion or review. But I cite those instances as examples of the effort, and he was probably making efforts to keep other Kennedy people 
comfortable. There were various social events that you attended--White House dinners--but that was not unusual. I had to attend--I say "had" because it became a bore 
to attend those over the years. 
G: How did Salinger make the transition from Kennedy to Johnson? 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --56 
O: I was trying to recall, I think there's a missing element in my recollection on Pierre. Pierre became a United States senator for a brief period of time. He was appointed to the Senate 
by Pat [Edmund] Brown. He then served in the Senate for whatever period of time it was until he sought election on his own in California, and he won the nomination and then was 
defeated. I imagine that's where the trail ends as far as the White House is concerned. 
G: But in terms of being press secretary initially for Johnson after the--? 
O: When did he go into the Senate? 
G: Let's see. I believe it was 1964, wasn't it? 
O: I guess it was, yes. 
G: I can check. 1964 or 1965. 
O: Yes. It was 1964. Pierre was there just a matter of months, and I don't recall Pierre's problems, if any, of adjustment. Who did the President bring in? 
G: George Reedy. 
O: George Reedy. Then at a later stage Bill Moyers. George Reedy as press secretary, I suppose, coincided with Pierre's departure to the Senate. 
G: How about McGeorge Bundy? 
O: I have a vague recollection there, too, how long Mac stayed and when he departed. I recall Ted Sorensen departing, and Arthur Schlesinger left quickly. His role would not 
relate to Johnson activity anyway. On Mac Bundy, I simply don't recall. 
G: How about [Myer "Mike"] Feldman? 
O: I don't recall. He was under Ted Sorensen. Lee White stayed, and I think stayed throughout the Johnson Administration. Mike departed at some point; I just lost track of 
it. It was Ted and Mike and Lee; that was their department. Joe Califano arrived replacing Sorensen; I don't remember the time sequence. But he was there through the 
heady days of the Great [Society] program. I left in April of 1968. 
G: Anything else on the transition? 
O: I guess I repeat this ad nauseam, but I'm so firmly persuaded that the human element is so vital in all activities. You always hear of tables of organization and structures and they 
can range all the way from small entities to massive entities, but the White House is unique. It's a relatively small group in a small building, working intimately with the 
president, and it's limited to a handful of top staff. Our top title was special assistant. If 
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O'Brien --Interview VI --57 
you look at the Kennedy White House, or the Johnson White House, and place different people in position, you're talking about the Mac Bundy role, the Ted Sorensen role, the 
Ken O'Donnell role, the Pierre Salinger role, the Larry O'Brien role. That's about it. You're working together intimately; consequently you have flowing from the president not 
only a lot of responsibility but a lot of authority--and it's highly personal, unavoidably so. 
The building lends itself to it. When you think of the awesome size of the federal government and the departments and agencies, I thought of that when I became 
postmaster general. There you have thirty-six hundred people on your staff, in addition to the seven hundred thousand people who work in the Department, and I don't know how 
many assistant postmasters general. That's all one department. Multiply that by the departments and agencies of government. Yet when everything is said and done, the 
thrust and the force and the heart of government emanates from that little building, and those who have the privilege of being associated with the president on a daily basis are 
truly privileged. 
With it, of course, comes tremendous responsibility. 
People say to me, "Well, you've had an opportunity to participate in various activities, not only in politics and government, but in sports. What really was the most 
meaningful role?" There's no question about it, it was as special assistant to the president, Kennedy and Johnson. 
Tape 4 of 4, Side 2 
G: [The Johnsons lived at their home] for a period of days while Mrs. Kennedy remained at the White House. Did you go out to The Elms any during that period? 
O: No, I don't recall that I did. Incidentally, it should be mentioned, too, that I never, in the time I spent with Jackie Kennedy, noted any indication she was distressed about what you 
heard rumbled all over Washington--that supposedly she was pushed out or she was mistreated. Frankly, journalists participated in this, too. The adjustment for some 
journalists was difficult. A number of reporters and columnists in Washington had become intimately acquainted with Jack Kennedy and Jackie Kennedy, socially involved and very 
friendly toward them and very resentful that this change had taken place. I think some of them took it out on Lyndon Johnson. So the effect, the ripple from that probably was 
more widespread than I realized. 
No, I don't recall being at the Elms; I don't think I was during that interim period. 
End of Tape 4 of 4 and Interview VI 
61
    [ Part 7: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--28 from   Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview VII*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
Project. In addition, some interviews were done for the Library under the auspices of the National Archives and the White House during the Johnson administration. 
Some of the Library's many oral history transcripts are available on the INTERNET. Individuals whose interviews appear on the INTERNET may have other interviews available on 
paper at the LBJ Library. Transcripts of oral history interviews may be consulted at the Library or lending copies may be borrowed by writing to the Interlibrary Loan Archivist, LBJ Library, 
2313 Red River Street, Austin, Texas, 78705. 
1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW VII 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview VII, 2/ 12/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
For Electronic Copy on Diskette from the LBJ Library: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview VII, 2/ 12/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
3
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-18 
4
O'Brien --Interview VII --1 
INTERVIEW VII 
DATE: February 12, 1986 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 1 
G: [Let's begin with] the assassination. Did the fact that the assassination occurred in Lyndon Johnson's home state cause a certain amount of bitterness toward Lyndon Johnson among 
the Kennedy people? 
O: I don't think so. I don't think that was an element in the attitudes that developed in the aftermath. There were those, as we have discussed, who had very negative views of 
Lyndon Johnson. And they probably, in some instances, had those views before the assassination, but didn't have a handle to articulate them to their friends and associates or 
press. 
I think what clearly came out of the assassination, regarding its location, was the very strong anti-Dallas, anti-Texas feeling on the part of a lot of people. Certainly that 
encompassed a great number of Kennedy people. The viewpoint I would hear repeatedly [was], "I would never visit Dallas again. I'd never want to be in the city. I dislike those 
people." It was, again, the irrational aspect of it, because if you look at the assassin and where he came from, what did that have to do with the city of Dallas? But they weren't 
accepting that. For years I'd have people repeatedly tell me about their dislike for the city of Dallas and dislike for Texas. They were very negative comments. Then they seemed to 
fade as the years went on; I haven't heard that sentiment in a number of years. But that was a lasting attitude toward Dallas, the city and the people of Dallas, as felt by people far 
removed from Dallas. But it was not, as I recall it, personalized in the context of any strong anti-Johnson feeling. However, there were some people who weren't closely 
associated with Kennedy or the administration who did connect Lyndon Johnson and Dallas in expressing their views. But once you got beyond that group, the anti views 
really were aimed at Texas and Dallas rather than at Lyndon Johnson individually. But it did create a great deal of feeling. 
I had occasion to go to Dallas, not for quite a while after, and I also remember when I went down there for the ground-breaking ceremony for the new arena. The mayor 
and some of his associates were taking me to TV stations, and there was going to be a cocktail party hosted by the Dallas Cowboy people to get acquainted. During the course 
of the day, the mayor and his associates felt that I would want to travel the route a little bit and take a look at the building again, which I didn't want to do. It wasn't because I had 
5
O'Brien --Interview VII --2 
any anti feeling, but I didn't want any reminders. They meant well, so I didn't say anything and we did a quick motor trip around that area. 
I suppose a tragedy of that nature is bound to arouse great emotions, and if it does arouse great emotions, adverse comments, attitudes, and irrational points of view will 
arise. I've never been in a similar situation, obviously, but I would guess, as we discussed yesterday, experts evaluating and analyzing such occurrences could almost predict those 
reactions. And it was pretty widespread. 
G: Did you ever talk to LBJ about his view of the assassination or how he explained what happened? Did he ever, for example, feel that it had been a conspiracy or anything of that 
nature? 
O: No, I don't recall any conversations with him on the assassination. There were probably references to it, but it just never came into our discussions. 
My sole after-the-fact involvement was, as I recall it, being interviewed by the Warren Commission. And, frankly, my feeling was that the sooner I removed myself from 
all of that and adjusted my own thought process, the better. It had made a tremendous impact on me, which I'm sure it did on everyone else who was intimately involved. In fact, 
the impact was so great that I have difficulty with it to this day. I think that affected me when I was doing my book, so I didn't dwell on it at any great length. I didn't find I was 
capable of it, frankly, and I find that I can become emotionally involved and upset by it if I get into too much of a discussion of it, what, twenty-two, twenty-three years later. I 
guess these feelings remain, and I assume the combination of Dallas and being with Bobby [Kennedy] when he was killed leaves its mark and leaves some emotional scars. 
My general attitude was that I didn't introduce it into conversation, obviously, and I refrained from getting into conversations with people who did bring up the subject. It 
was a matter of avoidance of the whole matter, but there were two occasions when I had to face it. One was the interview for the Warren Commission, which basically went to 
how many shots did I hear and that sort of thing. And the other occasion occurred a long time afterward when Abe Fortas and Clark Clifford came to see me in my office at the 
White House one day. From time to time you would hear reference to what happened to the missal, which I always referred to as a bible because I never did open the cover of it, 
the missal that I handed to Judge [Sarah] Hughes for the swearing-in. I had no idea what happened to it. It had disappeared on the plane, I was told. Obviously, once the 
swearing-in was over, I made no effort to take the missal back or even note where it went. It was a long time, maybe a couple of years, I guess, and Clifford and Fortas came in to 
see me and they had the missal. 
G: Is that right? 
O: Simply, I looked at it. I had a better recollection then than I have today of what the cover looked like and the composition of it. They said, "Is this the missal"--or whatever way 
6
O'Brien --Interview VII --3 
they referred to it--" that you gave to the Judge which was used in the swearing-in ceremony?" I looked at it--I didn't open it; I just looked at the cover because that's all I 
would be able to identify--and I said, "Yes, it is." Where they got it and where it went from that moment, I don't know. 
G: Was this while you were postmaster general or beforehand? 
O: I would think it was before that only because my recollection is I was questioned about the missal in my White House office. My guess, therefore, would be I was still [on the 
White House staff] because once I was postmaster general I was not in the White House office very often. 
G: I wonder why they were pursuing this. Perhaps to find out how it had surfaced? 
O: It had been located and how it came into their possession, I don't know. Who may have felt he had a memento of a truly historic event that could be kept quietly and secretly for 
years and surface at some appropriate time, I don't know. But I will say that I always regretted that I didn't question them--this was a short discussion and ended quickly. It 
was some time after that that I thought to myself, I wonder where it had been, how it came into their possession and, more interestingly, where is it now. I assume that you 
people probably have it. 
G: Yes. 
O: You do? 
G: Yes. 
You alluded in your book to the fact that you were not privy to any discussions regarding the possibility of denying the presidency to Lyndon Johnson after the 
assassination. Were you aware that discussions had taken place that at least is it conceivable, is it possible that Johnson could be prevented from assuming the office? 
O: I was not only not privy to any discussion that might have taken place, I can't imagine the grounds or the common sense of any discussion of that nature. It never would have 
entered my mind, never has, and I'm a little amazed even now if there was some indication discussions of that nature took place. I probably would not be privy to it because I would 
quickly remove myself from anything as ridiculous as that. I can't comprehend people considering bypassing the Constitution. 
G: But do you think that such discussions did take place? 
O: I've never heard of them. 
G: Really? 
7
O'Brien --Interview VII --4 
O: Never. 
G: Let me ask you how Congress responded to LBJ's assumption of the office, the transition. From your vantage point on the Hill, how did it--? 
O: I think the congressional reaction across the board was comparable to the reaction personally that I had and the reaction of most people, certainly, who I had any association 
with; that was the need to ensure there was in place an orderly transition. [There was] a totally supportive attitude, coupled with a very strong feeling on the Hill that there should 
be every action taken, every position taken which would underscore the strength of the Constitution in the process, and it was very supportive of Lyndon Johnson. I think that 
branch of government reacted in a very positive, supportive manner, and I never heard on Capitol Hill the kind of comments that I heard among some of the Kennedy people I have 
referred to. They would be from people who had, in many instances, close friendships with Jack Kennedy. 
A good example would be Eddie Boland, who introduced me to Jack Kennedy in the first instance. I'm glad I thought of him. He is a fellow who had known Kennedy from 
the time he was elected to the House of Representatives. Eddie wasn't in the House at that time, he was registrar of deeds in Springfield, but Eddie has been a family friend and a 
close personal friend over all those years. To this day I've never heard Eddie Boland make a negative comment about Lyndon Johnson or express distress about the state of Texas or 
Dallas. And I think that's why you have to draw the line when you say how wide was the circle, how far do the ripples extend. I think that perhaps my dwelling on it may even in a 
sense exaggerate it. But I want to make it clear, if anybody ever wants to have my views someday in the record, that the comments were confined to a relatively small circle of 
people who had been politically involved with Jack Kennedy and had been closely involved with him in his administration. It didn't even extend to people who knew him 
well, thought highly of him, and certainly Eddie Boland's in that category. He thought the world of Jack Kennedy, and I've talked to Eddie Boland on scores of occasions. 
Obviously, we've had a lot of contact over the years, and as I'm reflecting now, I have no recollection of Eddie Boland ever making a negative comment about Johnson, a negative 
comment about Texas. And I'm sure that he, among his colleagues, had adopted the same attitude, that we can be proud of our country and we've got to make sure the world 
understands that we're supportive of our new president. 
G: Did LBJ do anything unique to solidify the congressional support or anything of this nature? I know he addressed Congress but--O: 
Yes. Other than that, I don't think of anything that you would term unique. I think, as I described it, there was a continuity which had to be maintained, and that went to the 
legislative process. It went to the relations between the White House and the Congress, and Lyndon Johnson plunged into the continuity of that relationship without any hesitation 
or without any delay, and it just moved right along. You know, we were really from day 
8
O'Brien --Interview VII --5 
one, following the funeral, totally engaged in that area of activity, which would be the area I was involved with. And I would have to assume--I have no reason to suggest 
otherwise--that comparably in all other areas of presidential authority and responsibility, foreign policy and whatever else, everything moved on without interruption. 
G: Do you recall anything on Johnson's discussions with the foreign leaders that came for the Kennedy funeral? 
O: No, there was such an influx of foreign leaders, and protocol was maintained throughout. I don't recall specifically who they were, but there were half a dozen key foreign leaders 
who had relatively brief meetings with the President, all as part of this ceremonial situation. Certainly I don't recall anything of great moment emanating from all of that 
over the period of two or three days. 
I think it's just amazing, that whole period, when you think of it. I remember in the last phase of the funeral program, when the body was removed from the Rotunda of the 
Capitol, that we--the White House staff--joined the procession at the White House, for we had watched it from the Capitol down Pennsylvania Avenue to the White House on 
television. That was the moment when John-John saluted the television set and later on did the same thing at the church. It was during that period that one of the ushers, at Dave 
Powers' request, brought a bottle of champagne, and Dave and Ken and I opened the bottle and we saluted and drank a toast as we watched the set. But once you joined this 
procession, it was a mass movement; it was not a very orderly procession. There was dead silence, just the beat of drums. To go up to that cathedral to the beat of drums, to 
see people like de Gaulle and Haile Selassie and Prince Philip walking along the street and into the church, to look around and see these world leaders in every direction you looked, 
right through the ceremony at Arlington, was overwhelming. Certainly, nothing of any moment was occurring which would impact on world relations or anything else. I'll never 
forget they were in the same pew--Selassie and de Gaulle--and the contrast in size and the unbelievably brilliant uniform Selassie was wearing was striking. 
G: There was a presidential succession agreement with John McCormack in case of presidential disability. Do you recall that being arranged? 
O: Yes, I recall it being arranged. I don't recall the details of it, but my recollection is that this was pretty informal historically. While you could sit and look at the established 
succession procedure, you could go down the line through ten different people. As a matter of fact, I was in that line. 
G: Were you really? 
O: Because I was in the cabinet position which was the third or fourth cabinet position established. It didn't make any difference what the line did, as you had John McCormack, 
but it was determined that we should formalize this procedure so there'd be no questions about it in the event a situation occurred. Nobody ever imagines anything happening that 
9
O'Brien --Interview VII --6 
would bring you to the speaker and then to the secretary of state, et cetera. So they formalized it to be sure the record showed exactly what was to transpire. For example, I 
for one had no understanding, I'm sure it never entered my mind, that the provision for succession specifies that it is automatic. And if you go back to Air Force One, I don't 
believe there was anyone on Air Force One who had that understanding. But there has to be some ceremony, there has to be some action taken. The contention afterwards, of 
course, was there was no need for any action. Yet I don't think historically there has ever been an occasion where there hasn't been a swearing-in ceremony. Whether it was 
Coolidge or Truman, there was always a ceremony and an oath taken. But the fact is that the experts on the Constitution insist there's no requirement. 
G: In this case, you had the question of the President's health and an arrangement whereby if he were disabled, either because of a heart attack or something, then McCormack would 
step in and take over the duties temporarily, I guess relating to an agreement that Nixon and Eisenhower had worked out. Carl Hayden was president pro tem of the Senate, so 
two people in the line of succession were quite elderly at the time. 
O: Yes. 
G: Was this a concern to you or to the President? 
O: It was a general concern, a recognition, let's put it that way, of the facts of life, and a feeling that we'd better have this in order. Part of it clearly was the age of both Hayden 
and McCormack. I think it alerted everyone, and such a situation alerts people to the fact that a procedure should be established and not be subject to question or scrutiny. 
G: Did the assassination cause Lyndon Johnson and/ or the Secret Service to be more protective in terms of presidential travel? 
O: Oh, my gosh! 
G: Did you notice a difference? 
O: Yes, there was a tremendous, immediate reaction. We've had the ebb and flow of that, haven't we, right through our history? I remember it vividly because I saw it. I don't 
know the date, but it was shortly after Lyndon Johnson was president that Herbert Lehman died. The President was going to the funeral and I went with him, and the funeral 
was here in New York and the service was in Temple Emmanuel, on Fifth Avenue. We came into New York and the motorcade to the service went through completely empty 
streets. Pedestrians were not allowed outside. Everywhere you looked, you saw the military or police with guns showing, machine guns, out of windows and on edges of 
roofs. It was eerie. You went right up to Temple Emmanuel to that ceremony and not a soul was allowed on the streets. It wasn't long afterwards that things changed and went 
back to more awareness, better protection, greater alertness, if you will. Nevertheless, it is beyond human capacity to exert that kind of constant total protection to a president. 
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O'Brien --Interview VII --7 
We found since then with Jerry Ford and later on with Ronald Reagan that things aren't that different and that, well, you've reached the time in our democracy where you might 
have something similar to what I just described going up through the canyons of New York. 
It's interesting that press access to the president is accepted here to a far greater extent, I think, than perhaps anywhere in the world. The press that travel, of course, are 
allowed to get near him all the time. At the time of the President Reagan assassination attempt, I believe the fellow who attempted the assassination was really in a coterie of 
people which was construed to be press. And it'll always be that way. There's a great exposure. And President Kennedy hit it right that morning in the words he uttered to me: 
"How easy"--and it is easy. And it's easy to this day and always will be. 
G: Was there a difference between President Kennedy and President Johnson in terms of caution regarding presidential travel? Was LBJ more cautious, do you think? 
O: Yes, at the outset. He surely approved of what was transpiring in the way of protection, so he shared the general concern, obviously, that we all had. But there's nothing you can 
[do]. For example, I never looked at the statistics of the presidential mail coming in constantly in the form of threats, but there's a good deal of it. It's handled by the 
appropriate people as best they can, to follow up the checkouts. There has been, since my days in and out of the White House, a very easy access, almost informal. It's now very 
formal. On rare occasions I've been in there in recent years, I've noted that there's a considerable change in that regard. But yet it's not that difficult. Of course, the barriers 
that have been put up and all of the problems around the world today have added a dimension to White House protection and protection of the Capitol. But in the final 
analysis it's just a little more of the same, but it is a far cry from total protection, which is impossible. 
G: Let's talk about Lyndon Johnson and Robert Kennedy in 1964. You were perhaps in the middle, over the years, in that relationship. Did either man make an attempt during that 
year to improve the relationship? 
O: Yes, Lyndon Johnson did. 
G: Did he? 
O: In the sense that on a number of occasions--the President would discuss this nonrelationship with me. I wasn't awfully keen to be the fellow Johnson discussed it with, 
and, also Bobby Kennedy discussed it with. (Laughter) But it just played out that way. Interestingly, the President took the route of establishing a considerable amount of contact 
with Teddy Kennedy. He had him down to the White House on a few occasions where he had an opportunity just to chat with him. They were getting along famously, at least on 
the surface. And they were, because I never had had discussions with Teddy about Johnson and he never talked to me in any anti-Johnson manner. I think Teddy felt he was 
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O'Brien --Interview VII --8 
going along about his business and he wasn't about to be part of all of this. (Laughter) On I don't know how many occasions but more than one, the President would talk to me 
about this and in the context of not understanding why this situation existed between him and Bobby, and why Bobby had this attitude, as he saw it, toward him when he and Teddy 
had this pleasant relationship. It just didn't make any sense. And how could I explain all that? 
G: How did you explain it? 
O: (Laughter) I didn't. I said, "I don't know. They're brothers, but he's a senator and Bobby's in your administration. I don't think either one feels he has to hold the hand of the 
other. Each one is capable of doing his own thing." But it was a clear indication that the President felt this was a way of establishing some kind of reasonable climate. It was also 
an indication this was of considerable concern to President Johnson, that it bothered him greatly that this personal separation or attitude existed. But that is the most significant 
and probably the best evidence that the President was making a real effort to see if he couldn't bridge this. And he felt that having this pleasant relationship with Teddy would 
lead to Bobby not having that glare on his face all the time. 
But they distrusted each other, and there was an arm's length, uneasy situation between the two of them. And of course the time came when Bobby was absolutely 
exercised about Vietnam and considered, as you know, doing something about it in terms of seeking the presidency. 
G: But in 1964, aside from the friction with regard to the assassination and this inevitable problem here, what were the other elements that caused friction in their relationship? 
O: I really don't know. I can't cite a litany of occurrences that caused this. It would not have existed to the extent it did at the time we're talking about if there hadn't been a long-time 
attitude on the part of Bobby regarding Johnson and similarly, to some extent, Johnson regarding Bobby. I think, very frankly, there were contributing factors, I suppose, in the 
minds of both men. But also, you had such diverse personalities. Bobby wasn't Jack. 
And I've had difficulty over the years recalling the view that was expressed in a couple of books or by journalists that Bobby was calling the shots, and Jack Kennedy 
would get up in the morning and feel he had to lean on Bobby to get through the day. That was absolutely untrue. Nothing like that existed. What you had was a close 
relationship between two brothers with the clear understanding on the part of Bobby that his brother was boss, his brother was president, and Bobby's total commitment to his 
brother was to be as helpful as he could in every way he could, while his brother felt totally comfortable in discussing anything and everything of a sensitive nature with Bobby 
and felt very comfortable having Bobby around at major crisis times. But to suggest that Jack leaned on Bobby to steer him is a misrepresentation. 
So let me get back to Lyndon Johnson. What were Jack Kennedy's innermost 
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O'Brien --Interview VII --9 
thoughts about Lyndon Johnson? I don't know. But I know that in terms of the conduct of the office, the relationship between the President and the Vice President, maybe it's 
similar to a relationship I would have with Jack Kennedy. I always applied the word professional. I firmly believe Jack Kennedy respected me, appreciated what capacity I 
might have had, or I wouldn't have been in the role I was in in the campaigns or in the White House. And I had great respect and regard for him. I looked to him for leadership 
and had total confidence in his ability to govern. With regard to the President and the Vice President, I never saw an indication that Jack Kennedy had harbored some personal 
animosity toward Lyndon Johnson or that he had concern about Johnson's conduct in the carrying on of his duties as vice president or the assignments the President gave him. In 
the context of the unique aspect of the president-vice president role in our democracy, it is an extremely difficult relationship, extremely difficult, and I think both men have to be 
very sensitive to that and perform accordingly, and that was [done] throughout. 
Bobby Kennedy must have had some fairly strong views personally regarding Lyndon Johnson or this situation that we're discussing in 1964 wouldn't have existed, 
because I don't recall a single incident that sparked a flame. It was there. What day did it start? How did it start? I don't know. But you also have to build into this that Lyndon 
Johnson was a very suspicious person at times. He had his insecurities. I don't know whether that's the proper definition. However, what Lyndon Johnson and his associates 
went through in the [1964 Democratic] National Convention reflected absolute paranoia on their part regarding Bobby Kennedy and people like me. And yet I'm on a day-to-day 
basis performing my functions with the President, and after the convention the President seeks me out to go out and tour the country. 
But nevertheless we were absolutely isolated at that convention; by we, I mean the two closest people to Bobby politically, and personally in the case of Ken O'Donnell. Ken 
and I were over in some motel somewhere as far removed [as possible] from what was transpiring in the convention in terms of planning or carrying it out. Sure, we had the 
credentials and we were on the floor. But the total concern on the part of the President was what might occur at that convention to disrupt his candidacy. The emergence of 
Bobby in the film, and the great debate Steve Smith got involved in about when the film would be shown, I'll tell you candidly, Ken and I sat in that motel and we would just burst 
out with laughter. We thought it was the funniest thing that we had ever experienced, and it was ridiculous, it was absolutely ridiculous! And really what it went to, if you were to 
take it seriously, was questioning of our loyalty to the President we were serving. And that would bother you. But it was ludicrous, and yet it went on. Now that I think [back], 
you have to say, Lyndon Johnson clearly saw in Bobby a very serious challenge to him. 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 2 
G: Do you think that Johnson was aware of Bobby Kennedy's hostility toward him? 
O: I don't know at what stage he was aware of it. I think, frankly, he made a significant contribution to the hostility. 
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O'Brien --Interview VII --10 
G: Do you? 
O: Oh, I think so. I think as time went on and there were all these indications of how the Johnson people were suspicious of Bobby, suspicious of us and concerned about us, I 
never treated [it] as anything more than ridiculous, frankly. I'm glad I did treat it that way because if I had taken it seriously, which Bobby obviously did, I would probably have 
wound up in a situation where I would have had some confrontation. It wasn't that I refused to take it seriously, it was so ridiculous that I just didn't give it any credence. And 
yet it was there to a considerable degree. Now, what have you got? You've got this movement further and further apart as a result of all of this. 
G: In 1964 did Johnson use you as an intermediary with Kennedy to try to improve the relationship? Did he ask you--? 
O: Not specifically, but it was obvious that was what he would like to have me be. It might have been, I don't recall that it got that far, "Can't you talk to Bobby? What's bothering 
him? Tell him that I hold him in high regard. I've got great respect for him." But it wasn't, "Could you get hold of Bobby and get him in here and the three of us will sit down 
and spend an evening together? Let's let our hair down. This shouldn't be occurring and [let's] get it straightened away." I think it was the combination of how he thought he 
could work with Teddy in this area and that I ought to be, with my friend Bobby, trying to cool things or straighten things out. 
G: How did their relationship affect the cabinet meetings when Robert Kennedy would be there? 
O: Well, on the surface things just went along in the normal course. 
You have to recall, too, through these months of 1964, clearly Lyndon Johnson felt Bobby at a minimum was going to take some actions or exert whatever pressures he 
could to be the candidate for vice president. Regardless of how he might want to have some kind of a cooling-off relationship, the last thing Johnson wanted was to have Bobby 
Kennedy as vice president. That wasn't going to happen. During those conversations I had with Bobby, at no time did Bobby envision he was going to be designated by Johnson 
as the candidate for vice president. But that got you to the convention, the film and everything else: "Well, he knows I don't want him. He has to know that. But, by gosh, 
those people somehow, somewhere, are going to pull a stunt." And the paranoia set in. 
Then the time had ultimately come in the context of 1964 and the politics of it. Of course, there were probably a dozen potential candidates for vice president that were surfaced by 
Lyndon Johnson one way or another. And I was constantly having conversations with the President on the results of all the polls that were being conducted. He'd pull them out of 
his inside pocket and we'd go over them one more time. Of course, the polls were simply showing what obviously they would, that of all these various candidates none of them 
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O'Brien --Interview VII --11 
strengthened Johnson's position, and Hubert Humphrey was a wash, he didn't hurt or help. That probably would be the reaction you'd get on polls of that nature anyway. But to the 
point of encouraging people who would surface in the press as on the list, there was no discouragement. And this went on and on, up to and including a part of the convention. 
But I think that, very frankly, the meeting that took place--and I believe that's the meeting where Bobby had told me that he was coming over for the meeting, had--G: 
He came to your office first, didn't he? 
O: Yes. And then said, "I'm going to meet with the President. Could we have lunch afterward?" And we did. And I think that really capped it, because in the President's 
effort to advise Bobby he wasn't going to be on the ticket, Johnson unfortunately did two things. One, he said, "I'm not going to have any member of the cabinet on the ticket," 
which was not a very saleable presentation. If that was supposed to alleviate the situation, it probably was counterproductive at that moment. And secondly, he aroused Bobby's 
total suspicion that the conversation had been taped. 
G: Why was his suspicion aroused? 
O: Just the way the conversation was conducted, the way Johnson conducted his end of the discussion. Heck, I don't know what transpired in the meeting. We were going to have 
lunch, and it just happened that that was the key meeting with the President. We went over to have lunch and Bobby then started to talk about about the meeting, and I must say 
he was very low key; in fact, with a good sense of humor, because there was no surprise in this except the way it was done. And Bobby said to Ken and me--the two of us were with 
him--" I'm just persuaded [it was taped]." And he said, "I would absolutely resent it if the conversation was taped." And then it was suggested by Ken, "Maybe it wasn't taped but 
there was a voice box of some sort and Walter Jenkins was in another room taking notes." In any event it was clear [from] the aftermath, because Johnson called Jenkins in to 
review what he said was a memo he had dictated to Jenkins as to what transpired at the meeting. You know, people were just not buying that. 
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O'Brien --Interview VII --12 
So be it. But what was concerning the President? I don't know. So I cast myself in his role at that point. What was concerning him was he had to make it clear to Bobby 
that he wasn't under consideration and he took that means to do it. And, secondly, he was fearful of what Bobby's reaction would be and what he might undertake as a result of that 
meeting. 
Bobby's reaction, I must say you'd have to know Bobby and the great difference between Bobby and Jack in personality. There was a tremendous difference. Bobby could 
sit and look a little perplexed or knit his brow and think long thoughts and say, "Gee, I"--he told me and he thought that there was even a bit of humor. And he thought it was a 
little ridiculous to put it in the package of "no cabinet member." But he was concerned about the tone as well as the substance of the discussion, because he said he felt it was 
staged. Consequently he was very suspicious. He felt it had been taped, and we got into whether it was taped or Walter Jenkins listened to it. But nobody after the fact was 
buying that he called Walter in and said, "Now I want to dictate a memo to you." But so be it and that was no big deal either. 
But it bothered Bobby because he said he just didn't appreciate that happening. He said, "If the President had said to me, 'I'd like to have this conversation on the record. Do 
you mind? We'll put it on the record so there will be no misunderstandings later, '" he would have immediately acquiesced. But that bothered him--not that he wasn't going to 
get on the ticket, but the thrust and approach to the discussion and his suspicions regarding it. 
G: I see. Well, you indicated in your book that there were two different versions of what was said at that meeting. 
O: Yes. 
G: That Kennedy had one version and when you later talked with Johnson, or they had--what happened, did Jenkins come out and bring his memo? 
O: I don't recall whether he said, "I dictated a memo to Walter just to be sure that we'd have the record of the discussion, and this is the way it went." I don't recall, in fact I probably 
didn't listen that much. Bobby's version really went to not so much what was said as how it was said and his suspicions of [being taped]. 
G: So the big difference was in the recording angle rather than who actually said what? 
O: Yes, that's my view of it, because again you can't avoid the human elememnt. That is the aspect that historians obviously have to have problems with. You just have to a) be close 
to it, as I was in this instance, and b) have a very good understanding of the two personalities involved. Then what is supposed to be a big deal can be a lot less than that, 
although the aftermath can be troublesome. But it's just two people [too] suspicious of each other to have a conversation. You start with that and then you go on from there. 
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O'Brien --Interview VII --13 
(Laughter) 
G: Johnson's version seems to have stressed Bob Kennedy's disappointment, how disappointed he was, reportedly, that--O: 
Well, if Lyndon Johnson had called him in that day and the conversation went, "Bobby, you may be surprised, because we've somehow seemed to have had some problems or 
misunderstandings, but I want you on the ticket," Bobby Kennedy would have shaken his hand, I am sure, and said, "Let's go." But I've got to emphasize I don't believe at any time 
Bobby Kennedy seriously considered that was going to happen. Unless he was putting on a performance, he did not evidence any degree of disappointment. The emphasis was on 
the tone and the substance of the discussion, not on the message. 
G: Did Johnson later ask you about the lunch and what transpired? 
O: I don't know whether he did or didn't. 
G: Why did Kennedy want to be vice president? 
O: I don't know how much he wanted to be, because that wasn't a matter he and I ever [discussed], and if he'd wanted it badly, he would have discussed it with me. 
G: But he must have wanted it or he wouldn't have pursued that with Johnson. 
O: Well, he wasn't pursuing anything. He wasn't making any effort. 
G: He wasn't--? 
O: No, he was keeping his own counsel, but as far as the President saw, Bobby was out there and Johnson had to at some point say, "You won't be on the ticket." Bobby Kennedy had 
not made any public proclamation that he would refuse to be on the ticket. 
G: Well, Johnson seemed to be under the impression that Kennedy was lobbying to get on the ticket, that he was talking to people, talking to press, and trying to get them to lobby with 
Johnson for him. 
O: Well, if he was, it was unknown to me, and I find that hard to believe. If that were the case, why didn't I know it? Why didn't he talk to me? After all, we had been on a close 
and intimate political level since 1952 and anything of this nature would almost automatically fall into an area that I might have some input on or some thoughts. And 
Ken O'Donnell, who was very close to Bobby--they had been classmates and extremely close friends--never suggested to me, and in turn Ken and I were very close and we were 
really the political operatives. That never came into play. 
The only thought that enters my mind is it is conceivable if Bobby was doing what 
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O'Brien --Interview VII --14 
people suggest he might have been doing, he would not bring me in because I was in the service of Lyndon Johnson. He would know me and know that I would not participate in 
any activity that would undercut the President. Incidentally, that would be Bobby's nature. Bobby was a very straight arrow and you never had any problem determining what 
Bobby's view or position was. He'd make that clear. By the same token, you have the utmost confidence in Bobby's understanding of loyalty. For example, when I stayed with 
the President, Bobby made the point of coming to see me to discuss it before it was finalized. 
G: Why didn't Johnson want him on the ticket? 
O: I don't think that there ever could be the kind of relationship that's called for between a president and a vice president, where Bobby and Lyndon could on a daily basis be 
involved to the degree and with the sensitivity that goes with carrying out the role of vice president. I had never had any problem in my mind about the vice presidency, because the 
vice presidency clearly belongs to the president, the president must make the ultimate decision, and the president has to live with it and him. And I'm sure I never gave a fleeting 
thought to mixing oil and water in the presidency and vice presidency. So if Lyndon Johnson ever selected Bobby Kennedy as his running mate, it would be based solely on the 
cold practicality that he needed him in order to be elected, which was a significant part of the decision-making process when Johnson was named vice president. Short of that, if 
everything is equal and you don't need him, obviously you try to seek out somebody who can take your direction, who you don't have to be concerned about. And Hubert 
Humphrey fitted that--( 
Interruption) 
G: Did you or Ken O'Donnell have any--or for that matter Bob Kennedy--any other evidence that Johnson had a recording device and was taping that? 
O: Oh, no, and I must say that even in the context of that luncheon it didn't get to the point of saying, "My gosh, wouldn't it be great to know? Is there some way we could find"--none 
of that. I shared Bobby's concern. I was hopeful Bobby's suspicion was not accurate, because I thought that would have been a mistake if it had been done by the President. I 
have strong views on all of that, and that applied to the Kennedy Administration as well as the Nixon Administration. You know, it's the last thing I'd ever contemplate doing, taping 
them. I don't care about what the law says or doesn't say. I consider it immoral. And I think I'd resent it no end, and in fact probably to a greater extent than Bobby appeared to 
with his suspicions at lunch. Maybe in further contemplation or back home with Ethel, he got into an uproar about it, I don't know, but let's face it, he did not have any proof. It 
was purely a suspicion. I must say afterward when I had the conversation with the President, I considered Bobby's suspicions might be correct. 
G: What else did Johnson say in that meeting that you had with him about the conversation? 
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O'Brien --Interview VII --15 
O: I don't recall the purpose of the meeting was this subject, because I had so many meetings and I was with him so much. This came up in conversation and the reference was made to 
the memo he had dictated to Walter, in order to have me know exactly what happened. It was just, "I want you to know that we had this meeting and this is what transpired." 
G: Bob Kennedy was quoted as saying in reaction to the exclusion of all members of the cabinet from consideration as vice president that "I took a lot of good men with me." 
(Laughter) 
O: Yes, the quote is accurate. Bobby wasn't a fellow that exuded a lot of humor all the time, you know, but at lunch he really saw the humor of this. He was chuckling; he thought it 
was really kind of an off-the-wall approach. 
G: [Sargent] Shriver was one of those that he took with him. Do you think Shriver would have been seriously considered? 
O: No. You mean, in 1964? From the conversations I had with him, no. 
G: Any other cabinet officers? [Orville] Freeman? 
O: No. I think he was very comfortable with his presentation to Bobby. That was an attempt to give it a little bit of a cover. 
I'm trying to think of some of the others that were in the Senate who were on that supposed list. 
G: Well, Eugene McCarthy and Tom Dodd, for two. 
O: Yes, Tom Dodd took it very seriously, and Tom thought he was making a trip to the White House at the [President's] request [and] the President was going to name him. 
McCarthy took the occasion to chat with me at a function at the White House. I couldn't quite understand why Gene and I were becoming buddies all of a sudden. I didn't have 
any animosity toward McCarthy. He aggravated me no end before everything was over with Hubert Humphrey. But McCarthy's attitude toward Kennedy, his reminding me what 
a great friend he was of Jack's, finally hit me. He felt it was conceivable Lyndon Johnson might discuss Gene McCarthy with Larry O'Brien, and he'd want Larry O'Brien to have a 
favorable view of Gene McCarthy. 
I had little or no question about who was going to be on that ticket for a long period of time. It was appropriate and obvious to me. When the President asked me what 
my view was, I told him without equivocation, Hubert Humphrey. Hubert Humphrey should be his running mate. 
G: Did he feel that Humphrey had any liabilities? 
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O'Brien --Interview VII --16 
O: No, he relied a lot on these polls. They were dog-eared by the time he got through with them. He carried them in his inside pocket. His pocket started to bulge. Regarding 
Hubert Humphrey, there were two aspects: one, while there wasn't any indication he would add to his strength there was, as he saw it, reasonable indication he would not 
detract from it; and two, he and Humphrey had a long association and could get along well together. 
G: The one liability that at least is attributed to Humphrey from LBJ was that Humphrey had a difficult time keeping his own counsel. 
O: Well, I don't know if he would have considered that a serious liability. All of us who knew Humphrey knew that he had difficulty in terminating a speech, which he recognized. We 
used to kid him unmercifully about it. He had a tendency to be a devoid-of-guile sort of fellow. I guess you could put it in that context. Humphrey's personality, his great 
forthrightness and honesty impressed me. However, I later felt there were inadequacies in his staff, and he found it impossible to dismiss anyone. 
Just to divert for a moment. I never would have become involved with Humphrey in his campaign as I did after Bobby's death if that hadn't been the case, which he 
recognized himself, because it was sort of late in the game to introduce new key people into a campaign. And yet through my chairmanship I brought people into the campaign 
that were really Kennedy people, Joe Napolitan and Ira Kapenstein and people like that. It was unfortunate because that never happened to Kennedy. His team was in place from 
day one and remained intact throughout, and you didn't go out seeking outside assistance to bolster a campaign effort. 
G: Back to the LBJ-RFK relationship, LBJ did ask Robert Kennedy in 1964 to involve himself in the Indonesian-Malaysian conflict and he did negotiate a cease-fire there. Do 
you have any insight on that assignment? 
O: No. It was construed by Bobby and those that were close to him and to the President as a meaningful gesture, on the part of the President, to indicate to Bobby that he'd like to have 
a more comfortable relationship, and Bobby reacted very favorably to it in the sense that he was excited about the opportunity and the challenge. So it was good in that regard. 
Bobby was really appreciative. 
G: Did Bobby ever ask you to advance either a proposal or something on behalf of him to the President? 
O: No. 
G: Okay, as long as you've talked about the convention, let me ask you to elaborate on the film and the statement you made earlier about how paranoid the Johnson people were. 
O: Well, that was the evidence of paranoia. That's really why I cite it. First of all, you have a 
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O'Brien --Interview VII --17 
convention located in what were basically inadequate facilities. I don't recall the background of the choice of Atlantic City, but at that time Atlantic City hotel 
accommodations were inadequate. So the functioning of the convention presented some difficulties. 
It was going to be a routine convention without any basic problems. The President was high in the polls. It was well understood that he would be elected. There had been an 
evaluation of his potential opponents and the conflicts in the Republican Party. The selection of a vice presidential candidate would be widely accepted; no difficulties there. 
Thus you could put on a show for public consumption and go on about your business. 
The only area that emerged as an area of difficulty was the role of Bobby or the film in the convention. As I said, there was a degree of isolation involving me in terms of 
the convention. By that time Marvin Watson and Walter Jenkins had come aboard, and others were running the convention--rightly so--which was fine with me. So I had a 
non-role, but I did feel that the schedule of the film and the great concern about it on the part of the Johnson people was uncalled for, because I knew there wasn't going to be any 
movement of any kind in that convention involving Bobby Kennedy. It didn't exist. If there was a feeling on the part of the Kennedy people or Steve Smith or Bobby to see the 
film at a certain point in the convention schedule, why not? Why make an issue of it? Therefore, to start trying to slot it in some place that really didn't fit--I don't even 
remember the details--just gave clear signal that "We're suspicious of you people; we know that if you get an inch, you're going to try to pull something. And we're going to be 
absolutely sure you don't get that inch." 
Well, you might as well have taken out an ad in the paper on the attitude of the Johnson people toward the Kennedy people, and it was so unnecessary. It didn't have any 
impact on the election either; it didn't make one iota of difference. There again, my reaction to all of that, as I told you, Ken and I would sit and just chuckle, because it was 
so ludicrous. In any event, all it did was cause further animosity, and to the world at large, it was absolutely meaningless. 
G: Did you have any role at all in the preparation of the film or arranging it? 
O: No, I can't recall who did the film. Probably [Charles] Guggenheim. And, therefore, I probably did see some of the rough cuts. I don't remember. 
G: Anything on the Mississippi controversy, the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party and their efforts to be seated at the convention? 
O: No. 
G: You were not in a position to--? 
O: No. There again, I mean, who cared? If you go back over Democratic conventions in my 
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O'Brien --Interview VII --18 
memory, this convention was about as placid as a Democratic convention could be, as routine as a convention could be, and certainly unique in terms of the Democratic Party. 
If you look at the record of the convention and all that transpired, you'd say, "That was a yawn." 
G: Okay, let's go through some other issues that came up in 1964. One you talked briefly about yesterday, the Pierre Salinger [Senate] race and the controversy regarding his 
seating. The peculiar thing about this is that Tom Kuchel supported the seating of Salinger while [Everett] Dirksen challenged the legality of the appointment. Do you want 
to--? 
O: It isn't that peculiar, on reflection. Tom Kuchel was a unique Republican senator. With his voting record, his attitude toward our programs, Tom was considered by us to be a 
friendly member of the United States Senate. By the same token, Tom Kuchel was considered by his constituency in California to be quite liberal. Many Democrats were 
very comfortable with him in California, just as we were comfortable with him in Washington. And Tom Kuchel could show statesmanship and bipartisanship, if you will, 
without being uncomfortable. 
G: Was it difficult for him to remain in a leadership position, though, with his party when he was taking--? 
O: I think what carried Tom with his party was the very nature of Kuchel the man. He was a fellow who was held in very high regard by just about everyone up there, and that would 
be an important factor in retaining a leadership position. Listen, it provided a little balance on the Republican side. Dirksen really was the Republican powerhouse. And it gave the 
Republicans, in perception, a little broader base than they really had. 
G: Another example of Kuchel's broad-mindedness was the fact that he didn't support his party's nominee that year, Barry Goldwater. 
O: Yes, that's right. 
G: There's even some evidence that the Republicans tried to remove him from the whip post because of this alleged disloyalty and that perhaps Johnson used his ties to prevent that 
from happening. Do you have any recollection of that? 
O: I recall the concern on the part of some of the Republicans, but your concern can be greatly lessened with a devastating defeat. If you're subject to that kind of a defeat, it 
doesn't provide much of a position for you to be punishing people. But I do vaguely recall some comments along that line. After all, there are some very conservative Republicans 
up there, but Kuchel, after all, was a senator from a very large state with a very strong base of support, a very broad constituency. In addition to that, Tom and I became very 
close friends. Probably we saw things the same way on most occasions. (Laughter) But personally, Tom bought my house when I sold it. 
22
O'Brien --Interview VII --19 
G: Did he? 
O: Yes. So you're talking to a fellow that couldn't see anything really wrong with Tom Kuchel's positions even though some Republicans could. 
G: But my question here is did the administration attempt to help Kuchel in retaining his leadership posts? 
O: I don't recall, and I can't believe the administration would be in a position to. That, to me, could have been counterproductive to Kuchel. I don't think the Democratic administration 
could affect the leadership decisions of the Republicans of the Senate. In fact, if there was too much interest shown in preserving Kuchel's role, that might encourage some to make a 
greater effort to remove him. 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 1 
O: Re Pierre Salinger, there was some ground for challenge, which Everett Dirksen seized upon; obviously his legitimacy as a resident of California. I recall that it is so unusual, it 
certainly doesn't occur very often to have an opportunity to be designated as a senator. I truly felt that old lucky Pierre had just lucked out unbelievably, and it kind of resolved a 
White House situation, too. 
G: Oh, did it? 
O: Well, that wasn't the motivating factor. It just cleared away any possible problems in the press office and everybody was happy and comfortable. Beyond all that, Pierre's ultimate 
challenger was considered by us to be such a weak candidate, you couldn't do better in a state the size of California, and we were all flabbergasted when it didn't work out for him. 
Perhaps the Republicans in the Senate made some contribution because, obviously, one of the weaknesses that stayed with Pierre was a feeling this was a gift that was unfairly 
presented to some fellow in Washington who may have at one time lived in California and that just wasn't right. 
There isn't a great deal to talk about other than the tobacco lobby, and the congressmen and senators from the tobacco states were, in combination, extremely strong, 
vociferous and hard-hitting when anything occurred that might impact adversely on the use of tobacco. To that extent, there were some contacts from North Carolina and 
elsewhere and expressions of concern. Those expressions could be pretty strong, but I don't recall that it adversely affected pending or future legislation. 
I had it brought more forcibly to mind, without any thought to the sensitivity of some people in this area, when I was postmaster general. These were always awesome 
numbers in the Post Office Department, whether you're talking about the number of post offices, the number of employees, the number of anything. We had some twenty-three, 
23
O'Brien --Interview VII --20 
twenty-six thousand postal trucks around the country. There might have been more. You had panels on the side of the truck, and on a public service basis you would periodically 
change the panels and have a nice message for the public. 
We tied into this whole issue and I came up with a great idea as postmaster general: why didn't we have this anti-smoking [campaign]? Being an avid smoker all my 
life and remaining one throughout this period, nevertheless, I thought that was a good public service announcement to make use of the panels, and I proceeded to issue the 
directive. Well, the group came in on me--G: 
Did it really? 
O: --from the tobacco states, which I hadn't even thought of, and from the Hill. As a fellow who can be accommodating when it becomes necessary, I agreed to a compromise on the 
use of the message on the trucks so it wouldn't be used in the tobacco states. I think it probably only involved North Carolina and Virginia. But whatever it was, that was the 
way we worked it out. At least my conscience wasn't totally troubled, because if that eliminated a few hundred trucks, we still had thousands around the country with the 
message. 
The only point of that story is--and that still remains the case, of course--the awareness and alertness of the industry, its lobbying group and its representatives in the 
Congress. If anything occurred of that nature over the years, you'd get this very strong, very tough reaction to it. But despite all that, the non-smokers seem to be making 
progress as time goes on. I now look around every restaurant I sit in to see whether or not smoking is allowed or whether the party at the next table look like people who might 
attack me if I light a cigarette. I have become very sensitive. I noted last night the same thing. I looked across the table and I saw a girl smoking there. Otherwise, I probably 
would have hesitated for a while just to see what the lay of the land was. They'll get to it totally one of these days. 
G: Were there problems for the administration, though, in advancing these warnings? 
O: No, we were in accord with it and it was right and proper, so they moved along, as they saw it--the Surgeon General and the rest of them--and there was no attempt on our part 
whatsoever to deter this activity. 
G: I believe at one point Jim Goddard came out with the statement that it was safer to smoke marijuana than to smoke cigarettes. Do you recall that? 
O: No, but I wish I had known about it at the time. Maybe I would have changed my habit. 
(Laughter) 
G: One of the programs enacted that year was the federal food stamp program, designed to 
24
O'Brien --Interview VII --21 
increase the buying power of low income people, and there were a number of issues connected with it. This is on page 6 in the [legislative] outline. One was having the 
program administered through the Department of Agriculture rather than HEW. Do you recall this decision? 
O: Only that there was controversy about it. It was more a jurisdictional problem and [there were] strong views in both departments, reflected therefore by the appropriate committees 
on the Hill. After all, you're going into a new program. You're trying to contain this tremendous problem, food distribution, across the country. It was very innovative, I 
thought. Obviously, you'd want it properly administered, but there weren't overriding views and if compromising would be helpful under the legislative process, that was a 
comfortable position to be in. 
G: Here you had a case where the northern Democrats on the Rules Committee were evidently holding up a tobacco research bill until the food stamp [bill] received favorable 
action. 
O: That's accurate. 
G: Can you recall the details of that? 
O: Yes, because I thought it was pretty clever. I'm sure while we weren't directly party to it we were in accord with the procedure, because that was a handle available to try to force 
some people in line who obviously would not be supportive of this legislation if it were naked out there. 
G: Okay, I gather under this arrangement these two measures were--O: 
My recollection is each assured the other that enactment would take place. 
G: Yes. But then evidently the tobacco bill never cleared the Rules Committee so--O: 
Yes, that's right. 
G: But the food stamp bill was tied to the cotton-wheat bill, and those two were brought to the floor the same day. Now, was this the same--? 
O: The same, yes. And that wouldn't be unusual. What are the possibilities, what are the areas that you could consider that might enhance the process? You look at people who 
have a keen interest in cotton, you look at people who have a keen interest in tobacco--but particularly in this instance, cotton--and you find people you are pretty sure would not 
have any interest or less than keen interest in a food stamp program. You weigh all this and determine if there isn't some strategy that can be developed so that you can gain an 
inch or two in that direction, rather than just let them have free rein on their cotton. I mean, that would be part of the whole process. 
25
O'Brien --Interview VII --22 
G: Who would put this sort of deal together? 
O: Well, we'd have a role in it and this would be a matter that you would discuss with the leadership, not in the formal context of a leadership breakfast necessarily, but in the 
strategy sessions. You'd discuss it with the appropriate committee members and you'd just feel your way through it. We would be directly involved; by we, [I mean] the White 
House staff. We would by that time have no compunction about getting involved with things of that nature. In 1961 we would probably have shied away from it and been 
fearful that somebody might attack us. 
G: Yes. 
Recreation legislation: you had two major parks and recreation measures that passed and the establishment of some new park systems, the Ozark National Scenic 
Riverways in Missouri, Fire Island Seashore in New York and Canyonlands in Utah. Anything on the political process regarding the designations here? 
O: No, what would normally happen in something like that is you'd try to put together a package that might garner assistance from various quarters geographically. And basically, 
without checking it out as we're talking, my guess in this instance would be that this brought some strength to the proposal if you look at the differing geographical areas that 
were involved. 
G: How about the Roosevelt park on Campobello? Was this a problem in terms of the--? 
O: Well, it had been considered on previous occasions. It was highly visible, for obvious reasons, and I don't recall that it was a problem. I think it was considered in the nature of 
naming a building or an airport after a former president. 
G: But it was on Canadian soil, wasn't it? 
O: Yes, I know, but--G: 
Was this a factor that came into--? 
O: No, I don't recall it was. 
G: A very significant piece of legislation, the Land and Water Conservation Fund, the allocating of funds for the purchase of this land. 
O: Of course, what you get into was the cost factor, and one phase of this was the matter of fees, and then you have pretty strong views on both sides of an issue. But they go back 
again to a person's basic view on economics and on government spending and responsibility to contain spending. You know, it's the whole thing; it sort of merges into 
26
O'Brien --Interview VII --23 
"All right, you're going to do all this and what is it going to cost and this sounds good and I'm not opposed to parks, but who's going to support them? Why should the taxpayers 
who don't go to parks support the parks?" That was a portion of this whole discussion and debate on this issue. I can't get into a lot of specifics on it, but right from the outset 
there was an understanding on our part that this could be very controversial, as it turned out to be. It was not an easy task. 
It had a high priority, primarily because of Mrs. Johnson's interest. Certainly that was a significant aspect of it. There was a judgment early on that you've got to establish a 
concept, put in a program, give it legitimacy, have it in place. And it's really like you were planting a tree; it's going to grow. That was a discussion that actually took place, and it 
included some conversations with the leadership. At that time there was not much enthusiasm about this. There was on the part of Mrs. Johnson and others in the 
administration, but you didn't have this widespread "Oh, here's a crusade. We all want to join it." There was a road to travel and a little educating of people so that they would 
focus on this. So how do you go about doing all that and have a reasonable opportunity to accomplish it? Let's not try to go for a whole loaf on this. Let's get it in place and it'll 
be there to build on. Once it's in place, somebody isn't going to come along and successfully make an effort to repeal it. So that really was the thrust of our approach to 
this whole thing. 
G: There was a provision that a motorboat fuel tax would provide revenue and this fund had previously gone to the Highway Trust Fund. Was this a controversy? 
O: Yes. 
G: How did you work around this? 
O: I don't remember just how that played out, but I think some of the items became controversial. This often happened where there would be at least the occasional surprise 
factor. As you evaluated these things from a White House or a joint committee-White House point of view, you at times wouldn't envision the degree of controversy that would 
occur, because from your perspective you just wouldn't feel that it should be that controversial. But there again, you have the bureaucracy. If you're going to lose some 
source of revenue and it's going to be diverted somewhere else, before you know it, there's a big conflagration. I guess we probably should have been more cautious. But, in any 
event, it was hard to discern the degree of controversy in some of this. 
G: Did Mrs. Johnson sit in on meetings here, or what was--? 
O: Yes. There were a couple of meetings she sat [in] on, but my strong recollection is how intensely she stayed abreast of the progress to the point where she would contact me 
regularly to get an update on what was transpiring, even to going over to the living quarters, which I did on two or three occasions, to discuss the matter in detail with her. I 
was extremely impressed, not only [with] her interest and dedication in this area, but with 
27
O'Brien --Interview VII --24 
her--which I don't think I was totally aware of up until this time--broad knowledge of the whole process and her understanding of the intricacies, the problems, the ebb and flow of 
this whole thing. I also recall she had occasion to discuss this legislation with appropriate people on the Hill, by phone or if they were down at some function--G: 
Anyone in particular? 
O: No, I don't recall, but overall I have a vivid recollection of not only her interest, but her actual involvement, and more than that, how impressed I was with her knowledge and 
understanding of the process. 
G: Okay. Another measure that year was the National Wilderness Preservation System, coming out of the Wilderness Act. Here you also had some controversy. It was a 
conservationist bill, but you had to make some concessions to the commercial interests, mining. Do you recall that? 
O: Just in the context of compromise. The thrust of the bill was, you know, a conservationist thrust. It's strongly in that direction, with an understanding up front there would have to 
be compromise down the road, that we were not going to get a wilderness bill without compromise with mining or lumber. And that's what occurred. 
The conservationists--it's funny I remember that because we had preliminary discussions, obviously, with some of those entities and [I remember] their enthusiasm. 
Everything was halcyon, and this was in the good of the country, which we agreed with, and there was no reason in the world why people should oppose this because this was in 
the context of apple pie and motherhood. The reality was pretty clear at the outset that we were going to run into some significant roadblocks and there was going to have to be 
compromise and, of course, the conservationists weren't going to be happy with that. But there was nothing abnormal in that kind of a situation. You just do the best job you can. 
It was a very normal legislative effort in that context, forgetting the issues involved or the substance. 
G: There was a special effort to exclude the San Gorgonio, I guess, Wild Area in California from this measure and [inaudible]. 
O: Yes, I don't remember the pressure points there, probably better organized. 
End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview VII 
28
    [ Part 8: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--58 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview VIII*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW VIII 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview VIII, 4/ 8/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview VIII, 4/ 8/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
3
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-19 
4
INTERVIEW VIII 
DATE: April 8, 1986 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 4, Side 1 
G: [I'd like to] have you focus on that list of the congressional liaison people and assess the value of each one in this particular job. Anything unique about their individual approaches 
or their effectiveness, or lack thereof, on congressional relations? 
O: Well, as a group, they were obviously pretty sharp and knowledgeable on Hill relations and procedures. Otherwise they wouldn't be in these roles at their respective departments 
and agencies. Some of them, however, were better technicians than others. There were those who, while they would be extremely knowledgeable regarding the substance of their 
legislation, would not necessarily be solid in terms of promoting the legislation and the nitty-gritty aspects of head-counting. 
So the group varied in that sense, but as I look it over, the group had considerable balance nevertheless. Take the four fellows from the State Department listed at the top of 
this grouping: [Frederick] Dutton, [Robert] Lee, [Eugene] Krizek, and [Nick] Zumas. Dutton was very much a substance fellow; he wasn't a fellow that went to the Hill very 
often, as I recall it. Gene Krizek was a fellow who was very attentive to the relations with individual members and to their problems with the State Department. So you have a team 
really, a State Department team, at that point in 1964, that was a well balanced team in terms of promoting legislation the State Department had an interest in. Adam 
Yarmolinsky would fit into that category too: tremendous on substance, extremely able, but not necessarily the fellow who would be pounding on doors on the Hill. He'd be 
awfully good at committee hearings and as a back-up fellow. 
We've talked of Dutton, Lee, Krizek, Zumas [from the] State Department; Craig Raupe, AID, I remember him very favorably; Joe Bowman, similarly, at Treasury. Joe 
Spilman at Treasury I don't recall particularly. Adam I mentioned, at Defense. I don't recall General [Charles] Roderick's activities in detail, which should not be taken as 
meaning that he wasn't good; it's just a matter of recollection after a long period of time has elapsed. But it's interesting, as I go through this, that my recollections of the 
individuals and my evaluation of them are almost immediate. John Nolan and Joe Dolan at Justice were very close to the Attorney General. They were very familiar with all the 
nuances on the Hill. And Nick Katzenbach was exceptional. 
G: Was he? 
5
O'Brien --Interview VIII --2 
O: Yes, Nick Katzenbach, in his role at Justice, at his level never hesitated to get into the pit, in terms of the detail, the long hours and the exasperating situations that occur across the 
Hill. 
Mike Monroney and Dick Darling were from the Post Office Department--the Post Office Department, though I wound up there ultimately, was not an exciting department in 
terms of our overall picture and I guess that was traditional with the department. It generally had to do with the unions negotiating with the Congress rather than, as a table of 
organization prescribed, dealing with the department in union negotiations and all kinds of benefit arguments that occurred constantly. Monroney and Darling would present their 
update, but it would be pretty much a routine matter at meetings of this nature. 
Orren Beaty at Interior typified most of these liaison people because they all had a close and open relationship with the secretary, the head of the department or agency. This 
is a good example: Beaty at Interior with [Stewart] Udall and an associate of his, Bob McConnell, [who] worked with Beaty. Ken Birkhead, similarly with Orville Freeman. I 
think that was essential, as these were positions in the department or agency that were high in the table of organization. Consequently, maybe only on occasion did you deal with 
the secretary or the deputy. Every one of these fellows enjoyed a very close relationship [with the head of his department] comparable to the relationship I had with the President. 
Tom Hughes at Agriculture, along with Birkhead, in the day-to-day activities involving agricultural legislation, were obviously hand-in-glove with Orville in every phase of 
activity. 
John Stilman I remember as a competent fellow. Al Keefer from Commerce--Stilman was from Commerce--Al Keefer I don't recall as readily, or Larry 
Redmond or Frank Dooley. They were all in Commerce. I remember them all well, but I remember Stilman for some reason a little more clearly. Sam Merrick over in Labor and 
then [Robert] Meier and [James] Quigley in HEW all represent the type of fellow who was productive. 
G: Did Merrick do a good job of reflecting Willard Wirtz' views? 
O: Yes. Wirtz, as was the case with all of the cabinet members and agency heads, was extremely active in all phases of congressional relations. I think if anything should be 
underscored, it should be the role of the department and agency heads in advocating and promoting to the fullest, from initiation, the President's program. That was a given and it 
was totally understood. Some of the department heads probably found it easier than others to accommodate themselves to this kind of activity, but every one of them devoted 
a tremendous amount of time and effort to it. So their congressional relations people in every instance were working closely with the boss, who in turn was responsible to the 
White House on a daily basis, as we've recounted. It wasn't confined to cabinet meetings; the boss' input had to be into the memos that were sent to me every Monday, and they 
went directly to the President. 
6
O'Brien --Interview VIII --3 
Overall, it was really a team effort. The best fellows available in every instance were assigned these responsibilities by the respective department heads with the 
knowledge that they had, in turn, a tremendous responsibility to the White House and that they would be accountable fully for the progress of their legislation even though the thrust 
in most instances came from the White House. The cooperative team effort was emphasized at all times. So the point I'd make is that none of these fellows were simply 
civil servants. They, with rare exception, enjoyed at the outset a very close personal relationship to the cabinet member. The cabinet member's assignment of this task to the 
one or several in his department who were involved in congressional relations reflected a personal relationship and, obviously, a feeling that he had highly competent people. I also 
think, there was a recognition that the cabinet member's accountability was such that he'd better darn well get the best available and make sure he was working with them and they 
were working with him. 
You had fellows in this group who were extremely able and knowledgeable on the substantive side, had a lot of drive, vigorously pursued the legislation on the Hill--whether 
a "kaffee klatsch" or a late session with some individual member or late phone calls or weekend activities. When you have that kind of a person in the picture, first of all, he 
would be exceptional. Secondly, every base was covered because he would be deeply involved in the politics of legislative enactment, and he would be well grounded in the 
substance of legislation and, therefore, be in a position not only to discuss the pros and cons of a particular proposal but to actually negotiate compromises and amendments. 
And you could, with comfort, leave it to a fellow to do that, and he, with comfort, would know our confidence in him was such that he had considerable freedom, as I felt I had in 
terms of legislation where the leadership would suggest or negotiate an amendment. I didn't feel I had to call the White House to get approval. I'd stand or fall on my decision 
and say, "Yes, this is the President's view," or "The President will support this." 
I think a standout in this regard, as I recall it and outline it, is HEW and Wilbur Cohen because he would epitomize what I'm describing. That would be the perfect 
fellow. Not only did he hold a high position in HEW, but he was really the focus of congressional relations at HEW and he was indefatigable as well as extremely 
knowledgeable. If you had twenty or twenty-five Wilbur Cohens, you would have what I would envision as the perfect team. There never could be twenty or twenty-five Wilbur 
Cohens, however. 
G: I had planned to ask you to look at that list and tell me who you felt were the top three in terms of working with the Congress, dealing with the Congress. 
O: I may fill in a third, but I would have Wilbur Cohen and Nick Katzenbach. It may be an unfair quick evaluation. However, in fairness to some of these fellows, the particular 
legislation that they were involved in might not be at the level of some other legislative proposals. For example, you have representatives from GSA, and it's a little bit like the 
representatives from the Post Office Department. It's no reflection on them; they were doing their job. But when you focus on each year the priority list of legislation, apply it to 
7
O'Brien --Interview VIII --4 
the agencies and departments involved, and go to the congressional relations aspects of it, I think you're talking about Katzenbach in Justice and Cohen at HEW. You're talking 
about major legislation, too. 
But I think in both instances, with Katzenbach and Cohen, you had the happy situations of top-level fellows who also were the congressional relations fellows, and who 
were substantively deep. More than that, both of these fellows, Nick and Wilbur, were totally dedicated. They rarely slept; this was their life. So when you add all that up, our 
good fortune was to have them involved in very sensitive and extremely important major legislative actions. 
G: Who would you add as a third to this? 
O: I want to look through this. I think NASA falls a little bit in that category, too. You're talking about some basics legislatively affecting NASA, but NASA in those days, in the 
context of what we're talking about, wouldn't be at the top of the list. But nevertheless, it's an indication that we didn't overlook anything. 
We had John Linnehan in Small Business Administration and Marty Underwood; I remember them well. They performed effectively. Red [Redmond] Roche at Veterans' 
Administration. Bill Carey, Bureau of the Budget, had an input into all of this that was extremely helpful in structuring our activities on the Hill from his perspective, where he 
was really a true professional. I'll go back and look over the list again--I would go Cohen, Katzenbach. . . . It'll be tough. Can I have five? 
G: Yes. 
O: Orren Beaty of Interior, Ken Birkhead of Agriculture, and a fellow whose name is crossed off on this list for some reason, which probably had to do with attendance at this particular 
meeting: Joe [Henry] Fowler. Joe Fowler would fit into the same category as Katzenbach and Cohen. 
G: He was good at dealing with the Congress? 
O: Yes, extremely good at it. And, frankly, some of these fellows rather enjoyed it. It isn't the type of work I think many people really would enjoy particularly, but he did. I notice 
this is headed, "The following will attend the liaison meeting," and he was listed to attend and then was crossed off. I assume something occurred and he was unable to attend the 
meeting. But he would [normally] be there. 
Then, on the substantive side, not necessarily the nuts-and-bolts side, you'd have to list [Adam] Yarmolinsky and Dutton. But I think the way I've listed them, I've tried to list 
those that combined every aspect. 
G: Yes. 
8
O'Brien --Interview VIII --5 
O: Substance and shoe-leather. 
G: Many of these people had other responsibilities with the department. 
O: Sure. 
G: What percentage of their time would you say they spent on the legislative liaison work? 
O: I would say that, depending on the ebb and flow of the particular legislation they were involved in, it would be a significant portion of their time and exclusively at the key 
periods. With fellows like Wilbur and Nick and Joe Fowler, even though they did have other responsibilities, the top priority in their minds, without having to be guided or 
directed, was to ensure that maximum effort was expended in not only drafting legislation and preparing a program but enacting it. I'm sure there were months when Nick 
Katzenbach and Wilbur Cohen did little else, regardless of their [other] responsibilities, but work with the Hill. 
G: What would happen, for example, if [Anthony] Celebrezze had a differing view from your office in terms of how a compromise should be reached or how far you should go in 
compromising to secure passage of a piece of legislation? Would the give and take in the resolution of this issue come up in your internal operation with Wilbur Cohen, or how 
would you resolve something like that? 
O: There was a constant communication with the White House. A major element of negotiation or compromise: "Let's go to Wilbur." He would bring it to the White House, 
and we would sit down with the appropriate people and discuss it in great detail. Where there would be a major impact, from our perspective, of weakening the legislation or 
proposal by reducing the cutback--which in the compromise would be significant--that would be a matter that would involve the White House directly and the cabinet member. 
It was a rare occasion when it happened, and I may have some difficulty in recalling, but I'm certain there were times I'd make a decision only if it was necessary because of 
pending floor debate or debate actually in progress in Mike Mansfield's back room or in the Speaker's office. You just carry on negotiations. There were moments, but they 
would be rare. Normally, when you did that, if it were in Mansfield's office or in the Speaker's office, the department representative would be present also. I guess if I were 
involved in a sugar quota, which I was on occasion, the pure politics of the sugar quota was a matter of negotiating between Clint Anderson and [Robert] Kerr. They had control 
over the sugar quota anyway, and what you're trying to do is get a little piece of the action from the White House end of it in terms of trying to be helpful to people you wanted to 
help. 
But the other side of the coin is the one that stands out in my memory and that was with [Arthur] Goldberg in Labor and me, with the key people on the committee, and 
Rayburn and the leadership. We had to make a decision on a minimum wage bill. Arthur 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --6 
was asked by the Speaker to make the decision, which was a cutback eliminating two or three categories [of workers] from the bill. I remember the laundry workers, particularly, 
and maybe even the price tag. It might have been $1.25 to $1.15. Whatever it was, on the basis of our joint head count and our activities in the Speaker's office that day, it was 
apparent that we were in a very difficult situation and we needed some degree of further compromise in order to get a bill out of the House. The Speaker turned to Arthur and 
asked his concurrence on a suggestion that was made on the compromise, and Arthur said no, he could not make that decision as it would have to be a White House decision. The 
Speaker's eyes focused on me, and I made a judgment. I could talk to the President, and the President would feel that's a problem he ought to resolve, because this was a bill that 
was going to come up momentarily on the floor. I remember saying we should accept whatever the two or three elements were of this. I compromised with the Speaker a little, 
and the Speaker said, "Can we all be assured that the President concurs?" And I said yes. 
Those are occasions where you just have to do what you think is best under the circumstances. Normally, in the progress of mark-ups, you have time, you can get into 
counterproposals and, in some instances, extensive negotiations, which would be conducted by the department representatives and the White House representatives jointly. 
At times when you had an opportunity to thoroughly discuss proposals in great detail and develop counterproposals in terms of negotiations, you would probably be sitting in the 
White House with a fairly large group, representatives of the department or perhaps outside interests, the private-sector group, maybe organized labor, the educational groups. 
You tried to get everybody together for input. Oftentimes our job was to shore up the department and say, "No, we're going to go back and try again." 
But you play that out, for there were certain basics that we all understood, including that there was only one fellow downtown who was elected to office. Everybody 
on the Hill we were dealing with had been elected to office. I guess I misused the phrase, but I certainly used it at length and that was, "You can't suggest to a member he commit 
political hara-kiri." That isn't in the cards. You have to find ways of working it out in that context. You have to remember that when you're talking about meetings of this nature, 
talking about those Monday reports, talking about the cabinet meetings--where there was tremendous emphasis on the legislative program--talking about the leadership breakfasts. 
All the other points of contact involving the legislative program--social events, small group meetings, individual, come-in-the-back-door meetings with key members of the 
Congress--went on constantly, day in and day out. And everyone understood, which we would emphasize, that while the price for doing this was adverse comment on the part of 
ardent supporters, probably in the private sector--the ADA, for example, on some of our activities had very negative comments to make from time to time about our lack, as they 
saw it, of progress or lack of vigor--[ this] is the art of compromise in the final analysis. 
I think the minimum wage was an example, because it's a statistic that if you suffer a one-vote defeat on a major minimum wage bill in the House [and] you salvage some 
aspects of it in the Senate, you are going to compromise and going to have a pretty decent minimum wage bill. It was not exactly the proposal, obviously, we had sent to the Hill, 
10
O'Brien --Interview VIII --7 
but that's the art of compromise, the art of the possible. 
Then the other cliche which we used often was, "Listen, we're not going to walk away from this because we don't get a whole loaf. We'll take half a loaf or three-quarters 
of a loaf and make that decision. We'll go back for the rest later on." That was our procedure, and I think it had a lot to do [with our success]. The combination of the 
intensive effort across the board in the executive branch and the recognition of the political realities of dealing with 535 officeholders who were elected contributed 
significantly to the overall result. I don't think that's unique, but there were those who at times would be so exercised about compromise or possible compromise because of their 
strong position, their total commitment and/ or their deep involvement in a particular legislative proposal that they, understandably, could not see the overall picture. Some of 
the compromise might move over to another piece of legislation, and they would kind of throw up their hands or become deeply disturbed and say, "The hang with it. If we can't 
get it enacted, then let's not compromise it. It's all or nothing." We never approached it that way, and I don't think it was realistic to approach it that way. It's a little bit like 
Medicare; you feel that you'll get the job done some day, the sooner the better, but it's going to happen. Civil rights, too. 
G: To what extent did your office resolve jurisdictional disputes between two different departments on a bill? 
O: That was case by case. Those would be a little tricky at times, but they happened. 
G: Would they emerge in the course of the legislative struggle, and would your office be the--? 
O: We would be the people to make the ultimate decision. If there were conflicts, it was up to us to resolve the conflicts. And I'll have to say we didn't tolerate conflicting positions 
for any length of time. It's not the department's legislative proposal, it's not two departments' joint legislative proposal, it's the president's proposal. 
G: In a situation like this, let's say if you had two cabinet officers disagreeing on a jurisdictional question, would the president himself have to become involved in the 
solution? 
O: That would happen. You try to avoid that and resolve it without his involvement, again, conserving his time and energy. If there was an impasse that was prolonged and not 
resolvable, then the president would have to resolve it. But I don't recall there was an inordinate amount of that, frankly. There was give and take between departments because 
the department head, too, would recognize that this was not necessarily in the president's interest or good for the progress of the legislation. So I don't recall any bloodbaths. 
G: Would most of these people on the list attend a meeting at one time, or is this a more complete list than you would normally have attending meetings? 
11
O'Brien --Interview VIII --8 
O: When you get to National Capital Transportation Agency, you're really pretty much covering the waterfront. D. C. Affairs, the Federal Aviation Agency, Civil Service 
Commission, Small Business--G: 
That's a lot of legislative liaison work. 
O: Yes. All the major departments are obviously well represented, in some instances by two, three, or four people at a meeting of this nature. We didn't overlook anyone, and 
attendance was mandatory. 
G: It was? 
O: Yes. It wasn't a matter of asking if they would come to a meeting, it would be a matter of notifying them. 
G: Yes. Would you normally have three or four people from Defense or--? 
O: That probably would fit the situation. I think we have attached here the agenda for that very meeting, and you'll notice in preparing ourselves for the meeting there's a reference to 
Wilson McCarthy, and he would be asked for a head count and trouble spots. Ken Birkhead would respond on the food stamp bill as well as Food for Peace. The pay bill, 
that's where we got in the Civil Service Commission. Orren Beaty on land conservation and wilderness; Wilbur Cohen on Hill-Burton extension at that point and also water 
pollution control. Wilbur had a heavy part of this agenda because he was also on the nurses' training bill and NDEA amendments and Social Security amendments. It sounds 
like it was Wilbur Cohen's meeting. 
But then you go on. We had twenty-three items on this agenda, and the twenty-three items really reflected the breadth and scope of congressional relations, 
because you get to Fred Dutton, who was giving a report on the international coffee agreement and the status of it. I didn't notice [Joseph] Califano's name on here, but he 
attended these meetings. Yes, he's listed here. I didn't grade Joe. He was in a little different category. It was only a relatively brief period of time before he was over, fully 
engaged with the rest of us. 
The Commission on Automation--I'm having difficulty recalling the Commission on Automation, but I notice we have that. Nick Katzenbach on the public defender, that 
was in conference. If you look at this agenda, federal aid to highways [was] in conference. John Stilman was giving a report from Commerce on that, along with 
Appalachia and ARA amendments. But you look at that agenda, and that's just one of the regular meetings we'd have with the congressional relations people. You can see that we 
made every effort to have a full and meaningful meeting. What I think was good--and most of the fellows liked it and it was part of our emphasis in having these meetings--was 
that, regardless of what department or agency you were in, you could leave that meeting 
12
O'Brien --Interview VIII --9 
after two or three hours and have a feel for the overall picture. We always felt it was helpful. Rather than dealing with a fellow in the Civil Service Commission only because 
there would be a pay bill, he was considered part of the team, and it would cause him no harm and it might be helpful for him to have a continuing view of overall legislative 
activities, the ebb and flow, the emphasis of the moment. That fellow's turn would come. 
G: Yes. Some of these people, I think particularly Marty Underwood had been an advance man before, and I guess worked as one in 1964. Did any of these others double as 
advance men in--? 
O: Oh, yes, several of these fellows had been involved in the campaign. 
G: How would that--? 
O: Obviously, Dutton. 
G: Yes. 
O: In fact, probably 50 per cent of them. If you look through it quickly, Yarmolinsky had a role; Nolan and Dolan, both in Justice, had roles. Nick Katzenbach. Mike Monroney in 
the Post Office Department was involved in the campaign. Orren Beaty, Bob McConnell, Ken Birkhead, Tom Hughes, John Stilman, Larry Redmond, Frank Dooley, Sam Merrick, 
Bob Griffin; and Fred Forbes was involved in the West Virginia primary. That's how he came to our attention--no, the New Hampshire primary originally and then West Virginia. 
G: These people had been in the Kennedy campaign in 1960, many of them? 
O: Yes. John Linnehan, Marty Underwood, as you mentioned. The others I don't recall, but I'd say 40 or 50 per cent of these fellows. They were not new to us. We'd been around a 
while. 
G: This is more than a coincidence, then, that you had a lot of advance men working in congressional liaison? 
O: Yes. Well, they weren't necessarily advance men, but they'd played roles in the campaign. 
G: How did this relationship develop? Why did they end up in this line of work? 
O: First of all, we got to know them in the political context. Secondly, we had evaluated them in the campaign context where we could evaluate them in terms of aggressiveness, 
ability, diplomacy, all the various elements of dealing with people. 
Tape 1 of 4, Side 2 
G: Now you're looking--
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --10 
O: Now you're looking for people who are going to be in very sensitive and certainly very key roles, from our position, and I guess there would be a natural tendency to select people 
you know rather than people who were not familiar. Of course, those people came along, too, as time went on. But I think in establishing all of this initially, names would come to 
your attention--people who had an interest in participating in the administration. And after spending three or four years in a campaign context proving themselves it was 
obvious they had become more professional as time went on. 
And the team stayed reasonably intact. It wasn't a team that was going to achieve great glory, as it wasn't highly visible to the public. This was a team which to a great 
extent knew each other. Certainly we knew them and they knew us, and in some instances the department heads didn't know them initially but they were recommended to them. 
Some of them, I'm sure, fell by the wayside, [but] not these people. When you got to 1964 and they were still in this position, many of them had been in that activity for some 
time. It worked reasonably well, but, as I say, it was tough work, and in every instance, whether a fellow involved himself or became partially involved in congressional 
relations--a Katzenbach, a Cohen, these fellows--it was to a great extent because of their total grasp of the legislative proposal. And if you can get into serious head counts and are 
held responsible at this level of reporting, where they would have to give their specific head counts before a group or include them in their weekly reports, you move to another 
level. You're in a cabinet meeting and that cabinet member has to do the same thing and, obviously, he had to depend to a great extent on people on the congressional relations side 
in order to inform himself and be able to coherently present his case to the president at every cabinet meeting. 
G: Did many of these people go back out into the field in 1964 and work on the LBJ campaign? 
O: No, not many, because the LBJ campaign never took on the breadth and scope, obviously, of the 1960 campaign, as we will get to. Everybody was involved in their own activities. 
We were deeply involved in the legislative program. There was a fair amount of cabinet presence, top-people-in-the-administration presence around the country, at speaking 
engagements. But on an organizational basis--and most of these fellows had been in the organizational end--there was little of that taking place through the course of that summer. 
It wasn't until the fall when the President expressed some concern, and we had formed a structure of sorts, as you know, for the campaign. But to get out in the field and actually 
get to the proximity of the grassroots--and regional meetings will only take you to the proximity--that hadn't been accomplished nor did it take place until the fall. There were 
some fellows on the staff at the Democratic National Committee who, of course, could devote their time to 1964 campaign activities, but our attention really wasn't directed that 
way until the President was insistent we get out there and do something. 
I only had one problem with that. I didn't mind getting out there. It was a matter of trying to get out there and also keep the shop running while you were away. It wasn't 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --11 
easy but we did what we could. But I don't think anybody--and that would include me--could lay claim to making a great impact, organizationally or on registration. It was a 
matter of just weighing the votes, ultimately, but our leader's sensitivity to everything in this regard was such that he wasn't prepared to accept simply riding it out. We were 
going to win; it was only a matter of degree. He was looking for a 100 per cent vote, which was his nature. So we did not pull people out of the administration and put them in 
the field. We expected the cabinet members to do their thing, and more often than not a cabinet member would volunteer for or be assigned to a speaking engagement involving 
either a key member of Congress or a sensitive House or Senate contest where he might be helpful. 
All the organizational activity was pretty much confined to local activity, candidates' activity. When you think of that in presidential terms, you have a relative 
handful of contested Senate seats and a limited number of contested House seats. We would in each election identify less than a hundred House seats as contested. Well, it 
might approach a hundred if you hedged it a little bit. Now, those are seats that have a win-or-loss situation. The rest of them are routine and, if you have three hundred and fifty 
members of Congress and 60 per cent of them are Democrats who are going to win, you're not going to get a great deal of activity on behalf of the president, particularly when 
each one of them recognizes that the president is going to win also. So what you were left with was dependence upon party organizations, state chairmen, county chairmen, regional 
political people and, of course, in those days, a very active COPE, with the AFL-CIO. 
So my focus in the relatively brief period of involvement was to bring these elements into direct discussion, maybe a little confrontation, on a regional basis and to be 
sure that we had the appropriate representation at these meetings. You might discover some weak spots or some situations that could be corrected, and I think the report of the 
meetings reflects that approach. Now, for example, if you were in Cleveland and had a regional meeting and you found there was a potential for a considerable registration drive 
in 1964 in Ohio, the chances were good that other than giving a lecture you weren't going to be following up with any specificity. As I've often said, establishing the best national 
organization to handle every aspect of a presidential campaign with the most creative media you could utilize, in order to be 100 per cent effective--and I don't know what per 
cent of that you do achieve over a long period of time--when everything is said and done, you've probably impacted on only about 3 per cent of the election. The candidate did 95 
to 97 per cent. 
Granted that that's true, you probably could make a case for the 1960 election. I suppose you could make the claim that the organizational effort which extended over a 
couple of years was a contributing factor to some degree, and that in a close election where it's two or three percentage points, you would not have won if you hadn't done that. 
G: How do you explain then the large fluctuation in percentages sometimes before a vote? Let's say if you have polls a month apart or something, sometimes a gap of maybe ten or 
fifteen points will close. Is that due to external factors other than this sort of 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --12 
organizational work that you're describing? 
O: Yes. I think as you look at it--cast back to the 1960s. A lot of it would have to do with organization to close that kind of a gap. But a lot also had to do with candidate 
identification. That's not the proper word. Oftentimes you have a candidate who has great potential if he can get the right kind of visibility; that's the whole idea. But that 
doesn't mean he isn't carrying the major part of the burden. I think you could organize until hell freezes over, but if you don't have a fellow at the top, the candidate himself, who 
is extremely effective, you're not going to be able to pull it off. I am concerned about that because I think the 1960 debates, for example, the Nixon-Kennedy debates, had a 
tremendous impact on the result of that very, very close election. Now, that fell into our lap. That wasn't a matter of organization or even being cute and clever in bringing it 
about. It was a matter of the networks making a proposal and Nixon being foolish enough to accept it. We couldn't wait to issue a statement of acceptance. But I think if those 
debates hadn't occurred, you'll never know, but I seriously doubt whether Jack Kennedy would have been elected. That's beyond anybody's control. All your planning, all your 
long-range programming, but there again, it's the candidate. 
I think the bothersome aspect of all that is, as you'll recall following those debates, debating became the in thing. Everybody wanted to debate his opponent, even at the 
county and local level. Then there were debates with empty chairs all over the country where candidates refused to participate. I thought it was the healthiest thing that ever 
happened to American politics, because I thought the real test came in the direct confrontation of candidates. Then it got to the presidential election, I guess, of 
Ford-Carter. I think what's really happened since then is that the professional campaign directors, combined with the overriding emphasis on media, on the canned presentation, 
on the spots, have been adverse to the process. I really do. I think that it has let a lot of candidates for the most part off the hook, that they haven't had to face the adversary in the 
public view to the extent that I think should occur. You haven't had any meaningful debates on the issues, even in the last election when we had--a couple of debates? Reagan 
flopped in one and came out even in the second one, and that was that. It was a yawn for the most part. That could have developed into a really meaningful democratic process at 
all levels in this country. So it's that and the financing of campaigns that disturb and discourage me. 
G: How was the Reagan-Mondale debate different from the Kennedy-Nixon debate? 
O: Well, first of all they went into the debate with a big gap in public opinion. The Nixon-Kennedy debate was hotly contested with Kennedy trying to even it out with 
Nixon, but it was a contest in every sense. The Reagan-Mondale [debate], by the time the debates took place, had little or no impact. It was more show business, if you will, than 
the Nixon and Kennedy debate, which had a significant element of show business, too, to be fair about it. It probably didn't go to the substance nearly as much as perception or 
image. But regardless, I think if it doesn't do anything else, having that kind of procedure enhances a campaign in terms of public interest. When you have the sad situation in our 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --13 
country of 50 per cent eligible-voter participation in presidential elections, anything that could take place that might increase public interest to the point of broader public 
participation is to the good. 
I'm diverting, but just on the general subject--I've said this before--I was absolutely enamored with the idea of the dollar check-off. When we first arrived in the White House 
and I began to grasp this concept, we were all talking about one man-one vote. Having been involved in campaigns and knowing what occurs in terms of soliciting campaign 
funding and being very personally concerned about some of the sources of campaign funding, I detested the idea that a person could be a hundred thousand dollar-plus donor 
and have entree that others wouldn't have. Whether you intended it that way or not, that's the way it would work out. It was not the way you like to see things in our process, and I 
thought the dollar check-off would bring us to not a perfect democratic process, but certainly it would be a giant leap in that direction. Finally, in negotiating it, I discovered 
incumbent members of Congress were not going to succumb to the checkoff; they were not going to voluntarily release their advantage of incumbency, have limitations imposed 
on the financing of campaigns, be dependent upon some sort of a check-off procedure and, therefore, eliminate the big donor. You had to live with that and focus on 
presidential elections. Then with Ev Dirksen, you find a further compromise, which was not that bad a compromise as it turned out. You had the choice: a candidate could either 
go private or go the federal-funding route. But there were gaping holes in it. The business community and labor shared a common view that their existing entities should 
have some kind of exemption and should be permitted to pursue in some way their private-sector funding, which both sides claimed would not be in direct support of a 
candidate but the issues. 
We started with the dollar check-off, and the dollar check-off became a bonanza for the candidates. Through the gaping holes and all the exceptions, a candidate gets the 
federal financing under the established formula, which also provides for the emergence of third parties under a formula. Lo and behold, you're not involved very long when you find 
the creation of PACs and, if anything, a far worse situation than I experienced in my years in national politics. It has become absolutely appalling. I don't think there's any 
justification whatsoever for what we're allowing to happen in this country, and I think it contributes still further to the general cynicism toward our process. My dream, which I 
shared with many others, that the check-off would effectively create the best possible situation in the selection of a president just hasn't happened, and I think it's sad. 
But as all this has evolved, you go to Washington and, sure, you have organized special interest groups--the Chamber of Commerce and the [National] Association of 
Manufacturers and organized labor--but when I think back to that period and what exists in Washington today, there's no comparison. We used to say, and I think rightly, because 
of the nature of our programs, our desire to impact on society to bring about equality of opportunity and give everyone a fair chance to progress, "We're the lobbyists for the 
people." And we were. Clearly, our programs were in the interests of the people as a whole. We had to fight old procedures, established policies, and make major 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --14 
breakthroughs, and we did. Now I don't know who's lobbying for the people. I don't think there's any representation of the average person in America in Washington at all. It's 
simply PAC upon PAC upon PAC, lobbying entity upon lobbying entity upon lobbying entity. 
I think the best example [of this] you can cite, which I watch with great interest, is an advocacy by a Republican president of what is basically a Democratic proposal that is 
tax reform. As the months go by, this laudable proposal on the part of Reagan is supported by leading Democrats. It certainly is in the interest of the Democratic Party and 
its advocacy historically. It's a little like my dream of the dollar check-off. We'll have something remarkable. We'll have a bipartisan reform of the tax structure of this country, 
so that some kind of equity and equality is going to be built into it at long last. However, it appears more and more as time goes on that that is not going to be the case, and you're 
absolutely inundated with false information on the part of media. There's no presentation in terms of the public interest, or what should be the public interest, and there's a decided 
lack of knowledge on the part of the public generally regarding tax reform and what it is to accomplish. The lobbying interests are just stacked up in Washington sky high with 
their PACs and they determine a good deal of the legislative decisions in this country today. As for John and Mary out there, there's not only no one speaking for them, but I'm 
afraid there's very, very little interest in their welfare on the part of the elected officials. 
So I guess you're entitled to your dreams and aspirations when you're in the political process, but whether it's the dollar check-off or there are PACs the process has 
deteriorated. In the campaign procedures, there has been deterioration, too. And, of course, that goes to money because you're not going to have these fancy media people 
selling candidates for public office like they sell soap or cars on television unless you have financial resources. The overall campaign costs have escalated fantastically, too. I've 
painted a bleak picture, because I consider it bleak. 
G: Well, you still visit with friends on the Hill, old friends that have been around since the days in which you were working in congressional relations. Do you feel in your 
discussions with them that they echo the same concern that you've just described? 
O: I haven't had any in-depth discussions with them. My visits have been brief and purely social, but I don't detect any overriding concern. If it exists, I think it is minimal, and I 
think it is the old story: "You have yours; you've got it made. Hang on to it. Protect it." There are members who have publicly discussed their concern about this evolvement of 
PACs, and there are a handful down there that refuse to play the game. But as some fellow mentioned, "That's the way the game is played, and I'm playing it that way." And 
it's too bad because it would be a much better country if this wasn't the case. 
G: Let's go back to 1964 and the legislative operation again. What I've just handed you is a telephone list of senators to call and subjects to take up with them. It's not clear who was 
to make those calls, whether the President was or you were making them. 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --15 
O: Let me glance through--a list for presidential phone calls would be very selective. I notice it's confined to the Senate, and in each instance the suggestion for the call and the subject 
would indicate that this was a list that would be given the President periodically, not on a regular basis, when we would conclude that this could be helpful. You're talking here 
about nine or ten phone calls--I don't recall this type of list. I know it was not a regular procedure. 
G: That's what I was wondering. 
O: No, but I can see why you'd put together a little grouping like this every now and then perhaps and say, "This would take probably an hour sometime in the next week and it 
would be worthwhile doing." I'm sure it's not a reminder for me or others in the White House to make the calls; this would be a suggestion to the President. 
I really think the thrust of this is contained in just the first line: "The past shows it won't be easy to keep members, particularly liberal members, on the House floor 
throughout the prolonged civil rights voting." That was always a concern and, in this instance, the struggle had been monumental. So this would be an added dimension in 
which we normally would not probably engage because of the nature of the legislation. The liberals, who we were obviously counting right in our head counts, nevertheless, we 
needed their presence. We needed them in floor activity. We needed them to be participating in the debate throughout. So we were leaning heavily on the liberal group 
here and organizing them. I remember this. 
G: Do you? 
O: Yes. This was not a usual procedure, this was an added dimension. This was something where we were saying, "This is not a head count problem. You're for us, but you've got 
to be more than for us. You've got to be a full participant and be available and be active." That would be the thrust of this procedure, and I remember it very well because it came 
out of our saying, "Well, this is going to be some debate and it would be great if ardent supporters of civil rights who were going to be there when the bells ring for a final roll call 
would be actively involved," because we would anticipate the opposition would be very active. That would be the thrust of this. But, as I say, this was not a normal concept. 
G: Did it dovetail in with the existing leadership structure? 
O: Oh, yes. This would not interfere with the existing leadership structure. They would not be in conflict with it in any way. No, if we anticipated any conflict with the existing 
leadership, we probably would have refrained from going to this extreme. I think it's worth noting the next to the last paragraph, talking about the leadership conference. He's 
right, that's a problem for [William] McCulloch. And then he says, "If [Charles] Halleck is a reluctant dragon, this is a danger spot." Well, my recollection on Halleck is, once we 
had the initial breakthrough with Halleck early on, he was not a reluctant dragon. But we would always wonder. I mean, that didn't prove to us that Halleck was forever going to 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --16 
be our friend, but he had done something that we thought was rather remarkable, so he was willing to see it through. And, of course, McCulloch--and I've mentioned McCulloch 
before--was just an absolute stalwart. If any Republican deserves historically to be credited with a major input into civil rights, it's this fellow. 
G: Well, the implication also is that the southerners were more vigilant on this issue than--O: 
Well, yes, that's right. 
G: --the liberals. Or at least the conservatives; I shouldn't say southerners, although I suspect that's where they were from. 
O: Yes. They were historically well organized. We were kind of bumbling around pretty well by this stage, but the fact is that the record was very clear on their unified efforts in 
opposition to civil rights legislation and they were very good at it, very well organized. They knew by this time that they were in an uphill situation, too, that the climate had 
changed considerably. After going through what we did on the House side we said, "What else is there you could possibly do to add just a few more logs to the fire?" and this 
is the concept we came up with. 
G: Referring back to this memo, was the conservative or southern situation attributable more to their adamacy on this particular issue, or was it also their style of legislative work, that 
they would be more attentive, that they would--? 
O: I think their adamacy in this particular--G: 
On the issue? 
O: Yes. There was the southern Democrat-Republican coalition over the years and the glue [holding it together], to a great extent, was civil rights opposition. 
G: But you don't think the southerners or the conservatives would be equally vigilant in their attendance on non-civil rights-related issues? 
O: Not necessarily, because there would be a variance of attitude. In 1964 on some of our basic issues that did not directly involve civil rights but were liberal issues and advocacies 
we were involved in, we were getting more and more assistance from southern Democrats as time went on. But civil rights, that's the bottom line. You might get help in other 
areas, in education or indeed in Medicare and things like that, but this extends well beyond that. This reflects our concern that this battle isn't going to be over until there's a fellow 
sitting in the Oval Office signing a document. 
Tape 2 of 4, Side 1 
G: This last memo that you were discussing was a memo from Chuck Daly to you, February 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --17 
3, 1964. Let me ask you to go into this in detail because--O: 
Well, there was always a concern to us that this [cotton-wheat bill] was extremely meaningful legislation, as Mike Manatos points out in his memo to southern senators, and 
if you could keep that hanging and not have them be able to put cotton-wheat to bed, it certainly was going to be helpful to you in the filibuster situation. There were efforts 
made--and, of course, [Allen] Ellender was in the forefront--to resolve this legislation before civil rights hit the floor, and, of course, we were trying every ploy that we could in 
turn to avoid having that happen and to have it hanging over them. And as it was played out, that's exactly the way it happened. It played out in our interest. But there was a 
major effort made to get cotton-wheat resolved, and then they could sit and filibuster forever. 
G: How did you prevent cotton-wheat from moving ahead? 
O: Actually, that was to a considerable extent in the control of the leadership. Mansfield could keep that perking pretty well, and my recollection is that we got some comfort from 
Everett Dirksen in that regard, too. In fact, you'd have to point to that, probably, as meaningful as anything Dirksen did in the interests of civil rights, that Mike and Ev were 
able to stay in tandem to play this out. Ev did not make any move that I recall to be helpful to the southern Democrats in cotton-wheat, and that was a major element of the 
Senate strategy. It was interesting as the devil; Ellender and his friends, if they could get cotton-wheat resolved, could sit there forever and not have any concerns. But 
apparently--you know, the memo reflects--it's dated February 15, 1964--G: 
This is Mike Manatos to you? 
O: Yes. It reflects what Mike's picking up there, and he became very much concerned. But I'm sure that we reacted as Mike suggested. I don't recall the specific conversations, but 
we were involved with that for some time to see that they didn't get that advantage. 
G: Now, this memo represents sort of a big-picture view of legislation. In other words, rather than looking at the progress of a single bill, you're tying them together. You're 
looking at the impact, the effect of one piece of legislation on another. Who was responsible for setting up these relationships? Did your office do that? 
O: Yes. 
G: Was this fairly common for you? 
O: Yes. The degree of importance might vary, but opportunities presented themselves from time to time and sometimes even fell into your lap. It depends on the committee 
procedures, the calendar, the movement, the timetables, and it would not be unusual to suggest to a chairman that he might slow down activity in his committee on a given issue 
until we got something out of another committee and got a rule on it in the House or got 
21
O'Brien --Interview VIII --18 
it to the floor of the Senate before some other legislative proposal would hit the calendar and slow down the process. And then ultimately, of course, you have the slowdown as 
the leadership just digs its heels. So you have something going for you in that regard all the time. And you have to remember the intricacies of all of this; you could have a 
reluctant Mansfield, or in this instance, for example, a reluctant Dirksen, for any number of reasons--maybe individual commitments that they made or they didn't want to incur the 
enmity of Ellender or others. 
So you were always dealing with that. It wasn't a matter of just picking up the phone or dropping in and having a cup of coffee with Mike Mansfield to say, "We don't 
want this bill to move or to go to the floor until bill X hits the floor." You just don't sit around every day telling the leader how he's going to handle his calendar. But [when] you 
get to something as momentous as this--this sort of ties into the Chuck Daly memo on the House side--he can see what we were going through and this was helpful. It was nice to 
have. You didn't mind having this battle because you did have some of the southern Democrats very uneasy and concerned and a lot of pressure on them. 
G: Did the situation ever reverse itself? Did they come back at you and say, "Well, if you're going to hold up cotton-wheat, we're going to hold up something else that the 
administration desperately needs"? 
O: I suppose it did, but in this instance that wouldn't be acceptable anyway. 
G: Yes. 
O: There was nothing they could say to us but, "Release cotton-wheat." In fact, they could have said, "You release cotton-wheat and we won't be nearly as tough as you think we'll 
be," but we would never have bought that. 
G: Really? 
O: This was the battle. The blood was flowing. At that stage, I wouldn't have taken anybody's word who was opposed to civil rights on what they would do or not do. 
G: Did LBJ play a role at all in this sort of situation? Was he helpful? 
O: Well, I would assume he was aware of this. I think that, other than being kept apprised and totally aware, he felt he would leave it with us. If we ran out of gas, then maybe he 
would get involved. I don't recall that he had to get deeply involved as this played out because the Mansfield position, along with Dirksen's, was a fairly comfortable position 
from our point of view. There were times when we had to be very cautious about this sort of thing in either House or Senate, because they had their own activities played and their 
own games and you never reached the point where they could remotely suggest that you were making undue demands or moving into their province. So it was tricky. In this you 
had a common sharing of view and that made it easy, but if something could have been of 
22
O'Brien --Interview VIII --19 
[such] overriding interest to us or important to us to adjust the calendar or the committee timetable, you want to be very cautious because that would be very possibly crossing that 
invisible line and moving too aggressively. 
I think you get to the paragraph, "Not only to avoid antagonizing Kuchel but actually put a package together in the hands of Kuchel, too, in appreciation for his efforts 
and at the same time get the cloture bill from [Carl] Hayden." 
G: You indicated that Hayden was in ill health during this period? 
O: Yes. You see, I'm having trouble with the time frame. Hayden, you know, was just a grand old man and I loved the guy. When I first knew him, he was elderly, but as time 
went on the difficulty was to get him over to the Senate. Maybe it wasn't in this instance, but I can remember talking to Mansfield and we had a limo standing by if we needed his 
vote. No, I think that was the vote the senator from West Virginia double-crossed us on. 
G: Randolph? Jennings Randolph? 
O: Yes. Was it Medicare? 
G: Yes. 
O: We took a project away from him then. If he had stayed put, we had Hayden standing by and that would have been the last necessary vote. 
O: We took a project away from him then. If he had stayed put, we had Hayden standing by and that would have been the last necessary vote. But Randolph left us, and we were 
bitter. That's the period, I think, when Hayden was just toward the end of his time. 
G: It was. It was indeed. 
Let me ask you to focus on this situation of Carl Hayden and the Central Arizona project tied to his vote on cloture in the civil rights bill. 
O: It is a good example of the extent of our effort on civil rights and how far we were willing to go to work out any conceivable accommodation in order to ensure passage. When you 
look at this and at the historic conflict between California and Arizona, there was a great deal of discussion and negotiation between the two states over a long period of time and 
apparently, which I'm not familiar with, negotiations involving Pat [Edmund] Brown, the governor of California; Hayden, and others. There was a tremendous amount at stake, 
and we saw this as an opportunity to enlist Hayden's support on cloture. Furthermore, with the presidential involvement combined with all this effort on one cloture vote, 
hopefully it would have given us an opportunity to bow toward Tommy Kuchel at the same time. His staunch support of civil rights was very meaningful to us. If similar 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --20 
situations had existed we felt would have afforded us opportunities to make deals, we would have. It's a good example of the extent to which we and the President went to to 
bring about civil rights legislation. When you're talking about a major project of that nature and linking it with the vote of one man in the Senate, I guess that underscores the 
importance we placed on success in this area. 
G: But you had on the other end Thomas Kuchel who was already very supportive on civil rights. How did you work it out to the satisfaction of Hayden without alienating Kuchel? 
O: Well, Kuchel was not only supportive of civil rights, he was a rather remarkable fellow. All his instincts gravitated to liberal approaches to government, and I suppose that you 
could live with that in California, representing California as a Republican senator, and survive. However, Kuchel's nature was not to cast occasional votes in that direction to 
ensure that he had a quote, unquote, "moderate record," as some fellows did if they had an R next to their name, but Kuchel had a tendency to become personally involved. He really 
felt deeply on many issues, particularly in this area. Thus, there was no way that you could acquire Hayden's support if it was going to incur either the enmity of 
Kuchel--although it was not his nature to react that way--or be harmful to him politically. So you had to come up with a situation he could live with, [where] Hayden would commit 
his vote, and use this vehicle to accomplish it. 
It was pretty tricky and difficult, but how many issues would you be involved with over a period of years that would cause you to go to those extremes? This wasn't a matter 
of up or down on civil rights; this was a matter of one vote in the Senate, and you had to be concerned about every vote. Whether you were talking about delaying action on 
cotton-wheat or about the desperation of pleading with Charlie Halleck to be helpful on the House Judiciary Committee to get a bill out, every aspect of the civil rights struggle 
points to a total commitment. It took a long period of time and you attempted to utilize every possible angle that might come to your attention. You foreclosed none. 
I think another dimension to that civil rights struggle was the Chuck Daly memo we talked about in which you were even trying to envision areas beyond your normal 
procedure that would enhance the struggle. And there was considerable presidential involvement all the way and, of course, President Johnson's relationship with Ev Dirksen 
brought about an opportunity into which the President directly moved. 
G: Do you think this sort of quid pro quo, though, would encourage members of Congress and senators to put their vote up for sale? Even some that might be inclined to support a 
particular piece of legislation anyway, would they tend to say as a result of this, "No. Unless I get my Central Arizona project, I'm not going to vote"? 
O: No. This would be an extreme case we are talking about. Within our guidelines, sure, there was a little trading. But with us, the difficulty was not coping with the specter of 
undue attempts to trade or sell votes, it was the severe limitations imposed upon us in terms of any muscle we had in that area. We were very limited. If you were making an 
24
O'Brien --Interview VIII --21 
appointment in the administration, inevitably you would have recommendations for that appointment. Perhaps it had some regional or even state connotation, and the members, 
House or Senate, from that state or region would make recommendations or exert pressure. That came with the territory. It was not difficult; you tried to do it as 
diplomatically as possible, but it was not difficult to say no. 
When it came to projects, you weren't going to be able to make delivery in those areas, generally speaking. Maybe it would get to defense contracts, but when it got to 
anything as enormous as this civil rights, your ability to accomplish the objective was somewhat limited. You had to deal with a lot of people. You would normally have to 
deal with the appropriate committees of Congress--key members of those committees--and if that's an area of patronage or an area that's available to you to secure 
votes for passage of legislation, it's very, very limited. That was not a great tool. 
With Charlie Halleck we had to be cautious about being overly optimistic as to his continuing role and this memo of December 4, 1963, to the President from me, spells that 
out. We were talking about the bipartisan approach--Halleck and McCulloch were firmly on record and their position has been widely publicized. It is worth noting that McCulloch 
would not be a participant in the discharge petition and that would be understandable. First of all, a discharge petition is a very difficult process. Games could be played with it 
and were. 
G: Why was it difficult? 
O: Because people could sign and [later] remove their names. They could sign if they felt you were not going to get the required number of signatures, [and] if you started to 
approach it, all of a sudden you'd find names disappear. In this memo of December 4 we were talking about a petition and the dates the petition would be put into effect. I can't 
believe we were feeling this would be doable. The only doable thing was to get the bill to the floor in reasonable order and hope it was not decimated. 
I notice there's a reference to Halleck, [that he] might want to water it down. McCulloch was firmly aboard throughout. Charlie Halleck had given us a tremendous 
break at one stage, but I don't think anybody felt positive that Charlie would be fully aboard and stay there to the end. I think a lot of this had to do with our nervousness 
about Halleck and what others might attempt on the conservative Republican side. What I'm saying here to the President is, "The Republican Party has much at stake." Of course, 
it did have a great stake in this, as did Republican moderates and Republicans from the industrial states. You knew if you finally got to a roll call, a number of Republicans were 
going to have to support that legislation. All the games to avoid an ultimate decision in the House would be played out. But I'm attempting here to revive the publicity attendant 
to the McCulloch-Halleck activities of an earlier stage. It wasn't sufficient just to remind them--particularly Halleck--it was necessary to try to build a fire and have them develop a 
Republican interest once again. How effective we were in that regard I don't know, but again it's an indication of our constant pursuit of this in all its dimensions. 
25
O'Brien --Interview VIII --22 
G: Yes. The FEPC provision here was one of the controversial elements of the legislation. 
O: Yes. 
G: How did you get around that provision? 
O: I think we focused on that because it was a feeling. And Charlie enhanced that feeling by some actions he had taken. That was an area in which Halleck might effectively work to 
our disadvantage. He would be interested in doing some things to our disadvantage somewhere along the road and this would be an obvious area. I must say for Halleck, 
incidentally, we never had any commitment from him that he would see our version through to the end. That wasn't the commitment. The commitment was that he'd afford 
us an opportunity to have this fully considered. 
G: Yes. The public accommodations section was also very controversial. 
O: Yes. 
G: Do you recall any discussions or negotiations on this element of the bill? 
O: Not specifically. Those are the areas [you'd attack] if you were going to try to dismantle [the bill]. You have to remember this battle was waged over an extended period of time 
and those in opposition to civil rights legislation were going to seize every opportunity possible. If you'll look at the areas that are most controversial in the bill, the areas that are 
most sensitive, the areas of deepest concern to the opposition, you don't have to be a genius to figure out where the focus will be to dismantle or water it down. You just kept 
waging the battle. But the problem at that stage was, as the memo indicates, you knew darn well--whether the Rules Committee kept fooling around or whatever took place--that 
if you could only get to the floor then a lot of people who had no desire to vote for civil rights legislation and who were either going to be passive through the route or, worse than 
that, were going to make attempts to destroy [it], would have to vote for it once the chips were down. That's what the memo says. 
It was quite clear to us if we once got on that floor, we were going to pass meaningful legislation. Furthermore, it was equally meaningful that if we could get House 
passage of civil rights legislation, we were going to get a bill out of the Senate. House passage was the ultimate breakthrough, and that was really the last battle for the 
opponents of this legislation, even though it went through difficulty in the Senate. However, the Senate of the United States could not ultimately be in a position of having 
defeated civil rights legislation which had been adopted by the House. Republicans in the Senate, as Republicans in the House, would not be able to carry that burden. So the 
objective was obviously to carve it up, kick it around, present as many roadblocks as you could, although people participating in that exercise in many instances couldn't allow 
themselves to get out in front. 
26
O'Brien --Interview VIII --23 
(Interruption) 
G: --trigger memories. The first one in particular that is interesting in terms of the history of civil rights legislation is one that was accepted in amendment by Representative [William] 
Cramer to clarify that fostering desegregation did not mean to assign pupils in such a way that you would overcome a racial imbalance. Do you have any thoughts on the evolution 
of this concept? 
O: It was language subject to future interpretation. At that time the quote, "to overcome racial imbalance"--there would be all kinds of court actions and interpretations down the 
road ultimately--was something you preferred to have included by way of language, but there it was. 
In every case of legislative struggle, amendments which are adopted are inevitably bound to water down your proposal, and you fend them off to the best of your ability. 
The first one, for example, [which was offered by Richard] Poff of Virginia, was a teller vote to give defendants the same right as the attorney general to request a three-judge 
federal court. How much of your ammunition are you going to use as you go through something like this? That was eliminated quickly. Teller vote and that's it. Then 
whatever the [amendment] clarifying the definition of discrimination was, [offered by Charles] Goodell and [Edwin] Willis, we would think that the bill as written probably 
effectively defined discrimination, but then how many amendments are you talking about? 
Then you notice Howard Smith's [amendment], which is an interesting one. Prohibiting discrimination in employment due to sex. He was way before his time, wasn't 
he? 
(Laughter) 
G: How did he get out in front of the Johnson Administration on it? 
(Laughter) 
O: Howard Smith viewed that as an attempt to cause problems. He was not interested in eliminating sex discrimination. He thought this was pretty cute. 
G: But it passed. 
(Laughter) 
O: Yes. I think the important part of the House amendment listing is not so much the amendments which were adopted as the fact that ninety-four amendments were rejected. 
When you add it all up, that wasn't a bad piece of business. Granted that amendments were adopted, but for the most part--I'm sure we would have been in support of Howard 
27
O'Brien --Interview VIII --24 
Smith's amendment--they were watering-down amendments. 
You have about seven amendments, plus the ninety-four that were rejected, and as noted here in the summary, "The southerners reportedly entered the fight with little 
organization and enthusiasm and focused much of their opposition on the bipartisan coalition work in behalf of the bill, accusing [Emanuel] Celler and McCulloch of agreeing 
to oppose every amendment." This is a good piece of work in terms of legislative progress. If you can get through anything as mammoth as civil rights legislation with a 
limited number of watered-down amendments, I'm sure at the end of those few days we were quite pleased. 
G: The House adopted an amendment by Celler to exempt contracts of insurance or guaranty firms from antidiscrimination requirements under Title VI. Do you recall the issue of that, 
why they exempted insurance [companies]? 
O: No, I don't. 
G: How did Celler perform on this piece of legislation? 
O: Quite well. 
G: Did he? 
O: Yes. I'd give him good marks. I suppose it's unfair to Celler for me to give exceptionally good marks to McCulloch, but where he comes from was the difference. Celler is a 
staunch advocate up front. It's a matter of his strength as a chairman, his ability as a manager of this legislation, and you can make judgments on that basis. There's no 
judgment to be made on the basis of his support of civil rights and his background and history and record in that regard. But McCulloch, coming from the Republican side, is in 
the minority on the committee, and the position he took and his advocacy are worth recalling. 
G: There's an indication that Celler tried to dictate too much to his committee in terms of developing the legislation. 
O: I remember there were times when we were concerned about Celler's handling of the committee. But that's like anything else; you can nit-pick. Maybe we had valid complaints 
at times, maybe we wanted Celler to act a little differently than he did from time to time. Celler had been a member of the House for a long, long time and, to summarize Celler's 
efforts, it would be very difficult for me to find fault. But I do think, clearly, the success, to what degree we had success ultimately, from Celler's committee was due in no small 
measure to the efforts of McCulloch. So let's call it a team effort because there were suspicions all over the place. There were suspicions regarding McCulloch right to the 
bitter end. People felt they had to be wary of McCulloch. Maybe Manny Celler should be more amenable to the Justice Department and the White House concept of how this 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --25 
evolved. 
But when everything is said and done you think of where you started from, you had a battle on two fronts simultaneously. You had a battle with the conservatives on the 
committee, the southern Democrats, conservative Republicans, but you had just as tough a battle with the liberals. Their position was the old story of the half loaf or three-quarters 
of a loaf, and "we'll settle for nothing less." Their constituency consisted of civil rights groups you wouldn't expect to be patient. This was something long overdue; there should 
be no quarrels about it, there should be no maneuvering regarding it, and it should be flat out. That's not unusual, but in civil rights, it was the very strong, prevailing view. The 
liberals on the committee who opposed passage were reflecting the views of their constituency and we had to cope with that. We shared their views, and we'd love to do it 
their way. 
We were accused by some of being weak-kneed but, my God, are you going to have meaningful legislation or are you going to sit around for another five or ten years 
while you play this game? We became, if anything, more disturbed with some of our liberal friends on that committee than we did with some of the southern Democrats and 
Republicans because, after all, we knew their position. Those liberals sat around saying, "No, we won't accept anything but the strongest possible civil rights bill, and we won't 
vote for anything less than that." To kill civil rights in that Judiciary Committee was an appalling possibility! And it was not only a possibility, it came darn close to an actuality. 
That's why I can't help but reflect back on McCulloch and Halleck. 
Tape 2 of 4, Side 2 
G: [Was McCulloch] suspicious of the administration, do you think? Do you think he felt that the administration was trying to accrue credit to the Democrats rather than the 
Republicans? 
O: I suppose there might have been some of that, but I think what you have to remember is the relationship that was established between Bobby Kennedy and McCulloch and in the 
trenches [with] Nick Katzenbach. There was an understanding, a recognition, of McCulloch's problems in terms of how much he could get done. My recollection of 
McCulloch was that he was a stand-up fellow throughout and he was a realist. He had taken on a task which certainly did not ingratiate him with a lot of his colleagues, but he 
felt that right was on his side. This was a personal point of view. I don't think he had any overriding constituent pressures on him. He had a safe, or relatively safe, congressional 
district, but it was our good fortune that in his position on that committee he had made a personal commitment. 
In that context you have all kinds of ebb and flow, all kinds of possibilities, all kinds of problems, all kinds of negotiations, and all kinds of efforts by members of the 
committee to try to persuade them. But the fact of the matter is that you had a basic three-way split on the committee: you have the Democratic liberals; you had those that 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --26 
shared our view that "Let's look at the reality of all this, what's doable, and let's get it done." Then you had the adamant opponents. Obviously, when some of our liberal 
friends were screaming about "this pathetic piece of legislation," it brought smiles to the faces of Democratic conservatives and Republican conservatives, who couldn't have been 
more pleased with the assistance they were getting from these liberals to kill the legislation. In the midst of that, you have Celler and McCulloch, and you have the Justice 
Department and the White House. I have told the story about Mayor [Richard] Daley and one of his congressmen--G: 
Yes. 
O: --who played that game, too. I guess I'm being a little harsh, but my feeling at the time was that the speeches and the public statements some of those people were making were 
the very ones I would make. I was no less committed to civil rights than they were, but I did not buy them because I felt they were pandering to a constituency and their own 
personal interests. They were overlooking the cold reality that we had an opportunity here to have meaningful civil rights legislation, and they were going to blow it, just to 
satisfy their own egos. 
G: This is an element of debate that seems to come into almost every piece of civil rights legislation: how much of a loaf is possible? Of course, the liberals are going to respond to 
you that with just a little bit more perseverance they might have been able to enact a more sweeping measure. Is there a formula that you used at the time for determining how much 
of a loaf was possible? 
O: Why, sure. It was a pretty obvious formula: intensive discussions with each individual member of that committee repeatedly brought you to your own personal head count on 
what was doable. Then go back to those seeking the sweeping legislation and say to them, "This is what's doable. This is the cold reality. This is the best that we can do. If 
you can help us do better, then step up and do it. Now let's get off this, and we're demanding that you support it." That got to be a tough battle, believe me. We pulled 
every stop. 
G: Was this something that you had to formulate in other pieces of major legislation or was it peculiar to civil rights? 
O: There were elements in civil rights that just made it different. I think in any momentous, far-reaching legislation--Medicare--there are elements. But there's that additional 
ingredient in the whole civil rights struggle. If you're talking about Medicare, for example, a major legislative effort extending over years and years, it didn't get to the basic human 
terms of black folks and white folks. Civil rights is unique in that regard and, consequently, the emotions that it stirred were as intense as the emotions on any 
legislative proposal you could ever be involved with. You were going to break barriers that go back a hundred years or more. Whatever remaining partial barriers might exist 
after enactment, the situation was bound to improve once the base was in place. 
30
O'Brien --Interview VIII --27 
It was difficult for me at that time to accept suggestions from some of our most ardent supporters of the New Frontier and Great Society programs. Let's face it, they 
were 100 per cent supporters of all of our proposals and they'd say, "Well, what are you arguing with us about or with me about? I'm just an ardent supporter. This is the 
commitment of the Democratic Party. This is the commitment of the President. This is what the President wants, and I'm just supporting the President. You're coming to me and 
saying now, 'Alter to some degree your support; do a partial with us, ' and we can't accept that." So you get to, "Well, if that's the way you feel about it, you've joined forces with 
those other guys and you've got this blocked. I don't know what you're saying. We didn't try hard enough? We ought to devote more time and effort to this? Wait for a few more 
elections and maybe we'll be in a better position?" We reached the point where we were very intolerant of some of the activities of some of these people on that committee. 
G: Was Lyndon Johnson inclined to accept your estimate of how much--? 
O: He was a total realist about it. Is somebody going to accuse the top people in the Justice Department of being not liberal enough, not committed enough to civil rights, that they'd 
engage in some giveaway program? It was useless to be debating the intensity of interests in civil rights. All that was debatable was what was doable. If we hadn't succeeded in 
bringing a civil rights proposal to the floor of the House, if we hadn't succeeded in containing the last-ditch efforts by way of amendment to dismantle or water down, if we 
hadn't succeeded as we did in the Senate, if somebody had suggested to me going back to the House committee and agreeing with our friends on the committee who were the most 
ardent in this regard, "Let's set it aside and try another time because we're just not going to settle for anything but a 100 per cent package here," I wonder how many years it would 
have taken before, if ever, you'd have had civil rights legislation. 
There was nobody more ardent in his espousal of civil rights legislation than Lyndon B. Johnson, and nobody can take that away from him. From my own personal 
observations--I was there--we weren't sitting there enthusiastically accommodating some of these various elements in order to get a majority all through both bodies. We were 
doing the best we could, and we were dedicated. There had to be a tremendous amount of pride from all concerned with the ultimate result. 
To sum it up, I think the difficulty in something like this is not waging the battle with your traditional opposition. You know it's there, but to find yourself waging a battle 
on two fronts tested us to the point where we had to bite our tongues many times. 
G: Was this a problem that developed more in the House on this bill than it did on the Senate side? 
O: It was more a traditional situation on the Senate side. That's why I've said so often that House enactment was essential and did ensure ultimate civil rights legislation, because 
even with that, the Senate battle was intensive. But if you look at the debate in the Senate 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --28 
and look at the vote in the Senate, you'll find it followed basically a traditional course. There was much less Senate liberal screaming about the "weakness of the legislation" than 
there was on the House side. 
G: Before we get to the Senate side, let me ask you [this]: is there anything on the relationship between Johnson and McCulloch on this legislation that is interesting? 
O: No, not that I can recall. 
G: What did Johnson think of McCulloch? 
O: I'm not sure he became well acquainted with McCulloch because McCulloch's position had been established early on. Even though there are indications in these memos that "you've 
got to still keep an eye on old McCulloch," the fact of the matter is that I don't recall being nervous about him. I also recall if you said to McCulloch at that point, "This is a 
desperate move, we know, but we're going to go to a petition," and McCulloch would say, "No, I'm not going to have any part of that," you'd understand it because we weren't being 
total realists and it could have been disruptive from his point of view. I'm sure there were some shaky areas of support on his side. 
G: What insights did you draw about Johnson's relationship with Celler from this legislation? 
O: He knew Celler; he had known him quite well over the years, and I remember he had a great deal of confidence in Celler and was comfortable with him. They had a good 
relationship. I think it's probably an unfair reflection, but it probably should be put into the equation that Celler, even at this stage, was a rather elderly fellow. Maybe that's where 
our concern was, whether he had the strength to carry out this task. I'm very sensitive to age at this stage in my life, but I think there's a tendency, if you're younger, to say, "I 
wonder if the old guy will really hang in there." (Laughter) 
G: Well, he must have been in--close to eighty. 
O: I'm sure. 
(Interruption) 
G: Let's go to the Senate now. You were saying that there was building, during the Senate consideration of the bill, enthusiasm above what you had during the time that it was in the 
[House]. 
O: Yes. It grew rapidly in the church groups around the country. Disappointment in the House passage because of the content of the bill dissipated quickly, and we were able to 
finally bring into focus the realization that we were afforded a splendid opportunity to enact meaningful civil rights legislation. There was a tendency to refrain from criticizing 
the House action. If we move rapidly into the Senate there would be final enactment. 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --29 
This wasn't planned or orchestrated; it just evolved. 
The result was that the procedure was agreed to in the Senate to by-pass the committee and go directly to the floor. If it went to the Senate committee, you may never 
see it again. The decision was made, which we discussed in great detail, and which was in accord with the leadership in the Senate. Coinciding with that, there then seemed to be a 
significant escalation in the private-sector involvement and enthusiasm and a great effort ensued. That effort hit the Senate and hit very strongly and was very important in 
accomplishing the desired result. I don't recall that degree of private-sector activity in the House when we were going through it. 
G: Was this something that your office worked on? 
O: I don't recall that we did particularly. We were also coping with some dissatisfaction, a considerable amount of dissatisfaction, on [the part of] civil rights advocates through 
House progress. 
G: Who in particular, do you remember? 
O: Just in general. There were sayings: "Well, this isn't really a great bill." "There's been too much given away," and "There're too many problems with it." All of that, going back to 
the House Judiciary Committee, was reflected by the attitude of some of the liberals on the committee. Now you have a bill that has been enacted, and it is a civil rights bill. Then 
the move was to go directly to the Senate floor and carry on this battle, which everyone envisioned would ultimately force cloture and which you would have to win. You're 
talking about a mammoth task. There was a realization that "Here is the battle, and it can be won." That was extremely helpful to us because we didn't have all these protracted 
debates about substance under the House bill. We were now talking about "Can we get the House version enacted in the Senate in this session?" And then came the decision on 
the part of the leadership, in which we concurred, to go [directly to the floor]. That was really the only course. Were you going to go into a Senate Judiciary Committee and start 
all over again with the experience you had in the House Judiciary Committee? Once that was established, it went from there and escalated into a historic achievement. 
G: Well, you did have the problem in the Senate of unlimited debate, and--O: 
Yes. Sure. 
G: --you were hit with that at least initially. 
O: Yes. 
G: This is one thing that we really haven't talked about in any detail. Let me ask you to talk about the filibuster here. I mean, the southerners did block the vote for a period of days. 
What was it? Ten days, two weeks, something like that? 
33
O'Brien --Interview VIII --30 
O: I would say at least that. First you have the parliamentary procedures, Russell and the morning hour. 
G: Well, now, explain what happened in detail there in the morning hour. 
O: It was Russell's involvement, wasn't it? 
G: Yes. 
O: That was a simple delaying action. I don't think it took anyone by surprise. If you did it in the morning hour it wasn't subject to debate, so Russell just postponed it until after the 
morning hour when there's unlimited debate. Mansfield tried to compromise it, moving the Senate [bill] to the Judiciary Committee for a limited number of days, which was sort 
of a Mansfield approach to things. He figured that would be an accommodation which might alleviate the tenseness. But that didn't occur. I was just going to dwell on Morse 
because Morse was involved in referring it to the Judiciary Committee. 
G: Yes. It was his motion, evidently. 
O: What his motivation was eludes me at the moment, except that I have to assume that Morse probably wasn't enamored with the bill. 
G: Do you think he wanted a stronger bill, or do you think maybe he was introducing a motion that he hoped would be defeated? Would that--? 
O: I don't recall. Morse was a difficult fellow to evaluate in any event, and that's a blank with me. 
G: Now, back to the matter of the filibuster. Did the presiding officer in the Senate have some control over the filibuster at all? Was there a parliamentary way that he could break 
the filibuster unless it tracked strictly with the Senate procedures? 
O: No, the Senate procedure is unlimited debate and that's it. Unlimited debate leads you to exactly that. How long can you prolong the debate? The whole idea is to have unlimited 
debate until you exhaust everyone, and the whole thing dies and everyone gives up. Once they were unable to move it to the Judiciary Committee and they were faced on a roll call 
with the agreement of the Senate to take up the legislation, there was no alternative left for the opposition but filibuster and the odds would heavily favor the opposition, 
historically. It's not an easy matter for the Senate to vote to suspend its own rules and close out debate. 
So it was of great historic interest that this debate ensued in the context of civil rights. It added a dimension to the struggle. But it was an inevitable procedure. When 
everything was said and done, no matter how you tried to maneuver or manipulate, you 
34
O'Brien --Interview VIII --31 
were faced with one of two things. If you took the normal course and went to the Judiciary Committee, you probably were never going to see a bill. If you're going directly 
to the floor, then the battle is to be waged. "The bill is taken up and now filibuster ensues." Once you got to that, were you capable of putting together the necessary votes 
to break a filibuster? I don't recall historically when that had ever occurred, but I think in terms of civil rights legislation, at least, the memo indicates it goes all the way back to 
1917. It's awesome. 
G: Yes. 
O: You could go through this, and you're into seven weeks of debate before the petition was filed. Then it came to the climax--what is this, a morality play?--with Bob Byrd, and Bob 
Byrd set the record for the longest speech. 
G: How long did he talk? 
O: This says fourteen hours and thirteen minutes. It caused the first around-the-clock session of the 1964 filibuster. So you have to remember when the cloture petition was filed, it 
was after seven weeks of debate and then you're at "This is it!" 
G: Why wasn't it filed sooner? 
O: There's no perfect time, but you have to build a record that there was full debate opportunity, that everyone had all the opportunity that reasonably could be expected to 
debate this issue. You wouldn't move for cloture and want to be faced with, "I might vote for cloture, but I think this is a hastily taken act. We haven't had enough opportunity for 
discussion, and this is an arbitrary effort to close off fair and reasonable discussion of the issues involved here." There's a possibility of success when you say, "All right, you've 
been at it for seven weeks. There's no indication that any meaningful vote is going to take place here, so we're petitioning." 
G: Was there a physical dimension to this struggle? Do you think that the southerners eventually got tired of talking? 
O: I think it's an example of what can be accomplished when you maximize pressure, and I think without question the public pressure across the country--not only the church groups 
but long-time advocates and liberals in general--had been spotlighted to bring about an attitude of fairness and had an impact on the cloture vote. Each senator voting on cloture 
had to have some justification. The justification was in two parts: one was an overwhelming, overriding public demand for action; two, there had been ample 
opportunity for full discussion. So when that kind of a petition is acted upon, there's the order of business. You have a June 8 filing of the cloture petition, and June 10, the vote. 
G: Senator Russell was quoted as saying that "Cloture never would have been imposed had it not been for the pressure from LBJ and much of the nation's clergy." 
35
O'Brien --Interview VIII --32 
O: I think that's accurate. 
G: Who did LBJ pressure? 
O: I think it's the pressure in terms of his repeated public pronouncements and his effort as president to rev up the support. And when Russell says that the cloture vote would never 
have succeeded without pressure from the President and many groups in the private sector, of course that's accurate. In order to attain cloture, you've got to have a major 
effort, pressure across the board and that's just what happened. I see a reference to [the fact that] the Senate took 106 roll-call votes after cloture and through adoption of the 
substitute bill. The substitute bill was the Mansfield-Dirksen substitute, which was a clean bill. 
G: Can you describe the atmosphere when the bill passed the Senate? 
O: Yes. It was like the home team winning the Super Bowl. There were many expressions of enthusiasm, joy and handshaking and backslapping. 
G: Was the celebration concentrated in one particular office, a senator's office or a leader's office? 
O: No. It just spread around the Hill. In fact, the people who were in the chamber, outside the chamber and in the general vicinity during that time were numerous. You wouldn't be 
able to accommodate them in any one location. 
G: What was Johnson's reaction to it? 
O: He was ecstatic. 
G: Did you talk to him? 
O: Yes. 
G: Tell me what he said or part of it. 
O: There were two aspects to his reaction; he was ecstatic and relieved. It had been a long, long, tough grind, and his enthusiasm knew no bounds. 
G: Did you call him on the phone to tell him about the passage? 
O: I think we left that to the leadership--that's my recollection--to make the call. 
G: But did you go meet with him or how did--? 
36
O'Brien --Interview VIII --33 
O: We were in the office--I don't know whether it was that night or the next morning--and my recollection is we were immediately engaged in making plans for a ceremony. We 
weren't going to let any time elapse, but I don't remember when the actual signing ceremony took place. He had every right to be joyous about it because it was a major 
accomplishment for which he deserves lasting credit. 
G: What did he say about that bill? Do you recall? 
O: About the bill? 
G: Yes, about the act and its passage. Do you recall any phraseology? 
O: No, I don't. At that stage we all knew we had passed a meaningful civil rights bill which was to become the law of the land after decades of controversy and it had been brought to 
fruition. Nobody was dwelling then on whether it should have been a little better here or a little better there. You have established a firm base that can never be shaken, and you can 
build on that base as time goes on and experience dictates. 
That effort extended into June of 1964, and the Judiciary Committee in the House took this legislation up sometime in early 1963 or late 1962. When it was taken up by the 
House, it was at a point where President Kennedy had been belabored by the liberal establishment for his failure to move vigorously in this area. If this was as difficult as it 
turned out to be, it would have served no useful purpose to just accommodate the most ardent advocates by going through what would have amounted to a charade early on in 
the Kennedy Administration. It would have set back the whole process because it was premature and you would have failed. But he did go through a great deal of attack. ADA 
attacks were mounted on a number of occasions, and others attacked the administration for its perceived failure to tackle the problem of civil rights. We had to just ride with that 
because it wasn't something you wanted to debate particularly. Debate would have been rather useless because you'd have been talking about internal procedures which would not 
be generally understood anyway. 
G: The leader of the southern forces during this fight was Richard Russell, who had been Johnson's closest friend, perhaps, while he was in the Senate. Did Johnson offer any 
guidelines or suggestions in dealing with Russell or did he himself--? 
O: The Russell position was understood. I don't recall any instructions from Johnson in dealing with Russell, and I don't recall any direct efforts by Johnson with Russell. Russell 
was the acknowledged leader of the southern bloc. He was the person to lead the fight. He had never equivocated in his position and it was clearly understood by all of us that 
that was the way it would be played out. 
G: Did Russell's opposition on this issue and LBJ's pressure on the other side of the issue cause any estrangement in their friendship? 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --34 
O: Not to my knowledge, and I would not think that any estrangement really took place. How deeply Russell felt about defeat in this instance, I don't know, but the nature of the 
man was such that he didn't have a tendency to overreact publicly. He was very gentlemanly in any matters I was engaged in with him over those years. I respected him. 
In this area of "never the twain shall meet," my feeling was that Russell put up the best fight he could and he lost. What his personal reactions were to it I don't know. 
Tape 3 of 4, Side 1 
G: You were saying it was a battle and Russell was a professional. 
O: Yes. As a personal note, I had great respect for Senator Russell. The respect, of course, was a matter of my personal reaction to him, my relationship with him and my knowledge 
of his stature in the Senate and his political career. In no way would that affect my strong view of civil rights and my strong opposition to his view, and I think that applied to all of 
us. But it was, as the saying goes, nothing personal. We're going to wage this battle; we're going to succeed and let the chips fall. 
G: What was the basis of Russell's stature in the Senate? 
O: I think the nature of the man. He was an impressive fellow, impressive to meet, and to conduct business with. I found him a very courteous and a thoroughly decent fellow who 
had strong views in this particular area that we didn't share. But I didn't allow that to affect my feeling toward him nor did I allow it to in any way limit my activities against 
him. He was by nature the sort of the fellow that would gravitate to leadership. 
G: What do you think was the source of his opposition to civil rights? 
O: It's historic, I think. 
G: Regional? 
O: Sure. 
G: Did he seem to embody racial prejudice more or less than his colleagues in the Senate from that region? 
O: No, nor did he ever to my knowledge or in my presence make any nasty comments of a racial nature. It was a position that he had grown up with, I assume, and had embraced to 
the end. 
The strange thing about many of those southerners was that they held strong views on civil rights, but when I anticipated strong views on religion, they didn't seem to be 
there. I remember in the 1960 election that Kennedy fared quite well in the South. And I remember Senator [Herman] Talmadge, when I was having dinner with him at his home 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --35 
one night, pointing out to me a statistic of which he was very proud, and that is that Kennedy had achieved a higher percentage of the vote in Georgia than he had in 
Massachusetts. [I remember] him saying that the accusations outside the South of southern religious prejudice were not borne out. In fact, Georgia proved to be one of the 
strongest states in the Union in support of Kennedy for president. And it is interesting because as a fellow from Massachusetts with my background, the general perception was 
that southerners were strongly, or indeed violently, anti-Catholic. We had run into that initially in West Virginia, and it turned out not to be the case in a primary there, and it 
turned out not to be the case when it came to the election itself. I'm not suggesting that there weren't southerners who voted against Kennedy because he was a Catholic, but there 
were many people who voted against Kennedy because he was a Catholic who weren't in the South. 
G: There were some Democratic senators that didn't vote. 
O: Border state? 
G: Yes. Hayden was one who, despite your effort, did not vote for cloture. What happened, do you recall? 
O: No need. 
G: No need, is that what it was? 
O: Yes. 
G: He would have if you had needed him? 
O: Yes. 
G: How about [Alan] Bible? 
O: There again, it's sort of a conservative border state situation. 
G: Do you think Bible would have voted with you if you'd needed him? 
O: I don't recall that he would have. 
G: Okay. [Albert] Gore, a relatively liberal senator. 
O: Yes. Gore and that group were probably a surprise to us. 
G: Yes. 
O: But there again, with Gore--I'm guessing--I have a feeling that if needed it would have 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --36 
been the case there, too. 
G: But you do remember distinctly in the case of Hayden it was just strictly that you didn't need him. 
O: Clearly, we were sure in our head counts of availability if needed. 
G: Okay. Let me ask you about the bill-signing ceremony. I think it was in the White House in that large East Room, wasn't it? 
O: That's right. We used to have unique signing ceremonies for major bills. We went out to the Truman Library to sign Medicare. We signed the immigration bill at the Statue of 
Liberty. On the civil rights bill we did use the East Room. It was a who's who of civil rights advocates. In fact, we had so many signing ceremonies they all weave into each 
other. 
Even the signing ceremony, incidentally, would cause you great caution. You'd have to develop the list to be sure you didn't miss someone that should be there. It was a 
pain because that was the aftermath, and it was ceremonial, and [there was] the pen distribution. I have the set of pens that were given to me when I became postmaster 
general, for the Kennedy-Johnson period, all framed. It was given me by the Congress at a party up there--fifty or sixty pens of the major legislation of that period, and there's a 
little plaque on it. The President saw it after it was given to me, and he became so enamored with it he had a duplicate made. You probably have one at the LBJ Library. 
G: Yes. 
O: But the initial one was given to me by the Congress. I brought it back to the office and it came to his attention. And there's a change in the pen from the Kennedy pen to the 
Johnson pen. You probably have seen the identical one I have, but let me tell you, I have the original. 
(Laughter) 
G: Well, would pens be given out to private citizens as well? 
O: Oh, sure. 
G: Did you give out more pens than you used to sign the bill? 
O: No. 
G: There must have been a limit to how many--O: 
There was a limit, and you made sure that the pen would literally touch the signature in 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --37 
some form. 
G: Yes. Some of the signatures looked like they used sixty different pens to sign them with. 
O: Yes, but we refrained from playing the game beyond that. It was legitimate that it was a pen actually used in the signing ceremony. No, we didn't distribute a couple of hundred 
more later on. 
(Laughter) 
But that evolved, too. All those things became a little more creative as time went on, and we began to realize that signing ceremonies could be very effective. Photo 
opportunities, if nothing else. Subsequently, presidents have engaged in that to a great extent. I would have to refresh my memory on the civil rights signing, because I can just 
envision that if we did it in the East Room it was a total mob scene. How many pens were involved I wouldn't have the slightest idea. I'm sure everybody in the room didn't get one, 
but who knows? 
G: Okay. 
(Interruption) 
O: It had been arranged for Martha [Griffiths] to go back [to Washington]. (Laughter) 
G: Apparently there were some press leaks or something that disturbed her. 
O: Yes. It's quite a letter, though, isn't it, "far from the prejudices of the precincts." I don't know how Pierre [Salinger] got into that Bermuda bit. 
G: Yes, but it is an interesting analysis of how congressmen are tied not only by their own local interests and the interests of their districts, but also the fellow congressmen and the 
similarly situated. This is, again, the issue of transportation, one that required a good deal of Republican support as well. 
O: That's right. And, of course, there, too, when you're talking about transportation and the ports involved and some of the members referred to in that memo, you're talking about 
good friends of ours. In this instance it comes into that category we've referred to so often: don't ask someone to commit political hara-kiri. That is a good example of some of 
the difficulties you run into. You're not into liberals-conservatives varying positions on important social legislation. This is meat-and-potatoes. A [Ray] Madden or somebody to 
say, "Listen, I'm with you 99 per cent of the time, but not in this instance," You had to accept that. You're not going to be able to bump all those fellows into positions they feel 
are adverse to their political interests. If it were Corpus Christi or Baltimore or somewhere else, these fellows just couldn't go along with you. They would be subjected 
to a great deal of adverse criticism, editorial criticism, back home. 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --38 
G: John Young's complaint was that on the transportation bill, the committee bill was drastically--O: 
Yes, I saw that. 
G: --different from the original proposal. 
O: Whether it was drastically different or not, I'll accept that it was different. It was to John's best interest to suggest that it was drastically different. 
G: This last memo of those three that you looked at deals with scheduling and negotiations with the leadership in each house to--O: 
It's a good example of the problems you would run into, and this is not unusual. 
G: Is that right? 
O: You were constantly faced with the pressures on the leadership on scheduling for any number of reasons. This is an excellent example because Carl Albert and the Speaker, 
under any normal circumstances, were very cooperative, but in this instance Albert is giving his reasons why he feels these bills shouldn't be taken up as we suggest, 
back-to-back. Of course he has, from his point of view, valid reasons in talking about [the fact] that you need more work on mass transit. When you came to the pay bill, I can see, 
just glancing at the memo, what he was saying was, "Let some of these boys get through their primaries before they are on record as voting themselves and others a pay increase." 
It's so difficult, because there's a human element protecting the members, their own colleagues, cooperating with them and at the same time trying to accommodate the White 
House. This is an example. 
Finally you see from this memo, "I believe we need work on mass transit"--I'm saying that--" the pay bill is in reasonably good shape." But the President's concern was 
that they have this holiday period and that could mount public interest or press interest with the pay bill and be adverse to getting it done quietly, which was always what you 
were trying to do with that sort of thing. So apparently I'm saying to the President, "Insist on the pay bill [by] June 3." June 2 was the date of the New York primary. In other 
words, let's get it done the very first available moment following the New York primary. 
I don't know how many interoffice memos flowed each week between departments, agencies, my White House office, or the President and me, but I think it 
gives you a little feel of the intricacies of the process and all the involvements which no one would perceive. You'd have all kinds of problems trying to maneuver the schedule to 
your best advantage, trying to avoid having advantages gained by opponents and working with the leadership. 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --39 
I often thought [it was true] particularly [in the Senate], although it applied to both houses. The leadership, particularly in the Senate, I think, runs into "Senator So-and-so 
has a speaking engagement," or "He's got a fund-raiser" or "He's committed to this. Postpone the vote." You're dealing with a hundred people and rarely are all one hundred 
available in Washington as they should be. They're constantly going to the leadership to adjust schedules and to give them special breaks or permit them to dash off somewhere to 
get back at a certain time. Even within a day you'd often negotiate the time of the roll call and see if you couldn't kill some time if necessary. 
You saw on the head count you're looking at you have [Vance] Hartke arriving five minutes late, [and] regarding somebody else, I notice the memo saying, "We've told 
Mansfield that we'll provide military transportation." That wasn't unusual; we did that often. We hoped that we wouldn't get caught at it, but we used to do it. Just another 
example of the extremes required to get these people who have a responsibility to vote on these issues there and to vote, and that would apply sometimes to committee votes. You 
were constantly faced with members who had excuses for not being there or asking for postponements to accommodate their own personal interests. The leadership in both the 
bodies were involved with that all the time. I'm sure that's the case today just as it was then, and it drives you crazy. 
G: Did you also have a problem scheduling legislation in terms of your own priorities in addition to--? 
O: Yes, and you're limited to a considerable extent on scheduling. We scheduled consistently for the early years, at least on the House side, as we anticipated in every case there was 
going to be a very close vote. So you try to handle the schedule to maximize the attendance of your side, constantly trying to be alert to absenteeism. Realize that 
traditionally the House, and to some degree the Senate, won't have recorded votes except Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday. That's Tuesday afternoon, Wednesday, and up to 
early afternoon Thursday for the T-to-T fellows--the Tuesday-to-Thursday fellows. They won't be there; they're going home. 
In the House, with debate limitations, you could work out a reasonable schedule. In the Senate it was difficult, because Mike Mansfield or the other leaders couldn't 
pinpoint, within X hours, when the roll call would take place. It was miserable. It was one aspect of the process that was troublesome and nerve-racking, because you had to 
deal with that in addition to the substance. Now you're going to have a vote and you have to worry about your head count, who's going to be present and who isn't, what time is 
more appropriate for one member, which may not coincide with the time frame of another member. In this instance, the Carl Albert memo goes beyond that, obviously. He has the 
pay bill on a time basis because of primaries, but he also has mass transit. I would think from my own comments [that it was] a valid argument on the part of Albert that "We're 
not ready." Obviously the President is saying to me, "When will we get them done?" 
(Interruption) 
43
O'Brien --Interview VIII --40 
G: Okay. Let's talk briefly about foreign aid for 1964. Here is a brief memo that reflects a message from Bryce Harlow that he's been talking to President Eisenhower about helping. 
O: There were occasions when both presidents would look to the former president for assistance in an area of common interest, and foreign aid would be in the forefront. Each 
president regardless of party runs into this. Bryce Harlow was the conduit for both President Kennedy and President Johnson with former President Eisenhower. 
But I think the key to foreign aid in 1964 was the obvious: the change. 
G: [George] Mahon for [Clarence] Cannon? 
O: Mahon for Cannon. Yes. Of course, that created a new situation favorable to our interests and rid of a problem which had driven presidents crazy over a number of years, 
and that's Mr. [Otto] Passman. The end result is apparent: we had a relatively pleasant experience with foreign aid in 1964. By the time we got through, the authorization was 
the President's request in full and the appropriation was a relatively modest reduction. In fact, the major element of the reduction, from about 3.4 to 3.2 [billion dollars], was a 
Wayne Morse amendment in the Senate; it was not a House cut. Passman went through his usual exercise. But, without the assistance of his friend in the past he was 
unsuccessful, and you had a most acceptable foreign aid bill come down to the White House. 
It was in our time, and I'm sure in Eisenhower's time, approached in a reasonable, sensible manner; it should not be a partisan issue. Foreign aid and the debt ceiling, as I've 
said before, were the two issues that you had to face which were fair fodder for games to be played. They had domestically no broad base of support. Thus you had to depend on 
the common sense, good judgment and fairness of the Congress that would have been exercised over the years except for this irascible character. [In] 1964, foreign aid went its 
course through authorization and appropriation, with a very modest reduction in the initial request. 
To get back to Ralph Dungan's memo regarding Bryce Harlow. There was a good attitude on the part of the former President, which was reflected early in the Kennedy 
period and then with Johnson. But there was an added dimension worth mentioning now: Bryce Harlow. I don't want to repeat myself, but at the time of the transition Bryce 
Harlow couldn't have been more cooperative and helpful and I thought highly of him. We became close friends, saw a fair amount of each other over the years and communicated 
quite often. With Bryce in the position he had with Eisenhower, you had a fellow who was willing to take on a task with interest in being helpful and who had an open door to 
the former President. 
I don't know as Charlie Halleck ever became enamored with foreign aid, however. 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --41 
G: In the House vote on this foreign aid bill, I notice that the House rejected a recommittal motion that Representative [E. Ross] Adair had made--O: 
Close vote. 
G: Yes, it was a close vote; let's see, eighteen votes. And fifteen southern Democrats who later voted against passage of the bill itself were responsible for defeating Adair's motion. 
O: Not unusual. That was the assistance we were beginning to get from southern Democrats. It would be understood that they would help you on recommittal, but they wouldn't be 
there on final passage. In that way they would protect their long-standing position on foreign aid. Nobody would note that if they had that strong a position, why weren't they 
voting for recommittal? That was one of the aspects of congressional relations that was very interesting. It started early. There was a willingness, to some extent, on the part of 
many southern Democrats to be helpful where they could and not disrupt their positions on various issues. And that's a good example of their willingness to help and our total 
understanding that that was the extent of it. But it would be helpful, in fact it was imperative, we have their help at that stage on recommittal, and we could then ease by 
final passage. 
I would hope historians would note that, incidentally, when they see the voting pattern. I don't imagine any historian or student would have to think very long before 
they'd realize that this was a means of being helpful to an administration they felt friendly toward and yet not disrupt their own positions. Well, that's self-explanatory. 
G: Interesting. 
(Interruption) 
O: Clearly, the Passman opposition did not alter the basic opposition to foreign aid when it changed with the Cannon departure. As you'll note from the roll calls, it still remained a 
very close matter. What did change were all of the problems he could create in committee. When you finally got to a close-call vote on foreign aid on the House side, 
after Passman had cut it to pieces, you had a much slimmer package than you had after the change took place. So it wasn't that Passman had an impact on his colleagues' positions 
on foreign aid; his impact was felt while destroying the contents of the foreign aid proposal that ultimately went to the floor. 
(Interruption) 
My recollection is that it would be a little unusual for a cabinet member to send a memo of this nature to the President on details involving strategy on the Hill. I know this wasn't a 
common practice, and I would suspect that maybe Orville [Freeman] got his fingers burned a little bit, too, because I don't recall the details and I don't know as I ever read the 
memo. But the fact of the matter is that he ticked off Carl Albert, and it wasn't easy to 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --42 
tick off Carl Albert. Frankly, if we were engaged in that kind of a strategy session, we would have been darned sure--we, the White House--that Carl Albert was present. 
So that was one mistake Orville made, and the second one was that he was right. If that's what he wanted to discuss in great detail with the President, would he call? And 
the President probably had more important things at the moment to discuss with others. So that's all I can say about that, because he was well motivated and obviously deeply 
involved, but the normal procedure would be to move this through the congressional relations staff in the White House. That meeting would have probably had Henry Hall 
Wilson sitting there with Orville. 
But in any event, that's all I can say about it. Prerogatives are of extreme importance and always have been and I'm sure still are. 
G: Okay. This is a memo that I showed you earlier today regarding the War on Poverty. 
O: Yes. 
G: What was Johnson's attitude regarding the War on Poverty, from your perspective? 
O: By attitude, do you mean how deep was his commitment? 
G: That's part of it, and what did he think about the problem and how it could be solved. 
O: He embraced the concept when it was proposed. Even the designation of it as a war on poverty underscored his often-mentioned concern about the poor, his often-repeated 
stories about his childhood and his youth. It was his nature to become almost emotionally involved in this subject. Now, what do you do about it, how do you go about attacking it, 
and is it a war? I think the whole concept of federal involvement in a program to reduce and hopefully eliminate poverty, which would be your blue-sky objective, [was] something 
that involved a strong personal commitment on his part. 
Tape 3 of 4, Side 2 
G: It's been written that Jack Kennedy's commitment to alleviating poverty was formed while he was campaigning in West Virginia and saw the poverty there and in Appalachia. 
O: Yes. 
G: How about Lyndon Johnson? Where do you think his--? 
O: I think it came from his youth. I would have no question in my mind, having been exposed to a lot of Johnson's stories about his youth and NYA activities, that he had a 
very strong view. The difference would be that Johnson would have felt and touched poverty. It would be something that he could equate with from actual experience and 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --43 
move from there to the New Deal and all the programs. With Jack Kennedy, that was a direct confrontation in West Virginia, and I think there is a strong element of truth that he 
had an experience that shook him in the hills and valleys of West Virginia. Johnson's exposure to poverty created a deep impact, and he'd reached the point in life where he felt 
he could do something meaningful about it. With Jack Kennedy, I think it was necessary for him to have the direct confrontation and feel it and smell it and see it, and he reacted 
similarly. 
But I think that with Kennedy, however, there was an element of repayment. He felt that what West Virginians had put on the record regarding him, and their attitude 
toward him, deserved repayment. But the repayment went to the heart of the problem in West Virginia: poverty and widespread unemployment. And Kennedy became totally 
caught up in it. Johnson obviously was caught up in it, similarly, but he approached it from a different background and different experience. But they both came out at the same 
place. If you're president of the United States, it must give you a warm feeling to find yourself in a position where you can do something about a matter that's of overriding 
significance. 
I don't know how you describe Lyndon Johnson in one word in that regard, but in that and similar areas, he was constantly articulating his interest and concern for people. 
It's not an exaggeration to say that, and I ran into it so often. 
G: Did he tend to personalize it? 
O: Yes. He could where Jack Kennedy couldn't. And I think that Lyndon Johnson was very much a New Dealer. He was very much a Roosevelt man; he was a tremendous admirer 
of FDR, and he had lived through that period. I could equate with Lyndon Johnson's view of social problems, because as a kid my family and relatives and friends had many of the 
same experiences that Johnson's associates had when he was a young fellow. And we shared a strong, strong feeling about the Roosevelt era and what it meant. I think it had 
political connotations because it made us even prouder to be Democrats. 
G: Yes. Connally I think was an NYA student. Johnson was state director. 
O: So it's always been troubling to me, and Vietnam was the cause of a great deal of it. I've told you that I remember vividly a relatively minor but nevertheless significant aspect of 
civil rights in home rule for the District of Columbia, which reflected his commitment to civil rights. Yet the woods were full of people who were disbelieving. And that was a 
burden he carried. Maybe it was his nature, his personality, I don't know, which caused people to say, "Ha! He doesn't really mean that." Even in the White House, when you 
were in those battles and found his keen desire to be in the forefront battling to accomplish those objectives, how could you suggest he was putting on an act, that he didn't really 
mean it? That used to disturb me no end. He didn't need me to convince people that he was a committed person in this area. 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --44 
I think what bothered me was that [these were] people--and there were some of the staunchest advocates--who were very leery and suspicious of Johnson throughout. I 
thought it was grossly unfair. I guess that's life, too, but as I say, he doesn't need me as his defender, then or now. Let the record speak for itself. But you could have the record 
and people might still say, "Well, he did that only because he wanted to show he was a Democrat." The fact is that he had a deep personal commitment. 
G: You and Bill Moyers and Sargent Shriver met with LBJ in March of 1964, just before the War on Poverty message was issued, and supposedly LBJ did approve the package, the 
War on Poverty proposal, in this discussion with you and Shriver and Moyers. Do you recall the details of that? 
O: Not any specifics, other than the package was reviewed and he approved moving forward. I don't think there was anything new that came out of that meeting. I remember the 
meeting. It was, "Okay, now let's get moving." 
G: Do you think that he considered Shriver, who was the head of this task force, to come up with a package and a message, as the director of this War on Poverty? 
O: I think so. I don't want to suggest he specifically stated that to me, but I think that's accurate. There was a consensus among us that Shriver would be ideally suited for this 
role. 
G: This was in effect proposing to create a new administration, or a new executive office of the President. Did this create some jurisdictional problems with the other--did Bill Wirtz, 
for example, want to run the Job Corps? 
O: There may have been some of that, but I don't recall that it was overriding or became significant. 
G: Did you feel like the program had a good chance to become enacted on Capitol Hill? 
O: I don't know, because it was so new and innovative, and there was no pattern, no history in this area that you could evaluate. I don't know how much weight we put onto whether 
we could succeed legislatively or not. I think in this instance it was a matter of minimal discussion and concern because of the objective. This was something you were going to 
move forward on, and you're carving out new territory. 
G: Shriver did do a good deal of lobbying on the Hill on this himself. 
O: He certainly did. Sarge Shriver took to lobbying on the Hill like a duck to water. He's an outgoing, ebullient fellow with all kinds of drive. And he would put everything he had 
into any effort that he undertook. He was widely accepted on the Hill. I would think that perhaps no one did as much legwork on the Hill as Sarge did in this instance. He was 
indefatigable. 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --45 
G: The legislation was referred to Adam Clayton Powell's committee in the House, the Education and Labor Committee. Anything on Powell's role in this stage? 
(Interruption) 
O: It wasn't a matter of suggesting Phil Landrum; it was a matter of exploring with appropriate members of Congress this concept in its initial stage, getting a feel of attitudes 
and finding that Phil Landrum was very receptive. From the outset he evidenced an interest in the concept. 
G: Were you yourself talking to Landrum about this? 
O: I talked to him; others talked to him, and we agreed, to our utter surprise, that Phil Landrum seemed to be a fellow who not only had an open mind but seemed to be leaning 
strongly in the direction of a program. We realized that if by any chance Phil Landrum would take the lead in this, it could be just a tremendous plus for us. 
G: Because he was not known for advancing progressive social legislation? 
O: That's right. At what moment Landrum agreed, I don't remember. But I recall that labor was disbelieving. I went to the labor headquarters and met with George Meany. I believe 
Sarge may have been with me. In any event, I talked to George, told him about this coup, and he was disbelieving. Finally, by the time I left his office, he had to conclude one of 
two things: that I had just lost my head totally, or this was true. Landrum coming aboard in the leadership role was a real blockbuster. If you were to look over the House 
membership, you'd find he would be among the very last that anybody would ever suggest in this area. But that's what happened, and he stayed consistent throughout. 
G: To what do you attribute his espousal of this legislation? 
O: I honestly don't know. All I can say about Landrum [is that] I didn't find him to be the ogre that he was portrayed to be by labor. But I'm talking in human terms, because 
Landrum was a very pleasant fellow who I enjoyed. That wasn't the case with every member of Congress. I enjoyed my contacts with Landrum. I was leery of him because of 
his background, Landrum-Griffin. But I must say I found him a very easy fellow to be associated with. 
Whatever his motivation, I know this: there's no way that Phil Landrum would have taken on that task through any effort from the President or anyone else. This would 
be purely a personal decision on his part. He didn't envision that he would be in that role, but once we realized that he had a basic personal interest in pursuing it, asking him to take 
on the role was not that difficult. I'm not at all sure George Meany wound up being pleased he was doing it, but I guess he accepted that it would be a significant plus in 
getting enactment. But I'll never forget that meeting with Meany, because he just was 
49
O'Brien --Interview VIII --46 
thunderstruck. 
G: What did he say? 
O: He said he didn't believe it, and "Even if he's told you, I don't believe it." In fact, he got into a big discussion about the whole thing and refused to accept what I was telling him. 
And I had chosen to go over and meet with him to tell him and to review it with him. But he wound up by saying, "We'll see. We'll see. I'm not accepting this yet, and we'll just see 
how this plays out." 
G: Do you think that Landrum's support had to do with the poverty in his own Georgia district? 
O: Probably. Who knows? But I think it's like anything else. We were talking about Lyndon Johnson in that regard. I guess if you've been exposed to this directly in the context of 
representing people, you probably have a soft spot in your heart, and the day is going to come when the spark will be there and you feel comfortable. It's hard to figure that out in 
terms of his opposition to labor, but maybe not that hard. Talking about poverty is different than talking about organized labor and its power. It probably wasn't even on the 
same wave length in Landrum's mind. 
G: Now, since this poverty bill did cut across various jurisdictions of congressional committees, how was the decision made to refer it to Powell's Education and Labor 
Committee? 
O: The make-up of the committee. 
G: Really? You wanted to get a friendly committee, is that right? 
O: Yes. I don't recall all the names, but as difficult as Adam was to deal with as the chairman, there were any number of members of that committee whom we could look to 
quickly. 
You look at the Democratic side of that committee and you see that it's a liberal group. The Republican side would be the normal Republican situation you would run into 
on any committee. But you had Carl Perkins from Kentucky, for example. There's got to be a spark there, too. And Landrum was the big surprise factor. Then Jimmy Roosevelt 
and Frank Thompson--Topper Thompson was as liberal as he could be--[ John] Dent, [Roman] Pucinski, Dom [Dominick] Daniels, [John] Brademas, and Jim O'Hara, one of 
the solid, hard-working members of that committee whom we looked to for assistance consistently over the years. You have Hugh Carey, who was emerging as a very bright 
and able guy on the committee. Gus Hawkins. On the Democratic side, that was a very strong committee in terms of a proposal of this nature. 
G: Did any other of the committee chairmen resent not having the bill come to their 
50
O'Brien --Interview VIII --47 
committee? 
O: I don't recall that happening, but that may have something to do with the uniqueness of it. And I'm not sure at the outset that this proposal took off like a rocket. As I said earlier, 
we were carving out new territory, and I don't have recollection of serious quarrels within or among committees. 
G: Was there an effort to broaden congressional support by combining rural and urban features in the bill? 
O: Yes. That would not be an unusual approach because we're all going to be crusaders in this area. Nevertheless, the reality was that ultimately you were going to have to cope 
with how broad a base of support you could garner, and as you tried to garner support regionally or even at the state level, you also would do it in urban-rural areas. You try to 
incorporate enough in a proposal of this nature that would intrigue a broad base of membership and, therefore, support. 
G: Did LBJ help enlist congressional support on this bill? 
O: Yes, he was very much involved in this. 
G: What did he do? 
O: First of all, he gave it a priority and a lot of emphasis. He made a great deal of reference to it at leadership breakfasts, at cabinet meetings and took occasion to in public comments 
and statements. 
G: One thing, right in the middle of the hearings on the bill, he made a trip to Appalachia. Was this designed to high point the need for it? 
O: That was part of it. 
G: Did you go with him on that trip? 
O: I may have, because we obviously would have had some congressmen and senators who were from that area with us. I probably did. I went on just about every trip he took of 
that nature where there was a significant congressional presence. There was no better way to emphasize it than to make that trip. 
G: Mayor Daley came and testified on the poverty bill, and in his testimony [he] indicated that it would work a little differently in Chicago. 
O: I was trying to recall how different it would be in Chicago. But everything was different in Chicago. However, the plus was that Mayor Daley testified. He was not in the habit of 
coming to Washington and testifying. He really wasn't that interested in the Congress. 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --48 
(Laughter) 
G: How did you get him to come to Washington and do that? 
O: My recollection is that we tried to determine who might be helpful and somebody came up with Daley, but I'm not at all sure that the President didn't make a direct request to him. I 
think that's probably the case. 
G: Shriver knew him well, I guess. 
O: Yes, he did. Shriver became well acquainted with him when he was at the Merchandise Mart. 
G: You also brought in a number of businessmen to testify in favor of the bill. Do you recall--? 
O: Yes, to broaden the base, we had a task force engaged in making contact in the business community, with some degree of success. Of course, we had to give this some business 
flair in order to enlist some Republican support. 
G: Did you have to do some horse trading on this bill? For example, I notice in the outline that Representatives [W. R.] Poage and [Harold] Cooley seemed to have been holding out 
for more funds for regular FHA appropriations, and there's a suggestion that Adam Clayton Powell insisted on getting a certain amount for the OEO programs in Harlem. 
O: Yes, there was some of that. 
G: Was there? How did you deal with that? 
O: That again wasn't unusual. I don't remember Poage and Cooley specifically, but you have to recall that we were not on any easy street on this, and if there was some 
accommodation to be made, it was well worth doing. Adam spent some of his moments in Washington thinking about what he could do to be helpful to his district, I can assure you 
of that. That took a variety of forms, and he was very sensitive to any possibilities that might exist where he could get a piece of the action. 
G: Did congressmen support their own candidates for OEO job positions? 
O: I don't remember that. Job positions? 
G: Yes. 
O: At the top? 
G: Well, throughout the [agency]. 
52
O'Brien --Interview VIII --49 
O: No, I don't recall that. There may have been some of that. It would be looked upon as a new entity, a new agency, and job opportunity was there. But I don't remember any great 
pressure in that area. 
G: A few questions on the Job Corps: Edith Green pointed out right away that the Job Corps was not planned as a program for women. It was exclusively male, initially, and she had 
that amended so that there was also a women's component. Do you recall this issue? 
O: Yes, I recall Edith making quite a point of it, as a matter of fact, and rightly so. That was in the early days; we would have anticipated that up front if that were today. (Laughter) 
And we would have taken our own steps to ensure it. No, Edith made a valid point and her position was readily accepted. 
G: There was also the civil rights aspect to the question of whether Job Corps camps in the South would be segregated or integrated. Do you recall that issue and how you dealt with 
that? 
O: It was touchy and, there again, it was rare that you could totally avoid the introduction of that aspect. I don't remember how we dealt with it, but you had certain little advantages 
there. Those who would register objections--after all, this was a poverty program--would be cautious about going too far publicly. This would involve matters of internal argument 
or discussion, but even the most ardent were not in a position to publicize discrimination when you're trying to work out a program called the War on Poverty. 
G: There was also a conservation group in the Congress that wanted to have a minimum of the Job Corps sites be conservation projects run by the Forest Service or the Department 
of Agriculture. Do you remember that? I think Congressman [John] Saylor was one of the advocates. 
O: No, I don't recall. 
G: Then there was the question of the governor's veto of Job Corps camps. 
O: That became a major problem, and we compromised on that. There was some element of veto right put into the bill. That "right" became something we had to agree to or cave on, 
because it could have been extremely disruptive if we didn't work out some kind of an accommodation. Of course, that had the civil rights aspects to it, too. 
But that was something we just had to accept. That was a splendid opportunity for those in opposition or those worried about civil rights. It was a way of getting around 
the corner. Supposedly now we're in states' rights, which suddenly some people have great concern about who normally wouldn't be concerned. But you had to accept it for 
what it was; it was a maneuver. By the same token, that did provide an opportunity for people to either leave the reservation or not join the reservation. So it had to be 
53
O'Brien --Interview VIII --50 
accommodated, reluctantly, but the practical aspects dictated it and it happened. I'd prefer not to, but it did. I don't recall the exercising of any of these prerogatives particularly, as 
time went on, but there should not have been any authority in the bill for governors to make determinations. It was a political accommodation. 
Tape 4 of 4, Side 1 
G: The most controversial component of the bill was the Community Action Program. I have a number of questions on this. First, let me start with a quote. One former Senate aide 
observed that "If Congress understands Community Action, it will never get through." Did Congress understand Community Action when it passed that legislation? I think the 
point was that Congress was voting for something that they really didn't understand in terms of the--this is all based on the notion that they were enacting a program that would 
create a rival source of power, rival to the regular power structure in their districts, and that they would be working against themselves. 
O: What is this rival power structure that was being created? It would take away some of the power of whom? 
G: Of city hall or their supporters. It might create new leaders who would then run against them for Congress. 
O: I don't recall an uprising at the community level among the local power brokers. I recall that there was a considerable amount of discussion regarding it, but in the final analysis 
you're talking about power and patronage. If you're going to equate power and patronage with poverty, then the people who were equating it were on pretty thin ice. 
G: But didn't the Community Action Program to a certain extent bypass the local power structure and--? 
O: Yes, but it wasn't intended as a bypass. It was to be a coherent program. If you were going to segment this program into accommodation of every existing element of the 
so-called local power structure, there wouldn't be a program. I don't recall "bypassing" having the impact the notes apparently indicated. 
G: You observed the legislation over a period of time. Let's just break it down into component questions. Do you think that the members of Congress followed the 
development of the legislation closely and understood the contents of the bill? 
O: To the extent you would anticipate, they did. If they took a magnifying glass to the bill in terms of impact on existing structures, perhaps not. 
G: Do you think they were disillusioned later on, let's say in 1965? Did they come back and say, "What have we done?" or "This isn't what we felt we were voting for"? Did you get 
any disillusionment from them? 
54
O'Brien --Interview VIII --51 
O: There were people trying to get a piece of the action, but as far as its being adverse to political interests at the local level, I don't recall strong reactions. 
G: Okay. Family planning was one of the touchy issues associated with Community Action. How did you deal with this? 
O: It was touchy, and we anticipated how touchy it would be up front. It seemed to me that it really bordered on religious connotations, too. But if you're getting into something like 
this, you're going to be touching some sensitive nerves along the route. Whether there was a provision in the bill that was an accommodation to people concerned in that area, I 
don't remember. 
G: Church-state, the whole--O: 
Yes. But I don't recall this creating the great passions that you would normally get. I think that what was overriding here was the objective. Perhaps because it was new and 
innovative, there wasn't the attention paid within the Congress to some of the administrative aspects that would normally be the case. 
G: What was Lyndon Johnson's reaction to Community Action? Was he disillusioned by it, or did he feel like it was working as he had intended it? 
O: I think he was reasonably satisfied. 
G: He didn't explode in your presence about the operation of the program? 
O: No. 
G: The governor's veto was also an issue on the Community Action Program. Senator [Winston] Prouty introduced an amendment to give the governors a veto power over 
Community Action [projects in their states], and [Barry] Goldwater abstained on that. Do you have any knowledge of why he would have voted that way? 
O: No. Maybe you'd check on who the governor was at the time. I don't know. 
G: Well, that's as good an answer as [any]. 
O: I always look to something like that when I can't find an answer readily or I can't recall. Of course, you're talking about Barry Goldwater; you could never be sure where Barry 
would land on some things. 
G: Really? 
O: Well, he's always had strong views, and I must say my admiration for him is because he 
55
O'Brien --Interview VIII --52 
always expressed his views. You never had to seek them out; they were out front. But he could surprise you on many occasions. 
G: There was initially a land reform component of this poverty legislation that was dropped during the course of the congressional consideration. Do you recall that element of it? 
O: In the land reform, who did that antagonize? I know it was dropped, and it was dropped early on, I believe. 
G: Yes. 
O: So there must have been some strong opposition to that concept. I don't recall where it came from, probably from the established organizations that are very sensitive to any 
utilization of land that doesn't meet with their total approval or over which they have authority. 
G: Okay. Right at the time of the vote in the House on the act, there was a controversy over Adam Yarmolinsky's role in the program, what it would be and--O: 
That was the last effort on the part of the opponents: attack Adam. I remember that for its gross unfairness to Adam which, in my judgment, was a cheap shot. If they could 
deflect attention to Adam, take a little detour, maybe they could muddy up the waters. And they went at it. 
Adam was subjected to a great deal at that time. The attacks on him were an example of people reaching desperately for one other handle that might derail [the bill]. I 
don't know what the record shows or the history of this reflects, but the opponents at that stage would find it awfully difficult to attack Sarge. He had a broad base of support and, 
in fact, he was well thought of by people in opposition to the program. Adam would go along with Sarge to these meetings on the Hill. Some wise guy one day probably decided 
a shot could be taken that might bear fruit. 
G: Apparently there was a fear that the North Carolina delegation would not go along with you and you might not have the votes you needed. 
O: As I recall, and some of these things I probably get entwined with other activities, there was actually a caucus of the North Carolina delegation which we requested Cooley to 
have to try and shore up that situation. There was a fear, and I think we did--which is fairly extreme--ask the delegation to caucus as an entity. And that did occur. But that's 
my best recollection. We had no other state caucuses or delegation caucuses; that was the one I remember. 
The Yarmolinsky situation became the most significant controversy in that fight. After everything was tried by the opposition--whether you're talking about Community 
Action, family planning--it did zero in on Adam. I can't testify to Sarge committing to 
56
O'Brien --Interview VIII --53 
Adam that if he, Sarge, ran the program, Adam would be his deputy, but let's assume that happened. It became clear to us at the White House that there had to be a definitive 
position taken on Adam's future role in order to avoid ultimately losing this fight. Whether Adam was sacrificed or whether it was a totally exaggerated situation, it was 
easy to say, "Well, no, there's no contemplation that Adam will be involved." I rather think--and Sarge would have to testify to this--that it was widely assumed on the Hill 
Adam would probably be deputy. He had played a key role throughout and it would be very logical to assume he would have a key role in implementation once enactment took 
place. The opposition was able to create concern, but the concern seemed to focus on the North Carolina delegation and Harold Cooley. And Landrum was leader of this fight and 
finding that he might stumble in the last mile. There had to be an assurance on non-involvement. Maybe Landrum also demanded it, and he'd be in a position to make a 
demand of that nature because we were depending on him to carry the ball. 
I was not directly involved in any of the intrigue, but I'm sure if you asked Sarge, he would be quick to respond. Candidly, whether Adam was a sacrificial lamb or whether 
it was an exaggerated situation, it was not a difficult matter of assuring people he wouldn't be part of the program. All I know is if Sarge had publicly announced that Adam would 
be the deputy when the program was enacted, I think we still would have made it, but it would have been much more difficult. In fact, I'd never known whether Adam had any 
interest in being part of the program. 
Their antagonism toward Adam was his prior activities; he was Eastern Establishment and he was an ultraliberal in their view. 
G: He had played a role in the military desegregation, hadn't he? 
O: Yes, and as you know, [is] an extremely able fellow who you were happy to have aboard. Adam would step forward and take the personal sacrifice without even blinking an eye, 
but I thought the whole thing was a smear that was repugnant to all of us. I wasn't at a meeting where a demand was made. I know that. 
G: In the Senate, the sponsor was Pat McNamara. Was he your first choice as sponsor, or did you try to get someone else? 
O: Let me just reflect for a moment. Pat McNamara was a stalwart. When you say "first choice," was there any reason why he would not have been first choice at that time? 
There was an illness--I've lost the time frame--and I don't know whether McNamara was as active in the Senate at that stage as he had been. I don't remember. Maybe he was; 
maybe I'm thinking of another period, another time, another situation. But under normal circumstances he would have been first choice. 
G: I had a note that perhaps Lister Hill was considered. 
O: Lister Hill would not exactly fall into the Landrum category, but there again, it would be a 
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O'Brien --Interview VIII --54 
bonus. 
G: But you don't recall asking Hill to help with it? 
O: Asking him to help, sure. 
G: But to sponsor it? 
O: I don't recall that specifically, no. 
End of Tape 4 of 4 and Interview VIII 
58
    [ Part 9: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--41 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview IX*
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LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW IX 
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
3
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-20 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --1 
INTERVIEW IX 
DATE: April 9, 1986 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 1 
G: Let me ask you to first talk generally about the campaign of 1964 and discuss, if you will, the issues in that campaign as you saw them. 
O: We had anticipated--we, the Kennedy people--that 1964 would be a relatively pleasant experience. We were anticipating an easy time of it. Just before the trip to Dallas we had 
an informal gathering of some of the old hands, some of the people who had been in the 1960 campaign. The meeting was a reminder to ourselves that we weren't going to take 
anything for granted, we should have in mind planning and organizing the 1964 campaign, and we should move forward no later than the first of the year. That was the extent of 
attention to 1964. 
>From the time President Johnson became president until the summer of 1964, I don't remember any serious discussions relevant to the campaign. I remember that we 
discussed it in some detail, including the convention at Atlantic City, and then--G: 
Why was Atlantic City chosen as the convention site? 
O: It was not a particularly good convention site. 
G: Why wasn't it good? Was it too small? 
O: Yes. Also, Atlantic City had deteriorated. The hotel accommodations were barely adequate. But it wasn't a matter of overriding significance. Perhaps one of the most 
significant elements of the Atlantic City convention was the reinstatement of Walter Cronkite as anchor for CBS, which seemed to draw as much attention as the upcoming 
convention. In any event, it was a turning point in Walter's life, because he was reinstated as anchor and proceeded with the convention. 
Prior to any recollection I have regarding campaign organization, I remember Barry Goldwater's nomination in San Francisco and the controversy between the 
Goldwater people and the [Nelson] Rockefeller people. Following his nomination Goldwater paid a courtesy call on the President. He was early for his appointment, and as 
a result, asked to visit with me. We had a chat that I remember quite well, because Barry 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --2 
wanted to let me know he had followed the Kennedy campaign procedure throughout, he and his people had carefully reviewed the so-called O'Brien manual and had implemented 
it in all respects, and he therefore felt his people had done a good job at the convention. He was quite proud of this. 
We had, for the first time, in 1960 installed floor telephones and had a telephone system across the convention hall. Barry did that, but he added a new twist to it which he 
said was an improvement over our procedure. He went on from that conversation to spend a few minutes with the President--a courtesy call. He was going to oppose 
Johnson, he was the nominee of the Republican Party, but they were old friends. 
I can't recall specifically when we actually discussed the 1964 campaign in the White House. I have a recollection of a meeting or two with the President and it probably 
involved people like Jim Rowe, perhaps Terry Sanford, some of the Johnson people on the White House staff. But I'm not sure there was anything meaningful. 
We were still engaged in intensive Hill activity and it was a heavy schedule. At some point the President and I got to discussing the campaign. Now, at this point--it was 
either in the early fall or approaching the early fall--he felt strongly that I should plunge into the campaign, that there should be an organizational concept or at least it should be 
informational. We ought to determine just what it looked like across the country, what was occurring. 
I was concerned, because that meant I would be out of touch with legislative progress. My particular concern was that this communication that was ongoing with 
Wilbur Mills, this dialogue, would be interrupted by my travels. In any event, the President was adamant. He couldn't see why I couldn't handle both aspects. I had no 
alternative but to try to do just that. 
We put together a little group. One of the Reuthers traveled with me. Joe Napolitan, who was a long-time associate of mine and had been with me in the 1960 
campaign, agreed to go along. We decided to structure some regional meetings, so that in a brief period of time we would touch base in a manner that would cover just about all of 
the country. It was clear that you weren't going to pursue this to the grassroots, so we thought about it on a regional basis, and we wanted appropriate representation at these 
meetings. We went out on a series of these, and I think I ought to review this first week's memo and it will give a feeling for it. 
(Interruption) 
G: You say it's worth noting that--O: 
I don't think we started these regional meetings until late September. 
G: The Cleveland meeting was the twenty-eighth, and that's about as early a one as I have a 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --3 
record of. 
O: Yes. I think that's right. So to underscore this, you have a concern on the part of the President, shared by some of us, about the current status of his re-election. How was it 
going along? What activity was being undertaken? What impact was being made by the opposition? Frankly, this would also indicate there was little or no information from the 
Democratic National Committee or other sources or if there was, it wasn't satisfactory to the President. 
I note that with this start in late September, on October 4 I summarized reports that I had submitted to the President on the initial meetings. In this summary report on the 
first stage of this process, I advised him that I had conducted eight regional meetings involving key campaign leaders in nineteen states. That was accomplished by October 4. 
And it goes on to summarize the reports of each of the eight meetings that I had submitted to him previously. It was a state-by-state report, and it was basically upbeat. It did 
indicate that in Indiana I was saying, "You have a reasonable chance of becoming the first Democrat to carry Indiana since 1936." I go on to Kentucky and say, "Slim edge to you 
at this time; the issue is still in doubt." But the states I was talking about included Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, Missouri, Oklahoma, 
Arkansas, Kansas, Iowa, Nebraska, Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, Utah and Colorado. And in this summary report, I also discuss local races, governorships, 
Senate contests or House seats. There's an arrow on just one state, which would indicate that the President focused on that phase of the summary report, and it's the state of South 
Dakota. He probably narrowed it for emphasis because I say, "You are leading, but newspaper poll shows a ten-point drop in two-week period. Democratic candidate for 
governor far behind. I doubt he can make it." 
I concluded the summary report by saying, "We have a good chance of picking up nine Republican seats in the House in these nineteen states and a fair chance of picking up 
four more now held by Republicans." Now, that was a general observation after eight meetings covering nineteen states. You broke down the states, and this would be typical 
of the reports that were furnished subsequently. "Good chance: Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Nebraska, Utah, Colorado. Fair chance: Missouri, 
Kansas, Iowa." No, I'm sorry. Let me go back. It wasn't by state; these were congressional districts where we had a good chance of picking up seats. So that was eight 
districts. In each instance, in Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Kentucky, Wisconsin, Oklahoma, Nebraska, Utah and Colorado. Then I went on to say that we had a fair chance of picking 
up one seat each in Missouri and Kansas and two seats in Iowa. On the other side of the coin, I indicated I found eight Democratic seats in question. I felt that I thought we would 
hold them all, but there were problems in each instance. That was the two seats in Indiana, one in Kentucky, one in Arkansas, one in Colorado, and an Illinois seat in 
Chicago--two Illinois seats--and one in Ohio. 
Then I broke down the state-by-state registration, get-out-the-vote effort as I evaluated it. And then I got to the complaints that I heard in these first eight meetings. I 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --4 
list the major complaint--materials were not available. There was a lot of complaining about lack of material, lack of printed material for distribution. I go on to say this was the 
number-one complaint we heard on the trip, and the priority we have placed on getting materials into the field during the past week, which indicates that we had tried to move 
quickly on this, "should have results within a day or two." So the movement of materials out to the field obviously was in progress. 
Then I point out that labor's COPE also is putting fifty million pieces of literature out which should be at state COPE headquarters across the country by Monday, October 
6. Then I recommend that all materials available to the national committee be sent into the field at once without worrying about payment, because the procedure of the national 
committee was to secure payment for the material from the state organizations to defray the cost of printing and preparing this material. I simply say that the material has been 
produced, let's get it into the hands of the voters. We're going to have to pay for it eventually, whether it is being used effectively or moldering in a warehouse. 
Then I get to the issues, and the bomb is the biggest issue by far. Voters are frightened of Goldwater and don't want him in the same room with the nuclear trigger. 
That was clear in that first week of travel. The fear generally across the country was not of Lyndon Johnson or what he might do or not do. It was the fear of Goldwater. 
I say, "Interestingly enough, 90 per cent of the campaign leaders we talked with were critical of the television spot." This was a very controversial matter which, frankly, I 
was in a sense part of, because the television spot that is referred to, [the one] showing the little girl pulling petals off the daisy, caused great controversy, and it was one of several 
spots that were done by Tony Schwartz, in New York. Tony is an extremely creative fellow with a national reputation. His strength was in spots rather than in half-hour 
shows. He was amazing. 
G: Now, as long as you're on the subject of this commercial, let me ask you to discuss it. It's my impression that it didn't air very long at all, that you pulled it off the air right away. Is 
that [right]? 
O: Yes, I ran into situations somewhat like this in a later campaign, and I think I am very much a cynic in that regard. You determine whether you are going to take one real punch, 
settle for the punch, get to the dressing room, leave the building. But this was but one of a series of spots, and all of them were hard-hitting. We had one, as I recall--these were all 
Tony Schwartz' spots--of Goldwater with a good portion of the Northeast of the United States being cut off and floating out into the Atlantic, which went to Goldwater's 
references to regions of the country. I can't suggest to you that we put the daisy spot on anticipating the reactions to it, but we certainly felt at the time it was a hard-hitting spot 
and it went to the subject and you didn't have to have an imagination to get the point. 
G: What was LBJ's reaction to it, do you recall? 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --5 
O: I don't, except that I'm sure he reacted. I said it then and there's no reason to retract it now, just to repeat the paragraph: "Interestingly enough, 90 per cent of the campaign 
leaders we talked with were critical of the television spot showing the little girl pulling petals off a daisy, but it is my candid opinion that this ad did more to crystallize public 
opinion against Goldwater than any other single tool we are using." It was my opinion, and I think that really is what happened. We got the advantage of the impact and 
withdrew the spot, and the end result was it did focus a great deal of public attention on Goldwater's positions. 
G: Why were your leaders critical of it? 
O: I think that they got critical comments saying, "Gosh, that's too tough. That's rough, that's kind of mean." But while people are saying that, they've seen it. Even while some of your 
own people get a little bit nervous, feeling that it could wind up counterproductive, the impact has been made and there's no problem withdrawing it. And that way you satisfy 
your own workers. Now, that's a natural tendency in a campaign. Your own people are apt to react strongly to hard-hitting spots. We had that with [Spiro] Agnew and then 
Nixon at a later date, by the same Tony Schwartz. 
G: Oh, really? 
O: Yes. 
G: Which spots in particular? 
O: We had one in the [Hubert] Humphrey campaign? That's the one. I'm chuckling as I'm trying to answer, because we had one where a fellow was just sitting. Incidentally, these 
spots were made at very, very little cost. They were done by Tony in his own facilities. Maybe his son is in it or his wife and the cost factor was really minimal. For example, this 
one was a simple showing of a fellow sitting in a chair watching a television set. And on the set came "Agnew for vice president," and the fellow started to laugh. And he laughed 
hysterically. And that was the spot. 
(Laughter) 
And there was another one. You watched the screen, the line across the screen, and you hear the heart beating. You listen to that for a few seconds, and all of a sudden, 
underneath it, "Agnew for vice president, a heartbeat from the presidency." 
And then we had one on George Wallace. Tony came up with the idea of a fellow going in to vote. He started talking to himself--he's standing in the line waiting to go in to 
pull the curtain and vote--and he is saying, "I've always been a Democrat, always voted Democrat. I think, I think I can"--what was the fellow's name that was the candidate for 
vice president with Wallace? 
9
O'Brien --Interview XI --6 
G: Oh, Curtis LeMay, wasn't it? 
O: --that real bomb-thrower. And "Oh, this time I think I'll vote for Wallace and LeMay." Well, anyway he went through this for a few seconds, and then it came time for him to go 
in and vote, and the last thing: "No, it's Wallace and LeMay." He pulled the curtain, and the whole thing disintegrated. (Laughter) That one we didn't use. 
(Laughter) 
G: It didn't air? 
O: No. 
G: Was the 1964 campaign significant in the development of this sort of media political advertising? Was there anything new in 1964 that you hadn't done in 1960? 
O: Yes. There was more attention directed to spots, and there was a tendency to consider that television promotion of a candidate probably should go to a bio, a half-hour show. 
We did those. But the utilization of television spots was relatively new and the creative aspect was relatively new. 
Tony was in the forefront. To this day Tony Schwartz is considered the most creative man in America in this area. Every election a candidate winds up with a contract 
with Tony Schwartz, and he must go to Tony Schwartz' office because Tony will never travel. And the President of the United States, Jimmy Carter, used to sleep on Tony's 
sofa--as president--while Tony was doing some of his work overnight. 
But in any event, we ran smack into what was a surprise to us, obviously, the degree of adverse comment regarding the girl and the petals. 
G: How did the Republican campaign react to it? 
O: Very strongly. 
G: Did they feel it was unfair? 
O: Oh, yes. 
G: How was the decision made to focus on this nuclear issue, the--? 
O: It was handed to us on a silver platter by Goldwater comments. Barry has the tendency to shoot from the hip and he would make some of these God-awful comments that could be 
interpreted as wild and woolly. Of course, we just played off it. Barry Goldwater had a constituency, it was a little like, in reverse, the constituency [George] McGovern had later. 
It wasn't very broad but it was very intense, dedicated, and active. He was raising a great 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --7 
deal of money. And that was the emergence of Ronald Reagan, in the Goldwater campaign. Reagan went on national television to do a national fund-raising drive for 
Goldwater, and it was effective. I forget what was reported as raised off that half-hour, but it was substantial. But there again it was deep but narrow--Goldwater and his 
campaign activity and particularly his own personal approach to campaigning and the statements he was making. We just sat there and felt that we just couldn't let this go by, 
this was too good. 
G: This was really less than two years away from the Cuban missile crisis. Do you think that the sobering impact of the missile crisis caused people to be more concerned about nuclear 
war than they have been since? 
O: I wouldn't overemphasize that aspect of it, for what you had were the Goldwater comments. They bordered on the irrational in the view of many people; it scared people. 
And so we wanted to make sure that they were properly scared. 
G: Do you think that these spots were exaggerated, that, in fact, Goldwater would not have been as reckless as depicted by them? 
O: Probably, but that was nothing unfair, because we were just holding him to his own statements. He was like a fellow that comes charging out of the West on a wild horse, and 
he was going in every direction and making statements almost daily that were usable. 
The interesting thing about it all is that this one spot, since the advent of television spots in American politics, remains the most remembered, to this day. I've heard it 
referred to within the last year. And there's a tendency to refer to it as a horror story. It became more unfair and more of a horror story as the years went on. But it was scary, the 
Republicans were saying, "Why are you scaring the children of America? Kids see that spot. This is terrible. They can't sleep at night. They're having nightmares." You didn't 
have to use the spot anymore, the discussion relevant to it became so widespread that--G: 
For the record, the spot depicted a little girl pulling petals off a flower and then switched to a countdown of a nuclear explosion, is that right? And then showed the bomb going 
off. 
O: Yes. She was a very cute little girl, too. 
G: Another distinction between the two candidates that year was the role of the federal government, and particularly on such issues as social security, Medicare, the public power 
projects like REA and the TVA. How did these shape up as issues? 
O: You could incorporate some of those in broad, general issues. For example, while I recount the reactions I got uniformly to the daisy spot, you go on to another phase. We 
had requests in almost every state for more positive material in our television spots. And "I have assured everyone that we'll take a positive approach in the closing weeks of the 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --8 
campaign." Now that was our plan in any event. You stir the waters with the daisy spots and that sort of thing. Now you've got people talking about the campaign, and you've 
created interest, debate and discussion, and in some areas, bitterness. 
People know now that an election is upcoming. So now you move to the positive. Now we're talking about perhaps six or seven weeks before the election. We were going 
to be there just once wherever we were, we were going to have one opportunity, and we wanted to cover as much ground as possible. Responsibility in government. At that point, 
you have a nation at peace. I think, relatively speaking, there wasn't any great controversy about Vietnam. You were in a good position. You had a nation that was basically 
prosperous, a nation which people felt had done a satisfactory job of preparedness, "a sense of security about you" directed to the President, "insecurity about Goldwater." 
Well, that goes back to Goldwater having created this feeling of insecurity, which he had done on his own. 
"In farm areas, the REA issue is very strong and should be exploited more than it has been." Social security and Medicare: the fact of the matter is that while we had not 
gotten the job done, we certainly had succeeded in keeping a high profile on Medicare and there was a great deal of senior citizen activity ongoing. And then, "Many Republicans 
who normally would vote the straight ticket indicate that they are supporting you because they are frightened of Barry"--here we go again--" but will support Republican candidates 
in state and congressional contest." 
G: Did the doctors oppose you because of Medicare? Did you get a large opposition from AMA? 
O: Yes. Very strong opposition, organized opposition. 
G: How did it assert itself? 
O: They were heavy contributors to Goldwater. They were engaged in a lot of media activity and scare tactics on Medicare. The American Medical Association was in a good position 
to rev up its troops, because of all groupings in society, traditionally doctors know less about politics, have less interest in it, less interest in government and are very naive. They 
were told that this was the communist revolution that was going to destroy them and they would no longer be able to function in a democratic society. This was the thrust of the 
AMA program and these doctors bought it hook, line and sinker. Some of the finest doctors in America were screaming and hollering, sincerely believing that they were going 
to be destroyed and the practice of medicine would be destroyed in this country, as we knew it. That was a very strong but limited area of opposition. 
G: How about the public power issue and such things as the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Rural Electrification Administration? How important were these as issues, either for 
you or against you? 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --9 
O: They were issues for us, but they were basically regional. The reaction, even when you are in a favored position, is not very extensive. But it's helpful, and it can be particularly 
helpful, obviously, in hopefully picking up some congressional seats. While it's in discussion in a limited number of areas of the country, it's very significant in those areas. 
You've now tried to evaluate nineteen states. What are you concluding? You've talked about the spots, you've talked about "let's accent the positive," you've talked about 
a basic--that there is no material out there. How do you expect these people to arouse interest in the election and get out the vote if you don't have any basic tools? And so we 
take immediate corrective action, which wasn't difficult because there was a warehouse loaded with material. The DNC would not ship the material until they had received 
payment for it. As always, many of these party entities at the local level are not in a position to expend that kind of money. So they're not sending in the checks and they're 
not getting the material. We made one quick let's unload that warehouse, get it out in the field, and we'll worry about payment later on. That was a challenge that was easy to 
handle. 
This summary of the first eight meetings brings it into focus. You've talked about the issues that favor him and that should be emphasized. You have concluded that your 
material is on the way and the daisy concept is being eliminated. Then you get to the issues that are negative or unfavorable. This report indicates the political climate. You 
are saying, "During the first two days of this trip, we had five meetings involving seven states. Nothing was mentioned in any of these meetings about hate literature. So 
obviously they haven't accomplished a national distribution." 
The moment we moved west of Chicago, however, we began getting hit with warnings about the effect of the three hate books: A Texan Looks at Lyndon; A Choice, 
Not an Echo, and None Dare Call It Treason. "These books were mentioned by campaign leaders from the remaining twelve states we visited. The situation is worse in 
Oklahoma. It is safe to say that these books are being widely distributed by the Republican Party as well as by [John] Birchers and other right-wing organizations. They 
are available at all newsstands. They are being read and having some impact. At every meeting our campaign leaders agreed the books are hurting; you should not answer any of 
the charges; some weapons should be placed in the hands of our people to counteract the effect of the books." 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 2 
O: "I have recommended that the national committee prepare detailed profiles on the authors, emphasizing their right-wing extremist background. Also, reprint the Drew Pearson 
column tearing [J. Evetts] Haley to pieces"--he was the author of one of these books--" and any similar articles critical of the books. Get this information into the hands 
of each state organization immediately." 
G: Do you know the background of the Pearson story? 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --10 
O: No. 
So I sum it up, "Apparently a national effort is being made to get these books in the hands of voters, particularly in the non-industrial, marginal states of the Midwest, 
West, and South." 
G: Actually, there is some irony in the Pearson expose, because some of the material in the Haley book came from Drew Pearson. (Laughter) Reflecting that roller-coaster 
relationship that Pearson and Johnson had all those years. Any insights on that? 
O: No. I'm not too sure, frankly, when I headed out on this tour that I had focused on these books. That might have been brought to your attention, but you paid little heed, because 
you have other things to do that you consider more important. You don't have time to dwell on this sort of thing. So I was taken aback by the degree of comment made by "our 
own people," regarding the books and their concern relative to them. 
G: Was there an issue-by-issue refutation of any of these books developed by the--? 
O: Yes. Material was developed, but it was hastily done and it wasn't widely distributed. There was at least an effort made to counteract this: the Drew Pearson column and a little 
effort on the part of DNC to have discussions with selected members of media to see if they couldn't stir up some comments about the authors. 
G: I wonder if there was a residual impact on this literature, this right-wing literature. Do you think it's something that conditioned the public thinking over a period of years rather 
than just a [inaudible] thing? 
O: I doubt it. While I was taken aback with the extent of the comment and expression of concern, nevertheless I don't think I concluded it was monumental in its impact on the 
campaign. 
G: You didn't notice the same sentiment out there in 1968 when you were working for other candidates; they were not invoking the--? 
O: No. 
G: How about an impact on foreign policy? Do you think any of these books caused the administration to be more sensitive to criticism from the right in foreign policy? 
O: I don't think so. There again, I don't think that you can avoid the comparison. What was the aftermath of the McGovern campaign on the winning candidate? Did it have an impact 
on him? McGovern was in a narrow, deep, dedicated, support situation, but emphasis on narrow. Exactly the situation which Goldwater experienced in 1964. That's why you had 
overwhelming defeats in both instances. There are two hundred and forty million people, 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --11 
there are going to be millions voting, and you have to establish the broadest base of support possible. So if you're going to repeatedly direct your attention to that base, you're 
talking to people that are already with you. The more you do of that, the less opportunity you have to expand your base, and consequently you're a loser. And this is exactly what 
was happening. And so whether you have scurrilous material, the fact is that the impact was negligible. My bet would be that four out of five people who read one of those books 
were committed to Barry Goldwater and it had no voter impact to speak of, because they were already in the Goldwater camp. 
When you've covered nineteen states in eight regional meetings, you've listened to local and regional party leaders, labor leaders and your emphasis is on these books, it 
indicates that you're in pretty darned good shape. You go on to other issues which are having some effect: the Baker and Estes scandals, Bobby Baker and Billy Sol Estes. You 
picked up an occasional comment relative to them. In that same category, Life magazine's fourteen million dollar estimation of your personal wealth. Well, there were some 
comments in that area. Backlash in some of the border states, Arkansas and Oklahoma particularly, and you--G: 
This is backlash against the civil rights legislation? 
O: Yes. You were finding a little of that. 
G: Well, surely there must have been some of that in the Deep South as well. 
O: Yes, but really at this point I'm not in the Deep South. 
G: Oh, you hadn't gotten there yet. 
O: I specifically mentioned Arkansas and Oklahoma because they were included in these meetings. 
G: How about in any of the northern states or midwestern states? 
O: No. 
G: No backlash there. Was LBJ disturbed about the hate literature? 
O: I guess. 
G: You don't recall his reaction? 
O: When it happens to you, it isn't overreaction at all. 
G: One of your notes from one of the meetings indicates that this literature was targeted specifically at Protestant ministers and airline personnel. Did you find this to be true? 
15
O'Brien --Interview XI --12 
O: Yes. We were interested to find their distribution procedures--they had gotten it into some of the airlines; they had gotten it as a pass-out, through some airline employees, to 
travelers. And, of course, they went to the conservative, Birch-leaning ministers, from their point of view an appropriate place to achieve dissemination of the material. 
G: Did you do anything to counter these particular distribution points? 
O: No. This one paragraph, "No one questions your legislative record or your ability to serve as president." And I think that sums up the generally prevailing public attitude at that 
point. And then the other sentence in that same paragraph: "Their attacks are based solely on emotional issues, and it is difficult to fight emotion with logic." So you are talking 
about a little touch of civil rights backlash. The Republicans' latest campaign device, quote, "Well, at least Barry's honest," so they were trying to personalize the campaign, 
they were lacking anything substantive in terms of attacking his record or his capacity to be president. 
And I go on: "In the labor section"--and I was tremendously impressed, and it's worth noting that. We're talking about 1964 and the job labor had done in that past year 
and a half on voter registration, and the inherent strength of COPE as a political entity, the political arm of labor. That was toward the high water-mark of labor's impact on national 
elections, and--G: 
Was it more than it had been in 1960? 
O: As much. They were riding well. Labor's impact began to deteriorate in 1968. It was the labor membership that deserted to George Wallace, and from then on they were never able 
to recoup, to deliver their membership en masse. It became segmented. The tendency of any member of organized labor today has been to make his or her mind up and not 
consider that he she owes some allegiance to a leader that tells them what they should do. 
But Roy Reuther, who was traveling with us--Walter Reuther's brother, an extremely able and active fellow in the labor movement--was purposely on the team that 
traveled with me, because we were going to have labor representation at all these meetings. 
G: The organization in the field that you would work with in these various states, to what extent was it Johnson's own grassroots organization? To what extent was it the old 
Kennedy organization? To what extent was it a new organization made up of labor as the foot soldiers? 
O: It was basic state-county-local organizations that would run the gamut as to competency and ability. It was not a Kennedy organization or a Johnson organization. It was 
supposedly the party structure. We were not enamored with the party structure in 1960. That's why we went out and organized as we did in the Kennedy campaign, which 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --13 
paralleled--that's at least what we claimed--the party structure. We enhanced the party structure, we claimed, but in actuality we created our own structure. We had done that in 
Massachusetts initially. That was the only way that Jack Kennedy could ever have defeated Henry Cabot Lodge, because dependence on the Massachusetts state committee 
or city and town organizations in Massachusetts would have doomed you. And it's true in the country, there were just spots of really good, solid organization. In my years in 
national politics, I found that to be the case and I'm sure it's the case today. 
If Lyndon Johnson was seeking election in 1964, and you had a tough contest and I was his campaign director, I would have insisted early on, two years before an election at 
least, that we put in place a national grassroots campaign organization, utilizing the existing organizations where they were viable, but implementing them or supplanting 
them, depending on the requirements, so that you truly would be directing a national presidential campaign through the campaign's national headquarters and in concert with 
the Democratic National Committee, but you would control the Democratic National Committee. Everything would be under the direction of the campaign team of the 
candidate. Now, you're trying to determine where you can take some immediate and direct actions that might be helpful. 
One of the advantages was the role of labor, because labor had been engaged in a major registration drive. The Democrats who were meeting with the county chairmen 
were quick to tell us how impressed they were with what labor was doing in their area. So labor was carrying on a great deal of the leg work, and it was working out well. There 
was a close relationship between COPE and the Democratic National Committee. 
I notice I make specific reference to Matt Reese, who was responsible for this coordination between the DNC and COPE. Matt Reese was a long-time Kennedy hand, 
who had surfaced as an important member of our campaign organization in West Virginia in the West Virginia primary in 1960. 
G: What happened to the Kennedy organization in 1964? 
O: You try to bolster the Democratic National Committee, which has now become yours if you win the election. The Democratic National Committee is under the direction of the 
party leader, who is the president. And that would be the source of continuity because you would meld, which did not happen. Historically you'll find that's the failure, that you 
succeed after a massive effort and you don't ensure the permanency of that success. You go about your business of governing and you leave the DNC pretty much to its own 
devices. All politics flows from the White House. In the final analysis, the DNC is designated to implement wherever you feel is appropriate. 
If you're the out-party, you have one terrific problem, because the titular head does not have the muscle to ensure improving organization or maintaining organization. 
Consequently, I have never seen the Democratic Party, through its nominal national entity, the Democratic National Committee, in a position of strength, financial and otherwise. I 
17
O'Brien --Interview XI --14 
was national chairman twice, and I saw what happens when you're the chairman of the party and it's the out-party. That was much more challenging to be chairman under those 
circumstances [than] to be chairman when your party is in the White House. 
G: Was Kennedy's attitude toward the DNC after he was in the White House roughly the same as Johnson's or did they have different--? 
O: About the same. I remember somebody saying, "Gosh, maybe we ought to have the national chairman attend cabinet meetings." Well, it never happened. There should be 
some support emanating from here for the DNC and there should be a recognition that the president is on top of it. He is the party leader; that's one of his hats, and as party leader 
he assumes responsibility to ensure that there's a strong Democratic National Committee. You're well-meaning; nobody purposely says, well, let's forget the Democratic National 
Committee. Never have I seen a situation where I would be comfortable with the Democratic National Committee on an ongoing basis. Now, if somebody made reference 
to the fact that Jim Farley attended cabinet meetings; he was postmaster general as well as national chairman. After all, my first and primary interest, that got me into politics, was 
organization: the ability to put together groups of people who in turn could put together other groups of people who in turn could get people interested in the process and get them 
registered and vote. That's the name of the game. But organizationally I've never seen it, in even our best times, as it should be in terms of a national organization. And I don't 
think it's any different today than it was then. 
G: Was there an actual campaign manager for Johnson in 1964? Was there someone who had overall authority over the campaign? 
O: No, I think that I probably came the closest to it, because I was the only one that was engaged nationally in any activity in the campaign. (Laughter) 
G: How about Dick Maguire, or Cliff Carter or anybody? 
O: Well, they were around. I guess both of them--I don't know whether Carter and Maguire were both over at the national committee or Dick was still in one of the agencies. But the 
answer is that--and it's no reflection on anybody--I was charged to take over. It wasn't President Johnson saying to me, "Why don't you call in the people that are running the 
campaign and take their measure." Not at all. He was saying, "Nobody has advised me on what the state of the campaign is. Do everything you can, and in a relatively brief 
period of time see if we can't maximize whatever is available to us." It was as simple as that. 
But, you see, we did try to get it into an aspect of coordination even at that late stage. 
G: How much of a problem was the financing in 1964? 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --15 
O: Well, there shouldn't have been any problem. Whatever monies were necessary for media were there. You've got an incumbent president, and why should there be any financial 
problems? The chief concerns on funds were that the states wanted to know if they're going to receive any DNC money and if they were, when would they receive it. Now, that 
indicates clearly on October 4 that there hasn't been any coherent distribution of funding for campaign activities. If they are not going to get any, they want a quick answer. "I 
have emphasized that chances are remote," because clearly there was no provision for this. "We have serious deficit problems, too," I would say. That's part of the reverse sales 
pitch. 
G: But you really did have plenty of money, is that right? 
O: No, I don't think so. There had been no attempt to garner money. The DNC didn't have any money. 
G: But for the President's campaign, was that well financed? 
O: There wasn't any campaign. 
G: Well, he traveled around the states, you had TV spots. 
O: Yes, well, we financed them as the need arose, and that's all you were doing. 
G: You had all the costs of materials. 
O: I am saying to these people in late September, "Don't anticipate any flow of money of any significance. We're going to expect you to handle this at the local level." Then I get into 
something that refreshes my memory. I go on to say, "Release of funds tied up within the state." In several states money that has been raised in the state is tied up within the state. 
Now, that was fund raising undertaken in some states in the interest of the national ticket, probably local candidates, too. And it was laying there. Now these campaign leaders who 
felt that this money in reality belonged to the national campaign were asking me for permission to spend this money on their state campaigns. The money was tied up. 
Apparently there wasn't a coherent policy of funneling this money back to a national campaign organization. 
Then I say, "I talked with Maguire on this before starting this trip. He advised me to make judgments and recommendations, and I plan to sit down with him when I return 
to go over the financial problems of each state on a state-by-state basis. In the meantime, I have one recommendation to which I should like you to give serious consideration. And 
that is, immediate cash assistance to congressional candidates in close races that might well be the impetus needed for unseating several Republicans. If the money comes from 
you, these candidates unquestionably will feel some obligation to you for your help. I recommend a budget of approximately two hundred thousand dollars"--that's pretty 
modest--" and pumping this cash directly into selected congressional campaigns. The 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --16 
money could be delivered to the candidates in your name. This procedure is anticipated by the DNC and should move immediately to be effective." And, incidentally, that was 
implemented. 
G: Did it affect his relations with the Congress, particularly any of these members that were elected? 
O: Yes, it's helpful. We sent couriers to distribute these funds appropriately to the districts that I selected. They were advised the President was aware of their campaign and wished 
them all the best and wanted to be able to be of help. 
G: Do you know how many of those people won? 
O: In our records somewhere we had an evaluation of this. 
G: Let me ask you to compare fund raising during this time in 1964 as opposed to 1960, [for] the same time period. Did Kennedy and Johnson have different ways of raising funds? 
Did their monies go for different things? Did they come from different sources? 
O: Well, it'd come from basically similar sources. You're still in the era of the fat cat. Most of your fund raising came from those sources. What's the motivation of a fat cat? With 
Kennedy, if he becomes president, I'll know him. With Johnson, it's a much stronger position. He is president, and he's going to be re-elected, so I'd better make an effort. It 
was much more difficult to raise money in 1960 than it would be in 1964. 
G: Did a fear of Goldwater make fund raising easier for you? Did you get Republican funds? 
O: The fear they'd have is that they might not be on the record with the President as he continued in office and it might be noted that they hadn't been participants to the degree 
that we thought they should be. For the Democratic Party, it's always been much more difficult to raise money than the Republican Party, under any set of circumstances, for a 
national campaign. That was the heart of the motivation for the dollar check-off. 
G: Johnson had been a friend of Israel for a number of years. Did he do better with the Jewish vote than Goldwater? 
O: With the vote? 
G: Well, the fund raising, excuse me, than otherwise? 
O: I don't recall, either, in that area. The fact of the matter is that the Jewish community is of paramount importance to the Democratic Party in terms of fund raising as well as basic 
support. There's a Republican constituency out there that makes money readily available to Republican candidates, and it overwhelms a Democratic candidate nationally. I've 
never attempted to break down the list of major contributors to the Democratic Party or 
20
O'Brien --Interview XI --17 
the Johnson campaign or Kennedy campaign in terms of whether they're Jewish or non-Jewish. But I can say this, that it's of overriding importance to the Democratic 
Party--the financial support of the Jewish community. It's substantial; it extends way beyond their numbers. And that is all the way back to Roosevelt, if not before. 
The Jewish American is apt to be a Democrat, a liberal by nature. Large numbers of them are in position to be financially supportive, and they are most willing to do so. If 
you're taking the list of major contributors, start at ten thousand and up. Today I guess a major contributor wouldn't be a ten-thousand-dollar contributor, but in 1960 and 1964 
you would clearly put in your little private file the name of a fellow that contributed ten thousand or more. There's no question in my mind that the Jewish representation in that 
file would far exceed their numbers in terms of vote. 
The Jewish population is probably 3 per cent. They vote in strength. You take that small community of six million or so in a population of two hundred and forty million, 
and the economic level of that group is far higher than the economic level of the country. Then you add their interest in liberal programs, and the Democratic Party's traditional 
position in terms of Israel. You add that up, and that's a major source of the financing of the Democratic Party campaign activities; always has been. 
G: What was the role of the President's Club in fund raising in 1964? 
O: I have never been enamored with fund raising. I resisted all through my years in politics being directly involved with fund raising. I never liked that aspect of politics, but I 
recognized it was an essential element of it. 
G: How could you keep from being involved? 
O: I never solicited funds. If I was directing a national campaign, I would expect there were those in the campaign that I would look to for the necessary financing to carry out my 
programs. But they were not to look to me as a source of financing. That was the same when I was national chairman and Bob Strauss was treasurer. Bob and I had an 
understanding. Bob's job was to raise the money to keep that office moving, and I made the decisions on how we expended it. 
If you were to select one person, I think the fellow that emerged in 1960, again in 1964, was Arthur Krim. Arthur Krim was an able, innovative fellow. He has a 
tremendous reputation as a fund raiser in the academic community, particularly at Columbia, and in all kinds of worthy causes, as well as a political fund raiser. He was the 
catalyst for fund raising that extended through 1960, 1964, and 1968. That was a role that Arthur was willing to accept. He was looked to by people who were in a position to 
contribute substantially. They would react to Arthur's pleas, and he was able to structure fund raising events that were extremely productive. 
There were any number of people that were major contributors to the Democratic 
21
O'Brien --Interview XI --18 
Party. In 1968 in a desperate situation in the Humphrey-Nixon [campaign], you wound up with probably twenty-five people who carried the burden of the last three weeks of that 
campaign, which represented 50 per cent of the budget we had planned. Consequently, we lost it with Nixon. I was intimately involved because it was a desperate financial 
situation, tough from the outset. 
But you have been talking about 1964, and Lyndon B. Johnson could call on Arthur Krim at any hour and Arthur Krim would respond positively and with enthusiasm. 
Now there are others who are known in the party. In 1968 the major source of fund raising was Dwayne Andreas. He was a close personal friend of Hubert Humphrey's. 
They knew each other forever. He was a tremendous admirer of Hubert's. He was directly involved in every aspect of the Humphrey campaign, and he was responsible for a 
great deal of the fund raising. Twelve or so people met perhaps three or four weeks before the election in 1968. I attended that luncheon with Hubert, where a plea was made 
to these people to defray the three million dollar cost of the remaining three weeks of the campaign. That was the minimal that would allow us to have a campaign for the 
remaining three weeks, and that meant cutting your six million dollar budget for the last three weeks in half. It was in Dwayne Andreas' suite at the Waldorf and Dwayne hosted 
the luncheon. From that luncheon came the funding of the three million dollars. 
G: That's an expensive lunch. 
O: Yes. But these were dedicated people. They loved Hubert. They were wealthy Democrats and they did it. If they hadn't, we wouldn't have been on television the last 
three weeks. There would have been no campaign. 
In the financing of campaigns, the fund-raising aspect, I was never intimately involved. I didn't sit with finance committees or develop strategy in soliciting money. 
That was always left to others. 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 1 
G: This is a good point. 
O: Over my years in national politics, the inadequacy of political organization always hit me. You would constantly hear from media about party organization, party structure, party 
bosses and all this sort of thing, and how well organized elements of the party were across the country. 
But I can say, having traveled this country extensively in many elections and in my role as national chairman, the most impressive organization was Philadelphia, chaired by 
Bill Green, who had statewide influence in Pennsylvania and had an organization in Philadelphia that actually registered voters every day of the year. It had a budget, had a 
headquarters building, and had complete control of the Democratic Party in Philadelphia. 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --19 
I remember being asked by Bill to address a luncheon of the party organization one day in Philadelphia. Everyone in that luncheon meeting signed his or her name at the 
door. There were two people, one on each side of the door, to log them in. Every judge in Philadelphia was present, every congressman, every officeholder of any kind. Bill 
Green made all of the decisions, and when it came to election day you can be sure that the maximum vote for Democratic candidates in Philadelphia was at the polls. That was 
organization. 
In Chicago, Cook County, the [Richard] Daley organization was certainly comparable. In addition, you had Daley as mayor, and he wore two hats as county 
chairman. I met with Dick Daley in his office of county chairman; I met with Dick Daley in his office as mayor. It was organized to the hilt. 
Another organization which I had exposure to over the years emanated from Albany, Upstate New York. It was a county-wide organization. The mayor of Albany 
and county leaders maintained that organization, and that was a full-time, broadly structured, well-financed organization. 
The fourth organization was not in that context of a so-called party organization with all the patronage aspects. It was an issue-oriented organization, extremely 
impressive, and that was the D-F-L [Democratic-Farm-Labor] in Minnesota. 
G: Really? 
O: That organization was most impressive. It did a lot of organizing around the issues, meetings across the state consistently that were issues-oriented. While I'm sure patronage 
existed, that didn't seem to be pre-eminent. There was this commitment to social progress. 
There were in other parts of the country organizations which had measures of control. The party organization in Indiana, for example, where licensing and registration 
of cars was the party province. Across Indiana, if you won the election the licensing office [would] receive a fee from every license. And every employee of the state contributed 2 
per cent of his or her salary to the organization every year. So in that context it was organized. 
I'm sure I've overlooked some pockets of organization. I'm talking about my observations and pointing to Philadelphia, Cook County in Illinois, one county in Upstate 
New York, and the Democratic-Farm-Labor organization in Minnesota. 
G: During what time in Minnesota? The sixties? 
O: Yes, the sixties. Think of the governors that they'd had in Minnesota and the members of Congress from Minnesota. When I first met Fritz Mondale he was a county chairman in 
Minnesota, and he came up through the organization, just as a fellow in Philadelphia or 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --20 
Chicago, but it was a different type of organization. There were existing entities all over the country, but we're talking about organization as I would conceive it. 
G: Was Bill Green's as personal an organization as Daley's was? 
O: Yes. 
G: What happened to it after Green's death? Did it continue to work effectively? 
O: Yes. There was a successor to Green who then became mayor. Green's son became mayor later and he served a couple of terms. Bill, Jr., succeeded his father in Congress. 
You would always know in your head counts how to list the members of the Philadelphia delegation or the members of the Cook County delegation to Congress. 
There was the rare exception of a fellow who went off the reservation at the time of the civil rights legislation in the House Judiciary Committee and he was summarily retired by 
Mayor Daley. 
I think it should be in terms of issue orientation. That's why I particularly admired the Minnesota organization and enjoyed the relationship with them, because they fulfilled, 
as I saw it, the true function of a party organization--constantly enlisting support, registering, get-out-the-vote but at the same time placing focus on the issues, on the goals 
and aspirations of the party, on the welfare of the people of Minnesota, focusing on national issues. Their financing would not be fat-cat. They would have lunches or picnics 
or what have you to raise the necessary funds to maintain this activity. 
I think you have to be concerned about a two-party system. Always when I was active, I would have loved to have seen a well-organized Democratic and Republican 
Party across this country. I think it would have enhanced voter participation and contributed to a reduction in the widespread cynicism, if done properly, as the 
Democratic-Farm-Labor Party did in Minnesota. And I think we'd have all been better for it. 
But that isn't the case. Oftentimes we're talking at a time when there's been a series of scandals in the city administration here in the city of New York, and clearly a 
contributing factor to all of that is a one-party system--the fact that these boroughs in the city of New York are overwhelmingly Democratic, the fact that the officeholders and 
leaders in the city, elected, are elected through a nominating process and generally through a selection process of county leaders. There is just a charade of a voting process. Once 
that selection is made, or the designation is made--and that includes judges and everything else in this city--the voters then go to the polls and there's no choice. And the arrogance 
that results from all of that. People know that they have complete control, and they don't have to go to the voter. The tendency then is to consider it your prerogative and you do 
as you please. And that leads to all this taking place here in New York right now. 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --21 
I never accepted the premise that under our national two-party system it serves the public interest to have one party extremely weak. The Democratic Party is the majority 
party. I think the worst thing that could happen is to be a Democratic Party activist and not ever have to be concerned about election. 
But having said that, we were talking about party structure. What was the motivation of my father to be active in politics in Springfield, Massachusetts, as an 
immigrant? He became a citizen and a voter, battling as a minority for opportunity. I, as a kid, ringing doorbells and doing all the things that I did to motivate people to register, 
vote and participate, recognized the power of the ballot. 
It was like the Democratic-Farm-Labor Party in Minnesota that I observed in later years. The healthy aspect of it was that you used the ballot box. There have been times in 
recent history where people tried to shortcut that. You don't do it by burning and bombing. 
You look at the figures and you find that 50 per cent of those eligible to participate in the process go to the polls to select a president. It's a poor voter turnout compared to 
other democracies. We've done everything possible on the Democratic Party side: the postcard registration, opening the polls for longer hours and voter education. Why is it 
one out of every two people haven't interest or concern or feeling of citizen responsibility? You don't have to participate by virtue of some law that compels you, but if you have any 
sense of responsibility you should be a participant, even to the minimum degree of going to the polls. But it doesn't happen, and this gets back to what we were talking about 
earlier on, and that is who represents John and Mary down in Washington? Who lobbies for them? 
(Interruption) 
G: I was asking you why you picked someone from out of state to coordinate a state's activity. In this particular case you'd selected Eddie Boland, from Massachusetts, as the 
coordinator for Ohio. 
O: Yes, we established that procedure in 1960 after we left Los Angeles--a procedure that was basically the same as utilized in Massachusetts in the Kennedy-Lodge Senate contest. 
We called them "Kennedy secretaries." The thrust there, however, was the inadequacy of the state and local party organizations in Massachusetts. We felt we had to build our own 
organization, [and] avoid as much conflict as we could with established organizations that might not appreciate our activities. 
It worked out well, and when we were going to Los Angeles we had designated a person to handle each state delegation, in smaller states probably a couple of state 
delegations. Fellows like Abe Ribicoff and John Bailey and people like that received these assignments to stay in the hotel or headquarters of the delegation to which they were 
assigned. We had a monitored twenty-four-hour telephone system in Los Angeles to keep 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --22 
abreast of the ebb and flow of delegate positions individually. Each morning, these coordinators would meet at our headquarters offices in the Biltmore Hotel. We would go 
over every delegation in detail and determine what should be undertaken during the day to correct a situation or improve a situation. The result of that effort combined with the 
telephone procedures we initiated on the floor of the convention was that we were able to determine, within two and a half votes, the roll call that would nominate Kennedy. It was 
well thought out, well planned organization. 
Now, heading into a national campaign, we proceeded to have regional meetings immediately. We traveled the country. We brought Bill Green with us, because he 
epitomized organization. And we had Whizzer [Byron] White on the citizens' group. We had a woman from the women's division, and all that sort of thing. There were eight or 
nine representative people in the group, and we traveled the country. 
The use of state coordinators was a procedure we had followed in general in all our campaign activities. There was a realization that if we were to spend an inordinate 
amount of time to determine who should be the designated chairman of the campaign in state X, we would not only spend an inordinate amount of time, we'd get into a number of 
conflicts. So we made an effort at the top--a governor or a senator or perhaps a state chairman--to clear our selection. But our selection would be a person from outside that 
state who would literally move to the state, baggage and all, and stay through the campaign. He was the coordinator. They were all fellows who could handle themselves 
and had experience. No one in the state would be saying, "If we succeed, he's going to be in the key role in my state." There was none of that. They respected him and knew that 
he had authority, that he could communicate directly with the national campaign and he could get things done. You had to be sure he could, otherwise you destroy his credibility. 
A good example would be Eddie Boland in Ohio, a congressman. He's a volunteer; he's known to be intimately associated with the candidate and the campaign. 
He proceeds to deal with labor, various interest groups, the party people and to coordinate and ultimately maximize the activities there. We found that it worked out very well. It 
was very helpful in implementing our program. 
G: Was there a model for this that had been utilized somewhere else that you copied, or was this something that you just evolved? 
O: It evolved. It all started way, way back, with the first O'Brien manual, which was several mimeographed sheets stapled together. In Massachusetts the idea of Kennedy secretaries 
and Kennedy coordinators, while avoiding conflicts with party structures, went to the utilization of manpower. There was a different motivation at that time for three hundred 
and some-odd Kennedy secretaries in Massachusetts and an organization of over fifty thousand people. That organization was put in place because the candidate was unique. 
He could appeal to people who were not Democratic activists. More than that, however, of all of these people who were volunteering to help Jack Kennedy there wasn't one, 
probably, in fifty who had ever been active in politics. What do you do with these people? 
26
O'Brien --Interview XI --23 
Can you detail exactly what each one of these people could do? That got us to every phase of possible activity you could develop. 
There were people who could man a local headquarters; they had the time to do it. There were housewives who had kids at home, and they couldn't go out in the evening, 
but they did have a telephone, so you set up a telephone procedure. You gave them the lists with say a hundred or two hundred telephone calls. And then if they did get into a 
conflict with the person they were talking to they had a referral number where the person could discuss the issue. Now, that utilized those people. 
And then you had younger people who could take on groups of kids in their early teens. So rather than mail a tabloid, you distributed it door to door, over a million of 
them, with the kids distributing them all across Massachusetts. You could have mailed the million or two million copies to every home. But this utilized all these young people who 
wanted to be helpful. 
Then you finally got to the person who wanted to be helpful and had no time. We concluded a person probably would send out up to fifty Christmas cards. So there were 
up to fifty people that person knew well enough to communicate with at least once a year. So we had "Dear Friend" cards drafted. But we never would give more than fifty to 
anyone, because we wanted to be sure they were utilized. No one could mail them. They had to forward them back to the headquarters in the local community. Why? Because 
then you knew they were completed. Then we'd do the mass mailing. That was a task that you could assign. 
Well, the result was there were fifty thousand people across Massachusetts engaged in meaningful activity, ranging from putting in all kinds of hours or manning the 
telephones in their homes, or sending out cards, or dropping a tabloid at a person's home. All of this had to be detailed. You could make the calls only within certain hours; you 
always rang the doorbell with the tabloid, you never just dropped it at the door. You handed it to the person answering the door. Or if not, you could slide it under the door. 
Well, all of that utilized to the fullest our fifty thousand volunteers, and Kennedy was elected to the United States Senate, defeating a very popular incumbent senator, while 
the incumbent Democratic governor lost and Eisenhower swept the state by a quarter of a million votes. That was organization. 
We tried to carry it on in the primaries the same way, and we did, through the primary states. And then we utilized this kind of detailed organization in the election 
campaign. You know, it's not easy with Abe Ribicoff to say, "Abe, we want you to do sort of a journeyman's nuts-and-bolts task." But you had enough people, fortunately, of 
that stature, the Eddie Bolands and the rest of them, willing to do that sort of thing. So it was the utilization of volunteers in the instance of Kennedy where the unique aspects of 
the candidate would bring volunteers that otherwise might not be engaged in politics. And that was the purpose of all of this: look to your potential and your strength. 
27
O'Brien --Interview XI --24 
Then we got to that other phase, which was inherent in all of this: no controversy. This stranger comes into the state, respected because of who he is, his close proximity to 
the national organization, his close relationship with the candidate. Now you're in business. 
We had the telephone procedure, the boiler room, as we called it, in the headquarters, which was manned twenty-four hours a day by a group of girls. All the 
problems, everything funneled in, and we at the national headquarters would take the corrective measures, whatever measures were available, to respond to all requests from 
our people out in the country. And then they furnished, in turn, daily reports of progress. 
It's difficult, more intricate. But what happened to the O'Brien manual? I don't know how many different printings we had over the years, but it became a glossy, with 
pictures. It became a manual that was utilized in over thirty countries to my own knowledge. People from all over the world would come to visit us and want to talk about 
it. And what was it? It was a basic primer for utilizing volunteers. 
It involved the utilization of media, the potential for free media. It became more sophisticated, and finally, at the last election, we printed two or three hundred thousand 
copies. Then we sold them at fifty cents a copy to cover the cost, or seventy-five cents, whatever it was. In fact, it used to be an embarrassment to me to have somebody from 
Sweden or Great Britain or the leaders of a political party come in, and the State Department say, "This person wants to be sure to meet you." It was an embarrassment, 
because they wanted me to talk about this basic manual. They thought there was some secret somehow that could be explored. 
Now in 1964 the motivation for this in-depth effort really wasn't there. You would have enjoyed doing it one more time. But all of us who had been engaged in activity of 
this nature were otherwise engaged. So the dependency would have to be on the party structure. Cliff Carter was at the Democratic National Committee. 
G: Cliff Carter? 
O: Yes, Cliff Carter, and Dick Maguire was over there. And they were doing their job. There was an ongoing campaign, and we had done such things as arrange for media, the 
Tony Schwartz spots; we've mentioned the rest. But the President's concern was he didn't have a feel for it. He didn't really feel there was an ongoing campaign, rightly or wrongly. 
He latched onto me, and I supposed figured, "What is he doing sitting around here? He's had experience in the field. He ought to be out there." I didn't go to the President and 
suggest it. I recall the President just putting it right on me. 
G: Before you get into this one, let me just ask you one follow-up on Eddie Boland in the Ohio coordinating job. When you had an outside person in, did you sacrifice anything in 
terms of knowledge of the state? 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --25 
O: A little. 
G: And how did you compensate for that? 
O: They were quick at it, knowledgeable. Eddie Boland, for example, had been elected to office any number of times, didn't know the cast of characters, but quickly would find a 
common ground. That was a problem that was minimal compared to the plus factor of such an assignment. We prepared a briefing for them, the cast of characters and 
knowledge we may have of all the people. We had sent out a basic notification of assignments with a resume of the fellow that was assigned, so they, in turn, would know 
about him. His first order of business was to make his courtesy calls to the appropriate people and put a group together. And while there was a learning process, it worked out 
well. Certainly, whatever disadvantage there was was more than compensated for by the tremendous advantage of the non-conflict aspect of it operationally--nobody considered 
that fellow to be a future threat to them or him or her. 
G: Did you lose a degree of power by having someone from outside the state, local power? 
O: No, not at all, because it was accepted. The assignment represented an understanding of the fellow's stature in terms of the national structure, his stature in terms of the candidate. 
I don't recall any problems of getting full cooperation. There was only a certain number of people who could undertake a task of that nature. A Boland would be a good example 
of top quality. If you had fifty Eddie Bolands then you could, with great comfort, inaugurate a procedure of this nature and be assured that it would be properly 
implemented. Some of the fellows were not of the stature of Eddie Boland, but Eddie Boland wound up in a major state. No candidate is going to inherit a well-structured, 
grassroots national organization to carry on the details of the campaign, particularly in the nuts-and-bolts aspects of it. It's not there, and there has to be some degree of 
implementation. Of course, as I said early on, it should be there if the proper support were given to the Democratic National Committee, which is the national entity for this to 
flow from. 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 2 
O: We reviewed the summary that was submitted to the President by me, covering the first week or ten days of travel and that first summary covered nineteen states. The second 
summary was submitted to the President just about a week or so later, and at that time it was a report of organizational meetings in sixteen additional states and the District of 
Columbia. And this brought us up to thirty-six states plus the District of Columbia in about a two-week or two-and-a-half-week period. Now, I'm not suggesting this was 
in-depth coverage, but it certainly was an effort to get out there and get a feel of things. That left us at that point, which was October 11, with fourteen states yet to be covered. 
And this second summary follows pretty closely the elements of the first summary. We go 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --26 
into aspects of local contests and I do say that we have a good chance of picking up two House seats, and possibilities of picking up seven more, and we may lose one, with four 
additional Democratic seats in contest. So I think the combination of the two summaries would indicate that there was a limited area of potential change, that we would have 
difficulty retaining some districts, and we had an opportunity to pick up seats in a somewhat larger grouping of districts. 
And we also, of course, as we did in the first summary, got into evaluations of the governorship and Senate contests, where Senate contests existed. I do note, though, after 
doing that evaluation, I made reference to the problem that I had cited in the earlier summary, and that was the materials, the availability of materials in the field. And I note 
that I state, "The materials situation improved considerably this week"--now this was only a week later--" in some states, because they produced their own." That happened to be the 
case; as we moved along, we found some local organizations simply did their own work. In others, they had received orders from the national committee which showed that the 
national committee was responding rapidly to this request to move out of the warehouse. I also mention that COPE's fifty million pieces that I referred to in an earlier summary also 
began arriving this week. So there was a great deal of movement in a very short period of time in the distribution of materials. This took much of the pressure off, and we found 
that these meetings in the second phase did not focus on lack of materials to the extent that the early meetings had. 
But I do note here, and I should mention what states we're talking about, because this comes into this summary and it didn't in the early ones. In addition to the District of 
Columbia, this summary covered California, Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Hawaii, Nevada, Arizona, West Virginia, Delaware, Maryland, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, 
Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont and, as I said, the District of Columbia. In the summary report to the President, I mention that "it is becoming more and more apparent to me that 
we need to make a special effort to get out the vote in the Negro precincts. There is no question about the sentiment of Negro voters"--and they were referred to as Negro voters 
in 1964, not black voters; and we state the obvious--" is virtually 100 per cent support. But there is serious doubt in my mind," and I also mention in the minds of some of their 
leaders, "about how many of them are going to actually get to the polls. A special program aimed at this is being developed by the DNC in cooperation with labor." So this 
was a little belated, too, but at least attention was being directed to it. 
And then in this summary we get into the senior citizens for Johnson committees throughout the country. These had been established over a period of time; they were 
related to the effort, of course, of the President in the area of Medicare. And we mention that we are creating all kinds of special committees: scientists, engineers, arts and so forth, 
which we were, and they were doing that through the DNC. But senior citizens don't seem to be subject to the same kind of activity, so we did and would continue to alert all 
state campaign coordinators to form state-level senior citizens for Johnson committees this week. And "this week" was the week of October 11, late as it was. And they had to work 
with the party organization to [start a] get-out-the-vote drive. 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --27 
Then I point out the great variation in registration programs in these states that are referred to. I mention specifically that California has a good registration drive, and their 
efforts could serve as a model for other states. And then we get into some statistics. Again, which is a repeat of the first summary, I give great credit to COPE in this 
get-out-the-vote effort that has been put together. And I register admiration for the cooperation between the labor people and the regular party people, both at the state and 
national level. That was high that year, there weren't any conflicts and everybody was working in concert. As I said, in the past there had been real friction between labor and 
some party organizations, but that's not the case in 1964. 
And then it's interesting. I then say, "Except for Delaware, Maryland, and West Virginia, where civil rights is the big issue, the major issues of concern to voters in these 
states are the bomb, fear of Goldwater, responsibility in government, social security and Medicare." And there again, it's a repeat basically of the prevailing issues we saw in the 
early summary. 
Then reporting to the President again on hate literature, I point out that "We found it confined to Southern California, Arizona, Maryland, New Hampshire and Rhode 
Island." And it's interesting, covering the number of states that we did that week, that we now [have] somewhat isolated this in terms of specific areas where there seems to be an 
impact, indicating a real effort on the part of the hate literature distributors. Then we picked up evidence during those meetings that Haley's book had been translated into 
Spanish and also had been put on a long-playing phonograph record. So they were working hard. 
Then we get to our problems, and the biggest problems are the obvious ones: apathy, overconfidence, lack of concern. We're hammering away at that, and it, I think, 
reflected the poll results that were current, the overwhelming victory that was brewing. 
G: How did you deal with apathy, though, overconfidence? Everyone assumed that Lyndon Johnson was going to win that election by a wide margin. 
O: Your fate, in terms of total voter turnout, is to a great extent in the hands of organizations and candidates at the local level where there are contests. The difficulty in a national 
campaign is that you have a third of the Senate involved. You have, obviously, 435 House members but only less than a hundred of those House seats are really in contest. 
So there's another very weak spot in terms of having a credible turnout in a national election. Now you add to that the opinion that was overwhelming that Johnson was going 
to be easily elected. You add all that together, and it's a problem. So really, you're not in a position in a presidential campaign to put in a very effective, localized, get-out-the-vote 
effort. You're hopeful that there's enough state-level, county-and congressional district-level contests to arouse enough voter interest to ensure a reasonable turnout, and 
that's dependent oftentimes on the organizations, the get-out-the-vote organizations of the local candidates. 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --28 
I also make reference to the priority list for financial assistance that I had developed, and mention the figure two hundred thousand dollars again, which indicates to 
me that perhaps we hadn't gotten to that distribution, because it's a gentle reminder that that is something which has been put into place in terms of targets and we ought to 
implement quickly. 
Then I conclude in that summary another reference to our general situation. I call it "satisfactory on the whole. Goldwater's people are busy, and I'm convinced he will get 
out every possible Goldwater vote." That was the case; that was understood, and that wasn't any great finding on my part. I didn't have to travel to recognize that. But I do 
add, "For every sign of Goldwater activity we get several reports of Republicans switching to vote for you," LBJ. And then I repeat what I had said before: "I don't believe that these 
'Johnson Republicans' are likely to become Democratic converts. My feeling is that most of them will vote for you but then swing right back to the big R for state contests. Where 
other candidates will derive greatest advantage from your personal strength is in states where they can pull one lever or mark one box for the entire ticket," stating the obvious. 
So those two summaries really indicate the degree of activity we hastily engaged ourselves in, in a very limited period of time, and it's not in any way a suggestion that we 
plunged into a detailed national organizational drive, covering thirty-four states in two weeks, that was remotely as effective as it could have been if all this was engaged in at an 
earlier time. 
G: I assume that LBJ's travel schedule was already fairly well set by this time, so you--O: 
Yes, it was. 
G: --didn't have a lot of play there. 
O: No, you didn't. We might have made an adjustment; I don't recall it. I think we were locked into that, and that gets me to a separate memo which refers specifically to New 
York. I proceeded to spend three days in New York, where I conferred with all of the party leaders throughout the state. There was a series of informal group meetings and 
individual contacts, and there was no question about LBJ carrying New York. But I point out it's due to his personal popularity and strength and certainly not due to any New York 
organizational effort. 
Then I refer to Bob Kennedy's race. This is on October 17, and I did say at that point, "He hit bottom last weekend and now is picking up momentum." And I state, 
"There is no question that your visit"--LBJ's visit--" did a great deal to help Bobby's situation." Then I cite the New York problems, and some of them are not unique to New 
York. The usual problem was financial. The state committee really was not effective. "It's broke and in debt. Here we are, on the verge of the 1964 national election. There 
were some complaints registered with me that most of the money raised in the state, 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --29 
particularly by the citizens' committee, is being sent out of the state." Now that of course gets you back to our discussion of large contributors that I referred to sometimes as fat 
cats, and of course, many of those large contributors are here in New York. So those complaints might be registered, but the reality of the situation is that New York is a 
tremendous source of campaign funding, as California is, and it certainly could not be envisioned by anyone but somebody extremely naive that the monies derived from that 
fund raising in New York would be retained in the state of New York. 
G: Was this a source of friction between the Johnson campaign and the Robert Kennedy campaign? 
O: No, I don't recall it as friction. It was friction between the old stalwarts of New York, who knew most of these people and could envision the money raised in New York not 
being retained in New York. You might listen and be sympathetic to them, but it didn't make any impact. 
I do say, "The citizens' group apparently is concentrating exclusively on fund raising, is not engaged in the additional functions citizen's groups in other states have 
undertaken." And that means that this citizens' group was really a fund-raising group, and was not engaged in the nuts and bolts; the registration effort was spotty. Similarly, the 
get-out-the-vote drive--I go into a lot of specifics about various assembly districts, congressional districts and the rest. Then I do point out, "The Kennedy campaign group is 
bearing the brunt of general organizational activities." That's pretty normal; it's a statewide campaign. And it's obvious that they're bearing the brunt of it, because his 
campaign was much tighter than LBJ's campaign in New York. But that, after all, works to everyone's benefit, and the Bobby Kennedy people were engaged in a massive effort. 
G: Was it comparable to the Senate race in Massachusetts? 
O: It was following the same basic pattern, and I was never close enough to it to observe how effective it was or compare it in that regard. Bobby had discussed his campaign at 
length with me on a number of occasions. I think he would have liked to have had me come and spend some time in New York in the campaign, but he had some awfully good 
people, and some of them came in from outside New York, some old friends and political associates. 
G: Who did run his campaign, primarily? 
O: I don't recall who was at the head of the campaign. 
G: Who would have been near the top; who were his key people? 
O: There was Jack English--even names elude me at the moment--Jack English would be very key in this campaign. Joe Crangel in Upstate New York, who was county chairman of the 
best-organized county in the state, would be key in the campaign. And he had a number 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --30 
of personal friends and family friends who were involved. 
I point out that the regular organization, whatever it was, really was the mainstay of our campaign, because that's really organizationally all that we had going. Bobby had 
mounted his effort, and then you always have the conflict between the regular Democrats and the reformers. That's typical of New York. I mention that here, incidentally. "The 
reform movement is at odds with the regulars," although, obviously, both factions were supporting LBJ, so I wasn't unduly concerned. "We get some reports of individuals who 
make some shortsighted decisions not calculated to enhance the overall good of the Johnson-Humphrey-Kennedy ticket." I don't know who I'm referring to specifically there, 
but apparently something was disturbing me. But I point out, "They are relatively rare and do not appear to be hampering the overall effort. But the inherent friction between 
regulars and reformers remains, and we aren't going to end it. So we may as well adjust to it." 
Then I cite the New York Daily News poll of this date, and that gave Kennedy a psychological shot in the arm, but it showed LBJ running three to one ahead of 
Goldwater, and Bobby ahead of [Kenneth] Keating by about four to three. Coming on top of the reports of the Senate race as a tossup or even that Keating was ahead, this propped 
up many of the campaign people. 
I make some reference to the [Walter] Jenkins matter, which I guess in the time frame was probably a subject of some discussion at that point. 
G: It just happened, I think. 
O: I was trying to recall. That's right, it had just happened. I was wondering why I make a reference to it here. Oh, yes, I do say, "It's too soon to make an evaluation of the effect of 
the Jenkins matter on the New York race. My personal opinion is that it will not seriously hurt you here where you have a tremendous lead, but may cause some slight falloff in 
normally Republican areas, where Republicans have been looking for an excuse to vote for Goldwater." 
And then I mention, "The materials in New York, most of it had been produced in New York, and it's in reasonably good shape for that reason. Much of it is of excellent 
quality." I mention that several Johnson-Humphrey-Kennedy hyphenated, affiliated headquarters--they were joint headquarters--had been opened in Manhattan. "There's a 
large working headquarters. This headquarters is under the direction of Ed Cavanaugh, and I was impressed with what I saw there. I was advised that this was self-supporting." 
And then: "There's a volunteers' headquarters, and that is where the Kennedy operation is being conducted from. There's a walk-in headquarters at the Paramount Theater 
exclusively for the national ticket." So I detailed the New York situation. 
And then I state the obvious, that get-out-the-vote is the problem, and that's particularly true in the Negro and Puerto Rican areas. Meetings were currently in place to 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --31 
work on this and the financing of the get-out-the-vote drive, which would be a joint effort. And then the summary: "You'll carry New York big. Bob is in a tough fight but now has 
the edge. If he holds the city at 60 per cent, which is indicated by the poll, he can't miss. The [Hugh] Carey seat will be held, and there are a couple of fair shots," which apparently 
I had spelled out to him in my congressional report. And then I point out that following this three days in New York I am going to the South. 
G: Let me ask you about LBJ coming up here and campaigning with Robert Kennedy. Do you recall how that was arranged? 
O: I do know this, that LBJ was not only willing to come up, but he was anxious to. I think he felt that this was where he could establish a record of being directly helpful to Bobby. 
It was well done, carried out extremely well, enthusiastically accepted, and I think it did do a great deal in terms of helping Bobby. 
G: Did it help him? 
O: Yes, because LBJ was riding a crest at that point. And secondly, it was, in my judgment, at least a contributing factor of some significance in trying to alleviate this problem which, 
having been on the periphery of and directly involved with it on some occasions, was something that I didn't particularly enjoy either--the existence of that situation. 
G: Did Robert Kennedy ask him to come in the first place, or how did--? 
O: I don't remember how it started. I think if you're setting up what obviously would be a somewhat limited travel schedule, but you wanted and the President certainly wanted to 
have at least the appearance of an active campaign on the part of the candidate that New York would have been a must as a stop. The Bobby Kennedy situation, of course, 
underscored that. So I don't know whether Bobby requested [it]; maybe he did, and if he did, probably through me. But it wouldn't be anything that was of great significance in 
terms of let's think about it or let's weigh it. It was a pretty obvious step to take. 
G: Were there issues to resolve on the type of campaign that would be done, or the circumstances of Johnson's--? 
O: In New York? 
G: Yes. 
O: No. New York was a state that Johnson was going to win overwhelmingly. That's A). B), it's a state where a nationally watched Senate contest was ongoing. An incumbent 
Republican was faced with another Kennedy. And the media attention was beyond any normal Senate contest. C) Consequently, this contest ensured a pretty decent voter 
turnout, and the apathy we were concerned about to some degree was reduced. And it was just that, and it did intrigue the New York voters. It isn't every day you have a 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --32 
contest of that nature. I wouldn't suggest that it was Kennedy-Lodge, but it had some of the elements of it: Keating had been a Republican moderate. There wasn't any quarrel 
about Keating that I recall. He was a pleasant fellow; he wasn't Lodge, but his voting record would be somewhat similar. You had to conclude at the time of Lodge-Kennedy, 
if there hadn't been a Kennedy around, Lodge would have remained in the Senate for the rest of his life, if he cared to. And Keating, similarly, probably would have stayed in the 
Senate. You couldn't state that as firmly as you could in the Lodge instance. 
So adding it all up, spending three days in New York was part of an effort to react responsibly to Johnson's request. With the traditional weakness of the state party, the 
total breakdown of party organization in the city of New York, the reform-regular quarrel all the way back to Carmen DeSapio, New York was a disaster area organizationally. 
G: Did Johnson's campaigning here for Robert Kennedy improve the relationship between the two men? 
O: I'd like to think it did. 
G: Did you think so at the time? 
O: I'd have to reflect on what occurred later on in responding to that. Clearly Bobby Kennedy had to be thankful that he had received support from LBJ. 
G: Do you think he was? 
O: Yes. Because he was in a tough contest, and if the fellow who heads the ticket is going to get 60 per cent of the vote in New York, his presence arm-in-arm with you around New 
York has to be a plus. 
G: I wonder, though, to what extent it was a question of Johnson's popularity here or the relative unpopularity of their opponents. Keating seems to have been enormously more 
popular in New York than Goldwater was. 
O: Yes. It was generally known that Bobby and LBJ had had problems in their relationship, and I think just the two of them arm-in-arm under these circumstances had to have a plus 
factor. But the Kennedy-Keating contest was not unique in that sense. After all, you had close contests being waged around the country, and we all know that a president, a 
popular president, cannot transfer that popularity to others. I remember an election for governor in New Jersey in 1961. Dick Hughes was the Democratic candidate and wanted 
Kennedy to visit New Jersey. We talked about it, not that we didn't like Dick Hughes and hoped he would win, but it was conceivable that this first political activity of the new 
President could result in a negative, in the sense that he campaigned for Hughes in New Jersey and Hughes lost. Even worse, was it possible that the people of New Jersey might 
react negatively and say, "Who does he think he is to come into New Jersey to suggest to us who should be our governor?" 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --33 
What you finally came down to was that "the candidate wants you, he's our guy, he's a great fellow, and if he wants you to come, that's his judgment." So you go. I can 
remember managing a congressional campaign. Walter Reuther and others who were nationally prominent volunteered to come into the district to campaign on behalf of the 
candidate, who was Foster Furcolo. We refrained from having any of them in, because we concluded it could be a negative and that people would resent it. It comes to judgment. 
G: Any insights on the Walter Jenkins problem? 
O: No. I never knew the details of it. I remember the flurry, the Washington Post initial stories, the President's efforts to contain this. I believe that the two fellows that he looked 
to for advice and assistance were [Abe] Fortas and [Clark] Clifford. 
G: What do you think the effect of the Jenkins incident was on the campaign? 
O: Minimal to non-existent. 
G: Did Jenkins' departure change things in the White House? Was access to Johnson different, or was the operation of the President's office different? 
O: No. 
G: Jenkins had been around for a long time, and had been awfully close to Johnson. 
O: I don't recall any change. This was the situation after Dallas: Johnson not desiring or seeking change and putting another layer of staff in with the Kennedy staff. There was an 
observable tendency on LBJ's part to reach out to the Kennedy staff to maintain the comfort factor to the fullest degree possible. And we'll probably get into some of those 
things when we get to the aftermath of the November 1964 election. 
It was over the long haul an impossible situation. It did not affect me at all, and my relationship with Johnson was a totally open, complete availability, 
twenty-four-hour-a-day relationship. Walter Jenkins, [Jack] Valenti and the others took the same approach to me, doing everything possible to be of assistance. And that was 
enhanced by Johnson's attitude toward me. 
My staff and I had a major portion of that second floor, but there were Johnson people on the second floor as well as the first floor, and they extended themselves in every 
conceivable way to be cooperative. 
Tape 3 of 3, Side 1 
O: I think I'd like to touch on this separate memorandum to the President of October 23 which was headed "Get Out the Vote Nationally," and highlight three or four comments. 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --34 
I point out that the national committee's effort is in four categories, with Matt Reese responsible for general get-out-the-vote coordination; Louis Martin, our minority 
representative, the women's division's activities and the special groups, such as new citizens and veterans. I repeat my observations regarding COPE and point out that Roy 
Reuther headed this COPE registration program, leading to the get-out-the-vote program, and that COPE expended a million dollars-plus in the registration activities, which was a 
real contribution to that effort. And I emphasize the harmony and the coordination between labor and the party apparatus. 
This was affirmed by Roy Reuther, and he cited the three reasons why he thought this spirit of cooperation existed: LBJ's pro-labor positions on major legislation, the fear of 
Goldwater which was permeating the atmosphere, and, third, a purposeful effort by COPE to achieve this harmony. I again mention that COPE distributed fifty million pieces of 
literature and had an excellent fifteen-point pamphlet on getting-out-the-vote which had been widely distributed, using the same machinery that it used in its successful registration 
program. Our reports indicated that volunteers in this get-out-the-vote effort were at a high level, more than perhaps ever before. 
I did however point out, and Roy Reuther was in accord, that the soft spots were primarily in some large cities where ward leadership had remained constant while the 
people in the wards have moved on and the ward makeup had changed. I do say there are some of the old complaints, some degree of reluctance in some of the old, established 
party people, but this is a recurring complaint. And although there is obviously plenty of room for improvement, I advised the President that it was a better situation, in my 
judgment, than had existed in 1960. 
And then, in addition to the million-plus in registration, I projected COPE's investment in get-out-the-vote as approaching five hundred thousand dollars, including 
fifty thousand which had been pumped in through the campaign in certain critical areas that very week. Then I point out that Matt Reese of the national committee's operation is 
zeroed in on approximately sixty counties and cities in fourteen target states, because the reality was that you had to target. You couldn't handle a total national get-out-the-vote 
drive. 
It's interesting that Reese is operating with a budget of seventy-three thousand dollars and a limited staff, two full-time people in the field. And he's doing a 
commendable and conscientious job and has produced a solid manual on get-out-the-vote. You weren't really operating with much. 
What was always held in great confidence in every campaign I was ever in was the Negro vote--and I keep saying Negro in order to stay with the time frame here. Voter 
registration get-out-the-vote drive in the South has been described in detail in the previous memo, but overall, Louis Martin has administered a total minorities get-out-the-vote 
budget of $223,300. And I said I'm sure this money is being well spent. I break down the 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --35 
expenditures in each of the states that were involved in this special drive. 
G: I wonder about the variations from one state to another. Ohio gets thirty-one thousand, California only twenty-five hundred, and Texas ten thousand. 
O: Yes. Well, you have to relate from a national position. It came to that odd number, I'm sure, because Louis Martin, who was a very able fellow, was not a spendthrift. He would 
relate this to the activity he was aware of, involving state-level promotion of this get-out-the-vote drive in the minority areas, and California would reflect well-organized 
minority registration, get-out-the-vote activity. Willie Brown and those people had the capacity to carry their own financial weight and this meant Louis Martin sent a token 
contribution to the effort. There wasn't a need to bolster them financially. You'll find that the variation in some of these major and large states with large black and Hispanic 
populations reflects judgments of need. 
G: Judgments on supplementing the funds that they would need. 
O: Yes, that's right. And after all, this was a modest budget; it's the national budget, and it in no way reflects the total expenditure in that area. The get-out-the-vote drive in the 
minority areas is the most difficult. The registration drives are always the most difficult. It was always a problem and it wasn't something we could try to coordinate and direct. 
Louis Martin was the key to efforts of this nature. 
G: Tell me a little bit more about Martin and his role in this. 
O: Louis Martin, my recollection, when he was in the picture in 1960, of course. Louis Martin, a newspaper editor in Chicago, was a street-wise politico in the Chicago mold, 
extremely knowledgeable, and he moved from his newspaper experience into national politics. 
Louis was one of a kind, and we were fortunate to have him. It was very, very difficult in a national campaign to get a handle on the minority situation. There were any 
number of small minority newspapers over the country. There were a number of self-proclaimed leaders--local level, county level, state level--in black and Hispanic 
politics. 
There were people you could depend upon locally to give you advice and counsel, and you could follow their direction. But what was essential was that you have someone 
who was knowledgeable nationally, who was known to all of these people. You could turn over to him with great confidence all of this activity. He was also a fellow who 
recognized your financial limitations. 
It's a unique area, and it was a troublesome area; it was a difficult area for any of us to cope with. So Louis was an important element in all this. 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --36 
G: Did he have other assignments at the White House or was this something that he--? 
O: Basically, he was in minority relations. I believe he went into the White House in the Carter period. He was on the staff, and he had a feel for all of this, and he was the most 
knowledgeable fellow in the country. That's why everyone on the national scene knew Louis Martin and to this day has moved to Louis for advice and counsel in areas such as 
this. 
G: You mentioned the confidentiality of this aspect of the campaign, and in one of Louis Martin's memos he also points that fact out, that it has always been a rather quiet and 
secret operation. Why the secrecy? 
O: We had allocated approximately two hundred thousand dollars for key contested districts across the country, and we're talking about a little more than two hundred thousand 
dollars in this minority area. The tendency was to expend substantially more on registration and get-out-the-vote in the minority areas than in general. It was a more 
difficult task and you were forced to deal with local activists who claimed to be significant and important. That was the reality of it, and that's why it was just as well that we not 
discuss publicly the amount of money out of the total pot that went into these kinds of activities. 
G: Was there a fear that there might be a backlash or a response to this from white voters? 
O: It was a concern that knowledge of the amounts involved might be disturbing to people who would find that the fund being allocated to them was substantially less than allocated 
to this area. 
G: Was a consideration the high percentage of black voters who you knew would vote for Lyndon Johnson if they got out with this--? 
O: Oh, sure. If you could get every eligible black voter in America registered and to the polls, you have an assured 90-plus per cent support. It fell somewhat below that in the 
case of Reagan's re-election. That's a gold mine. You're faced with a lower voter turnout compared to the turnout as a whole. So each step of the way you've lost a potential that is 
guaranteed if you can only produce it. So your effort had to be maximized in those areas. You knew that any expenditure was going to produce and nine out of ten at least were 
going to support you. In this case, the assurance of support was so overwhelming that it was worth the effort. 
G: One of the memos indicates that Martin Luther King's Southern Christian Leadership Conference was very active in voter registration of blacks, as well. 
O: Yes. 
G: How did this dovetail in with Louis Martin's operation? 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --37 
O: It did in the sense that Louis Martin had an easy and pleasant relationship there, too. Louis bridged things. He could deal with the Negro establishment; he could deal with the 
Negro politician, and he could deal with the Negro civil rights activists. He was accepted in all quarters. While Louis leaned toward party organization, his personality and 
activities over the years placed him in a unique position. He could bridge all of this. He could be dealing with a hard-bitten Negro ward leader who would be as hard-bitten as his 
white counterpart and deal with them in the language of politics and yet he could deal with a reverend whose involvement and concern were focused on civil rights. 
He does point to the particular southern registration, get-out-the-vote effort and how it was being held closely and tried to avoid undue publicity attendant to it, and he had 
the agreement with the Negro leaders, including Martin Luther King, that they not publicize or brag about their registration efforts. He mentions Frank Reeves, who was 
very active. I thought of Frank as we were talking. I am sure that anyone reading this memo would understand the need not to publicize. Others might say, "The 
get-out-the-vote operation has four prongs," and find two of the prongs are the insurance agents operation and the barber and beauticians operation. 
There's a tremendous amount of insurance purchased by blacks, which required weekly or monthly visitations for collection. So, therefore, there is an army of the Negro 
insurance agents who have a tremendous amount of contact with their fellow Negroes across the country, and this was particularly true in the South. I'm not as familiar with the 
barber and beautician operation, but there again, Negro barbers and beauticians were looked upon as people of accomplishment by their fellow Negroes. They had a 
constituency. So Louis has pointed to two constituencies that normally you would not have listed among the four major segments of a get-out-the-vote drive and that's realistic. 
Only a fellow like Louis could implement this. 
But you had asked about civil rights connotations because of the expenditures. I was focusing on the internal structure of the get-out-the-vote drive. You have requests 
from all kinds of sources insisting that they have to have X number of dollars in order to accomplish the get-out-the-vote or registration effort. You would never be able to 
comply with all those requests. So you pared them down to whatever your resources called for. But you used a different scale when it came to the minority registration and 
get-out-the-vote. But I'm sure that Louis is accurate when he says that there was a great need to low-key as much as possible the activity in the South. 
End of Tape 3 of 3 and Interview IX 
41
    [ Part 10: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--25 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview X*
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paper at the LBJ Library. Transcripts of oral history interviews may be consulted at the Library or lending copies may be borrowed by writing to the Interlibrary Loan Archivist, LBJ Library, 
2313 Red River Street, Austin, Texas, 78705. 
1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW X 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview X, 6/ 25/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
For Electronic Copy on Diskette from the LBJ Library: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview X, 6/ 25/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
3
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-21 
4
O'Brien --Interview X --1 
INTERVIEW X 
DATE: June 25, 1986 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's residence, Cotuit, Massachusetts 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 1 
G: I just indicated that the record shows there were twenty-three of those regional meetings that you held around the country in 1964. I think there were only half that many, perhaps, 
in 1960 when you traveled. You talked some about that assignment last time, but one thing I wanted you to elaborate on today. Was there a feeling on LBJ's part that things 
were not happening, that the campaign was lackluster and something needed to be done? 
O: I believe so. It was a two-pronged situation. Sitting at the White House, he didn't discern that it was a very active campaign. And secondly, he felt that there was complacency 
generally, that it was a walk-through and everybody assumed it. Human nature being what it is and LBJ being how he was, he wanted to build a victory to the fullest extent 
possible. He became concerned and he had mentioned it to me on a number of occasions. We had gone through campaign planning internally, which took the form of a memo that I 
gave him earlier on the campaign organization. But the implementation of that didn't seem to be taking place. At least he felt that way and I guess I concurred because he was busily 
engaged in all of his problems and I was engaged in my own problems legislatively. Who was paying attention and who was really honchoing all of this? 
And it finally led to an insistence on his part that I get out in the field and determine to what degree implementation was taking place on the program that had been 
originally approved. How effective could you be, to what degree could you take this on? You could perhaps check things out and take corrective measures. 
So I came to the decision to have these regional meetings across the country. It wasn't 1960 where you were trying to build a grassroots operation from whatever re-sources 
were available to you. You had easy access to key people in the urban areas, the local level, the activists, the labor leaders, the women's groups, all the people that had an 
affiliation with the Democratic Party. The best thing to do was to elicit from them directly, face to face, eyeball to eyeball, what was transpiring. I'd been there before, and I 
could make judgments. To do that nationally and assure it would impact required pretty rapid movement. 
So I tried to locate these conferences and meetings in areas that would make it as convenient as possible to all the key operatives in the campaign. Operatives, incidentally, 
5
O'Brien --Interview X --2 
that were running campaigns of candidates for governorship, Senate and House. Because of his intense interest, Johnson was extremely anxious to learn from me just what my 
findings were. That led to sort of a semi-humorous approach because we started sending memos back so he would be informed, but he wasn't getting them rapidly enough and 
finally we were dictating in the wee hours back to the White House, so he would have a report from me on that given day of these tours. I was concerned because obviously I had 
a lot of things going on the Hill. I was worried about losing the handle on some things, my then-current dealings with Wilbur Mills. Nevertheless, I was charged with this 
responsibility and I did what I could. 
What he envisioned, what we both anticipated, was little concern regarding the presidential campaign, it was a walk-through. Consequently, there was a lack of registra-tion 
activity, nuts and bolts activity to ensure maximizing get-out-the-vote, all of that. We weren't on the issues particularly; we were on the structure. So I guess there wasn't any 
great element of surprise there. There were a lot of activities presented to me at these meetings. Under intensive questioning, you found that there was great exaggeration as to 
what was being done. There were things that could be done or be done better which might be of help in maximizing the vote, so you tried to work on those, for example, 
distribution of material. That was an example. There was a great deal of material in warehouse storage which had not been distributed out of the DNC. Well, those are the 
things that you could take some steps to correct. 
The Johnson campaign side of it, was just running along without any intensity, which was not a revelation. The [Barry] Goldwater campaign side, however, was to some 
extent a revelation, at least to me, because of the intensity of the Goldwater activists. Distribution of the literature, books and pamphlets occurred along with some pretty mean 
stuff out there [when] you got to the Clevelands and Detroits and San Franciscos around this country. You discovered that this rather narrow area of support for Goldwater had 
depth and commitment. It's comparable later on to the [George] McGovern campaign. Actually it was much the same. There weren't enough people out there to get the job 
done, but those that were committed were truly committed. 
G: Why do you think that was? 
O: Goldwater's campaigning had limited breadth of support. But they were ardent and had made impact, because I found comments concentrated in some areas more than others 
regarding books and pamphlets on the part of our own people. Their concern because of this was being discussed. It motivated us to do much more than had been done at 
grassroots on behalf of Lyndon Johnson. And that went to literature distribution to rev up registration where there was still time to develop relationships in campaign activity 
between labor and the Democratic Party structures. These meetings included all these elements, and there was a specific effort to ensure responsible presence of labor leaders 
along with our own people. And we made particular effort to enlist attendance of those who were engaged in local campaigns or statewide campaigns. 
6
O'Brien --Interview X --3 
What contribution did it make to the overall result? I think it made a contribution. It did enlighten us; it did alert us to where we could take corrective measures. In 
summary, it turned out to be worth doing. But it certainly was a far cry from an in-depth organizational drive in which you would normally be engaged. That would have extended 
over a period of months and would have been very intensive, conducted in depth. This was more surface activity, but I think one of the contributions was to have the President 
feel more comfortable about things. Not that I was giving him assurances to make him comfortable, because I was pretty damn direct in my reports. Instead of giving him 
comfort some days, I gave him concern because I would report what I observed and what my findings were, and sometimes they weren't very pleasant to hear. He attempted his 
own implementation at his end by having [Walter] Jenkins and others in the White House in contact with the [Democratic] National Committee trying to stir up the troops. 
G: Did it have any enduring impact on the way the national committee worked or was set up? 
O: I don't think so, particularly. I think that we continued to follow the same course from Kennedy through Johnson, which I guess, with the exception probably of the [James] 
Farley era with Roosevelt, was pretty much the way things went. I don't know. I never checked back in the records or history of the party. It was damn unfortunate. The role of 
the Democratic National Committee should be a meaningful role when the party is in power, as well as a meaningful role when the party is out of power. My experience with 
the national committee both times I was chairman, it was the party out of power, and the national committee, therefore, did have a great opportunity to be active and effective. 
That depended on the chairman, whether he would be aggressive. 
When the party is out of power, the only entity that focuses nationally is the national committee because the people on the Hill are interested in their own districts, 
their own states. On the political side, they are busily engaged in protecting their interests, and there's not a unified approach to the loyal opposition concept unless it's through the 
national committee. And if the national committee can enlist party leaders to be actively engaged with the committee, if the national committee can develop programs and have a 
battle plan and be vigorous and aggressive, then it can fulfill meaningfully the role of the loyal opposition. 
But when you're in the White House--in the Kennedy period, very frankly, we probably lost sight of the existence of the national committee. It was a vehicle solely for 
us when negatives came along, appointments particularly, to put the burden on the national committee, occasionally have John Bailey, who was chairman, make an 
announcement "I'm sorry, but Joe Smith is not going to be named federal judge," or whatever. It was that sort of thing and there was little or no direction or guidance from 
the White House. There was no meaningful public support of the committee on the part of the President. And the same in the Johnson era. 
G: Was the reason for Johnson's attitude different from Kennedy's? 
7
O'Brien --Interview X --4 
O: No, I think you become so absorbed you're completely inundated with your own problems and activities. Another election isn't for a few years. You give it a fleeting thought now 
and then, but to be supportive of it so that it is performing meaningful tasks just didn't take place. For example, the national chairman should be an observable-to-the-press presence 
in the White House on a regular basis. That's first and foremost. Then there's an understanding that the chairman of the party does have access to the president. He is a 
spokesman for the president in the political area. It was an oversight on our part. There were occasions [when] something [would] come up: "Oh, well, let's get hold of Bailey," or 
"Let's have the national committee try to do something," for example, in organizing the senior citizens' meetings that we had at one stage to push Medicare. 
It's somewhat similar to the secretary of state and the foreign policy adviser in the White House. The fact of the matter is you have political operatives in the White House. 
You could look to me with political experience in patronage or politics generally. In foreign policy you have the adviser and his staff right in your building. The secretary of 
state is in Foggy Bottom. Personalities have a lot to do with it. There's no question, for example, in the Nixon Administration that Henry Kissinger as foreign policy adviser 
undercut the secretary of state. In our administration, during the period of Dean Rusk and Mac [McGeorge] Bundy, there was some neglect of Dean Rusk, but there was a pleasant 
and easy relationship between the Secretary of State and the President. But the fact is that the President would turn to his foreign policy adviser, who is with him probably four or 
five times a day. He's there and you don't think of it in terms of a table of organization. He's there and his input is significant because of his opportunity for input and the 
opportunity for political input within the confines of the building is almost total. Why was Larry O'Brien, the special assistant to the president for congressional relations, out on the 
road in twenty-three meetings across the country involved directly in the political campaign when you have an entity called the Democratic National Committee down the 
street? 
Now, let's not fault the DNC down the street, [Cliff] Carter and some of those Johnson people who were working over there. Nobody paid any attention. Why didn't 
Johnson say to them, "Get out on the road. I want to know--"? Now, maybe some of it had to do with his confidence in me, because he always thought I stole the nomination 
from him, or I was one of those who was involved. All I'm saying is that in the White House, your speech-writing resources, your press resources, your political resources, your 
congressional relations resources, your foreign policy resources, your legal resources are all present. In the case of Kennedy and Johnson, there was easy access day or night on the 
part of a half dozen of the key people. So the national committee is an entity for filing purposes and other purposes and perhaps funneling fund purposes. That's over there in 
election time, like Nixon's committee to re-elect Nixon was, I guess, a separate entity from the Republican National Committee. 
We didn't do it right, and I felt responsibility because I had been there. I had more involvement in national politics than anybody in the White House, except the President of 
the United States, on the organizational side of it. So I had no excuse. I should have a 
8
O'Brien --Interview X --5 
recognition that the national committee should be supported and upgraded to the fullest extent possible, not to please some personalities in the national committee, but to be an 
extremely useful adjunct to the presidency. Perhaps that was the case of Farley and Roosevelt, where Farley was postmaster general and for some period also national 
chairman. Farley had total access to the White House, and he was a cabinet member. I'm sure that worked out nicely until Farley decided he wanted to be president and Roosevelt 
decided to run for a fourth term. 
G: Yes. Did Johnson expect you to put the Kennedy organization back in the field, do you think, in his behalf? 
O: No, no. By that time, the Kennedy organization was not separated from the Democratic Party generally around the country. In Cleveland there were probably--undoubtedly--
people in attendance at that meeting who I had become acquainted with because they were Kennedy supporters in 1960; there were other people who were elected officials of the 
party. And it would be a mix. 
G: Did your trips around the country have any policy impact in terms of the way the issues that the campaign focused on? 
O: The issues had been pretty well defined by Goldwater's position on most of the issues. He had taken care of that for us. No, basically what the President's concern was, "The polls 
show I'm going to win easily. I'd like to win as big as possible." But there's nothing to motivate the troops; everybody is saying, "Why bother?" And is there anything we can do 
about "why bother" to ensure we can get a few million more people to the polls, which would have an impact on the end result? We could win a little bigger. He'd like to win by 
getting 100 per cent of the vote. 
G: One of the newspaper articles on your trips indicated that after your return the campaign emphasized the "man with his hand on the trigger" theme, the nuclear hazard issue. Was 
this something that you picked up in your trips around the country as being a--? 
O: I don't think I had to take the trips around the country. I had dealt with Tony Schwartz on that. We had envisioned that approach prior to the trips around the country. I remember 
sitting with Tony in New York exchanging ideas by way of spots. If you remember, we were pretty hard-hitting, to the extent that they are still talking about the little girl with the 
daisy. You know, that is cited to this day. So what it amounted to was the finger on the trigger. Barry Goldwater just lent himself to that. It wasn't something that we pushed on 
Barry. His utterances were a little like--
G: Curtis LeMay. 
O: Curtis LeMay--when we had the polling booth blow up in a spot. I can see it now; I can feel it. You're in that White House, the days go by, the weeks go by, and you're trying to 
promote legislation, Johnson's trying to keep the country on an even keel, and everybody 
9
O'Brien --Interview X --6 
is busy doing whatever task they're assigned to. You get to the actual campaign and his personal involvement had to be limited. But how about the troops out there? We were in 
an excellent position to push and press and be a little bit rough about it, because everybody out there knew Lyndon Johnson was going to be in the White House and they 
better have the record show that they did their job. 
G: Can you give me an example of how you could get rough in this respect? 
O: Well, my comments would be pretty direct. I would, without even knowing the facts in Cleveland, to go back there for a moment, initially express my deep, abiding concern, 
which was also the concern of the President, about what we had determined was inadequacy in the operation of the campaign in the Cleveland area. I'd make that 
statement flat. You start on that tone, that I'm here because we're concerned. I represent the President, the candidate, and what we hear from Ohio and this vicinity is not good, and 
we want to tell you that we're unhappy. Those meetings were not nasty, but they were not patty cake. They were very direct and I would invariably express concern. I'm here to 
face up to this and I want you to face up to it with me, and you'd go on from there. That would be the tone. 
G: Was voter registration discussed in these sessions? 
O: Yes. And that varied from meeting to meeting, area to area, state to state, depending on the time frames of registration. By the time we got out on the road there were places 
where you just had run out of time. Voter registration, get-out-the-vote, and the record of the administration were not being appropriately disseminated. And their response to me 
meeting after meeting was identical: "We don't have material. We've pleaded for material." And that made a real impact on me because that was the case across the 
country. The fact is we had a warehouse full of material. But what they were attempting to do was to sell the material. The old story--it cost a thousand dollars to have this 
material printed; now we want two thousand dollars for that package of material to go to Sioux City, Iowa, and we'll make a thousand dollars for the committee. All of that, of 
course, was just falling on pretty deaf ears around the country. We got that material cranked out across this country in a matter of days and worried about who paid later. 
Their attitude, and rightly so, was we have a president in the White House and they want us to raise a couple of thousand dollars before they'll send us buttons or hand cards. That 
was really the hang-up. 
G: So many of the memos do discuss that. 
O: Then, too, we tried to be helpful if we could by making distributions to candidates in contested districts. It wasn't a great deal of money. But I remember I sent out four or 
five different people around the country to hand distribute contributions on behalf of the President, so they'd know that it came directly from him. 
G: Was this a dual purpose gesture, not only to help them get re-elected, but--? 
10
O'Brien --Interview X --7 
O: Oh, no, more the other way, just a little gesture to say, "Hey, we know what you've been doing for us." 
G: Did it have implications for getting out the vote, too? 
O: Hopefully it would help a little to get out the vote. 
We covered a lot of ground in a very short period of time and we got as close as we could get to grassroots. We had to go to local leadership and that's as far as you could 
get if you were going to get anything done quickly. And as I say, I don't want to exaggerate the end result of it. It was a strong effort belatedly with a very limited time 
frame to stir the pot and we did stir it to some extent, but it certainly didn't have a major effect on the election results. 
G: Were there any specific things that you did in terms of promoting the get-out-the-vote campaign other than the literature--? 
O: No, other than going over their get-out-the-vote programs and making suggestions on further implementation. Invariably though, as you do in any campaign, you get to, "We 
could do a lot better if we had more money." And that's always tricky, saying, "We're short on the money." That's always in political campaigns. I'm sure your conversation 
with Louie Martin revealed that in that area there was a particularly unique approach to this. 
G: At the time there was a lot of press speculation that you might replace John Bailey as chairman of the DNC. 
O: At that time? 
G: Yes. And later, too. 
O: Yes, I guess there probably was. That seemed a natural. I think a lot of writers just made that basic assumption. I never had any conversations on that subject that I recall. At the 
beginning the idea the Kennedys had was to have Bailey chairman for what they expected would be a relatively brief period of time, then I would succeed him. But that was never 
formalized or discussed in any depth. It was referred to by Bobby and Jack with me on a couple of occasions, but in the Johnson period I don't recall any conversations of that 
[kind]. 
G: Really? 
O: That speculation invariably would be entered into without any discussion with me. I don't recall reporters calling saying, "Now, I have this rumor. Will you confirm?" It was more, 
frankly, reporters figuring that O'Brien could probably better serve as chairman than 
11
O'Brien --Interview X --8 
serving in the White House in congressional relations. 
G: There were also rumors that you were going to leave and perhaps after the campaign even run for office yourself in Massachusetts. Did you--? 
O: Yes. 
G: This was late 1964, early 1965. People were urging you to run in--
O: For the Senate. That was the time when [Leverett] Saltonstall was up for re-election. I guess that's the period. 
G: Yes. 
O: And there were discussions with a number of people. Was that the time? That was later, wasn't it? I think Saltonstall was up in 1966. The reason I say that is when Johnson 
named me PMG at the Ranch, just before the press conference, Arthur Goldberg was urging me to go to Massachusetts and run for the Senate. Teddy Kennedy had urged me, 
also. It became a matter of discussion on the part of a number of people, and I gave it I guess serious thought. As it turned out, Kenny O'Donnell went back to Massachusetts 
and ran for governor. And as it turned out, Saltonstall didn't run; that's when [Edward] Brooke ran and was elected to the Senate from Massachusetts. He was the first black 
senator. I don't recall in 1964 but people would say, "You'd think you're such a political animal that you'd seek office." I had never seriously considered it, except that Senate 
contest. I can't say I ever seriously considered it, but it was brought to my attention and discussed with several friends. 
G: Did the political side of things either as a candidate or as an organizer for someone else appeal to you more than the legislative work that you were doing? 
O: I think the most meaningful experience I had over my years in politics or in government was in the legislative area in the White House. I found it more meaningful than being 
party chairman, even though I had always had a yen to be party chairman from the time I was a kid as a great admirer of Jim Farley. I felt that was the epitome of American 
politics. Therefore [in] my entire early years I never gave any thought to being an elected official, and I don't suggest that I sat dreaming about being national chairman either. But 
if you said to me, "What intrigues you the most about politics?"--as you know, I was engaged in politics from the time I was sixteen--it was the national chairmanship. And I 
think without question it was because Farley was unique and I admired him from afar. And then I became acquainted with Paul Butler when he was chairman in a very difficult 
time, when he was isolated by the Democratic Congress. But, with all of that and reflecting now, having spent a decade in the sports world, being involved as postmaster 
general, the most meaningful activity and the most rewarding to me personally was the period in the White House. 
12
O'Brien --Interview X --9 
G: Is that right? 
O: Yes. I feel that I accomplished something on behalf of the American people. I like to think that. But, you know, you could play a role of some degree of importance. 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 2 
O: Forget all the titles and all the rest of this, the fact is that that was the most significant part of my life. And as I reflect, I can't say that I didn't enjoy everything I've ever been 
engaged in. I was extremely fortunate to have a variety of opportunities, but the fact is that when you think of what you were involved with, in direct proximity to presidents, and 
what you could contribute to the legislative process and what the end result of that process could have on people, that was the most significant area that I was involved in. 
G: Why did you decide not to run for office in Massachusetts? 
O: I never envisioned myself, frankly, as being electable. I found that I could be a strong, aggressive advocate and that I could put my heart and soul into it. I had one great 
weakness and that was I was incapable of fund raising. I never had it in me to confront people and urge or cajole or demand campaign contributions. That was a basic, if you can 
call it that, weakness. I apply that to seeking elective office. And if I sought elective office, that lack of drive in that direction could be devastating. So I just felt that I wasn't 
the kind of guy who was electable. I had never had any interest in being a member of the House of Representatives. I'm sure that I would have enjoyed being a member of the 
Senate. But I wasn't sufficiently motivated to try and I didn't have confidence in myself that I could succeed if I did try. I had come up through political organization and I had 
opportunities which were intriguing, and that satisfied me. There was no way that I would have run against Saltonstall, even though I had reasonably high visibility in Massachusetts. 
In fact, there were polls conducted at some point. But I never got to the point where [I said] "I'm on the verge of this decision. Shall I or shall I not?" It never got that close. I 
just didn't think I was the kind of guy. Maybe I was wrong. If I was, then I guess that was the wrong decision in my life, but I don't think I was wrong. 
G: Was there anyone in particular whose advice you sought when you were trying to decide whether or not to have a political career of your own? 
O: No. I had a pretty good idea of Larry O'Brien in my own mind. 
G: Okay. 
O: Came close to being on the ballot there at one point as a stand-in for Lyndon B. Johnson in Massachusetts, but we'll get to that someday. I volunteered to do that. 
G: This is in 1968, I assume. Okay, just a second. 
13
O'Brien --Interview X --10 
(Interruption) 
O: I know it's not on that list. Joe Napolitan wasn't in government and he had been with me in the Kennedy campaign, and is, I think, one of the most able fellows and political 
operatives I've ever known. He was with me throughout those meetings. He may have missed a couple of them because of his own business affairs. But he was the closest one 
to me in that activity. 
G: Okay, let's talk about some specific problems in various states. One of them regarded Florida and [George] Smathers' vote on Medicare. Do you remember the tie there that--
apparently the two were linked? 
O: In the campaign contest? 
G: Yes, in 1964. 
O: No, I don't. 
G: Smathers had evidently been talking directly to LBJ and maybe trying to get some commitments from him about--
O: Yes. I just don't have any specific recollection. I'm trying to recall what kind of a contest that Smathers was involved in, or was he seeking re-election then? 
G: I don't think he was--
O: No, I don't think so. I just don't know. 
G: In Louisiana you had John McKeithen, the governor there, who was not enthusiastic about your ticket. Do you recall that situation? 
O: Other than he wasn't enthusiastic, I didn't pursue it with him. We went about our business as far as activities in the state were concerned and ignored him. I don't know how Lyndon 
Johnson felt about him but I didn't feel he was worth the effort. He wasn't somebody I felt close to. 
G: Apparently he was attempting to trade an endorsement of LBJ for a commitment from LBJ on the tidelands issue. 
O: Yes, he was trying to deal. What he might be able to do with LBJ was one thing, but I wasn't interested in pursuing some deal with him. We went about our business, as I said. 
G: There's some indication that LBJ used his campaign in Louisiana in 1964 to get Russell Long committed to Medicare. Do you recall the interaction here between legislation and 
14
O'Brien --Interview X --11 
campaign? 
O: There was [interaction]. Russell Long was an important target for us and whatever the President could do, not only in that campaign but on any other occasion, he endeavored to 
improve the relationship, all aimed at his ultimate support. Russell Long's support was very elusive. 
G: Why was that? 
O: Probably basically his own views. He wasn't as elusive as [Harry] Byrd, [Sr.], of Virginia, but--
G: Okay. Do you feel like there was an expanded women's role in this campaign? I know the O'Brien manual seemed to indicate that women were underused, that they didn't play as 
large a role as--
O: I think they remained underused in that campaign, too. 
G: Really? 
O: Yes. 
G: Tell me about the women's organization of that campaign. 
O: It wasn't much, as I recall it. In 1960 and 1964 there were attempts to encourage women's participation. But the leadership roles of women in campaigns were limited in those days. 
This changed dramatically. We had had an unusual experience in women's activities in Jack Kennedy's campaign. That went back to his campaigns for the Senate in 
Massachusetts. There was, for those times, an inordinate amount of women's activity. They were attracted to him. And that brought a lot of women into our activity who were 
not active in politics. That was played to the hilt with the women's teas and receptions. And it was a happy situation, because you had a Rose Kennedy and daughters available for 
these women's activities. And the women enjoyed meeting them. They did a tremendous job of enlisting women and it was part of the original manual, because it was an obvious 
area of real potential. I've never seen anything like ten thousand women at a reception in the street struggling to get in. 
(Laughter) 
It was true in the presidential campaign, too. The jumpers and the screamers, we had names for them on the parade routes. Some of them jumped straight up, some of 
them jumped off the curb. 
(Laughter) 
15
O'Brien --Interview X --12 
G: Well, you had both the women's division of the DNC and you had apparently a women's division of the Johnson for President group. Let me ask you to explain what each of those 
did. 
O: Their concentration was on women's activities. The women went their way to some extent; their activities were aimed at women rather than today where you don't have that 
sort of segregation. 
G: Were there two separate--let's say with reference with 1964, did the women's division of the DNC duplicate what the women of the--? 
O: I have a vague recollection. 
G: Well, wasn't that Margaret Price? Isn't that where she--? 
O: Yes. Incidentally, she was a very good campaigner, very effective. But I think that area was pretty much usurped by the Johnson women's activity. 
G: Oh, was it? 
O: Not purposely so, but it sort of just--
G: And who headed that? 
O: Well, there were several Johnson women involved. Liz [Carpenter] was very much involved. 
G: Lindy Boggs. 
O: Lindy Boggs. 
G: Scooter Miller, wasn't she? 
O: Yes, I was thinking of Scooter. Bess Abell. She was very good. But it was basically the women who had prior campaign experience with LBJ, added to it of course were women 
from state to state. I'd have to go back over the list. There was a national committeewoman in each state. In some states they were very good and in some states 
they weren't, like state chairmen or national committeemen, for that matter. But Margaret Price was the woman who traveled with us in 1960 to the regional meetings representing 
the women's division. She was the spokesperson for women's activity in the Kennedy campaign. She was very competent. Geri Joseph was extremely good, too. Geri Joseph 
really was [with Hubert] Humphrey out of Minnesota. And there was a woman from Wisconsin that I brought aboard in the national committee full-time--Mary Lou Berg. She 
was very impressive in Wisconsin and I persuaded her to come to Washington as a full-
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O'Brien --Interview X --13 
time, salaried vice chairman of the national committee. She stayed on after I left, and ultimately Carter appointed her to a commission. 
G: You indicated the appeal that Jack Kennedy had for women voters and organizers. What about LBJ, did he have a--? 
O: Well, it wasn't comparable. 
G: Nothing of the same--
O: No, it wasn't the same climate. I don't know how to describe it. The women active in LBJ's campaign had the basic motivation that, "We ought to do more for more people," 
the same motivation we all had. With Jack Kennedy there was that added element of excitement he created. I don't want to belittle that. It was very helpful and they were 
very, very enthusiastic. 
G: One activity that women engaged in was that whistle-stop through the South. 
O: Yes. That was extremely well done, and the people we've mentioned were key people. Of course, Mrs. Johnson was the catalyst for all of this activity and they were very effective, 
and it was extremely well done and very meaningful. I was not directly involved in that. That really was probably the highlight organizationally of the campaign. 
G: Oh, really, how so? Why do you say that? 
O: Well, I think it was better handled, well conceived, plenty of planning, and the time frame was well thought out. What we've been talking about was rather hastily conceived 
activity. But it was well received, enthusiastically received, and was a significant plus. What I'm saying is it probably was the best example of an organized national effort in the 
campaign. 
G: Any reason why? Was it who was planning it or--? 
O: Yes, I think the competency of the group, Mrs. Johnson's leadership. You have to remember that Mrs. Johnson was a significant plus. She was held in high regard and then 
you had Muriel Humphrey. 
G: How do you gauge the effectiveness of something like the whistle-stop? What measures--? 
O: The concept was like a candidate's tour. Even with the advent of television and its impact on campaigns, that personal touch motivates, arouses enthusiasm, leaves in its wake a real 
plus. It's something that people who work in campaigns appreciate, too. You make these personal appearances, you have motorcades, you make contact with people who are 
playing significant roles in your campaign locally. 
17
O'Brien --Interview X --14 
I've always said election night is the World Series, the Super Bowl, and the NBA playoffs combined. The stakes are unbelievably high. In victory and defeat, it is almost 
beyond comprehension. At the [Kennedy] Compound in 1960--with Hubert Humphrey through the night in 1968--in the midst of a decision being made by millions and millions 
which is going to have a tremendous impact on the nation, of course, on the people there and that one fellow there with you. 
Election night at the Compound after an effort that had extended over two years was intensive. But the feeling, as the polls closed in the East and you were preparing to 
start taking the returns, that the victory was yours, that the Gallup and Harris polls had closed over the last seventy-two hours to a relatively narrow plus for Jack Kennedy from 
what had been a more comfortable position for several weeks to find as the night wore on that it became more and more a possibility you were going to face defeat, not victory, into 
the hours of the morning. I can't describe it. It extends beyond anything I can envision in terms of impact. 
And that night with Hubert, the early results indicated a very close election. As it turned out, it was a very close election. Then the climate is different, because you went 
into that election night basically accepting defeat. There was little hope for victory though the polls had narrowed in the last seventy-two hours. We were talking about personal 
appearances and tours and whistle stops. Hubert had come out of Texas and California with massive crowds and great enthusiasm the last seventy-two hours. I flew with him to 
Minneapolis. On the plane, I must say, for the first time in the campaign there were some smiles and the feeling that maybe a miracle is going to take place. And you went into the 
wee hours of the morning before you conceded defeat. You know, it's quite an experience to be intimately involved in something like that. 
So we were saying, "Does it mean anything to travel the highways and byways of America in this day and age, when they say you lean on media and package your candidate 
and have so-called professional promoters handle campaigns? I still am not a believer in that. I still think grassroots enthusiasm and interest, if it can be engendered, is very 
significant. You can misjudge though, because in the Kennedy campaign the crowds were fantastic. I still see those hundreds of thousands in Ohio, Cincinnati, Cleveland, and then I 
remember the results coming in from Ohio that night where we lost big. So you can delude yourself with all that, but by the same token I think it is an essential part of the 
American political process, and always will be. I'm not happy with what has happened--more and more packaging impacts on the ultimate decision. That human element, the 
saving aspect, is the debate format that Kennedy and Nixon initiated. 
You were talking about the women's division and women's activities in 1964, the unique aspect of women's activities in 1960. And now you go beyond 1964 to some 
women's activities in the Democratic Party that I found counterproductive. I probably am more sensitive to it than many because I was chairman during part of that period and I 
found them devoid of understanding of team effort or goals that could be achieved. Some 
18
O'Brien --Interview X --15 
presented an image to the American people, and particularly American women, that was negative, and I think set back the women's movement considerably. 
G: Was this in the 1972 McGovern campaign? 
O: Yes. You had that period, but now you move on to normalcy as you'd like to see it, women seeking elective office successfully, women in leadership roles, a woman on the 
Supreme Court; that is real progress. You had to go through these phases. Women's rights were neglected for decades. But the advocates who captured Eastern Establishment 
media centers were unfortunate leaders at that time, but that's no longer the case. Now you find in Nebraska both nominees for governor are women. And I think it's great. The 
women of 1964, Mrs. Johnson and those associated with her, Muriel Humphrey and those associated with her, belonged to a different era. They were involved for the same reasons 
that men were involved. 
Now, you have the abortion struggle and right-to-life and NOW, but even with that, I think there's much more attention directed by women to the problems of the nation 
and the challenges to the nation. Women are more involved and motivated to be activists in politics than existed in my earlier days. And that's a natural evolvement. I've never 
taken to groups that have one single, limited objective and to hell with everything else. Either you're with them or against them. If you're not with them twenty-four hours a day 
for a lifetime, you're against them. All other matters that impact on all of us are ignored. This new era's involvement on the part of women is very healthy for the country. 
G: You talked about election night in 1960 and 1968. Let me ask you to go into some detail on your memories of 1964. 
O: [In] 1964 I wasn't with Johnson on election night. 
G: Where were you? 
O: I was in Washington. But we talked two or three times during the course of the evening. He called and we talked on the phone. 
G: Do you recall the conversation? 
O: Updating the election returns of the moment, projections that we both had heard or what it looked like in terms of the total electoral vote. He was excited; so was I. But it's not 
the same if you're not with the candidate. We were going to win with 56 per cent of the vote, 58 per cent; you're going to carry forty-seven states, as I thought he would, or forty-four 
as he did, whatever it was. There's an ingredient missing. The drama is far different when you have a candidate in a close situation for the highest office in the world. 
G: Do you think that Johnson created a goal for himself, trying to surpass Roosevelt's record? 
19
O'Brien --Interview X --16 
O: It entered his mind. There were references to what Roosevelt had done. That's normal. You reach a position where it isn't whether you're going to win, but how big. At that 
point you would like to set some records. You might be the batting champion this year, but if you didn't hit over .400 you haven't topped Ted Williams. 
G: Was the space program an issue in 1964? Was there a feeling that Goldwater would cut back on the space program? 
O: The overriding issue in 1964 was very simply, in one word, Goldwater. Public attitude was this fellow Johnson has been president a brief period of time. He's entitled to have a 
real swing at this. That's number one and that's a terrific plus. Then the opponent is making what are conceived to be some statements that scare you. We encouraged the 
scare side of it. The campaign issue was Goldwater and the finger on the trigger, if there was an issue. There were two: one, Lyndon Johnson seems a good guy doing a good job, 
he hasn't had much opportunity to get the job done and there's no reason why you shouldn't let him have a full term. And even if you didn't feel strongly that way, look at 
the alternative; the alternative scares the hell out of me. So you put those factors together and you have a nice situation for yourself. 
G: Was there a Republican thrust aimed at limiting this get-out-the-vote campaign that you've spoken of? 
O: To some extent voting rights legislation has changed the procedure of registration--the elimination of poll tax requirements and all that. But from the time I was a kid through 
these campaigns we're talking about, the Democratic Party at all levels would make an effort to register people. The Republican Party would make an effort to put roadblocks in 
the way of registration or maintain existing roadblocks. That has been the course of the two-party system's history. The Democrats would fare better if they could get more 
people registered because inevitably a significant majority of those people would vote Democratic. The Republicans knew that higher registration, including ethnic groups, and 
massive black registration would be negative to the Republican Party. 
So voter registration was always greatly emphasized by the Democrats, and avoidance of registration was emphasized on the Republican side. I remember the battles; 
we were always trying to get postcard registration, easy access, longer hours, all of that. And the Republicans would fight every bit of it, make it as difficult as they could. It's a 
little reminiscent of my earliest days in politics when there was a mayor of Boston, James Michael Curley, whom the Republicans abhorred. There was no way you could defeat 
James Michael Curley for mayor of Boston. A Republican governor, a Republican legislature in Massachusetts, passed a law that the mayor of Boston could not succeed 
himself. The mayor of every other city in Massachusetts could succeed himself. That was the way to get rid of Curley, but he fooled them and he became governor before he 
ultimately wound up in jail. The approach in the history of the Republican Party is to limit the opportunity to vote. 
20
O'Brien --Interview X --17 
G: You were saying that others you had to seek out. 
O: My initial involvement was first get them registered and then secondly get them to the polls. That was the name of the game and the numbers were there, but the percentage of 
voter participation was extremely low compared to the establishment. So that was the battle. 
G: There was an Operation Eagle Eye that the Republicans had that year. Do you know anything about that? 
O: Well, that was some group that toured the country observing Democratic meetings and appearances. Is that the one? 
G: I don't know. 
O: Yes, they may have been called Operation Eagle Eye--this was going to be Truth in Campaigning. They would follow the candidates and call a press conference immediately 
following appearances. They created a little publicity and a little interest. 
The Republican attack, or attempt, on LBJ in 1964 really was a personal one. There was little or nothing to attack him on in terms of his record. So they had to per-sonalize 
the attack or try to. 
G: Okay. Now, the victory gave you not only a four-year term for LBJ but a big majority in the Congress. Did you have any idea that you were going to get this kind of a landslide? 
O: No, in my wrap-up I gave to the President, I tried to project district by district, state by state, Senate contest by Senate contest, along with the presidential election. And my 
projection on the Senate side was that there would be a net gain of three seats, and we had a net gain of two. On the House side, I projected a net gain of at least seventeen, and it 
was a conservative projection. I wanted to be conservative and probably had in my mind a maximum of twenty-five. Actually it extended to thirty-three, thirty-five or something like 
that. We were envisioning some improvement in the Senate, and that wasn't overriding because we were in pretty good shape anyway. A swing in the House could really make a 
big difference, because that'swhere most of our problems were, combating the House Rules Committee and trying to break down the coalition. The result in 1964 gave us that 
direly needed elbowroom and provided us with an opportunity to move more aggressively. A reflection of those election results was the immediate action in the House to liberalize 
the procedure on the twenty-one-day rule. 
Overnight you could see the result. There were occasions when the twenty-one-day rule was put into effect. But more than that, bills moved out of the Rules Committee 
because they had to anticipate they would be taken from them. You didn't have this horrible delay, the road was just made much smoother, and Lyndon Johnson seized that 
opportunity. The net result was the Great Society program. 
21
O'Brien --Interview X --18 
G: You indicated before we turned on the tape that initially he was apprehensive about supporting that reform. 
O: Yes. We had gone through that enlargement of the Rules Committee battle in 1961, and it was a very hairy experience. If we got into the battle on House procedure, it could stir up 
a lot of enmity and create a climate at the outset that would be counterproductive. 
I don't recall that he was at all adamant about going for it. He was concerned and we discussed it. It was suggested by some columnist that I prevailed upon them to move 
in that direction and urged action. I don't recall that it took that kind of prevailing. Yes, he was concerned, and maybe I was, too. But you seize the opportunity, and there it was. 
They knew on the Hill that even if you didn't have the twenty-one-day rule or the other change we were probably going to be in pretty good shape in any event. It turned out to 
be a relatively easy change. 
G: Another development after this election was apparently at a cabinet meeting that was held two weeks after the election. He read a statement urging them to put their very best 
people in the departmental congressional liaison spots. 
O: Yes. 
G: I think the statement was something to the effect that he considered it the most important job in the department except for the cabinet officer himself. 
O: And he did. That's the way he felt about it. 
G: Let me ask you to give me the background of that statement. 
O: Well--
G: Sounds like something you might have been involved in. 
O: First of all, as vice president, Johnson was intimately acquainted with my department and how it functioned. He recognized the procedures and all of that. And when he asked me 
to stay on, the whole thrust was to do exactly what I'd been doing, and "I'm going to give you every element of support in that effort that I can, to upgrade it, to further emphasize 
it." That was part of the conversations we had. 
As part of this whole thing--I don't know whether to get into it now or not, but we can--along with a couple of Kennedy stalwarts who were very close to Kennedy, Dave 
Powers and Ken O'Donnell, I had submitted my resignation after the President was elected. We felt it was appropriate--and I certainly was a staunch advocate--to stay with 
the President from the time of the assassination through the election and do the best job we could. He was operating through that period with really a dual staff overlapping, not 
22
O'Brien --Interview X --19 
in my area, but overlapping with O'Donnell and Sorensen. It clearly wasn't something that could or should continue. If the President felt some personal reservations about 
suggesting changes because he felt some loyalty to us, it was our feeling that the best thing to do was to submit resignations without creating any problems for him at all. And that 
was done. 
He accepted Ken's resignation, accepted Dave's resignation, and then asked Jack Valenti to meet with me to discuss what he might be able to do to be helpful to Dave, 
because Ken was going on his own. That developed into a conversation that Jack and I had that he relayed to the President that brought Dave into the Kennedy Library. 
But with me, he wasn't accepting and it presented difficulties. I recognized that the New Frontier program, the portions not enacted, would now be folded into the 
Johnson program along with his own proposals. The change in the House obviously was going to make my successor's life a lot easier than my life had been. But overridingly I 
didn't want the President, who had indicated that he was happy with my work, to feel any obligation. So clear the deck and do it in an appropriate manner. 
So he asked me to sit down with him to discuss it. He couldn't understand why I would leave now. After the struggle of four years, the opportunity presents itself to com-plete 
Jack Kennedy's program. And [he said] didn't I feel some responsibility in his memory and my long association with him? And he carried on from there. He assured me 
that he would support everything I did in congressional relations. As he said often, he's available twenty-four hours a day. I understood all he was saying and his motivation. 
So we reached an agreement. I didn't mean to be arrogant, but I certainly had a lot of nerve to be making an agreement with the President of the United States, on my terms. 
The agreement was that I would stay through that session--whenever the session ended--with the proviso that [the fact that] I had submitted my resignation would be publicly 
known, so it wouldn't be misrepresented later; that he and I would close out the subject and it would not be reopened again, and that at the end of the session we would 
handshake goodbye. And that was agreed to. 
Part of this conversation was that, by God, he was going to put the wood to the cabinet, and his staff would be instructed that anything that I asked them to do they were 
to do it. That was a priority. The best people available in the administration would be involved and cabinet members would be held accountable at all times for the progress of 
their legislation. As you know, with that I incurred the enmity of some who thought I should not have stayed with Lyndon Johnson. 
G: Did Ken O'Donnell understand your situation, do you think? 
O: I think that there was--not that we ever had words--sort of a break, not any meanness, not any exchanges but a rupture. Some of his friends had negative comments regarding me, 
and on one occasion my administrative assistant Claude Desautels was taken to task in a 
23
O'Brien --Interview X --20 
restaurant. He was distraught when a couple of them told him what they thought of him still being with me and with Johnson. I ignored that. The staunchest advocate that I 
remain in my position with Johnson was Bobby Kennedy, who came to me and urged me to stay. He said that he understood that the President was interested in my staying and he, 
Bobby Kennedy, thought it was absolutely the right thing to do, which I very much appreciated. 
So you moved on to upgrade the process. The legislative program was always on the agenda at cabinet meetings in the Kennedy period and even greater emphasis was 
personally placed on it by the President, as well as on cabinet accountability. 
G: The cabinet departments became more responsible for individual pieces of legislation in 1965 than they had been, say, the previous--
O: No, the responsibility had always been there, but the accountability--
G: Oh, I see. 
O: --was revved up. The same procedure continued--the weekly reporting to me, my summary of the reports to the President, the meetings in the Fish Room [of] the 
congressional relations people. There were occasions when the President dropped in unannounced to those meetings and sat in. The development of flow charts for the 
leadership breakfasts. 
G: Did Johnson feel that this was the time to maximize his effort, in 1965? Was this--? 
O: Yes. You would launch it with the most meaningful domestic proposal that had been hanging around for years: Medicare. You'd move with Medicare first: HR 1 and S 1, the 
first legislative proposal of the new Congress. You would move as rapidly and as aggressively as you could. Move everything as fast as you could. That was the approach. 
I had never had to question whether he read my weekly legislative report. He would with great vigor pursue the agenda that I prepared for the leadership breakfasts; he 
would appropriately emphasize the progress, or lack of it, of the legislative program at cabinet meetings. He would be available to do anything in that area. You try to limit and 
husband his activities so they would be meaningful when he was engaged. The record shows it was done. 
G: To what extent was this upgrading that he urged the cabinet members to proceed with? Was it a question of replacing the men in the positions with more senior, more capable 
people, or was it a question of upgrading to under secretary or assistant secretary level the men who were already--? 
O: No, not the latter so much. It was due notice to them that whoever was responsible for congressional relations better be the best guy they could find or they were going to [be] 
24
O'Brien --Interview X --21 
held accountable. If things bogged down in the Department of Agriculture, then the White House would be taking another look at the ability of not only the secretary of 
agriculture but the congressional relations fellow and he was going to be in trouble. And it was up to him to get the best. What position the fellow held, assistant secretary, wasn't 
nearly as important as the fellow's ability and capacity. He must be the best on your staff. 
G: Was this successful in getting better people in the congressional liaison and did you feel like there was improvement? 
O: As a group, they were effective from the beginning. There wasn't a cabinet member who didn't respond immediately to my phone call from day one, because Jack Kennedy had 
done the same thing. The style was different, but he had made it clear to the Hill. When he became president there was a tendency on the part of some to try to deal directly with 
him. He would always ask, "Have you discussed this with Larry?" "Well no." "You ought to talk to Larry about this." That was helpful. In thirty days I was accepted 
throughout that Hill, the word was out: this guy does speak for the President, he has the President's support, open the doors to him. 
Now, with Lyndon Johnson, it was a matter of style; he was more direct. Jack Kennedy might not have said to the cabinet, "Now, I expect you to have the best man." 
The assumption would be that with the kind of accountability we had initiated, which had never existed before, you would have to be pretty dumb not to know that this was top 
priority. Lyndon Johnson thrust himself into this. On occasions when we had a setback--I've told that story--it epitomized the Johnson attitude toward the legislative program. I 
waited until he was awake to tell him we had lost the roll call. He wanted to know what time it happened. I replied it was four o'clock, and "Well, you should have called me right 
then, because if you're bleeding up there, Larry, I want to bleed with you. We're together in this." He said, "You shouldn't wait"--(Laughter) which is quite--
But anyway, I went along about my business and later on Johnson had great fun adhering to the handshake agreement but finding another direction to take. He never 
brought up the subject again. Only after the fact, after I was postmaster general, he reminded me that I was to keep my office in the White House, too. That's when I 
suggested to him that Henry Hall Wilson replace me. He held Henry in high regard but he was not going to make a change. So he got his way, and I haven't a moment's regret. It 
was a great period. I recalled Bobby saying "Stay, for God's sakes, this is where you belong." 
End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview X 
25
    [ Part 11: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--51 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XI*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XI 
PREFERRED CITATION 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XI, 7/ 24/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XI, 7/ 24/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
3
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-22 
4
O'Brien --Interview XI --1 
INTERVIEW XI 
DATE: July 24, 1986 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 4, Side 1 
G: Okay, why don't we begin 1965? You talked briefly last time about the impact that the election had on the Congress and the large majorities. 
O: Yes. Well, of course, we struck it rich in terms of that election, and I think I had projected to the President that we would pick up seventeen, twenty or something House 
seats. We actually picked up double that, around thirty-eight, I guess, [and] picked up a couple of seats in the Senate. I projected two or three. The end result was we had 
two-to-one Democratic majorities in the House and Senate moving into the Eighty-Ninth Congress, the largest Democratic majority, I guess, in twenty, twenty-five years or more. 
So the stage was set and a lot of the problems that had existed over those early years perhaps would dissipate if we handled things properly. And in that context we felt that at 
long last we probably could finalize the break that we had been looking for in the southern Democrat-Republican coalition. That was a troublesome matter and had been for many 
Congresses. 
So, of course, the first item that you would focus on under those circumstances was Medicare. Medicare was pre-eminent in our efforts and had been from 1961. We had 
worked arduously to try to move Medicare in every way we could. We had a considerable amount of support from Clint Anderson and others on the Senate side. We couldn't budge 
Wilbur Mills. There had been strong opposition from the AMA and others over a period of years and it had been effective. But now it was conceivable that you could bring about 
a change in Wilbur Mills' view. Attempts to tack Medicare on in conference had failed. Other attempts to act on Medicare had failed and it was a very frustrating situation. We 
anticipated a very fruitful Eighty-Ninth Congress, the first session, particularly. Underscoring that the movement on Medicare, HR 1 and S 1, which started immediately 
and culminated in, at long last, victory. 
Of course, it was not confined solely to Medicare. We had been frustrated also in our attempt to enact education legislation, elementary, secondary. We had the religious 
problem crop up on a number of occasions that stymied action in this area. Part of our 1965 challenge was to creatively come up with a proposal that could bridge these 
problems and bring about effective action in that area. 
5
O'Brien --Interview XI --2 
And then of course we had any number of legislative proposals in mind. We were going to finalize the New Frontier program and launch the Great society program. And 
there were a lot of innovative programs that Lyndon Johnson had in mind that would be the focus for the Great Society. So we had a full plate. Our optimism was based on the 
election and that we had in place what we felt was an effective congressional relations program in which most of us involved, and certainly that applied to the President, had 
been through legislative struggles. We were not, as we had been in 1961, attempting to build a procedure. Spearheading all of this was the Medicare effort. 
The fact is the first session of the Eighty-Ninth was most productive in the history of the country. It brought comparisons with Roosevelt's first hundred days. It wasn't a 
valid comparison. The Supreme Court had knocked out most of the Roosevelt proposals that were enacted to attack a tremendous problem, the Depression, he had inherited as 
president. And with us, I think it was somewhat different. A commitment that had been made by the Democratic Party and by us in the Kennedy-Johnson period had not been 
fulfilled. Go back to the five-vote margin to expand the Rules Committee. There was further change in procedure in subsequent years, but he moved from that to very close 
calls in a number of roll calls in the House, pretty good luck in the Senate. It seemed the switch of thirty-eight House seats in the 1964 election would give you just that additional 
elbowroom that could make the difference, and it did make the difference. It was a very productive session of Congress, it impacted on the vast majority of American people. 
Medicare was pre-eminent in that regard. Of course you had voting rights, you had higher education, you had the whole field of medical research and--oh, you can name 
it. At the end of that session, of eighty-eight proposals that had been made to the Congress we had succeeded in eighty-four, which was just miraculous. It was 
unbelievable. Nothing like that had ever occurred in terms of depth and impact. And of the four we failed on, one of them was the old Taft-Hartley 14( b) and another was home 
rule for the District of Columbia, and there were a couple of other matters. But when you look at that record in one session of Congress, it's just phenomenal. 
G: In terms of your own operation in the congressional relations office, was there a change from 1964 to 1965? 
O: The congressional relations function was in place, the people involved were knowledgeable, experienced. There was in existence--it had been growing over the 
years--a relationship [between] the White House and most of the members of Congress. And that included the other side of the aisle. And that was there. You have the 
departures of some who in a few instances were troublesome for us. We didn't inaugurate any procedures, it was more of the same with more to work with. That didn't mean that 
you could just sit and it would all happen. But if you could enact Medicare, for example, which had been a commitment of the Democratic Party back to Congressman Aime 
Forand from Rhode Island and from 1961 now into 1965. If you could accomplish this twenty-year goal that went back even to attempts of Harry Truman to secure action, if you 
had nothing else, the first session of the Eighty-Ninth Congress would have been, I think, 
6
O'Brien --Interview XI --3 
historic. 
G: Was Congress itself changing, not in terms of the proportions you've already indicated? 
O: Yes, it was changing in terms that I keep referring to--this so-called coalition in the House. It existed in the Senate, too, but in the House it had greater impact. It was an 
alliance, really, of southern Democrats and the Republicans who [had] effectively blocked, over many years, social legislation, civil rights. So the numerical advantage of the 
Democratic Party in the House was a phantom. It just wasn't there. In order for us to realistically count the House, we had to count perhaps ninety southern Democratic 
members along with the Republicans and say, "This is just about even. Anything you can accomplish, you're going to accomplish with a five-or six-vote margin or lose it by that." 
This had been an extremely effective procedure that went to the Democratic Party nationally. The difficulties in bridging the varying views in the Democratic Party had been 
in existence for some time. It became a matter of intense involvement with the advent of civil rights legislation. The Democratic Party platforms over a number of presidential 
elections advocated equal rights. It never faced reality, but you could mouth these platitudes. 
A southern Democrat could recognize it for what it was. He would just maintain his historic position. Any time there was an effort congressionally, that effort was 
stymied, so the Democratic Party went on with this patchwork quilt, a supposed national party. If you analyze the House of Representatives--I don't intend to focus on the House 
exclusively; [it existed in] the Senate too, obviously, in filibusters--you had a two-party House. You had Democrats and then you had a southern Democrat-Republican side of 
the House. We had worked arduously to try to break that one on one, from the time that we went into the White House in 1961, and we had some degree of success. Sometimes it 
was success that was not really clear on the record. Some southern Democrats, to help Kennedy, or Johnson later, would do a little behind-the-scenes maneuvering, agree to 
move legislation they might oppose in a roll call, that sort of thing. That was breaking down. 
We approached the 1964 election feeling that we had reduced the southern Democratic opposition to "liberal legislation" from ninety-plus to sixty or lower. There 
were some indications in roll calls we had cut it even further. That was primarily because of the intensive effort that was undertaken by the White House, by President Kennedy, 
Vice President Johnson, and later President Johnson. And it was really one on one. People like George Mahon and Al Thomas and Carl Vinson and any number of rather 
senior southern Democrats were anxious to be of some help if they could. 
Now you have an unfinished agenda, the New Frontier; several New Frontier proposals had not been enacted. You have the advent of a broadly based Great Society 
program of President Johnson. Now you have a two-pronged objective. 
But you have that elbowroom. Eighty-four out of eighty-eight legislative 
7
O'Brien --Interview XI --4 
proposals made by the White House were enacted into law. I've tried to impress upon people in discussions the human element in all of this, that it isn't a cold statistic. This guy 
or gal has been elected to represent a district or state reflecting the attitude of his or her constituency. That person has no desire to embarrass or demean the president. Progress 
was made inch by inch or often was due to human relations. People wanted to be helpful with respect to the office of the presidency, rather than on the substance or merits of the 
legislative proposal. If it didn't have merit it wasn't going anywhere anyway. 
But to have people say, "This is tough for me. But I want to help. I don't have strong opposition, I'm just trying to protect myself politically. Maybe I can take an extra 
step, because I do want to be helpful." Better those kinds of discussions than, "I don't like section so-and-so of the bill, if it is adjusted then perhaps I might have a change of view." 
Of course, you go through all of that, but a lot had to do with the relations the President had with the individual members of Congress, not only the leadership, but across the 
board, and the maintenance of a great degree of one-on-one contact in every way conceivable to ensure that. This human relationship that I talk about was in existence, was 
growing, was improving, as time went on. 
You had more to work with starting in January 1965, but people have the feeling that the president of the United States can work his will with the Congress. When the 
president is successful, then the press says, well, the Congress is a rubber stamp. When the president isn't successful, well, he can't seem to provide leadership, and the Congress 
would follow his leadership if he were a strong leader. 
The fact is that you could have had, in 1965, the same statistical breakdown of the Congress and a president in the White House, Democratic president, and have not 
succeeded as President Johnson did during that first session. You just can't get away from that. There is nothing automatic. It requires a strong president who has leadership 
qualities and is fully committed to the nitty-gritty of legislative progress. And a lot of it was nitty-gritty, consuming the president's time, involving him in a lot of things the 
president probably should not be involved in. 
G: Is there, then, by implication the fact that the members of Congress would support a piece of legislation advanced by a president of their own party whereas they might not support it 
if it were put forward by the other--? 
O: I think you start with that concept, then you have a starting point. But our role, working for the President re the Congress, had to be in focus. Our position re the Congress should 
be understood. We should remind ourselves constantly that no one downtown has been elected to office except the president of the United States and everyone we were dealing 
with on the Hill had been elected to office. We should be conscious of that at all times and understanding of it. And while we should do what we could to bring about 
accomplishment, we should never overlook the desire of every member of Congress to survive politically. 
8
O'Brien --Interview XI --5 
A member was not prepared to commit political hara-kiri in our interests. In that context keep working arduously in the interests of the president's program. Too little 
attention, too little organized effort by the White House with the Congress is disastrous, and overplaying your hand would be equally disastrous. 
It took a long time to establish this relationship between the executive and legislative branches and it was always potentially touchy. There was always the possibility 
that you could go too far and it could be counterproductive. Yet, you had broken some barriers. The separation of powers didn't suggest you couldn't communicate. The degree 
of communication was the important aspect and maximizing communication is the approach in any activity in life. It wasn't a great discovery; it was always there but there 
had been a great hesitancy on the part of the White House, historically, to move too close to that line. And there was a view in Congress that the White House must stay a distance 
from the line. As time went on, all that had occurred placed us in a good working position as we launched the Great Society program. 
G: You received and depended to some extent on the support of a number of Republicans who were sympathetic to the substance of some of the legislation issues. 
O: Yes. That's true. As a statistic, the basic head count you'd undertake in the House and Senate on all legislative proposals--let's stay with the House again--of the four hundred 
and thirty-five members, three hundred or more of them were almost automatically up front. 
That doesn't mean that you're not going to have some degree of communication with them, but you are not going to, [in] an allocation of time and effort, place a great deal 
into this category. 
Now you've got a hundred, a hundred and fifty, depending on the issue. This is where this is going to be decided. Many times you wouldn't have nearly that many 
question marks in a head count. So your area of concentration was reduced, not overlooking anything, hopefully. 
Now how do you convert, bring into support, to accomplish the end result? One on one personal contact. My recollection is that President Johnson got 61 per cent of the 
popular vote, something like that. It was two or three percentage points higher than a conservative guesser like me would have envisioned. That can make a difference and it 
did. There were thirty-eight switches in the House. 
To stick with Medicare for a minute, a proposal of the Democratic Party platforms for decades. There had been advocacy on the part of Democratic presidents; Harry 
Truman was the first. It clearly was a commitment made by the party, and we all recognize the party platform probably isn't worth the reading most of the time, and I don't 
think many people ever read a party platform anyway after a convention. 
9
O'Brien --Interview XI --6 
So, with a two-to-one margin in the House, with evidence that you had succeeded in breaking down the coalition, you go for a program that was so broad in its elements 
that it spoke to every Democratic Party position leading with Medicare. In 1961 we avoided the conflict that would take place with little hope of success in civil rights in order 
to get some meaningful legislation without a complete war on the Hill at the beginning and eased into the major legislative commitments, civil rights, in due course down the road. 
The contrast is obvious in 1965. You would approach it by saying, "I'm going to propose legislation in every area of challenge that exists today and has existed over 
time--everything that I, the President of the United States, feel is in the national interest." And that's exactly what happened. There was one goal, 100 per cent success, not any ifs 
or maybes, just "we'll go for it." President Johnson, without hesitancy, made that decision and we went for it. And he was right. It worked. And you can't overlook the additional 
members in the House and the two additional seats in the Senate. 
That traditional House roadblock began to disappear. The power of key Republicans and southern Democrats in terms of a coalition dissipated. And by the end of 
1965 we weren't using the phrase, "southern Democrat-Republican coalition," because it no longer existed. And that brought about a fantastic result. Everything that was 
occurring, every signing ceremony was impacting as we saw it, for good on the nation as a whole. It was fulfilling the role of the federal government. 
We thought we might run out of pens to distribute at signing ceremonies. We had a heavy schedule of signing ceremonies and we weren't immediately focusing on the 
implementation of all of this. How could you assure proper implementation, administration, grassroots productivity in these programs? That came later, and certainly 
some of the adverse comment about some of these proposals that became law had to do with not the substance, not the purpose, not the goals, but the administrative aspects, 
which were faulty in many areas and still are to some extent. But that's beside the point in terms of what our objectives were then. 
Tape 1 of 4, Side 2 
G: Let me ask you to talk a minute, though, about dealing with the Republicans that supported you. Naturally any of your legislative victories accrued to the advantage of the 
President and his party, and it was almost in effect a partisan victory, and yet you did have some Republicans who supported you. How did you keep them from resenting, or in fact 
did they resent the credit that the President and the Democratic Party would take? This seems like a universal problem regardless of which party is in the White House. How do 
you deal with a situation like this? 
O: There were about twenty Republican congressmen who represented what might be called Democratic districts: northern districts for the most part, northeastern districts, a John 
Lindsay-type of district. Those people didn't feel that the accomplishments of Lyndon Johnson were necessarily adverse to their political futures. A [Jacob] Javits from New 
York in the Senate, for example, was not a traditional Republican. 
10
O'Brien --Interview XI --7 
On the House side, Charlie Halleck, the minority leader during my first years of involvement and intensely partisan, held no animosity. Charlie Halleck wasn't going to 
deviate from his established position. The one deviation we discussed in the civil rights legislation, where he was extremely helpful. What are you going to do with a guy who is 
pleasant personally and his opposition is total--he'll do everything he can to block you, but there is no venom? You meet, you have a drink, which I did on occasions. 
Little incidents would crop up from time to time, but overall, whether it was Ev Dirksen--my recollections of Ev Dirksen are all pleasant and really I enjoyed his company, 
it was a pleasant experience--there were occasions here and there when Ev Dirksen was willing to be helpful. Jerry Ford replaced Halleck as we launched into the Eighty-Ninth 
Congress. I have no recollection of Jerry being nasty or mean in waging the legislative battles. I recall Ford, Les Arends, and others on the House side and other Republicans in 
addition to Dirksen, George Aiken, as fine human beings. They had their very strong views, which didn't coincide with our views. But it was never personalized, and I think 
that is a factor which existed to the degree it did in our years because of the progress that was made in person-to-person, individual contacts, social contacts. You weren't strangers 
to each other and there was mutual respect and understanding. 
I certainly never thought that the day would come when I, or indeed, the President of the United States could change Charlie Halleck's views on our legislative proposals. 
But that certainly didn't mean that you would build a barrier between Charlie and you, that you couldn't act in a courteous manner as you fought vigorously. If you were an 
extremely conservative Republican member of the House or Senate, you were in total opposition to the proposals of Democratic presidents. Generally speaking, you could bet 
that reflected his constituency and you understood that. 
If you're going to launch a program across the board, i. e., education, elementary, secondary, higher education; if you're going to get into Appalachia, into voting rights, into 
highway beautification; [if] you want to move vigorously in the field of medicine, research and development, heart, stroke and cancer; that meant a significant involvement in 
people's lives. Opponents would say it was an encroachment on their rights. That was under the guise of opposition to social progress. You were not impressed with that 
argument. 
G: How did Ford's succession of Halleck as minority leader change the Republican opposition? 
O: There was a contrast in personalities. 
G: How so? 
O: Halleck had the reputation, and deservedly so, of being heavy-handed in his approach to the battles while Ford was much less of a wild-eyed opponent. There was a difference in 
11
O'Brien --Interview XI --8 
personalities but Ford and Mel Laird, as they moved into leadership positions, functioned basically as Halleck had functioned. There was a vigorous effort to maintain party loyalty 
on their part. I had a lot of kidding around with Halleck--as I said before, Halleck for some reason insisted on calling me O'Toole as a nickname. And with Halleck, on a roll 
call, you'd make a token bet on whether you'd win or lose. You didn't have those discussions with Ford, that wasn't his nature. 
G: He was just more reserved? 
O: Yes, a different style, but the same basic approach and the same efforts were expended. Ford had a more serious problem, than Halleck, going back to the election statistics. 
G: Was one more skillful than the other? 
O: Halleck was of the old school. He emphasized party loyalty to a greater degree than Ford. Ford would try to focus more on the substance rather than the partisan black-and-white 
and there-is-no-middle-road approach of Charlie. I am not sure that in the final analysis there was much difference. They had their aggravations. Charlie had them and Jerry had 
them with that twenty or so--we might have gotten twenty-two Republican votes on some proposals. That was frustrating to them; they did have Republicans they couldn't keep in 
line. But after all, we were more frustrated, over the early years at least, with the number of Democrats that we were unable to bring into line. 
G: Lyndon Johnson has been quoted as very colorfully questioning Ford's abilities. Was this--? 
O: Well, I think that Ford--well, let's go to Halleck and Dirksen. 
G: The Ev and Charlie show? 
O: Yes, Ev and Charlie never really bothered us. We saw humor in it because these two guys in tandem in the public arena were not effective, and they were subjected to a lot of 
ridicule by the press. 
With Jerry--it's not fair to say that Charlie was colorful and Jerry was bland. Charlie was colorful in his own way, and he'd have some of these quotable quotes once in 
a while. Jerry on the other hand seemed to pretty much fulfill his task in a workmanlike way. But I don't recall Jerry as overly effective in presenting the Republican point of view 
in the public arena. His leadership was reasonably effective. I don't recall any Republican insurrections concerning his leadership. When Jerry Ford became President [there were] 
stories of supposed ineptness, stumbling off planes or hitting some spectator with a golf ball. People would say, "Jerry didn't wear his helmet when he played football," that sort of 
thing. I think Jerry took it in pretty good style. I liked him. He was a nice guy. It sounds strange, I guess; you would think that if you spend years working on legislative programs 
you're probably engaged in a war, that all kinds of viciousness takes place. 
12
O'Brien --Interview XI --9 
I enjoyed those people; even when they frustrated me. I didn't take it personally. President Johnson probably articulated what some of us privately said from time to time 
regarding Jerry Ford, but it wasn't personal. I don't think President Johnson considered Ford a strong adversary. For him and for Halleck, once those southern Democrats start to 
disappear from your side, you were placed in a difficult position to try to stop the Johnson steamroller. 
G: Of the Republican leaders, who was the most intelligent and the most skillful? 
O: A fellow who impressed me on the Republican side was Mel Laird. I think Mel Laird probably was as skillful and as intelligent as any of the Republicans. On the Senate side I 
was impressed with George Aiken, maybe because of his style, but he was respected, listened to, and had impact on the Republican side of the aisle. Laird was in that position 
in the House. And there were a few others. 
G: Ford announced the formation of a House Republican planning and research committee headed by Charles Goodell to formulate long-term policies. What was the effect of this 
group? 
O: I don't recall any particular effect. 
G: Really? None? 
O: I suppose it's not right to say none without researching it. Goodell is bright and not in the category of conservative Republican. But my only recollection of Ford's action in that 
area was, "It's just a matter of forming another committee." That's my best recollection of it. 
G: On the Democratic side, Russell Long was elected to succeed Hubert Humphrey as Democratic whip. What was the significance here? 
O: Well, you had two different personalities to start with. Russell Long would reflect southern interests that Hubert Humphrey didn't reflect. Russell Long was considered a 
smart operator. But we felt that he was an excellent behind-the-scenes manipulator. He had a kit of tools that he used effectively at one stage and that was the chairmanship of the 
Senate Campaign Committee. 
Russell Long had the ability to do significant fund-raising. Russell Long and Hubert obviously shared a keen desire to have a large majority of Democrats. While 
Russell Long and Paul Douglas would not see eye to eye on many legislative proposals, he made sure that he was able to provide financial assistance to Paul Douglas in his 
re-election campaign because Russell Long would never think that it was better to have a Republican from Illinois in the Senate than Paul Douglas. Long was a realist, very much a 
pol. So there was a great contrast between Humphrey and Long, in their personalities, 
13
O'Brien --Interview XI --10 
their general approach to dealing with people. Obviously Russell Long had some strong regional interests which Humphrey didn't share. 
G: Long defeated [John] Pastore and [Mike] Monroney for the post. How did that happen? 
O: Well, it was a split vote, a three-way split. We avoided direct involvement in organizing the Congress. There were times when we tried in our own way to bring about committee 
assignments, but we were very circumspect in that regard. In that contest, it was a matter of Mike Monroney and Pastore splitting a constituency. 
G: Of more liberal or moderate constituents? 
O: Yes, they were splitting the liberal members between them. 
G: Did the White House have a preference in that race? 
O: If we did, we didn't enunciate it. 
G: I guess all three of them had been friends of Johnson's. 
O: Yes, yes. When you say the White House, I don't recall the President expressing any serious interest or any concern. 
G: The Steering Committee was enlarged with Eugene McCarthy and Pat McNamara going on this committee. 
O: That was reflecting the change in the makeup of the Senate. There were two liberal senators added to the Steering Committee which better reflected the Democratic 
membership as a whole. 
G: Did the White House have a role here? 
O: I don't recall any role. 
G: Now, the fact that the Senate Democrats had about a two-to-one majority meant that the committee ratios had to be changed and this was done except in the Finance Committee, 
apparently. 
O: Yes, but Long objected to Mansfield's proposal and blocked it. 
G: Why would Long object? 
O: Long was content with the numerical breakdown that existed. From his own point of view, he felt that he had a reasonable degree of control and he wasn't going to take on the 
additional burden of a couple of liberals who might make it more difficult for him. That 
14
O'Brien --Interview XI --11 
was the surprise factor, that Long would actually oppose the Majority Leader. It is a reflection again of the hard-hitting approach of Long, and his great attention to the politics 
and maneuvering in the Senate. 
G: Do you think his position was designed to protect something like the oil depletion allowance or--? 
O: I'm sure that wasn't overlooked. No one ever would suggest that Russell Long couldn't count, and the Mansfield proposal would have affected his count in his own mind. His 
ability to protect the interests of his constituents would be a matter to which he would be very attentive. For example, Russell Long was able through his fund-raising activities to 
provide financial assistance to Paul Douglas, but that wouldn't necessarily mean that Russell Long would look forward to Paul Douglas being added to his committee. 
G: Wasn't [Harry] Byrd, [Sr.], still chairman of Finance? 
O: Yes. 
G: It seems like that Long is exercising more control over the committee than perhaps would be normal if he were not the chairman. How do you explain that? 
O: You explain it by just taking another hard look at Russell Long. Russell Long worked that floor and his colleagues extremely well. There was nothing passive about Russell 
Long. As we're talking, he is still very, very much the activist even though he is about to leave the Senate. 
G: Now, in the House Mendel Rivers succeeded Carl Vinson as chairman of the Armed Services Committee. How did this change affect--? 
O: A Rose Garden walk that Vinson notwithstanding--we had developed a comfortable relationship with Carl Vinson. We had great respect for him as everyone did. I remember 
Carl Vinson trying to be helpful in such things as minimum wage. He was a statesman in the House, widely recognized. 
Mendel was a rather mercurial guy who had the capacity at times to get his name in print on some offbeat activities. He was an entirely different kind of fellow, but there 
was a unique aspect to Mendel Rivers. It was his relationship with John McCormack which always intrigued me, because he would proudly proclaim he was a "McCormacrat." 
It didn't seem to reflect itself in his voting record, but he was a staunch supporter of McCormack's leadership positions through the years. It was brought to my attention on a 
number of occasions, in meetings in the Speaker's office, meetings when he was the majority leader. Mendel Rivers would react to a McCormack request, not fully--John 
McCormack couldn't say, "Mendel, I want you to vote for X legislation." But he might say to Mendel, "Maybe I can get a pair from you or you could remain quiet on this, or 
take a walk." So in replacing Vinson we were dealing with a very different type of fellow, 
15
O'Brien --Interview XI --12 
but we didn't envision that it would be detrimental to our activities in the committee. 
G: There were also some changes in the Rules Committee that were designed to make it easier for the speaker to bring legislation to the floor. 
O: You know the history of the Rules Committee over those years going back to the original rules fight in 1961. The minimum requirement to open the door for consideration of 
legislation was to increase the membership of the Rules Committee, and the proposal assured us of a bare majority. But that didn't occur when we got to education legislation. 
Now you had additional changes in the Rules Committee. You get the twenty-one day rule to bring a bill to the floor. With those changes, the hands-at-the-throat Rules 
Committee situation was eliminated. And that was real progress. We wouldn't have succeeded in 1961. We were lucky to get what we did. 
You think back on that body and the power of that Rules Committee, which the committee used effectively over the years, to block progressive legislation time after time. 
Just in that brief few years that power had been taken from the committee. 
G: Did the administration or the White House play a role--O: 
Oh, yes. 
G: --in advancing these changes or initiating them? 
O: We weren't interfering in terms of assignments to a committee. That can get pretty sticky and could be counterproductive. In this, we were in total accord with what was being 
attempted and we had no reticence about expressing our view and applauding it when it was accomplished. 
G: Who initiated these changes? 
O: It evolved from general discussions that we had with the leadership, reflecting on the election returns. 
You have to remember the leaders had their frustrations. Sam Rayburn and McCormack and [Carl] Albert and [Hale] Boggs, along with Democratic members, had a 
great feeling of frustration regarding the Rules Committee. [Howard] Smith of Virginia was a key figure for a long time, and was a very key guy in the coalition. 
Tape 2 of 4, Side 1 
G: Were these changes in the Rules Committee advanced with the idea of promoting a specific piece of legislation? 
16
O'Brien --Interview XI --13 
O: I'm sure at that early stage, as reflected by S 1 and HR 1, you were focusing on Medicare, but you were looking beyond Medicare. The leadership, incidentally, probably felt as 
strong or stronger than we did about the change. 
G: Oh, really? 
O: You're with McCormack as speaker; Albert, majority leader; Boggs as whip. You have three leaders that are pretty darn liberal leaders and totally committed to our programs. 
So if they can significantly reduce or eliminate the frustrating aspect of the machinations of the Rules Committee, that is very much in their interest in moving the program along. 
G: Another change I wanted to ask you about. Of course, with the expansion or the change in the ratio as you added more Democrats to Ways and Means in particular, three more 
Democrats came on, three Democrats who were favorably disposed toward Medicare. Did you have a role in that particular--? 
O: Not in picking them specifically, but with Wilbur Mills, he'd obviously have great influence over the new additions to the committee, in fact probably have total control. His 
willingness to add those members with their positions on Medicare and their general liberal approach was an indication that Mills' change of heart was ongoing. 
G: Before we get into the specific legislative measures of this year, I wanted to ask you a little about your own personal situation and the transition that took place within the 
administration, of many of the Kennedy appointees leaving the executive branch and going back to some other pursuit. 
O: Yes, that was--G: 
Let me ask you to describe the process in general first. 
O: Through the period from Dallas through November of 1964, there had been this unusual staff situation in the White House. It had little or no impact on me because of my role, but 
it did have on others. The President's intentions after Dallas to retain the Kennedy staff and add to the staff key people of his had moved along, but clearly--and this was my 
personal point of view--there had to be a change of direction. 
It was all right to function with President Johnson through that year, but he certainly should launch his own administration, elected on his own as president, with that 
intimate, important staff reflecting exactly the kind of a staff he felt he should have, and certainly I agreed. You recognized that this probably presented some problems to the 
President. How was he going to work this out in his best interests? 
There was no doubt in my mind that the proper and appropriate thing to do was to work arduously in President Johnson's interests through his election and then, to ensure 
that he had the fullest degree of comfort, to submit your resignation to him following the 
17
O'Brien --Interview XI --14 
election. That view was shared by a couple of other fellows on the White House staff: Ken O'Donnell and Dave Powers. Dave's situation was a very personal relationship he had 
with Jack Kennedy rather than a particular role he had in the White House. With Ken O'Donnell it was, again, a very close relationship with Jack Kennedy and his area of 
assignment, appointments secretary. The nature of the assignment called for you to be at the right hand of the president every day. 
With me, obviously I was in the White House because of a long association I had with Jack Kennedy. So Ken and I discussed it. It wasn't a matter of debating the issue, it 
was appropriately how to terminate our activities with the President and not have the President conceivably have concern toward us. It was a simple and obvious approach. 
So when the election was over, I thought that a presentation in written form to the President of resignation at the earliest moment following the election was appropriate. 
And interestingly, I drafted my letter of resignation. My secretary, Phyllis Maddock, typed it, and obviously you wanted to keep it confidential. Ken asked me if he could 
utilize Phyllis' services to draft his letter, and I believe also that included Powers. And that's what happened. The letters were typed by Phyllis, basically the same content, I 
guess, and they probably had the same date on them, I don't recall. 
The President came back to Washington. And my best recollection is that I went in to him the day he returned, as soon as I could see him for a few minutes. I said, "I want 
to formally terminate"--I felt very comfortable with him. The relationship I had with him had been very rewarding. The President said that he didn't want to accept a resignation 
from me at that time. He wanted to discuss it further. I don't recall whether this discussion took place at that first rather brief meeting; it probably didn't, but probably 
within a few days. 
I assume O'Donnell talked to him directly--his resignation was accepted. Similarly, Powers' resignation was accepted. And the President promptly launched into a long 
discussion with me, and it was a difficult situation for me in personal terms. 
G: Why do you say that? 
O: Because Ken and I had been very close and had worked in tandem. Ken joined me all the way back in 1952 when I was directing the organization of the Kennedy Senate campaign. 
Ken was new to politics and came to the campaign headquarters. We worked together and had been together throughout. There was a tendency on the part of the press 
occasionally to refer to the Irish Mafia. 
Other Kennedy people--[ Theodore] Sorensen and [McGeorge] Bundy, I guess, and maybe [Arthur] Schlesinger, there were three or four other Kennedy people--had 
taken their own steps to close out their White House activities. I had no plans for the future, in fact I'm sure I hadn't given the future any thought. My focus was on doing the 
right thing at the right time in the right circumstances with the President, with a 
18
O'Brien --Interview XI --15 
handshake. It turned out in Ken's case that he had plans, which I was not aware of at that time--to go back to Massachusetts and run for governor. 
It had been suggested to me that I run for the Senate. In fact, Teddy Kennedy had talked to me about it. I can't say that I had given it serious thought. At a later stage--it 
might have been a matter of days, certainly before Christmas--I learned indirectly of Ken's intentions. And obviously if I had ever given serious thought to the Senate it would have 
made no sense at all; if Ken was running for governor the voters of Massachusetts would not take kindly to two guys deciding to come home and take the two highest offices in the 
state. I wasn't aware of the Ken O'Donnell contemplated action, and I was not seriously thinking about the Senate in any event. 
G: It seems odd that O'Donnell wouldn't have consulted with you. 
O: I never understood it, but anyway, it happened. 
G: Well, what do you think you would have done--? 
O: If I had left? 
G: Yes. 
O: I have no idea. And that's not unusual for me in life. 
G: Do you think you would have gone back to Massachusetts? 
O: I really don't know. I hadn't focused on it. The only subject of discussion had been this Senate situation, which I did not seriously consider. I am sure I would not have run for 
the Senate. 
So the Johnson procedure and style came into play, and we had a long conversation which really was sort of one-sided. 
G: What did he talk about? 
O: Well, the President presented one, "We now have the opportunity to enact the New Frontier program. In addition, we have other objectives in mind, I do, the Great Society 
and so forth. Larry, you're going to leave here and foreclose the opportunity to see the New Frontier program come to fruition, something that you worked hard on over the 
years, and in memory of your close friend and long-time associate, Jack Kennedy. It's hard for me to believe now that you would just walk away from this." 
That was the basic thrust. Clearly, overridingly, I wanted to see that program enacted. I wasn't accepting President Johnson's contention that I was a key to its 
enactment. I'd say it was a typical discussion with the President in terms of the length of 
19
O'Brien --Interview XI --16 
the discussion and the President's position. This whole matter was ultimately resolved by the President and I agreeing that I would stay until the end of the first session of the 
Eighty-Ninth Congress; b) we would not at any future time have further discussion regarding this matter, that my departure would be automatic at the end of the session. We 
couldn't establish a date certain; we didn't have a date certain for the end of the session, obviously. But that would be the conclusion of my activities and that was agreed to. C) I 
pointed out to him that it seemed in my best interests that my resignation and the specifics of my staying be on the public record. That was agreed to, and he adhered to that. He 
later diverted to another direction, but I could never accuse him of violating the agreement. He pointed out to me that when that agreement was made it didn't foreclose 
him from coming up with other ideas that had nothing to do with staying in congressional relations. 
There was a public statement made by the President confirming this so that the record would be clear--I contacted Ken immediately and advised him of this agreement I 
had reached with the President. He made no comment that I recall, but I got the impression he was disappointed that I wasn't leaving. At this time, of course, I'm not 
aware of Ken's future plans. Some of those associated with us in the campaign or campaigns seemed to have an anti-Johnson feeling. Somehow or other, there was some 
responsibility on the part of Johnson for the departure of Jack Kennedy from the presidency, or a resentment that didn't reflect good sense or good judgment, resentment 
toward the Johnson presidency. In any event, there it was and I am going to pursue without interruption activities with the Eighty-Ninth Congress. 
There were a couple of interesting sidebars to that. Bob Kennedy urged me to stay. He said, "If the President wants you to stay I think you certainly should stay. I'd 
love to see the Kennedy program enacted and you can make a contribution to that." But there were others that weren't pleased. My administrative assistant who had been with me 
for years, Claude Desautels, was subjected to some rough comments on the part of some of the old Kennedy people as a result of my action, because Claude was staying with me, 
obviously. I was disturbed about that; I thought it was grossly unfair to Claude. If they had the guts they could take it up with me. But nobody got around to that. 
But it left a lasting feeling on the part of two or three people who were not significant in the administration. Ken and I never had bad words. There was a 
going-away party at Duke Ziebert's for Ken O'Donnell. Bob Kennedy asked me if I would join him in going to the party, which I did. Then Ken ran for governor and lost the 
nomination by a very close margin. He and I had discussions during that campaign and I was helpful to him, so there was never any personal animosity on my part and I don't think 
on his. He carved out his own career and I continued what I was doing. The principals can accommodate to a situation that has some sensitivity, but those on the periphery are 
not apt to handle it well. I've seen that happen in other instances. 
But it was totally unanticipated by me. I envisioned going to the President to formalize the parting, so I was totally taken aback. I must say he was extremely 
20
O'Brien --Interview XI --17 
persuasive. If I didn't do it, I would have regretted it years later because I would have felt that I didn't measure up to responsibility and challenge. But that's how I happened to be 
there for that great first session of the Eighty-Ninth in 1965. 
G: But it seems like if you really intended not to stay that you would have had some idea in your mind about what you were going to do. 
O: Well, you don't, any more than I had any idea when I entered the White House I could establish congressional relations. I had never met my predecessor, Bryce Harlow. Why? 
Because I was otherwise engaged. I was engaged to inauguration, trying to ensure the proper handling of all the key people in the country who had contributed to the election. I 
had no time, even though I had the assignment, to focus on it. In fact, I think it was probably within forty-eight hours of going in the White House that I located two staff 
people to assign, Mike Manatos and Henry Hall Wilson. I never was in the White House, never had a briefing from Bryce Harlow. My assistant, a good, long-time associate, 
Phyllis Maddock, went over and met with Harlow. In retrospect I wondered how Harlow reacted to that, but that was the extent of it. 
So now we've just gone through the election. I've never had a long-term program in life and I'm glad I didn't, because I probably wouldn't have had the experiences I had. 
So what you would do in the future was something you would think about after the holidays. No pressure, no hurry. 
So if the handshake had not taken place that day, my family and I would have gone through Christmas and the holidays and then probably thought, "Well, let's see what we'll 
do next." What we would do next I had no thoughts nor any concerns. Not a very intelligent approach and not untypical of my approach to life, but I would not suggest it to 
anybody else. 
G: Do you think that the fact that LBJ persuaded you to stay and presumably made no effort to persuade Ken O'Donnell to stay reflected his view of the loyalty to him of each man? 
O: I don't know. No, I don't think so. I really think that the President sincerely believed that I could make a contribution to the legislative progress, and he had mentioned on occasions 
his appreciation for the job I was doing. We had a close relationship over that year and he had even gotten to raising my salary, making me the highest-salaried on the staff, which I 
think was his way of indicating to you that he approved of your work. And I think it was simply, "I want O'Brien to stay around here. I don't want to disrupt congressional 
relations. I'm satisfied the way it is now." He didn't need Ken's continuity as appointments secretary; it wouldn't mesh. And Dave Powers really had a non-role. I 
thought he showed considerable sensitivity toward Dave. 
G: What did he do? 
O: Jack Valenti came to visit me in my office and said that the President wanted to be helpful 
21
O'Brien --Interview XI --18 
to Dave. Jack said the President wanted to see what could be worked out that would be helpful to Dave Powers. He had had a lot of years with Jack Kennedy. The President 
came up with the idea of Dave's placement in the Kennedy Library, which I thought was a marvelous idea. He wanted Jack to discuss it with me and get my reaction because I 
might have some reason this wasn't the right approach. I remember saying to Jack, "That is just a great idea. I think Dave would love it and it would certainly take care of his 
future." And that's what happened. 
G: Was O'Donnell actually working as appointments secretary when he left? 
O: He was at the desk--I think probably some of that was shared by others. In fairness to Ken, I was in an entirely different position. I had one area of responsibility. I had a staff. 
It was firmly in place. It was an ongoing, uninterrupted area of activity from Dallas on. I could devote all my time and attention to that, and I was not involved with any actual or 
potential conflicts of overlapping of staff or anything else. In fact it was the reverse. Johnson's position was that everybody in the White House, all his people were informally 
on my staff. Everybody was to get in the act and anything that I wanted by way of support was there. 
Now with Ken, that's an entirely different role he had. It was a very sensitive, close proximity, hour-by-hour, day-by-day role. And I know that it couldn't work out 
over the long haul, nor did Ken ever have any idea that it could. Obviously he had given a lot of thought to his own future. I don't think that Ken O'Donnell concluded that the 
President was unfair because he accepted his resignation and didn't accept mine. 
G: But O'Donnell did resent it, is that right? He did harbor some animosity? 
O: Not that I have knowledge of. 
G: Really? 
O: As I said, I think the two principals, can accommodate and that probably is not necessarily the case with some on the periphery. O'Donnell and I never had a word about this. His 
sort of noncommittal reaction to my notifying him immediately--he was the first one to know I was staying--indicated that he was taken aback, but it was never reflected, to my 
knowledge, by anything he said or did in subsequent years. We saw a good deal of each other as the years went on, and it was never a subject of discussion. 
G: Did your wife have any opinion about whether you should stay or leave? 
O: She certainly was in accord with my decision, but never did we discuss any possibility of being there after the first of January. It wasn't in the cards and it wasn't something you'd 
think about. My concern was that I closed out with the President in a gentlemanly manner, and that he would know I appreciated the way he had treated me, because I was 
appreciative. It would never enter your mind that you would get into a discussion about 
22
O'Brien --Interview XI --19 
extension. I was flabbergasted. For whatever reasons, he felt it was important. I can tell you that I thought afterwards I certainly exhibited a high degree of arrogance in saying to 
the President of the United States, "Let's have the record clear I resigned and you persuaded me to stay for a period of one session of Congress, and you and I will never 
discuss the subject again." 
I think what amazed me more than his action was my action. Who am I to be setting down the rules to the president of the United States? But he took it in good spirits 
and fulfilled the agreement. We can get into some other time [as] to how he found another road to travel. 
G: That's amazing. 
Tape 2 of 4, Side 2 
G: Well, let's start in with Medicare. Was there any accommodation between Russell Long's success in his effort to be leader and his support of Medicare? 
O: Accommodation? 
G: Well, or association. Do you think that some of the support for him as whip hinged on his willingness to go along with Medicare? 
O: I don't know as that was significant. It's an internal family matter. It's conceivable that Pastore or Monroney--I don't remember what the vote was--could have made a real 
contest out of it and prevailed over Long. But, as far as we were concerned, I don't think there was any real focus on the impact the whip would have on Medicare, whoever the 
whip might be. I don't think that was important to those voting. The candidates' colleagues would be making their judgments on the service aspect--the role of the whip. 
G: Why did [George] Smathers change? 
O: I don't recall. 
G: Let me ask you to talk a little about the opposition to Medicare, particularly in terms of the AMA. What sort of lobbying mechanism did they use in the Congress? 
O: There has been this suggestion that the medical fraternity represents the least political group in the country; they normally are not political activists. They got into this, which 
they considered an attack on them and their careers. They felt Medicare had the earmarks of socialism, indeed I guess [for] some of them, even communism. This issue brought 
doctors into a lobbying position as an organization. 
They were able to heavily finance their activities. There was no give on the part of the doctors; there was no feeling of social responsibility. This was total opposition to the 
23
O'Brien --Interview XI --20 
concept of Medicare. 
In addition, the spokesman for the AMA was articulate, aggressive, hard-hitting. He attained national prominence during those years, particularly from 1961 through 1965. 
The doctors at the grassroots level were used very effectively. Of course, doctors traditionally have been in a prominent position in the areas in which they practice, well 
respected and therefore potentially very effective. They were a potent force in opposition. It's hard to envision now, I suppose, but at that time, and certainly in the earlier stages 
before the sixties, this concept was downright repugnant to large numbers of people. 
You combine that with the aggressive position of the medical fraternity, and support for Medicare to a great extent emanated from the traditional social security 
advocates: organized groups of the elderly. It's hard to believe that it took that long, however, for something so obvious in terms of the role of government in our society and 
that the opposition would for two decades effectively block enactment of legislation of this nature. But that was the case. 
The Democratic Party historically had stated its strong support for Medicare, and yet it never came about. Kerr-Mills was spearheaded by two conservative members of 
Congress, Bob Kerr and Wilbur Mills, in an attempt--and a successful one for a time--to head off Medicare. The contention historically was this is a private-sector role. We agree 
that there is an area of responsibility, but it has to be developed through voluntary participation and private-sector activities. 
I'm sure if you went back to the beginning of the debate on social security you probably heard the same comments. You could extract some of the speeches that were 
made in opposition to social security and substitute Medicare and have the same thought process. I had a particular interest because of my family experience where my father had 
had a prolonged illness. The modest resources of the O'Brien family went into the financial support necessary. We did have some modest resources and we were able to see 
it through until the time my father died. Most people didn't have resources and it was devastating. How anybody could suggest that Medicare not become law was beyond my 
comprehension. 
In any event, that is the history of Medicare, and we had reached 1965 and the Eighty-Ninth Congress without succeeding. Through history this sort of governmental 
activity took a long time. It probably goes back to the feeling on the part of many that even though there was a law that allowed you to go into bankruptcy--I remember my 
father, that's the last thing in the world, he would have died first than to go into bankruptcy during the Depression. And yet that's now an accepted procedure and I think 
that welfare in this country is the same. 
In the early stages of welfare, I know that the people who I was associated with in our neighborhood would move heaven and earth to avoid going on the welfare rolls. 
Three days a week of make-work on the WPA was accepted because at least it was 
24
O'Brien --Interview XI --21 
earning what you received from the government. So you got fifteen or eighteen dollars a week for working three days a week. But that wasn't handed to you; you were out raking 
leaves or whatever to earn that check. 
It's like social security; people say, "Social security should be peeled back to ensure that anyone receiving the benefits of social security should have an economic 
need." The concept was, this is an insurance policy and there should not be any criteria of need. So again, the views of some of these programs are quite interesting, because in 
Medicare you have the same situation. 
To have the mass of people in this country without any guarantee of medical care at some stage of their lives, and have the opposition so effective it takes decades to bring 
about a program is hard to conceive. That's why in the context of this battle over Medicare, you wonder why all that effort had to be expended over those decades to bring 
about what should have been accepted as a direly needed program at the federal level. But that was the case. 
Now, civil rights has a different connotation. For a hundred years this was a racial issue that aroused passions, but when you're talking about social security and Medicare, 
that's a different category. It wasn't quite as difficult to bring about Medicare and social security, but you didn't have the racial issue. Maybe people felt social security had some 
racial aspects to it, or Medicare. But if there were any views of that nature they were senseless. So we were talking in 1965 about doing something that should have been part 
of the American scene at least two decades earlier. 
G: Was there an alliance between the AMA and the tobacco industry? The AMA seemed very reluctant to affirm any link between smoking and cancer even though individual 
doctors certainly recognized it, and I'm just wondering if this was a trade-off for Medicare. 
O: I couldn't say that it was, but I'll say this, that in the effort of the AMA to block this legislation would have been the avoidance of incurring enmity which might result in having 
some anti-position develop. But as far as formal alliance, I don't recall that. 
How could a couple of hundred thousand doctors block for two decades this obvious approach to social progress? It was the conservative view regarding government 
involvement. "That is not," they said, "the role of the federal government. It is an imposition on the rights of individual citizens, in this case doctors. Wherever there can be 
assistance rendered to those in dire need, the private sector must handle it." But in any event, that was the reason why it was blocked so effectively for so long. 
G: One of the arguments that the AMA used in promoting their own Elder Care [program] was that Medicare didn't go far enough, that it wouldn't really take care of a lot of the 
problems. And then Wilbur Mills turned around and tacked on this additional voluntary provision. In fact, [it] simply incorporated additional measures into the single bill so that 
some of the wind was taken out of the opposition's sails. 
25
O'Brien --Interview XI --22 
O: Yes, that wasn't our advocacy. 
G: Tell me how that evolved. 
O: Again it's a matter of accommodation. After all, you would not suggest to Wilbur Mills that Kerr-Mills was not effective legislation. And secondly, not only the pride of 
authorship, but there were some strong feelings that Kerr-Mills was doing a good job. We recognized that Kerr-Mills existed as an effective block to the Medicare concept. So 
when you get to Medicare and Wilbur Mills is going to lead the parade, you knew you had the most effective guy in the Congress to lead a parade. 
>From Wilbur Mills' point of view, "I'm going to change my view regarding the concept of Medicare, but I'm also going to retain my long-held views as expressed in 
Kerr-Mills--incorporate a package under the heading of Medicare which extends beyond the administration's proposal." This heads off some of the objections of the AMA, but 
we're sitting in the White House pleased with everything as it unfolded. 
G: Wilbur Cohen was quoted as saying something to the effect that Mills' maneuver was one of the most skillful political maneuvers he'd seen in thirty years. 
O: It didn't eliminate opposition, but suddenly you're looking at a piece of legislation that effectively rebutted these claims made over the years of ineffectiveness. I agree with 
Wilbur, as I've stated before, there was no one more effective in handling legislation than Wilbur Mills. 
Wilbur Mills was conservative in his approach to legislation. He was one fellow who, in my dealings with him, wanted to be fully assured that a bill, once it reached the 
floor, would pass. The last thing Wilbur Mills would allow to happen is to bring something to the floor that would be defeated. Secondly, he always wanted to be in a 
position to have a closed rule when it came to the floor so it could not be decimated by amendment. Once he was in that position, you could be very comfortable about the end 
result. 
So two things had to happen: one, Wilbur Mills have a change of view regarding the concept of Medicare; and two--as important if not more so--full and total assurance 
that it would pass. He incorporated the elements of the overall Medicare bill. As Wilbur Cohen said, "You talk about taking out an insurance policy on a Medicare program or any 
program and a guarantee built into it that once you push the button, there's no way it's going to be stopped." He had basically guaranteed that, in his committee and then in the 
bill. 
I must say that sitting in the White House, you reflect on legislative struggles over those years. But if you were presenting awards for contributions made to social progress, 
you'd have to strike an award to Wilbur Cohen for his contribution to Medicare 
26
O'Brien --Interview XI --23 
legislation. 
G: What did Cohen do, specifically, in this instance? 
O: I don't know what he didn't do. I don't know as he slept at any time; he was a ball of fire who had the advantage of knowing the subject intimately and, consequently, having the 
opposition arguments equaling Wilbur Mills'. He had the ability to communicate with the Congress. He also had the knowledge so you could feel comfortable in a meeting 
discussing strategy or substance. He made one significant contribution to this struggle. 
G: In bringing Mills around to this position, was any other legislation involved? Were there any projects in Arkansas or any--O: 
No. 
G: --other pieces of legislation that he was interested in? 
O: No. Let me tell you, anything to do with Arkansas Mills was in a stronger position than the White House. I remember that we had a ceremony dedicating a project in Arkansas 
that encompassed about everybody in the administration from the President on down. Wilbur Mills had the capacity to pick up the phone and request the appearance of a key 
member of the administration and have that request fulfilled promptly. Anything the White House could do to accommodate Wilbur Mills was done. But as far as projects into 
Arkansas, Wilbur Mills didn't need the White House. 
G: Let's go to the Senate. You had a situation where there was no guarantee that you could get Harry Byrd to hold hearings on it and move it along. And the President called some 
House members and senators to the White House; Byrd was one of them. Let me ask you to go through this episode and give me as much background as you can. 
O: Byrd was a problem. Visits to his apple festival were part of the attempt to soften Harry Byrd. Harry Byrd was in concrete on an item such as this. His objection to a federal role 
of this nature was a position he held from the beginning of his political career. As pleasant as he was and as nice a human being as he was, you weren't going to shake Harry Byrd. 
But how were you going to get around that obstacle in the Senate? 
I don't think any of us were sitting around envisioning that Harry Byrd would take any leadership position in this area. So finally the President in his own inimitable way 
conceived of having a little session on Medicare involving some of the key senators. Harry Byrd had the capacity to avoid commitments or controversy and would not be 
available if he suspected what you might have in mind by way of attempt to persuade him. 
He was asked to come in for this meeting which was presented to him as an extremely important, very sensitive meeting with the President. 
27
O'Brien --Interview XI --24 
G: Did you send a White House car to pick him up? 
O: Transportation was arranged, yes. Harry Byrd did arrive without any knowledge that he was going to be involved in a Medicare discussion. I thought the President was at his 
best. You had Clint Anderson and others, you had advocates and Senator Byrd walking into this trap, stunned to discover the subject matter and further stunned when he 
recognized that he was going to be on the public record as a participant in the discussion. 
G: Were you there when this happened? 
O: I was there through part of it. I do remember that I was a little stunned myself the way the President handled this. There was a record of the President indicating that Senator 
Byrd had agreed to have prompt hearings, to which Senator Byrd had no alternative but to acquiesce in front of witnesses. 
G: Well, it was on national television, wasn't it? 
O: Yes. (Laughter) It was all staged and planned. 
Tape 3 of 4, Side 1 
O: It did fulfill this commitment to have hearings and did contribute, obviously, to moving the legislation on the Senate side. But I must say that they talk about substance, but that 
human element enters into it. In this instance it was a very sharp president who knew just how far he could go to get a commitment on the part of the key guy. Position him on the 
record before the nation. 
G: You say it was all staged and planned. Whose idea was it to get Byrd to make this concession on television? 
O: It was the President's idea to have the meeting. I'm sure when we discussed the meeting, inherent was how do you get Byrd to the meeting? 
G: Who decided that? How was that decided? 
O: We were going to use a subterfuge. We weren't going to be lying to him--Byrd doesn't know the subject matter and yet he's impressed with the President's keen desire that he 
show up. But then I think the President played it by ear. The President waited minute by minute and made a judgment as to how far he was going to take Harry. He took him the 
full distance, because you would have just blown the whole thing if you said that the Senator has committed to support Medicare. (Laughter) The Senator was very gracious. 
After all, the President wasn't talking about whether Byrd was going to support Medicare or not. "The Senator is cooperating, he's assured me--haven't you, Harry? Is that right, 
Harry?" I think Senator Byrd made the comment, "If I had known all this was going to 
28
O'Brien --Interview XI --25 
happen I would have dressed more formally," or something like that. 
G: "Dressed more formally." 
O: Yes, "dressed more formally." I can see that little smile on his face now, "Oh boy, have I been taken." 
(Laughter) 
G: How was he maneuvered from the meeting to the television area? Did you go out to the--? 
O: Yes. Sort of just took him by the elbow. It was great. 
G: What was LBJ's reaction to this episode? 
O: He enjoyed it thoroughly. 
G: Did he? 
O: Enjoyed it thoroughly. 
G: Tell me what he said about it. 
O: Well, when it was over he had the biggest smile you ever saw on his face. 
(Laughter) 
(Interruption) 
I guess the only way to describe it was that it was like a fellow who just finished a beautiful steak dinner. He was very satisfied and relaxed. 
G: Was there any fallout to this at all? 
O: No, interestingly enough, if Senator Byrd had any ill feeling I never came across it in any comments he ever made. He was enough of a pro himself to recognize a pro in action, 
and probably admired it a little bit. (Laughter) 
G: Now, Russell Long was a peculiar ally in this fight for Medicare because he had his own plan, his own amendments that he introduced in committee. Do you remember, he had 
some proxies, Fulbright's and I think Gore's, that apparently were misused in one fashion or another? 
O: Yes, I do recall that. 
29
O'Brien --Interview XI --26 
G: Apparently he had a proxy from Fulbright for something else. 
O: Yes. There was a cute ploy. It didn't work, but it was a setback at the moment. There were two. Gore was the other proxy that was misused. But there was a new vote taken. 
And as we've said earlier about Russell, he's an aggressive in-fighter, and in this instance it backfired. We had to work on it and of course you had Fulbright and Gore protesting 
vigorously. 
G: Was this fairly common, to have a dispute over proxies like that? 
O: No, it wasn't. I don't recall a similar incident. It would be uncommon because you're really taking a risk. It would be a rarity to have a misuse of a proxy. 
G: There is also an indication in one of your memos of the need to work on Smathers and [Herman] Talmadge as being wavering or in opposition. 
O: In Talmadge and Smathers you're talking about conservative senators breaking with their traditional positions. Whether either were vigorous opponents over a long period I don't 
recall, but they were in an uneasy situation and we were uneasy consequently. This battle, as it came to its conclusion, was going to represent a breakthrough after years of effort, 
and you couldn't bring it to its appropriate conclusion without some new support that hadn't existed in the past. And you pinpointed Talmadge and Smathers because they were 
potential supporters, and they were potential opponents, depending on the AMA and what effort they could expend. 
G: Now, you had the peculiar situation of Long, as floor manager for the bill, actually in some respects opposing it. How did this arrangement develop? 
O: The Majority Leader was great for accommodation, avoidance of controversy and always sought consensus. Mike Mansfield's approach on controversial matters would be to bring 
together the key committee people, whoever he thought was appropriate to luncheon in his private dining room. It was not unusual for Mike to introduce a subject, make brief 
comment and then turn it over to me for further comment and discussion, the persuasion side of it. You would therefore gamble on Russell Long not being floor manager while he 
was trying to gut the bill. So you weigh that against suggesting you could take some other step in terms of floor management. So that's what it came to, you'd feel more 
comfortable with Russell Long floor managing the bill than Russell Long in committee using proxies. (Laughter) Our head count at that stage was pretty firm. And even with 
all that it wasn't that easy. It wasn't that simple. 
G: You had Nelson Cruikshank, Andy Biemiller, and Elizabeth Wickenden. Do you recall the role of each of those three in supporting the legislation? 
O: Well, Cruikshank had been the point man, or one of them, in the senior citizen concept. 
30
O'Brien --Interview XI --27 
Andy Biemiller would be in his traditional role with the AFL-CIO, and they were very strong supporters of this program. 
G: Elizabeth Wickenden, Wicky Goldschmidt. 
O: There was a classic example of utilizing the executive branch, the department, the White House. Then what do you have in the private sector? You had a well-organized senior 
citizens' group across the country. You had the AFL-CIO and you brought that into the team effort. This would be a good example of the utilization of administration effort and 
private-sector effort. 
This was always our attempt. How can you bring in the private sector, and what's available out there in any organized manner to complement the administration's effort? 
Then you're maximizing the effort, too, by assignment of members for lobbying purposes and joint head counts you conduct. We could be approaching a senator, and labor and 
senior citizens had certain assignments, and they might be going to the same senator. You might have Andy [go] to that senator, you might have Nelson, you might have others. 
It was a coordinated effort. We'd compare notes and sometimes you found some interesting reactions. The reaction reported back on a member might vary if three 
different people had talked to him. You still might find you were in a gray area. One person might report, "I'm now convinced he's all right." Another person might say, "I'm 
convinced that he's not going to be all right," or in between. 
You remember we discussed at one time the attempt to utilize the senior citizens to put pressure on Mills. It was decided that there would be a series of rallies around the 
country and there was a misconception of how you impacted on Wilbur Mills. Having a rally in Madison Square Garden could harden Mills' position. He had no accountability to 
a group of people in Madison Square Garden. 
But now what do you have? You have Mills. You have, on the Senate side, Russell Long, floor manager. The support area is broadened and diversified. Forget what 
degree of support or the underlying reason for support, it's there. Now you've really got a ball game going. The chances are good that where labor could make an impact on a 
Medicare vote, that vote may already be there. Where the senior citizen group could make an impact, that wouldn't necessarily be a vote already there. Andy would probably 
be reinforcing support among people who were already basically supporting him. But Cruikshank and the others in the senior citizens' group could make a contribution altering 
or shoring up a weak vote. 
So when you add it all up--the Congress, the leadership, the committee, the White House, the administration, the department primarily responsible, the private sector 
elements--if you've done it in a well-organized way, that's the best you can do and the best assurance you have of success. And this is a good example of how it works. 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --28 
G: In the conference committee Wilbur Mills prevailed on a provision that allowed doctors to charge reasonable charges rather than setting up some sort of rate structure. This element 
has, I guess, been criticized more than any other aspect of the bill, the fact that it apparently did result in increasing the doctors' fees dramatically. 
O: It was unfortunate that was in the final bill. You have doctors persuaded they were going to be destroyed economically. I think that it has proven in implementation to have been 
unfortunate. I think that some of those very doctors who were going to be driven into the poorhouse because of this legislation found a bonanza. I don't know of a doctor that lost 
financially by virtue of Medicare. 
G: If the administration had been more vigilant, could Mills have been defeated on this? 
O: It's a good question. I think that at no time, right up to the end of the road on Medicare, did we feel we could take on Wilbur Mills and try to override him. So we swallowed the 
pill in our mind by saying, "Somehow that'll be corrected down the road, but we've got a major breakthrough." Why take [on] Wilbur Mills in conference when Wilbur Mills 
obviously controls every conferee on the House side--there was nobody in that conference who was going to buck Wilbur Mills on the House side and probably there was little 
appetite to buck him on the Senate side either. And this sounded kind of reasonable. Why? Because oh, well, all doctors are reasonable, aren't they? (Laughter) You know, 
they are going to be fair and reasonable in fees. 
It was unfortunate, but I don't think we seriously considered undertaking an effort to override him in conference or block him in conference. If we had we wouldn't have 
succeeded. 
G: You would have had to have had a new bill, is that--? 
O: God knows what might have happened. It could have unwound a lot of things. 
G: Did Johnson ever reflect on that aspect of the bill? 
O: I don't recall. 
G: Aside from the celebrated television exchange with Harry Byrd, what else did LBJ do to advance this Medicare bill? 
O: He made repeated public statements. He introduced strong references to it at every opportunity throughout this period. He was alert to the ebb and flow from day one until 
the conclusion. He was totally immersed in it. I don't recall his injection directly into individual vote-getting. On the strategy side, when he was able to position Harry Byrd, 
that was awfully significant. 
His direct relationship with Wilbur Mills was in evidence throughout. There was 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --29 
presidential contact with Mills in a variety of ways. Mills was in the White House a good deal during that period. There were private visits on two or three occasions in the White 
House, not on the record. 
G: Did you sit in on any of these meetings? 
O: Yes, my contact with Wilbur Mills throughout, including any involvement in presidential contact, was detailed. Actually, from day one there was so much important legislation in 
Ways and Means, as there is traditionally. It is a very key committee. The personal relationship with Wilbur Mills was something that I focused on right from the beginning of 
my assignment in congressional relations. 
Wilbur Mills and his wife, Polly, and Elva and I became close friends, and we saw each other often. He was on the Sequoia with us on a number of occasions. He and his 
wife would be at our brunches at our home on Sunday, which became rather traditional as we tried to develop relationships. And the relationship became so close that to this day 
we exchange Christmas cards and notes. I communicated with him during his travail--he and Polly both--which I think cemented our friendship. 
Through this whole period you'd never suggest, even in a backgrounder with the press, that Wilbur Mills had a change of view, that somehow or other we had switched 
Wilbur Mills. You always low-keyed this. Wilbur Mills has always had a deep concern in this area. He had a different approach than we had; we've worked together and we have a 
mutual interest and mutual concern. It's a matter of how you get it done. We are of course pleased that he felt our view is a reasonably acceptable one. Never allow someone 
to write that Lyndon Johnson had put the hammer on Wilbur Mills and had forced him into a change of view. 
That not only applied to Wilbur Mills. We tried like the devil at all times to avoid public comments claiming credit for legislative progress. An example of that was the 
efforts we made in one instance. We decided to have a party for the Congress, have them come down to the White House so that the President could personally thank them for this 
marvelous legislative record, which was their doing and not ours. We were involved in late night legislation and the party faltered because--I think we were on Beautification. 
G: Yes, Beautification. 
O: And the President had a personal setback, I think, physically at that same time. 
G: He entered the hospital for that gall bladder operation. 
O: Yes, that's right, because I remember that evening. We were torn because we were going to have the party; it's going to go forward anyway, and it got to ten or eleven o'clock at 
night and a few drifted in. Our reaction was, "What are you doing down here? You should have stayed up on the Hill." And they, in turn, were concerned because they had 
33
O'Brien --Interview XI --30 
been invited and they thought it was an insult not to come. 
Beautification was another success story for the Johnson program and the Great Society. But I mention that only because you began to run out of ways that you could 
indicate your appreciation, your pleasure with the movement of the Congress and the movement of the program. 
G: Were there any specifics, though, that Johnson brought Mills around on during some of those meetings that you attended? 
O: To sum up Wilbur Mills, you're not going to impress Wilbur Mills by having rallies demanding action on Medicare. You are not going to ever persuade Mills by being overly 
aggressive or demanding or taking any action adverse to his interests. When Wilbur Mills ultimately supports you, he has done it on two counts. One, he has finally decided that 
he's in a reasonably comfortable position to be helpful, and two, that he has every assurance in his own mind that it will succeed. You've got to remember that Wilbur Mills' 
opposition to Medicare and substitution to Kerr-Mills to a great extent had to do with Wilbur Mills' great ability to count heads. He wasn't going to take on a crusade that was 
doomed to failure. 
What used to bother me was when you began to read press stories about a rubber-stamp Congress and how Johnson had twisted everybody's arm, forced them 
against the wall and they had no alternative but to succumb. That's the last thing you wanted by way of image. Throughout all of this, to be able to walk that tightrope, you 
had to resist overaggressiveness. 
G: You wanted the legislation, of course. 
O: Yes. We could have exhibited arrogance in January of 1965 and point to the increase in support in the House and increase in the Senate and start all that in public. You can begin 
to get perilously close to "You better do this or else," and you've destroyed everything you've worked arduously [for] over a long period of time to establish. 
Just focusing on Wilbur Mills for another moment, you go to Wilbur Mills' district. You go to his home, a little cottage on the railroad tracks. I've been there. His 
background, coming North to go to Harvard and, as he told me, he wasn't happy there, he didn't feel comfortable there. He was out of his element. He didn't know the Northeast; 
he had no involvement as a young fellow in big cities. To know that he was a baseball fanatic was a point of discussion to open up general conversation, to lead to something 
more serious. Wilbur Mills could fulfill the responsibility of his key role as chairman of that Ways and Means Committee as he saw fit, without any concern about backlash from 
his constituents at home. 
If you have some envisionment that you can fix somebody's clock politically, particularly somebody in the position of Wilbur Mills, you're not being sensible, 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --31 
particularly if you're trying to work behind the scenes to force him, through supposed public clamor, into changing a position. 
In every congressional election, you break down four hundred and thirty-five seats in the House, and I can tell you it's a little difficult to come up with ninety seats that are in 
contest. That's why a sweep of thirty-eight seats, for example, is a fantastic sweep, because that means [in] about one out of three that were in contest, you were able to 
reverse the process. 
The majority of the House of Representatives, redistricting notwithstanding, are basically locked in unless they shoot somebody or something like that. That's the factor 
which can be frustrating when you're dealing with a legislative program. But that's the reality you face. So what's your alternative to that? You've just got to get to him on a 
personal basis. 
G: George Smathers, when he was asked why he changed his vote on Medicare said, "Because Lyndon Johnson told me to." 
O: It's a simplistic response, but it's not nonfactual because he'd feel a very strong tug to be supportive of the President in this area. It may not have been simply "President Johnson 
told me to switch my vote," but certainly President Johnson and the relationship he had with Smathers would be a significant factor in Smathers making a decision on a vote in 
which the President was tremendously interested. 
G: Anything in particular that he might have done to--? 
O: No. If he did I don't know. 
G: There was fear of an AMA boycott of Medicare. What did you do to prevent this from happening? 
O: That fear is exaggerated. I don't recall any overriding fear. 
G: Anything on the signing ceremony in Independence? 
O: It was a marvelous setting for the signing ceremony. I probably recall that one as much if not more than any signing ceremony I ever participated in. 
G: How was it decided to have it in Independence? 
O: That was decided by the President. 
G: Really? 
O: Yes. 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --32 
G: Why did he want to do it, do you know? 
O: For obvious reasons. Harry Truman, the record showed, had been the first advocate of some form of Medicare. So it was appropriate. It was an opportunity for Johnson to pay 
homage to him. It just fit. There was a mutual interest on the part of the former President and the President, the library was there, it afforded an opportunity for a visit, and it was 
appropriate. 
Incidentally, on the AMA boycott, I can't believe that we took it as seriously as some people in the AMA did. It would seem to me to be a boycott of a program widely 
accepted by the public. It would have been an expression of arrogance beyond belief and would have tarred the AMA for years to come. 
G: Johnson did meet with a group from the AMA after the bill was passed. Do you recall that? 
O: No, I don't recall a specific meeting. I'm not trying to denigrate the AMA or the good works they are undoubtedly engaged [in] and have been, but the fact of the matter is just 
the cold political reality of the situation indicated that. . . . They had gotten one hang of a break in that bill, in the Mills action in the conference. I don't know as they recognized it 
then, but the record will show that--Tape 
3 of 4, Side 2 
O: I thought the AMA should be very thankful [that] they didn't wind up with a program similar to the British program. 
G: Anything on Johnson's reaction to passage or his own reflection on the significance of the act? 
O: His involvement had to represent one of the real high points of his administration and would remain such. The self-satisfaction in bringing this about made a real impact on him. 
I remember out at the Truman Library he was just exuberant. 
G: Was he? 
O: It was an extremely pleasant occasion and he was at his best. 
G: Can you remember anything that he said? 
O: The general climate and the conversations with President Truman and Bess Truman and other people present. I treasure a picture I have of that because he did rather stun me. He 
called me over to present a pen in a separate little one-minute ceremony rather than the usual handing out of a pen. I concluded from that that he was making a point of saying, 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --33 
"You had a real involvement in this." 
G: If you were going to assess your own role in this particular bill, where was your activity or your influence the greatest in it? 
O: I don't claim any particular influence on it. I think that the contribution I made was tenacity throughout from the beginning in 1961, and staying through 1965. My dedication 
to the effort to a great extent, as I stated earlier, flowed from my own personal experience in my family. So there was that additional element in my commitment. I would never 
suggest that Medicare would not have been enacted in 1965 if Larry O'Brien hadn't stayed in the White House. It's part of a team effort as it was in any legislation over the years. 
My reaction to successes legislatively was somewhat different. I was extremely pleased in instance after instance being present and involved. I was thankful to have that 
experience rather than try to determine whether my involvement made any impact or not. 
G: Anything else on Medicare that we haven't talked about, this year? 
O: No, that sums it up. The summation is that years of frustration terminated with success, a commitment to the American people had been fulfilled, a president had found a way. 
G: Let's go on to the Voting Rights Act, another significant piece of legislation. Let me ask you to just trace the background of this legislation if you can. 
O: Again, this was based on need. Of course there was demand, but there was need, there was obvious gross unfairness and inequity in so many areas of the country. In the South 
particularly, the battle that was being waged for voting rights by Martin Luther King and others, the Selma situation, all of this built up evidence for the need and [of] the gross 
unfairness. I would say that President Johnson in this instance was not reacting solely to this evidence of mistreatment of protesters. 
G: He wasn't? 
O: He was up front in determining that action take place in this area and he was absolutely committed to bringing about change. There was no need for the President to be made 
aware of this by any citizen activities. We welcomed those activities because they helped build a fire to bring about legislative action, but the President was committed up front to 
the fullest. 
G: Do you think that there would have been a voting rights bill without the Selma march? 
O: Perhaps not. It was a major factor. How do you bring into focus a challenge and a need? We just talked about Medicare. Probably the best implement you have to focus public 
attention and direct concern is to cite what is easily assimilated by the individual citizen. Regarding Medicare, you could cite case after case of terrible tragedies incurred because 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --34 
of the lack of this legislation. People will be giving it attention [by] citing that sort of example rather than statistical presentations. 
I've always felt strongly that to communicate, keep it simple, be repetitive, and ultimately you'll make an impact. And voting rights legislation, sure, you could cite all the 
statistics on blacks registered re the population in a given state in the South to white registration re the white population. And you could cite the difficulty of people being able 
to register and participate in the voting process. 
But to Selma you get to the marches. Now, that makes a significant contribution to focusing attention and arousing concern about an inequitable and unfair situation. That 
is a significant contributing factor. That is where people are concerned for their fellow man. It's the emphasizing of specific instances. And you do it by case citations. That 
often took place during the debate on Medicare. Or you do it by pointing to the gross unfairness, and now people are reading about it because there was a march, not because of 
the statistics. Then the march finally leads to an absorption of the statistics and the gross unfairness. 
So that's why I said that Lyndon Johnson didn't need to have that focus in order to be committed to voting rights. He was basically and fundamentally committed to voting 
rights, just as he was committed to civil rights, just as he was committed to home rule for the District of Columbia, while some of the liberals in the Democratic Party were 
disbelieving along the route. I don't have to justify his actions or his record--his record speaks for itself. But it isn't a matter of pointing with pride or anything. This man was 
not fully understood by American media generally for his inherent early-on commitment to fairness and equity and equality for all citizens. 
There was so much evidence of that. Maybe it was his style, his personality, or where he came from which caused--and that's where I faulted some of my liberal 
friends--cynicism or disbelief. But I think if you go to his background, to the New Deal days and his activities in New Deal programs, his commitment to the Roosevelt program. . 
. . I guess what I'm saying is there was a lack of objectivity on the part of some of the American media through the Johnson period, and I'm talking about the domestic side of it 
now, which was not justified. If some of those people took the pains to look into Johnson's career, positions he had taken on a number of occasions--it's long overdue. 
G: What was the impact of the television sequences of the marches at Selma and the [inaudible]? 
O: It was a considerable force for movement, legislatively. It was extremely helpful in moving the legislation--this aspect of the Great Society program. 
G: But how did it have an impact? Did it have an impact because it influenced senators and congressmen or did it have an impact because it influenced their constituents and they in 
turn influenced--? 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --35 
O: I don't think it's that simple, that it influenced constituents who in turn influenced them. You have the politician, the member of Congress, beginning to note that his constituency 
has an awareness and a growing interest in this problem due to mass media. You can understand a march; you can see some cop belting some poor black guy. That has a 
greater impact than citing a lot of statistics. 
And so, did that help? Of course, like the civil rights marches on civil rights legislation. And the reverse of this, I think, American media made a significant 
contribution to destroying whatever hope we had of success in Vietnam. 
G: How so? 
O: Because they destroyed America's support for the effort. 
G: By? 
O: By every night showing those terrible Americans killing Vietnamese, the horror stories of jungle warfare aroused the youth of America, not all but some. Some were aroused 
because they wanted to avoid being part of it. It was a sad, sorry aspect of national support for a cause that was embraced early on as a national cause. I'm not talking about 
the failures of the military, and they were significant failures. I'm not talking about Lyndon B. Johnson having to fight public opinion while he was undermined by the military 
and others in the administration who were giving him poor or false information. I'm talking about how does a nation wage war without the support of the populace? That's 
what brings countries down. 
Now, you can talk about the damn war and its unfairness and escalation. But you go to the heart of the Vietnam experience which started out as an attempt to build and 
maintain a democracy in South Vietnam, to prevent it becoming communist, and to give the Vietnamese an opportunity to have a democratic form of government. Before it was 
over we were a bunch of pigs or worse who had gone thousands of miles for one purpose--to kill as many people as we could in every way we could and destroy a nation. 
You had Americans traveling in North Vietnam to congratulate them. American media contributed significantly. Because it's the old story, which we still have--not in anything as 
meaningful as Vietnam perhaps at the moment--but the power of television, I think, still eludes us. And they can talk until hell freezes over about the evening news and how 
even-handed it is, that there is no editorializing. 
The fact is there are editors of the editorial pages of newspapers sitting making determinations on presentation of their point of view. That doesn't concern me nearly as 
much--the editorial page of newspapers is the point of view of a couple of guys in the newspaper office. It's the written word; it doesn't have the impact of the visual. There is a 
tendency not to read editorial pages anyway. 
39
O'Brien --Interview XI --36 
Now, television is entirely different. A majority of Americans get their news exclusively from television. That is one tremendously important area of communication 
and that's the kind of impact that television makes. It broke this country apart. And I don't think to this day it has been truly unified since Vietnam. It was devastating to a 
whole generation of Americans, whether they were in Vietnam or they ducked Vietnam. And I think what was lost as time went on was, what was the purpose? What was the 
objective? What was the original intent? But to get millions of Americans convinced that we were dastardly, foul people who purposely went out to use our military resources to 
destroy people for pure pleasure--I thought it was devastating. 
I therefore had a degree of understanding, when Grenada was invaded, of the decision of the administration not to have the media there. I think that in any actions in 
the future, any administration ought to be very, very cautious about people who are looking for headlines and their ratings and have no sense of responsibility in a medium by 
license of the people of the United States. It's not their airwaves. They are making millions on licenses granted by the government on behalf of the citizens and taxpayers. 
And they just don't seem to have any concept of what their responsibility is in terms of evenhanded, objective reporting, the avoidance of sensationalism for the sake of ratings. 
And I think it may become a more serious matter as time goes on. 
So anyway, to get back to voting rights, where television as a medium can be effective and is extremely effective on two counts. One, the presentation of, really 
objectively, what is occurring in Selma, Alabama, and that is going to impact on the American people and open their eyes and their minds and their hearts. Then the 
responsibility, which the medium fulfills--television--on reporting visually. It's more effective than print media. But I do get concerned when some guy is sitting in some 
corporate seat, deciding whether he will allow the president of the United States on television. The British are doing it better. 
Who are these people in the recesses of Black Rock at CBS or somewhere else to be making these decisions on what I am to be exposed to? They can devote five mornings 
to some wedding in London--that's entertainment. They're in the entertainment business, and that's fine with me, but when they start molding public opinion as they see it should be 
molded, then that's dangerous. 
G: But the press has been doing that for hundreds of years. 
O: I know it. They've been doing it for hundreds of years and, as I say, this, unfortunately or fortunately, I don't know, has a far greater impact. The press have been doing it so long 
that any person with a modicum of intelligence can take all of that with a grain of salt. He or she can read a paper that presents the point of view that the reader shares, you can 
decide to read tabloids and not the New York Times, or whatever. But when you're talking about sixty to ninety million Americans being given twenty-three minutes of news 
and that's it, and the judgments that have to be made as to what is presented and what isn't--
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O'Brien --Interview XI --37 
I don't have confidence in the people making the judgments. And now you say, well, you have public television. Well, you do. And maybe you can build up public 
television so it plays an equal role with commercial television. I guess that's pie in the sky. 
G: But how does it differ from newspapers, other than scale? 
O: Well, I do think there is an understanding that newspapers aren't just reporting news; they are in their news columns but their editorials reflect a point of view of the newspaper 
ownership. You can take it or leave it. But I think television is entirely different. 
G: Well, getting back to the Selma marches, did any legislators, lawmakers seem shocked by what they saw on television? What was Lyndon Johnson's reaction to the televised 
encounters? 
O: As I said earlier, you had a president committed to voting rights legislation and dedicated to accomplishing that. Impetus on the legislative process certainly was greater because of 
the visual aids that resulted from Selma and other actions of a similar nature. The greater awareness and concern which results from exposure of these inequities, the better 
opportunity to have a favorable result. But I don't recall specifically any reaction on the part of the President. I think probably it's easier to just point out that in my judgment the 
President was not pushed into voting rights advocacy because of actions in the streets of Alabama. 
G: Jim Eastland charged that the bill had been drafted specifically to exclude Texas from coming under the--O: 
Yes. 
G: Do you recall this argument? 
O: No. Why? Do you think that Jim Eastland was anxious to include Texas? (Laughter) 
G: Well--O: 
No, I'm being facetious. 
G: Of course the position was that it was being applied in a discriminating manner to some southern states which had discriminated, and indeed there was a Republican measure 
which would have applied it more broadly. 
O: Eastland obviously was claiming that the President was avoiding his home state to avoid, in turn, any political conflicts with his old colleagues from Texas. If there is any validity 
to that argument I'm not aware of it. 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --38 
G: One of the controversial elements of this legislation was a poll tax ban which the administration opposed. 
O: That was the most controversial. 
G: Let me ask you to go into this provision. 
O: It had elements of the controversy in the civil rights legislation, where liberals could oppose the civil rights bill in the House Judiciary Committee because it was not strong 
enough, and southern Democrats and Republicans therefore had additional support to block civil rights legislation. In this, some of the liberals--as I recall specifically Ted 
Kennedy among others--were, and understandably so, strongly opposed to any poll tax concept under any circumstance. They were insistent that this be part of the bill. You're 
always faced with weighing factors, weighing possibilities, weighing probabilities. Can you get meaningful voting rights legislation or are you going to wind up in a big 
hullabaloo with purists, which could be counterproductive to legislating? As I remember, we took a position up front in opposition to this proposal, and it did become the most 
controversial aspect of the debate. That was anticipated as it would be obviously the number-one controversial aspect. So you were left in a difficult position, because, "What's 
the matter with you, you want voting rights legislation but you're compromising," you know. 
This was waged each step of the way and was fairly handily defeated. I think that's correct. I'm trying to weigh that in trying to recall how deeply concerned we became by 
virtue of this poll tax aspect. I don't recall it reached dimensions where we felt that the legislation could be derailed. 
G: The administration's position was that the poll tax repealing provision could render the legislation unconstitutional. 
O: Yes, that's right. 
G: But apparently Johnson made some commitment to civil rights advocates to deal with the poll tax another way. Do you recall? 
O: He was directly involved and clearly wanted the record to show a commitment to the future. It was in the interest of meaningful voting rights legislation that we not take this to 
the mountain top, all or nothing. 
I guess you could suggest maybe that was a ploy. You wonder about the validity of that argument anyway. Let's assume that it was determined unconstitutional; would 
that affect the entire voting rights program? 
G: I guess it just depends on how it was drafted. 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --39 
O: Yes. 
G: And how the Court ruled on it. 
O: Yes, that's right. 
G: [Nicholas] Katzenbach, [the] attorney general, produced a letter recounting a conversation he had with Martin Luther King, Jr., who apparently endorsed the Senate version, the 
version without the poll tax repealing provision. Do you recall that facet of it? 
O: I recall the letter, but not the specifics of the conversation that Katzenbach had with King; I was not privy to it. 
G: You mentioned earlier the fact that whenever you had these kinds of successes, Congress was accused of being a rubber stamp. Do you feel that members of the House and Senate 
were being pressured to show independence from the White House at this time, if not on one piece of legislation then another, so they could defend themselves against these kinds 
of charges at home? 
O: I don't know as they were being pressured. I think that in the minds of some of them, it might be best not to have a 100 per cent voting record. You like to give it a little balance. 
I'd like to pick a spot here and there where I could show that I resisted the entreaties of the President and the White House and therefore I have independence. But that's very 
natural and normal in the world of politics. I think the difficulty of these fellows is, where could they pick? Because so much of this was truly major legislation, it was awesome in 
its scope. What are you going to say? "Well, I voted against Highway Beautification"--you might pick something like that--" but I did vote for Voting Rights and 
Medicare." I don't think the constituency is going to be awfully impressed with that. 
It's always a difficult situation, but the fact of the matter was, however, that there was a turnover in the off-year election. I believe the state of Iowa was the prime 
example--that in the Johnson sweep of 1964, there was a switch of probably five seats in Iowa. I would have to go back in the record, but there was a significant switch. And 
there was a switch back two years later. I remember a long-time associate of mine. We've remained close friends. He was a one-term congressman from Iowa: Stan Greigg. Stan 
came into the Congress with the Johnson sweep and proceeded to be totally supportive of the Great Society program, without deviation, then sought re-election and was thrown 
out. And I guess you could conclude that the argument of his opponent, which I'm sure was part of his campaign--that Stan was but a rubber stamp for Johnson--may have made 
some impact on the voters. 
Tape 4 of 4, Side 1 
G: You were able to get the votes of thirty-three southern Democrats on the Voting Rights Bill, which was quite a bit. 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --40 
O: That's evidence of the changing pattern. It reflected constituency change. From the 1964 election, the sweep of it, into 1965 you had civil rights legislation, you're in the midst of 
voting rights legislation, you're in the midst of Medicare, you're in the midst of all of these liberal programs, and I think there was a comfort factor. 
Southern Democrats felt more at ease, more comfortable supporting voting rights than they would have two to four years earlier. But it had to be some reflection of 
constituent attitude. Maybe the attitude wasn't advocacy of voting rights, but it might have changed to where there wasn't the intense opposition to that type of legislation which 
had existed heretofore. Therefore, in their judgment, they felt they could with some degree of political comfort support voting rights, which would have been a red flag two to 
four years earlier. 
G: Let's look at D. C. home rule. This was one of the few defeats, at least this year. 
O: It was one of the few defeats; on the other hand, it was one of the most intriguing battles. 
G: Let me ask you to recount this battle in as much detail as you can. You were saying that this battle was one of the most interesting, even though you were not successful in 1965. 
O: Yes, I was referring to the discharge petition in the House, the effort that was expended and the President's involvement in soliciting signatures for the petition. That made it a 
very interesting exercise, as it turned out to be not much more than that for that session. 
An interesting aspect of the discharge petition was the conclusion reached during the attempt to secure the necessary signatures. Liberal supporters gave up on the effort. I 
remember people like Joe Rauh and others who had been combing the Hill--and we had been working with them--felt that it had become impossible. The problem of course with 
a discharge petition is that people can remove their names. And that cat-and-mouse game was being played. 
Finally I went to the President and showed him a list of twenty-two members who should be on that discharge petition and were not. It wasn't my intention to have the 
President do what he promptly decided to do. We were in the office off the Oval Office. He was appalled at some of the names on the list and he proceeded to pick up the phone 
and instruct the White House switchboard to contact all of these. My recollection is that it was twenty-two, it was in that vicinity at least. He wanted to talk to each one of these 
personally. I sat through part of this. It was in the evening and some of them weren't immediately available or couldn't be located; others were located and he proceeded to 
plead and cajole and argue with each one of them. 
I remember Edna Kelly in particular because she was a congresswoman from New York, from a liberal district. I don't recall what reason Edna presented for not having 
signed by then, but probably something to the effect she was still thinking about it. I 
44
O'Brien --Interview XI --41 
remember distinctly the President was very strong in his advocacy, repeatedly saying, "Edna, I can't understand it. I can't understand. I hear what you're saying but I just can't 
understand. You of all people and the district you represent and the voting record you have." This went on until finally Edna agreed that she was going to capitulate and sign the 
petition. 
Well, there were probably six or seven more calls of that nature before that little session broke up. All the calls had been placed and I don't know just how many of them 
were ultimately completed, but it was a great example of Johnson in action. The result of it [was] that the necessary number of signatures finally appeared on the discharge petition. 
And it was a source of pleasure to me to see this occur because not only had the President succeeded in getting this over to the top of the mountain, but that was in the 
midst of total abdication on the part of leading liberals. I think some of my liberal friends needed that evidence of the Johnson commitment in this general area. And it epitomized 
to me just the degree of commitment he had in this general area. 
G: Wayne Hays moved to strike the enacting clause and his motion carried 144 to 140 on a teller vote, but was later rejected on a roll-call vote. Do you remember that? 
O: A teller vote moves quickly and this was close, but it certainly called for a roll call. Sometimes teller votes can be so overwhelming that it's not feasible to pursue it at that 
time, but in this instance we went to roll call. 
G: Apparently the biggest problem with home rule was the fact that the House didn't hold hearings for a long time, that you didn't really get it moving until the discharge petition. 
O: Yes. Well, you know on a national level, home rule would not percolate to the surface as a major piece of legislation. It had some parochial elements to it, obviously. It was 
nothing that would overly excite the Congress. Those who were engaged in the home rule struggle would have difficulty bringing to bear any constituent interest on the part of 
colleagues. You have to recall the lowest level of committee assignment was on the District of Columbia committees. This was where freshmen congressmen generally found 
themselves. It was recognized on the Hill as a committee of minimal importance at the bottom of the list of committee interest. In that parochial, localized situation it was 
difficult to arouse a broadly based constituency in support of Home Rule. 
By the same token, sometimes members on those District of Columbia committees became prominent in the District of Columbia and received a great deal of Washington 
press and television attention. And I suppose some of them probably rather enjoyed playing the role of mayor. The mayor was appointed by the president, his name was 
Walter Washington. He was credible in his role but there was dependence on the Congress for the administration and financing of the affairs of the District of Columbia. 
So it was still too soon, even in the climate of 1965 on the Hill, to bring this about. 
And that was the extent of it. As I said, any time the subject is brought up I reflect 
45
O'Brien --Interview XI --42 
on the Johnson role on the discharge petition. That seemed to be the highlight of that year's activity in that area. 
G: Do you remember anyone else specifically whom he called? 
O: No, this was a special list because we had carefully selected those you had every reason to believe should or could sign. These were people who had no political problems with 
signing. These were people representing districts where there would be no negative fallout. They were obvious potential signers about whom we felt frustrated. In every 
instance, obviously, we had pressed them to sign. The ADA and others had pressed them to sign, and for whatever reasons, they hadn't gotten around to it and I felt very frustrated. 
This was not a legislative proposal that had national interest, and yet he proceeded to work individually to accomplish the result. 
G: Okay, let's go on to the Elementary and Secondary Education Act. 
O: Well, as you know, this was a frustrating area for us from the time Kennedy went into the White House in 1961. We were anxious to move on Elementary/ Secondary. We felt we 
had a fine proposal and we worked arduously at it. And we finally got to the Rules Committee. The problem of public and private schools, the separation of church, had been 
the frustration. We felt there was no area of compromise that would include aid to private schools in any form. We had a Catholic president who was very sensitive to this and 
obviously in a difficult, indeed impossible, position to suggest aid to private schools. 
So we went the direct route, stating that any deviation in this proposal which would include private schools was not contemplated initially by us and would be 
unconstitutional in any event. We had not anticipated that we would be foreclosed from House action by the votes of staunch supporters of the New Frontier program and 
President Kennedy, but that's what occurred. 
The two members of the Rules Committee who stymied us were Congressman [James] Delaney of New York and Congressman [Thomas "Tip"] O'Neill of 
Massachusetts. It turned out to be an impossible situation. I remember distinctly the President and I meeting with Delaney and O'Neill in the White House, and we were 
extremely impressed with Delaney's adamancy because he articulated it at great length and great detail and turned the President down flatly. Now you move to the Eighty-Ninth first 
session in 1965. Obviously there was intense interest in getting legislation. 
How were you going to bring this about? Is there any conceivable approach to it that might somehow alleviate this adamancy on the part of the private school adherents 
and allow us to move forward? Even with the increase in Democratic membership, we could anticipate that we would run into the same difficult situation. President Johnson, of 
course, was in a much more comfortable position to accept, if it were possible, some form of private school assistance. He wouldn't be faced with accusations directed to him 
46
O'Brien --Interview XI --43 
because of his religion, so that aspect was clear. But it was how do you go about this, how do you bring about legislation? By determining need without reference to public or 
private seemed to afford a vehicle that might bring about a broad base of support. That was the approach and it turned out to be effective. 
We pursued the effort in my office with a group [which] brought together the administration, our congressional relations people, and representatives of the NEA and the 
National Catholic Welfare Conference in the same room for head count purposes and for assignments where it was most appropriate for each group represented to lobby on behalf 
of the legislation. It certainly was a pleasant experience when you consider the great void that existed that had stymied any meaningful efforts in this area in the past. 
G: Did you have the lobbyists for each organization? 
O: Yes, the representatives of each organization which would be the lobbyists. 
G: Who were they, do you know? 
O: I don't recall their names. 
G: Were they effective? 
O: Yes, they were effective and incidentally, it wasn't only that meeting, but as this moved on and as we became more intensively involved and the head counts progressed, the 
cooperative effort of all concerned was impressive. 
I recall that Hugh Carey was a member of the committee in the House. We were talking about textbooks in my office one evening--Wilbur Cohen and Hugh and whoever 
else--trying to brainstorm. Hugh came up with the concept to work out some provision to loan textbooks to private schools. 
I believe we sat there rather stunned, and thought, "What a creative idea." It's an example of people of good will, focusing on the dire need for meaningful legislation and 
groping for some way, practically and realistically, to avoid the major pitfall that would kill the legislation. 
Now on the other side of the coin, there were those in the Congress who fought this legislation vigorously. The concept of the allocations of funds on the basis of need 
without reference to specific types of education caused some to be very concerned and disturbed. So it did not eliminate this sensitivity. But the sensitivity focused on those who 
were opponents of any direct or indirect assistance to private schools, rather than the sensitivity of those who were advocates of assistance to private schools and therefore 
objecting to legislation because it didn't contain a provision of that nature. 
G: To what extent was the 1964 Civil Rights [Act] an aid in passing this education bill, 
47
O'Brien --Interview XI --44 
because you didn't have the old segregation question and aid to segregated schools? That had already been outlawed by the provision of the 1964 bill. 
O: That helped pave the way, but I don't think I can overlook the strong opposition of the Catholic church and some private institutions to educational legislation that did not 
recognize private education in some way. Delaney and O'Neill were not alone in that regard, and the National Catholic Welfare Conference, the representative of the Catholic 
church nationally, would have enlisted, as in the past, national Catholic resistance to legislation. That view would have been shared by elements of private education beyond 
Catholic education. 
If you had not pursued that course, an aroused Catholic church would have impeded and I think blocked legislation regardless of the new strength you had in the 
Congress. They would have made it a major issue and you would have had all kinds of pressures. 
This was a rather modest recognition of private education in a very indirect manner, [yet] the reaction to it was quite enthusiastic support for the program, even 
though it wasn't that meaningful. The reaction was--at least you recognize we exist and you recognize that we do play a role in education. 
That meeting between Tip O'Neill and Delaney and the President and I was probably needed because I don't think Kennedy or I really had focused on the depth of 
feeling. When they left the office we realized this is an area that you can't compromise because we're not prepared to have any recognition of private education. 
G: Adam Clayton Powell canceled the markup session and moved it after the House was voting on the funds for his staff expenses. Do you recall that? 
O: Sure. (Laughter) 
G: Was there a message in that? 
O: Oh, certainly there was a message. Adam enjoyed that sort of activity. He loved it. I don't think Adam, at any time in his public career, failed to enjoy taking actions that would 
be disruptive for the moment but get his job done. In addition to that, he was the most difficult chairman on the Hill to get to call his committee into action and handle the 
business at hand. His absenteeism was notorious; his free spirit [and] lackadaisical attitude were frustrating to his colleagues. Adam had an office that was unique on the Hill, with 
the dim lighting and Muzak and the very charming staff members. He very much enjoyed, in his earlier days, the concern of some of his southern colleagues about his presence. He 
had a facility to antagonize them in all kinds of ways, make his presence known and never allow them to forget he was around. 
He would have a keen interest that his office was funded to the fullest. It was a 
48
O'Brien --Interview XI --45 
little in jest, but nevertheless he wanted to be sure that the funding was all in order, because he was always concerned about some of those colleagues who didn't enjoy his 
humor taking advantage of him to cut his perks in some way, or lessen his importance. 
G: In this case there are virtually no amendments accepted, and critics were charging that the bill was just being stampeded through without any serious hearings or discussions or not 
tolerating any--O: 
They were half right, or right. It was rather remarkable, even as I reflect on it now. We had established a broad base of support in the world of education and once you had the 
NEA and NCWC in tandem working with you, you reach the point where you weren't going to be very tolerant of diminishment of what you were trying to do. So you moved 
as rapidly as you could and you would not engage in negotiations that would water down the legislation. There were times when you did engage in those kinds of negotiations 
because you felt the need to, but in this instance we were moving well. 
G: Was this resistance to amendments primarily designed to keep from upsetting that parochial school/ private school balance? 
O: That's right. 
G: How did you get your sponsors like Wayne Morse and Adam Clayton Powell to agree to this, to not adding on amendments? 
O: There was a sensitivity on the part of both of them to this effort. You should be awfully cautious about doing anything or even allowing extensive debate on amendments that 
might be disruptive. While the commitment was there, it obviously was tenuous and could fall apart. Both of them fulfilled their role as chairmen in that regard. They were sensitive 
to it, also. 
G: They didn't feel that they were sacrificing any of their own prerogatives in shaping legislation? 
O: No, because overridingly it's this sensitive [subject] that nobody really wants to get into--the religious connotation, the private schools aspect. In the final analysis [they] 
wanted to see meaningful education legislation. It didn't seem to be a constitutional problem, it was very creative. The end result is very significant in terms of elementary and 
secondary education in this country. There was a general attitude on the Hill of let's get on with this; it looks like we've found a way, and we need this legislation. 
G: There were some questions raised by liberals, in some cases, as to whether the money would actually find its way into the poverty-stricken families and the schools rather than 
just the school system in general. Did you have any assurance that it was really--? 
O: Those concerns were valid; I could understand. You're now talking about implementation 
49
O'Brien --Interview XI --46 
and those were valid concerns. And all we could do was assure that everything possible would be done to fulfill the intent of Congress. We didn't feel this was an attempt on the 
part of the liberals to destroy this legislative concept. "What assurances do we have that the desired result will be accomplished in terms of the flow of money?" The fact is you 
were going to do the best you could, but you couldn't give an ironclad guarantee that there wouldn't be some problems in the administration of this program as it unfolded. 
Tape 4 of 4, Side 2 
G: The legislation was described as a poverty measure, in the sense that it was designed to aid educationally deprived schools and students. 
O: The aid would be forthcoming and this was built in an attempt to bridge a major problem. With the concept, the political reality was that it would impact on about 95 per cent of the 
school districts in the country to some degree. There was something in it for just about everybody and that was important. 
G: Ensured a broad base of support. 
O: Sure. Sounds a little callous but it's part of the legislative process. 
G: There was also the argument that since some of the data showed that the time to really influence a child's education was at the preschool level, the Republicans, [Albert] Quie I 
think in particular, introduced an amendment to target the preschool [ages], three to seven, let's say. Should more attention have been directed here? 
O: By the time this became a matter for Quie and others to express an interest in, our fear of anything that would disrupt this was overriding. And some of us might have questioned 
Quie's motivation. This appears to be meritorious but this is an attempt of Quie to unwind the basic proposal. We chose not to entertain that and hoped that we wouldn't get into 
that area at that time. I think it's an indication of how sensitive we were to anything that might shake this house of cards we had built. 
G: Anything else on ESEA? 
O: This was extremely important legislation. It was a significant element of the Great Society program, and we were able to pass the hurdle. Some people suggested we used a 
gimmick. We didn't construe it as a gimmick at all. We thought it was very innovative and that it got the job done. It was one of the highlights, certainly, of that legislative 
session. 
G: The bill was signed at LBJ's former one-room schoolhouse near Stonewall. 
O: Yes. In this era of photo opportunities some of them are very innovative. We were attempting to be innovative in our day. It was the growth of photo opportunity and, as we 
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O'Brien --Interview XI --47 
discussed earlier in a different context, the tremendous impact of visuals and television. That was the motivating factor, as it remains to this day. That forty-five to ninety seconds 
on television can have far greater impact than thousands of printed words. 
G: Were you there at [Stonewall]? 
O: I was there for all signing ceremonies, whether it was at the Statue of Liberty or at the Truman Library, but I think I missed that one. 
End of Tape 4 of 4 and Interview XI 
51
    [ Part 12: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--24 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XII*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XII 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XII, 7/ 25/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XII, 7/ 25/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
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(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
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(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-23 
4
INTERVIEW XII 
DATE: July 25, 1986 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 1 
G: Let's start with this. I was asking you about Katharine Graham and the D. C. home rule. 
O: Well, this of course was a rather obvious step that was available to us. The Washington Post had advocated home rule over a long period of time and were often editorializing on 
the subject. We were having difficulty securing the necessary signatures for a discharge petition in the House. It was all right for the Washington Post to editorialize and press its 
position. Now reality faced us, and we felt that perhaps the Washington Post had an additional responsibility to be helpful in moving the legislation. So the result was that we 
contacted Kay Graham and put a responsibility on Kay and her associates to work particularly the Republican side of the House to assist us in acquiring signatures. We 
enlisted the Washington Post as a lobbying entity in this instance, which of course was unique and had never occurred before or after. 
G: Who contacted her, do you know? 
O: My recollection is I talked to her, and there may have been others. It was necessary first to elicit her commitment and then provide her with specific contacts that she might make 
or assign people who might know these people. It was not overly productive. 
G: Really? 
O: No, the assigned names to the Post were difficult names. And they were basically Republican members who had no interest in signing a D. C. home rule discharge petition. 
It wasn't that we were pressing Kay Graham to accomplish the impossible. On the Democratic side, we had been working arduously. Perhaps there was another area for 
these Republicans. They might respond or react to the Washington Post. They certainly weren't going to react to us or any of the people who were working with us. We were 
desperately trying to get the required number of signatures, but the way the discharge petition game is played, people sign and you discover two days later they've taken their 
name off. To get to that magic 218 was a cat and mouse game. And maybe there was an untapped area that the unique position of the Washington Post and Kay Graham and her 
associates might be helpful with. But my recollection is that it was not productive in any meaningful way, and that's no reflection on Kay Graham. We had given her what really 
was an impossible list, with the hope there was something we were unaware of by way of Washington Post involvement with some of these people which might lead to a contact, 
5
O'Brien --Interview XII --2 
that was all. 
G: Was this an isolated case, or were other newspaper publishers helpful in this sort of thing? 
O: No, I don't recall we were ever engaged in contact with newspapers requesting that publishers or managing editors become involved in any kind of lobbying activity. This was 
unique. After all, the Washington Post is in the District of Columbia; the Washington Post has spent a couple of decades strongly advocating home rule. So we were not 
inhibited. It wasn't calling the Post as a newspaper. You were calling the Post as an important entity in the community, in the business of the District of Columbia. Anyway, it 
was an indication that we tried every device we could think of. Your tendency is to say, what have you got to lose? 
G: Another area that I forgot to ask you about yesterday was a note that I have that you persuaded LBJ to support the reform of the House rules at the beginning of the session to 
help the liberal members of the House. Do you recall? 
O: Yes. My recollection is that you had two choices, obviously. You could fall back to a position which was good cover at times, particularly if you had a couple of members of 
Congress who were anxious for committee assignments and might feel the White House could talk to the leadership. Well, you avoid that kind of controversy and indicate we 
never get involved in the internal activities of either body. In a rules situation, rather than antagonize some of the conservatives, why get into that? It's going to cause some 
animosity. On the other hand, there was the strong view on the part of our supporters that there should be some indication of presidential interest. After all, it went to your 
legislative program; it went to the prior Rules Committee fight. If we had no hesitancy in 1961 to engage in head counts and work with the House Democratic leadership to bring 
about the increase in membership of the Rules Committee, why in 1965 not express an interest and state a position? The position would be obvious, after all. Liberalization of 
Rules Committee procedure was in our best interest, clearly, and it could be very helpful. So I had that discussion with the President, and the President was in accord. 
G: Was he reluctant at first? 
O: I don't recall that he was. We touched on the options. "This is the position that we should be in, and we should feel comfortable with it." What fallout negatively were you 
going to have except the accusation that you were interfering in the conduct of the business of the Congress? Valid, but in this context, so what? Clearly, you would incur 
the wrath of some of the ardent conservatives who were attempting to retain their last vestige of control over the committee. They're not going to be supporting your program, 
anyway. Most importantly, from those who have consistently supported the New Frontier and now the Great Society program, we can anticipate their blood and guts throughout. It 
would be unseemly, I thought, not to make known that you were hopeful the liberalization of the Rules Committee would be put into effect. And that was what it amounted to. 
6
O'Brien --Interview XII --3 
G: What did LBJ do? 
O: I don't recall that it involved LBJ calling members. That wasn't really the approach you take in something like this. It was a matter with the leadership, the President advising 
them they were free in any way that they thought it might be helpful to state the President's position, the White House position and White House support. And, on the 
staff basis, the White House was fully prepared to be supportive. The fact is that everybody knew we would be supportive; it made sense. If you got into presidential direct 
intervention, you could find yourself in a potentially counterproductive situation. I could just envision people making demagogic statements that this was guided and directed by 
the White House, interfering unduly in congressional activities. 
So to summarize it, you just leave it alone. Nobody could claim that you should have been involved. Or, you could make a bow to those you were looking to as your 
leaders and supporters of your programs. And that was basically what you did, and you did it in an informal manner--spread the word where it was helpful. Not to do it in that 
manner you take the chance of creating an issue that the opponents of change might latch onto which could be disruptive. 
G: Okay, we talked at length yesterday about Medicare. Another piece of health legislation was the regional medical centers program, which was an outgrowth of the 
Heart-Cancer-Stroke Commission, which Michael DeBakey had headed. To what extent was the opposition to this bill the same as that to Medicare? 
O: I don't recall that it approached the intensity of Medicare. You had the background of the committee or commission; you had Dr. DeBakey heading this. It's pretty difficult to be 
finding fault with an effort to tackle, by research, these very serious heart, cancer and stroke illnesses. We felt at the outset that this should move rather smoothly, and my 
recollection is that it did. Opponents would object to federal intervention and federal money, claiming the private sector is fully capable of handling all this effectively. It's 
pretty hard to debate that there isn't a responsibility and a role of government. So we were on the white-hat side of this, clearly. 
It's a good example of the sensitivity of the President. How does this come into being a proposal? You are responding to a responsibility you have as the president. It 
needs to have some creative input; it needs to be an integral and significant part of a program you're presenting to the Congress. You entered really a new and meaningful area 
of governmental action. 
G: Apparently at one point the AMA tried to persuade LBJ to delay action on this measure, and sort of hinting that unless that were done, perhaps the AMA might not cooperate with 
the implementation of Medicare. 
O: That occurred. The AMA had not gone through its last gasp of opposition. But as we said earlier, the AMA threat of nonparticipation on Medicare was something we did not 
7
O'Brien --Interview XII --4 
dismiss out of hand. But we felt that it was not going to go very far, and it didn't. Our experience with the AMA through the whole Medicare battle--and it wasn't confined to 
1965, obviously--brought us to the point where we weren't particularly interested in the AMA's position on a matter such as this. And, which may sound rather harsh, it was our 
attitude and it might have been unfair, but we were committed and the AMA could take it or leave it. We were not going to allow that to change either our position or our 
timetable. 
Let's remember, as we go through 1965, our approach off the November 1964 election brought us very clearly [to the understanding]--everybody was aboard and the 
President's leadership was there--that we're going for the whole ball of wax, and we are not going to be inhibited. It made it easier to function; you didn't divert your attention to 
avoidance of conflict; it's out there, we're going after it. We're going to get it done in this session. We're not going to listen to suggestions, we can work this out in some other 
way. We're beyond that. 
Now, that sounds like arrogance, but it wasn't, really. We weren't being arrogant; we were being realistic. The opportunity was there; the door had been opened and we 
were charging through. It was a very simple strategy. It wasn't the intricate, difficult strategy that often involved us in the past. 
G: What role did Mary Lasker and Florence Mahoney play in this? 
O: They played a significant role. I knew them both; I got to know Florence intimately. I'd have to credit both. Florence had meeting after meeting in her home in Georgetown. 
Mary Lasker and Florence were on the telephone constantly and their enthusiasm knew no bounds. They were dedicated. I enjoyed both of them, particularly Florence because 
day-to-day I was more apt to have contact with Florence. She was more on the day-to-day direct lobbying aspect. 
G: And what did Mary Lasker do on the other hand? 
O: Mary Lasker was, by virtue of her position, her involvement financially, widely recognized and highly regarded. 
G: Can you recall any individual senators or House members that they were effective in turning around on this issue? 
O: No, not specifically, but they were kept apprised of our progress, and they in turn would provide us with information. Florence had become well acquainted with key members of 
the Congress over a long period of time. She had a beautiful home in Georgetown; she was a marvelous hostess, and she utilized that home to the fullest. I had occasion to go 
there often and she would have people who would ensure that you weren't going to spend one of those typical Washington social evenings; you'd have opportunity for contact. I 
thought she was very good, very professional. 
8
O'Brien --Interview XII --5 
G: I wonder to what extent were these two agents of yours advancing objectives of the administration and to what extent were they lobbying, urging the administration to go 
farther. 
O: I think both, yes. I think that it's fair to say they lobbied both ways. Obviously, you were well aware of their intense interest. They had left no stone unturned to make sure the 
administration was aware that they and the people they represented were anxious for the administration to move. People deeply involved are apt to spend a fair amount of time 
talking to people who are already committed. It's difficult to measure the degree of contribution in terms of X number of votes that were garnered. It would be impossible. It 
was keeping the enthusiasm high, making sure those in a position on the Hill to be helpful had their backs rubbed. My recollection is that it was Florence in the pits with Mary 
Lasker as a person nationally known for her interest and financial support. 
G: But they did have a lobbyist themselves, didn't they, Mike Gorman? 
O: Yes. But Florence was a lobbyist. 
G: Well, did their financing include financing congressmen who were favorable--O: 
I don't know. 
G: --or was it--? 
O: We were not directly involved with them in that aspect. I frankly felt that it was none of my business, and they weren't volunteering information to me in that regard. 
G: Okay. One of the issues concerning this measure was an amendment by Senator [Russell] Long concerning the public's right to patents which were developed in using federal 
research money, whether the patents ought to go to the prescription drug industry or to the public. Do you recall that amendment? It was tabled; it was not enacted. Do you 
remember that? 
O: Only in the context of not being surprised that effort would be made. The private sector drug lobby manufacturers would be seeking contact to bring this about. Why Long? Who 
knows? It probably had something to do with manufacturers based in Louisiana. I don't know. But that always surfaces, and after all there was a lot at stake in that regard. 
G: Okay. Now, the War on Poverty amendments that came up that year centered around the governor's veto power. 
O: As I recall it, the opponents latched on to some incidents that had occurred. There had been eruptions in some of the Job Corps programs. It was suggested that this was an 
indication of serious administrative problems. Perhaps we should again recognize the 
9
O'Brien --Interview XII --6 
control aspect of some these programs. There was, as I recall, discussion regarding the salary level of staff, and perhaps the two hats of Sarge Shriver. It was troublesome. I 
guess it was what you'd anticipate. You have a program; now you're going to try to significantly increase its funding. Your opponents are saying, "This was a dog from the 
beginning; I'm still opposed. What can I conjure up to limit its expansion, cut back some of the authority at the national level?" It was a losing battle for the opponents. I think 
Adam Powell at one point got into some claims regarding the staffing and the salary levels, and then later on Adam, after conversations with Shriver, decided that all his questions 
had been appropriately answered; he had no further problems. Look at the bottom line and you'll find that the request was complied with. 
G: Why do you think Shriver did hold on to both jobs? 
O: I can't answer that. He was adamant and I don't recall that the President or anybody else was awfully exercised about him holding the two jobs. Go back to the beginning, to the 
attack on Adam Yarmolinsky in the early stages, and all of this we considered attempts to disrupt. 
Now if Sarge had said, "I've thought this over and I shouldn't be holding both jobs," I suppose the answer to that is, "Well, Sarge, that's your decision." But here is a 
fellow, going back to the Peace Corps, who had proven himself to be exceptional. He had the leadership qualities and the commitment, so he wound up with another hat. I don't 
recall objecting to it. We all felt comfortable with it. But by the same token, it was more Sarge's desires and commitment than any effort we made to persuade Sarge to retain two 
hats. That's about what it came down to. 
But when this became an attempt to blow out of proportion some administrative problems that existed, that was something that we wouldn't debate or negotiate. We just 
plunged forward. In this instance, once again, which was typical of the year, I think I'm correct in saying that the request, which was probably a billion five or something like that, 
was authorized. That's kind of remarkable in and of itself. 
G: This also pitted Ralph Yarborough against John Connally, then governor of Texas. 
O: Yes. 
G: And Connally was vetoing Neighborhood Youth Corps projects where enrollees were receiving $1.25 an hour and only allowing those that received $1.00 an hour to go 
through. Do you recall anything on this issue? 
O: Yes, Ralph latched onto that with great vigor. To some extent his vocalized concern had to do with the long-standing conflict Ralph felt existed, and as he conceived it, 
mistreatment by both Johnson and Connally over the years. I was made aware of that by Ralph Yarborough on any number of occasions. Whether it went to postmasters or 
projects or judgeships, Ralph was absolutely persuaded that he was put upon, that he was 
10
O'Brien --Interview XII --7 
unfairly treated. This provided rather a good opportunity. Why would Connally veto? I don't recall we had any sympathy for Connally's position and Ralph had a valid point. 
G: What was LBJ's role in this conflict? 
O: I don't recall--LBJ and John Connally and Ralph Yarborough. As far as I was concerned, I was not privy to the personal aspects and apparently there was a considerable history. I 
liked Ralph, I really did. But I must say there were times when I'd have to do a lot of listening, and I think there was a period when I was postmaster general that he felt I had 
become part of a cabal to embarrass him. (Laughter) 
G: Why did he think that? 
O: Ralph spent a portion of each day of his life trying to determine just what Connally or Johnson were trying to do to him that day. And it could become, frankly, a little off the 
wall. (Laughter) Maybe there was a degree of fact to some of it, but by gosh, what I would be put to, both in my role at the White House and then in my role in the Post Office 
Department, it got to be a little bit tiresome. (Laughter) 
G: Johnson is said to have dissuaded Joe Kilgore from running for the Senate against Yarborough. 
O: I don't know. 
G: What was Johnson's attitude toward Yarborough in 1965? 
O: Well, any time Yarborough involved Johnson and me, it would be in the context of the legislative program. I don't recall any discussion about Texas politics or back-home 
problems. Yarborough really wasn't a troublesome fellow in terms of the program, so you really didn't get into much. I don't recall Ralph ever saying to me, "Listen, I'm not going 
to vote for the War on Poverty," for example, "because I have found two rural mail carriers were named who are political enemies of mine," or that sort of thing. Ralph 
would moan and groan a good deal and I'm sure he was honestly persuaded. Whether Lyndon Johnson and John Connally went out of their way to make life miserable for him, I 
don't know. He was extremely sensitive to it, so I think he was looking for problems sometimes. 
G: The Foundation on the Arts and Humanities established the National Endowment for the Arts and National Endowment for the Humanities. Is there anything on that legislation in 
1965 that's significant, from the standpoint of--? 
O: Not particularly in the progress of the legislation. But that should be pointed to by historians, people who are going to evaluate this period, because you have President 
Lyndon B. Johnson as the advocate. You have a federal role in the arts and humanities being established. Granted, you're establishing it at this point purely organizationally; you 
11
O'Brien --Interview XII --8 
haven't gotten into deep fiscal commitments. But that in and of itself, I think, represents a very meaningful element of the Great Society program. 
I say that because I've watched it over the years. People complain bitterly about reduction in funding in some of these areas in this current administration. But federal 
involvement opened the windows and provided a broader-based citizen involvement in the arts and humanities, appreciation, and all the rest. 
When you think of the theater, for example, the British theater, traditionally the government is extremely supportive of the theater. Currently there's some conflict in 
Great Britain where they feel that a couple of the top producers and directors in England have taken advantage of the government's support, trying out plays and musicals, finding 
they have a very favorable audience reaction, then transferring them to the West End of London into a commercial position, making a great deal of money. Nevertheless, I've 
always admired the British for the significant role they play in promoting this area of the arts. 
To initiate that in the United States I thought was long overdue. This President recognized that [and] opened up a new area of governmental involvement in a very 
progressive and meaningful way. There again it comes to the basic, fundamental conflict between the parties, the philosophies of government. Here is a fine example of significant 
government involvement for the good of all, the beginning of a new era of governmental relations. 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 2 
O: I think there is a tendency to feel that this was just another legislative proposal, included in a massive legislative program. But it was far more significant than that, and has altered 
the concept of the role of government in fields of endeavor in the public interest. 
G: The House cut the appropriation substantially, from 10.7 million to 7.2 million [dollars]. 
O: You are into a new area, as I said. It was a substantial cut. The goal was to establish this entity. It's difficult to be supportive of people who are in the arts or humanities. 
Expenditures should be subject to close scrutiny; perhaps there are some wild decisions made because you are dealing with unusual people. 
I reflect on the time after Dallas, when we had that long-ending attempt to build a structure in Washington, and we were not getting very far. It was not long after Dallas 
when, sitting in my office, it dawned on us that this rightly should be the Kennedy Center. You can say, "God, you were a bunch of ghouls sitting there." First of all, we were 
totally in agreement that this was a worthwhile project and we were not making progress. Now, if this is designated as the Kennedy Center it could impact favorably and that's 
exactly what happened. 
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O'Brien --Interview XII --9 
Arts and Humanities were new for those at the national level. It was considered rather esoteric by many members of Congress who thought this was not sensible or 
realistic and it would incur additional federal spending. Funding was modest, and an indication there was a considerable degree of reluctance on the Hill. Establish it, take a 
careful look and let's have a modest start. 
G: Another initiative in this area in 1965 was the White House Festival on the Arts, a mixed result. Do you recall that in the President's--? 
O: I recall the White House Festival but I don't recall the specifics of it, and I'm not at all sure that I had any great involvement in it. 
G: Robert Lowell sent a telegram declining to come out of protest to Vietnam, and--O: 
Yes. Well--G: 
Do you think these initiatives reflected a personal desire on LBJ's part to be appreciated by this element, culturally--? 
O: I really don't know. I think what I appreciated was his recognition that there was validly and legitimately a federal role. The federal government should be supportive, and it 
wasn't. 
I think that I probably reacted as, perhaps, the President did. I was not intimately involved in the arts, but I think sufficiently broad-based to recognize it is meaningful in 
society. Perhaps rather than President Johnson saying, "I hope some of those wild-eyed liberal people in the arts would think well" of him, it was more a recognition that this was 
an appropriate role for government, and it was a worthy endeavor. If he did anticipate this meant they would applaud him particularly, that was not in the cards. I have found those 
people a little hard to take at times, but you look at the end result and tolerate some of their rather impractical approaches to life and to government. After all, some of the 
greatest artists in history have been people who probably needed a psychiatrist. 
G: Let's talk about immigration reform. This was the measure in 1965 that eliminated the national origins quota system, really a sweeping change. 
O: The national origins quota system had been in place without change for a long time. And historically, of course, it favored northern Europe; back to the founding of the country. It 
was established in the climate of northern European presence in the development of this country. It had neglected to reflect the dramatic changes that had taken place as this 
country progressed. The southern European and others had been limited. You had a quota system that oftentimes was not fully utilized. It was based on an old concept that 
no longer existed or should exist. And so it was massive in the sense that you were to completely restructure immigration procedure, severely limiting some countries that had 
pretty much an open door historically. You were trying to establish an equitable 
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O'Brien --Interview XII --10 
immigration policy. It was a heavily debated, controversial and prolonged struggle. And the outcome brought about a revolution in immigration policy. 
G: Was it essentially a civil rights measure? Minority groups did support it. 
O: Yes. I don't know as I'd term it that. I think it was so broadly based to revise an archaic procedure you could [say] there was a civil rights aspect to it also. 
G: What was organized labor's position on this issue? 
O: They did have one problem in this, the authority to determine farm immigration. They were insistent that the Department of Labor have the authority to make the determinations 
on farm labor immigration rather than the Attorney General's office, which was prescribed in the bill. Labor looked askance on authority being placed in a department other than 
Labor, where it directly affected the laboring person. The problem was they were working behind the scenes or behind our back, let's put it that way, to effect this change in the 
legislation. It was troublesome to us because that could adversely affect the enactment. There was a lot at stake in this legislation. 
It was a matter of our being disturbed with Andy Biemiller, the representative of AFL-CIO, maneuvering to bring about this change that we were a) unaware of until it was 
brought to our attention indirectly, and b) while they might have their particular interest in this specific area and want to ensure they had an open door to a Department of Labor, it 
was not something we felt should be engaged in at that stage of the legislation, creating a controversy we felt could be disruptive in terms of the progress of the legislation. They 
had moved to a point where finally it came to our attention. It was something that should have been up front early on in discussions, and who knows, the accommodation could 
have been made, perhaps. 
G: Was there any interaction between this bill and the attempt to repeal 14( b) of the Taft-Hartley Act? 
O: The attempt to repeal 14( b) was sort of an annual effort made in each Congress by the Democrats. It was a very strong commitment on the part of labor that they were going to 
get rid of 14( b). It became part of the opening and closing ceremonies of every labor meeting in the country. We had clearly committed to do everything we possibly could to 
accomplish the repeal. But by the same token, if you're sitting with this legislative program in the White House, the real world indicates clearly to you that you can wage 
that battle separately, and in good faith do everything you can. But if it could affect other legislative proposals, that's not in the cards. There's a presidential commitment, and it will 
be fulfilled to the best of our ability. When the time comes, we'll be there and we'll work with you. 
Organized labor would rather be dealing with the Department of Labor than the Justice Department. The Department of Labor rightly is the place to have this. If you're 
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O'Brien --Interview XII --11 
going to have some provision involving farm immigration, why would this be controlled by lawyers? It should be in the Department of Labor. That would follow the normal reaction 
of organized labor in any event, even though there have been times when organized labor hasn't been enamored with the secretary of labor. 
But on 14( b) I don't recall any attempt to play that to impact on labor's support in this legislation. If it existed, it made no sense from our point of view. 
G: One element of this immigration bill that the administration did oppose was the limitation on Western Hemisphere immigration of a hundred and twenty thousand a year. And that 
was included. You lost on that one. Can you recall that issue? 
O: Placing a numerical limit to the level the Congress did, I don't know as we were prepared to go that far. It was just extended beyond what we were interested in. But it did 
represent a strong view in the Congress. 
G: There's an indication that this concession was necessary in order to get the support of [Everett] Dirksen and Sam Ervin. 
O: I think that's valid. 
G: There was also an emphasis placed on family relationships, admitting immigrants who had close relatives here, parents or children, something like that, rather than placing the first 
priority on immigrants who had needed skills or special talents. 
O: That's right. 
G: But the administration supported the latter. 
O: I know it. As you thought it out, there was merit in that approach, as long as that didn't mean you overly diminished or reduced the skill aspect. It's something poignant. There 
were citations of how this would impact in human terms, and that was difficult to cope with. I've run into any number of immigration cases over the years which suggest the 
skills side of it is pretty rigid. 
I don't follow implementation closely. It comes to your attention when you know somebody or you are made aware of a situation. Western Hemisphere restrictions are 
rigid, the quotas are limited and the exceptions are hard to come by. Of course, there were private bills presented by congressmen and senators. I doubt they're as extensive as 
they were where recourse is to a private bill; that's a very difficult procedure. 
G: Why was it difficult? 
O: There's a tendency by the Congress not to favorably entertain these private bills. Now, I haven't followed private congressional activities over recent years, but I remember that a 
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O'Brien --Interview XII --12 
private bill would be resorted to because of extreme pressure on the member by either the family or organizations trying to bypass immigration procedure by legislative action. A 
member would have a tendency to refrain from that. It might have been rather cynical, but we used to construe that as an indication of strong pressure being exerted on the member, 
and the member had a full awareness that it probably wasn't going to go anywhere. On rare occasions something happens. I suppose if everything else has failed, why not try 
that? Of course, we're not talking about illegal immigration. That's another story. Immigration is a serious problem today, and the Congress doesn't seem to be able to cope 
with it. 
G: Representative Michael Feighan was an influential member in this immigration struggle. Can you analyze his role and discuss him in connection with it? 
O: He was persistent. He had his own views and he was going to be disruptive procedurally to accomplish his objectives. I can't tell you why he became as vocal and active as he did. 
Obviously his committee assignment had a lot to do with it. He was sensitive to the importance of his role in the Congress. I'm not suggesting he wasn't well motivated, but 
he was extremely active and deeply involved. 
There's nothing worse than to have a subcommittee chairman, or committee chairman, get his nose out of joint. All bets are off in terms of common sense and 
judgment. It becomes a matter of principle, and he's not going to be very rational if you get into that kind of a situation. There may have been some merit to Mike's position, 
because whether it was overt or not, Mike at the outset and up front was not properly included in the proceedings, at least as he saw it. 
G: Jim Eastland was chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and he was not a friend of the measure. 
O: No. It was hard to find Jim Eastland friendly to any measure that was advocated by presidents in the New Frontier-Great Society period, or perhaps prior to that. 
G: Johnson signed the bill at Ellis Island, I guess, didn't he? 
O: Yes. 
G: Do you recall that? Did you [attend]? 
O: Yes, I was there at the signing. It was a very colorful signing and another indication that we did devote attention to the show business aspect of signing the legislation. There was 
a sidebar to that, because I was on a ferry to Ellis Island. There was a large group, including press and political leaders, senators, congressmen. We had the appropriate 
representation of the Congress present for the signing ceremony. 
I noted the Governor of New York, Nelson Rockefeller, was aboard. Inasmuch as 
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O'Brien --Interview XII --13 
he was a Republican leader as well as governor of the state, I didn't appreciate the idea that he would try to secure a prominent position in the signing ceremony. I was kind of 
childish, I guess, but when we arrived at Ellis Island and we docked, I could see Nelson Rockefeller making his move to be the first arrival at the signing ceremony. Suddenly 
Nelson Rockefeller found I was in front of him, and no matter which way he turned, somehow I was turning in the same direction. He said something to the effect, "Gee, I'm 
trying to move out of here." I chose to ignore his comment; I didn't hear him. And finally, because I had succeeded in delaying him, there was a flood of people headed towards the 
signing ceremony, at which point he said, "I'm the governor of New York! I'm the governor! Let me off here!" I felt we'd accomplished the objective, and I said, "Oh, how 
are you, Governor?" I stepped aside, and he just growled. The result was he had a little trouble getting placed behind the President during the ceremony. That was a rather silly 
thing to do, but I guess it sort of reflected my Democratic Party background. It was a very well covered ceremony, it was obviously an appropriate location, so it made for good 
photo opportunity. 
Months went by, and we were in the East Room of the White House. The Governor and his wife were there, and we were standing around at some reception. He 
spotted me and came right over and brought up the subject and said, "You purposely blocked me that day of the signing." I said, "Come on." And I started to laugh. I said, 
"You know that's not true." He said, "I know it is; I know it, and you're never going to convince me otherwise." And I must say for him, he then laughed, and said, "You did it, 
you so-and-so." (Laughter) And he said, "Don't ever try to convince me that you didn't do it purposely." But he laughed, and that was that. I can't recall doing anything similar 
in my life. I'll have to say I kind of enjoyed doing it, although it was rather silly. The President had arrived by helicopter. 
G: There was one note that indicated that LBJ wanted to do the signing on Ellis Island if he could keep out of New York politics. 
O: Yes, that's true. That was always a concern. It's interesting that through our presidential campaigns, the ones I was involved in, we always tried to keep out of New York politics. 
I always found New York politics pretty messy. It was difficult to deal with people in New York without causing animosity with others. The party was not in good shape, 
never really has been on a statewide level. There were these groups in New York with their power centers; it was well to avoid if you possibly could. Now, in terms of the 
signing ceremony, it would be endless trying to determine who should be invited or not invited on the political side. That was of some concern to us when we were establishing 
the location for the signing, but it was not a problem as it unfolded. 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 1 
G: Okay, highway beautification. You were making an initial observation on that one. 
O: This as we know was Mrs. Johnson's pet project. She had a keen interest and maintained 
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O'Brien --Interview XII --14 
that interest throughout the legislative process. The net result of her interest and of her husband represented an unusual lobbying effort, involving people who normally would not 
be so engaged. The effort was to enlist the assistance of about everybody on the White House staff. Several staff members were given specific assignments to press this issue. 
Mrs. Johnson maintained almost day-to-day contact on progress. I met with her on occasions in the residence to update her. 
(Interruption) 
G: You said you met with her at the White House several [times]. 
O: Yes, on a number of occasions. This represented not only a great interest on her part, but great involvement. So, as I said, we had a full roster on our lobbying team throughout this 
effort. 
G: How did that arrangement come about? 
O: The lobbying aspect? 
G: Yes. Who brought everybody into the picture? 
O: Well, the President had made it known, I think informally, that he expected everybody would participate. He told me--which was the situation in any event--that the staff was to 
participate and be helpful wherever it could. They understood they were to be responsive whenever requested to ensure the success of this legislation. We probably had, in the 
White House, as detailed a head count, as detailed an effort as we probably had ever experienced. And that was all to the good. 
G: Did the President himself do any lobbying on the bill? Did he make any calls? 
O: I don't recall specifically that he did. As this moved along it was subject to frustrating time delays at various stages, which was not unusual. We stayed abreast of it and I don't 
recall there was any great need for the President to inject himself personally into this effort. It went along quite well, and of course the people on the Hill were fully aware of 
Mrs. Johnson's interest. There was a willingness to be helpful, because everybody admired her. They knew that this was something she felt deeply about. So you had the additional 
element that this would be so pleasing to her that everybody ought to just pitch in. 
G: One peculiar aspect of this is that the President's personal attorney, Don Thomas, was representing the outdoor advertisers in this. Did this ever come to your attention? 
O: It came to my attention, but I don't know as I had the occasion to particularly focus on it, because while it was unusual to have a friend of the President lobbying against a 
presidential proposal, we were accustomed to outside lobbying and opposition to our proposals. There was nothing you became involved with that didn't have private-sector 
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O'Brien --Interview XII --15 
opposition, most of the time pretty vocal, strong and well-organized opposition. That was part of the process. 
G: What specifically did Mrs. Johnson do to advance the legislation? 
O: She had conversations with a number of members of Congress. She spent her time on the telephone, and when members of Congress came to the White House for functions, she 
would visit with them, express her interest and ask them how things were going. There were repeated efforts on her part to ensure that there was a total awareness of her interest 
on the Hill. 
G: There's an indication that she did deal directly with John Kluczynski. Was that his name? 
O: I don't recall that specifically, but she dealt directly with any number of members. 
G: Did she enlist her friends in this effort? 
O: Yes. There were friends, Liz Carpenter and others were involved, Bess Abell. Everyone was involved. (Laughter) I don't know as we involved the fellows in the White House 
Mess, but we probably didn't overlook anybody who was in a position to be helpful. Both Bess and Liz--Bess in terms of regular contacts--were very much present. There were 
other friends who were enlisted who in their own way were advocates in whatever form it might take. The legislative progress at its various stages, the head-counting was carried 
out as we normally did, with the additional factor of White House staff involvement to a heavy degree, well beyond the congressional relations activity normally. 
G: You have a memo here that describes Mrs. Johnson's interest in getting six congressmen to join her for a tree-planting ceremony, and she--O: 
This would be part of the various activities she engaged in. In this instance, I believe the memo reflects a desire to know the specific position of each of these congressmen relative 
to the legislation, so there wouldn't be any problem in enlisting them. That memo would be typical of her interest and activity. I don't believe that we got into extensive exchanges 
of memos because it was direct contact and discussion, face-to-face review and update. Mrs. Johnson would call me when she had some thoughts or questions and as I said, there 
were occasions when I would go over to the residence and give her an update. So she was totally apprised, step by step, really almost hour by hour. 
G: One of the memos reflected how much she had riding on this legislation in terms of her own prestige, the fact that she had come out so strongly in favor of it. Did this mean that 
if a bill had not been passed that it would have damaged her image or her prestige? 
O: I don't think so. It would have been, obviously, very disappointing to her. She certainly was a significant plus factor in those years in Washington and extremely well thought of 
bipartisanly. So that would not have adversely affected her image, if something went awry 
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O'Brien --Interview XII --16 
in legislating. However, it didn't hurt to indicate, subtly, by fleeting reference that people who might contemplate opposing this legislation or unduly amending it could be adversely 
affecting her image. 
G: Was there some political fallout as a result of this issue? Did she herself become more vulnerable to critics? I know, for example, there were a lot of attacks on her at--O: 
A lot of the fellows just found it difficult to take this seriously. Beautification wasn't quite their cup of tea. As for the emphasis we were placing on it, I think some on the Hill felt 
that we were overplaying this. In terms of its importance on a scale re the Great Society, it wouldn't weigh that heavily, perhaps. Then some of the pundits and cartoonists decided 
they could have a little fun with it. But it was not mean or vicious. There were touches here and there, and there was a widespread recognition that this was Lady Bird's bill. 
There was an assumption on the part of some that the President would not have been as strongly committed except for his wife. So that was there, but the fact that this was her 
bill, that this was her baby, was accepted in good spirits. There wasn't any meanness. As I say, there was a little humor injected into it on the part of media, but it was passing in 
the night. Maybe there are things that occurred that I would consider not of any great significance, but if you're the target you might have taken it more seriously. 
The billboard industry, of course, was awfully concerned. That industry can wield some power and would be heavily financed. The industry had not paid any attention to 
what would enhance the environment or those elements of unsightliness. It was of no great interest to them; they were business people, in some instances large companies that 
were very profitable. There was great concern about the encroachment of government and the restrictions that might flow if this federal program came into effect. 
You had what was watered down during the course of the bill: impositions of penalties on states for noncompliance; highway funds would be withheld under certain 
circumstances. "Obviously it would be nice if the highways were more attractive, if the unsightliness of billboards was eliminated or reduced significantly, and junkyards were 
closed out so they weren't eyesores," all of that would have been pretty hard to argue. But then it got to the bottom line: how was it going to economically affect the billboard 
industry; how difficult would it be for the states to comply, and how severe were the penalties for noncompliance? All that became part of the debate and went into the 
drafting of the legislation on the Hill. At one point, we had a time frame that provided for 100 per cent withholding of highway funds under certain circumstances. Well, that was a 
pretty harsh action and that was reduced. 
What was undertaken was to water down to some extent the penalties and time frame restrictions. Beyond that there was a provision for some degree of compensation to 
closing off junkyards. But that's just part of the process. What you had was a First Lady who was sick to death of this sort of thing and her view was shared by many. She was far 
from being alone in her concerns. There was agreement, particularly among many women's groups and local organizations across the country, that some meaningful action 
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O'Brien --Interview XII --17 
take place. I don't know what kind of a priority this legislation would have had, or if indeed there would have been full pressure to bringing it into being, if there hadn't been 
this deep and abiding involvement of the First Lady. Clearly, that represented a different situation than you normally had in legislative battle. 
G: There was also the issue of compromising on the commercial and industrial zones, advertising in those areas designated as--O: 
That again, you could make an argument--are you going to try to beautify some highway somewhere and plant flowers or build attractive fencing around junkyards in a highly 
industrialized area? How far were you going and how deeply involved were you going to become? So you made an effort in the drafting to establish certain zones this didn't apply 
to. 
G: Roadside councils seemed distressed that some of these concessions had been made. 
O: Yes. Well, go back to the penalty provision in the original concept. This is an area where a lot of people were committed, concerned, dedicated, and you're dealing in the real 
world. Inevitably you're in the situation where some areas of compromise are distressing to the staunch advocates, and they don't quite understand. When you water down the 
penalty side or provide exempt zones, those actions take away from the original concept. People wedded to a concept of course want the 100 per cent pure, clean concept retained. 
And they're not focused on the art-of-the-possible realities that go into legislating, or some of the political realities that have to be considered. 
What you hope is that the end result is something that you can be proud of, is very meaningful. Mrs. Johnson would recognize as this moved on there were certain changes 
that did not go to the heart of the concept that you had to anticipate. You hoped it would be limited and minimized, and it was in this bill. Then you come out at the end with a 
strong bill that will be a solid starting point to a meaningful program. And I know she was personally pleased with the end result and very happy with the package as a whole. 
G: Do you think you could have gotten a stronger bill, in retrospect? 
O: I suppose you always say that. I think that the lobbying effort had some impact. Invariably there is some degree of impact on the part of organized private-sector lobbying. 
Then you get to the quirks, some that you can't anticipate. You can run into a member or members sometimes who have a particular hang-up, which you could never have 
anticipated, and [who] become very adamant. You have to make determinations. That's part of the day-to-day operation of congressional relations, and certainly it's part of the 
day-to-day relationship with the Congress. That's, in the final analysis, exactly the pattern that's followed in every legislative proposal. It is a rarity to have word-for-word to the 
last comma through the process. A minimal amount of adjusting is much closer to perfection than probably an outside observer would think. I would find it hard to conceive 
of a proposal that would be so widely embraced, unanimously supported, that would not 
21
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therefore entail the change of a phrase or a word and it came back exactly the way it was presented. That's not the real world. 
In retrospect, this was carving out an entirely new avenue of governmental involvement at the federal level. And I think that we did extremely well. I don't care what 
bill it was, significant or insignificant, there was always a lot of interest from some quarter or another, whether it was national interest or regional interest or self-serving interest. 
There are a lot of single-issue advocates in the country. There's one action they want to see brought about, and they're not interested in how it might relate to anything else. 
Obviously we were at all times subject to some degree of complaint and negativeness. We were too weak or we compromised too much. 
As we've said often through these interviews, what are you talking about? You're talking about the ability to compromise, favoring your side at all times, and you're talking 
about the art of the possible. How many times did we go to the Hill over those years where you have to come to the decision that you're not going to accept that degree of 
compromise? You'd rather not have legislation. I guess you'd receive accolades from the people in the areas of interest in that legislation. They'd say, "That's a sign of real 
courage." But is that the real world? How often did we have legislation come down and say, "Okay, we've had to compromise; it's probably, if you can put a statistic on it, 60 per 
cent of the proposal, we've lost 40 per cent along the route." Are you going to accept that 60 per cent or say, "We're just not going to accept that. That isn't what we proposed," 
and then forget it and we'll be back again next year? You're going to be back again next year, but you're going to take that 60 per cent, or half a loaf, or whatever it is, and you're 
going to store it. You at that moment are contemplating how you're going to get the other 40 per cent in some way at some other time. 
G: Was anything done in an effort to strengthen the bill after it was enacted, in subsequent years? 
O: There was the usual attempt to underwrite the cost factors and try to expand our investment in the program. 
G: Was there a sensitivity to using the highway trust fund to help underwrite--? 
O: Oh, yes. I think that probably, in the final analysis, elicited more concern than any other aspect of the bill. There were some strong views in that regard. 
G: What was the basis? 
O: Well, I guess they said, "Wait a minute. You're now encroaching on the highway trust fund, into something that the highway trust fund was not created for." I believe Wilbur 
Mills and others had some strong views in that regard. What we were caught with was if you could not break into the highway trust fund, then you were faced with the creation of 
something entirely new, which would involve additional taxes in some way--maybe taxes 
22
O'Brien --Interview XII --19 
that would be paid in some form by the industry, the billboard industry and others. From our point of view, obviously, the easier road, the more realistic road was to tie into 
something already in existence, and we felt we had a valid argument. And I think it was a valid argument. You're talking about highway beautification. Why wouldn't that be 
something that would be financially assisted through the highway fund? Why not? And it was pretty hard, I think, for those opposed to make a very meaningful argument. 
G: What was Bill Moyers' role in this? 
O: He was directly and personally involved in this throughout. I think Mrs. Johnson looked to him for advice and counsel. He was very much a participant, and I say very much a 
participant because that wouldn't have been his normal activity. 
G: How about Walter Reuther? Do you recall his efforts? 
O: Walter Reuther, highways, cars--it was appropriate that his interest be enlisted. Walter Reuther was broadly gauged in his interests, and Walter, from my experience with him 
throughout those years, was a fellow with broad vision, and was in many ways a very unusual labor leader. Walter did not confine himself solely to the direct interests of his 
constituency. He was a broadly-based American, a highly-visible leader. 
G: Your weekly legislative reports for a long period of time during this session indicate a real uphill battle on this bill. You use the terms "remote," and indicate that chances of passage 
are not looking good. What happened to change that? 
O: Mrs. Johnson. 
G: Really? 
O: I think to a great extent the degree of interest she had. I have to seriously doubt that this would have turned out as it did without Mrs. Johnson's deep involvement. If you look at 
it in the context of a massive legislative program, you look at a rather unique package. You're going to beautify the highways of America; you're going to avoid eye contact with 
junkyards. That's pretty esoteric. That isn't something that really grabs a lot of people. It isn't pleasant to drive along the interstate highway and see billboards, but in the final 
analysis, to go to the mat over this, particularly if you're talking about additional expenditures, about adding another layer on bureaucracy, why? How does this affect the 
lives of people? It doesn't contribute to education, to health, to social progress, all of these broad areas that we were engaged in. It's pretty hard to place this at a high level of 
priority. So the result in the initial stages was not purposeful foot-dragging; it was a yawn. Our plate is overflowing up here. That, I'm sure, is reflected in my memos as we 
went along, and I, undoubtedly, focused more attention on this than I normally would have as an item in the overall package. 
I was more concerned about the timetable and progress than I probably would 
23
O'Brien --Interview XII --20 
have been in a comparable bill that would be fairly low on your priority list. You'd be on top of it, but if you're in the midst of education or health legislation or what have you, 
you're not giving equal time. 
Now in this instance, the degree of involvement of the President and First Lady was not due to the substance. It did not have the overriding national impact that you 
would attribute to other legislation, so you did have to prod and prod. You also had a sensitivity to her and her interests, and I'll candidly say so. So I'm sure that time and effort 
I put in and others put in was well beyond what would have been normal. 
G: You had a close vote in the House Rules Committee; [they] voted it out seven to six. Anything in particular that you recall on that? 
O: No. 
G: You had a note here on the need to make peace with Ed Edmondson. Apparently there was a feeling that he was being pressured too much, and there was a comment, "We need 
his help more than his vote." 
O: I don't remember the details of it, but I was trying to relate it to Oklahoma, relate it probably to some pressures exerted that perhaps were excessive. If I said there was a 
need, then something had occurred that I wasn't pleased with. 
End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview XII 
24
    [ Part 13: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--33 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XIII*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XIII 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XIII, 9/ 10/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XIII, 9/ 10/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-24 
4
INTERVIEW XIII 
DATE: September 10, 1986 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 1 
G: Well, let's start today with the Water Quality Act, an effort to establish quality standards for interstate waterways. Do you recall the origin of this bill and particularly LBJ's 
attitude toward it? 
O: This was a fit in the overall Great Society program. We've talked about highway beautification. You're talking about clean air, pure water, the problems of neglect over 
decades in these areas and the failure at the federal level to seriously tackle these problems. 
Ed Muskie in both the Clean Air, I believe, and the Water Quality Act played a very significant role. At one stage I went to Maine to visit with Muskie when the 
Congress was in recess to talk to him on these subjects. On the Senate side, my recollection is a considerable dependence upon Muskie to provide leadership in these 
areas. 
G: Because he was more knowledgeable or more active? 
O: He had a great interest. He was very knowledgeable on the subject. The LBJ commitment in this area was strong, and he had a great personal interest. But that was 
true of other major legislative battles that occurred. 
G: Johnson, when he signed the bill, made the statement that you would be able to swim in the Potomac by 1975. 
O: Yes, I recall that statement. I guess as we sit here that hasn't been fulfilled. 
G: Do you think that the visible pollution of the Potomac was a motivating factor? 
O: Oh, yes. That was referred to often as an outstanding example of the seriousness of this problem nationwide. That probably was the reason that Johnson made specific reference 
to the Potomac, because the Potomac was in a sad, sorry state at that time. I don't know the state of the Potomac today, but I do remember when I used to take the members out in 
the Sequoia you'd have to hold your nose at times. 
G: Did you find that this was an easy issue to sell the members of Congress because they did 
5
O'Brien --Interview XIII --2 
have that firsthand familiarity with it? 
O: Well, there again, you got into cost factors, administrative aspects. The concept was a little hard to be opposed to: clear water and clean air. But, nevertheless, nothing is ever 
easy. It ultimately came out reasonably well. But I would not want to suggest that because you were with motherhood and apple pie supposedly in a proposal of this nature 
that it was that simple. 
G: Had Jack Kennedy had a similar interest in this sort of legislation? 
O: Yes, but I don't recall that we got deeply involved. There were several matters that obviously needed attention. For example, truth-in-lending, truth-in-advertising, the Paul 
Douglas role in those days, clean air, water quality. It was our conviction through the New Frontier-Great Society period that what was needed was dramatic and drastic action 
in these areas. It fitted perfectly into our concept of the federal role. 
G: One of the controversial aspects of this bill was the discretionary authority given to the secretary of HEW in determining the standards. And here the House version differed from 
the Senate version, the latter being the one that I guess was ultimately adopted. 
O: Well, that was typical of some of the debate and discussion. It really didn't get to, "Shouldn't we do something about cleaning up the air and assuring pure water?" That 
wasn't it. It was "Who's going to run the show; what kind of expenditures ultimately will be involved; where does the authority lie; what are the penalty provisions; is there going to 
be congressional oversight?" and all that sort of thing. That was really what the debate and discussion were about in the final analysis. Except for the usual hard core, it wasn't a 
matter of saying "No, we shouldn't legislate in these areas, we don't belong there, it isn't our province." It was with some reluctance, obviously, on the part of the Republicans, but 
nevertheless [there was] an understanding that it was darn hard to oppose legislation of this nature. You had to get to the nit-picking. 
G: Yes. Another question was the timetable for implementation: how long before the standards should be established. 
O: There again it's a part of what I just referred to. If you're not enamored with a legislative proposal and yet politically speaking the concept is really not debatable, then the tendency 
is to go heavy into the other elements. The timetable would be administrative authority, what penalties and the timetable. Those who were opposed to a federal role would try to 
extend timetables, weaken elements of the proposal. 
G: The Clean Air Act was another piece of legislation enacted that gave discretionary authority to the secretary of health, education and welfare. This was a bill aimed at 
limiting the auto emissions, pollution--O: 
Yes. Well, there again, Muskie played a key role. Muskie was chairman of the 
6
O'Brien --Interview XIII --3 
subcommittee that would be handling this in the Senate. Now you're dealing with the auto industry, and it's one thing to purify the water and another thing to be in favor of clean air. 
This is going to impose, potentially at least, some severe restrictions on the manufacture of automobiles--rules and procedures that would have to be adhered to. Up to this time, 
there hadn't been any major effort to impose rules and procedures on the auto industry, which is contributing tremendously to the problem of our air. Now you're getting into big 
lobbying, a powerful group with supporters in the Congress. 
In situations like that it's always interesting. There might be a liberal congressman from Michigan, and you find that fellow isn't sold on this proposal. You understand the 
reason why. So on a regional and local basis, you would have fallout in support. Actually the controversy goes on to this day in that area. There have been steps backward; there 
have been lessening of restrictions, there have been extensions of time frames. The auto industry to this day fights this battle. 
G: What role did the auto makers play in this battle, do you recall? 
O: In general, the position of the auto makers was that they had and would be making every effort to improve the situation and lessen the problem on a voluntary basis. The auto 
industry doesn't feel that the government should jump on its back, because the auto industry commits to the American people to continue this effort in this area if they were 
allowed to go about their business and do it. That's the position of every group when you are trying to whip them into line. 
G: A senator like [William] Proxmire would have both an environmental faction in his state and an automotive faction. 
O: That's right. 
G: How would he resolve them? 
O: I don't know how he would, but it would cause him some problems. He'd have to give it a lot of thought, because there's a major element of auto manufacturing in Wisconsin. He 
would undoubtedly be greatly interested in the retention of employees in the industry in Wisconsin. At the same time his gut reaction would be that he was personally favorable to 
doing something significant about this problem, so he would have to resolve that in his own mind. 
G: Did the United Auto Workers take a stand on this? 
O: I don't recall, specifically, to be honest with you. I don't recall the auto workers' stand. Did they support it? I'd be unfair to say they didn't; I don't recall how significant their role 
was. 
G: Was there anything that you could do to counter this pressure from the auto makers? 
7
O'Brien --Interview XIII --4 
O: We were in pretty good shape in that regard. It was a tough sell on the part of the auto makers, pretty tough to sell anybody with a reasonably open mind that we should refrain 
from taking this major step in the public interest. They were in a difficult position from the outset and that's why they had to make all the verbal commitments they would devote 
time and attention to this problem in terms of improving their product. And the record showed that there was no indication of any significant improvement over a period of time 
as they were indicating was the case. We felt it was not in the public interest to allow the auto industry to just go on at whatever pace they wanted to set. On the basis of past 
practices, current record, and the seriousness of the situation, it was indeed a significant area for governmental involvement. It was clearly in the public interest. So the 
manufacturers were not in a very good position to be selling their bill of goods. They had some buyers, but the buyers were people who were sympathetic to them or closely 
associated with them. 
G: Were there segments of American industry that supported the measure, such as those that were involved in making catalytic converters or this sort of thing? 
O: Oh, I don't recall any great rush of support from those areas. 
G: You don't think that was a critical element in--? 
O: We had a good case and a good cause. Those in opposition were not in a very good position to be against the concept, and those who favored the concept were obviously in a 
comfortable position. The private sector areas that would be affected by this had--we were confident that the public was not buying their hue and cry about federal imposition. 
The proposal itself flew on its own. 
G: Did the fact that California had already established some emission requirements have an impact on this--? 
O: It did some. I wouldn't suggest that that was overriding, but it was something that the proponents pointed to, that there was a state-level breakthrough already established. 
There were those who suggested that "Well, why don't you leave it with the states? That's where it belongs, not the federal government." So they tried to counter it by pointing to 
California legislation as an example of how this should be done at a state level. When you get to clean air and water you're having a little difficulty adhering to state lines. 
G: Well, even the manufacturers must have been leery of a state-by-state requirement that varied. If they'd have to manufacture fifty different versions--O: 
Oh, sure. But at the federal level, there was the record of involvement in the public interest in this area because of deep concerns. There again, the thrust of our effort was to 
get the best bill possible, the cleanest bill possible, the tightest time frame. And those were the areas of negotiation. Whether legislation would be enacted was not what was at 
8
O'Brien --Interview XIII --5 
stake. But [the question was] how closely would it come to the best approach and most timely approach. The whole debate wound up in terms of who's going to run the show; 
what's the role of the Congress. 
G: Okay, there was a significant piece of housing legislation, the Housing and Urban Development Act--O: 
It was significant certainly in its scope. It was the most significant housing legislation by far of a couple of decades. 
G: Yes, since the 1949 bill. 
O: This was massive in concept and proposal. 
G: In spite of the tremendous majority that you had in both houses, this was still a fairly close vote, [or] series of close votes. 
O: Yes. This was very controversial. 
G: Let me ask you to discuss the background of this legislation. 
O: Back again to what we were discussing: what is the appropriate involvement at the federal level in this area just as in many other areas? You get to a philosophy of government. 
Lyndon Johnson's view was that this is a tremendous responsibility at the federal level and a great challenge. His view of it was broad and deep. And it shook the conservative 
establishment, because the elements of the proposal were so far-reaching, and it was very controversial. The standards, the eligibility, were very intricate, very, very difficult. If you 
think back on it now, it's rather awesome. 
G: Yes. The rent supplement provision was perhaps the most controversial. 
O: Yes, it was. It was a difficult area. The implementation and administration down the road was going to be a very difficult task, and guidelines and procedures should be as carefully 
developed and spelled out. Rent supplement you can underscore as an example of the intricacies and difficulties of this legislation. 
G: The Republican effort to kill the rent supplement section was defeated in the House by a vote of 202 to 208 on a roll call. That was a very narrow victory for you guys. 
O: It sure was. 
G: Do you recall the details of that? 
O: That was a real sweat. I remember that aspect of it vividly, because here you have this omnibus bill and you finally focus on the most controversial aspect of it in rent 
9
O'Brien --Interview XIII --6 
supplement. I do remember we had as intensive a head count as possible. We held our breath and it was probably the closest roll call we had in a long time on any matter. We'd 
had our problems in a lot of the legislation, but when you finally got to the floor of the House, we had reached the point in 1965 where we generally were in pretty darn good 
shape. It wasn't like in 1961 and 1962, or indeed 1963 and 1964, but this one was a barn-burner. 
G: Who were the key players in that? 
O: The Republicans, first of all, were just almost totally in opposition. Secondly, it brought into play again the old coalition. There were racial elements in this, and I think it is 
reflected in that roll call. While you were not specifically recording yourself in that context, I think a lot of the concern about rent supplement went to concern about who 
was going to be the beneficiary of it and how far was the government going to go. That roll call reflected in a sense that this is a tremendous expenditure of taxpayers' money. Are 
we prepared to be that financially supportive or should we? This was not a matter of who's going to run the show. This was very basic and fundamental, and it sort of revived 
some of the old specters. Although that didn't surface in debate as such, it was there and it caused us a great deal of difficulty in winning that roll call. 
G: Was this an urban-oriented bill rather than a rural--? 
O: It was considered that by a lot of people on the Hill. I think, more than that, some of them saw it as implementing civil rights legislation. 
G: Yes. I notice that it was introduced by [John] Sparkman in the Senate. 
O: Yes. 
G: What was Wright Patman's role in this in the House? Do you recall? 
O: Well, he played a significant role. He wound up presenting the clean bill in the House, and he was very much aboard on it. 
Incidentally, before we leave Sparkman, I think if you go back over Sparkman's legislative record, you will find that in terms of the state he represented, he was even more 
than a moderate. I think there were indications of that in his legislative record, so it would not be a change in his general approach to be supportive in this area. 
This was sort of up Patman's alley in a way. If Wright latched onto a cause, he would be very active, very much in the forefront. That was his nature. I know some of 
his fellow Texans were not that admiring of him at times, but he was quite a guy in his own way. I had a lot of involvement with him over the years. 
G: One provision that was deleted was the administration's proposal to assist in the 
10
O'Brien --Interview XIII --7 
development of new towns. 
O: Yes. Well, if you can envision this massive bill, the new town concept was probably the most esoteric in concept of the entire proposal. This stretched out as far as you could get 
the bill, really. It's one thing to provide housing, but now you get to a whole new town concept. Ultimately these new towns were built through private enterprise. That was, in 
the minds of some of the fellows on the Hill, way out, "How far out do you go on this? How many waves do you want to make?" 
G: Did you have spirited opposition from the lenders, the savings and loans, or the apartment owners association? 
O: Oh, yes, there was opposition from all those quarters. This was a little reminiscent of some of the arguments that were presented on Medicare, i. e., this was so revolutionary 
that it bordered on socialism or worse. It was a totally uncalled for federal involvement in the private sector to a degree that was destructive. Of course, those arguments were 
motivated by their own special interests. The fact is that they persuaded themselves; they got pretty excited. 
I don't know whether I describe it properly or not--but it is considerably different than clean water and air. This got to the human element. It had pieces of action in it that 
it could be detrimental to lenders or to banks or to builders. As they saw it, it went a long way toward financially supporting individuals and families. So it was adverse to some of 
the special interest groups, very much so. It was very disturbing to most of the conservatives. It did break up any concept of bipartisanship. You know, that wasn't 
there. It excited people on behalf of the legislation, obviously, but it also excited people who felt this was the beginning of the end. My God, civil rights, Medicare, education 
legislation, highway beautification, now what else is there? Now you get to this point, rent supplements, new towns, this was revolutionary, and it disturbed a lot of people on 
the Hill and in the private sector. 
If you're saying, and rightly so, that this was the first major proposal in this area since 1949, you have to ask yourself why. Well, "why" went, to a considerable extent, to 
Lyndon Johnson's advocacy. So when you talk about Great Society breakthroughs, you'd have to put this legislation right up there near the top. 
G: Yes. Anything on LBJ's assessment of the measure when it passed or--? 
O: Well, LBJ's assessment of all measures when they passed was you could have a couple of sentences missing, or a couple of commas or crossing of t's, LBJ was never totally 
satisfied. That was his nature. [He wasn't satisfied] unless it was absolute perfection itself, not one element of it altered in any way. But he would get past that quickly and 
look at the big picture and the overall result. My recollection was that he was extremely pleased in this instance. 
11
O'Brien --Interview XIII --8 
G: What disappointed him about the bill, though? 
O: Nothing overriding. 
G: Really? 
O: No. But, as I say, he could reasonably enjoy the moment, but there were times when even while he was enjoying the moment, he would reflect back on somebody who opposed or 
somebody who became difficult to deal with or some change that watered it down somewhat. The fact is that once you got by the House vote and you got this enacted, you 
had really accomplished a great deal, a great deal. It was something to be really proud of, and he was. 
G: You also had the creation of the Department of Housing and Urban Development. 
O: Well, that all followed the pattern that had been established back at the time of Kennedy when the word was that [Robert] Weaver would be the first black member of the 
President's cabinet. That surrounded the enactment. As this dragged on--and it dig drag on--the black leaders became concerned as to whether or not Weaver indeed would be 
named if the department was created. And there were some comments made by black leaders that we thought were counterproductive, because it was just stirring up a pot. 
And I recall, also, some black leaders publicly stated that they in no way were trying to influence Johnson. But there were constant references to a Kennedy commitment that 
should be fulfilled by Johnson. There had not been a specific Kennedy commitment, but they thought [there had been] an understanding. There was some delay in the ultimate 
appointment, as I recall. 
G: Was this simply a calculated delay so that it wouldn't appear that Weaver had already been essentially designated? 
O: Well, I think there was some delay in the sense that the President did not want the record to indicate that he had been pressured into something. I think it was more a reaction to 
some of the comments of black leaders. If you find comments in newspapers to the effect that "He owes it to us," or "This was committed," I think your tendency is to say, "Wait a 
minute, I'm not going to make an announcement today or next week that would be construed as bowing to pressure. What's the hurry? I'll get around to this in due course, 
and I'm thinking about--" 
G: Yes. 
O: I don't recall there was a time when, at least as far as any contact I had with him on the subject, he was contemplating not naming Weaver. And I didn't blame him a bit, as I 
recall the circumstances, this is still a presidential decision; he is the president. There's no indication that this decision had been made early on. It couldn't have been; there was no 
department. Whatever Kennedy might have indicated or not indicated, he wasn't around 
12
O'Brien --Interview XIII --9 
to testify to it. And I think the President rightly could resent anybody making some claim that he had no alternative. And I think the black leaders recognized that. Some who had 
made comments made an effort to withdraw from public discussion to the point of saying, "This is the President's decision and we're not attempting to influence it." 
G: Did you yourself get involved in negotiating with the black leaders who were making statements? 
O: No. I don't recall being involved in any in-depth discussions regarding Weaver. I was assured in my own mind that that was the way this was going to play out. The Congress 
was pretty sure that was the way it was going to play out, and that was what concerned members up there in enacting the proposal. Weaver was in the government; he was 
playing a role, the prepping of Weaver for the position had really already taken place. You could justify the appointment clearly on the basis of experience and background. 
Tape 1 of 1, Side 2 
G: Was there opposition to the measure based on the fact that Weaver was the logical choice? 
O: Oh, sure. 
G: Let me ask you to describe [that]. 
O: It wasn't articulated in those terms. In the background was the feeling that if the department wasn't created, at least you would have postponed the probable inevitability of 
a black member of the cabinet. And there were still people on the Hill at that time--maybe still are, I don't know--who felt strongly about this and were bitter about the progress of 
the Great Society programs in the area of civil rights. 
G: Well, how did this--? 
O: Weaver was a darn good candidate if you were considering recognizing the black community at this level. He was not a civil rights leader as such. He was, as I recall, an 
academician. He was not one of Martin Luther King's lieutenants, which would probably have placed more of a spotlight on the whole thing. His image was of a fellow of great 
competency and good background, a solid resume, and qualified. 
G: But if this racial sentiment was not articulated, how did you know it was there, how was it manifest? 
O: Of course you knew. The people who were the most active in presenting arguments against creating a new department and adding another layer of bureaucracy, while some of 
them were well motivated, you knew the cast of characters. You knew with some that was a specious argument and behind that was a concern about seeing a Weaver in the 
13
O'Brien --Interview XIII --10 
cabinet. And this was set up in a sense. You were going to create this department. Our argument, of course, didn't go to who's going to be secretary. It went to the need for the 
department, the demand for it; the time had come. But, the word was clearly out: create this department and the first secretary will be Robert Weaver. 
G: Yes. Well, let me reverse the question then and ask if the administration's motivation was actually to promote Robert Weaver rather than to establish the need--? 
O: No. The need, as we saw it, went back to the Kennedy period. The creation of the department was something that we were persuaded was essential. Who was going to be 
secretary evolved in terms of the early-on mention of Weaver, which went back, as I recall it, before Johnson. Weaver had become involved in the administration over that period of 
time. The President's motivation in no way went to "I want this department so I can name Weaver." I think the President would have preferred not having that in the equation, 
because I know he resented some of the activities that went on by way of pressure. But it wasn't that Weaver was somebody from the hinterlands and you could question his 
qualifications. The fellow was a very substantial guy and he had performed well in the private sector and in government. He had qualifications that would be hard for the Senate 
to find problems with in terms of confirmation. 
But Johnson, I know, had made no commitment to Weaver. I'm positive of that. And whether a Weaver had existed would not have impacted on Johnson's desire to 
pursue this legislation. 
G: When you advanced this legislation on the Hill, were you asked by members and senators whether you had an intention to name Weaver to this? 
O: Yes, in a few instances. 
G: And how would you [respond]? 
O: My answer to that is, "I have no idea. I know no commitment has been made." 
G: Yes. Was there also a problem of encroachment on the turf of existing departments? 
O: Yes, some. If you're going to carve out a new department, obviously you're affecting elements of other departments. The departments that would be altered to create the new 
department were headed by people who are our people, and they were in no position to express annoyance or disturbance. 
G: One element here was apparently the status of FHA. And it did retain a separate identity but within the new agency. 
O: That's right. 
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O'Brien --Interview XIII --11 
G: Do you recall how this was devised? 
O: We had to give in. It's the old compromise; it was a very strong view. That was one element of salvaging that could be done by those in opposition to the department. "If 
you're going to have the department, we at least will salvage that aspect." I'm not too sure that went to the merits as it did to the desire of some of the opponents to salvage 
something. 
G: Yes. Sparkman was the one that introduced the amendment. Is that significant? 
O: Only in the sense that at the committee level he had some involvement with FHA. It's a vague recollection, but I think that he had some role at the committee level involving FHA 
and therefore had a particular interest in this aspect of it. 
G: Anything on the private housing industry's attitude toward this bill? 
O: No. 
G: Okay. You also had a constitutional amendment on the presidency that dealt with presidential disability and filling a vacancy for vice president. 
O: Yes. We had the Johnson illness, too. My recollection is that the Vice President was not charged with any responsibility of governing during LBJ's illness. But it brought, again, 
into focus a problem if the president was unable to perform his duties, how did a transition to responsibility take place. There was a need to clarify it, so it wouldn't be a guessing 
game if it ever occurred. And that was the example cited: if Lyndon Johnson was unable [to perform his duties], was the role of the vice president clear? 
G: The element of electoral votes, reforming the electoral college to some extent, ensuring that the electoral college delegates would vote for the candidate who had received the 
majority of the votes in a given state, this was something that was not passed but something that was proposed by the administration. Do you recall that? 
O: That was more than a passing concern for me. I remember in 1960 in that close election worrying about the electoral votes of Louisiana and the threat which was made on the part 
of some of the electors that they were not going to vote for Kennedy. I remember two or three of our key people in Louisiana were flown down to Palm Beach and we discussed 
this matter. I don't remember specifically who the people were, probably Camille Gravel and others. And it was like a nightmare, "What do you mean?" And yet, technically, I 
don't know how it would have played out. As it turned out, they wouldn't have been able to withhold enough electoral votes to make the difference, but there was that threat. I 
remember specifically Louisiana, and it might have been elsewhere. It's ridiculous if you carry the state and the electors have the unmitigated gall to decide on their own whether 
or not they are going to cast their pro forma vote for the candidate who had the majority of the vote in the state. So I'm sure that was in the background of considering whether we 
15
O'Brien --Interview XIII --12 
ought to have legislation that would clearly define this. But I don't recall why we didn't make progress with it. 
G: How was it resolved in 1960? Do you have any recollection of why they didn't do what they threatened to do? 
O: As it turned out, we determined this was a ploy to see if they could get some elbowroom in the new administration. 
G: What do you mean by that? 
O: They'd go along if you agreed that perhaps some of them might receive some recognition in the new administration. You say, well, this just can't happen. And then you realize that 
people could be crazy enough and nasty enough to cause it to happen. Then of course you refer to the rules, procedure, and the law. The elector will reflect the result of the 
vote in the state. Well, what does that mean? It was wild and woolly for a few hours and I don't know as it was very widely publicized. I remember it diverted our attention for a 
few hours. 
G: What was Kennedy's reaction to that? 
O: I remember he was totally disbelieving. Your first reaction was to treat it as a joke and then you realize that people could conceivably cause you to have to get court orders or 
whatever. 
G: Did it come to your attention through the newspapers or did they call you? 
O: It came to our attention through our people in Louisiana, the early-on Kennedy supporters, who in turn were some of the electors. They had this group among them who 
were embittered by the end result. But anyway, that is the only time I ever recall any questions being posed as to electors. I think there was an instance where an elector 
refused to vote for somebody. Historically I think there is an instance of that. 
I can't determine in my mind now why this wasn't pursued at that time. Maybe it was treated so lightly that people didn't find a need for it. But, as far as I recall, there's 
been no change legislatively and the electoral college procedure goes on. 
G: A rare defeat in 1965 was the right-to-work repeal. 
O: Well, it was a rare defeat, but it was anticipated. You go back over attempts to repeal [Section] 14( b) [of the Taft-Hartley Act] and you'll find that it was an effort pretty much 
doomed to failure time after time. In this instance we're at the high-water mark of recent history in terms of the strength of the president, and in turn his strength with the Congress. 
Labor felt that, here we go again. We insist that this is a Democratic Party commitment: repeal. We want it fulfilled, and the votes ought to be there now if they're ever going to 
16
O'Brien --Interview XIII --13 
be. Mike Mansfield and others were not persuaded. We in the White House, in all candor, were most reluctant to pursue this effort during the height of this legislative 
session, because we felt it could adversely affect elements of the program. It could not only bog us down but might have a fallout that would be adverse in terms of support for 
some of these matters that we've discussed. So there was a delay in getting involved in it. Ultimately, it was brought to the Senate and filibustered. 
G: Was the delay a reflection of its lack of priority? 
O: Lack of priority? Yes. Candidly, yes. Repealing 14( b)--my view during my years there was that it just wasn't going to happen. Now, I never stated that to the labor leaders, 
obviously. And it wasn't because I was pro-14( b) or anything like it, but the cold reality was that it was an extremely difficult and, I felt, impossible task. But your commitment 
was to make the effort and you would fulfill that commitment. And in fairness to the White House and the administration, we didn't have the muscle to repeal 14( b), no matter 
what kind of strength we had on the Hill at that time. It just wasn't there. 
G: So you think even if it had been made Lyndon Johnson's number-one priority, he didn't have the votes. 
O: I seriously doubt it. I don't think it would have turned out any differently if it was the first item on the legislative agenda in that session. [I don't think] that the result would have 
been any different. 
G: For Johnson, do you think personally it was simply an obligation that he felt to make it part of the program rather than something he genuinely--? 
O: No, no, I don't think it went to whether or not we thought it should be repealed. It went to the cold reality of putting together a legislative program and getting it enacted. And if 
labor couldn't present to us a reasonable prospect of repealing--and they never were in that position on a head count--then we were not going to rock the boat and potentially 
destroy other efforts we were engaged in. Now, if labor had a head count jointly with us that showed a reasonable prospect of success, then obviously we would have moved at an 
earlier time. But it wasn't there throughout the session and the record shows it wasn't there. 
We weren't conning labor or trying to avoid our responsibilities. It's a little like civil rights in the Kennedy period. You can get nice stories about your effort in the liberal 
press and that's lovely. In the midst of failure you're called a hero for trying, but the fact is that it's the possibility of success that you're concerned about. We weren't dragging our 
feet; it just wasn't there. And if you're going to have that kind of a battle and you're going to get into a filibuster, let's wait a little while. I don't think, frankly, if you go back and 
review all that, that there was any animosity expressed toward Johnson or the administration in that instance, because the [Andy] Biemillers and the rest in organized 
labor were totally aware of what the situation was. They did not make an attempt to urge 
17
O'Brien --Interview XIII --14 
us in the context of "Listen, we've got the votes. Let us show you the votes." It was "We've got to make this effort, so, okay, make it." 
(Interruption) 
G: Right-to-work did pass in the House. You did get a--O: 
Yes. Well, that's not unusual. I think if you go back over the history of it, it was always that stalemated Senate situation you were faced with. 
G: Mansfield assured [Everett] Dirksen that no effort would be made to bring the bill back as a rider or anything else. Why would he do something like that? 
O: That was a personal decision on his part. That's really in the context of Mike Mansfield's effort to be a leader that didn't stir up the troops, try to keep things on an even keel. 
Often his decisions were almost by committee. After considerable consultation with his Democratic colleagues, he did not try to force issues in a demanding sense or dictatorial 
sense. That wasn't his style. He had a rather reasonable working relationship with Dirksen. We ran into it in a different context in 1968 when we were trying to get the 
presidential debate issue resolved. We couldn't get Mike or [John] Pastore to force the issue on the floor because Dirksen said he'd filibuster it. Mike said he wouldn't take the 
floor unless Dirksen was willing to have it seriously considered. So in the give and take in the leadership, he and Dirksen I think exchanged agreements often on scheduling and the 
rest. 
G: Was there a combination by the administration on 14( b) and the farm bill, getting the urban Democrats to go along with the omnibus farm program and getting rural Democrats 
to support the [repeal of] 14( b), a quid pro quo? 
O: Are you talking about the House or Senate? 
G: The House. 
O: Yes. You were always in a reasonably good position to get favorable House action and you were never in a good position to get Senate action. I really don't know how you 
could have put that together. Of course, labor's activity was very heavy. Labor lobbying on 14( b) would be at least as extensive, if not more so, than on any other legislative item. 
But I don't want to suggest that the labor leadership in the AFL-CIO were cynics in this regard. They were committed to repeal and they'd break their pick trying to bring it 
about. But as I told you earlier, when you got to the Senate we needed more evidence than they could present on the possibilities or probability of success. They didn't have to 
guarantee it but at least show a serious, in-depth head count that the possibilities were there for us to disrupt other legislative activities. So as far as exchanging support, farm 
bill [for] 14( b), I guess there probably was some of that in the House. 
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O'Brien --Interview XIII --15 
G: But could this kind of exchange be a way to muster more support for the farm bill? 
O: I don't think it was close enough, the relationship there. You might play that off against something else, but not off 14( b) particularly. 
G: But the logic here was that a congressman could vote against the prevailing opinion of his constituents if he were convinced that in doing so he in turn would get something else that 
his constituents were very much in favor of or that was very vital to his district. 
O: Well, yes, though that's not an unusual situation or an effort that wouldn't be undertaken. 
G: Okay. In the farm bill, the administration did want to shift some of the burden of farm income support to the consumer, and this was not wholly effective. What was the 
hang-up here? 
O: Well, I guess it's pretty obvious. There wasn't a great deal of enthusiasm about shifting cost to the consumer. The traditional farm legislation has been that you take it out of the 
taxpayer but you don't do it directly and observably. We, of course, were trying to play the game that we were advocates of all these supports and the consumer pays indirectly. 
Why not separate this out in some form so the consumer payment is direct? Consumer involvement by way of partial payment is direct, and that of course would lessen the 
imposition on the budget. But that wasn't going to fly. It was one thing to vote for farm legislation, it's another to advise your constituents that they were going to issue a monthly 
check to the government for this specific support. 
G: Anything else on the farm bill that you recall? 
O: No. As I said early on, what I always ran into with farm legislation was an inability to comprehend the subject. On a staff level our tendency was to just keep it as simple as 
possible in terms of head counts and leave it up to the Department of Agriculture and others in the private sector to promote the substance. I found it extremely complex. So I 
wasn't very effective in talking farm legislation substantially on the Hill. 
Orville, incidentally, not only was very knowledgeable but he was very effective; he was a hard-driving lobbyist, which I liked. He just rolled up his sleeves and jumped, 
right into the pit. He didn't leave that to his underlings. 
G: Was there a balance that had to be achieved, or could he become too aggressive in that role? 
O: Well, Orville was a fellow--you never had to dwell at length on trying to determine Orville's stand--who was very direct, outspoken, candid, and came across as a two-fisted 
guy. Fortunately for us, we had an aggressive, hard-hitting, hard-working, sleeves-rolled-up fellow at the head of the department who worked that Hill very hard. 
And that was something we direly needed, particularly in this area. 
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O'Brien --Interview XIII --16 
G: The Appalachian Regional Development Act, here was an example of designating one geographic area of the country for special developmental aid--O: 
That was an aspect of it, obviously. On reflection you'd have to wonder how you got it enacted, because this was special legislation applying to a geographical segment of the 
country and you have to get support across the board to enact it. And while you may have all the justification in terms of the need, there were a number of people who felt their 
section of the country also was in dire need of similar federal support. So you had to convince people to go along with Appalachia, even if it did not inure to the benefit of their 
area of the country. There were attempts made to broaden the base to include other sections of the country. In fact, there were ten counties in New York which were 
determined to be eligible under this program. But that was a major hurdle to overcome, along with, of course, the basic concept of a program of this nature. The major hurdle 
was to arouse enough interest and support on the part of a number of people who were not going to benefit directly or indirectly. 
G: You have described in the past how Jack Kennedy's commitment grew out of his--O: 
West Virginia primary, yes. 
G: What about Johnson's commitment to this measure? 
O: Well, I think that the cold reality is--I guess it's wrong to describe a situation as being impressive when what you're talking about is the dire need manifested by any evaluation of 
this part of the country. His gut reaction was very strong, because this was up his alley. This was something that he not only well understood but had a great deal of interest in and 
commitment to. So he rolled with this one very naturally. Kennedy's motivation was a little different; his was deep appreciation for the openness and fairness of the people of 
West Virginia in a political context, along with the obvious dire needs of the state. 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 1 
G: The Republicans posed an alternative to allocate funds for all depressed areas of the country. 
O: Yes. That obviously had merit, but I'll have to say that I was cynical enough to suggest that this was more an effort to derail the proposal than to respond to need. But it's sort of 
typical of the process. 
G: Proxmire voted against this measure, the only northern Democrat to vote against it. Why do you think he did that? 
O: I don't recall. As we know, Proxmire's history in the Senate has been one of considerable independence, non-hesitancy in expressing his point of view regarding any matter, and I 
20
O'Brien --Interview XIII --17 
guess this probably reflects it. What was the basis of his opposition, I don't know, but obviously it flew in the face of general Democratic support and therefore was spotlighted, 
and yet that didn't deter him. But I don't think that was as unusual as it might appear. He has asserted his "independence" on any number of occasions over his Senate career. 
G: Dirksen voted for it, I noticed. Any significance in that? 
O: There were some of his colleagues that stood to benefit from it. 
G: The Senate did accept several amendments that prohibited using these funds for reclamation of land that had been strip mined until a study was done. Any significance 
there, or was this--? 
O: That was a reaction to private-sector pressure. They wanted to postpone that matter if they could, avoid action in this area, and they succeeded. 
G: Okay, you had a depressed areas bill, a Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965. Was this in effect an Appalachian bill applied to other areas of the country? 
O: Yes, somewhat. This is an effort to pinpoint depressed areas nationally and actually reflect back on the Republican effort in Appalachia. If you're talking about depressed 
areas, you're talking about need in other sections of the country and here's a bill that you can consider in that context. 
G: Anything else on this bill that--? 
O: No, this rolled along reasonably well without any great controversy. 
G: You had the excise tax reduction, also. 
O: The Democrats participated in fostering the concept of aiding economic growth through selective tax reductions, and that had occurred in the Kennedy period. Now on the excise 
tax side, the argument was that reduction of these taxes which created a basic economic burden would be helpful in spurring economic growth, improving the economy generally. 
You get into excise taxes as sort of an add-on to the same basic philosophy that you had in reduction of taxes. At an earlier stage in 1964 the excise area was probably something 
that should be tackled, too. Economic stimulation, they were calling it, and I guess there are Republicans that subsequently made the same arguments. 
G: One of the big questions was whether or not the businesses would pass the full amount of the reduction on to the consumer. 
O: Yes, and that was a logical question, because I think many of us were rather cynical in that regard, really wondering about the businesses passing on the reduction voluntarily. My 
guess is the record would indicate that didn't happen to any great degree. That is a 
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O'Brien --Interview XIII --18 
reflection of my cynicism--this idea of verbal commitments from people who were going to receive a tax break to pass it on to the consumer. I don't think you can have any real 
assurances of that. I don't know what the record shows but I'm darn sure it didn't approach the potential. 
G: Yes. Is there any way to make that mandatory? 
O: I don't know whether you could legislatively. Probably. But the opposition to making it mandatory would be strong. I can hear people now saying, "You're distrustful. You don't 
think your fellow Americans in the business community are prepared to discharge their responsibilities to aid economic growth." If you can't mandate it legislatively you're 
dreaming. 
G: There was one provision of the bill that was tied to automotive safety. Do you recall this? 
O: No, refresh my memory on that. 
G: Well, it was one aspect that would use the bill to establish automobile safety regulations. I don't know whether it was a rider or whether it was--and it was rejected, but do you have 
any recollection of this? 
O: On the Senate side this effort was contemplated at least or made, probably led by Abe Ribicoff, and that Wilbur Mills flatly stated he didn't think that an excise tax bill was a 
proper vehicle to impose safety regulations in the auto industry. And he refused to go along with the suggestion. It was a good idea, though. 
G: This, presumably, would be seat belts or something of that nature. 
O: Yes. I recognized Mills' argument. He had some merit to the argument, but on the other hand it wasn't a bad idea on the part of Abe and others. 
G: Yes. Okay, let's talk about eliminating the gold cover on bank deposits. 
O: This had been kicking around for a long time. I guess the feeling was that it was quite restrictive and limited expansion of the money supply. It was strongly advocated by 
Treasury, and it was their baby. 
G: Did the bankers support you on this one? 
O: Yes. They'd be happy to be relieved of some or any restrictions. 
G: Your Republican opponents argued that the real solution was to do something about balance of trade deficit rather than--O: 
Yes. That was a valid argument but it was in the wrong context. 
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O'Brien --Interview XIII --19 
G: Another monetary issue was the Silver Coinage Act. 
O: The motivation to move on that was the growing shortage of silver. Why was that necessary? It went to archaic concepts, so there was no need to continue to have that 
regulation. It just was not an overriding matter. 
G: Yes. Well, was part of the problem that people were hoarding silver coins? 
O: Yes. They were hoarding silver coins and the silver available in the marketplace was limited. You had to retain a certain amount of silver under law. If the restrictions were 
lessened or eliminated, then the market would be open and the shortage eliminated. Then the maneuvering and manipulating in the silver market might be reduced. This was 
supposedly created by the government regulations on silver, and if you eliminated that then you've corrected the problem, as the experts saw it. 
G: Did the silver-producing states oppose this measure pretty actively? 
O: Yes, but I think it was more in the percentage of retention rather than not doing anything. There were, in a few non-silver states, some Democrats who suggested we go further and 
soften the restrictions even further. 
G: So it was to some extent a compromise measure? 
O: Yes, it was, on percentages in the amount of retention, yes. Somebody said, "Why not eliminate all the silver in the half dollar also?" 
G: Okay, let's talk about some appointments. John Connor was confirmed as secretary of commerce. Anything on his replacement of Luther Hodges? 
O: I don't recall specifically how he surfaced as a potential secretary. It was his business and private-sector background. John was not a political activist. 
G: [Nicholas] Katzenbach, who had been acting attorney general, was appointed [attorney general]. 
O: Yes. That was a very logical appointment. There were many who wondered why such a long delay in naming him. I don't even recall how long it was, but I do recall there was 
murmuring among the political people and the press. And I don't think I ever knew what was in Johnson's mind. He may well have had other thoughts about who should be 
attorney general. But Nick had built quite a record and had acquitted himself extremely well in some very difficult areas. It was a very applauded decision. 
G: He had worked with you some on legislation. 
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O'Brien --Interview XIII --20 
O: Oh, yes. I was extremely impressed. He had been a strong right arm to Bobby Kennedy. 
G: In what respect? 
O: In the civil rights area. He had a fine reputation on the Hill. A brilliant guy. But I would think he was a Johnson man. Johnson inherited him, as he inherited a lot of us. When it 
came to this appointment, it may have been that LBJ had other thoughts and it took him a while to come to the decision to name him. In any event he did and it went down well. 
G: Henry Fowler succeeded Doug Dillon. 
O: Well, there again it was number two moving into number one, and he had earned it. Joe Fowler was extremely active on the Hill and so there again, it was logical to promote him 
when Dillon left. I don't recall there was any great discussion about alternatives. I think that moved quickly and easily. 
G: John Gardner replaced [Anthony] Celebrezze in HEW. 
O: There again it was an appointment that was met with widespread approval. I don't recall any controversy about it. 
G: Was Gardner effective in working on the Hill? 
O: It wasn't John's style to be as sleeves-rolled-up and aggressive as Orville and some of the others. He had a tendency to leave that to others. I'm not saying that in a derogatory 
sense; it was a matter of style. To get into the pit and the wheeling-dealing and the smoke-filled room aspect of the Hill, I don't recall John being quite as involved in that way 
as others were. As the years went on, [when] John went into Common Cause and he became more involved in the smoke-filled rooms. 
G: Of course, Gardner did have Wilbur Cohen. 
O: Oh, I was just going to say, if I were in John Gardner's position, I would have done exactly what John Gardner obviously did. That is turn over the reins to Wilbur to a great 
extent in terms of congressional relations. And Wilbur, as I've said earlier, in the role of the congressional relations person was right there at the top. So John could be very 
comfortable in having Wilbur as the point man. 
G: Yes. 
O: And he was. 
G: Arthur Goldberg was appointed UN ambassador, resigning from the Supreme Court, after the death of Adlai Stevenson, and Abe Fortas was appointed in Goldberg's place. Let me 
ask you to recall what you know of this sequence here. Why do you think Goldberg 
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O'Brien --Interview XIII --21 
resigned, first of all? 
O: I've never formulated a real answer to that. I've wondered over the years myself. I couldn't comprehend why Arthur would leave the Supreme Court to take a position at the 
UN. The UN was not a cabinet status position. While the ambassador to the United Nations would occasionally attend cabinet meetings, clearly he was under the direction of 
the secretary of state, who was the cabinet member. I remember Arthur, shortly after he took the post, attending a cabinet meeting prepared obviously to have a considerable 
discussion. When he had an opportunity to comment, the President suggested to him that he perhaps best take up those things with Dean Rusk. I think Arthur may have 
misunderstood the extent of his role as UN ambassador in decision-making, policy-making. He would simply be a spokesman enunciating a position or a policy. So I 
never understood it. 
Arthur is very, very able and I had a close association with him when he was secretary. We were involved in a lot of legislation. I thought it was a most appropriate 
appointment when he went on the Court. What motivated him to leave the Court and go to the UN, I never have understood. I thought that it was not even lateral, that it was a 
step down. Obviously, Arthur didn't feel that way and I don't know what pressures Johnson exerted upon him to take that step. Obviously, Johnson was very interested in 
placing Abe Fortas on the Court, and this move gave him that opportunity. But I must say, among us, we were taken aback and we discussed it at length. It was a topic of 
discussion in Washington. Nobody was able to fathom what prompted Arthur to agree, and none of us, of course, were privy to what might have taken place between Arthur and 
LBJ that brought about the action. 
G: There are two explanations. One is that Goldberg himself grew restive and wanted something that involved more activism and, having admired Stevenson, saw this as a 
chance perhaps to do something about Vietnam. The other is that LBJ talked him into assuming a job that was represented as being more than it actually turned out to be. 
O: I'd be inclined toward the latter. 
G: Really? 
O: It was well known and Arthur should have known that Adlai Stevenson was frustrated in that role in the Kennedy period. Stevenson had to be reminded, at least indirectly, that the 
role was limited and he did not have elbowroom to be making independent judgments or decisions in the United Nations. 
G: When was he reminded? 
O: I know that Adlai, through friends of his, made it known to the President that he wasn't pleased with what he could perceive to be a decided lack of attention to him and lack of 
recognition. Clearly the role as envisioned by the Oval Office was in place with 
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O'Brien --Interview XIII --22 
Stevenson, and Arthur would have been to some degree privy to that. I was and [so was] most everybody in the administration, so I don't think that Arthur could have envisioned 
that this role would afford him the scope, if that was his desire, to be an activist to any great degree. He went on to seek the governorship of New York at a later stage. His 
interest in being politically active was underscored by that effort. And maybe he was disenchanted with the Court, but he has a great legal mind. I think it was a pretty good 
sales pitch on the part of Lyndon Johnson. I'm comfortable saying it, though I wasn't privy to it. 
G: This did leave a vacancy on the Court, and Johnson filled that vacancy with Abe Fortas. Was there anything in clearing the Fortas nomination that would foreshadow the problems 
he had three years later when he was named chief justice? 
O: No, I don't recall. While there was a great deal of surprise in the terms of the withdrawal of Arthur, the appointment of Abe was applauded. The recognition of Abe Fortas as sort 
of a legal giant was pretty widespread. I don't recall there was any element of concern, foreshadowing what occurred later on. 
G: How would you describe his relationship with Johnson at this time? 
O: Abe? 
G: Yes. 
O: Extremely close. He and Clark Clifford I'm sure had many contacts with Johnson I wouldn't be aware of. The contacts that I was aware of would be more formal in terms of 
having these two fellows in to discuss legislative proposals, messages to the Hill, strategy. I had a fair amount of contact with both of them in that context. I don't know how you'd 
do a ranking. I would think probably Abe, Clark, rather than Clark, Abe. But it was close, from my observations. There was a difference in style between the two fellows 
when they were in these sessions. Abe was more apt to be brief and concise in expressing his views; Clark was more apt to get into rather lengthy statements of views. Who was 
first among equals I don't know, but I had a feeling that perhaps Abe had more personal involvement with Lyndon Johnson than Clark over the years. 
G: When you speak of them, you speak of them as a pair who worked in tandem or together. Is that the way they--? 
O: Well, that was my experience. We would sit down, half a dozen of us, with the President to discuss the content of a message that might be developed, or review a message that had 
been drafted, trying to get input. And Johnson would like to get a variety of input, political input, reactions. We'd have a free exchange. You'd nit-pick the hell out of that 
message. In fact, I used to feel sympathetic toward the drafter because there would be very little left by the time we "experts" got our talons into it. 
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O'Brien --Interview XIII --23 
I think when it got to strategy in terms of the possible re-election campaign in 1968, it was probably Abe more than Clark. There were some sessions we had where Abe 
was involved with Jim Rowe and others. So his involvement extended, to some extent at least, into the political arena. But there was no question that both of them were very 
much on the inside. 
To give an example, you may recall that I had given this Bible or missal to the judge on Air Force One, which I had taken off the side table in the President's bedroom in 
Air Force One. A long period of time elapsed and I was questioned about what happened to what turned out to be a Catholic missal. I had no recollection. I handed it to the judge; 
the President put his hand on it, the swearing in ended, and it disappeared. I didn't make any effort to note what happened to it. I don't know how long a period of time [had] 
elapsed--it was months as I recall--and one day Abe and Clark asked if they could see me. They came in and they showed me this book with a cross on the cover, leather-bound, 
and asked if I was familiar with it. I said, "Yes, that looks to me to be the book that I gave to the judge on the plane." And they said, "Are you sure?" And I said, "Yes," 
because I was sure. And it was in a box and it was as new then as it had been that day. I never understood why Abe and Clark came to see me to get verification of the authenticity 
of this. I guess you know where it is now. 
G: Yes. 
O: I don't. 
G: It was on exhibit in the [LBJ] Library. 
Did they discuss this in a confidential manner with you? Was it clear that--? 
O: I might have construed it as confidential. After all, this had been an act I participated in, a reflex action. I had not opened it to look at its contents, and I guess at times I referred to 
it as a Bible and somebody reminded me that it probably wasn't a Bible, it was a missal. It's a missal, I assume. Why it was on the [plane]--I think it probably was a gift that was 
very recent, maybe even in the course of that trip. I recall the cardboard box, the cover had been taken off and placed on the bottom and it was in this box. And I took it out of 
this box. All these months elapsed--where was this discovered? Nobody volunteered to tell me, and I didn't pursue it. 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 2 
G: [Did they] advise on foreign policy issues as well as political issues? 
O: There were sessions on Vietnam in terms of support of the President, what we might engage in that would enlist continuing support, either on the Hill or generally. That would 
be the focus of some of the meetings or become part of the discussion in meetings at one time or another. How many of these meetings took place I don't recall, but there were a 
27
O'Brien --Interview XIII --24 
number of them. They could be meetings with the President from the outset, or having the President join us during the course of the meetings. But the point is that those in 
attendance would be members of the staff. If it were foreign policy I assume Mac [McGeorge] Bundy would be there with Joe Califano, four or five of us, Dick Goodwin 
and maybe Bill Moyers, I don't know. But the only "outsiders" that weren't official members of the staff would be Abe and Clark. So, clearly, the President had great 
confidence in both of them. 
G: Was Fortas' relationship with the President a give-and-take relationship, or did he, do you feel, defer excessively to the President? 
O: I wouldn't say defer excessively. By the same token, I don't recall he would try to dominate a discussion. The best way to describe it is when Abe spoke, the President 
listened. Abe would consistently get the President's attention as he participated. 
G: But would Abe be willing to offer information that the President didn't necessarily want to hear? 
O: Well, I don't know whether these meetings would be that direct in terms of differing opinion. These meetings that I was involved in were more strategy or refinement of 
strategy or "maybe we ought to change this paragraph or move this somewhere else," or "perhaps we shouldn't get into that phase," that sort of thing, a group discussion. The 
other intriguing aspect, when you bring the discussion into final focus and get a consensus view, generally, as I recall these meetings, everybody would summarize quickly what their 
view might be, [but] inevitably, no matter which way it went around the table, Clark Clifford would have the final word. He'd express his view last, and I always had a feeling 
that Clark was very interested in the views of others before he developed his own final judgment. 
G: Then would you say that Fortas' advice was more strategy, how to effectively achieve a certain course of action? 
O: I would think so. There might have been meetings of this nature; I shouldn't just close it out. But generally, my recollection was that meetings of this nature took place after you 
had agreed on a basic concept. You're going for the program; you're now going to develop the strategy, what elements should you build into it that might be pleasing to 
some members of the Congress in key positions that might have potential widespread public acceptance. It wasn't "should we go forward?" as much as "let's refine this, get 
everybody's input, get a consensus and then we're all riding with the same program to the same objective." 
That was extremely important, because the launching was awfully important. You didn't want to find that you had inadvertently done something in the launching that was 
misconstrued, that you failed to make a salient point or you failed to include the views of people on the Hill who are going to be responsible to move this. In that context it wasn't 
28
O'Brien --Interview XIII --25 
envisioned that the person who would draft what was generally a pretty lengthy document was doing anything but putting words together in a nice form, you know, the rhetoric. 
But then when you got to all the refinements, of course, the tendency was to pretty much destroy the original draft, because you get six or seven people with their input, by the time 
you're through it's been changed rather drastically. Then the drafter would have to get back to the typewriter and put it in the best form possible, incorporating all these changes. 
That was the type of meeting that I'm referring to where I would run into Abe and Clark. 
G: Did Fortas continue to have this kind of input after he went on the Court? 
O: I remember Abe in the White House different times after he was on the Court, and my recollection is that some of our sessions had to do with 1968 strategy, well before Johnson 
decided to withdraw. There were some sessions where you had a different cast of characters around the table. Abe would be at some of those. It had a different cast of 
characters because then you would have a Jim Rowe, some three or four others, I don't remember offhand, who were involved on the political end of things. So Abe would be in 
that. 
I don't think Clark Clifford ever tried to present himself as a political expert, which he wasn't. He didn't attempt to. I recall when Jimmy Carter was running [for president], I 
was commissioner of the NBA. He wanted Clark to go down to his farm to discuss political strategy. Clark called me and discussed with me at great length input I could 
make to help his presentation. Clark was very much a Washingtonian and had not been politically out of Washington through the years. But Abe wasn't that different either, I 
guess, except that Abe was a keen observer of the political scene. He had a good feel for it. 
G: Some of the senators objected to the Fortas nomination on several grounds: one, his civil liberties thrust as a lawyer, particularly the Gideon v. Wainwright case. Anything that 
you recall here? 
O: Not really. I have no recollection of what the confirmation vote was, but I imagine it was overwhelming. I don't recall serious opposition. 
G: Another question that was raised by Carl Curtis was Fortas' role in the handling of the Walter Jenkins case. Do you recall this as an issue? 
O: You could depend on Curtis to get involved in debate along those lines. He had a reputation of being a little on the mean side, so that would fall into the pattern. But I'm 
assuming, to the best of my recollection, that the involvement of both Abe and Clark in the Walter Jenkins case was pretty widely known. Clearly, Lyndon Johnson called them into 
this matter early, on the strategy to handle it. My recollection was that I was in New York when that broke, with Hubert Humphrey. 
G: Well, Johnson was in New York I think when it happened. 
29
O'Brien --Interview XIII --26 
O: Well, then I was in New York. 
G: I think there was a big rally here or something. 
O: Yes, and I was here. I had no conversation with Lyndon Johnson, as I recall, during that time in New York, on the matter, but it broke at the time. 
G: Yes. Was there a charge of cronyism at the time in 1965, that Fortas was a crony of LBJ or--? 
O: Yes. Oh, there was some of that. I think that the more specific reference went back to the legal actions attendant to the [1948] Senate election. That was, I think more than 
anything else, in the forefront of discussion--that he had played an extremely key role in that battle, that ultimately Johnson prevailed and Abe Fortas was given a lot of credit for 
achieving that legal victory. 
G: What did Fortas do? Do you recall? 
O: I don't, but I gather that was the beginning of the close relationship. My knowledge of Abe Fortas was somewhat similar to my knowledge of Clark Clifford; it came through 
these occasional contacts. I wasn't acquainted with either man before I got involved in the 1960 campaign. In the case of Abe and his wife, it resulted in having dinner at their home 
on occasion. We lived in the same neighborhood in Georgetown. With Clark, I had gotten to know him back in the Kennedy period because he had a relationship with Joe 
Kennedy which became observable after Los Angeles. We had one strategy session at the Cape on the campaign at some stage and Clark was present, which was a surprise to all of 
us because he had not been involved. It turned out that Joe Kennedy had invited him to participate in this strategy session. 
G: Thurgood Marshall was named solicitor general, the first black to have that appointment. And former Mississippi Governor James Coleman was confirmed as a judge on the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals. There had been a lot of criticism in the Kennedy Administration, that in spite of the administration's support of civil rights, it was naming 
some pretty conservative jurists with histories of segregation. Was there a connection between the Coleman appointment and Thurgood Marshall's appointment? 
O: I don't recall. 
G: Really? 
O: No, I don't recall. 
G: Let's see, [James] Eastland would have been chairman of the Judiciary Committee. 
30
O'Brien --Interview XIII --27 
O: I know, and it could well [have been connected], but I would have to say I don't recall that I was privy to any of that. 
G: Was this a continuing sort of a problem? 
O: Well, "sort of a problem" is probably the best way to describe it. After all, the procedure in naming federal judges hasn't altered much over time. You always take the chance of 
having the card, as they say on the Hill, filed. Somehow or other you don't get around to confirmation and then there were often recommendations from senators. So it's a matter 
of accommodating to some extent and hopefully at the same time bringing somebody to the bench that you won't have to apologize for in the future. If you're looking at the state 
or regional level, where it might entail past records, that might not meet the total approval of a northern liberal. But Kennedy's view, and I imagine Johnson shared it, is that he 
wasn't going to have that sort of single-issue litmus test divert him from doing what he thought was best under the circumstances. So if you're looking for the perfect judge, 
you're looking for the perfect human being, and that hasn't happened yet. 
G: Was Eastland's position as chairman of the Judiciary Committee an obstacle for the administration? 
O: It was something that had to be considered, but Eastland didn't remotely play a role similar to [the one Jesse] Helms has played in some areas of presidential appointment. You 
certainly couldn't fly in the face of Eastland, but my best recollection of Eastland, as difficult as he was in terms of our legislative program in civil rights and the rest, he was 
not overridingly mean in trying to derail presidential action. I don't recall any specific instances of an appalling situation where he arbitrarily blocked the President. Maybe it 
occurred. Certainly we weren't in accord on many matters, that's for sure, with Eastland. 
G: Charles Halleck, the son of former minority leader Charles Halleck, was appointed to the District of Columbia Court of General Sessions. Any recollections of this appointment? 
O: He had a number of friends in the District of Columbia, among them some pretty staunch Democrats, and Charlie had a high batting average in opposition to our programs. There 
had been a couple of instances of Halleck's support. Also this was a very sensitive family matter. Charlie was very anxious to see his son move forward. One of the staunchest 
advocates of Charlie Halleck was Milton Kronhein, a very unusual fellow, widely known, a marvelous human being that all Democrats knew rather intimately, from presidents on 
down. 
G: Active politically? 
O: Well, in a sense, yes. The District of Columbia political activity wasn't very meaningful, but he had a wide circle of friends that crossed party lines. I remember that he was keenly 
interested in Charlie Halleck's son. 
31
O'Brien --Interview XIII --28 
G: Let me ask you about Francis Morrissey, a longtime friend of Joe Kennedy and Jack Kennedy. 
O: He had been an associate of the family before I had an association with the Kennedys. I became well acquainted with Frank Morrissey going back to the Senate contest in 1952. 
Frank was a very loyal and devoted assistant to the Kennedy family, and there was a keen desire to get him taken care of. Unfortunately, Frank had some weaknesses. There was 
nothing wrong with him personally, morally or anything, but [he had] some weaknesses in terms of qualifications. They were seized upon and there was a continuing attempt to 
bring about his confirmation and there was a continuing effort to derail it. It became rather personal, the attacks on Morrissey, at least from some quarters, and the ultimate 
decision was to withdraw his name. That was very controversial. It elicited a lot of publicity. 
G: Yes. The ABA opposed his nomination in 1960 for another judgeship, so I gather they were questioning his qualifications. 
O: That's right. It wasn't anything personal. They went to his qualifications, and of course the ABA had found him unqualified at an earlier stage, and there you are. Probably too 
little attention was paid to the problem that would arise if you brought his name forward. Frankly, it wasn't surprising that this controversy erupted. I think there was a 
misjudgment on the part of Teddy Kennedy. Of course, you could say that in retrospect, but the fact is that this was bound to be controversial and it turned out to be extremely so. 
G: This episode has been cited as one of the irritants in the relationship between LBJ and Robert Kennedy. 
O: I have no knowledge of anything specifically that would support that, and I seriously doubt it. There had to be a realization on the part of the Kennedys that in making this 
move they were taking a gamble. I at no time felt responsibility for failure should it in any sense be placed at Johnson's doorstep. I thought it was inevitable that this would be very 
controversial and I don't think those among us who were staunch Kennedy people were overly surprised that this wound up being as controversial as it was. If that was an irritant 
involving Bobby and LBJ, I'm not aware of it. I certainly wasn't privy to any comment on Bobby's part, reflecting on LBJ re Morrissey. 
G: You don't think that Johnson used the nomination as a way to embarrass Robert Kennedy? 
O: No. You see, there might be some validity to a contention such as that if you had a fully-qualified candidate and this somehow occurred. But the weakness was the record, 
the ABA actions, the early actions. It was an absolute handle for those who wanted to cause a storm. The handle was there for them, and they seized it. And I don't know how 
Johnson could have been construed to take advantage of it in any way. It eludes me. 
G: Were you surprised that you were not able to put this one over when this was the high tide 
32
O'Brien --Interview XIII --29 
of the administration's strength? 
O: I don't recall being involved in it, in putting it over, so to speak. This didn't come in the normal sequence of events in the congressional relation's office. 
G: Is that right? 
O: No. This had to be understood up front. You're going with this, we'll be glad to make the proposal, forward the name, but you've got to get the job done yourself, because all of us 
recognize there are problems here. And maybe you can get away with it, but perhaps not, and if it gets to controversy, then people look at the record. You've got a difficult 
situation defending this appointment. The withdrawal was a matter of judgment on the part of the Kennedys. I don't recall having it discussed with me by either Johnson or 
Kennedy. I don't recall Teddy saying, "Maybe you could give us a hand." 
G: Okay. It's interesting. This was a time when Johnson was recuperating from that gall bladder [surgery]. 
O: Yes, I didn't recall the time sequence of that. You just have to conclude that there was just too much of a burden to carry. I always found Frank to be a pleasant guy. I never 
tried to evaluate his competency as a potential federal judge. But he had been on a local court in Boston, the district court or whatever. He was known as a total Kennedy loyalist, 
almost a member of the family, from Joe Kennedy on through every Kennedy. It was a desire on their part to get him a position of permanency at a reasonable level, in 
recognition of all the services rendered. That's not unusual; in this instance there was just so much there for the opponents to utilize, and you were going to have just controversy 
and embarrassment throughout the process. 
G: There's an indication here that [John] McCormack was a very active supporter of Morrissey. 
O: I believe he was. I don't know how active, but if he were an outspoken supporter and advocate, then the answer would be yes. 
End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview XIII 
33
    [ Part 14: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--24 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XIV*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XIV 
PREFERRED CITATION 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XIV, 9/ 11/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XIV, 9/ 11/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
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researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-25 
4
INTERVIEW XIV 
DATE: September 11, 1986 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 1 
O: [The Higher Education Act of 1965] considerably broadened the areas of the involvement. For the first time, it was to provide for undergraduate scholarships. It got into a 
controversial teacher corps proposal, which was not in the initial presentation but was something Gaylord Nelson and Ted Kennedy had an interest in. That became the single 
most controversial aspect. 
G: Why was it controversial? 
O: It was innovative--to develop a corps of teachers which would compensate for neglect of the past. That again went to race. They thought there might be some exclusivity racially 
and there was resentment. The Teacher Corps was a new concept. It had not been in the initial proposal and it emanated from liberal members, so that set the stage for a battle. 
About everything that was proposed with additional federal involvement in funding facilities and the loan program, including the Teacher Corps, was incorporated in the final 
version of the bill. I don't recall the bill being tremendously controversial, but there was a fair amount of action at the committee level in both houses. It fitted rather nicely into our 
overall Great Society program and it complemented elementary-secondary, the whole field of education. There again you had a president who was totally committed. It worked out 
well. 
G: Was the Teacher Corps idea inspired by the Peace Corps, do you think? 
O: To some extent, the concept, yes. People on the Hill were constantly seeking ways and means to compensate in terms of neglect and unfairness over a long period of time. So 
when you got to education, [there was] the recognition that this neglect had been extremely harmful to a major segment of our society. While you were engaged to bring 
about equal rights and equal opportunity, if you were not able to develop significant federal involvement to improve the quality of education, it was rather pointless to be 
pursuing other elements of equal rights. 
That was a very strong point of view that all of us in the White House shared. This extends beyond just talking about quality education. You've got to develop 
innovative programs and put significant funding into areas that will move to close this 
5
O'Brien --Interview XIV --2 
void. In the Teacher Corps, you were going to get a group of dedicated people who were going to plunge into these areas. I don't think we envisaged it as a quick fix, but an area 
for which we had great responsibility. 
G: Did opponents see this as a federal encroachment on local control? 
O: That tune was played--encroachment on local control. The sensitivity [towards that] in the field of education would be greater than it would be in some other areas. There were 
contentions that this was an incursion into local control. Education is more sensitive so that pitch would have more impact. The fact is that, there again, it was to a great extent 
an attempt to divert attention [to] try to muddy the waters. [It was] well meaning on the part of some but didn't, as we saw it, have any great merit. There were protective 
elements in the bill; you weren't forcing [it] down the throat. You had local compliance, and cooperative effort was a requirement. 
G: Another element of the proposal was a loan guarantee program that the White House lobbied hard for. Do you recall the issues on that one? 
O: As I recall, the ABA [American Bankers Association] lobbied hard against it, feeling that by this guarantee program you were going to limit the bankers. You were going to inhibit 
them, lessen their potential profit. They were pretty tough about it, and Edith Green took on the job of trying to negotiate with the ABA, but I don't remember the details. 
G: Was Edith Green an ally on this bill? 
O: She was an ally in terms of portions of it. 
G: Do you recall dealing with her and--? 
O: If you go back to Edith on [the] Elementary and Secondary [Education Act], Edith had problems with some of this legislation. Her problems went really to her concern about 
ensuring the separation of church and state. There was some element of concern on the part of any aid that might directly or indirectly go to private schools. She didn't want 
those barriers. It was clear that you have to maintain the separation. In that context we were able to work out accommodations which didn't violate the constitutional provisions 
in Elementary and Secondary, and in [the] Higher Education [Act], a lot of the funding that had gone for facilities, there had been sensitivity. My recollection is that you had a 
rigid limitation on facilities in terms of the nature of the facilities and that this bill called for considerable broadening of that. 
G: There were also efforts to make a tuition tax credit part of the bill, which LBJ opposed. 
O: He opposed it, not on the merits but on the realities. [That's] very, very controversial, always has been and still is. That could well have undermined the bill. 
6
O'Brien --Interview XIV --3 
G: Was this controversial from the standpoint of its implications for desegregation or from its implications on fiscal policy? 
O: It had elements of private versus public. The debate on tax credits has taken any number of forms and there's been advocacy of recent vintage--and some elements of bipartisan 
support, but it doesn't fly. The continuing problem of what to do with people who choose private education yet as taxpayers pay for public education, that's been a matter of great 
controversy. At the elementary and secondary levels you get into the bitter opposition of the teachers unions. So that's a pretty darn sensitive area. It's troublesome because no 
one has come up with a reasonable and fair resolution. I think the prevailing feeling--probably still is--[ is that] you have the right of choice; you expend significant 
amounts of money to have your children attend private schools, some of them religious and some not, but private schools. That's the choice you make and there shouldn't be any 
credit given in relieving you of your burden to maintain the cost of public education as a taxpayer. I was never clear in my own mind as we got into these matters all those years. 
We didn't get into all that at the higher education level. In terms of facilities, private institutions have the same benefits as any other institutions. It came [about] because 
private institutions are considered to be state universities. So you didn't have these debates and discussions that you had at the elementary-secondary level. 
G: Some of the Republican members of the House Education and Labor Committee complained that the methods used in steering the bill through committee were 
heavy-handed and that there was in essence a move to sort of dictate from the White House what would be in the bill, [that there was] virtually no input from the 
Republicans--? 
O: Yes, that complaint was made on a number of bills. 
G: But in this one, it--O: 
In this instance, I think there was a greater degree of frustration because they seemed to be unable to create controversy and disruption or watering down or defeat of any elements 
of this bill. The bill moved rather smoothly, as I'm sure the record indicates. The smoothness would be considered by some as evidence of White House dictation and 
demand. We did play a strong game and I guess there are times when you could consider that it could be interpreted as being heavy-handed. But we were comfortable with it. 
G: Was [Adam Clayton] Powell himself in this particular bill, working as an agent of the White House or did he have his own--? 
O: Basically, he was cooperating with the White House. We should again mention that Adam was not an opponent of the White House in the Kennedy and Johnson period. The 
problem with Adam was to get his attention. He had some games he played here and there. He'd like to get a little project for Harlem, that sort of thing, and he was flamboyant 
in his general conduct. But our frustration with Adam Powell was his inability to maintain 
7
O'Brien --Interview XIV --4 
a schedule, to call committee meetings, to be available. On this bill, I don't recall that Adam was anything but cooperative. It's well to note that: when you have the Adam 
Powell problems, it went to Adam Powell and his lifestyle. 
G: In reviewing the legislation that was passed in 1965, which bill do you identify as being the greatest triumph from a standpoint of legislative tactics or marshaling support? 
O: I don't know as I could respond definitively to that. I think you'd probably do a one, two, three of civil rights, Medicare, and education generally. 
G: Which one do you think you expended the most effort on? 
O: Medicare. I think by this session of Congress, my recollection was that meaningful civil rights legislation was inevitable. Well, maybe you'd have to hyphenate civil 
rights-Medicare, in expending effort. I think one of the breakthroughs we had, not in terms of widespread public impact, was the breakthrough in elementary-secondary 
education. I was very pleased that you could achieve a meaningful breakthrough in elementary-secondary education. [It seemed] the problem was unresolvable. I'll never 
forget sitting with the members of the National Catholic Welfare Conference and the NEA in my office, assigning [them] various members of Congress in a joint effort to lobby. And 
I remember in the midst of that meeting just wondering whether I was dreaming, whether this was actually occurring--that's how difficult it was. 
So I don't think I'd want to say that civil rights [legislation], which took a hundred years, or Medicare which took thirty at least [didn't require great effort]. 
Elementary-secondary didn't take thirty because nobody had the concept of the federal role in elementary-secondary probably thirty years before this enactment. I think the 
record shows that that was an extremely difficult package to put together. There were certain [pieces of legislation where] maybe it was not realistic but I had that feeling of 
inevitability--I remember it clearly with civil rights and Medicare. In fact, I use that phrase time after time: "Medicare, it's as sure as tomorrow morning's sunrise." It's going to 
happen and the AMA and everybody else could accept that. Whether they're going to accept it today, tomorrow, next week, next month, or next year, they're going to accept it. 
There's just no way it isn't going to happen. And with civil rights, of course [I felt] similarly. Elementary-secondary, I wouldn't have said that it was inevitable until that 
breakthrough. 
G: Which one do you think Lyndon Johnson regarded as the most significant piece of legislation? 
O: Of course we know that he was wedded to civil rights and wedded to Medicare, that's a given. I think probably what might not have been noted is his commitment to education, 
[his] broad-based commitment to quality education at all levels. That was a commitment I noted in discussions over the years, which might not have penetrated among those in the 
field of education. This guy's committed to quality education, and that was very 
8
O'Brien --Interview XIV --5 
impressive to me. We were all committed to civil rights [and] all committed to Medicare. That wasn't a matter of questioning commitment. But in education, particularly at the 
elementary-secondary level, that was conceived by many as an impossibility and there was no way you could overcome the barriers. From my personal observations of the man, my 
feeling is that historians haven't noted how deep his commitment was in that field. 
G: Okay, let's shift gears. I want to ask you to discuss your cabinet appointment. You do talk about that in your book [No Final Victories], but I think that it would be good for 
you to go into it in some detail. 
O: It goes to the agreement that the President and I made regarding my extension of time in the White House. We have discussed that in some detail, and the commitment was to stay 
through that session of Congress. With the added strength that we had on the Hill as a result of the elections, with] the remaining significant areas of the New Frontier program, 
the goals [that] had not been fulfilled [and] the emergence of a broad-based Great Society program, the President had said to me he felt I should have a sense of personal 
responsibility to Jack Kennedy and a recognition of the need for continuity and [he hoped I would] stay on. The result was [my agreement] to stay on for that session and that we 
would not discuss the matter any further. 
So there was no discussion and we went about our business. We were sitting in the Oval Office one day and there was a special meeting of the Democratic leadership. 
The President was sitting at the head of this group that included [Carl] Albert, [John] McCormack and the others. Out of nowhere, he looked at me and said, "Larry, you know 
I'm going to win. I'm going to win." And then he went back to the subject. Well, nobody knew what it meant. Albert was sitting next to me and he whispered, "What was that?" I 
said, "I don't have any idea. I don't know what he's talking about." After the meeting I thought about it again because it was a very unusual, peculiar comment to make. It wasn't 
in context at all. And I thought fleetingly, my God, is he talking about our agreement? But that ended that and there was no further discussion. 
Then at a later time, there was a coffee and danish meeting in the White House one morning that involved a number of members of Congress. It was a briefing session by 
some[ one]; I don't remember now. It was an 8: 00 a. m. briefing; it did not relate to the legislative program, and so [I didn't attend]. That was unusual because, well, any time 
there were members of Congress present I'd be present. But for some reason I just didn't think about going to it. I was at home and I got a call from Jack Valenti. He said, "The 
President asked me to call you. Are you coming to this session?" I said, "I didn't plan to, Jack. You know it really doesn't relate--." "Well," he said, "the President thinks you 
ought to be here. If you could make it at least for part of the session I think you should," something to that effect. I said, "Okay, fine. I was just about ready to go to the White 
House anyway." 
So I went to the last half of it and it ended, and we were standing around talking. I was talking to Dean Rusk and others. The President was circulating. I noted that he 
9
O'Brien --Interview XIV --6 
stopped and stared at Rusk and me. He came over. Rusk and I were talking about the foreign aid bill currently on the Hill. The President said, "What are you fellows talking 
about? What are you discussing?" And we said, "The foreign aid bill." He said, "Oh." He was then trying to leave, go down the hall to the East Room for a press conference. 
Not all press conferences were held in the East Room but this one was. 
So everybody left, and I went to my office. It hit me when I got [to] the office that there was something strange. I don't know why but I thought, "Is it conceivable that in 
some way I'm involved in that press conference?" I thought back: Valenti's call, his concern about what Rusk and I might be discussing. I turned on my television set to 
watch the press conference, and [after] the routine press conference, I thought to myself, "How did that ever come into my mind?" 
So some time elapsed and I was sitting [in my office] one afternoon late in the week. I was meeting with Mary McGrory, the columnist, and the presidential phone rang. 
The President said, "Do you have a minute? I'd like to visit with you." I said to Mary McGrory, "Excuse me, the President wants to see me." Well, Mary, being the tenacious 
gal she always was, said, "I'll wait until you come back so I can finish this interview." I said, "I don't think you should, Mary, because I have no idea how long I'll be and we can 
pick this up later." Well, she was going to stay. 
So I went into the Oval Office and the President was looking at the tickers and he had his back to me. It was clear he knew I was there but he didn't turn around. Finally, to 
break the silence I said, "Mr. President, what have you got there, good news or bad news?" referring to his focus on the tickers. He said, "Well, a little bit of both, perhaps." 
And he said, "Sit down a minute. I want to tell you, which I think you know, that I think you've done a good job," et cetera, et cetera. And he said, "However, when I came to 
Washington, I ran an elevator on the Hill, had to work myself up. I was an administrative assistant to a congressman and so were you. And I went on and I was a member of 
Congress." I was listening to all of this. He said, "What I've always liked about you is"--something to the effect that "you don't seek recognition. You do your job. You 
really made an impact." I figured he can't have anything else to do to be sitting, giving me all this. Then he said, "But the time has come. I have made up my mind that you deserve 
recognition and it's grossly unfair that you're not being recognized in a meaningful way. Now," he said, "we're going to discuss all this at the Ranch. I'm going to the Ranch right 
after this discussion. I want you to come down tomorrow. Bring Elva down and, by the way, bring your son down. I like him. He ought to come down, too. There'll be a plane 
at Andrews and we can discuss [this], but I want to tell you that I am naming you postmaster general of the United States. We'll talk about it down at the Ranch and I'll see 
you because I want to get started." 
I'm absolutely bowled over and really can't comprehend this. I go back to my office and on the way back, I thought, "Postmaster general? We have a postmaster 
general." There's Mary McGrory, with my secretary in the outer office. I was in such a state, trying to figure out what had hit me, that I said to Mary, "I can't continue this 
10
O'Brien --Interview XIV --7 
discussion." She said, "Oh, it won't be but just a few minutes." I said, "I can't, Mary. I've got an assignment that I must get with immediately." Because there was no way that I 
could carry on this conversation with Mary McGrory. So I got rid of her and I closed the office door and buzzed Phyllis Maddock, now Nason, my long-time assistant. I said to 
her, "The President said he's naming me postmaster general." Well, she said, "When?" and I said, "I'm supposed to go to the Ranch, kind of kick it around." 
G: But you assumed that it was a firm, tendered appointment? 
O: Well, where, how, when, and under what circumstances? He had made a flat statement but in the same sentence had indicated clearly that this was a matter for us to discuss. So 
it left it a little bit of both. I then called Elva and said, "I just left the President and he wants you, me and Larry to come to the Ranch for the weekend." I told her we'd leave 
the next day. 
G: Did you tell her about the discussion and the appointment? 
O: I said, "He said something to me about naming me postmaster general, but he said, 'Come on down to the Ranch. We can talk about it. '" Well, Elva's comment was, "If I'm going to 
the Ranch, I'd better get my hair done." 
(Laughter) 
O: That was her reaction. 
I went to Andrews the next day--I'm confused; I'm not sure Larry [went that time]. It might have been later when I was confirmed that he suggested Larry come down. I'm 
at Andrews and, lo and behold, there's John Gronouski and his wife, Dean Rusk and others, ready to go on the plane to the Ranch. I don't know whether Arthur Goldberg was 
on the plane or came down in another plane. In any event, we landed on the private strip. I don't say anything to Gronouski [or] Rusk, and nobody says anything to me. I was 
considerably at sea about this whole thing. 
So, anyway, Lady Bird greeted us and made us feel at home, and everything is wonderful. Nothing more, as I recall, happened that afternoon or evening. John and his 
wife and Elva and I agreed that we'd go to mass together the next morning. There was a church somewhere near the Ranch and we'd go to mass. So the four of us went to mass 
and came back, went into the dining room and the President said, "Larry, why don't you and Elva come to church with me?" I said, "Mr. President, I have already been to 
church." "Oh, I know that." But "Come along, you ought to visit my little church." So we wound up in the motorcade to church. As we're arriving, Merriman Smith was among 
the press group standing there. The President said, "Look at Smith. Now, this is going to be interesting. Nobody knows you're here. When you get out of the car with me, I 
predict to you, you're going to hear Smith say, 'What's Larry O'Brien doing down here? '" 
11
O'Brien --Interview XIV --8 
(Laughter) 
O: Sure enough, we get out of the car, I could hear him: "There's Larry O'Brien; what's he doing here?" We go into church. It came the time for the collection and I reached into 
my billfold, finding the smallest denomination I had was twenty dollars, so that went on the plate. 
We came out of church; we're approaching noontime. I'm not riding with the President to the Ranch. I wind up in a car with Mrs. Johnson and Arthur Goldberg and 
somebody else. But [they were] in the back seat and I was sitting in the front. Mrs. Johnson said en route, "Larry, what is the subject of the press conference? What is the 
thrust of it, do you know?" I said, "I don't know. I have no idea." Arthur Goldberg said, "I would assume that the President is going to announce the Adlai Stevenson Scholarship 
Program." Something told me that Arthur wasn't right. 
But, in any event, we got back to the Ranch. I've had no conversation with the President throughout. Everybody was to file out on the porch. He's going to have the 
press conference. Bill Moyers is telling where you sit, and Arthur Goldberg engages me in conversation. He said, "Larry, I want to tell you I feel strongly that you ought to go back 
to Massachusetts and run for the Senate." He was very well-meaning. He said, "I think it's a real opportunity. It would be great for you." He said, "I've got a lot of friends in 
Massachusetts. I can be helpful to you." I'm standing there, figuring something is going to hit me on the head in a few minutes and here's Arthur talking about the Senate contest 
in Massachusetts. I said, "Well, Arthur, I haven't given it any [consideration]." "Oh, I want you to think about it," he said. He was giving me a lecture on the subject. At which 
point Bill said, "Let's everybody get out there." 
We go and sit and, of course, Hugh Sidey and all these old friends of mine are in the front row; they're wondering what's going on. There's Gronouski, there's Rusk, and 
there's Goldberg, and I don't know who else. The President, after some initial comments--the press conference on national television--praised John Gronouski and in the 
process announced that he was going to be ambassador to Poland, which of course I had not heard. Then he got to me and he did say, "It's known to all of you that Larry O'Brien 
and I have an agreement [for him] to stay a year as special assistant for congressional relations." Then he gave the old pep talk about how everything is going fine. "But now," 
he said, "I want Larry to join my cabinet and I'm naming him postmaster general." 
The press conference is over in a few minutes. My immediate concern--it's strange how you react to something like this. We had had no conversations, the President and I. 
The conversation he had talked about in the Oval Office never occurred. My first concern was that Mrs. Johnson would think that I didn't respond candidly to her when she asked 
the question. I went over to her and said, "I want to tell you that when you asked, [I didn't know about this announcement]." She smiled and said, "I'm surprised, too, because 
Lyndon said he was going to discuss this with you." She also said, "I didn't know he was going to announce it at the press conference." 
12
O'Brien --Interview XIV --9 
My second concern was that I have a sister in Massachusetts and she might feel it was strange that her brother had never indicated this to her. I went in the house and got 
my sister on the telephone. Sure enough, she had watched the press conference. As I'm explaining to her, "Mary, I had no forewarning of this at all. I don't want you to think that 
I had some big secret that I didn't share with you," the President came by and he asked, "Who are you talking to?" I said, "My sister," and he said, "Give me the phone." 
(Laughter) 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 2 
O: He got on the phone, telling Mary what a fine brother she had and that ended that. 
Then back to Washington. On Air Force One the President wants to chat with me. He was in high good humor. He was thoroughly enjoying this. He said to me, "It's 
all going to work out nicely. This is the way it should be." I didn't say to him, "By the way, what ever happened to the conversation that we were going to have?" He did say, "I 
was going to do this sooner, without any mention to you." And, lo and behold, he said, "Do you remember that morning when you and Rusk were talking? I had the press 
conference coming up? Well, I wondered what you were talking about because I had been talking to Rusk through the night and I had him busily clearing Gronouski, attempting to 
clear Gronouski with the Polish leaders." And he said, "Both leaders were unavailable. They were on vacation and he couldn't locate them. I had to drop what I had in mind, an 
announcement at the press conference because it would have been premature. I thought Rusk might have indicated to you what was going on." I said, "He never indicated 
anything to me about what was going on." He just chuckled away and enjoyed it thoroughly. 
When we got back to Washington, I received a call from Mike Monroney and Mike Mansfield, and they scheduled a confirmation hearing. I'm back Sunday afternoon 
and I guess it was Monday morning I was talking to the two Mikes and Monroney said, "I'm going to schedule a confirmation hearing tomorrow morning." And he did. I went 
up there, and I forget now who was there; I guess [Leverett] Saltonstall was probably there, and I think Bobby Kennedy made an appearance. It was patty-cake except for one 
incident in the confirmation hearing. I'm groping now for the Senator's name, from Maryland. 
G: Brewster? 
O: Dan Brewster. Brewster asked me when it came his turn to question, "How do you feel about mail cover? What will your--?" Frankly, I didn't have the slightest idea what he was 
talking about. So I thought it would be satisfactory to say, "You can be sure I'll look into that as early as possible once I take over the position, if I do." That wasn't good enough. 
Brewster said, "Well, I can't understand why you can't have a position now," and he got 
13
O'Brien --Interview XIV --10 
mean about it. Nobody was picking any of this up on the committee; they were all looking quizzically at Brewster. He is at the end of the table. So he said, "I'd have to give second 
thoughts to whether or not I'd vote for confirmation if you can't give me a specific response at this time." And I said, "I regret that, Senator, but I'm not in a position to give 
you a specific response at this time." And that ended the hearing. Of course it concerned me because first I had to find out what mail cover was. (Laughter) But in any event 
Mansfield [and] Mike Monroney met with Ev Dirksen and they waived the procedures. I was confirmed unanimously at the opening of the session in the Senate that day. 
For an extended period of time, I just went on with the legislative activities. The President made no reference to any swearing-in ceremony. As time went on, I made up 
my mind I wasn't going to bring the subject up. The President, meanwhile, had a physical setback; he had that [gall bladder] problem. He was at the Ranch for a considerable 
period of time. One day in a conversation--we had many conversations about the legislative program--he said, "Don't you think it's time that you were sworn in?" That may 
be the time then when he said, "Be sure to bring Larry." 
But, anyway, my sister and brother-in-law, and my son and Elva and I went down and I didn't even have any idea what the procedure would be. I was taken aback when I 
was told, "Let's all get in the motorcade. We're going to this post office," which the President claimed was the post office where he mailed his first letter in this little general 
store in Hye, Texas. So down we go. The postmaster who ran the general store was one of several brothers, as I recall. The President made reference on the way that they had 
their own family baseball team, that he was on a baseball team that used to play against them. And that he had named him postmaster. When we got out of the car, there's a 
fellow standing on the steps and he introduced me. He said to him, "Tell him who made you postmaster." And the fellow said, "Jim Farley." 
The President was considerably taken aback. On the way down in the car, he had talked about this cheese that would be in a barrel and he'd cut off a piece. It was the 
greatest in the world and he was looking forward to doing that. It was clear he felt that would be a good photo opportunity. Once this fellow had missed the target on who made 
him postmaster, we went by him into the general store with this little postal cage in the back of it. He asked where the cheese was. Well, there wasn't any barrel of cheese, so he 
wound up with processed cheese in cellophane, trying to go through with having a little cheese and crackers. Then on the steps of this general store we had the swearing-in 
ceremony. 
Now I must go to the Post Office Department and I proceeded to do that and I discussed with the President my replacement. I stated the obvious, that I'd like to see him 
name Henry Hall Wilson special assistant for congressional relations. He thought very highly of Henry Hall, but he said that he wasn't going to make that move at least at that 
time. He'd prefer that I continue on. 
G: Did he give a reason? 
14
O'Brien --Interview XIV --11 
O: He said you want to be sure that there was continuity in the legislative program and that I would retain the office and divide my time. 
I went to the Post Office Department. My time became immediately almost exclusively postal in a sense but I did come over to the White House often, attended 
strategy meetings and all that, and it continued that way. Members of Congress were kind enough to have a reception for me, sort of a farewell and hello. Everybody assumed that I 
was divorced from the White House activities but I really wasn't. Joe Califano was on the phone with me regularly; I was over at the White House regularly. When I went to 
cabinet meetings, the only change that took place, instead of sitting alongside the wall and being called on to report on the legislative progress, I was called on as postmaster general 
to report on the legislative progress. And I proceeded to carry on that way for an extended period of time. I think it faded little by little as time went on. We got deeper 
into postal matters, particularly when I got into postal reorganization, but I don't recall that the time ever came where we actually designated a special assistant for congressional 
relations. 
G: Why was Wilson the obvious choice to be recommended? 
O: On my staff I considered him senior. He had assistance in dealing on the House side. Mike Manatos was pretty much on a solo, as far as my immediate staff was concerned, on 
the Senate side. Henry had been involved in a great deal more strategy because of our problems in the House over the years, which were greater than the Senate. Henry had 
done a very effective job of trying to cut back the southern Democratic opposition in the old southern Democrat-Republican coalition. We used to carefully monitor our roll calls 
and committee action to see if we were making progress in that area. And we were. We were reducing, little by little, this rigid southern Democratic opposition, picking up 
support here and there and this situation was improving. Well, adding all that up, if I were asked by the President, "Who on your staff would you recommend?" I clearly would have 
without hesitancy [recommended Wilson]. And that's no reflection on Mike Manatos, it was just that I considered Henry first among equals. 
G: Do you think LBJ shared that view? 
O: I think so. He thought very highly of Henry Hall, and rightly so. So that had nothing to do with that decision he made. It wasn't that he had any hesitancy about Henry Hall 
Wilson. If I had dropped dead that day, Henry Hall Wilson I have no doubt would have been named special assistant for congressional relations. 
G: When you were down at the Ranch the first time, at the time of his press conference, after he designated you in public, then did he talk to you about being postmaster general and 
what he expected of you in that capacity? 
O: I don't recall. 
15
O'Brien --Interview XIV --12 
G: Did he ever talk to you about that in terms of--? 
O: No. The only time he ever talked to me about it was when, at some point, I wasn't readily available in some legislative discussion. He said and I'll never forget it, "Don't let that 
place bog you down." (Laughter) He said, "You get those limousines and all that staff and that's the way it should be, and you're a cabinet member. But if you find that it's 
taking up too much of your time, just name some more assistant postmasters general and let them do it." 
(Laughter) 
O: He didn't reflect on the fact that you don't name assistant postmasters general unless there's action to create the positions. But that was his attitude and that's why, other than 
the discussion that I had involving Charlie Schultze and the President, when I appealed my budget and got some satisfaction, we really didn't [discuss the Post Office Department]. I 
sent memos to him regularly as a cabinet member, giving him an update on the department, but I had to recognize that it was low on the totem pole in terms of priorities. 
You can keep making the statement that the postal service defrays 90 per cent of its cost and that these allocations of funding to close the gap are really less than 10 per cent of the 
cost of the postal service. That was what I am sure everybody expected, that I would just mouth the same and not be stirring anything up. 
Of course that's why [I didn't tell the President] about this task force I had put together clandestinely in the Post Office to determine just, if you had your druthers, what 
steps would you take if you had total authority to impact on the service. That led to the creation of a blue-ribbon commission and throughout all of that, I don't recall I had any 
conversation with the President regarding the postal service of any substance. When I went public with the proposal to create the independent entity, I didn't have any discussion 
with the President. I was fearful that he might delay it because I felt he wouldn't focus on it. I wouldn't be able to get him to focus on something like this to the degree that would 
be necessary to get a presidential okay. Certainly, I felt it was in our best interest and it was. Nobody ever suggested otherwise. 
So I didn't bother him; I went ahead and launched it. Then that brought it to a presidential blue-ribbon commission. When the commission filed its report, I was no 
longer postmaster general. They incorporated in the report about every element of the initial proposal, as I recall it. I was anxious that the President endorse it publicly, and he 
finally did endorse it briefly in his farewell address. That brought it to Nixon embracing it when he became president and moving on partisanly to bring it about at least in part, 
ultimately. 
(Interruption) 
G: What did your colleagues from the Kennedy Administration think of your appointment? 
16
O'Brien --Interview XIV --13 
O: Oh, as far as I know they were pleased with it and applauded it, certainly the Kennedys did. I guess one or both of them were at the hearing. Both were part of the record of the 
hearing, in any event. Teddy and Bobby were both enthused. 
G: Did you talk to them privately? 
O: Not privately--at the hearing with one of them and immediately afterwards with one of the others. I received phone calls from both of them on that Monday when I got back to 
Washington. 
G: In your book, you indicated that had you gotten some attractive job offers in the summer of 1965 and you were thinking about what you would do, planning to decide what you 
would do that--O: 
Yes. I was weighing that. I had to look ahead, it was only a matter of a year or less. There had been some contacts made with me; I don't even remember details of them. It 
was to be a matter of making a selection among two or three possibilities; also, I had on-going a book agreement. A contract was signed with Look magazine and Little, 
Brown. So that was in the works. I hadn't finalized anything that I can recall. 
Mike Bessie was with Little, Brown at that time and I had extensive negotiations with both Life and Look magazines. Now, whether they were in that year or following 
that year, I don't quite recall. But they did result in a contract that once again I didn't fulfill and I returned the advance to Little, Brown. It was at a later time that I signed up 
with Doubleday and finally did the book. 
(Interruption) 
G: Well, were the job offers that you spoke of offers in Washington or would they have taken you back to Massachusetts? 
O: I don't recall that anything would have taken me back to Massachusetts. It would have been Washington or New York, as I recall. Ultimately I wound up in New York in any 
event. But at the time of this action by Johnson, I'm sure that I was nowhere near reaching any conclusions about the upcoming year. I had envisioned that I would be there 
certainly through October and fulfill my commitment to the President. 
G: You did write in your book that you wanted to return to private life during this period. Why was that? 
O: I think there were a couple of reasons, perhaps. One, that I felt a considerable degree of fulfillment in terms of public activity. I felt a little worn-out. I had no serious thought of 
seeking public office, therefore there would be no reason to consider further public service. And the second aspect was that I obviously had made no provision for my future 
17
O'Brien --Interview XIV --14 
or my family's future. The time was inevitably going to come when I should face that responsibility, and that clearly would be in the private sector. 
Once I had made the agreement with the President, I felt reasonably comfortable with it and had no regrets and had no feeling that I would face great disappointment on 
departure. The activities I [had] engaged in were personally rewarding and I had been lucky to have had the opportunity. But by the same token, I was never very good at 
long-range planning. That includes right up to this minute. Interestingly enough, it all seemed to work out one way or another as the years went on. I never did have a set of 
goals or a timetable of any kind. And I'm not too sure that wasn't the case even at that moment. 
G: Political strategists had before served as postmaster general. Did you ever conceive of yourself in that role? 
O: I think the closest I came to conceiving of myself in that role perhaps dated back to my much younger days when I was enamored with the role of Jim Farley with Franklin 
Roosevelt, but not on the PMG side, but as the [Democratic] national chairman. My political activity for the most part has been basically political organization, going back to 
the O'Brien manual. I guess if I had been asked if I could make a choice what would be my preference by way of continuing political activity, it would have been to be national 
chairman. 
There was a degree of disappointment, although not of a serious nature at all, at the time of the Kennedy election, when it was decided that John Bailey would stay on as 
national chairman for some indefinite period. Conversations that Bobby and I had [were] to the effect that at some point I would probably become national chairman, but it was not 
a serious discussion and [in] no way [were there] any commitments nor did I dwell on it. Once I was in congressional relations, I was fulfilled in terms of challenge. And it 
probably was a more interesting and challenging job than national chairman. 
Going back over positions I've held, the most satisfying position for me was special assistant to the president for congressional relations, despite postmaster general or 
national chairman or sports commissioner. That was the most meaningful time of my life. I had no awareness of that at the outset, because I had no real understanding of the job. 
But as it unfolded, it became more and more meaningful and I became totally involved. 
G: More significant and fulfilling also than the political strategist role? 
O: Yes. Thank goodness the President-elect at that time and I had no real understanding of the job. If he had or I had, we probably would have concluded that I didn't have the 
experience to take on a post of that nature. 
(Interruption) 
18
O'Brien --Interview XIV --15 
G: In your book you mentioned a response to a question by LBJ when asked, "Who will replace O'Brien as head of congressional relations?" and he said, "O'Brien." Was that at 
the press conference at the Ranch? 
O: It might have been. He made that clear to me when I proposed Henry Hall Wilson. And it might have even been stated in response to a question at the press conference, too. In 
fact, I think it was. 
G: Was it difficult for you to maintain your job as head of congressional relations while assuming the post office position? 
O: Yes, it was, and the reality of it was that as time went on I was less and less attentive to the congressional relations side. You had the staff; I made regular visits to the White 
House, I participated in major discussions regarding the program, and that was fulfilling Johnson's request that I continue. On a day-to-day basis, more and more I became 
involved in postal matters. Postal matters, of course, turned out to be, obviously, time-consuming. As we've mentioned earlier, I guess, we had postal crises. We had the 
Chicago crisis, which was mammoth, at the Christmas period. We got to that period while I had attention directed to postal reorganization. Once that was launched publicly, more 
and more you found yourself involved. 
By then, I also had to do some traveling. But I tried to ensure that there was some political fallout from it. I went out as a post-master general around the country, but in 
local and area contacts and appearances, complementing the basic postal appearance, whether I was there dedicating a post office or attending a union convention or whatever, 
I had a degree of contact politically. I tried to keep my eyes and ears open and I would regularly report on those trips to the President. I would make a report regarding the 
department, but I would incorporate political observations. 
But, as I say, obviously you were in no position to be eight or ten hours in the White House office in congressional relations and that wasn't happening. It concerned the 
President and his concern was expressed to Joe [Califano] and then to me directly, to Joe on many occasions and to me directly. But I did the best I could to fulfill the 
responsibility. Where I could be helpful in the legislative program, I could continue to be helpful. It was not fettered in that regard. I could go to the Hill; I could do whatever. 
But to be responsible for the day-to-day activities of the congressional relations office was too much to ask if I were going to reasonably fulfill my responsibilities at the department. 
So in reality Henry Hall Wilson was carrying that load pretty well without title. It went along that way and it worked out. So you stay alert to legislative problems and you try to 
have input in resolving those problems whenever you could and that was the way it went. 
G: In your book you recounted a remark by Everett Dirksen at, I guess, a party that members of Congress and senators had for you, in which he asked you to save a little bit of bricks 
and mortar or something for a post office in Illinois. 
19
O'Brien --Interview XIV --16 
O: Yes. That was a unique party because it was put on by the press. It was a rarity for the press to dig into their pockets to put together a party. But they did and it was a fun party. 
It was just loaded with humor and kidding. Dirksen was called upon to make some comments. In his inimitable style, he complimented me on being postmaster general; he 
referred to our close friendship and then pointed out to me that he was sure I wouldn't be oblivious to or overlook some problems he might have in Illinois. He felt that I would 
certainly have in mind saving some bricks and mortar for him on occasion where it was in the public interest. It was a very humorous talk in which in summary he was saying, 
"Now, I expect to get a little patronage from you. We've been friends for a long time. Even though I'm in the other party, you're not going to pass me by. I'm sure you're going 
to remember me." 
G: Did you? 
O: I don't recall. 
G: Well, did members of Congress and senators, now that you were postmaster general, expect or ask that they be given patronage considerations in return for advancing the 
legislation? 
O: No. It followed the pattern that has been long established. You would get letters recommending rural mail carriers, postmasters, regional directors, but there wasn't any 
inordinate or usual pressure exerted. I remember that Strom Thurmond, who had changed parties, couldn't understand why he wasn't in a consultant position with regard to the Post 
Office Department despite the fact that he had changed parties. He took that up with me and we had a candid discussion in which I told him that my understanding was quite 
different than his. You have to take all those matters into consideration when you make a decision such as he made. 
(Laughter) 
O: That ended that. He took a swing at it. 
G: What about post offices? Would a senator ever say, "Well, I will support the administration's bill if I get my post office in X town or city? 
O: I don't remember having great pressure exerted in that regard. Our problem with post offices really was the widespread understanding that we were very well behind in 
maintaining modern facilities and that in order to erect a post office, we had to work on a lease arrangement with some private contractor. We weren't able to build our own. There 
would be occasional letters or calls from members of Congress saying that, "So-and-so I understand is under consideration [for a post office lease]," or "He has a building that he's 
putting up that would be an ideal location for a post office in town X. I just want to tell you that he's got a good reputation." And I'd always respond or my people would respond 
by saying, "Well, you can be sure that he will be given full consideration along with 
20
O'Brien --Interview XIV --17 
everyone else." I don't recall any mean pressure or hardball pressure being exerted on me during those few years. 
G: Let me ask you to describe your budgetary situation when you moved over to postmaster general. 
O: Well, there was a natural tendency in the executive branch of government--that was historic, too--to take a hard look at the Post Office Department budget last. There was no 
real internal pressure or presidential interest, to the extent that the Post Office Department was treated the lowest in priorities. And that wasn't because of somebody being anti-Post 
Office Department; it was the nature of things. The fact is that the Post Office Department never could bridge that gap, always had a significant debt, and it had to be 
made up by way of congressional action in any event. That always brought about rate increases; it was sort of a revolving door. 
While I was at the White House and dealing with the postmasters general, maybe it would be about some stamp that he'd like to see issued rather than the basic problems of 
the postal service. And when Ed Day was postmaster general in the early days of Kennedy, and John Gronouski was postmaster general, I can tell you, in terms of priorities 
at cabinet meetings, the postmaster general was almost nonexistent. That didn't change when I became postmaster general, because while I had a significant role at cabinet 
meetings, I had had a significant role since the beginning. I suppose if you were a fly on the wall, you'd say, "That's rather strange. They've gotten to the postmaster general and 
all he's talking about is legislation on the Hill. And he did throw a couple of sentences in about the Post Office Department." 
So you didn't have a constituency that was particularly willing to listen to your problems or care much about them. It wasn't because they were anti, it was just a yawn. 
The Post Office Department had been there since the days of Benjamin Franklin and it'll be there tomorrow and it'll muddle along. Typical of congressional attitude, I remember Mel 
Laird calling me one day. He was going home to Wisconsin but he wanted me to know that he was going to give me a kind of belting around because he had gotten several letters 
from Wisconsin complaining about postal service. Mel and I had that kind of relationship. I said, "Mel, be my guest." But he said, "Well, I just want to tell you because you'll 
probably hear I am decrying the ineptness of the postal service." So I said, "That's all right. That's your end. I can't stop you from doing it. Be my guest; I understand." 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 1 
O: Even at the committee level, with members of the committee on the Post Office and Civil Service, it certainly wasn't the highest level of committee activity in the Congress. 
It was pretty much nuts-and-bolts. You went up to testify to justify your appropriation and it got to "How's the zip code going?" or "How many post offices have 
you contracted for or leased in the last number of years, and how many employees?" Then 
21
O'Brien --Interview XIV --18 
when it came to dealing with those committees up there, frankly, the leaders of the postal unions had a lot more going for them than the postmaster general because they had the 
political power. There are seven hundred and some-odd thousand employees in those unions and they had grassroots strength, they were well organized and they were very well 
aware of the fact that, while you went through the charade of labor negotiations with the department, in the final analysis your pay raise would come from the Hill. You could 
make your demand up there and they'd capitulate. 
All of this added up to just what do you do about it or what conceivably could I do about it. I would not have continued as postmaster general if a Democrat had been 
elected president. 
So with that clearly in mind, I had this responsibility. I have a unique position because I have an entree to the President and a presence in the White House that's unique 
in terms of [a] cabinet member, and maybe I can make use of that. I have a relationship on the Hill that's been established over a period of years that's probably a little different than 
any other cabinet member. Can I make use of that? My first attempt to do that was to improve the budget with the President and then to ensure that it wasn't reduced or 
adversely impacted on the Hill. And I had total cooperation of the committees up there. That led me to saying, "Well, this is all well and good but it really isn't making any impact 
in terms of improving the postal situation." That led to what I have described before: the task force and blue ribbon commission and the ultimate proposal, to make it an 
independent entity with borrowing power and all the rest. 
In the launching, while it wasn't embraced with great enthusiasm by our own administration and it was late in the game when the final proposals by way of a report 
were available, it was interesting to note that Mr. Nixon wasted no time embracing this and making it a bipartisan matter and having his postmaster-general designate meet with 
me in, of all places, the Democratic National Committee headquarters; a) to advise me that the President-elect was going to go forward vigorously in support of this proposal; [b]) 
that he, [Winton] Blount, had had this meeting with the President-elect and that [it] was clear the President-elect [supported it], and that he, Blount, would lead the charge as the 
new postmaster general and would I, because of my prior involvement and my obvious commitment, be willing to take on some activity in the interest of this proposal on a 
bipartisan basis. It had nothing to do with partisan politics. And I agreed to do that and co-chair the citizen's committee with Thruston Morton. We testified, and I should add 
that Bryce Harlow called me during that period and asked me if I would be willing to come to San Clemente and have a press conference with the President to further 
emphasize this. 
I agreed to do it and a plane was provided for me and I went out to San Clemente. And I must say, it was a little bit strange. But I had coffee with the President and we had 
a long chat that was confined solely to the postal service. 
G: Really? Didn't talk politics? 
22
O'Brien --Interview XIV --19 
O: Other than he had made a public appearance that involved some kind of controversy somewhere the previous night. He had spoken somewhere, I forget where, and I made 
reference to that and asked him what his reaction was to it. 
Then we were joined by Morton and Blount. Then the President escorted me down the hall to the press conference room where I faced a lot of my old friends who 
thought this was really fun; they were getting a big chuckle out of it. There was some reference made as we stood to make our statements as to where I would stand, to the 
right of Nixon but not far to the right, or Nixon to the right of me at the podium. We went through this and it was confined solely to advocacy of reorganization. Then the 
President said that he was going to leave the press conference. He said it was obvious from some of the questions they probably would want to talk to me further. That was the 
signal for Blount and Morton to leave and I found myself alone at the press conference for a few minutes and there were some questions in the [area of] politics which were really 
just fun and games for a few minutes. That was the press conference and I left San Clemente. But I did have that brief association--G: 
Just questions about politics rather than about--O: 
The postal reorganization? Yes. (Laughter) There again, to arouse the press generally about the postal service has always been a major problem. They listened dutifully and had 
no interest or at least it wasn't expressed in any Q and A. But I thought it was interesting that Nixon decided to leave the podium to me. 
Anyway, Morton and I made various appearances at various times and this effort went on for a long period. It was an organized effort and it was funded by mail-users who 
were persuaded that this was the right way to go, all of them sharing a common concern about postal service, obviously. Then ultimately, it came to the finalization of 
reorganization in the form it took, by which time I was not directly engaged nor have I been since. 
G: Did you have a different relationship with Lyndon Johnson as a cabinet officer? 
O: No, I don't think so. I think that I wasn't immediately at hand as I was in the White House where you could have a number of contacts during the day. 
G: You didn't spend as much time around him, in his presence? 
O: Yes. 
G: I see. 
O: But as far as [that goes], I don't think Lyndon Johnson and I ever had a meaningful conversation about the Post Office Department. (Laughter) 
23
O'Brien --Interview XIV --20 
G: Did he treat you any differently as a cabinet officer? 
O: No. No. His treatment of me from day one was extremely pleasant and I never had--I shouldn't say never because there was an incident probably in 1968 that we'll get to when 
he was determining whether he would run for president again or not where--and I'll have to recall it by the time we get there. But there was a slight incident for a brief, fleeting 
minute. 
But the fact is, and this isn't gilding the lily, that there will be a fair appraisal of the Johnson presidency at some point that will be devoid of some of the meanness and 
recriminations which have existed in the early years following his presidency. I feel strongly about it because of the personal relationship I had with him and the personal 
relationship my wife and I had with both the Johnsons. It couldn't have been more pleasant. They reached out to us, which was very pleasant. Therefore, my experience 
with him was, as I said earlier, very rewarding. 
G: You saw him on and off during that fall of 1965. Did the gall-bladder surgery affect his conduct as president or his operation in the office? 
O: No, that was, as I recall it, a quick decision, a quick move into the hospital for the gall bladder surgery. In fact if I recall, it interrupted activity we were scheduled to be engaged 
in that very evening. 
G: The Salute to Congress? 
O: Yes. I had contact with him during his period of recuperation. It was limited, obviously, to telephone conversations which were exclusively on the progress of the legislative 
program. So I didn't have any opportunity to directly or personally observe. All I can say is that nothing changed as far as the White House and its operation were concerned. 
There was never any indication that the Vice President was taking over some role in the conduct of government. The reins were held firmly by Lyndon Johnson throughout. 
End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview XIV 
24
    [ Part 15: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--43 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XV*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
Project. In addition, some interviews were done for the Library under the auspices of the National Archives and the White House during the Johnson administration. 
Some of the Library's many oral history transcripts are available on the INTERNET. Individuals whose interviews appear on the INTERNET may have other interviews available on 
paper at the LBJ Library. Transcripts of oral history interviews may be consulted at the Library or lending copies may be borrowed by writing to the Interlibrary Loan Archivist, LBJ Library, 
2313 Red River Street, Austin, Texas, 78705. 
1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XV 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XV, 11/ 20/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
For Electronic Copy on Diskette from the LBJ Library: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XV, 11/ 20/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-26 
4
INTERVIEW XV 
DATE: November 20, 1986 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 1 
G: Some general items early in your tenure [as postmaster general]: first, one question regarding your swearing-in. There seems to have been some question as to whether to 
hold that swearing-in at Hye, [Texas], at the general store post office, or whether to do it at the [LBJ] Ranch. There was initially some plan to do it at the Ranch. Any recollection 
of that? 
O: No, other than I was taken totally by surprise. I am sure I had no idea regarding the location of the swearing-in or the format until we were in the process of heading toward 
Hye. So that would indicate that that was very much a last-minute decision which intrigued the President. 
G: I have a note that he took the press on a four-and-a-half [hour] tour of his various ranches during that trip. Were you along, do you recall? 
O: No, I wasn't. 
G: You seem to have maintained a policy of silence on the [William] Manchester book [Death of a President], which came out during this period. Any recollections of that? 
O: My recollection is pretty much limited to not making any public comment, I guess, but being disturbed with the book. My disturbance probably went to what were inaccurate 
comments in the book of one sort or another, all of which elude me now. I recall that Ken O'Donnell was very much disturbed about it and apparently his views were made known 
to Manchester, I don't recall in what form. But I did see, not long ago, a letter from Manchester to me on some occasion in which he said that he had wished Ken O'Donnell 
had refrained from comments that he made regarding the book before it actually was published. I think overridingly my recollection is that Jackie was very much upset by 
Manchester's approach to a book--G: 
But I thought she had authorized it. 
O: It became very confusing. If she had authorized it, then something went awry as it progressed. But my attitude toward Manchester and the book was confined pretty much 
to my own personal reactions and I didn't have the occasion or inclination to discuss the book publicly. 
5
O'Brien --Interview XV --2 
G: Did the book's publication exacerbate tensions between the Kennedy people and the Johnson people, would you say? 
O: I don't recall the book specifically in that regard. I'm trying to determine the time frame of the book. When was the book published? 
G: I'll have to get the date on it. It was sometime before your appointment, I assume, wasn't it? 
O: I would assume. 
G: In November you had O'Brien Day in Springfield, [Massachusetts], and [Hubert] Humphrey came and spoke, and you were--O: 
That was November of 1965. 
G: 1965. 
O: Right. 
G: Any recollections of that event? 
O: Oh, I have a--G: 
Cathedral High. 
O: I have vivid recollections. It really warmed my heart. It was fun. I remember arriving at Bradley Field, the Springfield-Hartford airport, and there were signs and banners and the 
Cathedral High School band. I went to my high school and addressed the student body informally, and we had a lot of fun. Then in the business section of the city, all the store 
windows were set up with O'Brien-type displays and posters. I remember a blackout that night prior to the dinner, or the night before the dinner, I guess, and it was an extensive 
blackout through the Northeast. 
G: Throughout New England, wasn't it? 
O: Yes. So for a period of a number of hours it looked like the O'Brien ceremonies would terminate abruptly. 
But then they had this dinner. The people that put this together did an unbelievable job. I forget how many thousands there were at the dinner. 
G: Three thousand or so? 
6
O'Brien --Interview XV --3 
O: Yes, it was the largest ever seen there. And Hubert was at the dinner at his own request, because when I was asked who should be invited from Washington, I asked them not to 
invite people from Washington. I felt I didn't want people feeling compelled in any sense to go to my dinner in Springfield, Massachusetts. But Hubert learned about it and spoke 
to me. In his inimitable style [he] said, "Why don't you include me? I thought I was your friend." (Laughter) And he said, "I'm coming, whether you invite me or not." And he 
did. 
It was a really great evening. We had John McCormack there, who didn't travel very much. I didn't know until toward the close that McCormack's wife was in the car in 
the parking lot. She didn't attend functions, but she had traveled with him from Boston over the road. We had any number of people, including the Republican governor of 
Massachusetts, John Volpe. It went well, highlighted by a show. The stage [was] so far away it was hard to see from the head table. But I remember there were some dancers, 
and Hubert turned to me and said, "Gee, they're good. Look at them." And Muriel [Humphrey] said, "Yes. They're great." And all of a sudden they disappeared. We heard 
some noise, and the stage had caved in. (Laughter) And Hubert thought it was part of the act and I did, too. We didn't realize that the stage had fallen. It was kind of a crazy night. 
They had some profit, whatever thousands of dollars it was, and I decided that we [should] split it between my high school and Western New England College and set up a 
scholarship-type fund in the name of my father and mother, and that exists to this day. They give an award each year to one high school student and one Western New England 
student in memory of my parents. I think it was such a contrast to dinners that you're accustomed to. It was coming home and I enjoyed it thoroughly. 
G: There was a lot of speculation at this time that you would run for the Senate--O: 
Yes. 
G: --and apparently a lot of people [were] urging you to run. This was before [Endicott] Peabody got into the race, and there was a feeling that maybe [John F.] Collins couldn't 
beat [Edward] Brooke. Was that the--? 
O: Yes, that was the substance of it. There were suggestions made, and I think probably even polls were taken. I guess I may have mentioned it before, but in this context Arthur 
Goldberg urged me to run for the Senate in Massachusetts, moments before I was being named as postmaster general by the President at the Ranch. 
I can't say that I gave it a great deal of thought. I suppose it was a little intriguing. But I never had any great confidence in my ability to be elected to office. I felt I could 
work on behalf of others and felt comfortable doing it. I never was a fund-raiser, even in behalf of others. I always found that repugnant, and all I could envision was running for 
the Senate and seeking funding and I never felt that I would be very good at it. So I can't say that it was a great personal decision on my part, and I wouldn't want to exaggerate the 
7
O'Brien --Interview XV --4 
number of people or the extent of the persuasion. It was impressive to me in a lot of ways, but I never really reached a point where you would say, "What is he going to do in 
the next forty-eight hours?" 
G: Collins, I believe, did come down to Washington and met with you sometime. 
O: Yes, I do recall a conversation. I believe also that McCormack was involved in some way. But I don't remember the details. 
G: Collins reportedly wanted you to issue a statement that you would not run, and your statement was somewhat qualified, I think, that you're not planning to run, or not a 
candidate at this time--O: 
Yes. 
G: --which was not exactly what he wanted to hear. 
O: No, and you do jog my recollection, because at that time when Collins asked me to make a statement, it was probably close to the height of the discussions that were taking place and 
the recommendations I was receiving from friends regarding what I should do. The statement I issued probably had as much to do with not disappointing people who kept 
urging me to keep thinking about it than [with] my own personal view. 
G: Did you feel that Collins would not be able to mount a successful campaign against Brooke or--? 
O: I don't know what my thoughts were at that time regarding Collins. I would say that Collins would be a solid candidate on the basis of his background and visibility. The 
general attitude toward him was quite favorable. Of course, the question would be, would I be a better candidate than Collins? But the fact that Collins was seeking or wanted to 
seek the Senate seat was not a problem to me at all, nor did I feel that perhaps this should jog me into further consideration because Collins would be inept as a candidate. I don't 
think that really entered into it. 
G: What was Ted Kennedy's role in this? Did he urge you to run? 
O: Yes. 
G: Did he? 
O: Yes. I say urge; I don't want to, decades later, try to directly quote anything that Ted said to me, but he made it clear that he felt I should give it serious thought and that he was 
approving. I don't think he probably went much beyond that. 
G: Would he have helped you, do you think, in that race? 
8
O'Brien --Interview XV --5 
O: I would think that perhaps not, only because traditionally he avoided becoming involved in contests up there. In Ken O'Donnell's run for the governorship that was evidenced. He 
was not involved with Ken, and Ken was very disappointed in that regard. 
G: Was the fact that O'Donnell was at the time running for governor a reason that you didn't have more enthusiasm for this? 
O: The bottom line really came to that. I don't want to suggest, and it wasn't the case, that I decided not to run because Ken O'Donnell was running for governor, because my interest 
was not that great. But, clearly, if I had lulled myself into a decision to be a candidate, I think it would have been a big mistake, because it would have been O'Brien and 
O'Donnell, who had both left Washington, both seeking high office in Massachusetts. Who did they think they were to come bouncing into the state that way? 
>From my point of view, it didn't overly concern me because I didn't have that keen an interest in any event, whether O'Donnell was running for governor or not. Clearly, if 
that were my ambition and I had formulated in my mind a decision to make that drive and commit myself to it, I think I would have been foreclosed by the O'Donnell run. It 
wouldn't have made any sense. But inasmuch as I never got to that point, I can't say that I would have sought the Senate seat if O'Donnell had not been a candidate for governor. I 
have to say, though, that, if I really wanted to run and I was committed, I would have had to make a very practical decision that it was rendered impossible, really, by the O'Donnell 
candidacy. 
G: Yes. Did this dilemma affect your relationship with O'Donnell? 
O: No, the O'Donnell departure from the White House was a matter that affected the relationship, not between O'Donnell and me, but those on the periphery. There were a few 
O'Donnell friends who were disturbed that I stayed in the White House, and that caused some friction. I was never directly exposed to it, but it came to my attention. Bobby 
Kennedy came to me and asked me to join him at a party at Duke Ziebert's for O'Donnell when he was leaving. I went with Bobby to this cocktail party. Then later on, O'Donnell 
and I met in Boston when I was there for a speaking engagement. We had a long session in my room at the hotel, not in any sense saying that there were misunderstandings, but 
talking about his campaign. I was a contributor to his campaign. And it was at that session that Ken told me about his inability to elicit support from Teddy Kennedy, which 
bothered him considerably. But--G: 
Did he want you to do more in that race? 
O: No, I was in the Johnson cabinet. He didn't ask for anything. I was not directly involved in the campaign and I felt what I was in a position to do was to contribute financially to 
his campaign, which I did. As the years went on we saw each other occasionally and maintained a warm relationship. We met in New York on occasions at Toots Shor's and 
9
O'Brien --Interview XV --6 
other places; we had lunch and dinner in Washington two or three times over those years. Ken went his own way. He was based in Boston, and I never felt that there was any 
personal problem between Ken and I, nor do I think he did. I think the only disturbing aspect of it to me was that I did not have the knowledge that Ken was going to run for 
governor, that that was kept closely held, and I did feel that I should have been advised when he and I and Dave Powers were in the process of resignation. He didn't have to, 
didn't need to, but it would have been a natural thing to do, and that didn't occur. I think I learned this through a reporter in Boston. 
G: Did O'Donnell ever explain why he hadn't told you? 
O: No, never got into it. But, you see, if you were thinking ahead yourself--I'm sure I wouldn't have been thinking of running for governor of Massachusetts--you were aware 
there was an upcoming Senate contest. I think it was that early that Ted Kennedy first broached it to me, at a time when I wasn't aware that O'Donnell was going to go back to 
Massachusetts and run for governor. 
G: There was a press mention of the fact that O'Donnell was not at the head table at your Springfield dinner, and in fact that he arrived late and apparently wasn't even able to get a 
seat in the hall, it was so packed. Do you recall the reason why he was not--? 
O: No, I don't. When was this, November of 1965? 
G: Yes. 
O: No, I have no idea. I do now recall that he was there. But inasmuch as I didn't do the planning for the dinner, I'm sure of this, he was invited. Why he wasn't at the head table 
or he arrived late I have no idea. As a matter of fact, O'Donnell attended, at least on one occasion and perhaps twice, functions for me in Springfield while I was commissioner of 
the NBA. 
G: There was also some speculation that you would have accepted a draft from the state convention for that Senate race. 
O: Well, I think there probably was speculation, but I don't know who would have been drafting me. 
G: Do you think that Peabody's announcement that he was going to run effectively closed the door on your--? 
O: Oh, I think the door was closed anyway. 
G: Really? 
O: Yes, I don't think that probably impacted on it. 
10
O'Brien --Interview XV --7 
G: Because there were all sorts of statements in the press that you were reportedly ready to run if you got a draft, and it was almost as if there was some sort of campaign being 
advanced--O: 
I had friends in Massachusetts urging me to run who were, in turn, probably doing whatever they could to mount some kind of a procedure that would convince me to run. I 
don't want to gild the lily. I don't want it described as an army of people in Massachusetts that was marching up and down urging Larry O'Brien to run for the Senate. There were a 
number of people in Massachusetts and in Washington who felt that it was an obvious shot for me. I recall some polls, maybe not then but later. I had a higher visibility in 
Massachusetts than I envisioned, as I had been away from there for quite a while. But I don't think, frankly, it was a matter of playing coy. It was a matter of appreciating the 
attitude of people who felt that it was a good idea, being impressed with Teddy's view and perhaps some others. But I don't recall--I'm sure it was the case--that I got to anything 
close to serious consideration of this. 
G: Can you give an assessment of the race as it actually developed between Brooke and Peabody and also an explanation of why Brooke won? 
O: I don't remember the race itself, to be honest with you. Brooke had achieved a solid position in Massachusetts. It was rather amazing, with perhaps the population of 
Massachusetts 2 or 3 per cent black. Brooke was a very attractive, charismatic guy. But I don't remember closely following the campaign. 
G: Did LBJ ever talk to you about the Senate race in Massachusetts? 
O: I don't recall that he did. It might have happened, but if he did, it had to be some fleeting comment. At that time I had gone through the discussions with the President after his 
election. I had reached the agreement with him to stay on through that first session and in turn he had named me postmaster general. A lot of things occurred over that year, and if 
he was aware of this potential candidacy--and he probably was--I don't recall it ever came into discussion. 
G: Okay, let's go into some of the issues you faced when you did take over as postmaster. One of your first actions was an announcement that you were committed to the policy of 
President Kennedy's executive order recognizing the postal unions. Do you remember that? 
O: The assistant postmaster general who dealt directly with the postal unions was Dick Murphy, a long-time friend and associate of mine. 
G: Let me ask you to talk at length about the postal unions, because this must have been a very significant aspect of the entire Post Office Department. 
11
O'Brien --Interview XV --8 
O: The postal unions were and are extremely well-organized and cognizant of their political clout. My recollection is that there were something like seventeen unions of one sort or 
another involved in the postal service. The clerks and the carriers, of course, were the predominant unions. Closely following my arrival, we were engaged in negotiations with 
the unions. I attended some of the sessions. The nitty-gritty aspects were conducted by Murphy and other members of the staff. In these negotiations, which would go on ad 
infinitum, there would be no real give on the part of the unions. There was no authority, really, in the hands of the postmaster general in the final analysis as a negotiator to resolve 
issues. 
G: Why not? Why couldn't you? 
O: The bottom line was they could go to the Hill. You'd play out this charade, and there was not any meaningful give. Ultimately they would be storming the Hill, demanding their pay 
increase, with a lot of political clout, and they'd get it. So the role of postal management in union relations was not the role you would have in the private sector. It was 
exasperating because you had a keen desire to work out reasonable agreements with these people, to ensure the continuity of the service. I would be in and out of these 
negotiations, and Murphy and his people would be involved in them day after day. They could walk away from you after they had gone through this phase, and they would get 
what they wanted in the final analysis and you could lump it. That was not a very pleasant situation. 
G: Had you had dealings with the postal unions during the 1960 campaign? 
O: People did, in the campaign. The postal unions, you know, they've been around a long time and they're very potent. The members of Congress listened to them, were concerned 
about them, worried about their positions with the unions in their home districts. After all, there are seven hundred thousand postal employees and their families with a tradition of 
political involvement despite federal rules. No member of Congress could ignore the postal unions. This was one lobbying group that was present in every district in the 
country and they made their presence known. 
G: You came into office with a lot of ideas for upgrading the postal service and making it more efficient, more automated. 
O: I didn't come into office with those views, but I wasn't there very long when I realized what I had come into. (Laughter) I guess like most people, I never paid a great deal of 
attention to the postal service. My predecessor at the cabinet meetings would not have much of a voice; nobody from the President on down paid a great deal of attention to the 
problems of the postal service. You were sort of low man on the totem pole. I didn't really know what I was walking into. But some aspects of it hit early on. Zip code was 
just coming into being at that time; that was the first evidence of real progress in the postal service for a long time. This had to succeed or there wouldn't be any postal service in due 
course. (Laughter) The role of the unions in the Post Office Department exceeded the 
12
O'Brien --Interview XV --9 
role of any other federal union by far. The inability of the postal service to progress in terms of mechanization, facilities, and the rest because of budgetary restrictions, had 
brought about a totally unacceptable situation. You couldn't build a post office; you didn't have the finances. There were some thirty-seven thousand post offices. Obviously, they 
needed upgrading constantly. It required new buildings, and it was a bonanza for people in the private sector who would acquire a piece of land, go to their local bank for 
financing on the basis of a commitment from the Post Office Department. It was very costly, but that was the only procedure you had. On the mechanization side, the process 
was slow in evolvement, almost nonexistent. I was flabbergasted to find that there wasn't an assistant postmaster general level entity in the postal service for research and 
development. 
So there you had it: you had the unions; you had the political overtones; you had the attempt to overcome the basic service problems with zip codes; you had this situation 
regarding facilities. And you had no observable creative input in research or development. So we created an assistant postmaster general for R & D [research and development], 
accepted the realities of life regarding the unions. Then [we] organized national advertisers to do public service, selling zip code. Here you are, with a volume of mail 
equal the volume of the entire rest of the world, growing constantly, a rate structure that was ridiculous--third and fourth-class mail users are being subsidized--and, in addition, the 
service was inadequate. You found that even some western European countries were ahead of you in terms of service capability. You have to face those responsibilities and 
determine what you can do about it. 
Well, the structure was so enormous, I mean, just the statistics were mind-boggling. (Laughter) As I said, seven hundred thousand-plus employees. That 
beautiful building at that time was the headquarters of the Post Office Department in Washington. I think the table of organization showed thirty-six hundred, I believe, 
members on the postmaster general's staff. I forget how many assistant postmasters general and you had the deputy postmaster general, a battery of lawyers, thirty or forty. 
Not knowing the staff, with rare exceptions inheriting the staff, 99 per cent civil service, I did resort promptly to establishing a little task force of my own, four or five young fellows 
who had either been at the Post Office a brief time or joined me there, and clandestinely, secretly, charging them with the task of reviewing every element of the Post Office 
Department and trying to develop a "if you had your druthers, how should it function?" 
That went on for a considerable period of time and they did their research. They had to lean on career people for research but it was never considered that was being done 
for this bottom-line purpose I had in mind. Then you would have to sell it to the major mail users of this country and to the President of the United States. It didn't take long 
after [my] arrival to [have to] cope with the crisis aspects, the snowstorms at Christmas time, the semi-strikes in some post offices, problems that started to crop up regarding 
equal opportunity. [You had to] cope with it to the best of your ability, but hope that while you were there, because of your unique situation--your relationship with the White 
House and the President--you had an opportunity to launch a meaningful program that 
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O'Brien --Interview XV --10 
would reconstitute the department totally. Having in mind that if you got broad-based support from the private sector [and] you have the support from the President, you then 
had the most difficult area and that was the Congress. You would never get meaningful support in the Congress if indeed it was true that members of Congress treasured the 
patronage with the postal service. 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 2 
O: I concluded that patronage was exaggerated. Sure, members of Congress were very much interested in postmasters or rural mail carriers or regional directors or whatever, but the 
political reality was that every time they engaged in that, they made enemies. While it might be fun and games, a sensible member of Congress might conclude that weighing it 
on a scale, it was a negative not a positive, politically, to have patronage. So having that in mind gave you some comfort in envisioning down the road that this patronage aspect 
would not be as overriding with the Congress as people would assume. 
I was trying to keep abreast of the service on a daily basis, having in mind that it was not in the cards that you were going to personally reorganize the postal service. You 
had to travel this other road, which hopefully might lead to focusing on this problem and getting a consensus, all while I was trying to stay abreast of the legislative program and 
doing a fair amount of travelling as postmaster general. 
The unions would, of course, invite you to their annual convention, and of course you had to go. They would have these massive convention dinners and you'd go to them. 
You'd give the "we're-all-part-of-the-team" speech, and look up and down the head table at the congressmen and senators lined up to tell these people how great they are. As long 
as I'm going to travel extensively, I'm going to also engage in some political checking and take speaking engagements that will expose me to the political side to try to keep abreast 
of that. 
So putting it all together, you did have your postal responsibilities, your legislative responsibilities, and political responsibility to the President. When it was announced that I 
was to be postmaster general, the reaction was "Here's another Jim Farley type who's going to be postmaster general." I was asked about it and I said, "I recognize the 
seriousness of this assignment and the responsibility I have. You can be sure I will devote most of my time to it." (Laughter) Well, most of my time was spent--here's a fellow 
who's becoming postmaster general who says he'll devote most of his time to it. Not all of it, but most of it. (Laughter) I did say that, and it was treated humorously. As it turned 
out, it was most of my time. 
G: The time allocation question must have been a real problem for you, because you did travel around the country and you did make a lot of political speeches for Democratic 
candidates in 1966. Yet you did indicate the enormity of the problems that the Post Office Department faced. Was there an inherent inconsistency here in your citing these 
problems and yet devoting a good deal of time on the other [hand] to political problems? 
14
O'Brien --Interview XV --11 
O: No. Ira Kapenstein was a member of that task force, and he was in constant communication with me. Your attention would be directed to their findings and how best 
to launch a program to attract public attention to the problems of the service and what could be done. 
I tried to make some impact on the overall budget of the Post Office Department, and I engaged in discussions with Charlie Schultze, which ultimately led me to appealing 
my postal budget to the President. I asked to meet with the President and Schultze, and I had developed, on an item basis, areas that I felt I could sell in terms of increasing our 
budget allocation. And I think the President enjoyed that, he got a little--G: 
Was Schultze there at the time? 
O: Yes. 
G: Let me ask you to describe the give and take in that meeting. 
O: We're talking about something like a hundred million, I don't know, but in those terms. I had a list of items that I felt needed improving and justifiably so; they were just too low. 
And I went over them with Schultze present. I'll say this for Charlie, he didn't put up a big debate. We're three friends sitting there. I think the President was getting a kick out of it. 
Here is O'Brien now raising ructions about his budget; this is a new role for him. 
My recollection is that I got about 50 per cent of what I requested and that Charlie went through the motions of saying, "Well, of course you know things are tight." And [I 
remember] the President saying finally, "Well, that sounds reasonable to me," and Charlie would say, "We can do something there." So it was worth the effort. But I'll never forget 
the meeting--that was when I realized I had another hat on. (Laughter) I'm sitting in the Oval Office with the President and Charlie, discussing an area that I never had had any 
involvement in heretofore. I'd listened to cabinet members screaming about their budgets but I'd never paid that much attention to them. (Laughter) Then it was my turn. 
G: Was BOB [Bureau of the Budget] your principal adversary in terms of a budget every year for the Post Office? 
O: Yes, they had the technicians that could do a good job in defending their budget, so to speak. (Laughter) Charlie would have certain people on the staff assigned to the Post 
Office, somebody assigned to other departments and agencies putting a budget together. 
G: Did you have one of your assistants who was responsible for dealing with this aspect of the Post Office Department? 
O: Yes, the deputy postmaster general, really, Fred Belen, who was basically a career fellow. He had come from the Hill years earlier. He had been on the Hill and in the postal 
15
O'Brien --Interview XV --12 
service, that was his career. He was an expert on all of this, and I relied on him. And Ira, who was a remarkable guy and had been there with John Gronouski, was very adept at 
spotting soft spots where you might be able to produce something. 
G: Was the Post Office Department, as far as BOB was concerned, easy prey because here was an area that did have a large item and they could cut it without any real--? 
O: You didn't have a constituency that would be helpful in carrying on this battle. But the Post Office Department was unique; it pays 90 per cent of its way through revenue. And 
that's true. But if you're talking about billions then you were very much short, particularly with all the subsidizing by the Congress. You always had this deficit. And I think that the 
attitude in the BOB, or generally I guess in government was, "Well, they'll make their way through." Of course, that's nothing new and it's still the case. You were dealing at that 
time with sixty billion pieces of mail--my guess is it's probably twice that now. It's just a mammoth task. 
G: There were two ways to reduce this gap. One was to reduce the expenditures; the other was to raise the revenues, to raise the rates. 
O: I was trying to remember what a first-class stamp was when I first went there. 
G: Five cents, I think, and air mail was seven. 
O: There were some people who would argue, why do you have to have a balanced budget? Why do you have to pay your own way a hundred per cent? This is a service to the 
American people. They should receive some subsidy. The bulk mail users contribute to the economy, charities and nonprofit institutions, all of that went into the equation when 
we added it all up. (Laughter) You know, you were providing service to a lot of people who were just not remotely paying their fair share. 
G: Tell me how Congress participated in this budgetary process. 
O: You appear before the appropriate committees of Congress to justify your budget, like any department or agency. I believe the hearings on the budget of the Post Office Department 
were scheduled within about thirty days after my arrival. I found myself on the Hill, justifying a budget that, frankly, I had little knowledge of. Because of the relationships I 
had on the Hill, I walked in there on my first day ever appearing before a committee for the purpose of justifying my budget. It was patty-cake. Everybody on the committee, 
Democrat or Republican, was kind and considerate. (Laughter) I remember there was a great deal of sympathy expressed toward me and my problem, and a willingness to be 
helpful. I can't say I was subjected to any adverse criticisms. But that was due, I'm sure, to some of the fellows on the committee, bipartisanly. 
G: Here is a list of the House committee, and then on the following page, [of] the Senate committee on the post office. Let me ask you to look over that and comment on your 
16
O'Brien --Interview XV --13 
relations with the individuals there. 
O: You have to recognize that membership on the Post Office and Civil Service Committee is not the highest level of committee membership in the House. I don't think I'll go on the 
record regarding some of these fellows--but it was a mixed bag and I'm going to be more definitive than that. The Democratic side first: the chairman [was] fine, cooperative, but 
[there were] Democrats who had their special interests and their own relationships with postal unions, but more than that, had their special relationships with mail users. That was 
big business, and campaign contributions from mail users across this country were really significant. 
Now, there were fellows, as I look, who were very troublesome in that regard, who were not prepared to adjust rates that would at least in part eradicate deficits and 
achieve more balance and equity in payment for postal service. And I'm looking at one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, 
sixteen, seventeen Democratic members of that committee. Now I'll tell you, of the seventeen Democratic members of the committee, those with the closest association with 
mail users were one, two, three, four, five of those seventeen who were downright impossible. 
G: Really? Did it reflect on their districts? Was it a question of having a lot of big--? 
O: No, it was a question of [the fact that] they liked the relationship and it was mutually beneficial, let's put it that way. 
G: So it didn't matter whether they had a big direct mail firm in their district or not, it was just--O: 
No. 
G: --more of a financial relationship? 
O: The direct mail organizations are national in scope, and they were very effective and well financed. They would, over time, determine where they could be served best on the 
committee. 
Now I go to the Republican side. There are one, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight members on the Republican side. I'll go back over them; one, two, interestingly 
enough, three of those seven. 
G: Is that right? 
O: So you had, whatever it was, five Democrats, say, three Republicans, you've got close to ten--
17
O'Brien --Interview XV --14 
G: The ratio was the same [?]. 
O: --members of that committee who are not about to give a fair hearing to adjustment of postal rates. 
G: Were any of them doing it from the standpoint that the direct mail or the mailer was a non-profit, charitable thing, or was it strictly a financial [inaudible]? Did they tend to be 
urban rather than rural? 
O: No, they tended to be motivated the same. 
(Laughter) 
G: There was no pattern, though, really? 
O: No. They spent their time and effort with the mail users. 
(Interruption) 
G: Were these members, or not the same members, but the committee, influenced by the unions to the extent that they were by the mailers, the mail users? 
O: It was an entirely different situation. The unions had, as I said, political clout. They had resources different than the resources of the mail user. They had vote muscle back home 
in everyone's district. They were well organized and they had lobbyists on the Hill representing these various unions full-time. There was a great awareness of this and a 
great concern about it on the part of many members. They didn't want their local postal unions giving them trouble. Those postal unions kept a record on their votes on anything 
involving their benefits or their pay and they made it known in a well-organized manner to all their union members and their families. They were potent. 
Now, the others, those three or four, are in an excellent position to play that game with the mail users. It's a tremendous business, and it was in their interest to maintain a 
good relationship with the appropriate committees to head off as best they could attempts to move their rates up. So it was a constant battle in those areas. 
G: How much cohesiveness was there among the big users? Did they have a fairly tight--? 
O: Yes, yes. They were well organized, they had a national organization, offices in Washington. 
G: What was the fellow's name who was the Washington--Dailey, John J. Dailey--O: 
Yes. 
18
O'Brien --Interview XV --15 
G: --of the Direct Mail Advertising Association. Was that one of the big user groups? 
O: That's one. That would be the type of [organization], yes. 
G: Now, let's look at the Senate side. 
O: First of all, the Senate committee had a keen interest in postal service and Mike Monroney was an excellent chairman. The only person I had any problem with was Dan Brewster, 
and that did not relate to what we've been talking about. Dan Brewster was the only difficult person when I was confirmed by the Senate, when he asked me about mail cover. 
We've mentioned that before. Rather than say to him, "I don't know what you're talking about," which I should have, I guess, I tried to say, "Let me look into it, and you can be 
sure I'll look into it." That wasn't satisfactory, and of course I hadn't been off the Hill fifteen minutes when I was asking, "What the devil is mail cover?" As it turned out, he 
was subjected to mail cover, and that came out later in another context. 
G: Did he realize it at the time, is that--? 
O: Apparently he was suspicious of it. 
G: Well, maybe that explains his peculiar [interest]. 
O: Some time later and in an entirely different context, Dan had to do some explaining, and it turned out that there had been a mail cover on him, as I recall. I don't know. The fact is 
that other than that little incident, I don't recall anything about Brewster in terms of dealing with the committee. Mike Monroney chaired that committee effectively, and Mike 
had a keen interest in the postal service. I don't want to be knocking a lot of people on the House committee; it would be grossly unfair. If you take a total of five or six out of a 
twenty-five member committee, and among them two or three were really troublesome, you then have to note the others on that committee who were not in that category at all 
but were responsible members. 
G: Were there battles between the House and Senate over postal issues? For example, I've read somewhere that the House was inclined to favor much broader franking privileges 
than the Senate because the House members wanted to circulate mailings statewide in the hopes of maybe running for the Senate, and the senators opposed this sort of thing. 
O: There was some of that. I think probably the surprise factor was the patronage side, because historically postal patronage was considered an integral part of the political 
process. The power of the postmaster general apparently reached its peak in the period of Jim Farley. The Post Office Department building was beautifully constructed and the 
postmaster general had the largest office in Washington. A mammoth office with a bedroom, kitchen, two fireplaces, panelled, and his reception room would seat 
comfortably probably four to six hundred people, if you wanted to use it as an auditorium. They tell me that in the days of the Depression, when [James] Farley was postmaster 
19
O'Brien --Interview XV --16 
general and had the position of chairman of the Democratic Party, there'd be hundreds filing through that reception room each day, and Farley would be taking notes, or an aide 
of his would, and he could place people into postal jobs all over the country. Sometimes I suppose [they were] temporary assignments, but it was a desperate situation for a lot of 
people and the Post Office Department was a political source for employment. 
By my time, the Post Office Department was well organized, unionized, and you weren't in that climate. By that time, however, postal employment was, including salaries 
and benefits, at a solid level compared to the private sector. There was one internal problem the postal unions had, and that was the salary level, of course, was applied 
nationally. The argument with New York unions, which was an internal problem these unions had at a time when they were negotiating salary increases, was [that] they should 
be based on the cost of living. 
G: There was a tremendous disparity in the cost of living. Should this have been adjusted, do you think? 
O: You never would have gotten it done, because the votes wouldn't have been there on the Hill. You know, it would have been major urban areas against the rest of the seven 
hundred and some-odd thousand. So they were never able to resolve that by presenting a proposal from the union. Of course, the New York locals were aggressive, not only in 
that context, but they would threaten to take to the streets. They were not nearly as placid as many of these locals were across the country who were reasonably satisfied with 
their position in the service and their compensation. 
There was an interest on the part of the Congress in rural mail carriers. A rural mail carrier by definition is from an area where the cost of living would be below urban 
areas. In addition, mileage and other perks went with the job, so a rural mail carrier was a much sought after job and it was high on the patronage list. 
But you were faced with so much. The numbers were so mind-boggling, whether you were talking about the number of employees, the number of post offices, the number 
of trucks, the replacement needs--and there was a little sidebar to that. I may have mentioned it before, but it's worth noting. I thought I had a great idea; our trucks had 
panels on each side for public service advertising, and periodically, you'd change the panels. I was and still remain an avid smoker. But we were sitting there in a little strategy 
group and said, "Gee, why not join this anti-smoking crusade? We could use the panels, and it's great public service. There are organizations around the country who would love 
this and be impressed with it." So I proceeded to authorize it, overlooking the fact that there would be great consternation from North Carolina and Kentucky, probably, and a 
couple of other places. And the members of Congress, the senators, just landed on me. 
G: Did they really? 
O: We adjusted that by eliminating putting the advertising on the trucks in those states. 
20
O'Brien --Interview XV --17 
(Laughter) We went ahead with the national program. 
G: That was someone like Sam Ervin? 
O: I forget now exactly who they were, but they were calling me and they were making no bones about it. To have a government entity utilizing its facilities to urge people to stop 
smoking was not in the cards. (Laughter) 
G: Going back to the members of the related committees in the House and Senate, if you went into the district of one of the House members on that committee, would you find a 
much more elaborate post office than you would find in a member's district who was not on the committee? 
O: No, I never detected that, or probably I never looked for it. Post offices became a blur to me. 
G: Did members of the postal committees expect more postal patronage than other members of Congress? 
O: I wouldn't say that that was the case because they may have been put upon a little bit more than others, but the patronage would still be localized. It would go to their districts, and 
they wouldn't be in a much different position than any other member in that regard. 
G: Let's talk a little more about patronage. 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 1 
G: Edward Day, in his memoir on his service as postmaster general, indicates that the patronage, surprisingly to him, was run out of the attorney general's office and that he 
himself had very little control of it. Robert Kennedy was the one who would designate who got jobs and that sort of thing. Any recollections on that? 
O: I don't recall that, no. And I can't believe that the attorney general's office would have been involved in rural mail carriers and postmasters. Ed Day was our first postmaster 
general in those early days when the appointments were being made. There might have been some input from Bobby. I don't recall his book, but if Ed had said the patronage 
seems to be run out of the White House rather than the Post Office Department, he would have been closer to being accurate. 
G: Is that right? 
O: Well, I think there would be times when members of Congress would say to me, "I've got this fellow who I think would be a great postmaster," it's very possible that somebody on 
my staff would talk to the Post Office Department and give them direction. 
21
O'Brien --Interview XV --18 
G: Fred Belen had said in his oral history that congressmen really expected to be able to name the postmasters, that they really didn't even consider this a boon from the White House. 
O: Oh, basically that's true, yes. I think that if you have thirty-seven thousand post offices, you've got thirty-seven thousand postmasters, at one level or another, and certainly the 
naming of a first-class postmaster would be a very significant step in any congressman's district; it would be a big deal. As a matter of fact, I remember when the postmaster in 
New York was named and we had a ceremony where I swore him in on the steps of the post office. There were thousands of people there. Bobby Kennedy as senator was there; 
it was a big ceremony. Of course, first of all, he was a new postmaster, but probably more than that he was one of the first major-city black postmasters. 
So there was a lot involved and I wouldn't suggest that you'd debate postmasters, sitting in the White House, with a member of Congress, House or Senate. That member 
of Congress had his problems with postmasters, and Belen might have looked at it from a little different perspective than I did, because I think that if you're just Washington-based, 
you say, "John Smith named Joe Brown postmaster in Peoria, Illinois, and that's a big deal, that's a big patronage item." I'll bet you that that congressman had twenty to thirty 
applicants and all kinds of pressures exerted on him. And that's the direction I came from, feeling that a fellow with his feet on the ground might ultimately say, "Hey, this is fun for 
the moment, but I make more enemies along the route. It isn't worth it. Maybe I'm better off not being involved." And I wasn't approaching that as a dreamer; I'm not a dreamer 
when it comes to politics. But my own judgment was that this was not as pretty a picture as appeared on the surface, politically. 
Now, there were those who would disagree with me. The idea that they could ultimately call the tune might be so overriding that the negative fallout didn't mean that 
much. But I think a lot of people on that Hill--I was sure of it--felt, "I have to go through with this; this is part of the system, part of the process, and I can't tell people back home 
that I don't name the postmaster in the final analysis. But it might be more pleasant for me if I didn't have that power." 
G: Were there many occasions where you had a conflict between the civil service requirements and the imperatives of patronage on the other hand? 
O: You're not apt to. 
G: Really? 
O: First of all, there are exams and lists with veteran's preference. You can pick from the top three. 
G: So there were not instances where you would really have to bypass the civil service requirements? 
22
O'Brien --Interview XV --19 
O: One way or another it would generally work out. Perhaps revision or a new list. 
The postal service is difficult, at best. I don't know how it's functioning these days, but a reasonable part of the initial proposal for reorganization was finally adopted. It's 
unfortunate that the proposal was not adopted in toto, but at least it was taken out of departmental status or cabinet status, and they were able to finance R & D, and finance 
mechanization and finance facilities. That was an imperative; at least that came about. 
(Interruption) 
G: You had talked at length about patronage. Was there any realization when you came to the post office how little patronage power, appointment power, you actually had? 
O: I had an understanding of the process. This was to a great extent congressional patronage. 
G: Was it difficult to remove someone who had been appointed due to the fact that they did have sponsors on Capitol Hill? 
O: I doubt that it would have been difficult, because if there were situations like that, they would be cases that were so overriding that removal was called for and a member of 
Congress wouldn't be in much of a position to fight it. But I don't remember specific cases. There probably were some, but I don't recall them. 
G: How would you contrast the clerks' union from the carriers' union? 
O: In numbers, of course, they were the largest unions by far. I would say you would probably weigh them equally on a scale in terms of impact, potency, and the rest. 
G: Was one more aggressive than the other? 
O: I don't recall that being the case. You really dealt with their leadership. It was the position of union leaders that they had to respond to their constituency and be as 
aggressive as they could be in order to impress their members. 
G: I believe one of your predecessors, perhaps Gronouski or perhaps Day, had proposed eliminating the mileage allotment for rural carriers and instead [proposed] leasing 
automobiles, which would have helped save money, and the rural carriers managed to defeat that. 
O: Yes. 
G: Did you have a similar experience here? 
O: It was discussed. I don't recall that we got into it very deeply. Maybe we did, but I don't 
23
O'Brien --Interview XV --20 
remember. 
G: How about your whole effort toward automation and going into a more mechanized, modern post office with optical scanners and sorters and things like this? Did the unions 
see this as a threat to their jobs? 
O: They had a considerable sensitivity to modernization. They didn't mind modernizing as long as featherbedding that might exist continued. There was a reduction from a seven 
hundred thousand-plus to a six hundred thousand-plus, at a stage, probably a decade ago now, which was a result, to some extent at least, of automation. But it hadn't reached the 
point where the potential for reduction was overriding. There was a recognition this was a factor the unions would have to take into account at some point. 
Our emphasis was to broaden the acceptance and utilization of zip code. But it required a lot of public relations in order to get it across. Of course, once you got the 
major mail users to zip code that was a big help. There was a great deal of effort in that area and a considerable degree of success. But then [when] it got to the individual mail 
user becoming accustomed to zip-coding, that took time and took a lot of effort. 
G: Do you think that while you were there that there would have been more automation if it hadn't been for the unions? 
O: I think so. I think that probably applies in the private sector as well. There's always a resistance to automation. The age now of the computer, of course, has been revolutionary 
in the major industries. The tradition of the postal service was the manual aspect of it; therefore, the requirement of these hundreds of thousands of employees and the reason 
that it was at that level and had been for some time were obvious. The resources to mechanize and modernize weren't available, so they didn't have to fear it. 
G: The other aspect of this, the coding innovation, zip code, to what extent did the users resist this? 
O: They, of course, had to absorb some cost internally. But the compensating factor was that they would be assured better delivery. So it was quite well accepted. When I arrived, 
there was foot-dragging, reluctance, or lack of knowledge. We did reach out for private sector help. They were helpful in developing spots for television; the networks were 
helpful in promoting zip code. There was quite an impressive response from the private sector to help promote zip code. 
G: One of the problems with the initial zip-coding [was] that it seemed that they would change the codes, that they wouldn't stay with the same--O: 
Yes, there was that. There was trial and error for a period of time. It finally was pretty well reconciled. But there were expressions of concern and disruptions in the process and 
changes of signals and what have you. But that was all in the implementation. 
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O'Brien --Interview XV --21 
G: What was Congress' reaction to the zip code innovation? 
O: I don't recall unfavorable reaction. It had been launched, and whatever the Congress wanted to say had passed by the time I arrived on the scene. I don't recall, other than on 
behalf of a constituent now and then, a congressman complaining. In the overall concept, there wasn't much to quarrel about. Everybody had to agree that if you could effectively 
have a zip code program, it would improve the service. 
G: My notes indicate that one of the congressional committees, or a subcommittee, went to Europe to look at coding over there and came back very impressed with it. 
O: Yes. I had gone over myself and I was impressed, too. 
G: This foreign travel brings up another area of your work and that is the emphasis on international mail. 
O: Yes. Well, that was an attempt on our part to improve that situation [and] have a closer relationship with western European nations, which might facilitate international delivery. I 
remember the head of the postal service in France and I entered into an exchange agreement. It was a very modest beginning, where we would have an exchange program 
to learn from each other, and it might be mutually beneficial. I remember I was particularly impressed with the operation of the service in Great Britain, and the 
recognition that that service was functioning quite well out of governmental morass, which was exactly where I wanted to see us head. 
G: Was your idea, then, something that stemmed from the British experience? 
O: No, it stemmed from an early recognition that the current mail service in some parts of the country bordered on the disastrous, and a recognition that decades had elapsed without 
any great progress or innovation, and the reasons for it went to financing and lack of aggressive research. Along with that, my conclusion very early on [was] that it was 
absolutely impossible to bring about a first-class postal service in this country with the strictures of departmental status and inability to invest in improvements. The only 
conceivable way that would ever occur would to be to remove it from departmental status and make it an independent entity, because you could spend the rest of your life fighting 
with the Congress and everyone else. Retaining the entity as it was and hoping for a significantly upgraded service wasn't in the cards; you had to look elsewhere. So as I said, 
it was a dual highway. On a daily basis you tried to do everything you could to improve the service which oftentimes was band-aid, and at the same time have in the back of your 
mind that, in the recesses of this, research was going on that hopefully would bring about an approach that would be completely different and would be dramatic enough so that it 
would impact on the public generally. 
G: Back to the international mail situation, you established a special assistant for international 
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O'Brien --Interview XV --22 
postal affairs and an international relations officer in each bureau. Do you recall the significance of this measure? 
O: Well, it was to pursue the elements of our service that extended beyond the continental United States. To do that it was conceivable at least that you could have cooperative 
effort, and probably joint efforts in some instances, because you'd assume that those people in France, Great Britain, the Scandinavian countries would be interested in 
improving international service because of the flow of mail into the United States. And this wasn't something that we ought to just touch on occasionally in our staff meetings. 
So we structured it that way. 
G: Any developments in relations with the Soviet Union in this connection? 
O: I believe we made attempts; what developments took place I don't recall. But we didn't foreclose any aspect of international relations. After all, this was of world-wide interest 
and concern. Postal service exists everywhere in the world, and while we were responsible for half of the volume of mail in the world, there was another 50 per cent of it 
out there. Some of it impacted directly on us and there was no reason to restrict our efforts. Our efforts could be world-wide. 
G: Limited mail service was instituted in North Korea. 
O: Yes. 
G: Was this a controversial move on the administration's part, and was this something that the Post Office Department initiated or was it done with the State Department's leadership? 
O: My recollection was that it was done through the State Department. We became involved in mail service to our servicemen, to upgrade and improve that. That was really our role, 
and that was of particular interest to the President, too. But on the North Korean end, I think that was State Department. 
G: In December 1966, you went to Europe, to Germany and Holland among other places, and had an audience with Pope Paul. Anything significant about that trip? 
O: Well, the reason I went to Holland is they had a postal school, almost at the level of a college. It was an institute that had achieved considerable recognition, that we had heard 
a lot about and knew a little about. They had innovative ideas; they had mechanization concepts they were testing that were considered to be very innovative. Our feeling was 
that it wouldn't hurt to take a look at it and develop a relationship with those people. 
In Germany, there again, there was a keen interest, as in France and England, in observing and hopefully learning more about their procedures because, as I said earlier, in 
some areas they were ahead of us. It was pretty sad to contemplate that we, with our volume of mail, had been so lacking in progress over the years, while other countries had 
26
O'Brien --Interview XV --23 
given more direction and financial support to the mail service. 
G: To what extent do you think this difference was due to smaller geographical size? 
O: To some extent, certainly, but when you could have guaranteed delivery in London and in Paris on the same day of mail, you had to be impressed. It was interesting, because below 
the streets in Paris they used pneumatic tubes. It was reminiscent of department stores years ago in the United States. And yet that was superior to our service, particularly when 
there had been an early-on attempt, which resulted in a significant investment of monies, in the city of New York to accomplish the same thing, and they had never completed it. It 
had been dismantled or left in discard. Some of that equipment still exists down there. We had failed. Now, cities of comparable size to New York in Europe had done this. 
People putting letters in pneumatic tubes by hand and sending them all over Paris were far better than our ability to deliver, even though you wouldn't consider it a very modern 
procedure in this day and age. You could literally deposit a letter in London and have it delivered in the city the very same day. That was very intriguing and it was embarrassing, 
because you like to brag about your country. 
I don't recall that we gained anything particularly by way of knowledge of postal service in Italy. As long as I was going to be in Rome, there was an audience with the 
Pope, and there's a little sidebar to that, because I met with the Pope privately. There were three or four other people in my party: my wife, Claude DeSautels, I think, and 
Phyllis Maddock and somebody else I think from the State Department. In any event, I was told when I arrived that the Pope wanted to meet with me privately. It disturbed me 
because the members of my party were looking forward to this and this meant I would see the Pope and they wouldn't. I made the comment to the Pope's secretary or emissary 
immediately, and he said, "No, not at all. He'd like to visit with you for a while and then [have] the rest of your party come in." The Pope's reason for the private visit was to tell 
me that he wanted me to reassure the President that he was continuing to do everything he could to help bring about peace in Vietnam, and that he had had some very recent contacts 
pursuing this effort, and would I advise the President that he was very much in his mind. 
That was the thrust of the discussion for fifteen minutes or so, and then the rest of my party came in and visited with him. We had a gift of a leather bound volume of 
selected stamps. I was presenting it to the Pope, and he reached over to his desk and presented me with a volume of Vatican postage stamps. He had the same idea in mind, 
but he pointed out when he opened the cover that it had been autographed to me, which mine wasn't, to him. (Laughter) 
But that was the sidebar to that trip, which was a very interesting experience. I did, obviously, tell the President of my visit with him and what he had to say. 
G: What was LBJ's reaction? 
O: I remember he said something to the effect that "I knew that he was in my corner," or 
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O'Brien --Interview XV --24 
"He's trying to help; it's nice that he took the pains to underscore it to you. He's really trying." The Pope had involvement over that time, obviously to no effect, but there was 
an effort made. 
G: The Pope didn't elaborate on the specifics of his contacts? 
O: I don't recall that he did. There were a couple of specifics in there that elude me now, that I relayed to the President. I can't remember whether it was a date of recent contact or 
anticipation of another contact at an early date. 
G: The Pope did not urge reduction of bombing, or anything like [that]? 
O: No, we didn't get into that at all. It was the quest for peace, to bring about a resolution, and we didn't get into the aspects of our continued involvement. He was persuaded, as he 
said, that the President was dedicated to bringing about an end to hostilities and to a peaceful resolution, and that he wanted to do everything he could to be helpful in that 
regard. That was basically it. 
G: Would you have initiated discussion of Vietnam if the Pope had not done so? 
O: No. That would have been a courtesy call, pure and simple. It wasn't something I sought. On a trip of that nature, if you're in the cabinet and the State Department is involved, they 
had an advance man. A postal fellow and a State Department fellow advance the trip. At each stop there was some formal or informal get-together, a luncheon or a reception at the 
embassy, something like that. As a matter of fact, after I left the Pope at the Vatican that evening, there was a reception at the American Embassy. I forget the Ambassador's name; 
he was a career fellow. He wanted to know what discussion I had with the Pope, and I refrained from going into the subject that he had brought up. He had noted on the ticker 
that I had been with the Pope for twenty-five or thirty minutes, which was a rather long time, and clearly he was concerned because he had no role in it, and it was his 
responsibility to report to the State Department on the visit. I felt, in view of the fact that the Pope and I had had this discussion privately, I should do what I was asked to do and 
report directly to the President. So I didn't tell him that the subject had been Vietnam. 
G: You just reported directly to the President? 
O: Yes. 
(Interruption) 
O: I guess an interesting aspect of this phase of our discussion [is] what did I envision the role of a postmaster general was and what were my reactions to the job. I suppose that 
President Johnson, in assigning me, was expressing his desire that I stay with the administration. I don't think I had any real notion about the postal service in terms of the 
extent of the problems. Once I was there, I felt that part of it was personal pride. Your 
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O'Brien --Interview XV --25 
responsibility was clearly there. I should plunge into that job to the fullest, to the best of my ability. I also became very intrigued with it, because again it was a challenge, which is 
always something that you enjoy. The President made reference to it fleetingly on a couple of occasions, "If you need more help to release you from those responsibilities, 
why don't you hire some more assistant postmasters general?" But it was something I wanted to do, and also it would have been ridiculous to treat it in a cavalier fashion, you 
have the title and let somebody else be concerned. You just couldn't do that. 
G: You had a tremendous increase in the amount of mail going to Vietnam, of course, with the tremendous increase in the number of soldiers there. Let me ask you to describe your 
effort to upgrade the mail service there. 
O: The effort went into priority delivery of mail, as high a degree of priority as you could give it, without regard to the cost factors involved. It was a reflection of the keen desire of the 
President, his sensitivity to the needs of the troops over there, and nothing was more important than mail from home and prompt delivery of that mail, and also the prompt 
delivery of mail designated from Vietnam. So we put a good deal of time and effort into it and whatever resources were necessary. It was an area that could be helpful to morale 
and was very, very important to the fellows over there. 
G: Was President Johnson explicit in his own desire that this be accepted? 
O: Yes, he was. 
G: Do you recall his conversation? 
O: He recognized that this was one area where you could really get something done for morale. The great sensitivity of mail delivery to servicemen under the gun in Vietnam was 
obvious to all of us. It was a simple matter of ensuring that it was done to the fullest. That was something that he and I discussed; he had a keen personal interest, he was 
urging every action that was available to us. We in turn felt equally strong about it. 
G: You went to Vietnam, as I recall, [inaudible]. 
O: No. Somewhere during that time the President designated me to head the bond drive. (Laughter) 
G: Yes, the savings bond drive. 
O: The savings bond drive. (Laughter) I guess he felt that I didn't have much else to do. (Laughter) 
G: Tell me about that. 
O: That was a little like doing head counts and keeping the President apprised of the progress 
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O'Brien --Interview XV --26 
of the legislative program. The President was great for statistics and percentages of employees in each department and agency who were participating in the bond drive, and 
how it related to their past participation. We had a launching in the auditorium of the Post Office Department; we had all these gimmicks, banners and posters and buttons. My first 
objective was to ensure that the Post Office Department would have a better record than it had in the past, and hopefully the best record of any department, which may have been the 
case. I'm not suggesting that it consumed a great deal of my time, but it was another element of responsibility thrust upon me which I hadn't sought. 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 2 
G: There were some reports that some of the postmasters were being a little too aggressive in soliciting savings bond participation. 
O: Yes, there were. They were being aggressive because they were being aggressively pursued from headquarters. (Laughter) So the degree of their aggressiveness probably 
was measured by the degree of pressure put upon them from Washington. I wasn't going to try to explain to President Johnson why the Post Office Department didn't have a good 
record. (Laughter) So we were aggressive and they in turn were, and there was a little backfire. I don't recall it was of great significance. 
G: To what extent do you think your effectiveness as a postmaster general hinged on the fact that you had a lot of Hill experience, perhaps more than predecessors in--? 
O: It was helpful. It was helpful in the budget process particularly. There was a real spirit of cooperation on the part of most of the members in matters that involved the department. I 
didn't find any undue pressures from the Congress on the patronage side or in any other area. But I think that whether it was appealing your budget to the President or whether it 
was dealing with the Congress, the fact that I knew most of them well and the fact that it was understood that I had a continuing dual role were helpful. It was an advantage. 
What happened was that when I was assigned to the job, the Congress decided to have a party for me. Really, it was in the context of a farewell party, farewell in the sense 
of congressional relations. There was the normal reaction: "O'Brien's leaving the White House and he won't be involved with us on a day-to-day basis in congressional relations, 
but he's going over to the Post Office Department. We'll have a party for him." And they had just about all the Congress at the party. I didn't bother enlightening them that I wasn't 
going that far away from them. (Laughter) But as it went on and they realized, of course, it was a continuing relationship with them on the legislative program and that things hadn't 
changed particularly, it was helpful in terms of carrying on the job over at the Post Office. 
When I got to deciding between Hubert and Bobby Kennedy after Johnson announced that he would not seek re-election, the disappointing aspect for me was the 
departure in April, 1968, from the Post Office Department, with eight months remaining in the President's term. I truly felt, because of where we were at that point, I could have 
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O'Brien --Interview XV --27 
made significant progress in reorganizing the department. And that was a loss to me. It was unavoidable, but that was disappointing because I didn't like to leave that hanging. 
But that was it. As I indicated earlier, I was persuaded that the President would have been aboard and I would have been able to focus his attention on this to move the proposal 
forward. Instead the report didn't move out of the White House for months, and there was no action taken. It was only belatedly in the farewell address of the President that 
there was an endorsement of the proposition. If you could have moved that six months up, we would have been able to significantly escalate attention and direction. But it didn't 
occur and it became really a Nixon-Republican White House proposal. 
G: You talked about your confirmation hearing and your initial unfamiliarity with the process of mail cover. Once you did become familiar with it, you did issue a statement, I think, 
saying that the Post Office Department would not open any first-class mail. 
O: Once I became knowledgeable on the subject, and it took some doing because that was an entrenched bureaucracy--G: 
Really? 
O: --the secrecy went almost to "what the postmaster general doesn't know won't hurt him." Apparently that traditionally had been the case. In any event, I had a difficult task of 
eliciting from the postal inspectors all the facts on mail cover. Ira and I were kind of frustrated, because you had to come up with the right questions in order to get answers, 
and you didn't know the right questions. There was very little volunteering of information. Finally we got it all put together and realized this was widespread. Departments would 
make a request of the Post Office Department to put a cover on somebody and we'd go ahead and do it. Whether that was a legitimate mail cover on our Senator from 
Maryland--and I think it turned out it might have been--he had done me a favor because I could have gone a long time without recognizing the scope of mail cover. 
To the consternation of those in this area, I severely limited all mail cover. It had to do with national security. 
G: So you personally approved each [inaudible]? 
O: No. But we set up guidelines and restrictions. I was visited by the Director of the CIA, and others made inquiry, but the Director visited with me and had a pleasant chat--I think 
it probably was [Richard] Helms--G: 
Yes, it would have been. 
O: --just recounting his previous relationship with my predecessors. That sort of conversation. It was clearly intended to elicit from me an agreement that nothing would 
change. I listened him out and we ended the conversation and it didn't deter me at all from putting in these new rules. 
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O'Brien --Interview XV --28 
At some point there was a congressional hearing in this whole area, and former postmasters general were called to testify. What I had undertaken, the procedure during 
my time, left me looking awfully good in the eyes of the committee. They were aware of it, so I wasn't a witness. 
G: These were the hearings on CIA's illegal surveillance of Americans or alleged illegal--? 
O: It focused on the Post Office Department's procedures. I think that [Winton] Blount in the Nixon Administration became a witness, and there was a relationship between the Post 
Office Department and John Mitchell in this area. Now, that represented a change from the procedure that was in existence while I was there and I assume while Marvin [Watson] 
was there. 
G: Now, let me understand the procedure again. And you did change it--I mean, it was one policy when you came in and then you did--? 
O: The policy when I came in was not a policy that had been inaugurated by Day or Gronouski, it was just that you could have mail cover on request. A department could 
say, "We have reason to believe we have a problem and that we need some surveillance. We request that you put a cover on John Smith," or sixteen John Smiths, or some 
organization. The Post Office Department didn't perceive it was a decision-maker in that regard. What we did was determine how many mail covers exist, how many right today. I 
remember saying, "I want to know today, this minute, how many mail covers are in existence." "Well, it'll be hard to find out." (Laughter) And you know, it just--G: 
So how did you find out? 
O: We forced the issue, that's all. They couldn't hide it forever. And, after all, I am the postmaster general. So I reversed policy to some extent. We wound up with a full record 
of mail covers. 
G: Were most of them dealing with IRS investigations? 
O: No, they were dealing with just about anything. 
G: Really? 
O: I think depending on who made the request. 
G: Did most of the requests come from the Justice Department or from Internal Revenue? 
O: And Defense. 
G: Defense made a lot, too? 
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O'Brien --Interview XV --29 
O: Yes. 
G: They did. 
O: CIA, obviously, or I wouldn't have had the visit. But, anyway, it was widespread. There was one mass cover put on at Kennedy Airport that went on for a long time and nobody 
knew about it. But now we know, and the record shows, there are X number. Some go off in a given month, others come on, so it maintains a level of several hundred. We're 
going to reduce it to the bare minimum, and it's got to be a proven case with the Post Office Department being given information to justify the claim that this is national security. 
We want to see the file or we're not going to inaugurate the cover. And we reduced those mail covers by probably 90 per cent. Like anything else, "Why not put [on] a mail 
cover? Why don't we have a little fun and games?" Some of it was justified, but the number was most significantly reduced and the covers undertaken were justified on the 
record. 
Apparently in a new administration this was reinstituted, but I never received another contact from the CIA for a mail cover while I was postmaster general. 
G: Did you personally have to approve them? 
O: No. 
G: You had someone else. 
O: Ira would be sure to maintain [records]. 
G: Postal inspection? 
O: The chief postal inspector had to report to Ira to show him the records. 
G: Was there a double standard of recording information on the outside of an envelope versus actually opening the mail? 
O: Oh, yes, there were two processes. The most prevalent process was to record the return addresses on envelopes and deliver them. 
G: But let's say after you established a new policy, in order to do the second, in order to open the first-class mail, let's say, did you have to have more evidence or did it have to be--? 
O: There was not going to be any form of mail cover without justification. 
G: Okay. Just surveillance of the mail. 
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O'Brien --Interview XV --30 
O: Well, mail cover really is supposed to be taking that return address, but mail cover goes beyond that. It's a matter of interpreting what mail cover is. 
G: Were you aware of any political abuses of this process? 
O: No. 
G: Either before, during, or after? 
O: No. 
G: Did Senator Brewster's troubles span your--apparently he'd been [inaudible]? 
O: I believe so. I recall that something occurred later on; he had some difficulties which indicated that the concern he had initially expressed at my confirmation hearing was a 
matter of serious concern to him personally. He didn't present his questions that way, but obviously that was the case. He had become aware or suspected that there had been a 
cover on him. 
G: How did the Post Office Department deal with mail fraud? 
O: The inspection service and the legal department. And [where] there were cases of mail fraud, to bring criminal action. So there was a great deal of activity in that area that may 
have justified the existence of a score or so of lawyers in the department. And that would be dealt with by the people directly responsible in that area, dealing with the Justice 
Department. 
O: Did the Justice Department follow up on these cases after they were referred to them? 
O: Yes. And then another area which involved the inspectors was obscenity. And it seemed to me that they devoted a great deal of time and attention to that area. I was subjected to 
a deep briefing with evidence shown to me of a wide variety of obscenity and use of the mails in this area. My feeling was you ensure that the law is adhered to, but I wasn't 
particularly interested in getting a regular briefing on all the gory details. There had been a postmaster general who became very involved in that area, and the Department devoted 
a lot of time and effort to it. He used to intrigue the press by showing them the array of items confiscated. I had heard reference made to that period while I was there, because 
older people would still recall how he'd call all the press in and say, "I'm going to show you this," and the press would be intrigued in viewing it all. (Laughter) 
G: This was [Arthur] Summerfield, was that--? 
O: I think it was Summerfield. 
So there was background to the Post Office Department's intense interest in 
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O'Brien --Interview XV --31 
obscenity. There was an area of responsibility there. And my signal was, "Proceed. Fulfill your responsibilities under the postal laws." The mail cover was a different matter. 
G: But how did the inspectors know if the material was obscene or not without opening it up, without doing a--? 
O: I'll tell you, when they came in with this stuff to make the presentation on obscenity, I chose not to pursue it. 
(Laughter) 
G: Is that right? 
O: It was too much for me. 
G: Were they photographs or--? 
O: There were instruments and articles and photographs and--( Laughter) 
G: How about weapons being sent through the mail? Was this another area where surveillance was necessary? 
O: Yes. The postal inspectors were really quality people and truly dedicated. They were the FBI of the postal service. It came to my attention personally one day when the chief 
inspector wanted to see me on an important matter. He told me that while you would get threatening type mail, which I wouldn't see, which they would follow up, that he was 
particularly concerned about a recent situation. He told me about this fellow in New Jersey--G: 
Was it Newark, do you think? 
O: Yes. This [person] had threatened to get me on a visit I was making to Newark to speak within a few days. It's interesting how something like that can develop. While I was at 
the White House, often I would send responses to people that wrote the President and it was done mechanically. This fellow apparently had written a number of times, and he 
wanted to be, I think, a postmaster in some town, a postal official. He would get this response from me: "The President appreciates hearing from you," or something to that 
effect. 
He had had this correspondence from me, a half a dozen or so responses to his mail and one morning he discovered I was postmaster general. He proceeded to write to 
me as postmaster general, and was getting the same sort of response from somebody and he became very aggravated. So the chief inspector said that he wanted to have some 
inspectors with me on the trip. So I said, "Sure." 
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O'Brien --Interview XV --32 
And it really was quite an evening, because not only was I accompanied by some of our own people to Newark, but when I got off the plane these plain-clothes guys 
surrounded me. I got to the hotel, and they had blocked off the floor I was on. It seemed to me to be the height of ridiculousness, until I got downstairs. They had this head table 
reception room, and Ira was with me. We were lining up for pictures, and suddenly a fellow who was just standing against the wall stepped over and handed me a card and 
stepped back, glaring at me. I looked at it; sure enough, here he is. So I looked for Ira; I didn't say anything. He was at the end of the room. Finally I was able to signal him, and 
he went out one door of the reception room down the hall into the other door, and I slipped the card to him. He looked at it, and he alerted these people. They gathered 
around the fellow and grabbed him. He had a gun. 
G: Really? 
O: He had been in an asylum and I don't know whether he intended to do anything or not. Now they quietly take him away. So at the dinner, they won't let anybody near the head 
table. He's already incarcerated somewhere. I don't think he had violence in his mind. If he were going to do something, would he be handing you [a card] to let you know who he 
was? But, anyway, that was the one incident I had with the postal inspectors where I was a party to their operation. 
G: Anything else on the postal inspectors? 
O: No. They were really in a class by themselves; they had a role to play, and they were highly professional. 
G: Did they investigate mail theft, theft of mail? 
O: Yes. Also, of course, they were charged with responsibility of investigating internally in post offices, if you're talking about theft in that context. 
I don't recall how many postal inspectors there were throughout the country, but there were a fairly large number, and the chief inspector was a very disciplined fellow and 
very serious-minded and very responsible. And I think it bothered him when I got into this mail-cover thing, because I think perhaps in his judgment I should do what others had 
probably done. His view would be, "There's no point in telling the boss about this. It's better that he not know." I think it was a setback in our relationship early on for me to be 
adamant about the procedure and really restricting it. But other than that we had a very good relationship, and he didn't indicate after the fact that he had any concerns about it. 
Maybe he had a sense of relief, too, because somebody else had taken the responsibility and he had clear guidelines and he adhered to them. 
But I think it's an extremely important function of the postal service. It's a highly sensitive area and extremely important. When you think of all the activities they're 
engaged in, they also have the responsibility to follow up with employees. There are 
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O'Brien --Interview XV --33 
always incidents of thievery in post offices and it's a constant problem. 
G: How big of a problem was it? 
O: Well, in the sense that there was generally something cooking somewhere in that regard. That isn't big in terms of seven hundred thousand plus people, but the opportunity for that 
sort of thing to occur is obvious. It wasn't something that you focused on every day or anything, it was handled in a professional manner. All I'm suggesting is that I'm sure that a 
fair amount of their time went into that. Then of course if you had slowdowns or other problems that would involve them, too--G: 
Is that right? 
O: --in the security sense. 
G: If you had a work slowdown? 
O: Yes, on the security side you would have to be concerned. 
G: Did you have any cases that were particularly egregious or significant in terms of theft of mail or contents, in terms of the dollar amount or--? 
O: I don't recall any incidents. I think there were a couple of times when bags of mail disappeared. You know, that happens, you read about that every now and then, where 
some carrier decides that he's overworked and doesn't quite get around to delivering the mail. An incident of that nature makes for quite a human interest story when it surfaces. 
But I don't recall any major gangster-influenced takeover of the post office. 
G: The Post Office Department did handle a tremendous amount of money: social security checks, welfare checks, things like that. Was there an inherent security problem with 
simply the carrier with a bagful of checks that he was delivering on certain days? 
O: I don't think it's comparable to Wells Fargo and the rest carrying money around in armored trucks. I don't know how much the Post Office Department handled. It was 
substantial, but there again, everything is relative. 
A difficult area was legal documents. Law firms put these legal documents in the mail with delivery time. So occasionally--and I must say it was no more than 
occasionally--it was something I was very sensitive to because you could cause irrevocable harm by failure of delivery on a timely basis. There were occasions when you would--not 
often--have to document post office failure of delivery in order to avoid the adverse effect on one of the parties involved. Maybe that's changed and I assume it has, with Federal 
Express and this sort of delivery service which has come into being. It's one thing to be getting a letter from your old friend delayed a week or two, but to have some document 
that must be filed by twelve noon in the Superior Court of New York or whatever, to 
37
O'Brien --Interview XV --34 
perform that service properly was extremely important. 
Fortunately only on rare occasions did we run into a problem. And that said a lot for the Post Office Department, because a lot of that was in the mail flow every day. 
G: Let's talk about some of the crises that you had. Was the Morgan Annex fire during your tenure, when the New York City--? 
O: I was trying to remember. 
G: In terms of number of pieces of mail, I guess, more were destroyed in that than any other. 
O: I don't recall. 
G: How about the Chicago crisis? 
O: That was a crisis. 
G: Let me ask you to recount as much as you can about that, when you first learned that it was developing--O: 
This was Christmas time. 
G: That's right. 
Tape 3 of 3, Side 1 
O: Well, Christmas time, obviously, was a very difficult time for the postal service. There was even a note of almost desperation because of the volume of mail during that period, 
the need to deliver it on a timely basis and the terrible adverse fallout if you failed to do it. The Chicago post office was a mail center, and it was halfway between the East and the 
West. And I believe there was snow. I think that we had a snowstorm in Chicago to compound it, too. That was the most serious situation I faced while I was in the 
job--very, very difficult. It was on the edge of complete debacle for days. My recollection, maybe I want to recall it that way, is that we came out of it finally without 
the total debacle, but it was the major crisis of my time. 
G: What policy changes came out of it, do you recall? 
O: I think that, first of all, we had several thousand employees in a totally inadequate facility. What you had in major cities like New York existed in Chicago: the basic problems of 
street delivery, and it sort of underscored all of the failings of the department in terms of modernization, mechanization, and it was all focused in Chicago. There were problems 
with the unions at that time, too. You were in slowdown, you were in disruption, and you had weather conditions added to it. And that was impacting tremendously on the through 
38
O'Brien --Interview XV --35 
mail going through Chicago, the movement of mail coast-to-coast in both directions. 
G: Did you send someone out there? 
O: There was a task force that went out there--G: 
Really? 
O: --a team went out there bag and baggage. 
G: Who did you send? 
O: I don't even remember who they were. They were shipped out there and put in place. 
G: Was some of it related to this tax that New York put on printing, causing a lot of the large mailers to mail out of Chicago? 
O: There was a diversion of an excessive amount of mail into Chicago in a hurry. The volume increased dramatically in a very brief period of time, and in a significant part, it 
was due to what you referred to. 
G: My impression is that the mailers didn't bother to let the post office know that they would have ninety-three million more pieces. (Laughter) 
O: That's right. When you think of all the elements that went into this total breakdown and debacle. There was no way you could have envisioned this escalation of volume over a 
short period of time, and it was due, as you say, to mass mail users. 
G: Did the President become involved in this at all? 
O: I don't recall. 
G: How about Mayor [Richard] Daley? 
O: I don't remember Mayor Daley being involved. I think that at least one of the senators and congressmen became involved. 
G: Was it [Everett] Dirksen? 
O: No. 
G: [Paul] Douglas? 
O: Douglas. 
39
O'Brien --Interview XV --36 
G: CORE was also picketing, demonstrating against what they regarded as discriminatory practices at that time. 
O: Yes. That was beginning to percolate. We began to get isolated claims by employees that their position had been shifted or they didn't get a promotion. Discrimination claims began 
to grow. And there was a sensitivity to that, going over postal history. I do believe--at the postmaster level--minority representation was almost nonexistent, certainly in major 
urban areas. And there was a conscious effort made on the part of those involved in the patronage process--and that was true in Chicago, too, where we named a black 
postmaster--to start showing that minorities could achieve high position in the service. That didn't go to the rank and file and the percentage of representation in the service, 
however, and a lot of that, of course, had to do with the civil service procedures and veterans' rights and the postal examinations. But when you got to postmasters, then of 
course you had some leeway. And we did it in New York, and Douglas was in the forefront, I remember, for the designation of a black postmaster at Chicago; Bobby 
[Kennedy] and others were in the forefront in New York. 
The Chicago crisis was a nightmare, an absolute nightmare. There was nothing left conceivably that could go wrong that hadn't gone wrong. Everything, whether it was 
CORE, whether it was the snow, whether it was the excess volume of mail, whether it was a slowdown, all of it was there. 
G: Well, I think you've described that part of the process was to divert mail that was--O: 
We did, yes. 
G: --just divert it around Chicago, first of all, so it didn't shut down the rest of the country. 
O: That was really the first step. Obviously, you had to start diverting. 
G: I think it started in--well, the crisis was in December but it may have even started before that. 
O: If there was a bright spot, it did focus attention on the problems of the postal service. 
G: It started in October, apparently. 
O: Yes. 
G: Yes. I have a note here to the effect that at one point your task force considered burning all outdated third-class mail and starting over. 
(Laughter) 
O: That's right. That was considered. They thought they had two choices: either burn it or 
40
O'Brien --Interview XV --37 
lose it. 
(Laughter) 
G: To what extent were you personally involved in the decisions here? 
O: To a great extent. It was a crisis situation that extended over a lengthy period, and you diverted just about all your attention to it. 
G: As a result of this, did you require the large mailers to notify you of their--? 
O: It flowed from that, yes. Of course, there was the case of each large mailer not realizing that all of his colleagues were doing the same thing and figuring he was going to have an 
edge. 
(Laughter) 
G: To what extent was this sort of thing related to just the change in mail transportation patterns, the fact that ten or twelve years before there had been ten thousand trains using 
the mails and sorting the mails on the trains rather than using airlines and ground transportation, trucking? 
O: The cost factor and service problems contributed to changing the mode of transportation, moving to air transportation in terms of crisis to get delivery accomplished. So that was 
an element of it; there was this great change. But you have to go back a bit to the history of the postal service. I remember that C. R. Smith talked to me at length about the postal 
service in the early stages of the airlines. Smith said that American, or no airlines that became major airlines later, could have launched their airlines without the postal service. 
That was the key. Consequently, he said, the effort that was expended to get postal contracts to launch an airline was unbelievable--the pressures that were exerted and the 
influence that was exerted. He said that was the sole hope of he and others who were early in the airline industry--to launch and survive. Without the mail contracts it would 
have been long delayed. 
So there was this postal contribution to the airline industry that was extremely significant. That's a little history of the department that I never focused on. There were 
three or four of them that started at the same time. 
G: Braniff was an early--Pioneer [Airlines] was an early [one, too.] 
O: And there was another one. Was it Pan Am? 
G: Yes. 
O: Yes. They all knew each other and they were involved in carving out new horizons. He 
41
O'Brien --Interview XV --38 
said they were two-fisted fellows, and he said, "We just fought each other practically on the streets for those postal contracts." (Laughter) 
G: How about the use of trucks rather than trains? 
O: Well, you were compelled [to]. The deterioration of the trains was a continuing one. There were two substitutes obviously: air, to some extent--the cost factor on short haul 
prohibitive--and trucks. And you wound up in a lot of leasing there--or contracting, not leasing--because, again, you didn't have sufficient facilities of your own or the ability to 
secure them to be able to get the job done. So as [with] the airlines to the trucking industry, it became an important source of business. 
G: So the switch from rail transportation to truck transportation and air mail was a result rather than a cause of decline of the railroads, is that right? 
O: A result, yes. I don't know what the volume of postal business related to other business the railroads had on the freight side, but you'd have to assume that the decline of the 
railroads was a factor. It wasn't the Post Office Department that brought it about. The department, in a sense, was a victim of it. 
G: If you had a big contract with a trucking company, is this the way you would do some of it? You would let a contract--? 
O: Yes. That would be, again, the legal department and the assistant postmaster general for transportation. He would negotiate the contracts, and it was a big business. I don't recall 
any scandals during my period in that area. 
G: But this was done without congressional involvement? 
O: Yes. That was part of the internal process. 
(Interruption) 
G: Getting back to the nuts and bolts, I wanted to ask you about stamps. At one point you were exploring the idea of a color, illuminated-type stamp that would evidently work with 
a canceling machine in some way that different colors would--O: 
First of all, you were limited to five colors. There was a limitation on the kind of a stamp you could produce. That changed, even while I was there, and has broadened so you can 
be much more innovative. Secondly, there was a pretty well-established procedure that you issued, as I recall, some fifteen new stamps a year, even though you got thousands of 
requests and recommendations. I established a stamp committee for the purpose of developing and evaluating the stamp itself and its design, but it was helpful, at least 
indirectly, coming to a consensus on categories. 
42
O'Brien --Interview XV --39 
The process changed in later years. Now you produce, for example, a variety of flowers, and they're very attractive. But at that time you were limited in what you could 
produce, design-wise. You tried--and that had been the tradition and I followed it--to adhere to a limited number of stamps a year, avoiding a proliferation of stamps. It's very 
meaningful to issue a stamp, very significant, it's a high honor. You have ceremonies, you have first-day issues, you have a great deal of publicity. 
So that was really the procedure with stamps. I don't remember the problems or processes you described, except my guess is that it probably has something to do with the 
broadening of the procedure to allow for more creativity and utilization of a variety of colors. That didn't exist back then. 
G: Was there an economic factor, too, in limiting the number of stamps? 
O: Yes, in the sense that you could concentrate on fifteen. There was a Roosevelt stamp while I was there. Well, obviously that lent itself to all kinds of activity. There was an 
Iwo Jima stamp. In your thought process was, are you diversifying within the fifteen appropriately? When we developed this committee, I remember trying to come up with 
names which would make it as prestigious as you could. I came up with Andrew Wyeth. No one thought Andrew Wyeth would serve on the committee, and I had never met 
Andrew Wyeth in my life. So I resorted to simply sending him a letter asking him to serve, and to the surprise of all of us he agreed to serve and was a full participant. I think 
the design aspect of it, the artistic side of it, appealed to him. 
But this selecting the stamps was very, very difficult, and there was a lot of pressure exerted. There was a basketball stamp while I was in the White House. I 
happened to be in position to urge it. Then there were times when major organizations urged recognition. 
G: The Polish Millennium? 
O: That was a controversial stamp. The Polish government resented the content of the stamp. 
End of Tape 3 of 3 and Interview XV 
43
    [ Part 16: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--33 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XVI*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
Project. In addition, some interviews were done for the Library under the auspices of the National Archives and the White House during the Johnson administration. 
Some of the Library's many oral history transcripts are available on the INTERNET. Individuals whose interviews appear on the INTERNET may have other interviews available on 
paper at the LBJ Library. Transcripts of oral history interviews may be consulted at the Library or lending copies may be borrowed by writing to the Interlibrary Loan Archivist, LBJ Library, 
2313 Red River Street, Austin, Texas, 78705. 
1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XVI 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XVI, 11/ 21/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
For Electronic Copy on Diskette from the LBJ Library: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XVI, 11/ 21/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-27 
4
INTERVIEW XVI 
DATE: November 21, 1986 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
G: I want to start with a few miscellaneous questions. First, do you have any insights as to why [John A.] Gronouski was made ambassador to Poland and you postmaster general? I 
realize that LBJ had made a commitment to you to allow you to leave your White House job and this was a way for him to honor that commitment and yet still keep you around. 
But do you think there was any feeling that Gronouski was having some problems? 
O: No, I don't think that existed at all. It had to be solely the President determining to retain me in the administration and at the same time saying "I'm not violating any agreement we 
made." 
His whole approach underscores that. He was at one point going to announce me without any notice to me in a press conference. [He] told me later on that was his 
intention that morning at the press conference in the East Room, but during the prior evening Dean Rusk, who had been charged with the responsibility of notifying the Polish 
government regarding Gronouski, had been unable to contact two leaders who had to be notified. He had to forego that announcement. Finally [he] made a brief off-hand 
comment on naming a postmaster general; "Come on down to the Ranch and we can talk about it." Going to the Ranch and not having any discussion. Having Gronouski at the 
Ranch to be announced ambassador to Poland. I can't speak for Gronouski, but there was hardly any advance notice to me as to what the President intended to do. To sum it up, 
the President felt there was a very logical step he could take and that was naming me postmaster general. 
John Gronouski was postmaster general and had acquitted himself well. I never heard any adverse comment regarding him in the White House. Ed [J. Edward] Day as 
postmaster general really did not have a political involvement. There wasn't a tendency in the White House to focus on the Post Office Department, unfortunately. So that was the 
obvious spot for me. Johnson could make that move and rightly say to me, which he did, "I didn't violate any agreement we had. But I told you one day that I was going to win." 
John had a Polish background. He doesn't, certainly, deserve to be just dumped in order to take care of this O'Brien problem. I suppose the President came up with the idea, 
well, Polish background, make him ambassador to Poland. But I'm absolutely sure it had nothing to do with his performance as postmaster general. 
G: We were talking about stamps yesterday and one stamp that was issued was a beautification stamp. Do you recall that? 
5
O'Brien --Interview XVI --2 
O: I recall the stamp. 
G: Did Mrs. Johnson have a role in that at all? 
O: I believe so. Her keen interest in that area, I'm sure, led to discussions relative to a stamp. She may or may not have participated directly in the discussions, but let's put it this way: I 
don't think there would have been a beautification stamp except for Mrs. Johnson's keen interest. 
G: Did you ever have any problems with violations of the frank by members of Congress and senators? If so, did the Post Office Department get involved in investigations here? 
O: I have a vague recollection that something of this nature did crop up perhaps once or twice, and that there was a need for the Post Office Department to confer with the 
member of Congress. There were some citizen challenges, but I don't remember them in specific terms. I'm sure there was a little of this on a couple of occasions. 
G: Okay. Some of the innovations that you instituted had to do with manpower. One thing you did was to institute a recruiting program to fill about twenty thousand positions with 
new talent, and a five-year college recruiting plan. Do you recall these, the specifics of your efforts? 
O: I recall the plan. It was an effort to bring more talent into the department, trying to interest people in a career opportunity in the postal service. 
G: When you would recruit these college-trained people, at what level would they begin? 
O: Under the rather severe restrictions imposed by civil service regulations, you were obviously limited in opening up opportunity. You had to convince people that they had to 
start at the bottom, but that there was greater opportunity for advancement that would appear. There were occasions when you could bring people aboard, people of unusual 
talent that you were able to recruit. You could put them on the rolls in a temporary status, and try to find some way down the road to place them in a permanent position. 
While you were attempting to recruit them, it was difficult. There was a civil service procedure. There were limitations imposed on the patronage side too. Most of 
the time they were circumvented in one way or another, by delay, by new lists, new examinations, and you had veterans' preference. Veterans' preference, of course, went a 
long way. Where you had two people, one a veteran and one a non-veteran with close to equal abilities, that veteran would get that job. There was no way you were going to 
by-pass veterans' preference. 
So all of that created situations in the area of patronage that really were somewhat restrictive. There were eligibility lists and they would expire, and you would have a new 
6
O'Brien --Interview XVI --3 
list. That did not totally inhibit patronage, but it was not just a simple matter. 
At the federal level, you're looking at decent jobs with pretty well-assured careers. The benefit side of it was generally overlooked and the benefit side was liberal. So the 
fellow might not have stature, but there are opportunities to move up. 
Like any federal entity, the federal civilian establishment contains a wide variety of jobs with step increases and creates a pretty decent opportunity for stable employment and 
good benefits at a relatively early age. I think it's more than comparable to the private sector. I've always had the feeling there are some significant advantages to federal 
employment. 
G: You also instituted a Post Office Department trainee program. 
O: Everything we were doing was to upgrade the department. Plus [we were] trying to come up with ideas that might improve the opportunity to move up. You could say on-the-job 
training, or, "Are you interested in participating in this program that could be helpful to you on the promotion side?" You were attempting to do that because you had a heavy 
turnover. There was a large number of new arrivals annually. It was an effort to upgrade the quality of new employees and improve the abilities of employees within the civil 
service structure for advancement in the service rather than, "Spend twenty years and you've put in your time." It had some impact. 
G: Did you have trouble getting funds from Congress for this training program? 
O: Yes. You had a slight opening for a diversion of funds for these programs, too. There was a little elbow room. We also found in stating it up front in hearings in presenting 
these programs that there was a good attitude. They in fact would be complimentary because they liked the idea that you were trying to do something, so the tendency was to 
try to help you in terms of the budget. 
G: Let me ask you to talk about the temporary employment situation, Christmas and summer jobs. 
O: Well, those were basically patronage. You would get requests, most of them not to the postmaster general or the headquarters, but at the local level. Postmasters had a lot of 
leeway putting people on. They dealt with their congressman or senator in that regard. Summer employment and particularly Christmas employment gave young people who 
were in school an opportunity to pick up some fairly significant money in a hurry by working sixteen, eighteen hours a day at a good pay level. So those were sought and it 
was a form of local patronage. You had this hiring authority locally to move that mail; it was imperative that it be moved, the Christmas mail. We wanted to proudly proclaim that, 
come hell or high water, you did get the mail delivered--particularly the Christmas mail. That did open up thousands of temporary jobs--summer replacements on vacation periods. 
There was some of that too. Many would go to their local post office and apply. Many 
7
O'Brien --Interview XVI --4 
more, however, would go to the local congressman and make his or her interest known and the congressman would invariably have a good relationship with the postmaster to 
accomplish it. Most of those people who picked up a few hundred dollars during Christmas accomplished that through political contact. 
G: Were these programs designed to hire underprivileged rather than--? 
O: No, it didn't work out that way. 
G: But was this the intent, do you think? 
O: You would proclaim this was an opportunity to hire people who were unemployed, who needed this work, but by the time you got through the political process, it wasn't 
necessarily true. There were any number of young people from middle income families who worked in post offices across this country at Christmas time. 
G: My impression is that this caused some negative publicity for John Gronouski, your predecessor. 
O: I don't remember that. 
G: Did you have any publicity problems with the--? 
O: I don't recall I did. 
G: Well, these jobs ended up going to middle class people and even sons and daughters of congressman and--O: 
I don't remember the sons and daughters of congressmen. The sons and daughters of congressmen generally wound up in some other congressman's office on the Hill in the 
summer and they still do. But on the post office side, it would be a matter of the congressman's inability to place them in a little better position than carrying mailbags at 
Christmas time. 
G: Did the unions object to this form of--? 
O: It was temporary. They weren't overly concerned about it. If you ever stretched it, I'm sure you would have had problems. If you decided that maybe you needed them in 
January or February too, there would have been a lot of problems, for obvious reasons. But it was a rather traditional procedure and was accepted. Reality was that you couldn't 
claim temporary Christmas employees were solely people who were in desperate financial circumstances. It just didn't work out that way. 
G: One of your first actions was to appoint an equal employment opportunity task force within the Postal Department to look at the hiring of blacks and see what could be done to 
8
O'Brien --Interview XVI --5 
increase the number of black employees. 
O: Yes. 
G: Can you describe this problem? 
O: We were aggressive in this area. I like to think we were in the forefront of this activity at the federal level. We recognized our responsibilities. You must remember that among 
these unions there were black unions. 
G: National Alliance of Postal Employees. 
O: Yes. 
G: Anything else on the hiring of minorities? 
O: No. 
G: Was there a problem with underemployment of minorities within the Post Office, the fact that they did seem to occupy lower grades? 
O: It would follow the pattern of federal employment. I don't think it was unique in the Post Office Department. If you started developing statistics, which the black unions of course 
did, you could identify that there wasn't any meaningful balance and recruiting ought to put heavy emphasis on blacks. 
My White House Fellow was black, and I placed him in a key role at my right arm on the staff. In fact, he was on the task force developing a new approach to the postal 
service and he became well-known throughout the postal service. He had requested to be my White House fellow when I was at the White House. Before he came aboard, I 
became postmaster general and--Ronnie Lee was his name--I told Ron, "You would have found it more interesting, I'm sure, to be in the White House, but I'm not going to be here 
so you can make your judgment." He chose to go to the Post Office. He found many interesting areas of involvement and activity in the Post Office Department and he became, 
in a short period of time, very expert and highly visible. He had a lot of direct communication with employees in general, employee unions and particularly black unions. 
G: Any other aspects of the White House Fellows Program? 
O: No. I didn't share the view of some, when it was established, who thought it was just a gimmick. It turned out to be a very worthwhile program. It was a marvelous opportunity 
for a young person. The head of the department would make a real effort to include that White House fellow in the day-to-day activities of the department. I certainly did, and I 
think it was a great experience for Ronnie Lee. 
9
O'Brien --Interview XVI --6 
G: You had a different one each year, is that right? 
O: He stayed with me. 
G: Let me ask you about the issue of curb versus door delivery. 
O: You would determine eligibility for door delivery. [We] found that there were probably over a million homes entitled to door delivery that were still getting curb delivery because 
of, again, the budget factor. These people were greatly disturbed, distraught. You have the right, but somehow or other it doesn't happen. There was delay in providing this 
service. The backlog built up significantly, and the entitlement was there. So you had to switch around the day-to-day operation of the Post Office I've described and say, "Now, 
can't we put some resources and focus on this and try to clean up that backlog?" 
G: Door delivery was considerably more expensive, I gather, because it was slower. 
O: Sure. It requires much more manpower. 
G: Was beautification a factor here, the fact that the mailboxes out on a post were not as--? 
O: Every once in a while you'd get letters saying they had neighbors who had these crazy mailboxes and they distorted the neighborhood. The fact is that door delivery is far more 
satisfactory than curb delivery. I can see you would be aggravated if you knew you were entitled to door delivery and it just didn't happen. But the expense factor of course was 
significant. 
G: You also experimented with places like Columbia, Maryland, the kiosks or central delivery point where people would go and--O: 
Yes. You could somewhat improve the situation. It was experimental; not awfully expensive either. It would be better than what currently existed. Columbia, Maryland, 
presented an ideal situation, because of this man-made town aspect, to try that out. 
G: Do you feel like more should have been done in terms of trying to centralize the pickup of mail? 
O: Yes, but you have to go back to square one, where you were way behind in research and development and modernization of facilities. You had these people who weren't getting 
door delivery. You tried the kiosks. The fact is that the only way you were going to have meaningful mail service, updated and adequate, was to modernize the service. How long 
could you go on using bandaids and adhesive tape or this or that gimmick? It was a dead end. You couldn't revise the entire concept of postal service and place that department in 
a position to move into the modern world, to have an ability to finance new facilities, to put monies into research, to take advantage of new developments and mechanization. It 
was very depressing because meanwhile, while you were trying to move into the next 
10
O'Brien --Interview XVI --7 
century, you were trying to have this archaic system function somehow on a day-to-day basis. 
You had the Chicago disaster and you were going to have that across the country at some level as the years went on. Meanwhile, the volume is dramatically increasing 
every year. It was unbelievable; 10, 20 per cent increase in mail volume and the Post Office Department is the same department it was thirty years earlier. There is no light at 
the end of this tunnel. So we had to act drastically. It had to be a complete change of approach and that was the frustrating aspect. 
You breathed a sigh of relief after Chicago. You had trouble with your trucks; there were all kinds of breakdowns. While you're trying to attend to all that you're 
thinking, what does it require to focus attention on the need to dismantle this existing service, close the door to it and move on into an entirely new era? 
G: One criticism of the Post Office Department at the time you moved over there was that in the past, the Post Office Department had advocated modernization and automation but 
had not, in fact, spent the funds that Congress had appropriated for that purpose anyway. 
O: I can speak definitively to that. The ability to innovate didn't exist within the department. There wasn't any creativity in that regard. The most appalling aspect, after you got a look 
at it for thirty to ninety days, was that there wasn't any R & D [research and development]. Therefore, whatever modest budget allocations were made in this area, the 
Post Office Department was bereft of competency to utilize that money in an effective manner. I can assure you that that money, if they were utilizing it in an effective manner, 
would not have made any great impact because it would have been so minor an amount of money. But where the department could be faulted was you haven't utilized the money, or 
where you have, it doesn't appear to be effective. You've got zip code and yet zip code can't be totally effective if you don't have the backup to fully utilize zip code. 
You don't have to be very bright to figure that you have a department that is a multibillion dollar department with seven hundred thousand employees trying to deliver 
sixty billion pieces of mail or whatever, and you don't have creative talent to work on development, in concert with the private sector, to move this department forward. The 
financial resources were limited, but as limited as they were, they weren't properly utilized in some instances. There was no focus on it. It wasn't even considered important enough 
to be on an assistant postmaster general level. 
G: You did initiate some contracts for research and development with several universities: Dartmouth, Michigan State, and SMU--such things as transportation difficulties, 
motivation, automation, things of this nature. Any recollections of these? 
O: Yes. There again, it was putting your toe in the water; recognizing the inadequacies that existed internally and trying to move to the private sector to utilize that expertise on a 
contractual basis to bolster our situation. As R & D went forward and was quickly 
11
O'Brien --Interview XVI --8 
expanded and placed at the level where it belonged, there was more and more private sector joint effort to compensate, at least in part, for loss of time over a long period. We 
were reaching out wherever we could to find any help to aid us in resolving our problems. Tape 1 of 2, Side 2 
G: [Were] these contracts successful, would you say? Did they provide you with the--? 
O: They were successful in what they agreed to provide, but you were faced with the onerous task of implementation. Some of these proposals and innovative programs were to a 
considerable extent stuck with the implementation aspect. To move your budget allocations in that area from ground zero to something reasonable was like climbing a 
mountain. The void was so great; you were not going to do it overnight. You weren't going to do it in a year or even in a few years, particularly if you had to divert your 
attention to maintain facilities and cope with the needs of facilities where you had no financial resources at all. You had to go out and enter into contracts under the gun. 
If you have a piece of land and the post office has asked for submissions of sites for a building, you can go to the local bank and be totally financed if you've gotten a 
long-term lease from the Post Office Department. You have an assured tenant that will pay. You haven't had to expend a great deal of your own financial resources and you have 
a nice thing going. Through that whole process, you know we don't have an alternative. Perhaps the alternative is that it's not John Smith, it's Joe Jones because the site is better. 
The net result is your bargaining position on the square foot costs is limited. You would talk to the Congress about this and the only answer was that you had to have 
substantial funds to do this structuring yourself. You were not going to get it, and you couldn't borrow. You couldn't go out in the marketplace, therefore you had to have 
independent status. One fundamental reason for independent status from day one was to finance these activities which you were absolutely unable to do as a department. 
G: Did it also mean that you would be able to have more suitable space because you could tailor the kind of buildings and location to your exact needs? 
O: Since postal independence, if you will, you've had facilities built, massive structures to handle bulk mail and process it. There has been an amount of modernization and a 
number of new facilities, all of which, if that action hadn't been taken would, in my judgment, still be non-existent. 
G: The press reported that early in your tenure as postmaster general you created an office to draw up a master plan for improving postal service in the immediate future and also for 
preparing for the long-range needs and challenges. Was this a task force or group that was different from the one that [Ira] Kapenstein--? 
O: Yes. The immediate future aspect included a good number of career postal people because you weren't talking about total change. This was sort of travelling two roads that 
12
O'Brien --Interview XVI --9 
paralleled, as I described: trying to attend to the problems of today, next week, next month and next year, and meanwhile trying to dismantle and start over again. 
G: Did big labor and railroads prevent you from transferring more mail service from railroads to trucks? 
O: There was a big to-do in that area. It was the declining rail situation. The over-the-road delivery system was growing. The trucking industry was replacing the declining railroads. 
It was a quest on the part of two major industries to determine how they could maximize their business with the Post Office Department, so they wound up in a competitive 
situation. 
G: Okay. One of the things that you pressed for was cycling the issuance of government checks. Do you recall this issue? 
O: Yes. We became part of an overall effort in that regard. I don't think it was confined totally to the Post Office Department, but it seems to me that bridged other departments, 
didn't it? 
G: Yes. 
O: I recall it. 
G: Well, Social Security and--O: 
Yes. 
G: Another effort of yours was directed at getting the government agencies and departments to use the zip codes. 
O: I vividly recall that. I couldn't believe what was happening to me. There we are in the private sector saying, "You've got to be good citizens," and you look over your shoulder 
and your own departments were not complying. That was an aggravation. Believe me, a lot of pressure was exerted and I utilized White House pressure in that regard, too. You 
have departments in your own administration failing to cooperate while you are busy with the mail users and the citizens in general, pleading. We got that corrected. 
G: The coast guard was the worst, apparently. 
O: I recall something--( Laughter) 
G: Why do you think that was? 
O: I don't know. 
13
O'Brien --Interview XVI --10 
G: Did the President get directly involved in that? 
O: I believe there were some kind of orders issued. There was some clearly defined procedure that made it known to all that they were to comply and to comply forthwith, 
because they weren't listening to me very much. (Laughter) 
G: Okay. You were concerned with providing overnight delivery of mail. This was a goal that you had--O: 
Yes. That was the stick-out in the delivery process. You found your focus on that overnight delivery aspect--the price paid for failure to maintain a level of improvement 
over a long period of time. London and Paris were able to accomplish same day delivery. It just was not acceptable that you couldn't accomplish overnight delivery. That was the 
focal point of every activity you were engaged in, and you would fight the statistical battle. You would have an evaluation made. The statistics were quite impressive, but not 
quite believable as far as the general public was concerned. I'm not suggesting they were doctored, but if you were accomplishing 90 per cent-plus overnight delivery that probably 
wasn't a bad record. When you're talking about billions of pieces of mail, up to 10 per cent of that not delivered on a timely basis is a crisis. 
This was compounded by the attitude of some of the members of Congress who felt that it was great publicity for them when they responded to some constituent 
complaining. Send out a hundred letters and check out how rapidly they were delivered. Then come back with their statistics and berate the Postal Service. This congressional 
activity was grossly exaggerated in terms of failure to accomplish overnight delivery. 
There again the service was an easy target. I remember some Congressman, I think it was Ted Weiss, deciding to go on horseback around his district. Well, of course, 
you're subject to national ridicule. I remember Mel Laird, whom I had a friendly relationship with, calling me one day and saying, "I'm going back to Wisconsin"--this was 
when he was in the House--" and I've had some constituent complaints about the postal service so I'm going to kick the hell out of you. I just wanted to tell you up front." I said, 
"I understand. Be my guest." 
There weren't many people making favorable comments regarding postal service. You'd have people with the occasional story of remarkable delivery that was made in some 
crisis situation. Once in a while articles would appear that would make the Postal Service look like it was expected to be, a dedicated entity of public service, but you were fair 
game. 
With all of your problems, under the circumstances, postal delivery in this country was pretty darn good. It really was. And is. But boy, it doesn't take much, a 
misdelivered handful of letters and some citizen screaming to his congressman and you have a story of deplorable postal service. The amazing part of it all, in everything we've 
been talking about, was that somehow you were able to deliver 50 per cent of the mail in 
14
O'Brien --Interview XVI --11 
the world on a reasonably timely basis. That is the other side of the coin. 
G: Did you have some sort of built-in mechanism within the department for monitoring the time it took to deliver--? 
O: Yes. 
G: What sort of system was that? 
O: There were experts in that area who worked on that. They would do these checks and surveys and there was a high degree of accountability. This wasn't something you did 
sporadically when you were put under the gun; this was something that was ongoing. You tried to monitor delivery service in great detail nationally. There was obviously a 
considerable dependence upon the people who were part of this reporting system. They were indeed reporting accurately in all aspects. Our numbers would be presentable and far 
removed from a considerable public perception that we were inadequate. Actually, that was part of the frustration of it all. It never was going to be what it should be with the 
system that existed. 
One per cent failure isn't acceptable. I waited two weeks for a letter that was important to me that was mailed on Fifth Avenue to Third Avenue. It was received 
yesterday. I could be calling my congressman, screaming and hollering about postal service, but since I've been in this office we've had less than a half a dozen instances of 
misdelivery. It could be that I am a subtenant, therefore, the carrier of the moment might have a problem determining just where I'm located. Those things occur, but because of 
the sensitivity, errors could be built up far beyond reality and you paid the price in terms of public perception. 
By the same token, we would get reams of mail approving of service. They would take the pains to drop you a note and express their appreciation for the service. It wasn't 
all one-sided. But that was not of much help to you if you wanted to put those together periodically and call a press conference. The press might sit and yawn and say, "So 
what?" That wasn't the real story. The story was your failures, as it always is. 
Walking to the office this morning I saw a sign on a bus: "New York's Detective Force, The Greatest in the World," with the union's name. I thought they spend money to 
promote themselves and only the record will show whether they are the greatest in the world. Every individual makes his or her determination in that regard. The Postal 
Service's "Neither Rain nor Snow" became the credo of the Postal Service--that army of over seven hundred thousand. From my observations, there was a high degree of 
dedication, a high degree of acceptance of responsibility. Thousands of them were subject in their own area of activity to the same frustrations I was subject to. It was tough and 
they were berated as I was berated as the postmaster general. There was overall a good spirit and a great sense of pride, I found, as I toured the country. 
15
O'Brien --Interview XVI --12 
G: Did the emphasis on prompt overnight deliveries hurt local deliveries? 
O: I don't think so. 
G: Another thing that you did early on was to increase the postal window hours. 
O: We did that particularly in urban areas. I don't remember specifically what the hours were generally, but it didn't provide an opportunity for service for a working person. We tried 
to stagger some of the hours, have "X" number of windows open to provide opportunity for people after working hours. This is a public service. How can you provide that 
service if you don't have some provision for people who are in no position to go to the post office in the normal working hours? There should be Saturday provisions, as well as 
extra hours. That was important because there was a lot of comment, and rightly so, about the inability of people to get to a post office during its normal open hours. 
G: Another thing you did was to restore six-day parcel post delivery service. 
O: Yes. I found it necessary to mandate restoration, and that got us into some conflicts with the unions. But we got it done. 
G: The whole parcel post issue was something that required a good deal of legislative work. 
O: Yes. 
G: The opponents felt that your proposed legislation would cut into the business of the REA Express. 
O: That was a brawl. It was a bloodbath, because the REA had very effective lobbying. I remember two [committee members] specifically I didn't identify who were front and 
center flailing away to preserve the business of REA. Any attempt to improve our service that could have some cost factor with the "private sector" they were going to fight. It was 
a mean fight and it involved back room activities. 
G: Really? Any specific recollections of these back room--? 
O: I've been in politics all my life and I've been in a lot of back rooms, but I've never seen anything as sleazy as that was. 
G: How did you become aware of these? 
O: It wasn't hard. The information came to us and we had been able to identify the people on the Hill who were involved. In a couple of instances their staff people were involved on a 
full-time basis. The good guys, who were the overwhelming majority, aren't focusing their attention on a problem of this nature. 
16
O'Brien --Interview XVI --13 
G: Oddly enough, UPS, I guess the biggest competitor, came out in favor of the bill. Why was that? 
O: Actually, what [we] were doing in expanding this service was not going to be an overriding negative factor to the private sector. One of the problems of the Postal Service 
over the years was its continuing attempt to preserve its turf. There were a number of occasions when private entities would be established. In every instance, they would focus 
on the cream, the aspect of service that was financially rewarding. None of these organizations were prepared to provide overall service in competition with the Postal 
Service. They would pick off some of the better aspects of service and take it on as their own. The only way to describe it is to take the cream and leave the rest with us. That 
happened and we would vigorously oppose it. The Postal Service is in the position to provide equal or better service at a lower rate and it's highly competitive. 
G: Before the measure was passed there was a provision put in that the Post Office Department would have to hire any private carrier employee who was displaced by this 
new capability. 
O: Yes, that was part of getting the legislation. I don't recall that we moved very vigorously in that area. But that was--G: 
During this discussion over this measure you cited the example of your wife trying to mail a package and she was unable to mail because it didn't match the size requirements. 
O: That was about as complex as anything you've ever run into, the size requirements. There were limitations imposed there that were favorable to the private sector. 
G: Where did the unions stand on this issue? 
O: The unions saw opportunity for increased employment, so they would stand aside. I don't remember it impacted on the unions. 
G: Mail-order companies also supported the bill. 
O: Yes. There was a service aspect that would [be] helpful to them. 
G: What was the effect of the bill on REA Express? 
O: It would have taken a period of time to determine whether there was any adverse effect. It was a matter of greed on the part of an organization that wanted to retain everything. 
They had no interest in the public service aspect. What disturbed me was the cast of characters. They were at a level that I frankly didn't enjoy having any involvement with. 
G: Was it simply a question of observing the interest groups operating out of a congressional office or was there something more overt than that? 
17
O'Brien --Interview XVI --14 
O: It was the level of the effort they expended to block us. It was at a level of sleaziness that was despicable. 
G: Was it negative campaigning or was it--? 
O: From our position we were convinced it involved expenditures of monies in an illegal manner. Let's put it that way. 
G: Offering bribes and such? 
O: I'll just leave it there. 
G: Now, in late May there was a controversy over a bulletin that you issued to all of the Postal Service decrying delays and rudeness and urging the entire Postal Department to 
provide the best possible service. Apparently some of the employees were defensive about this. 
O: Yes, they were. It was in response to an increasing number of complaints about basic service. They were not localized in one area. It seemed to take on a national scope. 
There was an inordinate number of them so you had to conclude that this was not just crank mail. It concerned us to the point where we let the whole department know about 
our concerns. I would make demands as the postmaster general to straighten up and fly right. The postmasters and local supervisors across the country were going to be held 
responsible and I wasn't going to tolerate this. It seemed to be escalating, treating patrons in an uncivil manner and that sort of thing. 
[I] should've anticipated there would be some adverse reaction. You would have union leaders contacting Dick [Richard J.] Murphy saying, "This is unfair," and "This 
spotlights something that doesn't exist and the Postmaster General is overreacting." I didn't mind that reaction because at least [I] had gotten their attention. 
G: Did the public appreciate this sort of effort to--? 
O: It was a responsibility to the public. I don't know whether there was any discernible reaction. 
G: Did it have a positive effect on the--? 
O: I believe it did. Supervision in my judgment had become lax and it was totally unacceptable that a clerk or a carrier should not fulfill responsibilities by being, at a 
minimum, courteous to a patron. You wouldn't accept that procedure in the private sector and certainly it wasn't acceptable to us. 
G: I have a note here that you were booed at Louisville at the postal clerks convention. Was 
18
O'Brien --Interview XVI --15 
this a result--? 
O: I don't recall. Was that in the same time frame? 
G: Yes. 
O: Well, it probably was then. 
G: It was that summer, at least. Okay. Let me ask you about efforts to hire the handicapped. 
O: We made a special effort in that area. It was all part of our attempt to focus on responsibilities that were inherent, whether we were talking about minorities or we were 
talking about summer employment. Hiring the handicapped was something that we could move aggressively into and take a lead position. 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 1 
G: Was this something that was unique to the Post Office Department or was it an administration-wide [effort]? 
O: I know we didn't borrow it from someone else. It was something we initiated on our own. 
G: Do you think there was sufficient attention given to hiring women? Or was the Post Office Department a male-dominated--? 
O: It was male-dominated. At that stage in the mid-and late 1960s I couldn't say that the appropriate attention was being paid. 
G: I have a note that you laid down the law to trucking firms that had contracts with the Post Office, insisting that they hire black drivers. Do you recall that? 
O: That was part of our effort in terms of minorities; we felt that we had a handle there. We were customers and we were significant in that regard; therefore we did have an 
opportunity and we seized it. 
G: How did they respond? 
O: Reasonably well. They were forced to show some meaningful response or they would be in continuing trouble with us. That would have an economic impact that would be 
significant to them. We had something going for us in terms of being able to press in that area. 
G: Were any contracts ever canceled? 
O: What we found was that there was a degree of response that certainly justified the effort in 
19
O'Brien --Interview XVI --16 
the first instance. That was the extent of it. 
G: Now you had, I'm sure, been to cabinet meetings before you became a member of the cabinet. 
O: I'd been to all of them. 
G: As the head of congressional relations. 
O: Yes. It was automatic on all cabinet agendas, [in] both [the] Kennedy and Johnson periods, that I would be present. All that changed in the cabinet meetings was that instead 
of taking my usual seat along the wall, I moved up to the table. But I played the same role. There was very little discussion regarding the Postal Service at cabinet meetings 
before I was postmaster general or while I was postmaster general. Most of it would be initiated by me in my effort to push our cause, and it would receive the same general 
reaction that you always got when you talked about the Post Office Department. When I sat along the wall awaiting my turn to discuss the legislative agenda, it really never 
focused on postal problems, so I couldn't expect to sharply change that attitude. I had a chance to make my points. Although I sat in the postmaster general's chair at the cabinet 
table, when my turn came I was still in the role of discussing the legislative program--its progress or lack of it. 
G: Tell me how the cabinet was used, how it functioned in 1966. 
O: There was more attention directed to agendas for cabinet meetings. At some stage Bob Kintner came in as a coordinator or secretary of the cabinet. There were efforts made to 
have the cabinet members report in detail regarding their departments in advance of cabinet meetings. Tight agendas were developed that were all-inclusive in terms of what 
should be on an agenda. There was a conscious effort on the part of the President to make the cabinet meetings as meaningful as possible. There was an opportunity in that 
context for each cabinet member to have his moment. I would say overall that the meetings, therefore, were more structured as time went on. 
G: Really? Was there less give and take, do you think? 
O: There was a closer adherence to an agenda, less drifting from an agenda, therefore, you may conclude it was more businesslike. That continued until I left the cabinet. I found 
that the cabinet meetings were reasonably productive. 
G: Really? 
O: What are they meant to accomplish, really? When everything is said and done, the President needn't call his cabinet to discuss major decisions. It gave each cabinet member 
an opportunity to have a better understanding, a recognition of the problems in other departments or agencies. You felt involved and the President's objective was to utilize the 
20
O'Brien --Interview XVI --17 
cabinet members as fully as possible in the promotion of the Great Society program. 
In the earlier years, cabinet meetings were not called on a regular basis in the Kennedy period. They would be called at the discretion of the President without any 
established timetable and an agenda would be developed through telephone conversations. President Kennedy, in my judgment, was not convinced that cabinet meetings were very 
productive. Consequently he didn't have them on a regular basis. In the Johnson period they became more structured and more effort [was] expended in developing agendas. 
G: Was it an opportunity for candid discussion of issues? 
O: There was no lack of candor, but all of us recognized that you weren't to go off on your own particular area of interest to an inordinate degree. It was all well and good if you 
were expressing a concern or making a statement in the context of seeking help. We would appreciate having them focus their attention on being helpful and that would be the 
President's thrust. 
The President moved through an agenda well and would state in emphatic terms his distress that progress wasn't more forthcoming. He would question members of the 
cabinet on recent visits to the Hill and what they had experienced there. He would question them on delays or lack of progress at the committee level or any level of the 
legislative process. A good deal of the Johnson cabinet meetings were focused on the Great Society program and legislative progress. Foreign policy and problems of that 
nature would be referred to, and there would be a brief statement by [Robert] McNamara or Rusk or whoever. The cabinet meeting was primarily an opportunity for the President 
to restate he expected full cooperation with me, with the White House, with the administration as a whole. It was everyone's program no matter what element was on the 
front burner at the moment. It was not only expected but demanded that this mutual effort be always present. You would be hard put to it to leave that cabinet meeting and not 
understand what he meant. 
G: One of your memoranda reflects a report on the travels of cabinet members in helping Democratic candidates who were up for election in the fall of 1966, and clearly a feeling 
on your part that they were not on the road enough, that their travels were ill-timed, or they were going abroad or doing things that were not helpful to Democrats who needed 
help. Let me ask you to go into this in some detail and talk about how--O: 
It was the situation at that time that caused me to do that. I was very concerned that there didn't seem to be an understanding that the time and effort were to be expended to 
enhance our position in terms of an upcoming off-year election. I became so exercised about it I decided that I would put it on the table and spotlight it. It wasn't something that 
was occurring because people purposely wanted to avoid it. But some travel was not at all productive in terms of what we were trying to accomplish politically and it wasn't well 
understood. 
21
O'Brien --Interview XVI --18 
It was my responsibility as the department head to go to the clerks convention or dedicate a new post office somewhere, which is non-partisan. But you should utilize that 
time to the fullest by seeing if you couldn't make some political impact. Do a little promotion of the Great Society program or the President's Vietnam position. This seemed 
to be overlooked in some of the domestic travel. Oftentimes a cabinet member would be speaking to some business group and the text of the speech would be appropriate, but he 
seemed to neglect thrusts on behalf of the President and the administration and the program. I thought it was a failure to fully utilize these opportunities. So I focused on it. 
G: The context was the congressional elections, though--the fact that not the President but members of Congress and the Senate were up for re-election. Was part of the strategy to 
boost your supporters? 
O: Oh, certainly. I probably approached it a little differently than some of the cabinet members. Now you take an Orville Freeman or a Stu Udall. With their political 
background they were sensitive to all this and they knew how to maximize, how to take advantage of an opportunity. But there were others, and you didn't fault them because 
they just didn't understand. They didn't have sensitivity to this. In addition, there seemed to be travel on the part of some out of the country at a time when I thought if they were 
traveling they ought to be focusing domestically. The bottom line was: "Listen, you have a handful of fellows who have some stature by virtue of position. If they go to Cleveland, 
Ohio, or Louisville, Kentucky, or any city in this country they are going to have media attention. They should have a press conference. They should incorporate in their 
comments matters that might be of some help in terms of the off-year election and not just confine themselves to some dissertation on a particular subject that they are experts in. 
It's pretty obvious, pretty straightforward. So let's get together and try to coordinate." 
There's another aspect of it. If you found three cabinet members were in Cleveland within sixty days of each other, maybe that wasn't the right approach. But there was some 
utilization of cabinet members and visibility that should be helpful and it was up to them to make sure that they were making contributions. 
G: Did your emphasis here adjust the situation any? 
O: The time factor eludes me--it might have been later than 1966--but at some stage the President asked me to have a meeting of the cabinet in my office at the Post Office 
Department, excluding the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State. I called the meeting at the direction of the President. We met at the Post Office Department and we 
kicked this around. It might have been at a later date that we really got that far into it. I think it probably was, as Vietnam escalated. I do recall the context of utilizing your 
position to the fullest to the advantage of the administration and the President; [it] was a continuing subject. It might have been at a much later time that it really got to the point 
where we sat and made certain commitments to exchange information on schedules and time frames and to be more aggressive in moving around the country. 
22
O'Brien --Interview XVI --19 
G: Why were McNamara and Rusk excused? 
O: The sensitivity of the two departments and the political context. 
G: Okay. Now, there was a lot of speculation in 1966 that you were going to take over chairmanship of the Democratic National Committee after the elections, before the 
elections, that whole year. 
O: Yes, there was speculation. I think it was simply a matter of assumptions that were made on the part of some press people that it seemed like a natural or obvious step. I don't 
recall that it was more than that. I guess people would say, "O'Brien's there; it would be logical for him to be national chairman." I don't recall it going beyond that. 
There was a time when the postmaster general also was national chairman. I believe that in addition to [James] Farley in Truman's time, there was that tradition for a 
period. But a long period of time had elapsed when that had not been the case. By virtue of holding both positions, of course, the Democratic chairman attended cabinet meetings, 
and there was some talk about including the national chairman at cabinet meetings. That was never formalized. I remember a conversation such as that on two or three occasions, 
but I don't recall that we ever got beyond discussing it briefly. 
G: Actually, at this point so much of the patronage was handled through John Macy and the President's Club was the chief financial arm of the party. Was the DNC on the decline? 
O: The mistake that had been made on prior occasions we continued. I think there was a failure on our part and that failure would have to be shared by the President--both 
Kennedy and Johnson, particularly probably in Kennedy's time--a failure to focus on the national committee and ensure it retained the stature as the party entity that it should have. 
There was neglect to that. On the patronage side, it drifted along through the Johnson period. Macy would gather the information, develop the list, check out the 
recommendations, but he was not a decision-maker. It was not in the political context. John would await instructions and implement whatever instructions he got from the White 
House. 
The President's Club was reasonably active. There were people in and out of the DNC on staff level from time to time. There were attempts now and then to bolster the 
DNC. There were people who went there and attempted to develop programs, registration programs or relationships with county and state chairmen. But the reality was 
[that] there was little attention from the Oval Office and from the immediate staff. I plead guilty because I had been longer involved in national politics than anybody on the staff, 
and I should have been more aggressive in trying to ensure that the national committee was at an appropriate level. I'll have to say that I did not focus on it either and I've 
regretted that neglect. The significance of the national committee is apt to be higher when the party is out than when the party is in. Once the party is in, all flows from the White 
House, and that includes the politics. It's in the nature of things; consequently, the 
23
O'Brien --Interview XVI --20 
national committee can be neglected. 
Additionally, in my own experience as national chairman, you had very little support from the Congress. It was always troublesome to me to be coping constantly with 
a serious debt without any real vehicle to raise significant money. Yet the Congress would have annual fund-raisers where they would tap everybody available across the country for 
the House and Senate campaign committees. The national committee was not party to that. You were limited to simply being invited to the dinner. As an entity you didn't have 
much by way of resources to do any meaningful fund raising. The end result, obviously, was that the debt grew larger; the effort to keep the committee active and appropriately 
staffed became more difficult. 
When the party took over the White House you were in a considerably different position. You were in a position to achieve some financial support, but you were not in a 
position to deliver to people because the party is now the in-party and the White House runs the show. 
To sum up, and I guess I've mentioned it before, John Bailey was a top-level pro with a lifetime of political experience, a strong leader at the state level in Connecticut and 
really ran the show. He was left by us, thoughtlessly, and we would think of John only when there was something negative to be announced and John would have the 
responsibility to do it. We would hold everything of a plus nature within the White House. That left John sort of hanging. 
(Interruption) 
G: Let's talk about your political activities in 1966. First, let me ask you to describe in some detail the political aspects of your work that year. 
O: It was an off-year election and my role was pretty much the role that others in the cabinet would have. I did a fair amount of traveling and speaking, and I would try to incorporate 
in those travels meetings with the party leaders in whatever area of the country I was in to get an update on attitudes, reactions to the President and his activities. I reduced it to 
writing and advised the President on my findings. I would get invitations because I was postmaster general and then I would get invitations because of my political activities. 
Those speaking requests would for the most part be from members of Congress who were having a fund-raising dinner or a testimonial dinner. When they occurred, you tried to get 
a feel of political opinion, public opinion. 
So during 1966 I engaged in that activity. It was the beginning of an unraveling of support for the President's Vietnam policy. My first exposure to this softening was in 
California. In California Democrats generally were very liberal and would be more inclined to react more quickly than Democrats in other parts of the country. My effort 
was to be as supportive as I could to the President in any comments I made at press conferences or speeches, in addition to the pointing with pride to the Great Society 
24
O'Brien --Interview XVI --21 
program and his record of enactment. 
Over those months, it was becoming apparent that the negative factor was growing. There were supporters who were becoming concerned, disturbed, in some 
instances distraught, and worried about their political futures in terms of continuing to be avowed Vietnam supporters. I believe the congressman's name was [Jeffery] Cohelan. 
That was an early stop and I had been advised in advance that Cohelan had a real contest on his hands and he was moving away from supporting the President. So I took it upon 
myself to incorporate in my speech, to a large dinner audience that was honoring Cohelan, my support for the President's Vietnam policy and the need to support him on a continuing 
basis. Cohelan refrained from any suggestion of support for the policy and perhaps more than that, gave some peripheral indications of personal opposition. 
So there was a sensitivity in what I had to say. On that same trip I found that Congressman [John] McFall, which was my next stop, didn't share Cohelan's view. In 
fact, he was disturbed that Cohelan had taken this route. He told me his support continued strong and that I should not be inhibited at the function. I would be speaking in 
his behalf, and be as strong as I wanted to be in that area. 
G: What would they say when they were talking? 
O: They felt we should get [out] of Vietnam, that this was a loser, that it was a bottomless pit, and the President didn't seem to be making a sufficient effort to bring it to a resolution. 
It reflected a desire to see this go away, to see it end. But it hadn't erupted to the point where pundits and others would say the Democratic support for the President in foreign 
policy had significantly deteriorated. You have to remember this goes from relatively early 1966 through the off-year election, and the disintegration of support was more 
pronounced into 1967 and 1968. But it was a situation I perceived for the first time. Perhaps it was the first time I was sufficiently involved in the upcoming off-year election 
to have serious discussions with old friends or political activists. There was enough there in those early travels in 1966 for me to be candid with the President in memoing him as to 
where I had been, what I had been doing, what my findings were concerning Vietnam. 
Coinciding with that, the President was becoming more concerned about possible erosion of support. We were constantly trying to provide statements and information to 
the Congress for utilization in the Congressional Record or elsewhere. The President became more concerned as time went on, even in 1966, when he would learn about party 
leaders or members of Congress questioning the policy. He would try to blunt that, urge people to speak to those members, urge them to avoid anything negative and hang in 
there. 
So that was the climate of 1966, and the reason that I underscore it is that was the first spark and the first alert. 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 2 
25
O'Brien --Interview XVI --22 
G: Were these political leaders that you had known in the 1960 campaign? 
O: Yes. They were not only people I had known in the 1960 campaign, but people I was dealing with on a regular basis, members of Congress. By the close of this activity, I had 
traveled extensively and had met with many political leaders, political activists. I gave the President a report on November 7 and stated that during my campaign travels I had been 
in forty-two congressional districts and made appearances for sixty-seven candidates for the Senate, House and governorships. Then I attached the detailed report of every 
congressional district I was in and every candidate that I had been involved with. I also, that same week, gave him my evaluation of the election and my predictions concerning it 
district by district. 
I stated, "It would appear we will have a net loss of thirty-two seats in the House." We had a net loss of some forty-seven seats in the House. I went on to say, "It appears 
we will have a net loss of one seat in the Senate." I believe we had four. And then I said, "It would appear we will have a net loss of four governorships," and we had a net loss of 
about eight. So while I predicted losses, it was a more serious setback than I had concluded it would be. 
As early as February of 1966, a congressman by the name of John Dow was expressing soft views on Vietnam and he was a real dove. But I had looked upon John at 
that stage as being an exception to the rule. In fact, in my report to the President I pointed out that Dow was dominated by his wife and he's a peculiar fellow anyway. So I 
obviously felt John was one-of-a-kind. It didn't penetrate. 
In that same tour I had gone into the district of Congressman Jim [James] Hanley in Upstate New York. Jim was a solid, lifelong Democrat of Irish-American heritage and 
there was no indication that Jim had any problems with the Vietnam policy. That underscored that perhaps Dow was the single exception. Then I went on to another 
district, Joe [Joseph] Resnick's, and spoke at his function and confined my report to the President to the contest he was engaged in, seeking re-election. I went on to discuss the 
Roosevelt stamp, which I mention only because that's the way you tied in some of these things--the issue of the Roosevelt stamp with the Roosevelt family. It was an impressive 
ceremony and I really was able to move into the politics of the area by virtue of being there to launch the stamp. 
Further into February, into New Jersey, in talking about Bob [Robert] Meyner and reviewing the congressional seats, I suggested to the President that four or five seats 
posed serious problems. All of the problems had to do with the candidate, the strength of his opposition, the nature of the district, not national issues and certainly Vietnam wasn't a 
factor. It was more a reference to Bob Meyner, the former governor, being a candidate against Senator [Clifford] Case and my view that he was the only potential candidate who 
could give him a tough race. 
26
O'Brien --Interview XVI --23 
I came to New York in March. I was in Newark for a testimonial dinner for Congressman Paul Krebs and I tied it into breaking ground for the new FDR postal 
installation in Manhattan. I make a reference there to Vietnam but I haven't, other than in my first report, run into anyone who seems to be overly concerned regarding the policy. I 
pointed out to the President I had felt my remarks had been well-received. So we're still comfortable and there is no concern, really. Then in New York I had lunch with the 
publishers and editors of the New York Times. I noted to the President that in a two-hour Q & A, the luncheon focused primarily on Vietnam policy and the New York Times. It 
was apparent that while there wasn't unanimity of view at the New York Times regarding the Vietnam policy, there were a number of people at that luncheon who were becoming 
distressed and disturbed with Vietnam. At the luncheon you had [Harrison] Salisbury and [Harding F.] Bancroft and [Turner] Catledge and Cliff Daniel and [Lester] Markel and 
[Charles] Merz and [John B.] Oakes and [Daniel] Schwarz and Bill [William] Shannon. So you're really talking to the top echelon. As I said, a significant portion of the two 
hours was devoted to Vietnam. It wasn't mean or bitter, but it was clear that these fellows were not at all convinced regarding the policy, or they were certainly not pleased with, as 
they saw it, a lack of progress. I reported I didn't detect any degree of warmth toward the administration at this meeting. 
Interestingly enough, I had a follow-up luncheon with the editors of Newsweek. They were younger than the New York Times group. They focused more on Bobby 
Kennedy's activities regarding New York. They did, as the New York Times suggested, indicate they felt we were going to have a tough time in November, but they were not 
suggesting that we deserved it. The tone of the Times had been "You're going to have a tough time in November and you've got it coming to you." 
Then I mentioned the contrast between the two groups. And I say, "the Times, an older group, obviously impressed with its role in our society and in its history; Newsweek, 
young, vigorous, interested but with no show of ego or indication of power to mold public opinion." 
So we go into March of that year and other than Congressman Dow and the climate of that lunch at the New York Times, it hasn't hit you, particularly. 
G: In addition to that element that was, I guess, more represented in California than elsewhere, of a dovish nature, did you find an element as you went around the country that 
felt that the administration was not doing enough militarily? 
O: To put it in a little different context, I didn't have people saying, "Why doesn't he escalate the war?" They were saying, "Why can't he win the war?" But they weren't urging 
escalation, only negotiations. 
In March I was the speaker at the Indiana Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner, an audience of six thousand. It was the largest dinner in the history of Indiana. Both 
senators were there; [Vance] Hartke came by and the Governor introduced me. Hartke 
27
O'Brien --Interview XVI --24 
was worried about being booed because he had indicated some opposition, apparently locally, to some of our activities or programs. I wasn't clear and the memo isn't clear as to 
exactly why he was concerned, but he was greeted by polite applause, I reported to the President, far less enthusiastic than greeted [Birch] Bayh. He made the pitch that he 
always supported the New Frontier and Great Society and he referred to the President as a great president. But then he suggested that all this progress could be destroyed by a 
nuclear holocaust, and made references to setbacks in Vietnam and how Vietnam was bleeding America and diverting our attention from our social problems. Then I say, 
"However, I followed Hartke and I had rebuttal time. I went strongly into the Vietnam aspect." It had become so sensitive with Hartke that he suggested that he and I have 
lunch back in Washington. He wanted to talk in detail about his concerns. He hoped that we had not concluded he'd left the reservation, but obviously he was well on his way out 
the exit door. Birch stated in his remarks that the nation must meet the challenge and accept its responsibilities, internationally as well as here at home, but I noted that 
otherwise, references to our foreign policy were avoided. So you're getting a touch of it now. You have a senator who has started to move out. 
That brought me in April into California and the Jeff Cohelan business I made reference to. Again, I made a strong pitch on Vietnam policy and I note that the audience 
reaction was extremely cool to my comments. Cohelan was a liberal Democrat who was off the reservation. That was in Oakland. Then in San Francisco I had an off-the-record 
luncheon with sixty Democratic leaders in northern California. I opened the meeting to questions, and I have to report to the President, "I found expressions of deep concern on 
Vietnam and a strong tendency to move away from your position." As with Jeff Cohelan, several of the people present at this luncheon obviously wanted us out of Vietnam now 
regardless of conditions. That probably summed up what was occurring, certainly in that part of the country. You have sixty Democratic leaders who can let their hair down. I 
know them all and they wouldn't consider me an adversary, but felt obviously that this was an opportunity for them, off-the-record and privately, to express their views candidly. 
And they did. So there you are. 
Then I get to Congressman [John] McFall in Stockton where I am going to address his testimonial dinner. He indicated his concern relative to Cohelan's handling of 
the dinner and his campaign, and told me to feel free to discuss Vietnam in any terms I cared to. To summarize, this is April, 1966. Now this encompasses observations from 
some New York-New Jersey based political functions, postal functions and in-depth meetings with the New York Times and Newsweek. In this report I say, "The extent and 
depth of concern regarding our Vietnam position in northern California surprised me." I was told this was the case in California, but I felt it was probably for the most part 
confined to southern California rather than the North, which is more basic[ ally] Democratic. Then I point out that, "I campaigned California intensively in 1959 and 1960 
and am intimately acquainted with just about every political leader and activist in the state. If these findings of mine are accurate . . . this certainly means political trouble in the near 
future," and that was April, 1966. 
28
O'Brien --Interview XVI --25 
There were other stops into Oklahoma in May. I did some post office dedications there. And--not to get into a lot of detail--I met with the President's Club members. I 
addressed the Chamber of Commerce and I talked to a number of party leaders. [I] found that, interestingly enough, for the first time in eight years the Democratic Party was 
reasonably united in the state and there was real optimism about the governorship as well as re-electing the congressional delegation. But I do say, "While one would expect strong 
support for your Vietnam position in Oklahoma, I do recall a poll recently indicating a fallout of support. I endeavored to determine this in individual conversations, and I 
believe there is a degree of uncertainty and concern. I nevertheless did not have it forcibly presented to me, as was the case recently in California." 
Then apparently in a response to a presidential request in mid-1966, I talked to Jack [John] Gilligan who had been quoted in a Scripps-Howard piece by Ted Knap. I 
don't have the quotes, but apparently we were concerned in the White House regarding Jack's comments. I sat down with him and he emphasized his dislike of the situation that 
existed. He said, "When the draft is breathing down the necks of the sons of many, it's very difficult to maintain support for this cause." He says that Taft was repeatedly 
demanding of Gilligan details of his position on Vietnam while not advocating any position himself. He reviewed with me a tentative proposal involving the July 4 recess, namely that 
nine House members with outstanding war records, six Democrats and three Republicans, be sent by the Speaker to Vietnam to report back that our troops were in good spirits, no 
segment of the South Vietnamese desirous that we leave, anxious we stay, and that sort of thing. Those he suggested, in addition to himself, were Congressman [Teno] Roncallio, 
[James] Corman, [Thomas] McGrath, [William] Hathaway, [John] Murphy and Republicans [Tim] Carter, [Edward] Gurney and Bill [William] Bray. I asked him what 
assurances he had the Republicans would join in something of this nature. He said he felt confident about Carter and was waiting further word on Gurney and Bray. I concluded 
that Gilligan was sufficiently supportive of the Vietnam policy at that time. I dismissed the quote attributed to him, which brought about this meeting in the first instance, and 
attributed it to the fact that he had a difficult re-election coming up. 
But there were others who were surfacing here and there that we were observing. One was Lester Wolff, Congressman Wolff. I said, which is a fairly accurate appraisal of 
Lester, "He's a pleasant but unrealistic fellow." He probably was a realistic fellow but I didn't note it. I tried to point out to him that comments of a relatively insignificant nature 
could be blown out of proportion when they appear in print, but he was not comfortable with the discussion. I let it go at that. 
Then Lee Hamilton said, "Vietnam could wreck us but I really don't detect any deep resentment presently in my district. I do, however, believe the President's position 
has deteriorated back home; I can't cite specifics." But he had no personal concerns politically. He was pretty relaxed about it all. 
Then I summarize, "The ebb and flow that is bound to take place with Vietnam will of course in turn affect these members in varying degrees." So I guess, as you reflect 
29
O'Brien --Interview XVI --26 
back on it, we're in mid-1966 and beginning to detect it. I guess you wouldn't call it an unraveling at that point but a new development. Fellows were not only privately 
expressing concern; they were beginning to give public indications of their concerns, and we're talking about Democrats. 
G: Do you think it depended to any extent on who they were running against if they had--? 
O: In a couple of instances, as the memos reflect, the difficulty of the contest had something to do with it. For example, one of these candidates, I notice, pointed out his opponent 
was a right-wing Republican who was well-financed. Obviously, in political terms, he didn't have to be concerned about Vietnam particularly because his opponent wasn't going 
to make a big issue of getting out of Vietnam. So he was more relaxed about it. Others who were in serious contests and probably felt personally concerned about Vietnam were 
clearly either softening their positions, avoiding comments or even edging toward negative comments to enhance their re-election possibilities. 
G: To what extent can you read public opinion on Vietnam as a cause of the outcome of the 1966 off-year elections? 
O: I think [it was] a factor, but not overridingly. We really were faced with the pendulum swing from a major 1964 victory; political history will prove that pretty well--that 
occurred often. Eisenhower suffered a significant loss in one off-year election, comparable to this one. It certainly was not a major issue that contributed to the losses. 
It hadn't reached that level of discussion or national concern, not at all. It was beginning to percolate. 
G: In addition to your memos to the President, did you talk to him about it in person? 
O: Yes. We had discussions. The President was always intrigued with this sort of thing. He was a political animal. As in 1964 when I was in a different role, observing the 
organizational aspects of the campaign, he was most anxious to get the quickest, the earliest reports he could of my findings and views. And he would absorb it. We had 
occasions throughout this to make references individually. I'm sure the memo I quote referring to my conversation with Gilligan and Lee Hamilton was in that context. I didn't 
receive some written directive from the President. It flowed from a conversation I had with him and his expression of concern about some of the comments that had been 
brought to his attention that were being made by nominal, staunch Democratic supporters on the Hill. He had the benefit for what it was worth--isolated as it might be and 
spotty--of observations I had been making that encompassed a portion of the country. 
In June I made a trip to California again, and I spoke at Jim Corman's testimonial dinner. Now I'm getting the feel of southern California. I state, "He has a stiff contest; 
Vietnam is a political problem to him." But I said, "More than that, he's a member of the Judiciary Committee, and that had gotten him into some local difficulties on housing 
legislation." He was well supported and there was a big dinner, but he stated to me that 
30
O'Brien --Interview XVI --27 
Vietnam was posing a problem to him. 
Then I went to Town Hall in Los Angeles and addressed a thousand people at an award luncheon. The emphasis of my speech was again Vietnam. I point out--maybe it 
was the nature of the audience--that in the half hour Q & A following my remarks, most of the questions were on the economy and the budget. And then I say, "This is a 
conservative business group and on the basis of audience reaction, supports you on Vietnam." Really, their reservations went to federal spending; they weren't really that 
concerned about Vietnam. 
Otis Chandler at the Los Angeles Times had a reception for me with his top staff and we had an extensive Q & A. Their focus was more on [Ronald] Reagan and his 
progress. It's interesting that in June of 1966 I say, "The current view of the staff, the Los Angeles Times top staff, which includes political writers, two of them I have known for 
years, is that Reagan has done awfully well." Repeatedly they mentioned that he had gotten to the middle of [the] road without alienating the right, and that his performances 
generally were better than could be anticipated. They were particularly impressed with Reagan's visit to Eisenhower and the reports on his appearance before the National Press 
Club. They mentioned they felt [Governor Edmund "Pat"] Brown had been around too long. Their observation of Reagan at that stage is interesting. 
G: Prophetic. 
O: Yes, in view of what has occurred since. But I don't indicate that that luncheon brought forward any meaningful comments regarding Vietnam. Apparently the luncheon stayed 
pretty much on Reagan and California affairs and the governorship. 
Then I met with Pat Brown and Jess Unruh, Carmen Warschaw and Gene [Eugene] Wyman. Pat expressed concern that he hadn't heard from the President and 
about belatedly receiving a telegram congratulating him on his primary victory. Jess Unruh went on to say he was going to support Pat whether Pat wants his support or not. 
And Warschaw was going to fight vigorously to be state chairman. All of this was local politics, state politics. That was about it on that trip. 
Then I get to an interesting memo in September 1966; a letter from Bill Bundy is worth reflecting on. I had sent a memo to Bob Komer. I don't recall the specifics in the 
memo but he makes reference, "Bob Komer passed your memo of August 22 over to me with the request that I send you documentation on North Vietnamese and Chinese 
Communist references to the dissent on Vietnam, which will provide convincing proof that this dissent is supporting the enemy's will to fight." Obviously what I was reaching for 
was evidence that comments being made by some of our friends regarding the Vietnam policy were being utilized by our enemies. Therefore our friends should be made not only 
aware of this but told that they were making a contribution unwittingly to the enemy. He points out that they went through all recent broadcasts. Most of them were straight 
reporting and proved nothing beyond the obvious fact that the communists are happy to 
31
O'Brien --Interview XVI --28 
exploit such grist for their propaganda mills. "Enclosed--" and I don't have them--" are a few quotations which seem to go beyond this. Before this material is used in the manner 
you suggest I recommend that careful consideration be given to the two-edged nature of this material. While some of the material would be effective and convincing, the officials 
quoted are all Democratic senators." 
It's very interesting to reflect back on that, because it's another piece of evidence of our rising concerns about support and loyalty to the President from fellow Democrats. 
Now you're going to deride these people. You find that to utilize this for the purpose I had in mind is probably worthless. All you're doing is pointing with disdain to fellow 
Democrats. 
G: So, what was the answer? 
O: Obviously, we didn't pursue it. I don't have any indication we did and that was a little bit of an off-the-wall idea anyway, but at least we checked it out. I think it was 
interesting--along the lines of the off-year election and efforts to be helpful--the September memo from Bob Kintner to me. He points out that he had reviewed the travel schedule of 
the cabinet members and other presidential appointees and, as I indicated, "They are disappointing. With the exception of Secretary Udall and Secretary Freeman, travel by 
other cabinet members is very limited in terms of being helpful between now and November 8. That same holds true for sub-cabinet members." He goes on to say, "I am 
sure you have noticed that a number of the travel schedules show trips out of the country during this crucial period. Appearances at events within the United States will not be 
meaningful in terms of what we hope to accomplish in the coming weeks." Then he discusses the need to develop two lists, one showing federal officials, cabinet and 
otherwise, whose travel schedules can be filled in in a meaningful way, and the other showing the congressional districts and states in which we want to concentrate. All that 
information was available and had been available to cabinet members and it was a matter of whether they were utilizing it or not. He said, "You know, of course, where the crucial 
areas are. Concerning the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and others who might be considered off-limits for partisan appearances, there is no reason why they 
cannot make an impact in important areas around the country in speaking from non-partisan platforms and giving non-partisan talks. Secretary Rusk, in particular, did 
this very well in 1964." It hadn't been up to our hopes and expectations, the cabinet and sub-cabinet participation in the off-year election, and there is a belated attempt to restate it 
at that time, which we followed through on for whatever it was worth. 
There is no point in restating the statistics of the losses we suffered that year. I've suggested that I don't relate this in any meaningful way to Vietnam concerns, that it was 
more of the swing of the pendulum, the historic switch that occurs in an off-year off a big win. There might have been a little of Vietnam in it because the losses on the basis of my 
projections were somewhat higher than I had projected. I had said that thirty-two House seats would be lost, forty-seven were. In any event, that was the politics of 1966 and my 
personal involvement. 
32
O'Brien --Interview XVI --29 
End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview XVI 
33
    [ Part 17: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--29 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XVII*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XVII 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XVII, 12/ 17/ 86, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
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2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
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researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-28 
4
INTERVIEW XVII 
DATE: December 17, 1986 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 1 
G: Of course [in 1966] you had big majorities: sixty-eight Democrats, thirty-two Republicans in the Senate; two hundred ninety-three Democrats, one hundred forty Republicans in the 
House. I have a note that early in 1966, the [Senate] Democratic Steering Committee appointed four assistant whips, all liberals, to assist Russell Long. Was this a measure 
designed to dilute Long's influence? 
O: I don't recall it as that. I think it was a move that was accepted by Long, whether with reluctance or not I don't remember. But clearly, it established a team that leaned toward 
our program strongly and was committed to it. So that would be helpful to us during that year. 
G: How supportive was Long during this period? 
O: He was reasonably or maybe you could even term it quite supportive. You always evaluate in the context of the part of the country he came from and some of the basic 
positions that officeholders from Louisiana would hold, whether it was on oil or perhaps some elements of civil rights. But Long was basically supportive. 
I don't recall whether it was this year of 1966 or at a later time but Long's loyalty to the party was such that when he was chairman of the Senate Campaign Committee--in a 
position to be the source of some very significant fund-raising--he made sure that those funds were distributed to senatorial candidates, incumbents or otherwise, on a very fair 
and equitable basis. I never saw any indications that he would adjust his support on the basis of the senator's position, conservative, moderate, or liberal. He was very 
evenhanded in that regard and I think that's an example of what you could cite regarding Long legislatively. He was pretty evenhanded and he wasn't disruptive. 
G: He replaced Harry Byrd, [Sr.], as chairman of the Finance Committee. How did this change the Finance Committee? Byrd had been there for so long. 
O: We would look upon that at that time as potentially a plus. Long could not be described as other than a moderate, and perhaps a conservative. But Byrd was ultraconservative 
and had posed problems for us as committee chairman in the past. Long taking over would be construed by us at that time as a plus; if significantly so, time would tell. 
5
O'Brien --Interview XVII --2 
G: This was the first one hundred billion dollar plus-budget, I guess, that was submitted to Congress. Was there any pressure to try to reduce it below one hundred billion? 
O: Well, do you mean pressure internally, in the executive branch? 
G: Yes. 
O: [There was an] effort to hold it down, but like every budget exercise it was substantially beyond that figure in its initial stage. There was a lot of paring down but not sufficient to 
get it below that so-called magic figure. 
G: Yes. You had a tax increase that passed, I guess to help pay for the Vietnam War and perhaps ward off inflation. 
O: Actually, there was an emerging indication of inflation. It posed a problem, but it was the Vietnam War cost that motivated the effort to increase taxes. It was becoming more and 
more costly all the time. We tried to avoid direct tax increase on individuals by playing the periphery in terms of withholding or postponing some tax consequences and trying to 
find revenue in some areas that affected the automobile industry and other industries. Interestingly enough, at that point I don't recall a great wave of anti-Vietnam sentiment in 
the Congress. There was what seems to me now to have been rather a reasonable acceptance of this tax proposal, recognizing that inherently it was due to the escalation of 
the cost of the war. 
G: I think the Republicans did express some concern that this proposal was not sufficient to deal with the threat of inflation. 
O: Yes. There was expression of that. When you're stating that there was a need for additional revenue, it would be our tendency to point to problems of inflation and try to 
downplay as best you could the need for additional revenue due to Vietnam. That would be just a matter of strategy. The Republicans did focus on the inflation side. 
G: How did you get the automobile manufacturers to support you on this one? 
O: Joe [Henry] Fowler and others played a significant role in that. I don't recall that I had direct contact with the representatives in the industry. They were put into place through 
the department. There was quite a good relationship. It was a reasonable understanding that this was not that big a deal. There was a willingness to be helpful, a recognition of 
the need for additional revenue. Of course we were also escalating corporate tax payments and other things. But that made an impact, having the representatives of the 
industry who were directly affected by a portion of this proposal step forward and embrace it. That was helpful in lobbying for the bill. 
G: Now, there were several attempts to add amendments--well, in fact Winston Prouty proposed an amendment for extending the social security minimum [payment to those 
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O'Brien --Interview XVII --3 
over] age seventy and also Vance Hartke [offered] an amendment to exempt local telephone service from the excise tax restoration. [Editor's note: Prouty's amendment 
extended minimum social security payments to people seventy or older who had not been eligible before.] 
O: Yes. Prouty seized the opportunity. That was really an opportunity to hang something onto the bill where there was staunch advocacy. The Hartke side of it, to try to be helpful 
to local telephone services, would indicate this was not an effort he was expending particularly in the national interest but more reflecting the pressures upon him. 
G: Were there a lot of telephone interests in Indiana or--? 
O: Obviously, there had to be significant interests that brought them to undertake this effort. Hartke made quite an issue of this matter and worked arduously to bring it about. The 
Hartke amendment was adopted at one stage and then dropped in conference. 
G: Any recollections on how it first passed in the Senate and then was defeated in conference? 
O: An amendment such as that, with really a single member of the Senate devoting tremendous effort, is a type that is sometimes adopted on courtesy, with every intention of 
dropping it in conference. This is an example. Hartke could satisfy his constituents while at the same time decrying the result of the conference and be in reasonably good shape. 
G: Yes. How about the social security issue? Now, here was something that was essentially a more liberal measure than the one in the administration position. 
O: Any improvement or increase in social security benefits was generally difficult to oppose. Of course that's what's happened to the social security program over the years. As 
originally conceived, it was a program that had stability. You needn't be concerned about its financing. In recent years we've had all this concern expressed. Go back over the 
history of social security from its inception and look at the myriad of add-ons. Some of those add-ons are almost extending beyond the concept. They've been costly and I guess 
none of us paid that much attention to the ultimate costs or impact on the system. 
But this Prouty amendment would be a valid, generally accepted proposal. On the merits, it isn't quite like some of the other social security amendments. The only point is 
that any time you were in the position of trying to block increased benefits, you were cast in the role of an ogre. It's pretty hard to quarrel inordinately with Prouty when he wanted 
to extend it. It didn't belong in this bill, but there again, you seize the opportunity. 
The package was enacted in reasonably good shape in terms of the initial proposal, with minimal rancor, which is rather surprising in a tax bill. 
G: Should there have been more of a tax increase, though? 
7
O'Brien --Interview XVII --4 
O: Probably so. In this instance, our feeling was there was the need for additional revenue and under the circumstances, inflation and Vietnam, perhaps you could have handled 
revenue beyond the proposal. But there again, you make your decision on what's doable or what's reasonable. 
G: Was there a fear that perhaps a larger tax increase might have caused Congress to insist on paring back some of the domestic programs? 
O: That's what you would have come to. Whether they would have succeeded or not, that's another thing. But obviously, you would have had far more debate and far greater effort 
than you have in a proposal of this nature. In any tax proposal, you say, "Okay, you need the additional revenue, but how about expenditures? Have you taken a hard look on the 
expenditure side to see if we can't achieve some savings and limit the increased taxes?" So that's the way it flows in about every tax bill that I recall. It's far easier to be appealing to 
Congress to reduce taxes than to increase taxes. 
G: You also had a measure raising the debt limit, the ceiling on it--O: 
When didn't we? 
(Laughter) 
G: --the annual--O: 
That's the annual exercise, we've discussed before. There were two activities you engaged in annually that you didn't look forward to with glee. That was the debt ceiling and 
foreign aid. The debt ceiling afforded an opportunity for the Republicans to play some games and cause you difficulties and embarrassments. But you did not overreact to all of 
that. You had to go through this exercise, which was generally prolonged, and roll calls on the debt ceiling increase were always very tenuous. But in the final analysis, there was 
going to be a debt ceiling increase. It was inevitable that that would be the end result, so you understood that. But you still had to go through the exercise, and it was not a 
pleasant one. 
G: I have a note that only one Republican, Joe Martin, voted with you on that measure. 
O: I don't recall that. I don't recall Joe Martin[ 's vote]. He's the only one that voted--? 
G: Voted with you, with the administration. 
O: I don't know why Joe Martin voted with us. But if you'll look at the roll calls on debt ceiling, you would find Republican support minimal, almost nonexistent. This was part of 
the inevitability. What prompted Joe in that instance, I don't know. 
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O'Brien --Interview XVII --5 
G: You also lost a number of Democrats on this, too, perhaps ninety-three, ninety-four Democrats--O: 
Yes. You would find a number of Democrats off the reservation, if you go back over roll calls over the years. It was understood pretty much by us. This is one where several of 
those would be available if needed, but they'd like to take a walk and establish a record. Our feeling was, "Be our guest, as long as we get the job done." We wouldn't get overly 
exercised about a significant fall-off on our side on a debt ceiling vote. 
G: Was there any correlation between how safe a representative's district was and--? 
O: If you analyze the votes you'd find yes, because if a Democrat felt the need to get this vote on the record for balance, that was politically justified on the basis of the make-up of his 
district and his problems in re-election. 
G: Was there any regional pattern? 
O: I don't recall that. 
G: Did liberals tend to vote with you more than conservatives? 
O: Probably, but there again, I don't think it had anything to do with region. It certainly didn't have anything to do with a person's political philosophy. This is one of those votes 
on the moderate or conservative side that give him an element of balance, which was a free shot for him. No harm was done; the debt ceiling was raised and the White House 
was understanding. 
G: Now, you also had a bill that suspended the investment tax credit, again, another measure to combat inflationary pressure and reduce interest rates. 
O: Well, the motivation was the specter of inflation; this was an attempt to contain [it]. That was the motivating factor throughout. 
G: This also had a rider in the Senate that exempted the proposed NFL-AFL football merger from the antitrust laws. Now, tell me about that one. 
O: I think the commissioner of the NFL would be better to give you the answers. (Laughter) The NFL enjoyed an excellent relationship with the Congress. Some of it was, however, 
on the basis of NFL expansion--where the NFL might locate in the future and the constant quest on the part of some members for a franchise location in their state. This was 
particularly significant on the Senate side but it applied to both sides. Over the course of time, expansion was effectively played off against legislation, to the benefit of the NFL. 
This was an internal matter in the Congress. The league operated directly with the Congress. They could pick their spots and they effectively utilized this leverage that they 
had. 
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O'Brien --Interview XVII --6 
G: Do you think perhaps--? 
O: There wouldn't be the New Orleans Saints today if there hadn't been congressional activity. 
G: Do you think they were holding out some of these franchises in order to get the legislation passed or was it--? 
O: It was a matter of trying to avoid decisions on franchises, because if you had a half a dozen to a dozen possible sites and that involved ten or twelve states, you were in a pretty 
good position. It ultimately got to a decision that involved Hale Boggs as the majority leader [of the House] and Senator Russell Long and others, where that vote was not going 
to be taken unless the NFL made a favorable decision regarding the New Orleans franchise application. But the vote was held back until the decision was assured. 
G: Did the White House get involved in things like that or did you just sit on the sidelines and--? 
O: It would be difficult for the White House--for me, personally--to try to convince Hale Boggs or Russell Long in a matter involving the NFL, if overridingly their interest was 
securing a franchise in New Orleans. The NFL did not succeed in getting legislation passed in the last couple of years but came close to it. There were inordinate efforts on 
behalf of the NFL in the Senate by senators who are hopeful that their states will secure an NFL expansion franchise. It's unique. It isn't part of White House lobbying on legislation. 
G: Besides Louisiana, were there other states that--? 
O: Yes, there were. They exist to this day. I think one that comes to mind is Arizona--Phoenix--and I think if you look at the recent record in the Senate over the last 
couple of years, you'll find great interest in NFL legislation on the part of the senators from Arizona. I don't recall the last expansion of the NFL but there's always the potential 
for further expansion. That expansion can be extremely meaningful to these people, as much as anything else I can think of. 
G: Do you think that the motivation from the senators' point of view was that this was something to boost the economy of their state or was it a way to help an important 
constituent? 
O: Your approach would be that it's a boost to the economy of the state. It's a reaction to public interest, which has been fanned by media. There is an aroused public, the story of 
pride and great interest in sports. The owners would not be the overriding issue. In some cases you might have two, three or four applicants for the same franchise. The argument 
would be, "This is helpful to the economy of my state." The overriding aspect would be the interest of the public. That all adds up to a spotlight on your activities and your effort. 
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O'Brien --Interview XVII --7 
G: Okay. Business interests opposed this suspending the investment tax credit. It seems that there had been some opposition from business to enacting the tax credit to begin with, and 
now they wanted to retain it. Did this represent an increased understanding of how the measure--? 
O: Well, I don't know whether it's the same interests in both cases, the same people, you see--G: 
Oh, I see. 
O: --because while business interests generally expressed opposition, there were those in the business community who were willing to accept this as long as it was on a temporary basis 
in "the national interest." That was about what it amounted to. There wasn't an overriding, across-the-board, business support on this, for obvious reasons. 
G: An amendment was accepted to continue the 7 per cent tax credit on air and water pollution control. 
O: Yes, that was beginning to surface. The understanding of the problem of air and water pollution was beginning to be a matter of discussion. It grew tremendously in later years, 
but that was really one of the first examples of an expression of concern. 
G: Did the White House play in a role in this? 
O: I think our position was if we could accomplish the basic objective, a little jiggling here and there would not be overly harmful. 
G: There was also an amendment to exempt railway passenger and freight cars from this. This seems to be a special interest. 
O: Yes, that's really what it was. Interestingly, there could have been a myriad of special interest efforts in this area but that one seemed to surface. 
G: Okay. Another bill where you had even more extraneous amendments was the foreign investors law that was set up to provide a more equitable tax treatment of foreign 
investments in the United States. 
O: Yes. Before we get on to that, it's worth noting that, again, you have an example in investment credit of accepting an amendment by one body and then having it dropped in 
conference. Advocates can make a decent record for themselves in a special-interest situation. You've made the record and then it's dropped in conference. You're in 
reasonably good shape with your constituents. 
G: Were the conference committee votes generally not made public or--? 
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O'Brien --Interview XVII --8 
O: Often you had agreements that were verbalized or by show of hands. You didn't have the spotlight on the conference. 
G: Excuse me. As long as we're on this, as a rule during this period, did the conference committees reflect the prevailing opinion of each body on a particular issue? Were they 
usually representative? 
O: Generally, the majority of the House and Senate membership of a conference would reflect the administration view. You would have a goodly number of staunch advocates and 
supporters of the administration. So the compromises in conference would, as a rule, give the administration a partial success or complete success. You look to a conference as 
improving your situation rather than further reducing your position. If you got the bill to conference and resolved the House and Senate versions, in that process you generally 
came out with a better bill than you had at least in one of the bodies at the outset. 
G: Did you usually have some input into the selection of conference committee members? 
O: The selection of conference committee members followed a pattern; it followed seniority on the respective committees. You had in the leaders of the conference, House and 
Senate, supporters. Otherwise the bill wouldn't be there, because they had supported the legislation on the floor. They would be activists in the conference and would therefore 
provide leadership. That added up to a reasonably good situation for us. 
There were times [when there was] an impasse in conferences where we would be in communication with members of the conference regarding compromise. Not 
clandestinely, but on a confidential basis, [we would receive] information as [to] the progress in the conference and what was entailed in the negotiations. We would be aware 
of it; [it] would be brought to our attention, or through our own processes we would be aware of it on a timely basis. You would have recesses and adjournments in conferences 
so that we could negotiate with our friends. So we were very much a part of the confer-ence. 
G: Did you ever fear the conference committee making modifications that would cause the legislation to have to go back for a vote? 
O: You always feared that, and you could have an impasse in conference, a failure to agree. More often, you would have the long delays in conference. At no time during the process 
were you devoid of support in the conference. But you could run into great difficulties, and obviously there were times that occurred. That was part of the process. But once 
you're in conference, you're reasonably confident that you're going to come out with something acceptable from your perspective. 
G: The conference committee members were named by the leadership in each house? 
O: In reality, by the chairmen and ranking minority members of the committees. 
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O'Brien --Interview XVII --9 
O: There would be majority-minority representation. Occasionally one or two less senior people would be on the conference, but the key members of the conference would be key 
members of the committee, key in the legislation. You would have a strong voice. 
G: Okay. Let's look at the foreign investors law. This bill acquired the name "the Christmas tree bill" because of all the tax gifts to various lobbying groups. 
O: Yes. This gave an opportunity to decorate the tree. I recall this provided an occasion for Senator Long to get his presidential financing bill, the dollar check-off, which we all felt 
very strongly about. It was Russell Long's initiative anyway. That probably was as controversial as any amendment. 
G: Tell me your own thoughts on that measure. 
O: I felt strongly about it. I had felt for a long time that the process of financing campaigns not be confined to the presidency but to federal office and cried out for a procedure that 
would eliminate the influence of the fat cats. I oversimplified my advocacy by saying we have one man, one vote and we add to that one dollar and you'll have the democratic 
process in place as it should be. 
Tape 1 of 1, Side 2 
G: [You were saying that] this was a matter you discussed often and at inordinate length. 
O: Inordinate length, back to the Kennedy days, and Russell Long became wedded to this concept. He was almost alone for a long time in his advocacy. The period that we're 
discussing I assume must have been the period--I hope I'm correct on this--when I received a call from the President in Boston where I was scheduled to speak at a function. 
I believe the President was on a trip outside the country. 
The call came in and they reached me at the hotel. Somehow he had learned that a vote on the dollar check-off was in the offing momentarily. The result of the conversation 
was that I canceled my speech and immediately came back to Washington to the Hill. I have to conclude as I recall all this that this must have been the occasion when Russell 
Long made his attempt on the dollar check-off as an amendment on this bill because that was 1966. I was then postmaster general [but] I still had this responsibility legislatively. 
The dollar check-off was going to be simple, and was ultimately, at some point, compromised in two significant areas. One--and I was party to it--it was compromised 
with Ev Dirksen so that you had an option--to go to federal financing or private-sector financing. That was the Republican compromise. Then it was further compromised by the 
AFL-CIO, who insisted that COPE continue its fund-raising procedures as it had in the past. And in order to achieve that, it was further compromised that the long-established 
business entities could have the same exemption. Nevertheless, the very enactment of it, I 
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O'Brien --Interview XVII --10 
thought, was the beginning of a process that would have a fantastic impact on presidential elections. Hopefully, although the Congress would not consider it although we advocated 
it, it would ultimately affect House and Senate elections, in other words, the federal level. Thus, the voluntary check-off on an individual's income tax return evolved. 
I remember the first year they boxed the check-off; it came toward the end of the tax return or somewhere in the return. Then it was changed to the front of the return on 
the first page. There was an excellent public response, to a degree where there were millions and millions of dollars in the coffers of the election committee. A procedure was 
established as to distribution. There was provision for third parties. The desired result of this dream many of us shared has not been realized, due particularly to the advent of 
PACs. I must say that's one of the great disappointments in terms of my political involvement. 
But anyway, back to Long. I have never forgotten leaving Boston and canceling a dinner to get to the Hill to be engaged in this effort on the part of Long, the dollar 
check-off. 
G: What was LBJ's position on this? 
O: Strongly supportive. And that's why that day I refer to impacted on him tremendously and impacted on me. 
G: Is this unusual, given the fact that he seems to have garnered so much more money than [Barry] Goldwater did in 1964? 
O: If you look at elections over the years, you would find that invariably Republicans raised significantly more money in a presidential election than Democrats. But as far as I was 
concerned, and I think as far as the President was concerned, that was beside the point because he had not suffered financially in the 1964 election. But if you're talking about the 
process, it would be hard for anybody looking at this in the public interest not to conclude that this was the best hope to improve the election process. The inclusion of the fat cat 
contributor in invitations to White House functions, becoming a member of the President's Club, having sessions once in a while with the President in the White House, gave them an 
edge over everyone else. It was nauseating to me, but it was part of the process. And I truly believed that the dollar check-off would eliminate that. 
G: Were you yourself involved in the President's Club and--? 
O: No. 
G: Okay. There was also an individual retirement program that was proposed which the administration opposed, allowing a self-employed person to set up a retirement fund. Do 
you recall this initiative? 
14
O'Brien --Interview XVII --11 
O: There were so many proposals in this bill, so many special interest angles. What you tried to do is just keep focusing on the basic proposal and hope that you could retain a 
significant portion of it. You sort of ran out of gas in terms of trying to keep abreast of every special interest amendment that was being tossed around, particularly as I recall, on 
the Senate side. The end result was basically the adoption of most of the original proposal. 
G: Why do you think that all of these different lobbyists hit upon this particular measure? 
O: I don't know how many thousands of Americans lived and worked overseas, but I'm talking about the individuals now. The bankers, the corporations, everybody was on top 
of this thing, screaming and hollering. But then there was a strong element of individual interest, and there were some very significant tax breaks--and they continued on after this 
bill--that I suppose initially were in the law because it was considered somewhat of a sacrifice to work overseas. But meanwhile, there were any number of people overseas 
who were paying limited taxes or getting all kinds of fringe benefits that weren't available to others. 
This stirred it up, because suddenly with this advocacy you were encroaching upon the preserves of not only the banks and the corporations who had achieved great tax 
advantage in foreign investment, but individual Americans by the thousands had certain privileges. This caused a great deal of controversy. You had advocates all over the 
Congress trying to take care of these significant special interest groups. At the same time, most of these people wanted the record to show that they had voted for the legislation in 
the final analysis. They wanted [to have] their cake and eat it, which is not unusual. In this instance a lot of special privilege advocacy emerged that we didn't perceive, at least to 
the degree that it occurred. 
Beyond all that, you had Russell Long's amendment. 
G: Well, there was apparently also a fear that foreigners who held deposits in banks in this country if the law were changed would withdraw their funds. 
O: Yes, there was that argument. That's the argument you'd make if you were trying to preserve the benefits of some special interest group. You have to come up with a position 
that seems to have merit. That was the argument, there would be a mass exodus of monies held here by foreigners. 
G: Were there any other interest groups that you can identify that were attempting to--? 
O: You did have these major special interest groups, along with individuals who were working or in business overseas. I think that was somewhat a surprise factor which 
underscored the benefits they enjoyed. 
Then there was an effort, right to the end, to kill Long's campaign proposal. There 
15
O'Brien --Interview XVII --12 
was a renewal of the Republican-southern Democratic coalition. Their argument was that this would enhance the opportunity for third parties or fourth parties. 
G: Well, has it or will it do so in the future, do you think? 
O: It was advocated by Long. Secondly, the staunch supporter in conference of the proposal was Wilbur Mills. So while you say this is a liberal view of the election process, here you 
had a couple of moderates who were in the forefront. 
G: This measure passed the House under a closed rule, as did a lot of other measures during this session. Let me ask you to explain what a closed rule was and why they were used in 
this situation. 
O: The record will show that Wilbur Mills insisted on closed rules. A closed rule means it's not subject to amendment. It's up or down. Wilbur, would be very sensitive to head 
counts. He would go to the Rules Committee when he was assured our head count clearly showed this legislation would pass. Then he'd go for the closed rule. Wilbur's contention 
was that legislation emanating from the Ways and Means Committee was intricate, subject to amendments and disruptions. He was not going to allow it to become a matter of 
amendment on the floor. He would prefer to wait rather than to get involved in something like that. So in the Ways and Means Committee you had the Wilbur Mills closed rule 
procedure. 
G: Was that the only committee that tended to--? 
O: No, there were others at times. But certainly you're far better off if you can get a closed rule than an open rule if you're going to the floor. 
G: And that's just a question of the Rules Committee granting a rule? 
O: The Rules Committee granting the rule, yes. 
G: Did your office become involved in these questions at all? 
O: Sure. 
G: Did you? Give me an example. 
O: An example would be any bill that came out of the Ways and Means Committee. We would discuss it with the leadership, and the leadership would discuss it with the members 
of the Rules Committee. We would discuss it with members of the Rules Committee. We were very much involved. And when Mills went to the Rules Committee, you can be sure 
that it was a fait accompli. I haven't followed the process. But it was not unusual to have a closed rule in those days. This was before the so-called reform of the House. Seniority 
prevailed; committee chairmen had great power, and the Ways and Means Committee was 
16
O'Brien --Interview XVII --13 
one of the two major committees in the House of Representatives. The Appropriations Committee was the other. 
G: Okay, you had an unsuccessful civil rights bill in 1966. Let me ask you to discuss that. 
O: We ran into a barrage on that. It was unsuccessful and it probably was our greatest setback in that session. I think, after our great civil rights success, we assumed the door 
was wide open. And we were hit with a fire storm from the outset on the Republican side, and as time went on, the opposition broadened. 
G: You had large majorities in the House and the Senate. Why was this measure defeated when, for example, the 1965 Voting Rights Act had passed? 
O: You're talking about housing. You're really talking about real estate interests. You're talking about an awful lot at stake in terms of financial interests. It sort of extended 
beyond basic civil rights. It brought in another dimension. There were any number of opponents of this proposal that perhaps were not necessarily motivated because they were 
anti-civil rights. As they saw it, this legislation was an incursion by the federal government into an area in which they didn't feel the federal government belonged. You 
had people like [Charles] Mathias trying to come up with creative amendments that might help resolve the problem. 
There were other stakes, and they surfaced. They had support from the anti-civil rights people who still had a significant base in the Congress. Now you have this 
combination of circumstances. 
G: How critical was Dirksen's opposition? 
O: I don't know as I'd term it critical but it was significant. 
G: Yes. What did the administration do to try to win Dirksen over? 
O: The President became personally involved in trying to win Dirksen over. He tried mightily to change Dirksen's position and failed. It's important to note that Senator Dirksen did not 
think about it over a period of time and conclude that he would not support it. He made a point of announcing his opposition right at the outset. He took his position publicly, 
perhaps because he envisioned that there'd be efforts down the road and he wasn't going to wait to debate it. 
G: Were you involved in any of the--? 
O: Direct negotiations? 
G: --negotiations? 
17
O'Brien --Interview XVII --14 
O: It reached the point where it became Lyndon Johnson-Ev Dirksen. You're talking about the Dirksen side? 
G: Yes. 
O: I had preliminary discussions with Dirksen and it was clear that Dirksen was not amenable to negotiations. Now, he was--G: 
Was it because of real estate--? 
O: While Ev Dirksen could move with civil rights, and did, at this point you'd have to conclude that there were other elements of opposition that were important to Dirksen. 
While we were able to invoke cloture, make history, not too long before all this, we found we couldn't get it done [now]. 
G: Yes. Well, one thing in the House measure, here you had a combination of liberals and southern Democrats defeating efforts to weaken the bill--southern Democrats presumably 
because they felt like they could generate more opposition to a strong bill then they could a weak bill later on. 
O: This isn't really that different if you go back over the history of the civil rights legislative struggle. You had liberals who came close to derailing the whole procedure in the House 
in the Judiciary Committee. Their opposition [was] based on what they perceived to be the weakness of what the administration was prepared to accept. We've gone through all 
of that--how far we had to reach in order to get a reasonable bill out of the House Judiciary Committee in the first instance. Now you have the same forces. We have a 
replay to some extent. We have this added dimension that you're dealing with housing; you're dealing with real estate. In a cloture vote in the Senate, you found, I guess, a dozen 
senators who had voted for cloture in the civil rights struggle, but who voted against cloture in 1966. And I must say it was a surprise to us. 
G: Do you think the administration was as committed to this bill as it had been to the 1964 and 1965 bills? 
O: Yes, I do. All of us involved in this from the President on down felt this was a natural extension of civil rights legislation. This was an important step to flesh out civil rights 
legislation. It's hard now even to structure why we weren't able to prevail and accomplish the same thing as we had in the first place. 
You have to go back to Dirksen. That his opposition was the single element is probably an exaggeration because you see all of this House activity, too. But Dirksen was 
reflecting the disarray in the House and the cloture vote in the Senate. There was an additional element beyond basic civil rights that added enough to the mix to foul up the 
waters. 
18
O'Brien --Interview XVII --15 
G: The other provisions of the bill were barring racial discrimination in jury selection, empowering the attorney general to initiate desegregation suits, and protecting civil rights 
workers, as well as a floor amendment to make it a crime to travel in interstate commerce with the intent of inciting a riot, something that was later enacted I guess in 1968. Any 
reflections on these other provisions? 
O: Other than to say that when you take the provisions as a whole and look at the entire package, we probably should have anticipated controversy to a greater extent than we did 
at the outset. 
G: Well, were some of these provisions added as a result of the violence against civil rights workers in the South? 
O: Sure. This wasn't going down easy for some people who had still refused to cave in this area. 
G: What was the effect of the Watts riot on this legislation then? 
O: It became a topic of considerable discussion on the Hill. 
G: Did it? 
O: It was seized upon by the opposition to try to muddy the waters. 
G: What did they say about it? 
(Interruption) 
We were talking about the effect of the Watts riot on the civil rights discussions, informal discussions in 1966. 
O: It had a tendency to revive some of the old arguments and open some of the sores of people who still were committed to containing civil rights even though they had failed to 
stop enactment. 
To what degree it impacted on the ultimate failure of the legislation, I don't know. Probably not to a great degree because those people who would make an issue of Watts 
were in their traditional positions in any event. So I don't think it increased opposition. There were other elements introduced that were not elements that we had to cope with a 
couple of years earlier, and that went to housing. 
G: Yes. Did you ever meet with LBJ on this legislation and talk to him? 
O: Oh, yes. 
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O'Brien --Interview XVII --16 
G: Any recollections on this? 
O: Yes, he was very troubled because of his commitment, his advocacy. And I think he was troubled also because he, as the rest of us, had not envisioned this. He was particularly 
frustrated that he was unable to move Ev Dirksen. 
G: Did he in any way retaliate against Dirksen or punish him for his opposition? 
O: No, I don't recall that he did. 
G: Okay. You had Food for Peace. 
O: Well, this took on some of the elements of foreign aid. 
G: This was both an agricultural support program and a foreign aid program, wasn't it? 
O: Yes. It was rather a neat package. 
G: Let me ask you to discuss your allies here in the Congress and your opponents. 
O: You'd have to start on the House side and say that Chairman Cooley was at least willing to work with us to get a reasonable bill out. Harold Cooley was very conservative. In our 
head counts over the years on Great Society legislation, Cooley would not be an advocate. In this instance we had to depend on Cooley. And he got into adjusting the time frame of 
the legislation. He had some of his own amendments. I guess as a result of Cooley's activities, it became a two-year program rather than a five-year program, and there were 
other limitations that he imposed. But once the bill came out of committee and it went to the House, it was overwhelmingly supported. 
The strongest opposition was, I think, Al Quie's talking about the extended payment time. As he put it, it extended so far into the future that he could envision the 
new generation canceling the payments and he thought that the time frame should be severely limited. But that's about as close as you got to a major opposition. 
G: Okay, there was a ban on sales to countries which sold goods to North Vietnam and Cuba. Do you recall this amendment? 
O: No. 
G: The emergency aid for India? 
O: Well, that was not a very difficult proposition either because you had widespread drought in India and strong bipartisan support that there should be some assistance rendered. 
G: Did the administration use this program to exact some reforms from Indira Gandhi's 
20
O'Brien --Interview XVII --17 
government, do you recall? 
O: I don't recall. That was outside my province if that did occur. 
G: You also had the [creation of the Department of Transportation]. 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 1 
G: --consolidation, we find fragmentation. Do you think that this was a serious problem in the mid-sixties? 
O: Yes, I really do. I think this was a major effort to at least attack a problem. It was a segmented situation: for example, putting [the] Maritime [Administration] into the 
package and having the [House] Maritime [Merchant Marine] and Fisheries Committee coming out with a bill that was in opposition or conflict to ours. They got to a rule on it 
and it didn't get beyond that. But the Maritime Administration became a major debating point on the bill. 
G: Well, let me ask you to trace this pressure to keep the Maritime Administration separate from [the Department of Transportation]. 
O: The lobbying effort seemed to focus on the maritime aspect. The Maritime Commission and those who enjoyed positions of power or influence on the commission were a pretty 
significant group. But the Committee was not one of the most prestigious committees on the Hill and tended to husband its authority. 
The members of that committee became involved with the cast of characters in the industry. The creation of this department incorporating Maritime would significantly 
reduce the authority and prestige that existed and would affect the impact of the industry's lobbyists on an agency of government. 
They became very, very exercised about all this and carried on a vigorous fight. As often happened in a legislative proposal, opposition would coalesce. In this instance, it 
seemed to focus on this aspect. 
G: There were also efforts to establish a highway administration, a railroad administration, an aviation administration. 
O: Yes. 
G: Any reflection on those? 
O: This was, again, of an attempt to preserve power. 
G: Did this weaken the position of the secretary of transportation, do you think? 
21
O'Brien --Interview XVII --18 
O: Clearly there were some limitations imposed on the secretary by virtue of this enactment that we would have preferred not to have seen. But there again, you had a reasonable bill. 
You had achieved your objective of creating a department. If there were unwanted limitations, you proceed nevertheless. You can always look to the future to take 
corrective measures. Chet Holifield, who managed the bill on the floor in the House, summed it up saying that the secretary would have a meaningful kit of tools and could 
operate. 
G: Did the administration engage in any special lobbying to bring the Maritime Administration into the new department? 
O: Yes, we made an effort out of my office. We even tried to make some contacts through the unions. But the maritime unions were not amenable to AFL-CIO efforts in this area. 
G: Is that right? 
O: Let's face it, they succeeded: they were able to retain the Maritime Commission. You go back to the history of that commission and industry, and you can envision who wields the 
power in the industry. 
G: Okay. You also had a major victory in terms of the minimum wage expansion. Do you recall that, increasing it in stages to $1.60 and extending the coverage to additional 
employees? 
O: Well, I reflect back on a prior battle on minimum wage. The $1.25 base went back a few years and was a difficult struggle that resulted in a one-vote loss in the House and a partial 
recovery ultimately in conference. There were exceptions in that bill at that time and of course the wage level was below what we had advocated. 
In 1966 you're going to see if you can't improve the situation. It turned out to be a very difficult, prolonged struggle involving employers, the unions, the Congress. We had 
to battle this, and you had a close, daily working relationship with labor. It was basically a joint effort: our lobbying effort with the Congress and labor's was carried on jointly. I 
remember discussions I had with George Meany. He was very much involved. And this is a classic struggle. You could have a throwback to early labor legislation in the New Deal 
that rekindled long-time animosities. It's hard to believe in this day and age that you could have that kind of difficulty in bringing about what would be considered a relatively modest 
minimum wage increase. 
I remember the first go around in the Kennedy period where I said, "Okay, we're going to eliminate the laundry workers, and we'll agree to that." This compromising went 
on and I guess I didn't realize the intense opposition to minimum wage legislation that was inherent. And here we go again in a better climate, widespread approval in this Congress 
of the Great Society programs, and yet you find you're in a hard fight. 
22
O'Brien --Interview XVII --19 
G: Was there any effort to include farm workers in this? 
O: There was discussion about it. More than just a passing reference. 
G: I noticed that the Senate committee held its discussions of the House-passed measure in executive sessions entirely. Why was that? 
O: That was to fend off the army of corridor lobbyists. I think that's another example of just how heated this was, that they felt they just couldn't function except in executive session. 
G: Okay. That year you also passed the demonstration cities or model cities program. Let me ask you to discuss that. 
O: We were attempting to meld existing programs at various levels--federal level, local, city level. The objective of the President was to rebuild entire urban areas. It was a concept 
that was far-reaching but it was an integral part of his Great Society program. The underwriting of this program would be overridingly the role of the federal government, but 
local participation would require financial contribution to these programs. 
G: There was a new towns plan that was dropped by the Senate committee that had been proposed. Do you remember that? 
O: That was a concept that, as broadly gauged as this proposal was, extended to another dimension and it was cut off. It's interesting, incidentally, in the final vote on that bill to 
see that there were three senators in opposition and they were senators from Delaware, Wyoming, and New Hampshire. (Laughter) This program wasn't really going to impact 
them [?]. (Laughter) 
G: That is true. This demonstration cities concept was a way to focus the resources of the federal government on a few target areas and to really bring back those areas that had 
been hit by severe urban decline. 
O: Yes. 
G: Was there a natural tendency after this was set up to spread it out over much larger areas, over more constituencies, over more cities and thereby dilute the impact? 
O: As we went through this, we were focusing on major urban areas on a select basis. But as it evolved over time, I know it was extended beyond those original targets. 
G: Okay. Another measure that you would have been directly involved in would have been the parcel post revisions. We talked a little about the necessity for that last time, but let 
me ask you to go into the legislative aspects of it. 
23
O'Brien --Interview XVII --20 
O: The existing laws on size and weight of parcels were a morass of procedures that inhibited the Post Office Department in performing a service in this area. The cream or profit 
aspects of parcel service was being controlled by a relative handful of people in the private sector, particularly REA Express. When we tried to revise these packaging procedures, 
there were great claims on the part of REA and others that this would drive them out of business; this would destroy them, that it was a blow to private enterprise and supported 
by a strong lobbying effort, with two or three or so members of the House committee completely wedded to REA and to others. A person trying to mail a package was so 
totally confused because of the crazy-quilt rules and procedures. The net result of it was that the Postal Service was not performing a service in this area that was meaningful. If 
you didn't adjust the size and weight of these packages, the Postal Service ought to close the door in that area. 
There was an amendment that I accepted requiring the post office to employ displaced private carrier workers. I'm sure that I did that with a wink because they'd have 
to qualify under civil service. That was a nod to the opposition and probably was a little helpful to some members who were under pressure. The President's comment, "a bill that 
very few people ever really thought would pass" was accurate because I don't believe that for some time there had been any effort to modify the Postal Service in this area. It had 
been usurped by this private-sector group which felt it was their province, that the postal service had no rights in this area. That's how far it had gone, so we'd have to call this an 
improvement. 
G: What do you think the key to its passage was, though? 
O: We took a bill that nobody normally would probably pay a great deal of attention to. I had a particular interest and gave it a strong push and a great effort. I do recall that I 
became resentful of not only the private-sector role that effectively barred the Post Office Department from performing a service, [but] I became even more resentful because of the 
arrogance of these people and the position of a handful of members of the Congress in support of these people. I made up my mind that I was going to try to drive a hole in their 
armor. The President was sufficiently impressed to include it as a significant item in our program. 
G: Okay. You expanded the Elementary [and Secondary] Education Act by increasing the authorization for two years. 
O: Yes. Well, here we go again. This was opposed by some church groups who refused to accept any legislation that did not provide some benefits to the private school sector. 
Along with that was the fear of federal encroachment into the operation of schools at the local level. We have to refer to that 1965 act as child-oriented, not school-oriented. That 
enabled the local districts to allocate funds and skirt the religious issue. And the Congress went beyond the proposal in this instance. 
G: This was unusual, really, wasn't it? 
24
O'Brien --Interview XVII --21 
O: Yes, it was a surprise to us. And of course the opponents tried to introduce the Vietnam argument, too, the cost factor. 
G: Some of the House Democrats tried to come up with a new funding formula that would allocate more funds to the poorer states. Do you recall that? 
O: I recall the effort, yes. I think the point of greatest interest in this proposal is the fact that the Congress did go beyond what we envisioned. They not only embraced what we 
proposed but they decided to broaden it. We found ourselves being presented with a bill to defray the costs of all this that extended beyond what we had in mind and the President 
was protesting how much they were doing, not how little they were doing. (Laughter) 
G: What was Johnson's reaction to this? I mean, here he was, setting himself up as the education president and--O: 
The train was going down the tracks without an engineer. (Laughter) He had some reaction to it but I don't recall it being excessively strong. But of course what was 
bothering him was he didn't know what the price tag was. He could just see down the road, looking for new revenue. That was bothersome because while the administration, 
the President, and all of us were proclaiming our dedication to education, in the back of our mind was the cost factor. We had structured this so that it was something that we 
could live with and discharge responsibility to education and show progress in that area. And the Congress was saying, "We're glad you brought it up. We've got some ideas of 
our own. Here's the package and now you budget the financing." So I guess you call that a mixed blessing. 
With the struggles that had ensued in the education field and in that same session [to] have a setback in civil rights, it was a surprise to us to find Congress had become so 
liberal and progressive. 
G: There was in the final measure a compromise which deferred funds up to ninety days for non-compliance with civil rights legislation. Was this a difficult provision to achieve? 
O: It was an appropriate provision, an acceptable provision, and I don't recall that was a great debating point. It might have been but I don't recall. 
G: Let me ask you about the Higher Education amendments of 1966. Here, this extended the 1963 act and increased aid for construction of college facilities. This again showed 
elements of Congress acting independently of the President. 
O: Yes. I guess you'd term that Congress the Education Congress. Here again, we presented our proposal and the Congress said, "We share your interests and concern and we've got 
news for you. We think your proposal is too modest and we have some areas where we're going to increase participation and spend additional monies." And that's what happened. 
25
O'Brien --Interview XVII --22 
Take the two education bills sort of back to back and you'll find a Congress that was wedded to the proposition, and the administration was also. Somehow, every person was 
going to have the opportunity for education to the fullest of his or her capacity to absorb it, which was laudable. We were all firm believers. 
G: Anything specifically on the give and take here over the funding level? 
O: It was a little embarrassing to us who were in the forefront in this area to find ourselves objecting to enhancing our proposal, expanding it. It's pretty hard to put your heart into 
something like that when you're a firm believer in the ultimate goals. It's pretty hard to sit with a fellow and say, "We have to register objections to increasing the potential cost in 
this area." Your normal reaction would be, "I'm awfully glad to hear you say that. The more the better." It wasn't a very comfortable position for us to be in. 
G: Let me ask you about the auto safety act, which was inspired by Ralph Nader, I guess. 
O: Yes. This was the first effort to establish safety standards for the industry. The industry had been able to function on its own without any governmental intervention. Ralph Nader 
had established a reputation of being a one-man band trying to do something about this and he had been widely applauded except by the auto industry, I would think. As I recall 
it, I was very much impressed with Ralph Nader, and his ability to direct public attention to auto safety brought the administration to considering this an important element of our 
program. The result was the Traffic and Auto Safety Act. There had been hearings on auto safety a year earlier, and earlier in 1966, and the climate seemed to be right because 
real progress had been made in persuading the Congress that there was a dire need in this area, that it was a serious problem that needed governmental attention. 
G: Did you work with Nader on this? 
O: Yes. Nader and his people were not completely happy with the proposal but they did sign off on it. The proposal obviously represented our best judgment on how well we could 
move this, how much we could accomplish. It resulted in a sort of an informal partnership, if you will. It didn't take on the dimensions of working with the AFL-CIO on 
minimum wage but there was communication and rapport. As you anticipate, of course, the industry went right up through the roof. 
G: Well, Nader apparently advocated criminal penalties for the--O: 
Yes. His desire was to have much stronger language in the proposal. We had a lot of support for this and a good attitude up on the Hill. 
G: Did you have any support from the industry at all? 
O: I don't recall that we did. Beyond safety standards, what you were doing was breaking new ground. You were saying to major American industry, "You're going to be subjected 
26
O'Brien --Interview XVII --23 
to procedures, rules, and regulation imposed by the federal government." They recognized that no matter how modest it might be initially, a precedent was established 
that was probably irrevocable. They have fought it consistently ever since, and I must say in recent years they have succeeded in rolling back regulations and they've consistently 
been let off the hook. 
There was a lot of arrogance in the industry, too, and it was spelled out by some of the efforts that were made. Industry spokesmen I don't think acquitted themselves 
particularly well through this because they could not contain their arrogance. But they've lived with it. The industry was not set back because of the standards and procedures. 
Their economic problems certainly weren't related to the need to make auto transportation safer in this country. So they were not economically adversely impacted. 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 2 
G: --truth-in-packaging, another consumer measure. This was an effort to guard against deceptive packaging and labeling practices. 
O: Yes. Well, this was part of a continuing effort in two areas, truth-in-lending and truth-in-packaging, because in both areas there was a tremendous amount of deception to 
not have the purchaser of the product or the person requesting a loan know the facts. There was a keen interest in the administration of Kennedy and then Johnson in the two 
major areas: trying to simplify the lending forms to put the true interest rates of the loan up front and not hidden, and packaging, with the content, the size, the weight and all that, 
to simplify it so that. . . . The cynics would say, "Why bother? Nobody cares anyway. Most people are not going to take the time or effort. If a person wants a car loan or some 
other kind of a loan, they want the money and they're not going to be concerned about what the cost factor is and how they repay it. They want a certain package in the grocery 
store, in the pharmacy or wherever and they're not going to really care." 
That's beside the point. Why have major businesses in this country [been] carrying on this widespread deception, not having any interest in voluntarily correcting it? So this 
is, I think, an appropriate area for governmental involvement. That went to the 1966 truth-in-packaging proposal. That was really an expansion of existing regulations to 
provide simple, direct, accurate and visible information. 
(Interruption) 
The final version was a somewhat watered-down version. The lobbyists for the businesses and industries involved had a degree of impact on the Congress. It was in the category of 
settling for a part of the loaf. It did represent a continuing effort to try to expand what you had established by regulation and keep expanding whenever you could. 
(Interruption) 
27
O'Brien --Interview XVII --24 
At the end of the second session of the Congress, we prepared a report for the President which summarized the two sessions of the Eighty-Ninth Congress. This report was sent to 
the President by Joe Califano and me, and we stated that in our view this had been a fabulous and remarkable Congress. We said this is not because of its unprecedented 
productivity but because what was passed has deep meaning and significance for every man, woman, and child in this country and for future generations. We also pointed out 
that the second session of the Eighty-Ninth was as productive as the first, which we felt was also an impressive aspect of this summary. 
We stated that in the first session, the administration initiated and sponsored eighty-seven major measures. Eighty-four of those measures were passed by the 
Congress. In the second session, the administration initiated a hundred and thirteen measures. Ninety-seven were passed by the Congress. So the grand total for the 
Eighty-Ninth Congress was two hundred administration measures advocated, a hundred and eighty-one passed. Nineteen did not pass. So the batting average was .905. 
Not to list all of the measures, obviously, but to point to some of the areas of success, there were some sixty of them that we considered landmark and of historic 
significance. Among those are: Medicare, Elementary and Secondary Education, Higher Education, Voting Rights, Immigration, Social Security increases, and a myriad of bills 
that impacted upon housing and urban development, health, medical facilities, the war against poverty, the creation of the arts and humanities foundation, Appalachia, highway 
beautification, air and water pollution, the Department of Transportation in the second session, truth-in-packaging, demonstration cities, funds for rent supplements, Teacher 
Corps, the Asian [Development] Bank, water pollution legislation, anti-inflation legislation, child safety, narcotics, traffic and highway safety, water pollution control, 
reorganization, mine safety, health professions training, child nutrition, various other safety legislation including tire safety, protection for savers, [and] the [Cold War] GI Bill. 
Then we had the very important minimum wage increase in the second session of this Congress, urban mass transit, elementary and higher education funding. That's just sort of 
a quick summary of the elements of legislation that went to every phase of challenge in terms of social progress in this country and really encompassed all the elements of the 
Great Society program that President Johnson had presented. 
The accomplishment was very close to total. It wasn't going to resolve the ills of the United States or the world totally but it certainly represented historic breakthroughs in 
areas that were extremely significant to every American and were in many instances a challenge to government over a long period of time. What we failed to pass during that 
Eighty-Ninth Congress did include the civil rights bill of the second session, repeal of [Section] 14( b) [of the Taft-Hartley Act], which had been something that we had broken 
our picks on on other occasions in the past. There were some amendments to unemployment insurance that we wanted that we didn't get. D. C. home rule we didn't 
succeed on. Truth-in-lending remained a matter that we still had to work on in the year ahead. There was some election reform that wasn't enacted. Then there was a gun bill 
that we did not succeed in bringing about. There were a few others perhaps of somewhat 
28
O'Brien --Interview XVII --25 
less importance at that time but it added up to a total of nineteen bills. When you go back and look at two hundred measures in over two years in the two sessions of the 
Eighty-Ninth Congress, a hundred and eighty-one passed, nineteen that remained unpassed and would in just about every instance continue to challenge us in the future Congress. 
That is the record of the enactment of the Great Society program. 
End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview XVII 
29
    [ Part 18: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--10 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XVIII*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
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LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XVIII 
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2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
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Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
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(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
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(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-29 
4
INTERVIEW XVIII 
DATE: December 18, 1986 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 1, Side 1 
G: [In 1966 you] had a reorganization plan that transferred the Community Relations Service from the Commerce Department to the Justice Department. This was the instance 
reflected in the documents where, according to Mike Manatos, you had more Jetstars in the air than you did planes over Vietnam that day, to get senators back from Puerto Rico 
and other places for the vote. Apparently, [Everett] Dirksen had backed out after indicating his support of the measure. 
O: Mike's memo reflects the nature of the problem when he and [Nicholas] Katzenbach and Barefoot Sanders were in [Mike] Mansfield's office. That was just the time Dirksen had 
notified Mansfield he was going to oppose it. According to Mike, Dirksen had on at least two occasions assured Katzenbach and Mike that he would support it and Mansfield felt 
that ended the effort. So this was a shocker, and then Mike became deeply involved in the head count and checking out of absentees for twelve noon. Howard Cannon was the 
number-one target and Mansfield did not want to call Cannon to urge him to come back so Manatos was left with this problem. He did contact Cannon in Puerto Rico and 
Cannon agreed to come back. 
G: Was this characteristic of Mansfield, a reluctance to--? 
O: There was a tendency on the part of Mike over the years not to be overly aggressive with his colleagues. He would low-key it and when it would come to something like this, 
which really was arm-twisting, Mike would be reluctant to be calling his fellow members of the Senate. He never objected to our engaging in this. He preferred that we undertake 
this effort. He would be in support of our effort, but he wouldn't necessarily be in the forefront making the calls or pleading with members. 
The Manatos memo reflects the state of the legislation at that point, the intensity of the effort and the concern about the bill. Manatos also talks about presidential calls he 
received on the Hill. Any number of senators were contacted and every attempt was made to provide transportation where it was necessary to get them back in time. That type of 
activity was something we engaged in from time to time. We tried to keep it low key. We were always concerned about publicity, using military planes for this purpose. But you 
would set that aside and take your chances when it came to a problem. 
He became disturbed with Jack Valenti at some stage. I was trying to recall--
5
O'Brien --Interview XVIII --2 
G: Apparently, it was a matter of not being the one to transmit invitations to the senators? 
O: He refers to invitations to travel on Air Force One, and he took this occasion to pinpoint his concern. He refers to these invitations as "platinum-plated plums" and said it would be 
helpful to him on future votes to be in the position of extending the invitation to Mexico City to Mansfield, Dirksen, [George] Aiken and [Paul] Douglas and [Joseph] Montoya, 
obviously. I had been aware of it and I would have reacted exactly the same way. It did not serve any purpose, if we were going to do our job on the Hill, to have someone else in 
the recesses of the White House extending invitations to join the President on Air Force One. If we weren't a part of that, that reduced our kit of tools. 
As he said, he felt a little stupid to be asked by the Majority Leader of the Senate--he, Manatos--about the format for the Mexico City trip when he had no 
knowledge that Mansfield had been invited and he had to admit to him that he knew nothing about the trip. He summed it up as a congressional relations' concern; it wasn't an 
ego trip. We needed whatever we could have in our kit to work the Hill, and there was mighty little, actually. We had gone over things we could do to maintain friendships up 
there and obviously Air Force One would be significant in that area. And he said, "It would be helpful, Jack, if I can't dispense the goodies, to at least have a smell of the 
wrapper." Mike was not a fellow that became overly exercised; he was rather a low-key guy. This indicates we were very sensitive to something like this. It would be an 
embarrassment. 
It was somewhat comparable to what occurred one day when I was in Mansfield's office and Mike was distraught and really greeted me coolly. [It was not] our usual "Sit 
down, have a cup of coffee" and I had no idea what--I thought I had detected something. Mansfield said, "Well, all right, tell me about it." I didn't know what he was talking about. 
As it unfolded, he was talking about the closing of a VA hospital in Montana which had not been discussed with him prior to the announcement of the closing. He had not even 
been notified of the closing and he was extremely disturbed and angered. I, frankly, had to tell him I had no idea what he was talking about. I called the White House in his presence 
and, sure enough, the Ramsey Clark review to bring about [budget] cuts had gone to VA hospitals. He had compiled a list of VA hospitals and, apparently, the Veterans 
Administration and the White House had not bothered to [call Mansfield] and we in congressional relations had not been advised. 
It turned out to be a very serious problem between Mansfield and Johnson that continued for months. Mansfield never let go of his opposition to a House committee 
hearing on VA hospitals. The President reacted by trying to plant editorials about cost-cutting. This had elements of a couple of men overreacting. 
It was a break for me that I didn't know [about it] that morning. It's an example of how essential it was for the entire administration, every department and agency, to keep 
the White House congressional relations department advised on everything that might be a 
6
O'Brien --Interview XVIII --3 
problem--in addition to [providing] the usual reports on legislative progress. And never were we to be left in the dark, for obvious reasons. When it occurred from time to time, 
as in this instance, we would react very strongly. 
G: The memorandum describes Dirksen backing out of an apparent commitment to support you on this measure and suggests a degree of undependability. How dependable was 
Dirksen? 
O: I think Dirksen would play his cards close to the vest. That was his style. It was extremely difficult to get a commitment from him. He would talk on all sides of an issue. 
He would be very courteous and listen carefully and give you all the time you wanted and everything would be pleasant. You'd have to do a little guessing as to where you thought 
he might land. In this case, where Manatos is stating that he and Katzenbach on two occasions had gotten a specific commitment from Dirksen, it would be unusual for 
Dirksen to do that and then back off. You were more apt to have to sweat Dirksen out to the last moment where he had his options, and if he didn't support you, you could never 
really claim that he had said he would. 
In this instance, this was a shock to all concerned. Whether Dirksen was misunderstood doesn't make any difference. Obviously, we're sitting rather comfortably. 
You had Dirksen's support, consequently you are not going to have a difficult vote the following day. Suddenly, within minutes, you have this fall apart. You have the Majority 
Leader saying, "Well, that's it. We're losers. It's all over." 
The effort is a good example of President Johnson's personal efforts, because you see here again, he got personally involved. If he had a pilot's license, he'd probably pick 
up Howard Cannon himself. That's why we tried to husband his impact and not overuse it. 
G: You had a meeting with Mansfield early in 1966 with regard to Vietnam and he seemed very concerned about the alternatives, concerned about [William] Fulbright's view but also 
concerned about the opinions that the war should be escalated. 
O: That was Mansfield's position. Mansfield was not a hawk. He was a staunch supporter of the President. He supported President Kennedy fully and he supported President Johnson 
fully, and we could never have any quarrel with Mansfield's support of the program. In the area of Vietnam, he had a tendency to refrain from critical comments. He did not want 
to lessen his on-the-record support and yet as early as January of 1966 you see indications of my conversation with him, my report to the President by this memo, that he was 
beginning to express concern. This was in the context of escalating, where you had [Richard] Russell and [Mendel] Rivers real, true hawks, urging escalation, and Mansfield 
expressing confidence that the President won't bend to military pressures. 
Then on the other side of the coin, I don't know specifically what Fulbright's argument on colonialism meant, but Mansfield in turn said that his arguments made no 
7
O'Brien --Interview XVIII --4 
sense. But I do report to the President that I have no doubt of his deep concern. Then he suggested direct meetings with Fulbright, which is interesting. He felt that could reduce 
the public impact of what had become generally known in Washington as conflict between the President and Fulbright. 
G: On another matter, Mansfield refused to schedule round-the-clock sessions on [Section] 14( b) [of the Taft-Hartley Act]. Let me ask you to--O: 
That would be a judgment call. The repeal of 14( b) wasn't in the cards and we all knew it. Mansfield's view was: how many battles do you take on; how thin do you spread 
yourself? He was a realist and his view to go through an activity that would not have a positive result was something he wasn't prepared to undertake. On the other hand, we had 
committed to labor that we would never give up, that we would make every effort we could. And it seemed that this approach would be evidence of the intensity of our effort. 
So you got caught in that judgment situation. Mansfield said that he'll shoulder the blame for not having the round-the-clock sessions. Mansfield has just about had it in this 
area and he was going to tell labor, "Forget the round-the-clock, just provide six or seven more votes and we'll get this done. That's your problem. Don't be leaning on us. It's 
about time you people produced, and you haven't." 
(Interruption) 
G: A couple of things that I want to ask you about procedurally with regard to congressional relations. One of the memos there reflects some improvements in your operation: one, 
having Manatos and [Henry Hall] Wilson screen invitation lists. Apparently, you had one situation where the Republican opponent of one of your Democratic congressmen had his 
picture taken with the President and publicized it all over the Iowa newspapers. Two, trying to speed up the processing of presidential handshake-type photographs so that they 
could be used by the congressman or senator quickly enough to really be news. Do you recall these activities? 
O: We felt that this was an area where we could make some impact with a number of members. It was essential that it flow smoothly. The President was in total accord with 
this process, which was rather time-consuming and interrupted his schedule at times. But it was very important to a lot of members and we had made the commitment. You wanted 
to assure that the operation would run smoothly and maybe the priority with us was not as high with some in the White House who had other things on their minds. It was a 
continuing effort to ensure that we had as smooth an operation in this area as we could. 
And it's quite a setback when you found an incident like this, where a candidate is having his picture taken with the President and then he was an opponent of an incumbent 
that we had been working with. That was the catalyst that got us to review this activity and tighten it up. That's basically what it was. 
8
O'Brien --Interview XVIII --5 
G: Was it a seasonal activity largely, following the campaign season or preceding it? 
O: Preceding the campaign season but at an early enough date so there could be utilization. For example, the lead time on printing of materials that a candidate would have. You not 
only had to have it done but you had to have it back to him in ample time so he wasn't faced with problems in fully utilizing it in his campaign. That meant you had to structure 
this activity at a relatively early stage. 
G: Typically, would a congressman call your office? 
O: No. We really extended the hand, made the offer, made the opportunity available. We didn't wait for them to call us. We seized upon it because you're always looking for 
something you can do to maintain this relationship, hopefully improve it and have a continuity of contact. Well, this was ideal; this fitted in nicely. We sought them out and 
they obviously would respond in most every instance enthusiastically. We carefully monitored contested districts. We had all our statistics and information on every contest, 
so you had an awareness where this effort would be appreciated. If a fellow had no contest or a walk-through, he wasn't very excited about this because he probably wasn't 
going to print literature or do television anyway. So it did vary. 
G: A general question: do you feel that after you became postmaster general that the White House was as considerate of the needs of congressional relations as they had been when 
you were doing that full time? 
O: Yes. 
G: Really? 
O: There was no perception on my part of any falling off. The problem I was faced with was that the President was very much interested in my continuity as full-time as possible. 
There were occasions when he reminded me of that and he expressed some concern that I was devoting attention to the Post Office Department that wasn't necessary. He wanted to 
be sure that I was continuing my activities with the staff. 
My effort to adjust the staff failed early on and the retention of the office in the White House was his decision. It did cause some problems. He would charge Joe 
Califano almost daily with the responsibility to be in communication with me. And he would make comments to Joe: "Did you talk to O'Brien? What does the rest of this memo 
mean? Is this O'Brien's view?" That sort of thing. Joe and I entered into an informal understanding. I, of course, was abreast of everything, but if I weren't there at different 
times of the day, Joe was free, as far as I was concerned, to indicate to the President that he and I had discussed things that really didn't need discussion. We weren't trying to con 
Lyndon Johnson but some of it just wasn't necessary or at all vital. And Joe was free to use my name as he saw fit in assuring the President. 
9
O'Brien --Interview XVIII --6 
That did not mean that we decided to drop this whole area of communication, and my relationship with Henry [Hall Wilson] and the rest, of course, remained a very, very 
close one. There was no day that I wasn't in communication, discussion with the White House staff. 
End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview XVIII 
10
    [ Part 19: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--38 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XIX*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XIX 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XIX, 4/ 22/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XIX, 4/ 22/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
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researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-30 
4
INTERVIEW XIX 
DATE: April 22, 1987 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 1 
G: Let's start with some of the legislative developments in 1967. The Republicans gained forty-seven House seats in the 1966 elections, and the ratio in the Senate was sixty-four 
Democrats to thirty-six Republicans, so you still had a significant advantage there. 
O: Yes, my recollection is that the forty-seven seat loss in the House in an off-year election would not be that unusual, if you go back historically to off-year elections, particularly 
off-year elections following a strong presidential victory two years earlier. The pendulum swings. 
A loss in the 435 member House of forty-seven was disturbing. The statistic does not reflect what happened in that off-year election. Those forty-seven were members of 
the House who had supported the Great Society and President Johnson. I recall a fellow who was a freshman congressman from Iowa. He had come to Washington in 1964 in 
part because of the big Johnson win. He supported us 100 per cent over two years. In several instances his support was not helpful to him politically back home. He and a 
number of other congressmen in that category were defeated in the off year. So when you say a loss of forty-seven, you were close to a loss of forty-seven votes for your legislation. 
On the Senate side, I believe that we lost four in 1966. That did not indicate we were going to have increasing difficulty in the Senate. 
In the House, however, it became a problem quickly, and it was reflected in the head counts. As we discuss 1967, you will find as the months went by that our difficulties 
seemed to increase. The climate was changing, and that was due to the growing concern regarding Vietnam. You had a handful of members who were registering concern. That 
number grew as time went on, and it became particularly a problem when you had staunch supporters of the President's Vietnam policy expressing concern. So you have the 
situation of the drop in the membership in the House. You had the growing concern regarding Vietnam. That was the way the Ninetieth Congress kicked off for us. 
But the President was sensitive to this, not sensitive to the anti-Vietnam feeling that would grow rather rapidly during the course of 1967, but to that specific loss on the 
House side. He wanted to keep the momentum going in his legislative program. Even though a major portion of the Great Society program had been enacted into law, there 
5
O'Brien --Interview XIX --2 
were still elements that required further action to which he had a commitment. It was interesting to see how this manifested itself in the White House. The President became 
awfully concerned about the depth of involvement of just about everybody with the legislative program--in the departments, the agencies, and on the White House staff. As 
1967 unfolded, more and more the President was demanding involvement of people who heretofore had not had any role in the legislative program or any direct responsibility for 
it. And so many members of the White House staff found themselves involved to a far greater degree than they had been. There are the people outside of congressional relations 
in the White House. That was part of the President's attempt to keep the momentum going. That was the climate of 1967, as we moved into the early stages. 
G: What about your own involvement in the legislative program? Did that tend to slack up in 1967? 
O: The hour-by-hour involvement was not as intense as it had been over the years from 1960. I had stayed totally involved with the program through 1966. At the end of 1967, I found 
that it became more and more difficult to balance responsibilities in the Post Office Department and my continuing responsibilities regarding the legislative program. 
However, it was not to cause me to step away from it or remove myself to any degree. 
In 1967 I became a staunch advocate of postal reform, and that became a major project. It brought about the creation of a blue ribbon commission by the President 
[President's Commission on Postal Organization] to investigate procedures that could be undertaken to correct the major problems of postal service. The effort became one of 
heavy involvement on my part. I launched this, and it caught on nationally. Ultimately, in part, it was enacted in the Nixon Administration. That involvement obviously was 
time-consuming. Additionally, I had a legislative item on the agenda involving postal rates, which became a sticky situation. Pressure groups were in heavy action; it took a lot 
of doing to have some rate adjustments ultimately enacted. 
Beyond that, the President was beginning to focus on the election of 1968, and I found that I was in conversations with him over 1967 more and more. Those 
conversations involved evaluations and planning and projections that would lead into 1968 in the primaries. It was a full plate. A number of White House staff people were brought 
in by direct assignment and direct involvement into the promotion of the program. 
G: One of the press articles that I read in 1967 described your reduction in your own legislative activity in saying that this was really beginning to show, because the legislative 
program was bogging down as a result of a weakening of leadership. Would this be an accurate characterization, do you think? 
O: Weakening of leadership from the executive branch? 
G: Yes. 
6
O'Brien --Interview XIX --3 
O: I don't know as I would characterize it as a weakening of leadership, and I don't suggest that the President's effort was to compensate for my lessening involvement on a daily basis 
in the legislative program. I think it was more a reflection of the President's concern when he reviewed the election results and what that would mean in creating additional 
difficulties in the House. For example, the twenty-one day rule in the House was repealed. Now, it's fair to say that because of the change in the make-up of the House, we had, by 
new assignments to the Rules Committee, a solid majority on the Rules Committee. Consequently, the loss of the twenty-one day rule would not adversely impact on our 
ability to move legislation. But it is also a fact, however, that we were not giving away the twenty-one day rule and that we were disturbed we were faced with this repeal when 
such effort had been expended in the first instance to bring it about. That's an indication that the 
leadership in the House was softening a little bit in the intensity of their involvement. 
All through my experience with the Congress, while we dealt with the leadership in the House and Senate, the so-called whip system in the House never was an effective 
system. Our encroachment into the rights and privileges of the House, as we discussed in the past, had reached a point where we had a very easy relationship that brought about 
free exchanges of views, voting habits, head counts. [But] I never felt it allowed us to demand of the leadership in the House that they reorganize the whip system. That's an 
internal House operation. Each region would select its own whips. When it came to head-counting over the years, it varied considerably from district to district. 
That began to show in 1967, that weakness in the system. You're saying, "Things aren't moving as they used to move or as rapidly." You'd get the feeling that some of the 
leaders are getting a little tired, that this forty-seven member loss is really affecting them. All that was part of a cloud that was gathering, and would reach a point toward the end of 
that year where that cloud--Vietnam--was diverting the attention that you wanted them to direct to the domestic program. I would run into it. It became more and more a case of 
going in to discuss, say, truth in lending and finding the conversation diverted to, "What are we going to do about Vietnam?" Vietnam was impacting more and more as the weeks 
went by. 
G: One question on the whip system: to what extent was it related to the personnel? One of the notes said that it had been somewhat effective or useful under Albert, but that by 
1967--O: 
Well, it would have to do with the leadership, but the fact of the matter is that McCormack, Albert, [Hale] Boggs, and others had fulfilled to the fullest their commitment 
to promote the New Frontier and Great Society programs. There was no way that we in the White House could quarrel about these fellows. At times you wondered if you weren't 
getting overly aggressive, if you weren't going to antagonize these people. Some of them might say, "Wait a minute. You've neglected to read the Constitution recently--the 
separation of powers." You always had to be sensitive to that. McCormack was devoted and directly involved; to a lesser degree some of the whips. 
7
O'Brien --Interview XIX --4 
But with Carl's commitment to the program, and indeed, McCormack's--I want to be fair to both these fellows, but I also want to emphasize both played key roles in the 
success of our programs--they would become concerned about their own whips. They would be constantly on the backs of whips. They never felt that they should dictate who 
the whips would be. There's a plus factor and there are brownie points being a whip. You had fellows, when they would be called by Albert, saying, "We've got to move quickly, 
check out your people and give me the count," that he'd have to do it more than once. And oftentimes he and McCormack would do most of it themselves. 
Now, I would say with all of that, however, it was a far more active whip system than it had been historically. It was a paper tiger, historically. At least some of these 
fellows were responding. Some of them might grumble and say, "I've got other things to do," but they'd respond to Albert and McCormack and Boggs. But to suggest that it was 
an automatic pressing of the button, you'd be deluding yourself. Perhaps we became more sensitive to the whip system than we had [been] in the past, because we had lived with it 
and things had gone well. Now things aren't moving as rapidly as they used to, and you have the feeling that there's been a slowing down. Obviously we in the White House are 
trying to determine why. And then you're apt to say, "That whip system isn't effective. It ought to be reorganized." And are you going to say to the leaders, "Fire some of the 
whips and tell your colleagues that these are the whips that you want"? You're not going to push the Congress that far, from the executive branch. 
G: Did you have discussions with the President with regard to your increased difficulties on the Hill? 
O: No, because they weren't that discernible. This is something that gradually began to penetrate. As I said, the best way to describe it is that through the whole New 
Frontier-Great Society, which now has been enacted, 90-plus per cent of it, it was a rarity to have any element of that massive program interrupted on that Hill by Vietnam. Now, 
more and more you'd have people you were dealing with say, "Oh, by the way. I'm getting constituent mail," and, "The President ought to bomb them off the face of the earth," or 
"The President ought to figure a way out of this," or "The President--" whatever. It was all being reflected by what was occurring in the streets. You had the riot in Detroit, and 
the riot in Newark, and all of this was just a matter of growing concern. 
It was there, and I began to find it as I went along. I can't recall specifically a conversation which probably affected me on the Hill regarding Vietnam. There was a 
conversation I had with Mayor [Richard] Daley, initiated by him, where he expressed great concern about Vietnam, where it seemed to be tending, what it was causing by way 
of disruption and growing public concern. You wouldn't find a greater hawk than Dick Daley or a more loyal Democrat or a loyal Johnson supporter on the Hill or anywhere 
else--a man who did not have to be concerned about his political power being eroded by Vietnam. But he, as a loyal Democrat and a loyal Johnson supporter, became concerned 
to the point where he had a very candid conversation with me and said this was a growing 
8
O'Brien --Interview XIX --5 
disaster and this was going to be devastating to the Democratic Party. "We've been candid with each other over the years, and I just want to tell you." 
I reported that to the President and sent him a memo. I don't recall the memo specifically, but I know this, it impacted on me, because I said, "If Richard Daley has 
become that concerned about Vietnam, you've got to realize that this is not some passing cloud. This is something that has become of deep and abiding concern to a lot of people." 
And these weren't doves who were concerning me, but people who had been loyal supporters. They weren't saying they were going to leave Johnson or publicly denounce 
the policy. But in political terms they were saying, "Something has got to happen, because this is headed toward political disaster." 
G: This view also seemed to be echoed on the Hill with people even like Richard Russell who would say, "Get in or get out. We ought to go all out or cut back." 
O: Yes. People were flailing about. Russell would be a good example, but there were others: Danny Inouye, people like that, who were loyal supporters and had no problem with the 
policy, who were believers in the policy. But they're beginning to get more and more of this expression of concern of people in their states, and they're thinking more about it. But 
who has the answer? Who has the answer? 
Again, it's the loneliest office in the world, the presidency of the United States. With the so-called experts on foreign policy when the chips are down, they are quick to 
say, "Mr. President, it's your decision, and I wish you luck."--prepared, of course, to Monday-morning-quarterback in the event you fail. That is the reality of the presidency 
under our system. 
It's tough in terms of attitude and attention directed to Vietnam. It kept growing, and it becomes a problem if your attention is diverted in the midst of head counts. 
G: Was Fulbright's opposition in 1967 noticeably more active? 
O: Yes, that's my recollection. First of all, Bill Fulbright was an articulate, bright and able member of the Senate. He enjoyed an excellent reputation. His concerns seemed to grow 
as the situation seemed to deteriorate. It became disturbing to the President; he was very sensitive to Fulbright. He had Lady Bird and Mrs. Fulbright socially engaged, trying to 
keep Fulbright contained. Fulbright was a man of conviction, and he was not trying to destroy Lyndon Johnson; there was nothing personal about it that I observed in any 
conversations that I had with Fulbright. He was a man of conviction and he was persuaded that we were on the wrong path. And any socializing or attempts to recall old 
friendships were not going to deter him. 
G: Before we get into some of the other issues concerning Vietnam that year, I want to ask you to go into the Hardesty operation. This was a new development, I gather, in 1966. 
9
O'Brien --Interview XIX --6 
O: Yes. Bob Hardesty was on my staff at the Post Office Department, and he had a close association with Ira Kapenstein. There was a need to try to broaden our activities in terms 
of feeding the Congress, which is a term I think we used occasionally. We want these fellows to insert in the Record favorable comments about the legislative program. We 
want them to be making statements in their constituent newsletters that are favorable to the program. That ultimately resulted in Bob becoming full-time involved in this project, 
which was an inherent part of congressional relations. You're trying to funnel this in a systematic way and ensure that your friends in the Congress are cooperating. They are 
being provided with the tools, and the tools would be the material. You couldn't expect a friend on the Hill to be doing his own research to come up with a statement or insert. 
Let's get him these favorable comments and these potential inserts and whatever else we can give him, as part of serving him. Then you can depend upon him to make good use of 
all of this. 
Then you realized that Bob Hardesty, who started as a one-man band, had to have additional assistance, and you had to have the fullest possible cooperation and involvement 
of departments and agencies. Bob found he needed more manpower. But he also needed the basic material, and this you expected and instructed the departments and agencies to 
provide. So then we started to place more and more emphasis on this in our meetings with the congressional relations people, with the cabinet, and the rest. Bob knew what he 
needed by way of organization and cooperation. He was frustrated on many occasions because he wasn't getting the degree of cooperation that he was entitled to. He and I 
would discuss that, and then I would, again, do some kicking around. 
But all of that was part of our endeavor to broaden congressional relations. It was another significant element of congressional relations; it was a meaningful element, if you 
could get the cooperation on the Hill and from those who had responsibility in the executive branch. It was a well-managed, well-conducted activity, and it was a significant 
contributing factor to our congressional relations effort. I could sympathize with Bob when he felt that he was not getting the fullest degree of cooperation, because Lord 
knows I had experienced that from the time I became first involved. You were never totally satisfied, and you always had to come up with ideas that would keep these people 
with their feet to the fire, with an understanding that the White House was totally knowledgeable about what they were doing and to what degree they were doing it, and 
how effective they were and how cooperative they were. But with all of that, it became an integral part of congressional relations, a very important part of it. 
G: Did it require some delicacy to get members of Congress to, say, give a speech or incorporate--? 
O: Well, it would be the same as getting a member of Congress to support you, particularly when a relatively friendly member was being asked to vote with you or support you on a 
legislative proposal that was not overly popular in his district or state, and could even be politically harmful to him. Well, with Bob you had a solid list of people who would 
cooperate in this area. But, as I said, the key to it was not to have Eddie Boland or 
10
O'Brien --Interview XIX --7 
somebody say, "Oh, gosh, you can depend on me. I'll be more alert to inserts in the Record, and I'll make sure I make speeches that include favorable comments," and then in 
a particular struggle at a given time, "I'll be involved, and in addition to my vote you're also going to have my active involvement," and then walk away and leave it up to him to 
find out just how that is done. It wasn't that sensitive. It was the feeling that you could use all you could get together. There was a placement opportunity for all of it, and so the 
frustrating part of it was to find that you were running short of material while you had these willing fellows waiting to hear from you. 
G: Wasn't the material actually speeches for the most part? I mean, wouldn't Bob and his group go ahead and write--? 
O: Yes, they did. You do speeches, but you often did inserts or brief statements; you liked to get that Record filled. That was probably the easiest part of it, easiest from the member's 
point of view. You have a legislative struggle ongoing, and that member--I just mentioned Boland; he's an old friend of mine, he's still in the Congress, and it wouldn't bother Eddie a 
bit if you said to him, "Would you put this in the Record?" Or, "Will you put this in a newsletter," or "Will you issue a press release giving your views on this particular matter?" 
even if that did not relate to Eddie's area of interest or his committee assignments. But Eddie is sitting there, and if he doesn't hear from the White House for a month or two, he's 
probably forgotten about this commitment. But he has no problem having somebody funneling this material in to him. You could also go as far as preparing full-blown 
speeches for some of these people. 
The frustration was not finding people willing to participate, but finding that you haven't heard from the Interior Department in a month, and yet you've made six calls over 
there saying, "Listen, this legislation is coming up and we have people who can help promote it and get it in newsletters and elsewhere, but what do you expect Bob Hardesty 
to do? Write it for you?" 
G: So ideally the departments themselves would do the writing, and it would just be transmitted, or maybe edited, shaped up, through--O: 
Yes, that's right, because it was just too big a project. It's no different than our efforts overall in congressional relations. We have a right to expect these cabinet members to be 
devoting a great deal of their time and attention to the programs. Do they think a handful of us sitting in the White House are going to get it done for them? That was why we 
never had a cabinet meeting that the legislative program wasn't on the agenda. The emphasis of the President and all of us was on the legislative program, and this became an 
integral part of the promotion of it, the advocacy of it. And I expected from those people the same degree of attention and involvement, when Bob Hardesty and his people were 
asking them, as I would expect when I'm talking about their efforts on the Hill and their weekly report. That White House staff was a very small staff, and our constant effort was 
to engage as many as we could in the executive branch in promotion of the program. And there wasn't a member of the cabinet who wasn't totally aware that the first priority was 
11
O'Brien --Interview XIX --8 
that legislative program. 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 2 
G: [Were some] departments better than others about cooperating with this--? 
O: I think some departments probably felt a little differently about it. I think it had a lot to do with the head of the department. You would find that a department head who had 
political acumen would be as sensitive as we were to the legislative program. If he did not have that background, it was possible that it took a while for it to fully penetrate. You 
can't divorce politics from all of this. An Orville Freeman or a Stu Udall, they're politicians, and nobody had to explain it to them. But you had to educate some of the 
others, and the education wasn't that difficult, once they got lectured at a cabinet meeting by the President. The question would be directed right to that department and that cabinet 
member, and he'd have to explain to me before his colleagues and to the President why there hadn't been greater progress on the particular item. He'd have to be specific: who he 
had talked to; who had talked to whom, what were the assistant secretaries doing, how much time did they spend on the Hill--it never ended. So nobody could say, "I wasn't 
aware of the intense interest of the fellow in the Oval Office and my responsibility." 
G: There's a story that one member of Congress was giving one of these speeches that had been written for him by Hardesty's group, and two copies were stapled together 
inadvertently, and the fellow didn't know that and gave the same speech twice; just in the middle of it started over: "Mr. President," and went all the way through it again. Have 
you ever heard that? 
O: I don't know about that one, no. 
(Laughter) 
G: Were there some snafus in connection with this? 
O: I don't recall. The frustration in that area had to do with the people who were supposed to be working with you in the executive branch--no matter what you handed a friend up 
there, he went with it. You had to use judgments and obviously not overextend yourself, but it was doable and it filled a void. You don't want to overlook any possibility and that, 
of course, went to the White House staff. Everybody became part of congressional relations. 
G: The operation was considered relatively confidential, though, I gather, that this was not something that was advertised or--O: 
We tried to maintain it that way; we kept it informal in terms of the White House. I mean, you couldn't look at a White House table of organization and say, "Here's a group that is 
feeding the Congress," for obvious reasons. Nor did you have it in formal context on the 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --9 
Hill. These were people our friends on the Hill knew were part of our operation in the White House. We wanted to avoid any media focus on this activity, because it could be 
misconstrued and it could be embarrassing to people on the Hill. 
You were dealing with friends. You're not going to somebody who is a borderline case and doesn't have a very good voting record with you. 
G: Was there also an element of responding to the criticisms that other members had made--O: 
Oh, of course. 
G: --that this was a way to get out a rebuttal? 
O: That was an integral part of it. You have to remember, this would start as dawn broke every morning, when Jake Jacobsen got through combing the Congressional Record and 
identifying every reference that would indicate support for the program, or favorable expressions regarding the President. He would then hand deliver to the President this 
Congressional Record, marked so he could go to these various sections, and he maintained a daily overview. Adverse comments, of course, alerted us immediately, 
because you would try to get to rebuttal as rapidly as you could. 
G: Was the operation limited to the Congress, or was this sort of research help prepared for people outside the Congress? 
O: Occasionally outside. If you were, for example, on the Elementary and Secondary Education Bill, you had noncongressional sources. But the focus was basically on the 
Congress. 
G: Yes. But you're speaking of educational groups or--O: 
That's right, in that instance, where we had this unique alliance of the NEA and the Catholic educators. 
G: What about the press? Was there any effort to get favorable stuff to them that friendly reporters might use? 
O: No. No, we handled the press basically the same way throughout the years. My people were free to do backgrounders as long as they advised me of them. That was not an easy 
area because after all, you would be considered by most of the press as being self-serving. But you were more apt to await press contact, which was frequent. Obviously, there 
were members of the press in contact with you in one way or another as the program progressed, and we made every effort to disseminate our periodic reports on progress and 
our year-end report on the record of accomplishment. Our effort was to do as much of that as we possibly could and hope the reaction would be favorable. 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --10 
I always recall one of Washington's top writers, Pete Lisagor, who wrote that there was minimal accomplishment in the Congress, that our program was not moving well. 
Then at the end of the session he was good enough to call me and say, "I misjudged this whole thing, and I'm going to go do a series of articles on real accomplishment this year, 
contrary to my articles during the year and my projections." But that was a rarity. 
Through 1966 you didn't have a great problem, because the record was there. It was hard for anybody to find fault with it. The record was so impressive there was a point 
where some members of the media said, "This is a great record." Then some said, "Congress is nothing but a rubber-stamp." Some chose that course. Rather than to 
compliment the administration, they were apt to berate the Congress for passing so much legislation; there was something wrong with that, too. 
G: Let's look at some of the Vietnam issues in 1967. There was early on a disagreement between Secretary of Defense [Robert] McNamara and General [Earle] Wheeler over the 
effectiveness of the bombing. 
O: Yes. 
G: My impression is that the bombing became increasingly an issue in 1967. 
O: Yes, it did, and I think those who were opposed to the escalation of the bombing took great comfort in the differing views of the Secretary of Defense and Wheeler as to the 
effectiveness of the bombing. I don't recall that McNamara's testimony was the reverse of Wheeler's testimony and contentions. It was a matter of degree, where Wheeler was 
saying they were extremely effective and McNamara was saying, "I'm not claiming they're that effective." But the fact is there was a differing view as to the degree of effectiveness. 
At all the cabinet meetings I attended during that period, reports were upbeat, and progress was detailed. And it was always progress. You could become rather a cynic 
yourself, sitting at the cabinet meetings. I guess I've mentioned it before, but I remember telling Henry Hall Wilson, who was on my staff, after one cabinet meeting, that I 
wondered how many thousands of bridges there must be in North Vietnam, because the hundreds of bridges each week I heard about that were disappearing, you wouldn't think 
there would be a bridge left. So I think I was sitting there taking this in and wondering myself about the accuracy of a lot of it. But it was all well-meaning, and there was a 
feeling things were going well, that we were having elections over there at some stage, that we were going to ensure that democracy was in place in South Vietnam, that there 
was light at the end of the tunnel. And it was a long time before that attitude began to change. 
G: What was the President's reaction to these continued reports of progress? Did he show any skepticism in cabinet meetings? 
O: He would listen attentively and perhaps pose two or three questions. But you have to 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --11 
understand cabinet meetings that I saw in both the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. Johnson had more cabinet meetings than Kennedy, and they were more structured. The 
agendas were carefully prepared and back-up material was provided to the President, and the agenda was pretty much adhered to. How long do cabinet meetings last? An hour or 
two. And each person, or most everyone at the table, would have something to report. When it got to the Defense Department you had a summary from Bob McNamara, a 
progress summary. It would include some specifics such as the number of bridges or whatever. But I don't recall where we got into a prolonged, detailed discussion of 
Vietnam. It was more a feeling that the members of the cabinet ought to be updated, but there was no need to discuss substantively ongoing Vietnam matters with the cabinet. 
G: I gather that the Tuesday luncheons were a forum much more for Vietnam than--O: 
You mean the leadership--? 
G: No, the Tuesday luncheons with McNamara and [Dean] Rusk and--O: 
Yes. And rightly so, because, you know, at a cabinet meeting you'd have the secretary of agriculture, the postmaster general, the secretary of the interior and what have you, and 
this is not their area of expertise, but inasmuch as they are members of the cabinet, then they ought to be given an update or a briefing. 
G: Senator Joseph Clark introduced a sense-of-the-Congress resolution to limit the air war over North Vietnam and also to limit the number of American troops. 
O: Yes, he used early on in that session an authorization or appropriation, I guess, to see if he could tack on some limitations--number of troops and that none of the monies could be 
used for bombing in the North. It didn't get very far, and there was a Mansfield substitute. But at that point, it's interesting to note, you're talking about January, February, of 1967? 
G: Yes. 
O: Was it Wayne Morse, Clark? And there was a third senator. 
G: I think Gaylord Nelson. 
O: Yes, it was Nelson, who became involved in trying to establish a sense of the Senate on escalation. In that early stage of that Ninetieth Congress, you didn't have any takers. It 
was limited to those three, and Joe Clark particularly, I think, tried to pursue this further on in the legislative process. My recollection is on the House side there was little or no 
effort to try to limit or contain the President. So at those early stages of the Ninetieth Congress, the President was still in good shape with the Congress regarding Vietnam. 
G: LBJ wrote secretly to Ho Chi Minh proposing direct talks, and this offer was rejected. Do you recall that? Did you have any--? 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --12 
O: No, other than knowing that it occurred. 
G: Then after the rejection there was bombing and mining of the navigable rivers. 
O: Well, that was after the rejection when the bombing escalated. There was a feeling that Lyndon Johnson had turned even more hawkish, and there again, while you might have 
discussions of this on the Hill and expressions of concern, those concerns weren't being manifested by any actions or pronouncements that would be adverse. But the doves 
became a little more concerned than they had been. They interpreted that as meaning that Johnson had chosen the route of full escalation; that what Russell and others have 
suggested was about to happen. To this day people suggest that the failure of the Vietnam policy had to do with the failure to bite the bullet. You were trying to achieve an 
objective without the commitment. 
G: Martin Luther King became more active in opposition to the war. 
O: That certainly was a contributing factor to the escalation of the anti-Vietnam attitude. Once he succeeded in taking the civil rights movement into the anti-Vietnam movement, 
that had a considerable effect on congressional concern and public attitude. 
G: Yes. How did LBJ react to this development of first urging the merger between the peace movement and the civil rights movement and then joining in a peace demonstration in New 
York? 
O: I know our general White House attitude, which probably reflected his attitude, was one of resentment. Here's the Johnson Administration, in the forefront of civil rights, and 
we've been working in tandem, and he proceeds to arbitrarily take his following into the anti-Vietnam camp, or bringing them together, whichever way you describe it. And I 
think our first reaction was that we were not pleased at all with Dr. King. I can't verbatim recount the President's reaction, but I do recall that the subject was discussed on a number 
of occasions as this unfolded, and the President was distressed and disturbed. 
G: Did he make any effort to reduce King's opposition, or--? 
O: I don't recall anything specific in that regard. King's motivation, I suppose, was as pure as anything would be. But from our point of view, we considered this broadened his base. 
He was the leader of the civil rights movement, no one questioned his leadership, and this was a move on his part to broaden his base and increase his strength as a leader. So I 
think we were looking at it as rather a callous act rather than one motivated by conscience. Perhaps that was grossly unfair to Martin Luther King, but you can picture us 
sitting in the White House reacting that way, nevertheless. 
G: How would you characterize Johnson's attitude toward King at this point? 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --13 
O: It would be hard for me, and I don't think I should try to unless I could recall specific discussions with him. Dr. King had been a meaningful force in bringing about or forcing, 
if you will, the Congress into action. This was in our interest, any advocacy of civil rights legislation that flowed from the private sector benefited the effort that we were engaged 
in. But that didn't mean that you had a love affair between King and Johnson. They had a common interest. 
G: Did you detect a spirit of rivalry between them? 
O: No. Lyndon Johnson, as you know, had been the victim throughout of a degree of cynicism on the part of the civil rights stalwarts, who continued for a long time to question 
the degree of his commitment. It came into focus at the time of the home rule fight in the House, where the liberals gave up on the fight and Johnson continued to pursue the fight 
and the discharge petition. That certainly was evidence of his commitment in this area, whether it was voting rights or home rule or civil rights. And I don't know what more 
evidence was needed by some of the liberals and some of the leaders of the civil rights movement as to his commitment. I never had any question about his commitment, but I 
must say that the commitment I knew he had and that he expressed to me a thousand times was underscored by what I observed personally in that particular little sidebar 
struggle on home rule. Nevertheless, throughout the civil rights struggle you were always coping with some question about commitment. 
G: During this time, Ellsworth Bunker replaced Henry Cabot Lodge as ambassador to South Vietnam. 
O: Yes. Henry Cabot Lodge, in his initial acceptance of the ambassadorship when President Kennedy named him, was a surprise to us. I don't recall the specifics of his departure. 
Somewhere in 1967 I noted in a memo that I was explaining to the President why I was so busily engaged in so many matters that I didn't feel I had the time to go to Vietnam 
as I had been asked to. There were a couple of incidents along the route where some people for some reason thought that I should be assigned to Vietnam on the organization 
of the election process over there. I had no interest whatsoever in that kind of involvement, but apparently this continued on until late 1967, and the memo does not 
recall the details to me, but it does recall that there were at least a couple of occasions when this cropped up. I know one of them was Henry Cabot Lodge requesting that I be 
assigned to Vietnam. I guess he admired my activity in the Senate contest in 1952, when Kennedy beat him in Massachusetts, and thought maybe it could be put to use over there, 
I don't know. But, in any event, I didn't go to Vietnam. 
G: Did you feel that this political system was not transferable to Vietnam, or that--? 
O: I don't know as I gave it that much thought. I don't want to suggest that I was oblivious to everything that was transpiring in Vietnam, but I was not privy to in-depth policy 
discussions or strategy discussions regarding Vietnam. I don't know if that was the 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --14 
motivating factor in suggesting to the President that I go to Vietnam. I can tell you that I had a later experience in the Philippines, where I applied an American campaign procedure 
to Marcos' democratic election, and I felt quite good about it. I was obviously taken aback when democracy disappeared from the Philippines a few years later. 
G: In connection with Vietnam, Rutherford Poats' nomination as deputy administrator of AID was confirmed--O: 
After a real struggle. 
G: It was a battle. 
O: It was a real battle, spearheaded by the senator from Indiana. 
G: Birch Bayh. 
O: Birch Bayh, yes. 
G: What was the problem with Poats? 
O: Birch had a real hang-up in this case, and obviously had a lot of support among his colleagues. He took on this battle because he was totally disenchanted with his operation 
in his position with AID. I don't think it had elements of Vietnam policy as much as Birch's view that this fellow was inept, that he had functioned poorly in his position. 
G: The recommittal motion failed by one vote. Do you recall how the administration was able to defeat that? 
O: I knew that Birch, who was a friend and always a solid fellow with us, was not going to be deterred. Of course, we were left in the position of trying to block him. He gave it his all, 
and we had to devote time and attention to what shouldn't have been that attention-getting. But that's the sort of thing that can happen from time to time. You run 
into a situation like this, and all of a sudden you find that you're heavily engaged in a very time-consuming effort and that was what happened there. I suppose if we had known in 
advance that this would be this much of a problem, we probably would have found another way of handling the appointment. But we were caught with it. 
G: The Glassboro Conference took place that June. Did you have any role in that at all, either from a distance or--? 
O: It was limited to some activity in ensuring favorable reaction on the Hill, but that would be peripheral. That would be in the normal course of things, another presidential activity that 
you hoped would elicit favorable comments from the leadership and others. 
G: What was the reaction to the conference on the Hill? 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --15 
O: It was quite favorable. Image-wise it seemed to create a favorable reaction. As far as the President was concerned, he got solid marks and I believe that overall it was a plus. And 
it was a needed plus in the foreign policy area at that time. 
Now you're moving more and more into this "anti" situation, as far as Vietnam is concerned. This was an indication of a very active and involved president in the foreign 
policy area, extending beyond Vietnam. 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 1 
G: Also in June, the Six Day War between Egypt and Israel occurred. Do you have any recollections [of that]? 
O: Well, there again, it didn't have any impact on our legislative progress on the domestic side. It attracted a tremendous amount of attention throughout the world and in the 
United States, but it did not impact on us in terms of what we were engaged in. 
G: You were not involved specifically in any discussions relating to this? 
O: No. So you got midway in that year, and there's a rising concern about the cost of the Vietnam War, and the diversion, supposedly, of monies from anti-poverty projects and the 
rest. That, coupled with the riots in Newark and in Detroit at that time, added another dimension to this rising storm that we referred to that continued to increase in velocity as 
the year unfolded. Now you're at mid-1967, and then you have the Joint Economic Committee Report, which fueled the fire. It created an opportunity for those opposed to 
the Vietnam War or concerned about the war to point to the economic factor, which created another dimension and a further opportunity for the growing number of critics. 
They could in the economic area say, "Now let's stop talking about the policy for a moment. Let's talk about the domestic economic impact. That's something that we all 
should be concerned about. That's an added dimension to this problem." Which was a normal evolvement. After all, criticism was growing month after month in any event. 
G: Certainly one of the economic elements here was the proposal for a tax surcharge--O: 
Yes. 
G: --that the President proposed in his State of the Union Message. 
O: What was it, 6 per cent? 
G: Yes, initially 6 per cent and then when it was reproposed it went to 10 per cent. Let me ask you to discuss this issue. 
O: This flew right into the face of the procedure of the Chairman of the Ways and Means 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --16 
Committee. The contention was that, first of all, we obviously had underestimated the cost of the war, that basically what you were trying to do was preserve your domestic 
programs and try to secure additional revenue to overcome the shortfall that the war was causing, which was 
detrimental to the progress of the domestic programs. No matter what face you put on it, that's just where you were. It was a means of securing some additional revenue, increase 
taxes. And to accomplish that, you were going to have to convince Wilbur Mills. You're never going to get anywhere unless you convince Wilbur Mills. My recollection is that 
Wilbur followed pretty much his normal procedure: he was quite critical of the presentation by the administration; he found fault with witnesses, he found fault with the 
details, he found fault with the backup, every aspect of it. He was not enthusiastic at all about the proposal, and certainly not at all optimistic about any ultimate success. 
This dragged on, and I believe that Wilbur Mills took it off the front burner. Then late in the session he decided to renew the discussion in his committee, and then ultimately 
it folded. The concentration was on convincing Wilbur Mills that he should accept the leadership role in the House that was required to bring this about. 
G: I think perhaps housing starts had slowed down or something to indicate that the economy was slowing down. 
O: That would justify giving it another look and a more serious look. But an awful lot of effort was put into that over many, many months, and there were times during the course 
of that battle where we, I think, convinced ourselves that we in turn could convince Wilbur. But the reality of it was we didn't come close. 
G: One of Mills' objections was apparently the notion that the surcharge would be temporary. He challenged that. 
O: Very much so, and he had the grounds for that. He pointed to prior surcharges that were temporary that never seemed to be removed. That was a pretty strong argument, that 
"I've listened to you telling about the temporary basis with total assurances, but I can tell you from my own experience it just doesn't happen that way. I'm not pleased with the idea 
of imposing a permanent increase in taxes, no matter what you tell me about your good intentions, because there's nothing built into the legislation that would terminate it on a 
given date. It's just your promises." I believe that was the way the debate went. And Wilbur, not being a staunch advocate in any event, knew that was a good debating point, 
that what you're really doing is enacting an escalation in taxes that will remain on the books. 
G: To what extent was Mills' opposition simply opposition to the surtax rather than opposition to the spending level? 
O: Basically, Mills--and I think the history of the Ways and Means Committee will prove the case--did not take kindly to chairing a committee that was going to increase taxes, 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --17 
particularly if he saw that perhaps he would never get it done in the other body. He couldn't see the votes there. There was nothing, really, to encourage Wilbur to take this 
on. 
Basically, what were we trying to have him do? Raise taxes. What you're talking about is trying to secure additional revenue for the conduct of the war. As I said, you 
have the shortfall; you have the disruption of domestic programs, you have the escalating costs of the war. So we weren't on strong ground. Under any normal set of 
circumstances, this would have been based on economics, and perhaps you would have succeeded. But here you had Vietnam. Wilbur Mills was a hawk, but not to the point 
where he was ready to put his reputation on the line to raise taxes. (Laughter) 
G: Ultimately, Mills did go along with the surtax when it was coupled with a budget cut. 
O: That speaks for itself. There's the handle. 
G: Any insights on his deliberations with Johnson during this period? You had two strong men. 
O: This extended over such a long period of time--months--the effort on our part was intensive. You hark back to Wilbur Mills, for example, on Medicare and the period of 
time that it took to ultimately bring it about, all the way from adamancy, Kerr-Mills and the rest. 
You cannot underestimate the power of Wilbur Mills. He not only was chairman of that committee, but knew more on any given subject than any other member. He 
worked harder at it than any other member. He devoted his time and attention seven days a week to that committee and its affairs, and he had a very strong hand on the committee. 
No member of that committee, including senior Democrats who were friendly to us, had the temerity to take the Chairman on. We could wheel and deal till hell froze over. The 
fact is you had to get to the point where Wilbur Mills said, "I am prepared, after you prove to me that the votes are there, to stick my neck out and lead this parade once the 
parade is formed." 
The record shows that every aspect of the New Frontier-Great Society programs that related to the Ways and Means Committee was enacted into law. You can say, "It 
should have happened sooner," but it happened. So Wilbur played an extremely important role during those years. 
Now, Wilbur didn't say, "The President doesn't seem to be getting this Vietnam War resolved." That wouldn't enter into it. But I don't think you could remove Vietnam 
from everything at that time. Truth-in-lending had nothing to do with Vietnam whatsoever, but we couldn't get it across the finish line. Now, under the same set of 
circumstances, two years earlier or a year earlier, that legislation would have been enacted. 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --18 
G: To what extent do you think the budget estimates that were conservative, the outlays ended up being more than anticipated, to what extent did this element, do you think, 
contribute to Mills' position? 
O: An administration will go forward with budget estimates and exceed them. That's not something that would shock somebody. 
G: He was accustomed to that. 
O: He might use it in conversation with you. 
G: Did you yourself feel that the administration was working with reasonably accurate figures on the cost of the war, or were the--? 
O: I would say they were reasonably accurate, but it's like any cost projections. The escalation of the war became fairly rapid and would throw those figures out of whack. I 
don't think it was something purposely put together to try to fool someone at all. 
G: You don't think there was any deception involved; it was just a--O: 
No. I think that the events brought about the increases that necessitated some kind of action if we were going to maintain a domestic program. I think the record reflects that 
when Mills took another look at it at a couple of days of hearings late in that session, that was based on some kind of economic factors. But there were just two days of hearings 
and it was set aside again. 
G: Shall we talk about the federal pay raise and the postal rate issue? 
O: Yes. The proposal to adjust postal rates doesn't arouse great enthusiasm. Very little that happens in the Post Office Department arouses enthusiasm or interest. In an 
administration it's something that you have to live with. It's almost like talking about the debt ceiling or foreign aid; I mean, people don't get exercised about it, but complain a 
great deal about service. 
In any event, this was a package that the President decided to list with his proposals for the Ninetieth Congress, and it ran into a buzz saw, which was anticipated. 
Third-class mail, so-called junk mail, is represented by a very strong lobby. They could be very aggressive, even overly aggressive, and there were indications that their 
aggressiveness was counterproductive in terms of their efforts to scuttle this. But then the real problem that occurred was that the employees' pay bill was a separate item, and the 
President had put a cap on it--there would be no pay raise extending beyond 4 1/ 2 per cent, I guess. The postal employees lobby, as I've said before, is a very, very strong lobby, 
really grass roots, with seven hundred thousand members across the country. So it was decided that perhaps they were going to increase the pay raise in the Congress, and how 
were they going to get that past a presidential veto? The idea was, let's couple the two 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --19 
bills, the rate bill and the pay bill. I think it was rather remarkable that that bill wended its way through the House and Senate with all the lobbying against the bill, and came out in 
reasonably good shape. It also incorporated a provision on executive pay--the creation of a commission that proposed very significant increases from the cabinet level and that was 
put into effect at a later date. It was all started in this proposal. 
What you had was the rate increase, which was an absolute steal. These people with great profit centers were having this service rendered to them at reduced or 
ridiculous rates. We were able to garner something meaningful. We wound up with the federal employee pay increase and an executive pay proposal. This legislation does not 
have a great deal of glamour to it. My recollection is that even though this was a considerably different bill than the original proposal, the end result of having legislation 
that made some significant impact on rates was pleasing to me. What we got I was reasonably satisfied with. 
G: H. R. Gross introduced an amendment targeting the second-and third-class increases and was supported by Wilbur Mills and Gerald Ford. That amendment lost narrowly; I think 
the vote was 199 to 211. Do you recall that? 
O: Gross was a member of the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, and he was a very difficult member of the House. He was supposedly the expert on parliamentary procedure 
and utilizing it in a negative sense. 
G: In the federal pay raise, OEO employees were excluded. Do you recall that issue? 
O: They were initially excluded, I think, in the House. But I believe that they were included in final passage. 
G: Yes. 
O: It was a cheap shot, and it's rather surprising that it worked initially. I recall that we never felt it was going to stay in the legislation, and it didn't. I don't know how you could have 
justified that legislative action. 
G: You also had the issue of the seating of Adam Clayton Powell. 
O: That brought into play all the sensitivities in terms of the reluctance of the Congress to act against its members. But Adam had defied them to the point where it was unavoidable. 
We've gone through Adam's activities legislatively in the context of our problems with him as chairman of the Labor and Education Committee, and the problems the leadership had 
with him. He was a defiant fellow who enjoyed raising the hackles of everyone, particularly southerners. So he carried it to a point where even some of his--not 
necessarily staunch defenders, but people who did not have any personal animosity toward him, John McCormack would be one, were left in an untenable situation. While they 
didn't seat him, it resulted in a special election. Adam then won re-election 
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overwhelmingly and retired to Bimini, as I recall. That was difficult, because it had racial overtones and all the rest of it. 
G: Did the White House have a position in this? 
O: No, we tried to adhere to the separation of powers. 
(Laughter) 
We were respectful of the prerogatives of the Congress. There was a point when there were efforts made to engage us, but I remember walking a tightrope. The last thing I 
wanted to get involved in was this. I don't even recall discussing it with the President. Maybe I did, because obviously he was aware of what was transpiring. It was clear that if 
we could avoid involvement in this matter we were going to be the better for it. That might indicate some lack of courage, but I don't look at it that way. I was being realistic. 
G: Did Powell seek the administration's help in this? 
O: I don't recall he did. 
Actually, Adam, who frustrated me no end, never reached the point of causing me to dislike him. I always succeeded in seeing good in Adam. He liked to be defiant and 
rather enjoyed stirring the pot. Those who didn't have the stomach for removing him, he gave no help to at all. He remained defiant and remained to the end a fellow who couldn't 
care less about personal views and didn't seem to appreciate the fact that there were people who wanted to be helpful. 
G: Was the Powell seating issue an embarrassment to the leadership? 
O: Yes. 
G: My impression is that McCormack came out badly on it. 
O: Yes. 
G: It seemed to get out of control. 
O: Yes. It was an embarrassment. It's fair to say that traditionally in the Congress there's a keen desire to avoid that kind of confrontation. They tried to cover over and say, "It 
could be me tomorrow." It takes an awful lot for the Congress to confront a situation such as this. And this had the added dimension of racial overtones. So McCormack didn't 
enjoy this at all. He had to accept the responsibility, and ultimately that's what happened. You're a loser in that sort of a situation no matter whether right and justice are on your 
side. 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --21 
G: Were the civil rights groups inclined to stay out of this struggle? 
O: Surprisingly, my recollection is that there was little effort on the part of the civil rights groups. That was due to the difficult situation of defending Adam. It was difficult even 
for the civil rights groups to strongly defend him. So that did not surface to the degree I think people in the House feared. 
G: Let me ask you to talk about the censure of Tom Dodd. 
O: There, too, that was an internal matter in the Senate. It didn't involve us and it wasn't that we were avoiding involvement. We were very careful in the Adam Powell situation not to 
be involved, and there wasn't pressure to involve us in any event. In the Dodd situation there was not the remotest indication there should be some involvement on the part of the 
White House. This was internal, which the House matter was on Powell, for that matter. 
G: Were you surprised by the revelations in the Senate? 
O: Yes. I knew Tom Dodd quite well. He was a solid Democrat, he was a liberal, and his record reflected staunch support. It surprised me completely. 
G: Really? 
O: Yes. You feel that wouldn't happen, because it's such a rarity. But it did. I thought that his son showed great courage and commitment to his father when he chose to seek the 
Senate. He was elected to the Senate--that's got to be a real difficult situation for the young man. In a sense he was defending his father's reputation by going to the people 
himself successfully. 
G: Let's look at the Elementary and Secondary Education Bill passed that year, extending the authorization for school aid and the Teacher Corps through fiscal 1969. This bill was 
styled as the largest school aid bill in history. 
O: It was. And it proved to be difficult. The efforts that were expended by [Albert] Quie and some of the Republicans to try to scuttle this took on a dimension that perhaps we hadn't 
anticipated. Everything was thrown into this in terms of negatives. The highlight, from at least my perspective, was our ability to bring together these divergent groups, divergent in 
their views on the role of education and separation of church and state. It was a heartwarming experience to find that the National Catholic Welfare Conference and the 
NEA could ensure the ultimate passage of this legislation, because it could have been so easily scuttled. It was particularly important to the President. This area of education was 
always [one he] was totally involved in and his commitment to education was so strong that it would have been most unfortunate if we weren't able to succeed. But the 
accommodations to Mrs. [Edith] Green, to the various elements of the bill, made it a long trip. 
25
O'Brien --Interview XIX --22 
G: Quie had proposed block grants instead of the approach in the bill, and the block grants would have allowed for considerably more latitude, the states deciding how to spend the 
money. 
O: It might give the states more latitude, but it also would severely restrict any private-school benefit from this. No matter what was said in the debate, that was what was involved. 
Obviously if Quie had prevailed, you would have lost the support of the private school area and, in my judgment, the support of any number of liberal Democrats, and, as we had 
experienced in the past, [have] the extreme difficulty of passing education legislation. 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 2 
O: The ability of the NEA, NCWC, and others to oppose the amendment, knowing that you had to follow that course to achieve legislation, was rather remarkable; it was a tribute to 
people who really were dedicated to education and were willing to adjust to ensure a meaningful federal role in this area. That was exciting--I don't often say that about 
legislative proposals, because much of it was sweat, blood and tears and you found it difficult to find the excitement quotient. But in this it was because we were so pleased to 
be able to work with these private-sector groups under difficult circumstances. I think that you got into the problem in the Senate with this, too, with Senator Russell, and in the 
House, the Fountain amendment. So it had civil rights aspects to it, and that accommodation was made by ensuring that anybody who might lose benefits by failure to 
fully comply with the law would be advised of the problem early on in a given year and not at the end of the year, so there was adjustment that satisfied people who weren't pleased 
with the legislation. Those people finally accommodated to the overall effort, which is a tribute to them. This had intriguing, interesting elements to it. 
G: I wanted you to reflect on the Education and Labor Committee for a minute after Powell's chairmanship. You now had Carl Perkins and there's some suggestion, for example, that 
Perkins was not able to control Edith Green as Powell had been able to, that she was a lot more of an obstacle, or perceived as an obstacle by the administration, than she had been 
under Powell. 
O: Edith Green had strong views and those views oftentimes were contrary to our interests and Elementary-Secondary would be an example. She felt we should rigidly adhere to the 
separation of church and state. This was something that she strongly believed in; it wasn't anti-anybody. And Carl Perkins was not Adam Powell. Adam Powell in his own 
inimitable way exercised a great deal of power and control over that committee, not only with Edith but with others. There was deferring to Powell, a toleration of Powell's 
on-again-off-again activities. The failure of the committee to perform its tasks without delays was to a great extent due to Powell. I would say that Adam Powell had a degree of 
influence over Edith comparable to the degree of influence he had over a number of members of the committee. Carl Perkins' style and his approach were not similar. So 
perhaps Edith Green's opposition to the committee would be less apparent under Powell than under Perkins. But I'm not persuaded that it went to the point where Adam Powell 
26
O'Brien --Interview XIX --23 
could control Edith Green and Carl Perkins couldn't. I don't think either one of them could. 
Key members were helpful to us through the Adam Powell period and into the Carl Perkins period, people like Jim O'Hara and Hugh Carey, and there were others who were 
strong people. 
G: Thompson? 
O: Yes, Topper Thompson or Frank Thompson. Those people really made it for us on occasion after occasion. While they wouldn't take on Adam, they would become as 
frustrated as we were. We were dependent on maybe six members of that committee who consistently fought the battle to see that we finally prevailed. The fact is that the 
productivity of that committee over those years was very impressive. 
G: It looks like there was some sort of coalition on this issue between the southerners who wanted to alter the provisions cutting off funds to schools which discriminated, and Edith 
Green, for example, who wanted to have the state education agencies have control over the Title III funds. Was this in effect, as you saw it, an unholy alliance between--? 
O: That was Edith's interests on the one hand and the southerners' interests on the other. So that's the way that evolved. It isn't that somebody said, "Let's form an alliance." It came 
about because it was a rather obvious procedure to follow. 
G: Everett Dirksen introduced an anti-busing amendment which he withdrew several days later. Do you recall that? 
O: I recall the introduction of the anti-busing amendment; I don't recall the motivation for withdrawal. That would be Everett thinking it over and deciding to enter into an 
accommodation with [Mike] Mansfield. 
G: The Teacher Corps was controversial. 
O: Yes. 
G: What do you recall of that? 
O: The strategy was to take it out of Higher Education and put it in elementary-secondary. The justification for that strategy could be debated, but our contention was that it was 
better suited there. Actually, we saw a better vehicle to assure passage. That was good judgment. 
That got us into conflict with Edith. She resented having it removed from Higher Education because that was her province. Our strategy was to get it away from her and 
get it into a more responsive subcommittee. 
27
O'Brien --Interview XIX --24 
G: I believe her opposition centered around local control over what the teachers were teaching in Teacher Corps, and just having some--O: 
Yes. I don't want to misconstrue Edith Green's interests. She had a profound interest in education, and I think that has to be emphasized. I don't want to suggest that she was 
simply a spoiler coming up with frivolous actions or attempts to derail. That wasn't the case at all. She had firm views as to the role of government in education. This is 
something that you had to accept and understand. She wasn't amenable to maneuvering. What might happen sometimes where a person may not feel that deeply or be that 
involved, you'd say, "Come on. You can go along with us." You couldn't have that kind of discussion with Edith. 
G: Okay. Truth-in-lending passed the Senate. 
O: Yes, it passed the Senate, but I don't know that we've touched on Paul Douglas, my admiration for him, and our dependency upon Douglas as the leader of this 
truth-in-lending struggle. I could never understand why we were so long delayed and found it so difficult to pass legislation of this nature. We couldn't get across to the public 
the intricacies of how you establish interest rates or how large the print is on a loan form. That eludes everyone. The lobby was strong from so many lending quarters. This effort 
extended over a number of years. 
G: Of course, one of the big issues was the disclosure of interest rates for revolving charge accounts. 
O: That's right. I think I allowed that legislation to get to me personally. It struck a chord with me, not comparable to Medicare and others, civil rights and what have you, but I felt 
very strongly about it. I thought it obscene, the way business was conducted, and I clearly saw the need for legislation in this area. I could never quite get through my head why our 
base of support wasn't broader and the involvement of more people didn't occur. The power of the lobby against this legislation was strong, and yet we weren't able to build a 
citizens' lobby to cope with it. 
There were people who suggested to us early that liberal Paul Douglas was not the right fellow to be the advocate, that it should have been somebody in the moderate or 
conservative wing that took on this battle, that this was another Douglas liberal idea. The substance of the argument seemed to be lost. I found it very frustrating. We brought the 
Senator in to testify in this go-around and did everything we could, but. . . . I'd suggest this was to some extent due to the climate of the time, but I don't think that that's 
accurate, either. I think this was in a unique category. It had a very strong opposition lobby through this session. 
G: Were the lobbyists largely financial institutions? 
28
O'Brien --Interview XIX --25 
O: When you think of it, all the way from the store-front lender to major New York banks. They found it very pleasant to hide the cold, hard reality of exorbitant interest rates on 
borrowers throughout this country. I found it revolting. However, it's only recently I read where people are not concerned about interest rates. We look at the credit card syndrome 
of today, 18 and 19 per cent interest rates, and nobody seems to get exercised about it. I guess perhaps human nature has always been that way. 
G: You also had the whole question of the campaign subsidy, the check-off and--let me ask you to reflect on that. 
O: That goes back several years, and we've talked of Russell Long's coup in getting it in the form of an amendment on the floor of the Senate when there were probably six senators 
present on a Friday afternoon. It goes back to the Carnegie Foundation. Jack Kennedy became enamored with this proposal early on. Now you find that you're prepared to put it 
into action, and the dismantling process starts. It turned out to be one battle that was on-again-off-again. I guess it was defeated on the floor of the Senate and adopted again 
and reconsidered. I was very much interested. This was legislation to affect American politics and what I thought was the most disturbing aspect of the process--that is the fund 
raising side. The fat-cat syndrome disturbed me no end over my years in campaigns. 
I wasn't naive enough to think you could have a program like this and have it affect the Senate and the House. These fellows were not going to voluntarily give up their 
decided advantage as incumbents. I remember a conversation with Ev Dirksen on this subject early on and Dirksen saying to me, "If you think for a minute that I'm going to 
support legislation when we outspend you guys two or three to one, that I'm going to support legislation that eliminates that advantage in a presidential election the Republicans 
have, you're crazy." It led to Dirksen and I discussing an option. You could either take public financing or go the private route. That intrigued him. "If you have that option, 
then it is something that I might take a look at." 
I felt strongly about the dollar check-off from the beginning, and I remember debates about friendly proposals that I just couldn't support. I was adamant and I was 
considered by some thickheaded about the dollar check-off. I felt the dollar check-off was the answer. It was a voluntary check-off; it wasn't even a dollar out of the taxpayer's 
pocket. It was an allocation of a dollar of his taxes. Give it a trial and that would determine public attitude. If you found a large percentage of participation on this 
voluntary basis, that would indicate the public is in support of this approach. The fact is that it's worked. 
Now, that hasn't eliminated presidential candidates getting into financial difficulties and incurring significant debt, but it does significantly reduce the impact of the fat cat. It 
made sense to me--one man, one vote, one dollar. The problem is that in the process of accommodating various powerful groups to lock this up, you had the provision that 
COPE, the political arm of labor, could pursue its fund raising. Obviously Dirksen and others said, "If we're going to do that, the National Association of Manufacturers and the 
29
O'Brien --Interview XIX --26 
others should have the same privilege." 
Even with that, I think that it was a significant breakthrough in containing this appalling financing of campaigns that almost left a for sale sign over the White House. 
However, PACs came along, and the proliferation of these political action committees, these self-serving pressure groups have created a poisoning of the process. The members 
of Congress who never wanted to have any restriction by way of federal financing of House and Senate campaigns, most of them are engaged throughout their terms of office 
in raising money, getting money through PACs. The Senate now is engaged, I hope seriously engaged, in coming up with a program comparable to the dollar check-off. That 
at least would limit those kinds of contributions. 
But to get back to this and election reform, Lyndon Johnson put our forces into this. We were committed to reforming the process. This goes back to the day we walked 
in the White House in January of 1961, when President Kennedy was completely committed to this. I must say that we sweated this, particularly on the Republican side. 
Because option or no option, it was a disadvantage to them. Look what's happened: Republican candidates have gone the route of federal financing. I remember one of the 
gimmicks to derail this was, "Where does it say that we're confined to a two-party system in this country?" At this point there happens to be two major parties, but candidates 
should be free to run without party label or create a new party and run--George Wallace. You can't pass legislation that effectively bars from the process any funding of the 
candidacy of a third or fourth party or fifth-party candidates. So we're going to build a formula that: if you've got five million votes, then you were compensated on a formula. 
I think back on all the roadblocks and yet it became the law, with its imperfections. It's far better than the situation that existed prior to the dollar check-off, and the sooner 
this Congress passes comparable legislation the better. I notice even at the state level now there are discussions about similar programs. Someday, hopefully, we'll achieve 
perfection within the bounds of human frailty that will clean up the election process and might restore confidence in the process that doesn't exist today. 
G: Where did the five million-dollar figure come from? 
O: It was a matter of negotiations and checking on how many votes have been gotten by third-or fourth-party candidates, historically. I think 
Wallace had a vote count in that vicinity. I think it was a matter of negotiations. 
G: The idea was to keep it to so that the two major parties would be the ones to benefit. 
O: If George Wallace established a party and it got this minimum of five million votes, he was entitled to benefits because it would become a legitimate and established party. It 
wouldn't be just a one-shot situation. The media was editorializing on this at that time, particularly conservative media, Republican media, pointing to this weak link. What were 
these two parties trying to do, effectively bar forever the establishment of another party? 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --27 
You had to be alert to that and respond to it, and that's how you came up with the five-million formula. 
G: Aside from Republicans, who else comprised the opposition? 
O: There were people who legitimately felt that this was not a role of government. But you can see built into this the corrective measures. Most of the argument went to, would there 
be any kind of allocation mandated of taxpayers' money in this process? The voluntary check-off, there were many who chuckled to themselves when it was adopted, saying that 
this isn't going to happen. The first income tax form following this came out with the dollar check-off column toward the end of the form, pretty much buried in the form. Then 
we took on the effort of changing that, to put it up front in the form, at the top. It was buried and most people didn't even know it was there, and there are people who don't 
know it's there today. But I can tell you that with my income tax return each year, that's the first thing I do, check that box. But if a taxpayer didn't want a dollar of his tax money 
allocated, it wouldn't be allocated. So we finally took care of all the arguments of the opposition. 
G: Okay, let's talk about election reform. This was a proposal that LBJ had made in 1966; however, the 1967 measure did not include the plan for disclosing outside income and 
gifts by members of Congress. 
O: Lyndon Johnson's proposal was creative and on target. This wasn't the dollar check-off. This went beyond that. There was a tolerance of the dollar check-off because it wasn't 
going to impact on incumbents in Congress. But now you suggest that there be a disclosure and detailed limitations on income that might be related to their office. And this 
of course applied across the board to all federal elections and primaries, even pre-convention campaigning. 
Tape 3 of 3, Side 1 
G: Did the President ever talk about this measure with you; did he ever discuss it? 
O: Oh, yes. We had extensive discussion of it. 
G: What was his philosophy behind it? 
O: He saw what I think everyone saw, that this was a freewheeling situation without accountability, that it left itself open to all kinds of devious activities. It was a 
contributing factor to what even then was the public attitude toward politicians and the process. His view was that somebody has to take the lead, and there's only one guy who 
can take the lead. This is not going to flow from the Congress. There has to be strong advocacy, and leadership, and a formal proposal. So the President will take the leadership 
in this. This went right to the heart of the political process, or at least certainly to an important element of it. The scurrying around on the Hill on this on the House side was 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --28 
interesting. There was some sick humor. There were people running for cover and avoiding involvement. They were not comfortable with registering objection, just utilizing 
all kinds of internal procedures to delay and derail. 
G: Can you give me some examples of what--? 
O: The contentions of unfairness [that] somehow [were] inherent in this. The violation of a member's privacy was primarily the argument, and I hear it today. In the legislature of the 
state of New York the other day, people [were] fighting the governor's contention that there should be disclosure saying, "We're citizens and we don't ask other citizens to follow 
any prescription such as this. Why should we be singled out?" 
Of course they should be singled out. An officeholder is not an average citizen, and the responsibility is inherent to disclose. Now, of course, it's automatic for top 
officeholders to disclose their income tax returns. It is an invasion of privacy in a sense, but I think it's essential if you're going to have knowledge of who these people are that are 
serving. It's a weak disclosure in the Congress now, but it's something. You're never going to see the time where you turn back the clock and I don't think you're ever going to 
see the time when you have a serious effort to repeal the dollar check-off. So I guess you have to be patient. But in this instance our friends on the Hill, and many of them were our 
friends, weren't about to be lulled into this kind of disclosure procedure. (Laughter) What are you going to say? "I'm against reform?" No, so you have to resort to activities 
to delay consideration. That's what happened. 
G: Charles Goodell was quoted as saying that the bill was being opposed by an unholy alliance or coalition of liberal Democrats, conservative southerners and Wayne Hays. 
O: That was probably fairly accurate. In this instance liberals and conservatives could have the same point of view. The conservative objection was the application of this to 
primaries. Liberals' objections were that this was a violation of individual rights. In each instance people were saying, "Don't misunderstand me. I'm for reform, but I don't think 
we're approaching it properly." So when Goodell describes it as an unholy coalition, I think he was underscoring that this issue crossed not only the aisle but all spectrums of 
opinion. Whether you were a liberal, a conservative or a moderate you might have personal concerns about this. 
G: But why would they single out Wayne Hays like this? 
O: I believe that Wayne Hays had something to do with it. Wasn't he in the committee position on this? 
G: Maybe so. 
O: I think so. 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --29 
G: This was the House Administration [Committee]? 
O: Yes, I think so. I think that's why he was singled out. 
G: Do you want to discuss the rail strike settlement? 
O: The record is clear on that--and it involved legislation, obviously. There were about three different occasions we had to ask for legislative action to terminate or avoid strikes. The 
President, because of transportation and what it means to the economy, must take on a battle of this nature, but he needs congressional support. That was an extended battle that 
ultimately was worked out. The final agreement was quite favorable to the employees, to the unions. But to avoid a national rail strike is a role of the president. Lyndon Johnson 
devoted a lot of time and effort to that. 
G: Did he? 
O: He had his sleeves rolled up. He was in the midst of it. 
G: What about your own involvement in this particular issue? 
O: There was involvement on our part. We had to come back three times, I guess, to the Congress. We were busily engaged in trying to get the back-up legislative action to 
support the President. Of course, there was a lot of pressure being exerted on the Congress not to act. That took on the same form as a legislative proposal; you had head 
counts and all the rest. 
G: Okay. The rat control measure was initially defeated in the House. Do you recall that one? 
O: I must say, that's the darndest title for a legislative proposal that you could ever come up with. That opened itself up to some sick humor. Some wise guy said why don't we just 
enlist all the cats in the program; we could save a lot of money. It was subjected to a lot of ridicule until we began to look at some of the appalling statistics regarding this 
problem. 
G: It says fifty-one representatives switched their votes, forty-five of them Republicans. 
O: I think Martha Griffiths says that she put an end to the laughter by noting that rats have killed more persons than all the generals in history. Then somebody else says that the day 
before we had passed an anti-riot bill and we couldn't pass a rat bill. (Laughter) Then the President got into the act. He said that the government spent money to protect livestock 
from rodents; it seemed that they could afford to do the same to protect children. Even the leadership conference on civil rights got into it. 
Well, the switch of the Republicans came when they approached it from a different 
33
O'Brien --Interview XIX --30 
direction. There was so much criticism about the House ridiculing this and acting irresponsibly that they finally got a provision in the Partnerships for Health bill for forty 
million dollars without specifying that it was for rat control, but with the understanding that it was available for that purpose. That's when the large number of Republicans 
switched. 
(Interruption) 
O: We're not really in a position to do it. 
G: The [William] Manchester book [The Death of a President] was serialized in--I guess it started the serialization in 1967 and was published sometime thereafter. You said at the 
time publicly, or were quoted in the press as saying, that you thought the book contained factual inaccuracies, and--O: 
My recollection is that there was some controversy between Manchester and Jackie [Kennedy] somewhere along the line. 
G: Well, it had to do with the control of the material. I think that they had worked out some sort of agreement initially, and ultimately I believe the family wanted to exert some control 
over it and he didn't want them to. 
O: Yes. There were some glaring inaccuracies in the book. I can't really go back to them now, but I remember that I was disturbed. It had nothing to do with Jackie. I wouldn't 
have felt compelled to avoid Manchester because Jackie was disturbed with him. I know that I had some conversation with Manchester at some stage. I don't know when the book 
was published or the serialization started, but I had voiced some public comment about the inaccuracies. My recollection is that Ken O'Donnell was totally disturbed with 
Manchester. He just was completely aroused about Manchester. 
G: What was he disturbed about, do you [remember]? 
O: He said he was just completely off base in the book, that it was more than just a few inaccuracies. He said it was a completely false presentation. I saw a letter from 
Manchester to me. It's a fairly recent experience. He sent me a letter expressing his concern about my comments on his book, and it was by way of apology for 
misinformation that didn't, I don't believe, go to the heart of the book. I remember particularly in the letter he said it is unfortunate that he had never had the opportunity to 
have serious discussions with Ken O'Donnell during the project, because much of Ken's objection could have been avoided, and he indicated in the letter to me that perhaps his 
objections to some aspects of the book were valid. But Manchester was saying, "That's because Ken never gave me an opportunity." So that's really all I recall about Manchester. 
G: One of the things--I think you even wrote a letter to one of the magazines or newspapers at the time. Manchester maintained in the book that no male aide to President Kennedy 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --31 
witnessed the swearing-in of Lyndon Johnson on Air Force One, and I think in that case the photographs disproved this issue. 
O: Well, I was standing there with the Judge [Sarah Hughes]. I was the fellow who brought Jackie out of the room to join in the thing. If he wrote that in his book, then that was a 
complete inaccuracy, but I can't believe that I would have confined it just to that. Maybe so. 
I never saw Manchester again until the memorial service for Jack Kennedy in Washington. I was coming down the aisle and somebody jumped out of one of the pews 
and grabbed my hand; it was Manchester. So I don't know any more about it than that. I was intrigued with this memo showing all these phone calls, because obviously he was 
anxious to talk to me, and I guess the number of calls would indicate I wasn't as anxious to talk to him. 
And the Doris Kearns letter is addressed to me on May 25, 1967, in which she expresses her deep concern regarding some utilization of her name in an article that had 
indeed been brought to the President's attention by someone, and he had been very disturbed. 
G: Were you around him when he reacted to it? 
O: Not that I recall. She asked me for my help, and she said, "I feel unable to leave Washington until I'm sure that the President completely understands how and why my 
name came to be attached to an article in the New Republic I would never under any circumstances have written." It's a lengthy letter, and it goes on from there. It closes by 
saying, "I recognize how insignificant this issue is to the President, given the magnitude of the problems he must face daily, but I write just in case there might be a chance sometime 
in the future for you to communicate my feelings to him." I did communicate this to the President. Attached to it is a page and a half specifying in great detail how all this came 
about and what her role was. 
G: Well, you must have had some success, because she did stay around. 
O: That's my recollection. 
G: Do you think that if you hadn't intervened with the President she would have been removed from her--? 
O: I don't really know, but I guess the third paragraph of this letter speaks to why she's addressing me: "I come to you because I think you above everyone else will understand 
how I came to be involved in this macabre situation in the first place, for it was your visit that crystallized my interest in the problem of student alienation from politics and that 
stimulated me to assent to Sandy Levinson's request that I make a critique of an essay he was writing on the formation of an independent political bloc. Ironically, Sandy's request 
35
O'Brien --Interview XIX --32 
for my critique was based on his desire to have a criticism from one who shared your perspective. How from this critique I was tagged as co-author was the result of a set of 
circumstances described in the enclosed." I don't have any recollection beyond that. I discussed it with the President. I thought in fairness to her and under the circumstances 
the details of her letter and her attachment should be brought to his attention, and I did that. 
G: Anything on his reaction? 
O: I kind of lost track of things after that. This is May of 1967, and I don't recall any further contact with Doris or any further discussions. But it's a well-constructed letter and a very 
detailed attachment. Another memo in Miscellaneous is one I addressed to Marvin on July 10 of 1967. It was following a visit I made to Ireland, and I recall this very well. While I 
was in Ireland I met a number of officials of the Irish government, and I was with our ambassador, who at that time was Ambassador [Raymond] Guest, at some function during 
my private visit. At that time the Ambassador and officials of the Irish government made known to me their deep concern about a pending decision involving international air 
travel. My recollection is that it had to do with authorizing an American airline to have a schedule in and out of Ireland during the tourist season, which would be extremely 
adverse to the Irish airline activities. It turned out that Irish Airlines was one of the few businesses that were in place in Ireland and had fared well over the years. Apparently an 
American airline was seeking permission to move into their business. 
I remember advising them that I had no involvement in this sort of activity and therefore I had no knowledge of it. But they were urging me to make their concerns 
known, if I could, in some way to someone. They had given me a brief outline of what the problem was. I attached it to a detailed memo I sent Marvin, which was in part to 
discharge the commitment I had made that I'd make this known, and secondly to have it lead to a discussion I might have with the President on political grounds. I had some 
thoughts on it. But I certainly did not want to get involved with the State Department and butt into other people's activities. 
Following this memo I did bring the subject up directly with the President, and it was an interesting conversation; that's why I recall it. I told the President that this little 
country over there didn't have much going for it, certainly weren't beneficiaries of foreign aid or help of any kind, nor did they ever ask for any assistance from us. And this couldn't 
be an overly significant matter for whatever airline was involved, and yet it was awfully important to them in the progress of their airline business. The President, either at that 
point or subsequent to that, advised me that the recommendation from the State Department was awaiting his signature. He said, "When I think of the way the American 
Irish have supported the Democratic Party over the years, and how important it is to we Democrats, when I think of the Democrats in Boston and New York and Chicago, or the 
Irish Democrats and the Irish officeholders and their loyalty to the Democratic Party, you're right, Larry: we never have done anything for them. And I'm going to find out the 
details of this, and maybe there's an opportunity to do them a favor." It became a big 
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O'Brien --Interview XIX --33 
thing with the President. 
(Laughter) 
And I remember sitting there and thinking, "Gee, I didn't come in here to get all this aroused." Sure enough, he tore it up--G: 
Did he really? 
O: --and didn't give the permission to the airline. I remember him saying, "Why are they butting into their little business, why destroy them?" He was happy to have this 
opportunity. Apparently the president has to sign off on agreements of this nature that the State Department enters into. He stopped it dead in its tracks, and the Irish airlines 
continued to conduct their business in their normal way. Needless to say, I didn't discuss this with the Irish government; let nature take its course. I don't know what their 
reactions were. 
But I have to say that President Johnson did one favor for the government of Ireland at that time. I thoroughly enjoyed his gut political reaction: "These people get 
nothing from anybody and we've never done anything for any [of them]." (Laughter) It was a real enjoyable moment with the President. I had forgotten about it until this memo. 
G: It's a great story. 
O: Yes. 
G: It's interesting that he saw it in terms of domestic politics. 
O: He didn't need any encouragement. The conversation became a monologue telling me what the Irish-Americans have done. And he said, "When can you ever do anything for 
them? They're friendly with us and it's a great little country. And look at all these voters." 
(Laughter) 
I know that none of those voters ever knew what he did, but he felt he was doing something meaningful, and he was pleased to have the opportunity. 
This one intrigues me no end, this memo of November 14, 1967--I guess we discussed it earlier--from me to the President: "I feel I should forego my Vietnam trip due 
to the extension of the current session until at least mid-December. The significant legislation will not be considered until after Thanksgiving, and particularly the disturbing 
aspects of the discussion at this morning's leadership meeting in terms of our current goals." I don't know what that last sentence means, but the point is that apparently the 
President had at least suggested to me, if he hadn't directed me, to go to Vietnam to see if I could be of some help on the political side. I knew on one prior occasion Henry Cabot 
37
O'Brien --Interview XIX --34 
Lodge had made the request to Dean Rusk and to the President that I go over at the time of the elections in Vietnam. I had no interest in going to Vietnam, and as I look at this 
memo, it seems that I'm busily engaged in avoiding the trip. 
End of Tape 3 of 3 and Interview XIX 
38
    [ Part 20: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--19 from   Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XX*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
Project. In addition, some interviews were done for the Library under the auspices of the National Archives and the White House during the Johnson administration. 
Some of the Library's many oral history transcripts are available on the INTERNET. Individuals whose interviews appear on the INTERNET may have other interviews available on 
paper at the LBJ Library. Transcripts of oral history interviews may be consulted at the Library or lending copies may be borrowed by writing to the Interlibrary Loan Archivist, LBJ Library, 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XX 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XX, 4/ 23/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
For Electronic Copy on Diskette from the LBJ Library: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XX, 4/ 23/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-31 
4
INTERVIEW XX 
DATE: April 23, 1987 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 1 
O: We have a white paper dated late September, which was a detailed presentation of a campaign in the form of a campaign manual. You have my additional comments in 
October as to personnel--a campaign task force. You have Jim Rowe's comments regarding my white paper and my response at the end of November. Clearly at that time, 
November 7, nothing has been done. We're still just talking. Why? It probably reflects the focus of attention on Vietnam, the disruption that occurs when you're busily engaged 
in other matters, the legislative program. Vietnam has flared up as a national issue of great concern to a lot of people, including the President. 
That's partially the answer to why you would be sitting, knowing that, potentially at least, there were candidates considering running in some primaries. You're into 
November of 1967 and [neither] the President nor any of us, I guess, have focused to the point where any action had been taken. Conversations took place of an informal nature, 
but anything in an organizational sense had not occurred. That is awfully late. So it has to be people in their spare moments giving some thought to a campaign, including the 
President in his spare moments. It may even indicate some waffling as to where he was going at that stage. 
G: Do you think it reflects the possibility that he would not seek re-election? 
O: Not really, because I don't think there's anything in these notes that indicate I had the remotest thought he was not going to go forward. 
Now, the President's feeling towards me in this regard is that it was well and good in 1964 to have me the person that had responsibility to coordinate the campaign. What 
campaign? I recall the President saying, "You've got to get out on the road. You've got to find out what's going on. You've got to advise me. We've got to find out where our 
weaknesses [are]." Go out on the road in the midst of a very intensive effort being made on the Hill. 
I remember particularly negotiations I was engaged in with Wilbur Mills. Yet, I had to find some way, so I took trips out in the field. I organized these meetings. I took a 
team with me and we'd go out for three days or so and then come back and go out again. If you logged the time I devoted in the White House and on the road dealing with the 
5
O'Brien --Interview XX --2 
Democratic leaders regionally and at the state level across this country you probably would log six weeks. I was the only one involved, really. So that was the extent of the 
campaign. 
Now, to the approach of 1968. To what degree there was a recognition at that point of a Gene McCarthy or Bobby Kennedy candidacy, I don't specifically recall. The 
President's concern and sensitivity toward Bobby was apparent to me. We had had conversations on the subject. I found myself in the middle of the Bobby Kennedy-LBJ 
situation. Bobby Kennedy would give me his views and tell me his problems and concerns. The President would in turn ask me what was wrong with Bobby, what was 
Bobby's problem. I think both Johnson and Bobby felt I was a go-between, that matters would be ultimately resolved and that Bobby wouldn't go the distance. I found myself in 
this very unusual or unique position because I had a long-time association with Bobby. I had now several years of association with Johnson. Johnson trusted me and supported my 
efforts with the Congress. 
How do you account for going into November talking or starting to nit-pick a white paper which is the basic document that's going to govern the organization of the 
campaign? Whether you find one paragraph somebody doesn't agree with or another, this is the document. And there's no one else around Lyndon Johnson who's going to develop 
a document that detailed, that extensive and that thoughtful. There it is, and it has apparently been sitting around with the President since September. 
I think there's another aspect. I believe the President chose to take a different direction and that surfaced in planning the New Hampshire primary. But I do recall that I 
had little or no discussion regarding the New Hampshire primary, that the President did not call upon me to discuss it in any detail. My involvement is peripheral and that would 
indicate that the President wasn't prepared to turn over to me the activities of his re-election campaign. Nevertheless, he had requested this input on my part. The white 
paper was not a voluntary effort or any attempt that I undertook to move into a 1968 campaign. It was a response to his specific request that I present to him my views on 
what kind of a campaign should be waged, not only organizationally but in terms of issues, policies and the rest. That's where we were in November of 1967. I had been on the road 
occasionally during the year. 
What had happened as far as my activity was concerned was that I launched my postal reform proposal publicly in March or early April. It was a very revolutionary 
proposal--the removal of the department from departmental status to create an independent entity. And there were good reasons for it. This launching occupied a great 
deal of my time during that period because there was a tremendous amount of public, press, media interest and a great deal of interest on the part of the Congress and people 
that had a particular interest in the postal service. That included talking to the President about creating a blue ribbon panel to review the proposal and come up with 
recommendations. The President issued an order to that effect and the panel was created. 
6
O'Brien --Interview XX --3 
Beyond that, there were serious problems in several cities, riots and the rest, that had an impact on the postal service. I had to direct my attention to that and see if I could 
be helpful as the White House made an effort to contain these problems in Detroit, Newark and elsewhere. 
We reviewed the degree of my involvement in the first session of the Ninetieth Congress. On the political end, I endeavored to undertake some activities that might be 
helpful: trying to have a more effective effort on the part of top members of the administration promoting the administration, promoting the President across the country. 
We ran into conflicts because the President assigned Governor [Farris] Bryant to work out the utilization of members of the administration. Bryant, at that suggestion of 
the President, created a program. Meanwhile, probably unknown to me, the President said, "You've got to get into it and the Vice President's got to get into it." So, we 
undertook this and found there were crossed wires; so we got that resolved. Then, when I would get a chance to go out around the country, particularly in the key states, I made a 
conscious effort to ensure that I maximized that opportunity politically. And memos that I sent to the President over those months recounting my findings in Ohio, Michigan, and 
particularly in California, reflect attention to the politics of 1967. 
In reviewing those memos, there's one thread through them. That is the rising concern expressed by Democratic local and state leaders across the country regarding 
Vietnam. [In] speeches I made in California and elsewhere, while presenting the administration's position on the Great Society legislative program, I also was very 
supportive of the administration's Vietnam policy. And in meetings with people that were important to us and would be important in 1968, I found I was on the defensive a great 
deal of the time. More and more it was apparent that there was an uprising. We mentioned that yesterday and that's the climate of 1967. The impact in this area that 
impressed me the most was Mayor Daley's position on Vietnam, which was revealed to me by Dick Daley at some point during 1967. 
The President had old supporters and friends--Jim Rowe would be typical of them, I guess Abe Fortas, [Clark] Clifford, probably others--who had been involved with him 
over the years. Obviously he would be eliciting their views. Here is a president who has to have some concern about the political fallout from Vietnam. This could cause 
difficulties within the Democratic Party. I can't account for it in any other way, other than it drifted and the formalization of a campaign certainly drifted over a period of time. 
When Rowe or whoever it was said, "It's awfully late," I certainly concurred because of my experiences in prior campaigns. That was awfully late when you're only, by that time, 
three or four months away from the first primary with a clear indication that it was going to be competitive. 
G: In June 1967, according to a press story, LBJ was flying on Air Force One from New York to Washington and a Democratic congressman from New York asked him about 
your role in the campaign. The President was reported to have responded that you were 
7
O'Brien --Interview XX --4 
going to be running his campaign. Then you were quoted as saying that the President hadn't talked to you about that. 
O: I think that would be accurate. 
G: Do you remember that? 
O: I don't remember that comment at all but certainly in June of 1967 the President had not talked to me about the 1968 campaign. I'm sure of that. 
G: But he evidently had a role for you in mind. 
O: Yes, I think so and I think that perhaps that's reflected in the memos I sent to him--my observations and suggestions as I made my trips around the country. Certainly the white 
paper was responding to a request by him because I would never have deigned to prepare a detailed white paper including every possible element of a national campaign on my own. 
That would not have made any sense. That was responding to him. You're talking about his comment in June and we're in November. 
At some point, there was an indication that he had chosen a somewhat different route in terms of handling his New Hampshire problem. I cannot recall anything beyond 
that. Bernie Boutin, former mayor of Manchester, New Hampshire, was our key fellow. He was a top fellow in the Kennedy campaign in New Hampshire and he had joined the 
administration in some capacity. Bernie became very active back in his own state in trying to work out the Johnson problem. We did have a couple of meetings. It must have been 
prior to the end of 1967. I remember sitting with Marvin [Watson] and Rowe and probably others to discuss the campaign. 
But along with that, there was deep concern about the Massachusetts primary. It became important in discussions I had with the President and he was trying to determine 
what he would do. You could have Bobby Kennedy in the Massachusetts primary, certainly [Eugene] McCarthy, [so] how you would handle the Massachusetts primary was 
sensitive. A poll was taken to see who could be a Johnson stand-in in the Massachusetts primary. My name was included in the poll and as the poll came out, it looked like I 
should be the stand-in. Even though I hadn't been in Massachusetts in years, the name identification was there. 
All of that brought me to the conclusion that I had a responsibility to discharge. Johnson wasn't going to be on the ballot. It would have to be somebody on the ballot in 
his interest. So I volunteered. If it came to that, and we couldn't get a local fellow like Morris Donahue, I would be willing to step into that role. The President was very 
appreciative and mentioned that on several occasions and, of course, that petered out. But there was that kind of peripheral involvement. 
G: Why did it peter out? 
8
O'Brien --Interview XX --5 
O: Well, it never came to that because the result of the New Hampshire primary was quite negative. It's the old moral victory aspect and the press nationally were declaring 
McCarthy the winner of a primary that he had probably--I've forgotten--gotten 35 per cent of the vote or something like that. 
Whatever primary they're talking about, I have memos to the President that indicate that I was deeply involved in trying to structure a slate in California and made the 
determination after meeting with the man to have Tom Lynch, the attorney general of California, head the slate. Under the unique laws of California, his name would be the 
only name that would appear and the rest of the names on the slate don't appear on the ballot. He was a popular fellow who wasn't directly aligned with either wing of the 
Democratic Party out there. So that had been pretty well determined. We had met with all the Democratic congressmen, met with all the Democratic leaders. I had intensive 
meetings in California and on the Hill. We had moved that far. 
But I don't recall this being part of an overall program nationally. We have the unique situation in Massachusetts and the Kennedys; maybe we ought to focus on that. 
California clearly is awfully important. There's a peace movement out there in the liberal wing of the Democratic Party, the so-called CDC, the Alan Cranstons and the rest were 
indicating they were going to have a peace delegation, an anti-Johnson delegation, on the ballot. So there was a great deal of attention directed to that. 
I don't remember the specific date of the Wisconsin primary, but prior to that it was at the request of the President--would I find some way of spending some time in 
Wisconsin. I chose the route of setting up in three different cities with postal officials, the justification for being there, and then tying that into some very intensive political 
discussions. That is when the President watched the evening news and saw this rally with the balloons and O'Brien addressing the rally and all the enthusiasm. He called me to say, 
"That was great." I had to point out to him that the rally was composed of postal workers. I had to tell him the cold facts, and the cold facts were that he was in bad shape 
in Wisconsin. He was going to lose the primary and probably lose substantially. That report was given to him within probably three days of his speech saying he wouldn't be a 
candidate. That speech was given on a Sunday prior to the Tuesday primary in Wisconsin. So things started to fall apart, obviously, in New Hampshire. 
There was an uncertainty throughout all of this. What was being done, what was being planned, who was planning it. So it all ended. 
G: Going back to your role in the campaign, one of these documents details an organizational structure for the campaign and at the very top is the campaign director, or at least under 
the President and Vice President. And that's the only blank in the slot. This was something prepared by you. 
O: I think the top was the Vice President. 
9
O'Brien --Interview XX --6 
G: Yes, after that, though. 
O: Yes, he would be the--G: 
But my point is that the campaign director slot was left blank and all the others down the line were filled with names of individuals. 
O: Yes. 
G: I was wondering if it was assumed that you would fill that role. 
O: That was in response to the President saying to me, "I'd like to have your recommendations on personnel for the various key roles in the campaign and I suggest 
you do not make reference to the top role." That was not an indication that my name would be filled in the blank. It could have been one of his old colleagues, supporters, I 
don't know. 
G: So it was his suggestion? 
O: Yes. But he said all the major elements of the campaign so, as director of organization, I put Marvin Watson in. And then for good solid reasons, I went on to Dick Murphy and 
Jim Reynolds; in the women's activities, Orville Freeman's wife [Jane]; and the senior citizens' registration, get out the vote, minority groups, Louie Martin; polling coordinator 
Dick Scammon; media director Leonard Marks--these are people available to us that we knew intimately who had the expertise--policy, position papers, Joe Califano; scheduling, 
Bill Connell; and then finance, the obvious fellow, Arthur Krim, assisted by John Criswell. That meant that John Criswell was the working guy on the finance side and Arthur Krim 
would be the fellow who could establish the contacts. Then we had Joe Napolitan and Claude Desautels and Ira Kapenstein. This represented my best effort to respond. But in 
the context of this memo, I'm telling him, "You know my views on the organizational structure." I refer back to my September 29 white paper where it's all there. 
G: One of the themes that seems to run through a lot of these documents is the impotency, the powerlessness of the DNC. 
O: In fact, my comments about the DNC around the country probably, if anything, were lower key than with what I was hit. You're getting close to talking about individuals, 
which I studiously avoided. But there was a lot of negative comment about the DNC and its operation. Now the fact of the matter is, and we've discussed this before, the DNC and 
its operation probably deserved all these negative comments. But why did this situation exist? We were at fault. The President was at fault. Going back to the first day we 
walked in with Jack Kennedy, with John Bailey at the DNC, we were not supportive of the DNC. Traditionally the DNC receives no support from the Congress; they have their 
own financing, their Senate and House Campaign Committees. 
10
O'Brien --Interview XX --7 
The role of the Democratic National Committee in a period of incumbency was an experience I've never had. It is a different role when you're chairman of the Democratic 
Party and the party is out of the White House. That was the role that I had and that's when I tried to be a spokesman and go on the attack against the administration of Nixon. 
Now, that's an understandable role. You can dig your teeth into it and have some degree of effectiveness. But now you have a Democratic president in the White House, that 
chairman is sitting there. Not purposely so, but you just go on about your business. 
In 1967, you'll note that there's limited reference to the DNC. There are names on that table of organization that are DNC people and that wasn't to have representation. In 
my judgment those two or three people that were at DNC actually had great capabilities and could perform very well in the role that I was suggesting for them. 
But it used to hit me when people talked about the DNC what little attention we paid to the DNC. It bothered me; it had come up from time to time. I'd express concern 
and we'd say, "We've just got to do something. We've got to show more support of John Bailey," particularly because I felt along with Ken O'Donnell direct responsibility during 
that Kennedy period. What are we doing? John was over there, a lost soul in a sense. You thought of John Bailey when something negative was going to happen. When an 
appointment was not going to be made, poor John would be the contact; we'd say, "John, call this fellow and tell him it isn't going to be done." In the meantime, anything of any 
value politically, of course, was in the Oval Office, and rightly so; it was all in the President's name. 
The role of national committees has varied over the years. A strong chairman probably can overcome some of that natural tendency to forget about the national 
committee. It isn't that you're purposely trying to divorce it from the process. You're engaged in whatever assignment you have; you're in the administration; you're in the White 
House. Then you'd get out into the field as I did in 1967, having these meetings with Democrats holding responsible party positions or elected positions at the county, state 
level. Invariably, they'd get to the ineffectiveness of the national committee, their inability to receive support or assistance from the national committee. I'd try to be a good listener, 
but it bothered me. It bothered my conscience because I knew I had to take some responsibility for this. I hadn't made any great issue in the White House of a strong 
national committee. 
G: Do you think that the committee was downgraded because of feelings that John Bailey was not as able as, say, some other chairman had been? 
O: I don't think there was that much thought given to it. John Bailey was a visible chairman and was well known in the political world. John had retained his leadership of the 
Democratic Party in Connecticut. He had always played a very important political role in Connecticut, but he had a keen desire to stay on as chairman. In 1960 at Los Angeles, 
Bobby Kennedy--I remember a comment he made to me, "John won't be there forever." 
11
O'Brien --Interview XX --8 
The indication was, "At some point, you ought to be chairman." And it never went beyond that. But John wanted the position. He enjoyed it. He was a good guy, certainly 
had paid his dues, and certainly had been a loyal Kennedy supporter from the beginning. 
Well, to 1968. Bailey was still chairman. I remember when I became chairman in Chicago, Hubert Humphrey made some comment that John would like to continue as 
chairman. There had to be a new approach to that campaign of Humphrey's, in view of all the problems the party had. But it was no reflection on John. 
G: Did LBJ have a particular distrust, do you think, of Bailey--O: 
I don't think so. 
G: --or the DNC as an institution? 
O: I think he felt he had a couple of his people over there, that he would expect them to be active. That bothered him when he looked at some of these reports. He focused on his 
own people who were there. Why weren't they maintaining a close relationship with party leaders? The bottom line is obvious: who's going to finance all of this? Who's going to 
fund a committee that has to pay office rent and has a staff of forty or fifty people? Who's doing that? The committee has to struggle along and contributors do not have the 
national committee high on their agenda. I remember when I was chairman, I would be invited to the Senate and House Campaign Committee's annual fund-raising dinner. I'd be 
introduced for a bow and that was it. 
Not one nickel was funneled to the national committee from those fund-raising efforts. What were we doing in the White House at the beginning of the Kennedy period? 
I don't recall that we were doing anything to help finance the national committee. We weren't saying the President ought to make political appearances around the country. We 
ought to make some effort through the President and others in the administration for fund raising to ensure that these people can function and perform. To a great extent the 
complaint about the committee and their failure to perform these services was simply that the committee was in no financial position to perform services in a meaningful way. 
You utilize media. That doesn't cost money. See if you can make an impact for the party. On the part of the in-party, there shouldn't be any problem. You'll find the 
Republican National Committee has never had that problem. My guess is that there's no debt. They had financial resources. How well they performed was something I can't 
comment on. I don't know. But certainly they had the underpinning financially to carry on the basic functions of a national party. It's an entirely different role when it's the 
out-party or the in-party. 
In any event, we have a drift in 1967. We got to formalization of concepts of a campaign; we got to the point of talking about slots and individuals who were to fill those 
slots. Then it fell into a defensive effort, whether it was New Hampshire, or potentially 
12
O'Brien --Interview XX --9 
Massachusetts, or potentially California, or actually Wisconsin. I don't think any of that--the New Hampshire primary, what was going to happen to Lyndon Johnson in 
Wisconsin on that Tuesday--has anything to do with organizing a political campaign in the true sense. I don't believe that we ever got to anything meaningful. I remember Terry 
Sanford became involved in the campaign, and others. We talked campaign and we did more than talk. To say everything was in place, all signals are go, to the best of my 
recollection it never got to that. 
G: In September, when you were out in Detroit and Columbus, Ohio, you recorded that there was an almost desperate desire for leadership from Washington. 
Tape 1 of 1, Side 2 
O: There again, in each one of those meetings I reported on, I was talking to the top people in the Democratic Party in those respective states: Ohio, Michigan, California, for 
example. You remember first of all that you talk to elected officeholders. You, obviously, also talk to county chairmen and state chairmen. But the structure of the 
Democratic Party at the state and county level was not very impressive. I think, if you're a county chairman or the state chairman, you'll probably have difficulty financing your 
operation. The state level contributors probably focused their attention on individual candidates and little or no attention on party structure. It's very difficult. In a sense, they 
were experiencing the same situation that the national party was experiencing. Some of them would say, I don't know who to contact in Washington, or I asked for registration 
advice or material or a speaker, but did not get any response. 
In the White House, there was no specific point of contact. That's the guy who is the "pol" in the White House. He can get you the speaker, he can do this or he can do 
that, or he can nudge the national committee to be more responsible. It was in a state of drift and there was little attention focused on it. These people are having their own 
difficulties and they'd like to feel there's someone to whom they can go. They had this feeling that there was nowhere to go in the DNC and for that matter, probably the White 
House. They didn't have the sense that anybody cared. 
I arrive on the scene and they all know me. It was a splendid opportunity for them to express their concerns and disappointments. You'll note those reports to the President 
had a heavy input regarding Vietnam, which permeated the atmosphere at those meetings and dinners. If you're talking about lack of coordination at the Washington level, you can 
be sure that that reflected a concern they had regarding Vietnam and the future of the party. 
It's difficult to recognize that existed at the grass-roots at the heights of the greatest legislative program in history. There was little reference to that. It was Vietnam. 
G: Let me ask you, what was the political fallout of the riots in 1967? 
13
O'Brien --Interview XX --10 
O: To what degree, I don't know, but it certainly was a contributing factor in the increasing negativeness and increasing loss of confidence. These people are engaged in the business 
of politics. What's going to happen with their county ticket, their state ticket? Are we going to have a burden that we can't cope with? On the riots, I don't think that added a 
significant dimension to this growing negativeness. But it was there and was part of the climate. 
G: Were you involved at all in the Detroit problem and the communication between Governor [George] Romney and the President with regard to sending out troops? 
O: No. 
G: The riots, in the area of your involvement, the Post Office Department, must have created an enormous headache for you. 
O: It did. We had had a crisis in Chicago, which came close to closing out postal delivery. That didn't relate to riots but an element of postal employee attitude regarding equal rights 
in promotions. But in Detroit, we were asked what we could contribute by way of assistance. 
G: Yes. 
O: I responded as best I could. But in the response, I took the occasion to point out that the Post Office Department was having difficulty, as a result of riots, in terms of mail delivery 
and servicing the public. Well, we contributed by way of resources and facilities. We were prepared to do it. 
But at that point, in our own area, we were coping with problems that were created by the riots. There was a lot of absenteeism. Some areas of Detroit were unable 
to deliver mail for a period of time. We weren't in much of a position to be of any great assistance in resolving the overall problem. 
G: You discussed the California political scene and the problems. Let me just ask you to elaborate on a couple of aspects there. Let me ask you to describe Sam Yorty's role. One 
memo characterized him as the real problem. He had supported Nixon over Kennedy and Reagan over Brown. 
O: He was a continuing problem. He was a renegade. He had no interest at all in the Democratic Party. He was a troublesome fellow. He created all kinds of problems in 
California. 
>From our point of view, in Washington, we'd like to fold under that tent everybody we could, and that would include Yorty. On a personal basis, I did not look kindly upon 
Yorty. My past experiences with him, dating back to the 1960 campaign, would indicate my attitude toward the fellow. But I couldn't allow that to cause me not to make an 
14
O'Brien --Interview XX --11 
effort. 
G: Did you deal with him directly? 
O: I don't recall how direct the dealings were. 
G: How about Jess Unruh? 
O: Well, there were indications, at the time of my visit to California, that Jess was on the way off the reservation. Jess had become a strong supporter of the peace movement. The Jess 
Unruh I had known over the years as we formed our organization in California in 1960 was an entirely different Jess Unruh. 
Jess was a consummate pol, played hard ball and was capable of getting things done. Even though I had some assurances earlier from Jess that he wasn't going to cause 
any commotion, as time went on he became deeply involved with Bobby. He became a confidant of Bobby's. It was clear he was seeking ways to urge Bobby to seek the 
presidency. Jess arranged for polls in California that showed support for Bobby which he would discuss directly with Bobby. 
G: Is that right? 
O: Yes. 
G: Did the fact that you were associated not only with Johnson but with the Kennedys create a difficulty for you in dealing with people like Jess Unruh? Would he see you as a conduit 
to Kennedy rather than an agent for Johnson? 
O: No, I don't think it caused me any great difficulties. The reason was that Bobby was completely understanding of what my position was. We had discussed it as old friends. 
There was no question in his mind that I was going to remain totally loyal to the President. I was part of the administration. He accepted that and respected it. 
So while Bobby made attempts to convince me to leave the administration and join his campaign, it was never a major effort on his part and it was with the understanding I 
was not going to do that. I never would have. I would have remained with Johnson until the end of that year. All of this blew up on that Sunday night when the President made his 
decision. I sat there, watched it, and as the program ended, my first comment to Elva was, "I wonder how long it will take before the phone rings." I'll tell you it was within 
minutes. 
G: Was it really? 
O: I don't know who got there first. I think Hubert was in Mexico. But as the night unfolded, between Hubert and Bobby, I was not going to get another night's sleep until I 
15
O'Brien --Interview XX --12 
acted. In fact, Bobby's comment was "Did I get to you first?" (Laughter) 
There was a resentment on the part of some people that I stayed with Johnson. None of them had the guts to confront me. It's the people on the periphery who engage in 
that sort of thing. The principals are classy enough and professional enough so they don't. 
I had experienced that. Bobby was totally aware of it. I must say that I appreciated Bobby urging me to stay. He couldn't have been more pleased. When I was 
designated postmaster general, he was pleased. Bobby was quite different than Jack. But I must say, he was a solid fellow. I never had a problem with Bobby. 
So in the context of California, to try to put together a delegate slate that would bridge the various Democratic Party elements, I had no problem. They were saying, 
"How can he carry on this role? He has a close relationship with the Kennedys and all the rest." The reason it never caused me difficulty is because of the clear understanding I had 
with Bobby. 
G: John Roche wrote in a December 1967 memo that with regard to Robert Kennedy--this is to LBJ--" Your actions," meaning President Johnson's actions, "play an active role in 
his,"--Bobby Kennedy's--" decision-making." Is that a fair statement, do you think? 
O: I read that memo and I guess what John was referring to, in his judgment, [was that] Bobby was simply reacting to Johnson and that Bobby didn't have his own game plan. I 
became aware as time went on that Bobby was becoming more interested in actually taking Lyndon Johnson on. His concerns about his Vietnam policy--in conversations I had 
with him--were more intense. He'd never personalize it with me saying, "I don't like the s. o. b." or anything like that. 
He became immersed in the peace movement, completely adverse to Johnson's Vietnam policies. That feeling, as he expressed his views to me, became stronger as the 
weeks went on. That was his ultimate decision. You could see it coming. 
G: Did his relationship with Lyndon Johnson have any bearing on Ted Kennedy's decision not to stand in for Johnson in Massachusetts, if in fact Kennedy was asked to stand in? You 
had suggested Ted Kennedy. 
O: Yes. I talked to Ted Kennedy about it one evening at Bobby's house. At that time, Bobby had not reached that point of no return. It was a social occasion and I took Teddy aside. 
I told him flatly that's what I felt he should do. He should accept that role. He did not just flatly say no, but clearly he wasn't going to do it. Teddy, in his inimitable style, tried 
to kid around about it saying, "I've got to think a lot. I've got a lot of things on my mind." I left with no thought that Teddy was ever going to acquiesce. 
G: Why do you think he didn't want to do it? 
16
O'Brien --Interview XX --13 
O: I think it had a lot to do with Bobby's strong attitude. 
There were occasions when Teddy would come down in the evening and meet with Lyndon Johnson. I was a participant. I'm not suggesting it was once a week or 
anything like that but there were occasions. Inevitably, Johnson would discuss his meeting with me. It was always in the context of, "I really like Teddy. We get along. We had a 
great conversation last night. Why is it that Bobby dislikes me so much and yet I get along well with Teddy?" Well, I didn't have any answers to that. 
(Laughter) 
But Teddy had to be a little uncomfortable with his brother's views regarding Lyndon Johnson. It was clear to me that he preferred having a comfortable relationship with the 
President, not any adversarial situation. The President could never quite understand how he could have these pleasant sessions with Teddy and yet Teddy's brother was causing him 
loss of sleep. I had no answer. 
G: Another political event of 1967 was in March 1967 there was a meeting of the Democratic National Committee in Washington which David Broder termed a success due to the 
contributions of Hubert Humphrey and yourself. Do you recall that and what you--? 
O: I don't recall that, but I recall being the principal speaker at the Western States Democratic Governors' Conference. 
G: That was later. That was in August. 
O: Oh, was it that late? 
G: Yes. 
O: Even then in August, as I got my report to the President on that conference, there had been minimal opposition to Vietnam. I was engaged in some pipe dreaming, apparently, 
because I felt that was a good sign and appropriate resolutions had been adopted. I was the invited guest, I guess, to represent the administration at the conference. You're 
referring to a meeting in April in Washington. 
G: March. 
O: March. I don't recall the details of that but I do recall that in August, I apparently was thinking that this could be contained. The best evidence I had in August is, "Look at how 
well the Western Democratic Governors' Conference went. No problems." I guess we were all kind of lulled into that. 
G: Here's a memo from you to the President in November 1967, November 3, with regard to whether or not he should announce, and that is the memo that he apparently requested for 
17
O'Brien --Interview XX --14 
discussion at a meeting that evening. Do you recall the circumstances of that? 
O: This indicates a serious meeting in terms of the upcoming campaign and it is November 3. It's probably the first of its kind because it's a meeting the President's going to play a role 
in. I don't recall who attended. 
I tried to anticipate the areas of discussion and the points that should be made and that he should be prepared to respond. That's what this reflects: Should the President be 
an announced candidate at an early date or not? What, if anything, does the President do about the key presidential primaries? Does he make any direct efforts in the important 
primaries? The recommendation of mine was no, he should avoid direct involvement. Your best position in a campaign is to be busy as president--the hard-working president, 
concerned about the problems of the nation and the world, devoting all of his energies to the solutions of these problems. He's above the fray. 
Assuming no direct presidential involvement, this was the key to what we've been discussing. Should any efforts be encouraged in the President's behalf? Yes, in certain 
states where the outcome of the primaries would be interpreted as a measure of the President's popularity, regardless of whether any efforts are expended. In New 
Hampshire, for example, I mentioned that Governor [John] King and Senator [Thomas] McIntyre are taking the lead. Another example is Wisconsin and the best I could come up 
with was that the State Chairman, Dick Cudahy, and the Attorney General, [Bronson] LaFollette, could be encouraged to organize a Johnson effort. That was probably as close 
as you'd come to anything meaningful in Wisconsin at that point. 
Then you go to the issues: why four more years, what's the President's vision of the future, how do we handle the charge it's time for a change, how do we handle potential 
Republican candidates during the next several months? Then I recommend ignoring the candidates as much as possible, by promptly refuting their charges through administration 
spokesmen whenever necessary. How and when should a campaign organization be established? Can a full campaign organization be put into effect several months before the 
President announces? Yes. The major elements of the campaign organization need not wait on formal announcement. You have my detailed views of organization by White 
House paper--I refer to it again--on September 29. 
"Are there any overriding reasons for a full campaign organization now?" I guess I was saying this is November. This will be a difficult year, some media aspects, all that go 
into it. Voter registration--what are the major elements of the campaign organization? Then I proceed to list all the various elements. There were many of them, obviously. 
Then, when should the campaign organization be formed and fully manned? This is November and I say, "Recommendation: January 1, which gives us just eight weeks to 
accomplish the job." 
It's an interesting memo because I made, obviously, a conscious effort to not dwell on where we'd been and why have we been so inactive. Let's grasp the opportunity at the 
18
O'Brien --Interview XX --15 
moment. The President's prepared to get into some detail on this. That was 1967. On the political side, there was clear evidence of drift, considerable drift. Pieces of evidence that 
things weren't as you'd like to see them. Going back to November, 1966, we lost forty-seven seats in the House and dropped four Senate seats. Ongoing problems 
legislatively we would overcome; it was just a somewhat more difficult task, particularly on the House side. The repeal of the twenty-one day rule was a danger signal early on. 
The efforts that were being made to respond to this by trying to broaden the base of congressional relations, include more people in the White House, all of that went on. 
On the congressional relations side, there were indications that concern regarding Vietnam was growing on the Hill. As time went on and I had opportunities to do some 
traveling and get more grass-root response, it was basically the same. There was a growing concern. First, a spark here and there but then a fire. It wasn't until late in the 
year that we finally focused on re-election. Even that never got into a full organizational status--the way you would traditionally conduct a national presidential campaign. 
The President's focus on Vietnam became more and more intense. His concern regarding Vietnam became more and more obvious. You closed out the year in some 
disarray. By then it became quite apparent that Gene McCarthy and Bobby Kennedy were going to be very much involved in the 1968 campaign. And it became obvious that some 
of the traditional supporters were wavering here and there. 
It was a long session. We did close the session in good shape. I think the session went to mid-December, probably one of the longest, I guess, in history. You closed out 
1967 without really recognizing that these problems would increase rapidly. The problem of the continuity of the President in office would become a matter of question. That had 
not reached that point by the end of 1967. It grew as you moved into 1968. 
I accomplished what I had set for postal reorganization in terms of launching it. I had participated in the legislative process to a considerable degree and was reasonably 
satisfied with the end result. And I had an awareness that there was a growing political problem. We were to the end of this first session of the Ninetieth Congress in that 
position. 
End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview XX 
19
    [ Part 21: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--49 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXI*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XXI 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXI, 6/ 18/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview I, 6/ 18/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-32 
4
INTERVIEW XXI 
DATE: June 18, 1987 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 4, Side 1 
O: The 1968 tax surcharge battle evolved from the proposal that was made in 1967 by the President. He was anxious to deal with the rising costs of the Vietnam War and curb 
inflation because that was becoming a troublesome matter. The proposal was not submitted to the Congress until late 1967, August, and no action was taken until the next 
session. He renewed the request early in 1968. I recall the Congressman [James] Burke Amendment which, perhaps in the background, we supported in order to limit the 
reduction. The Burke Amendment failed and we had to accept a signification reduction that was part of the ultimate passage. The passage would not have taken place, however, 
if we had not been able to put together a solid business community effort. 
G: How was this done? 
O: To a great extent through efforts by Joe Fowler. He enlisted the support of Henry Ford and Stuart Saunders, who was at that time chairman of the Pennsylvania Railroad. You 
had two prominent members of the business community in the leadership. That was important in the overall lobbying effort because you were invoking some new taxes. 
There was a great concern in the business community in some quarters, so it was necessary to get business support. We succeeded overall to a considerable extent due to 
the lobbying of some business leaders. 
G: Wilbur Mills seems to have been staking out a very nebulous position all during that. Did you have a pretty good feel for what Mills would go along with? 
O: He was very cautious throughout and it was hard to determine where he would ultimately land. There were aspects of this bill, of course, that directly related to the Ways and 
Means Committee. 
There was quite a battle in the Senate on this, too. There was a fair amount of resentment regarding the Senate procedure. Then you had the AFL-CIO, who were 
ambivalent, but concerned about the reductions in the bill, which they opposed. It was a touchy situation throughout, but the overall result has to be termed impressive under those 
circumstances. 
In the midst of that, as this debate ensued and the maneuvering went on, the political aspect was heating up. It extended through that period of presidential decision. 
5
O'Brien --Interview XXI --2 
G: LBJ issued some uncharacteristically harsh public statements on this matter. Do you recall those and the reasons? 
O: He took the opportunity at a nationally televised press conference to somewhat berate the Congress. It was quite strong, but it wasn't that unusual for him. He would express his 
views strongly from time to time on legislative progress or lack of it over the years. 
G: Did you sit in on any of the meetings with Mills? 
O: I don't recall I did. 
G: Anything on the conference negotiations? 
O: The organized labor aspect was not aggressive support but a decision on the part of labor not to oppose strongly. That in and of itself was helpful. 
G: Shall we talk about the Civil Rights Act of 1968, the open housing legislation? 
O: It was a real accomplishment, particularly in view of the efforts that had been made in this area in 1967, I think back to 1966. There were attempts at cloture in the Senate. 
Amendments were offered on both sides of this issue. The record shows that Clarence Mitchell made a significant contribution in this. 
G: Well, what was the key to passing the cloture vote? 
O: The ultimate key was the attitude of [Everett] Dirksen. It was a surprise that he changed his position. There were people who suggested all kinds of reasons. I can't concur with 
any of those because if anything occurred along the lines suggested, it was unknown to me. It's more valid to conclude that he might have been concerned about losing control 
among the Republicans and that he didn't want, as the minority leader, to take a defeat. You had the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, which had an impact on this 
legislation, obviously. The key was to persuade the House to accept the Senate version, as it was tenuous because of the battle that was waged in the Senate. If you could avoid a 
conference, that would be certainly the best resolution. That was the pressure that was exerted off the Martin Luther King assassination. 
G: Initially there had been an inclination to beef up the existing executive order rather than legislation. 
O: We had been frustrated over a couple of years and there was a feeling of pessimism regarding our ability to legislate. As it played out it was a clear indication that, despite the 
President's other problems, he was still able to impact on the Congress significantly. Some felt that would not be the case, that it was the last year of his administration, therefore 
there would be less muscle. Most pundits were somewhat surprised that you were able to 
6
O'Brien --Interview XXI --3 
enact further meaningful civil rights legislation under those circumstances. 
Similarly, in the Housing and Urban Development Act it was a surprise factor, too, because it turned out to be relatively easy. It was landmark legislation providing for 
subsidies of mortgage payments for low-income families and it was far-reaching. The major dispute had to do with the income limitations and a formula was devised by way of 
compromise. That new town concept was intriguing. I don't think many felt that would survive the struggle. It was knocked out of the legislation and then restored. This closed 
with the Senate passing the measure by a voice vote and the House passing it overwhelmingly. It was again, as in the tax legislation, surprising that you could move 
with the Congress that well in 1968. 
It was a much more successful session than could have been anticipated. Beyond that, when you think back on the long struggle to bring about meaningful truth-in-lending 
legislation, there, too, legislation was enacted which was far-reaching. A note I have says, "Nine years after the first such bill had been introduced," so that was a long struggle, a 
struggle that Senator Paul Douglas engaged in for a number of years when he was a member of the Senate. 
G: Of course one of the big issues here was the disclosure for annual or revolving charge accounts. 
O: That had to be compromised and it was. It wasn't all we wanted. That was the single significant compromise. There again the art of the possible came into play. 
G: Was there a lot of lobbying by the department stores and banks? 
O: With all we had going for us over those years, it's rather amazing that it took nine years to enact legislation of this nature. It clearly was indicative of the power of the lobby. They 
were able to fend this off and fend it off. Yet it seemed so significant and fair. I think the fairness aspect always frustrated me. I could never quite understand why we couldn't 
bring this about when I didn't consider it even debatable on the fairness side. They were able to stymie us for a long time. Finally, in the last months of the Johnson presidency this 
legislation was enacted. 
When you take housing, taxes, civil rights, truth in lending, you've got quite a package of accomplishments. 
G: You have talked in the past about the increasing influence of Vietnam on the congressional attitudes. Apart from that, was there an increasing reluctance of Congress, do you think, 
to promote Great Society legislation? Was there a feeling that the country needed time to digest the array of programs that had been enacted? 
O: I don't think Congress was approaching consideration of domestic legislation in those terms. But you could not avoid noting that in 1967, more and more discussions with 
7
O'Brien --Interview XXI --4 
members would involve expressions of concern about Vietnam. That increased in degree as time went on. But if you look at this legislative record in 1968, you were not being 
adversely affected by the growing concern regarding Vietnam. In the tax surcharge, the escalation of the cost of the Vietnam War was directly related. You would have people 
saying, "We're going through this because of Vietnam." 
The rest of the major legislative enactments that year were not impacted. The Congress was continuing to be supportive of the President domestically. 
When you say some were surprised with progress in 1968, that went to a feeling that he's not going to move the Great Society program, complete it, because he is carrying 
the burden of Vietnam, but that just wasn't the case. There was no observable reluctance on the part of our supporters in the Congress to pursue the objectives of the Great Society 
program. 
Through this period, also, I had determined to make a major effort in the Post Office Department to reorganize it. That had led to a highly publicized proposal to create 
an independent postal service removed from departmental status. When it came to making a political decision, my major concern in leaving the administration was that I was leaving 
incomplete the effort that I had devoted a tremendous amount of time and attention to over a long period. 
The Kappel Commission was in place; the President had named the commission. It was a blue-ribbon commission in every sense. It had not completed its report and 
recommendations, findings. I was deeply concerned about that. There was not White House enthusiasm for this. I had kind of dragged the President into it in a way. Yet, I 
was absolutely persuaded this was something that could be very meaningful, meaningful in terms of communication in this country. 
When I left in April, this was unfinished. While I was engaged in discussions that had to do with the 1968 election, none of the people who were discussing my possible role 
understood that part of my reluctance had to do with my keen desire to see through what I had started in postal reform. However, there was nothing much you could do about that 
except try outside of government to pursue this effort. I resorted to talking to Joe Califano on a number of occasions urging him to be sure that the Kappel Commission was 
nudged to get its report and findings in. 
A preliminary report was submitted by the commission. There were some aspects of it that were not in accord with my views. I had to try to ensure there'd be negotiations 
to refine those questionable areas and get to a final report. That ultimately occurred, but even then I found myself very frustrated. I'm on the outside. There is not presidential 
support or advocacy in the Congress. This went on through all of 1968. While I was quite pleased with the ultimate result of the commission's findings, I was not able to press 
for it from the inside. And that was frustrating. 
8
O'Brien --Interview XXI --5 
Joe was cooperative with me. He was the source I had in the White House to see if we couldn't keep this alive. I did not want to see it die and it was on the verge of dying. 
It never was accepted and advocated by the President until his farewell address. We were able to get an insert into the address that was supportive of the commission 
recommendations. There was no real involvement in the White House. The President wasn't focusing attention on this matter. I have a feeling my successor Marvin Watson 
was not that enamored with it, either. I'm not faulting anyone. This wasn't something that excited people, so you had to keep fanning that flame if you possibly could. It would have 
been sad to have launched this, secure widespread public media support, come out with a very impressive set of recommendations and put it into a closed file. The best we could 
get was a reference by President Johnson, a favorable reference, in his farewell address. 
To underscore that, it didn't take his successor long to note the value of this. I had the experience--by that time I was national chairman--to be visited by the designated 
Postmaster General, [Winton] Blount, designated by Nixon, who discussed this with me as a result of a detailed conversation with the President-Elect. The Nixon Administration ran 
with it. I was asked by the President to co-chair a citizens' committee to carry on this advocacy. I considered it totally non-partisan. I was very pleased that this was still alive 
and I did become actively involved, toured the country in support of it, testified in Congress in support. Ultimately, the legislation was enacted in significant part. Not in 
toto by any means, but at least I felt reasonably comfortable. The Post Office Department was removed from departmental status, given a considerable degree of independence and, 
most importantly, ability to self-finance. 
That was very much in my mind at the time I was making political decisions in April of 1968. I'm not suggesting that if I had gone through 1968 we would have gotten it 
into legislation. I still feel that if I had remained I would have been vigorous enough in my advocacy to get a rapid decision from the Kappel Commission, a more rapid reaction from 
the White House and the President, and enlist advocates on the Hill who would have introduced the legislation in 1968 and not have it a Nixon proposal in 1969. 
G: Well, likewise, do you think that as a result of your joining in the political activities first of Senator Kennedy and then Senator Humphrey that thereafter there was reluctance of the 
White House to push this measure through? 
O: I don't think it was due to my political involvement. This from the beginning was the difficult task of directing attention to what some would conceive to be a nuts and bolts 
proposal that had no great glamour. It didn't light a fire. You had to light it yourself and keep fanning the flame. I launched it without direct approval of the President. The 
President was in accord and that resulted in the Kappel Commission. But you can't keep attention focused on a matter such as that unless you stay abreast of it yourself and you 
refuse to accept inattention. That goes to the nature of the department. As I have said, at cabinet meetings, after I was a member of the cabinet, the only change that occurred was 
instead of discussing the legislative program from my seat along the wall of the Cabinet Room, I was discussing the legislative program from my seat at the table. It was a rare 
9
O'Brien --Interview XXI --6 
occurrence for any discussion to take place regarding postal service. 
The fact that the Post Office Department, I think, was created as the third department of government, Benjamin Franklin had been the first postmaster general, the 
fact that the volume of mail was equal to the entire rest of the world, the fact that there were 750,000 employees in the postal service, the fact there was a tremendous 
dependency on the postal service on the part of every single American. . . . I can say all those things, but I tell you they wind up on deaf ears. I would have deaf ears to it also 
before I was postmaster general. 
Then it came to the budget process and again the Post Office Department was low on the totem pole. The Post Office Department defrayed 90 per cent of its costs through 
revenue. The other 10 per cent had to be subsidized in one form or another. The postal unions were faring as well or better than any other civil servants because they were 
powerful entities with a great reservoir of strength in the Congress. You recognize that and so be it, so all right. You get to the budget, you get to this, but the postmaster 
general trying to arouse the White House and the administration generally regarding problems of the postal service was up against a stone wall. 
I had the unique situation of becoming postmaster general with daily entree to the White House. That's why I went into reform. I felt this was an opportunity that was 
unique and I should seize it. And I did. I'm pleased that something happened, something quite meaningful. But I was frustrated during that period of months when I was out of 
direct action, trying to keep the spark flickering in the White House with Joe Califano and others. The record shows the President registered approval at the end and another 
President seized upon it and it ultimately came into being. 
During those last stages when I was in the administration, we did finally conclude intricate and difficult negotiations with the several unions that represented postal 
employees. It was long and at times acrimonious negotiation but the threat of strike which was over our heads for months was avoided. We also tried to use our facilities to be 
helpful in the poverty-youth employment area. We did have some resources that could be put into that and we utilized them. We tied into the national organization of the Elks, for 
example, on youth employment. We were able to circumvent, against the union position, some of the civil service rules and bring in temporary employees that could be put into 
training programs that could ultimately lead to full-time employment. We introduced a number of these programs around the country and frankly, the postal service never 
received the credit it should have received. 
G: Why did you think it did not? 
O: There again, it's a big amorphous mass that nobody would pay any attention to until they failed to get their mail. 
Along the lines I was discussing regarding the Kappel Commission, I sent a memo 
10
O'Brien --Interview XXI --7 
on April 20, 1968, to Califano in which I said, "I have read the draft of the Kappel Commission report and I would strongly recommend against public release or presidential 
endorsement of the report in the form that it was sent." Joe Califano had arranged for me to review the draft and I had some problems with some aspects. I said, "It is totally 
senseless to base the recommendations upon a diatribe against the Congress and politics and upon a total denunciation of the postal service as it exists today." That was bothering 
me. After all, the commission is denouncing this administration, this President, for allowing these conditions to exist. 
Tape 1 of 4, Side 2 
O: "So we have done a very heavy editing job on the draft," I advised Joe, "while preserving the recommendations. If the commission is willing to accept the edited version which I am 
enclosing with this memo, I would endorse the report and I would urge its public release and I would recommend the President signify his approval." Then I threw a sentence in 
there. "I realize that that is a big 'if' but I will depend upon you, Joe, to get the job done." That's evidence of my frustration being out there somewhere. "I think it's important you 
return this edited version to [Frederick] Kappel making clear the recommended changes in the report are necessary or the report is dead. I understand that an editing committee, the 
commissioners, will be meeting Tuesday to go over the final draft. They should have the benefit of views prior to the start of that meeting." So that's just an example of the effort I 
was expending to try to keep this thing alive and keep it moving. 
G: It demonstrates that you had good ties within the commission as well to keep up with--O: 
Yes. Yes, it was a good commission. The commission members were not politicians and were not diplomatic in the language that was contained in the report. The basic 
recommendations I was in agreement with, but the tone of the report I was not. That would have caused a problem if you accepted it in that form. You would have had 
negative comment and congressmen would be saying that you don't need reform, what you need is the administration to straighten out the postal service. 
But with legislation and postal reform, this was a period of concern politically. Back to the political events from November of 1967 through the election of 1968, there 
was a great deal of action and significant decisions were made. Early on in 1967 you had the normal procedure, committees endorsing LBJ for re-election. I became intimately 
involved in this process. There was a request made of me to develop a suggested campaign program. 
G: Who made that request? 
O: The President. 
G: Describe the background in a little more detail. 
11
O'Brien --Interview XXI --8 
O: This would come up from time to time. It's late 1967. You're a year away from election. It was reminiscent of discussions we had in the Kennedy period where we started to talk 
about 1964 a year and a half before 1964. You're busily engaged, but every once in a while those who have political responsibility would wake up to the fact that time was 
running. Occasionally the President would make reference to, "We're in 1967 and time will run rapidly." It was decided the President ought to start thinking about 1968, and 
perhaps the best way to focus on 1968 was to have a talking paper. I called it a white paper. It represented a great deal of thought on my part. It was a basic, in-depth proposal 
for a campaign organization. I submitted this to the President on September 29, 1967. 
G: How did you develop this paper, first of all? 
O: I developed it through my experience in various campaigns going back to the O'Brien Manual actually. 
G: Did it draw heavily from the O'Brien--? 
O: Yes, with refinements to update in terms of changes in campaign procedures. It's forty-four pages long and quite detailed. It does go into overall campaign organization 
and then it breaks down into the campaign structure itself, organization, polling, media, films, campaign literature, advertising, policy and positions, scheduling, finance chairman, 
federal agency liaison, use of the computers, issues. Then, looking at party weaknesses, looking at focal points, suburban voter middle-class American, lack of rapport with 
candidates to be concerned about splinter group hostility, youth, women, as we said in those days, the Negro vote. Republican strategy, we reviewed that, what we could 
anticipate. [I looked at] the presidential primaries and then the national convention. In a two-paragraph conclusion, I said, "At the start of this white paper, I stated that the goal is 
your re-election as president of the United States. I believe this goal is attainable and will be accomplished. We must not, however, lose any of the precious weeks and months that 
are needed to put into effect the organization of the campaign. It will take a full year, starting in November of 1967, to implement the recommendation of this paper. The time 
for decision-making is upon us." This was my effort to comply with the President's request that I detail what I conceived to be a campaign organization. Somebody had to 
initiate discussions and this was conceived by me to be a way of focusing attention on the campaign. 
G: The white paper was critiqued by Jim Rowe. His critique was critiqued by you. 
O: Yes. Jim Rowe critiqued the paper in some detail. He made some references to things he felt should be included that were not and also that greater emphasis should be put on some 
things. For example, he said, "I do not have comments on the substantive issues at this time other than to say O'Brien has spelled out the important ones with the exception of the 
farm problem." He went on to discuss the faults in the white paper as he saw it. Then [he] said, "If the President were to devote one or two evenings with a number of people in 
whom he has confidence, including O'Brien, to discuss the problems, beginning with this 
12
O'Brien --Interview XXI --9 
paper would be most helpful. The sooner he does it the better," and I notice he had a yes or no and a check mark yes--I don't know who checked it but that was his critique. 
Then November 7 I sent a memo to Watson giving my comments on Rowe. They were solicited; I was asked to comment on his critique. I said, "I find it difficult to relate a 
main committee to a working task force. My emphasis from the beginning has been on coordination. The task force [is] composed of coordinators with individual responsibilities 
who could also participate in general campaign planning. You will note this means coordinating all the elements of the campaign including the volunteer structure. I fear that 
the role of viewers versus the doers is misunderstood. It is easy to present a plan; it's extremely difficult to staff it. I cannot believe that a campaign can be waged by a 
committee of viewers. In that context, I felt that last Friday evening's meeting following the President's departure was a debacle." 
I also sent a note to Rowe appreciating receiving his critique. He had suggested coordination with the national committee; I pointed out to him that I had included key 
members of the national committee. I went on in some detail. However, what is missing here--we have my white paper, we have Jim's critique, my critique of Jim. But, clearly, a 
meeting took place and the President was at that meeting, but he departed the meeting at some point on the basis of the November 7, 1967, memo to Watson. In the last paragraph 
I say, "I cannot believe that a campaign can be waged by a committee of viewers. In that context I felt last Friday evening's meeting following the President's departure was a 
debacle." Now, I don't remember specifics, but what I would term a debacle would be a group of people sitting around who are not going to play a full-time role in the campaign 
but have points of view which they want to express, running the spectrum without any specificity. I always considered campaign meetings of that nature to be debacles. I had 
lived through meetings where people pontificate and nothing was accomplished. Clearly, I reacted strongly to that meeting; clearly the meeting included the President. I guess you 
have to assume that the President said, "I'm going to leave now but, fellows, keep on discussing this and let's get things done." In my judgment at least I felt that the meeting 
ended without anything being done. 
G: Do you remember who else was there? 
O: No, I don't except I noticed that--I was looking at the bottom of this memo which comes out of the Watson file. 
G: This is a memo from you to Watson, November 7, 1967. 
O: Yes, but the meeting with the President had already taken place. In fact, it says specifically, "I felt last Friday evening"--whatever date that was--" following the President's 
departure was a debacle." That same day I sent a memo to Jim Rowe. The subject is Jim's memo concerning my white paper. I went through a great deal of detail on that 
meeting, too, making some general comments, reviewing the task force concept, registration, scheduling special groups, the farmers particularly which Jim had felt I did 
13
O'Brien --Interview XXI --10 
not properly emphasize, polling coordinators, media, policy and positions, intellectual community. All of this I kept repeating. For example, intellectual community, so-called, 
"Once again, this area must be represented within the task force." My feeling was all of this had to be coordinated. I guess my conclusion to Jim Rowe, "Your memo does not 
recognize what the white paper envisions as the role and functions of the task force. The task force is not to be a public group officially designated in press releases and hoopla. It 
is to be a working coordinating group with adequate staffing. Its purpose is not to bring attention to itself but to organize, direct, and coordinate a presidential campaign. Your 
memo says that the white paper does not distinguish between the various stages of the campaign. This obviously would be one of the initial assignments of the task force, but it 
cannot be accomplished unless you have the people and the organization to do the job." 
You'd have an inside group of observers and so-called experts, of which I would be one, who have these meetings and have discussions. But where was the working team? 
I didn't feel that you wanted this group of senior consultant experts and a campaign organization separated. If you were not going to be an integral part of the campaign 
organization and be familiar with all of its activities and totally involved on a day-to-day basis, I wasn't interested. That was never the case in any campaign I was ever in. 
G: Why do you think there was a tendency to have this development in the Johnson election? 
O: I don't think there was a formalized development. If you're going to have Abe Fortas, Clark Clifford, Jim Rowe or whoever, that's all well and good but what are they going to 
be doing? The tone of the meeting I objected to indicated to me that you could spend the next several months having conversations about how things should be done without any 
full involvement, knowledge of how this was unfolding or even a reporting system. This group would be close to the President and somebody else would be running the campaign. 
G: Do you recall LBJ's input at the meeting? His reaction to your white paper? 
O: All I can recall is that the initial purpose of the white paper was accomplished. For the first time in that meeting, that Friday before November 7, the President sat with a group to 
discuss a political campaign, a re-election drive. 
G: But he didn't say anything about the white paper. 
O: The white paper was basically the reason for the meeting and was available to everybody at the meeting. 
G: Any other recollections of who else was there? 
O: If my memory hadn't been jogged by the memos I probably would not have recalled the meeting. 
G: How would you compare Jim Rowe to yourself as a political strategist, let's say? 
14
O'Brien --Interview XXI --11 
O: Oh, I don't know. I never made an attempt to compare. Jim had been involved in national politics for a long time, had acquired, and rightly so, a reputation in that area, had had 
obviously considerable success. I'm sure it never entered my mind to make some comparison. 
G: If you were making a comparison today, would you reflect that perhaps his strength was more oriented toward the West whereas yours might have been more toward the East? 
O: I don't know. I think perhaps--and this sounds self-serving--that there wouldn't be anybody around at that time who had the experience I had nationally in every state in this 
union, and had as much direct contact with political leaders from the county level up across the country. That would be because I'd been through it more recently than Jim. 
Now, Jim undoubtedly had all that at a point, too. He had been through it and Jim and I were not in any conflict. My feeling was more "let's get on with it." I can remember being 
concerned about the Kennedy campaign for re-election and saying to Steve Smith and others, "We're all busy. We're all doing our thing, but before we know it we're going to be 
involved in another national campaign. We've just got to get with it." 
I remember that meeting we had in the Cabinet Room in the Kennedy period. There were a number of us there who had been involved in the 1960 campaign and were 
now in government saying, "We've got to get with this." Get with what and when. And you go back to your office to catch up with your phone calls. That always concerned me. 
I never bought the idea that you peak at a certain time. I always felt in a political campaign you work harder and longer than the opposition. 
It's nuts and bolts. There's very little, if any, glamour attached to it. It's hard, hard work. So I would get frustrated if you didn't get to the nuts and bolts. That really is all it 
amounted to. I felt that November of 1967 was not too soon to get people assigned, develop strategy. That forty-four page white paper is not something that can be 
implemented overnight. 
G: Was there any doubt in your mind at this time that the President was going to be a candidate again? 
O: No. 
G: How about anyone else in the meeting? 
O: I don't recall. I don't think frankly I would have involved myself in, even at the President's request, a white paper if I had doubts about it. At that point in September of 1967 you 
were just not contemplating anything but a re-election drive. And the re-election drive could turn out to be walk-through. It could be comparable to the Goldwater of 1964. 
There was an attitude among some of the Kennedy people in early 1963 that 
15
O'Brien --Interview XXI --12 
re-election was going to be automatic so why get excited or concerned? Well, I felt that Jack Kennedy never would have been president of the United States if we approached 
political campaigns--back to Henry Cabot Lodge--that way. It just doesn't happen. You have to work at them. A campaign that I'd be more accustomed to, obviously, would be 
basic O'Brien Manual nuts and bolts. It was not just sitting around discussing grand strategy, and that would be where I think I would feel some degree of frustration. 
G: Now, you yourself I guess went through a change in terms of your own involvement with the President's campaign. 
O: Yes. 
G: From the standpoint of not being involved to a certain extent and then being very involved. 
O: Like a roller coaster, I guess. Jim Rowe, incidentally, surfaced through this as a key fellow with Lyndon Johnson and I must say a creative guy. I could see why he had been 
successful in the political arena. 
(Interruption) 
O: You have November of 1967, and there were perhaps other meetings. I know that Jim Rowe and I, following this meeting, had a great deal of contact. I don't recall any 
meetings comparable to this one I referred to where we just sat and kind of pontificated. Jim wasn't that type of fellow either, incidentally. He had a great awareness of presidential 
campaigns so he and I wound up in pretty regular contact. It didn't take long before this organizational concept just disappeared because, as early as January of 1968, I have a 
memo to the President regarding the Massachusetts presidential primary. That's a far cry from establishing a broad-based national campaign organization. 
He had asked me to evaluate the Massachusetts primary. I don't recall discussion with the President between November and January about organizational strategy across 
the country. This memo reports that I have evaluated the situation. I took the occasion to have a poll taken showing that any number of candidates could easily defeat Gene 
McCarthy in Massachusetts. But I also had a warning that whatever route might be taken regarding the Massachusetts primary it should be anticipated there would be an active 
campaign. You could not take this poll and assume that would be the end result when you have an extremely active Gene McCarthy with an organized campaign. 
So, whoever was going to stand in, if that was what the President's decision was, would have to be prepared to organize and campaign vigorously in Massachusetts. I had 
thrown my own name into the poll and I pointed out to the President that I would be prepared to leave the administration and be the stand-in if that was his desire. 
G: There was some interest in having Ted Kennedy. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --13 
O: Having Ted Kennedy would accomplish all kinds of things, but was it realistic? You shouldn't foreclose it. In fact, I discussed it with Ted Kennedy. 
G: Tell me about that discussion. 
O: I'll get to that. 
All you're saying is, "Has the President made up his mind to enter primaries?" That's his decision. I, at one point, thought it was appropriate and at a later point thought 
it was most inappropriate. All we were dealing with at that point really was a Gene McCarthy situation. Massachusetts was particularly important because McCarthy clearly 
would enter that primary. 
The reason that you felt Ted Kennedy could possibly be the stand-in, favorite son, was because he had a stake in the Massachusetts primary. My judgment was that Ted 
Kennedy would not be enamored with the idea that Gene McCarthy would be handed the Massachusetts delegation on a silver platter. Maybe that would motivate Ted. Here you 
have a serious look at the Massachusetts primary, how you're going to fend off McCarthy, how you're going to preserve the President's position. 
I was at Bob Kennedy's house one evening and as the evening closed out, I made a point of getting Teddy in a corner as we were both about to leave. I put it to him directly. 
This was very close to the final date for filing for the Massachusetts primary. Teddy made it clear to me he would not be a stand-in in the Massachusetts primary. 
G: Did you try to convince him to? 
O: No. I asked him if he was prepared to and he said he didn't think so. I asked him if he would consider it. He indicated he wouldn't. I asked him finally if he would keep an open 
mind and he agreed to do that. Let's close it out that way, but I certainly didn't leave feeling there was any chance. That took care of that. 
I had a conversation with the Speaker at which the Speaker made it very clear to me that he would not act as a stand-in. 
G: Yet, he was in a similar position because he didn't want a McCarthy delegation either, I guess. 
O: He didn't have as much at stake as Teddy had, as I saw it. 
G: Why didn't Ted Kennedy want to do that? 
O: Ted Kennedy had a pleasant relationship with the President. They got along well. The President's concern about Bobby obviously existed and we will get into that. Perhaps 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --14 
Teddy could work with McCarthy to split the delegation--something short of putting his name on a ballot. Teddy wasn't enamored with the idea of being that committed to 
Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam. Now, none of those things were said, but you could come to such a conclusion. McCormack wasn't going to go to Massachusetts and campaign as a 
stand-in. If he had agreed to do it, it would have been a matter of simply putting his name on the ballot. 
While all this was going on, there was activity in New Hampshire. Bernie Boutin was handling the President's interests in New Hampshire. I had no knowledge of what 
was going on in New Hampshire. At this time I'm not involved in discussing anything other than the Massachusetts primary. I thought that if it was the President's decision that 
he be represented in Massachusetts and you didn't have the availability of McCormack or Teddy--I had no ego in that regard--that in loyalty to the President I should volunteer to 
stand in. That would be his decision, and he understood that; that was clear. 
But it became a matter of total indecision. I had a breakfast meeting with Bobby at some stage. Bobby was expressing his concerns about Vietnam. I believe it was at that 
meeting that he urged me to have a discussion with Bob McNamara. I don't know how the meeting was set up; I don't recall, but McNamara came to my office and proceeded to 
make a strong pitch that Bobby should run for president. I pointed out to McNamara that everybody shared concern about Vietnam. It was a growing concern. I was picking it up 
around the country and on the Hill. I felt in the best interests of all a major effort should be made internally to change the President's course on Vietnam. 
Tape 2 of 4, Side 1 
O: That was my position and I would continue to retain that position. Bobby, at some meeting during that time, made reference to a poll that was being conducted by Jess 
Unruh, who had been a long-time Kennedy supporter in California, to determine Bob Kennedy re: Lyndon Johnson in California. This was getting serious. Bobby decrying 
Johnson's Vietnam policy; Johnson complaining to me about Bobby's attitude toward him went on from time to time. He said he would advise me on the result of the poll. The 
result of the poll was discussed. There were three or four of us sitting around. I don't remember what was discussed in specifics. There were no copies of polls. That was the 
only knowledge I had of the poll. The poll results were never formally given to me. There wasn't a great deal of emphasis placed on the poll results, but nobody made a big 
issue of it and that was the extent of my knowledge of the poll. 
I found myself deeply immersed in Massachusetts primary discussions, lacking any knowledge of what was transpiring in New Hampshire and sensing that the Bobby 
Kennedy matter was getting more serious. While the concern was at that point focused on McCarthy re: Massachusetts, re: New Hampshire and perhaps elsewhere, it was a strange 
position to be in. I had put on the record to the President that all he had to do was say, "I want you to stand in," I'll stand in, and let's get this done. I owe it to him. I will do it with 
no reluctance and give it all the effort I can. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --15 
But Bernie Boutin called me one day. He is running the New Hampshire primary. He said, "You probably would wonder why I haven't been in regular contact with you on 
what's transpiring up here." I said, "I have wondered how it's going." He said, "Well, I'm"--I think this is what he said--" under instruction not to be involved with you in this." I 
don't know who the strategists were that were making those decisions, but it did bother me to the extent that I have been loyal, yet whether it's the President or others, they 
distrust me. They just are not sure of me. That was bothersome because, with all of my Kennedy associations, I was adhering to a straight line, would continue to. Bobby and 
Teddy Kennedy would recognize that and understand that. They did. I never had a problem with them in that regard. They knew that I was not going to do anything but 
support the guy that I worked for and that was it. They could wish otherwise but that wasn't going to happen. Certainly the two Kennedys were not going to consider this some 
kind of an affront. In fact, interestingly enough, they appreciated that; nevertheless, there is somebody on the Johnson side saying, "I don't know about O'Brien." Be that as it may, 
we got to a situation in Massachusetts where it was decided that the President of the state senate, Maurice Donahue, would be the stand-in. 
G: Who decided that? 
O: I was involved in it. 
G: Was Ted Kennedy involved in it? 
O: No. Here's a leading Democrat in the state. He's president of the state senate. His attitude was "Fine, be happy to; just give me the signal." 
Meanwhile, the President said he deeply appreciated the fact that I had volunteered to stand in for him, but he didn't feel that he wanted to have me do that. It meant leaving 
the administration, but he appreciated the offer. So at that point you have Maurice sitting in Boston, and we had conversations with the state chairman who came to me to discuss 
this. 
G: This was Hyman? 
O: Les Hyman. We discussed the various procedural aspects and the rest. So by process of elimination, if there is to be a stand-in, it's Donahue and he's ready. It got to the last day 
for filing. This information is available to Marvin Watson and I assume Jim Rowe. But I have no signal. I desperately try to get the signal while Donahue is on standby in Boston. 
I couldn't get Marvin Watson on the telephone. The day wore on and I kept [getting] back to Donahue saying, "Stand by." I never was able to make the contact; there was no 
filing. The decision obviously was made by the President not to have a stand-in. I hadn't been advised that was his decision so I played it out to the last hour. As I had been 
requested to be directly involved in the Massachusetts primary, I stayed involved until the closing of the State House. The Massachusetts primary has gone by the board. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --16 
G: Did you draw conclusions from this that perhaps the President wasn't going to run? 
O: No. 
G: Really? 
O: No. Not at all. I concluded that the President was being very indecisive on how to handle this. 
G: There was also a question with regard to the delegate slate for this primary. 
O: Yes. 
G: And it seems a lot of horse trading. I know Ted Kennedy insisted on Dick Goodwin, for example, and administration didn't seem to want--O: 
There was a lot of that but really what it came to was, was there going to be a delegate slate or not. I don't remember Goodwin. If he insisted on it, I wasn't aware of it and I 
was deeply involved, I thought. 
G: What was Hyman's role in all this? 
O: He had [a] certain responsibility as state chairman. 
G: That must have been a frustrating experience for you. 
O: Well, it--let me--G: 
This is February 2, you say. 
O: Yes, 1968. There is a memo to Jim Rowe from me which underscores the activity that I was engaged in. In this memo, I report my current findings on primaries. I start with New 
Hampshire; no one had told me not to be involved in New Hampshire so it wouldn't enter my mind not to be. I point out that New Hampshire is well-organized and in good hands. 
I point out that I have talked twice to Governor [Hulett] Smith of West Virginia and he has noted that there is no interest on the part of anyone to get into the primary. He said 
he will stand by through the close of business today and in the event anything occurs, he is prepared to enter his name; in other words, if somebody else entered the primary. Ohio, 
confirming the arrangements with Steve Young as favorite son, with the release of the delegates prior to the first ballot, is firm. In Pennsylvania, we'll have a report shortly. 
In Massachusetts I said, "For your information I attach a copy of the memorandum I sent to the President expressing my views." I discussed write-in problems with Bernie 
Boutin. It is only the city of Portsmith with voting machines. It's extremely complicated 
20
O'Brien --Interview XXI --17 
and if machines existed through New Hampshire it would be impossible for him to carry on a write-in. I have reached the firm conclusion that the President's name be on the 
Massachusetts ballot. However, this must come about by a decision made by Chairman Hyman without any acquiescence on our part and accompanied by public support from the 
Massachusetts State Committee, all the state legislative leaders, as many Democratic leaders and other Democratic officeholders as possible and the congressional delegation. 
Obviously, this does not include Ted Kennedy who will remain neutral." Then I talk about raising money in Massachusetts. I say, "A write-in in Massachusetts is unrealistic and I'm 
now convinced a stand-in is also probably not realistic." Then I say, "I suggest you incorporate whatever portion of this report you feel is significant in your report to the 
President." 
On February 22, I sent a memo to the President regarding the Massachusetts primary in which I said, "Jim Rowe and I conferred today with State Chairman Lester 
Hyman, Speaker McCormack and Eddie McCormack. For the first time I was given the opportunity to review the slate of delegates compiled by Ted Kennedy to be approved at 
the Democratic State Committee meeting in Boston. The list includes Professor Sam Beer, Jerry Weisner, Allan Sidd, who garnered four votes in leading the fight against the 
pro-Vietnam resolution to the Democratic State Committee, Adam Yarmolinsky, and Dick Goodwin. As best I could determine, all on the slate are clearly pro-LBJ. We discussed 
each of these assuming they oppose your Vietnam policy but [do] not necessarily oppose your re-election with the exception of Goodwin and the discussion centered on him. 
Hyman advised us that Ted Kennedy insisted Goodwin be on the slate." 
I said I didn't remember it but here it is. "Further, the slate contains my name along with Bob Wood and Charlie Haar. It does not contain the name of John Roche and 
it was indicated he was traded off for not including [John Kenneth] Galbraith. I told Hyman I did not know what policy, if any, existed for presidential appointees as delegates. 
I further stated the selection of delegates was a matter for Ted Kennedy and the Democratic leaders in Massachusetts as they had clearly indicated that by not discussing 
this matter with us until now. We, in turn, would of course determine what, if any, position we would take regarding a candidate against McCarthy. Hyman reiterated his 
intention to place your name on the ballot. The McCormacks indicated approval of this procedure. Rowe and I were noncommittal. Stand-ins were discussed. McCormack was 
mentioned on the basis he would not be considered in any way a future challenge to the Democrats. Other stand-ins were discussed including Maurice Donahue, Kevin White and 
me." Kevin White was mayor in Boston. "All agreed that any stand-in would cause conflicts that would seriously lessen the pro-LBJ vote. Once again, Rowe and I were 
noncommittal except Jim suggested McCormack, but the Speaker seemed adamant. The Speaker expressed deep concern, as this would of course place him in a position of being 
pledged to McCarthy; he'd be a delegate. If he stayed under these circumstances he would not remain on the delegation. Hyman firmly stated he would also remove himself. Both 
of them pointed out that the leading Democrats on the slate would undoubtedly follow suit. In this area of discussion as in the others Jim Rowe and I were noncommittal except 
to indicate no name on the ballot had to be considered as a possibility along with the other 
21
O'Brien --Interview XXI --18 
possibilities that have been discussed." 
I summarize saying, "Apparently, the Hyman slate will be endorsed by the state committee. However, there will be a resolution presented urging your renomination and 
re-election which will complement the Vietnam resolution passed by the state committee last meeting." Then, "There is unanimity of opinion that you are strong in Massachusetts 
and we have staunch supporters at the leadership level." I point out that "last night Donahue and Kevin White both expressed their strong support for LBJ. The alternatives 
are a) Hyman pursues his course and files your name without any signal from us or b) the Speaker be persuaded and only you can do this, or c) a stand-in be selected from the 
remaining possibilities or d) not allow your name or the name of any official stand-in be presented thus permitting the delegation to be pledged to McCarthy on the first ballot 
which will result in decimating the slate Teddy has put together and leave the situation in a shambles." I suggested to him that they could anticipate a roll call at Chicago and it 
would be more impressive than simple acclamation. In other words, they stay on the record. 
So Hyman was very much involved because that's February 22, and on March 4 I have a memo from Ira Kapenstein to me. "Lester Hyman called me this afternoon to 
present an angle on the Massachusetts primary. There is a line on the presidential primary ballot to write in the name of the candidate for president. Assuming the President's name 
is not on the ballot and a stand-in for the President is running against McCarthy, the more sophisticated voter on April 30 will realize that a vote for the stand-in will be a vote for 
the President. However, the less sophisticated voter could decide to write in the name of the President. This would split the vote for Johnson between stand-in and the write-in. 
These votes would be tallied separately, thus creating the possibility of a McCarthy victory because of the split voting. Lester said this angle had been brought to his attention by a 
reporter today and that he had not thought of it previously. This seems to be a valid concern and serves to re-emphasize the need for a highly-organized, well-financed 
campaign. If there is to be a stand-in, the campaign must get across to the Democratic voters that Mr. X is standing in for President Johnson." 
On March 6, I sent a letter to the Secretary of the State of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts saying, "I wish to withdraw as a candidate for delegate for Massachusetts 
in the 1968 National Convention." Apparently I was on that roster of delegates. "When I was nominated for delegate at a meeting held in Boston on February 24, it was my hope 
that I would be able to vote at the national convention for the renomination of President Lyndon B. Johnson. However, the only name that will appear on the presidential 
preference primary ballot in Massachusetts is that of Senator Eugene McCarthy, which means that under the Massachusetts law the delegates will be committed to vote for 
Senator McCarthy at the national convention. I do not want to vote for Senator McCarthy as a delegate, therefore I must withdraw from the slate." So I formally 
withdrew. 
On March 6, I sent a memo to Marvin Watson saying, "The attached is 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --19 
self-explanatory. It represents my views and how best to handle non-presidential involvement in primaries in general terms." It is a background paper where I say, "There 
seems to be some misunderstanding as to the President's position concerning the presidential preference primaries." This is March 6. I point out that "only fifteen states 
have presidential primaries and of that number only three states have primary laws which make the president's name on the ballot mandatory unless he certifies he is not a candidate 
for re-election. Those states are Wisconsin, Nebraska and Oregon. At this time the President has made no decision concerning his candidacy for re-election and therefore he 
would not file the disclaimer in the three states mentioned above. Therefore, the President will avoid involvement in all presidential primaries this year where there is any option. 
That is exactly what happened in Massachusetts. If a stand-in for the President had been entered in the Massachusetts primary this would have indicated at least indirect 
presidential acquiescence. The presidential primaries are a totally valid testing ground for candidates in the party out of power. An incumbent president who has to rely on being 
active on the presidential primaries for his nomination would be operating from a position of weakness and be risking the antagonism of the American people for involving himself in 
political campaign activity long before the November election." This is an argument. "I present this as the background paper for justification for not entering any primaries." 
G: Did this reflect your own actual feeling at the time? 
O: We had gone through this Massachusetts debacle and it was clear that the President was not going to be entering primaries or preferred certainly not to enter primaries. You say, 
"Okay, if that is the procedure that is going to be followed, this is the justification for the procedure. It's weak, but it sounds fairly good." You reach a little, but you're talking 
about his attention to his duties. 
G: But clearly the President's position aside, there was an impact on state politics if he forfeited entering primaries. As you said in Massachusetts, it left in shambles the 
delegate--O: 
It did. 
G: Well, which is preferable? 
O: Well, at this point, if you have foreclosed Massachusetts and you are trying to do a write-in in New Hampshire, you don't have anything preferable anymore. You better 
come up with a rationale for non-involvement and let it fly. What else are you going to do? Are you going to say, "I didn't go here but I am going there" or do you have an 
overall policy? Your policy is forced upon you really at that point. You can't be talking about these other twelve or thirteen primaries beyond New Hampshire and Massachusetts. 
You have to be concerned that you may be stuck in Wisconsin, Oregon and Nebraska and you were in the Wisconsin primary. You have to forego seeking the nomination in order 
to avoid having your name on the ballot. 
23
O'Brien --Interview XXI --20 
To reconstruct this, you go back to the white paper. That white paper obviously assumed a lot. It assumed that this man was going to seek re-election, that we weren't 
going to make any waves about it and we were going to proceed in all aspects of the campaign. That obviously would have built into it the primaries. But that's in September. 
There's a meeting in November. Now in January I find myself spending time in the nitty-gritty of a Massachusetts primary, including a slate of delegates. Then you find that 
you can't get a response to determine whether or not you're going to have a stand-in, within hours of the closing of the filing; the closing at five o'clock goes by and you've 
never been able to talk to anyone. So it was clear that nobody wanted to talk about it. That was the mess we were in. 
G: Did you ever discuss that point with the President later? 
O: I don't recall that I did. 
This document to Marvin Watson that I put together says, "The debacle has occurred. The game is over. There is no point in discussing stand-ins, primaries, from 
here on out. There has to be a position that justifies your decision not to be involved. Why? That's because you wanted to attend to your duties." It's weak, but all that's 
available. 
Now you get to the notes of a meeting that took place on February 9 that included Jim Rowe, Crooker. 
G: John Crooker, probably. 
O: And me. And at that meeting Boutin reports 1,600 volunteers are working in New Hampshire. It was agreed two steps should be taken. First, "O'Brien will make some 
opportunity to dedicate a post office or honor a postmaster so that he may visit the state, and John Dow will have some occasion to be in New Hampshire and will seek to take a 
reading of feeling among younger people." And I did go to New Hampshire. "With respect to Wisconsin, it was suggested by Rowe that Ralph Hewitt and John Holden be 
asked to coordinate efforts, that Kapenstein could develop a great deal of helpful information about matters in Wisconsin. O'Brien will contact [Clement] Zablocki to 
ascertain whether he'd be willing to serve as a co-chairman. During the meeting [Richard] Cudahy called from Wisconsin to report on the initial work being done at the headquarters 
in Milwaukee. As the deadline for filing in Pennsylvania is only a few days off, O'Brien agreed to appraise the situation in that state over the weekend, especially as he has a 
speaking engagement there on Saturday night, February 10. Governor Price Daniel visited with the group and reported on suggestions that certain Democratic governors and former 
governors become involved in campaign efforts. Rowe will be leaving for California on February 10, will contact key leaders there and will relay to [Edward] Breathitt all 
important information and permit Breathitt to size up the situation by the time he goes to California about February 14. Brief reference was made to designate certain individuals 
who would have primary responsibility for contact with several states and also for 
24
O'Brien --Interview XXI --21 
geographical regions or groups of states but this topic was deferred until a later meeting in which possibly [Samuel] Kanell, [Russell] Carter and/ or [Erwin] Griswold might be 
present." I don't know. All that indicates is you're playing around with this on February 9. 
Over St. Patrick's Day, I had a schedule in Massachusetts. It wasn't confined to March 17. March 16, I was in Massachusetts the day Bob Kennedy announced his 
candidacy. At some point during that thirty-six hour period, March 16, 17, by sheer coincidence I am with Teddy Kennedy at a function in Everett, Massachusetts and I'm the 
speaker. Teddy said he wanted to talk to me after the function or at some time during the function. However, he left before we had any conversation. He left early for some reason 
and a fellow on his staff, Jim King, told me after the function that Teddy wanted to get the word to me that Bobby was, I guess the following day, announcing his candidacy for 
president. That's how I learned of it. I was in western Massachusetts the next day at several functions during the day and I, at some point, heard Bob Kennedy's announcement. 
That's all I recall about it. 
I came back to Washington and on March 18 I sent a memo to the President reacting to a proposal made by Rowe that he and I quickly send a telegram to hundreds of 
Democrats around the country, which I construed as a serious overreaction to the Bobby Kennedy announcement. Apparently, it had caused hysteria. In that context, Rowe was 
pressing me to enter this joint action with him. I didn't particularly appreciate Jim Rowe making that decision, which I considered not sensible. An overreaction would be picked 
up by the press and we would get the hell kicked out of us. If Rowe had taken it on his own or whether it had been at the urging of the President, I didn't know. But if it had 
been something that the President was interested in directly, he could discuss it with me directly. I should not be thrust into something like this willy-nilly. 
G: Do you think it was Rowe's idea to send that out or do you think it was the President's? 
O: I assume it was his. You have the Bobby Kennedy announcement and out of the White House comes this rash of telegrams across the country which in substance say, "Restate 
your loyalty to the President immediately." I believe that Rowe in the context of that recommendation suggested I be immediately designated chairman of the campaign. If 
anything would be construed by the press that the President didn't sleep last night and won't sleep ever again because of Bobby Kennedy, that would do it. I thought it 
amateurish at best. In any event, I reacted rather strongly to it, I guess. 
G: Your notes also indicate that Ted Kennedy had dinner at your home that night. 
O: That was March 18. Yes. He came to my home. It was just he and I. It took him a long time during the course of what was a social occasion--split a bottle of wine; have a 
leisurely steak--to get around to suggesting that maybe I ought to give some thought to joining Bobby. 
25
O'Brien --Interview XXI --22 
G: How did he phrase his suggestion, do you remember? 
O: Chuckling and laughing and kidding around. A little reminiscing. It would be like old times; I would direct the campaign. Why did I want to be bothered with that Post Office 
Department? It was light, a lot of humor. But he didn't persuade me. 
G: What was your response? 
O: In the same vein: "You've got to be kidding. You know what my position is and will continue to be." He didn't press the issue but he sure brought up the subject. I'm sure that 
was orchestrated as part of Bobby's announcement. The coincidence of Teddy having made arrangements to have dinner with me on March 18. "Why didn't he drop by to my 
place and we have a pleasant evening?" If you look at the timetable, it couldn't have been more fortuitous from his point of view. In any event, nothing came of that and Teddy 
didn't express any animosity whatsoever. He indicated that he understood clearly, but why not try it? I believe the very next day Bobby called me. 
G: That's the date on your--O: 
What date is that? 
G: The nineteenth, the next day. 
O: Bobby called me at my office. He was obviously totally aware of what transpired the night before and he carried on in the same vein, saying, "Well, we're not going to give up. 
This won't be the last of this," that sort of thing. Coinciding with that I was scheduled to address the National Press Club. 
G: The twentieth, yes. 
O: Bobby took occasion that morning to call me. Normally, Bobby would have been disinterested in my speaking at the National Press Club. I got a kick out of the call 
because he said, "I understand you're addressing the National Press Club and I was wondering what you were going to say about me." My response in a rather jocular vein 
again was, "I'm not going to say anything about you, but I have my prepared remarks and I'll give you a section"--which I read to him in which I strongly supported LBJ. 
G: What was his reaction? 
O: "Well, I just thought I'd check. I thought maybe you'd have something nice to say about me." One of those typical conversations I had over the years with the Kennedys. 
Nevertheless, this was going on all the way back to Bobby expressing his growing concern about Vietnam and the President's position, the Bob McNamara conversation, the lunch or 
breakfast I had with Bobby, dinner at Hickory Hill, learning Bobby was announcing while I was sitting at a banquet in Everett, Massachusetts, Teddy by more than sheer 
26
O'Brien --Interview XXI --23 
coincidence scheduled to have dinner with me at my home, Bobby calling me the next morning to follow up on Teddy, and then the National Press Club. It was always in a light 
vein; nevertheless, the pressure was there. 
But the pressure did not affect me at all because you shouldn't be affected. Because--" Are you loyal to the President?"--if I had preached all my life loyalty and I felt 
so strongly about it in the White House in the Kennedy period and the Johnson period and always said if you have some problem with loyalty, you have one action to take: leave. 
That went back to problems I had with a couple of members of the Kennedy Administration in the earlier days when I put it to them. So I had no problem whatsoever. 
I wasn't losing a moment's sleep and my course was clear. I was going to remain loyal to that President and fulfill my responsibility to the end of his administration. I should say it 
in all fairness, that the Kennedys knew that there was no way they could pressure me. It would have to be a matter of cajoling me or reflecting on friendship and that sort of thing. 
Tape 2 of 4, Side 2 
O: They conducted themselves in a proper manner but they made the effort. 
(Interruption) 
O: At one point in all this, before Bob Kennedy's announcement, in a session I had with him--one of these dinners or luncheons or breakfasts--I urged him to contact the 
President. I felt very strongly about it. Bobby can tell me until hell freezes over all his problems regarding Johnson's policies. Johnson can tell me until hell freezes over all his 
problems as he perceives them with Bobby. But, for God's sake, stop telling me, both of you, what your problems are concerning each other. Why don't the two of you sit down 
and see if there is any way you can work out these problems? Talk to each other. I urged Bobby to do that. I urged Bobby to just pick up the phone, make an appointment with the 
President, sit down, see if anything can come of it. As I recall it, he indicated he was going to seriously think about it. It never happened. He did not have the meeting with the 
President. However, in that period, Ted Sorensen, on Bobby's behalf, reportedly met with the President--this was unknown to me at the time--and presented a proposal to form a 
committee to review Vietnam policy. I have always felt that that was Bobby's way of moving with the suggestion I made to him. He took that circuitous route that he felt 
would mean the President would sit down and talk to him about it, rather than Bobby asking the President to meet with him. He used Ted as the emissary. The President, as I 
understand it, dismissed it out of hand, which I think in retrospect was a big mistake. Again, nothing probably would have come of it, but this was a reaching out by Bobby to 
LBJ. He made the gesture. And I will say that's all it was, a gesture. It was far from my suggestion that he meet directly, request the meeting. I think if I had been Lyndon 
Johnson under those circumstances I would have said, "Let me think about it. I'd like to discuss it directly with Bobby. Why don't we have Bobby come in?" Who knows what 
persuasive powers he might have had at that point that would have ameliorated this situation, but it didn't happen. 
27
O'Brien --Interview XXI --24 
Meanwhile, I had a problem, the only problem I ever had with the President, and it occurred at some point in this whole primary/ non-primary, nonparticipation/ participation 
area. There was an article in the paper that quoted a top official that Johnson was not going to enter any primaries. Johnson reacted very strongly to it and he called me. We 
had a tough conversation. He said that he assumed I had been the source of that story and, by God, he'd make up his own mind whether he entered primaries and all this sort of 
thing. 
G: Why did he assume that you had been the source? 
O: I don't know. I think probably that was what Boutin indicated to me. I don't know. 
G: In your book I think you said that Ira--O: 
I learned that Ira Kapenstein had inadvertently made that comment to somebody. I was unaware of it. Certainly he was under no instructions from me, but I wasn't about to send 
Ira down the drain. Ira never made another mistake that I can recall in all the years he was with me. I wasn't about to tell the President that--I think probably by the time of the 
phone call, I had found out. Maybe Ira volunteered, which would be like him and he said, "I goofed. You may have seen this article and I did it. I'm sorry." Well, I got hot. I said, 
"Do you have anything further to say on this subject?" or something to that effect, and the silence or "No" when I hung up. That is the only occasion I had in my years of association 
with him when we had words. 
G: Did he question your loyalty on that occasion? 
O: Well, I don't think he got that far, if he intended to, because I hung up. I think really I hung up because I had been adhering rigidly to the line. I had no problem with it. I keep 
repeating that because people would assume I must have been going up the wall because of Bobby Kennedy. I wasn't, and the Kennedys knew that because they knew me 
intimately. They knew I was an independent guy. They had indications of that through my years with Jack. I was not concerned. I was in place and I was staying in place. 
Perhaps the President or some around him were thinking, "Can you be sure of O'Brien? Sure, he had the white paper. Sure, he volunteered for the Massachusetts primary and all 
that but he's a Kennedy guy." I was the only Kennedy guy left. All the others had disappeared long ago. "Can you really be sure of him?" I think that item--he's not going 
to enter any presidential primaries--was an indication to Johnson that, yes, that's O'Brien. "Why would he say that? He doesn't want me in any primaries. What's he doing, 
positioning me? What's he"--I don't recall we discussed it beyond that phone call but I do remember that I was upset, because I construed the phone call really to be questioning my 
loyalty and I resented that no end. If that phone call had gone on, the chances are pretty good that I would have told him to shove it. 
G: What was the follow-up to the phone call? 
28
O'Brien --Interview XXI --25 
O: I don't recall any. 
G: The next time you spoke with Johnson, he was amiable? 
O: Yes. I think probably he was a little bit stunned with the way the phone call terminated. I chose to forget it. He obviously chose to forget it. I never heard of it again. 
G: But he had, in effect, chosen not to enter any of the primaries? 
O: I guess by that time he had. I don't recall the time frame. We've really been talking about a relatively short period of time here where a lot of things happened. 
In the meantime, you're trying to go about your business. Concern regarding Vietnam on my part became an increasing concern and more personalized with me in the 
short time following these incidents. The fact is that we found ourselves with Bobby as a candidate pursuing his course, Lyndon Johnson suffering what the media determined was a 
defeat in New Hampshire. That fell into place at some point. Clearly, Bobby was not going to wait any longer to be a candidate when he saw that there was a basic Johnson 
weakness exposed in the New Hampshire primary and there was Gene McCarthy, who Bobby had no regard for, picking up the marbles. So he was not going to stand by and see 
that happen. 
Meanwhile, you were going to have the confrontation. Maybe you could get past the New Hampshire primary, but you couldn't avoid Wisconsin. That was the problem 
faced by the President. At some point he asked me if I would meet with cabinet members to explore a more aggressive effort to promote his position around the country; that I 
convene the cabinet members with the exception of the two or three you don't involve in politics. 
G: The three being the Secretary of State, Secretary of--O: 
Secretary of State and Defense and there is some other one. There were six or eight of them in town that I called. We had a long session in my office in the Post Office 
Department. The hawk of the session was Orville Freeman. Orville was a strong supporter of the Vietnam policy. Stu Udall and a couple of others were expressing 
concerns. But the pitch of the meeting was not to review the policy, the pitch as I conducted the meeting was, "We've got to get out and do more. We've got to coordinate 
our efforts and be selective in speaking engagements to see if we can't make a contribution to favorable impact." Everybody agreed on that. Orville had been in Wisconsin and spoke 
and had been booed by some college group, which didn't deter him a bit. He, with some glee, talked about that. He was a real fighter. When the meeting was over Stu Udall hung 
back. He wanted to chat privately. He said he and I shared a lot in politics back with Kennedy and that he was deeply concerned about Vietnam. 
29
O'Brien --Interview XXI --26 
I had chosen to express my concerns in the political context. It sounds crass but I felt that was the direction I could speak from. I was not a policy maker; I don't discuss 
strategy in Vietnam. I could discuss it or reflect on it in the political context. I had made my views known to the President in writing. There was a day when I was talking to the 
Vice President and I revealed to him the views I expressed to the President. It turned out that Hubert was concerned and we discussed it in a political context. He said, "We are 
involved in so many things over such a long period of time, and I've never known what view if any you might have about what's happening." I said, "I didn't know about your 
attitude." He said, "Well, of course, neither one of us is ever going to express concerns publicly, but I wish we could figure something out." 
G: These views didn't come out at cabinet meetings? 
O: No. There was a cabinet meeting where the President said that he wanted the views of the cabinet, that he was becoming concerned about some reactions on the Hill. I'll get to 
some of those meetings which indicated the rising concern on the Hill. I responded to the President by sending him a memo. This was March 21. I said, "At the last cabinet 
meeting, you suggested that any cabinet member who had views on Vietnam should present them. Through this memorandum I want to express my thoughts. At the outset, 
let me say that while all of us cannot hope but have an eye toward the consequences of our policy in terms of next November, my concerns in this area are not in any way 
politically motivated, viewing our challenge in human terms. We must with all deliberate speed shift the burden to the South Vietnamese where it belongs." And I do say, "I'm not 
suggesting withdrawal. Apparently, it is unrealistic to expect meaningful negotiations. Conversely, significant escalation would in all probability be matched by a similar increase 
in the other side. What I am suggesting is a phasing out of the tremendous American responsibility for the conduct of a war and a phasing in of a far greater responsibility by 
the South Vietnamese themselves." 
And I go on, "I feel another escalation would be futile. I do believe that you can publicly enunciate the disappointment and unhappiness of this government with the 
failures of the South Vietnamese government. You can pledge support to their efforts to fight their war and win their peace. You can project to the American people you believe 
far greater sacrifices must be made by the people of South Vietnam." I conclude by saying, "I do not believe from my observations and contacts the American people continue 
to retain confidence in an administration which they feel is rigidly fixed into a position brought about by past judgments going back many years. I feel the American people 
would support an administration that lessens our involvement based on the realistic assessment that the government and the people of South Vietnam have not fulfilled their 
obligations." 
That was an honest response to his request. It was the best I could do because I was neither a military expert nor a foreign policy expert. Clearly, what I'm saying here is 
that this doesn't wash. You can anticipate further deterioration. It's a hopeless situation over the long haul. 
30
O'Brien --Interview XXI --27 
(Interruption) 
G: There really wasn't much discussion within the cabinet about Vietnam, is that right? 
O: No, not in terms of candor or expression of personal views. I think over those years the cabinet was in about the same position as the leadership. There is something about the 
president and the presidency that inhibits people in being totally forthcoming. At this point when the President told us that we should feel free to give him our views, it was not 
in the context of, "Let's talk here." It was, "If you have some thoughts, feel free to express them to me." I construed that to mean that you should communicate directly with 
him, and I chose to send that memo. 
The deterioration in the public acceptance of the Vietnam policy was escalating through late 1967 into early 1968. Entwined in that, of course, was the President's 
concern about his own political future, which is reflected in many of the things we've discussed. We talked about the ultimate decision not to enter primaries. It became 
apparent that there was no other decision that could be made by the President. This was reflected in the memo I sent to Watson in which I attempted to spell out a position to 
justify non-participation. The advent of the Kennedy announcement of candidacy coupled with the existing McCarthy candidacy, of course, compounded the situation. 
As I said earlier, I met at the President's direction with the cabinet members. Even in that context, you could detect a certain degree of reluctance to speak out, express your 
thoughts, but it began to occur. The fellows felt a little more comfortable; there was no president sitting there. 
G: Let me ask you to elaborate a little on this. Was this, do you think, more or less the case with Lyndon Johnson in particular or all presidents in general? 
O: I think it probably applies to presidents generally because I know that people who had an opportunity to meet the President would find themselves inhibited. I think it was a normal 
human reaction. There is something awesome about it. The Oval Office and the president of the United States. It does inhibit. And to some extent that applied to the members of 
Congress, even some of the more senior ones. It was difficult to get expressions of views. Meetings that were of extreme importance--the Cuban missile crisis would be a significant 
example--found the President soliciting views and finding that there was little or nothing being said in response to his solicitation. A session of this nature would end with a 
restatement of support. In the Cuban missile crisis, members of Congress weren't anxious to become involved in a crisis of that nature. They would resort to "It's your decision, Mr. 
President. Whatever your decision is, you have my support." 
So Vietnam, as it moved along, became much more troublesome. I often reflected on a conversation I had--and there might have been more than one--with Mayor Richard 
Daley. I was taken aback when Daley expressed concern about Vietnam. He expressed it 
31
O'Brien --Interview XXI --28 
in human terms, his deep concern with the loss of life, then ultimately in political terms, his wonderment about the ultimate political fallout. Mayor Daley was not, I would assume, 
considering this in terms of policy and strategy in the foreign policy area. But it had gotten to him. 
We resented the media reaction to the New Hampshire primary, contending that under difficult circumstances the President had defeated McCarthy in New Hampshire. 
Why didn't media just so state? The fact is that it was a disturbing result and caused considerable reaction in the White House. 
G: What did the New Hampshire primary mean to you? 
O: We took it seriously at the time of Jack Kennedy with a nonentity on the ballot, some pen manufacturer who was taking a flyer. Even that was a source of some disturbance to us. 
You felt it was politically important to have the highest vote you could attain. We worked at it as if it were a contest. That is what New Hampshire meant and still does in terms of 
the presidential quest. An incumbent president having to look at an opponent being proclaimed a moral victor wasn't a pleasant situation and was evidence that this was a 
situation that could get worse as time went on. With all of the indecision that existed during that period, you are going to have to face the situation. You can say, "We won the 
primary and the President wasn't involved. He didn't campaign, so we don't consider this a defeat in any sense." But what were you going to say after Wisconsin? 
G: In terms of New Hampshire was there a percentage that the administration needed to get in order to make it appear a moral victory as well as a numerical? 
O: I would say that under the circumstances, the press would not have reported it as a victory for an incumbent president with anything less than 60 to 65 per cent of the vote. That 
would be my judgment. 
G: Were you surprised by the results of the--? 
O: I don't recall reacting one way or another. I think primarily because I wasn't that close to it. I had been so involved in Massachusetts and there was such uncertainty about my role 
I didn't feel intimately tied into the New Hampshire primary as I would have been otherwise. 
G: How did the Kennedy's react to--? 
O: The reaction of Bobby Kennedy was one of nudging him very much toward seeking the nomination. He was deeply concerned about Vietnam and LBJ and certainly concerned 
about McCarthy. He'd better make his move if he's going to make it at all before McCarthy got further down the track. 
G: Did he feel that he should have made his move sooner so that it didn't feel that he was 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --29 
coming--? 
O: I never discussed it with him. I never had, up to the time of his announcement, any serious discussions with him about campaign strategy or anything else. The fact is that the 
last direct conversation I had with him was one where he was emphasizing more his concern about Vietnam policy than his possible candidacy. 
My recollection of one evening at Hickory Hill that I've talked about was that the one person in the room who was an avowed supporter and made the out and out 
statement that Bobby must run was his wife. Others were not pressing at that time. 
G: He was accused by critics of being a usurper for having waited until after the New Hampshire primary, after McCarthy had demonstrated Johnson's weakness, to enter the 
race. 
O: I don't see that particularly. 
G: You don't think it worked against him that he waited until after the--? 
O: No. 
G: Or that he wished he had gone in [before that]? 
O: I'm sure that he had not made a decision until the New Hampshire primary. It wasn't a matter of Bobby saying, "I'm going to go into this but the time isn't right." There had to 
be a significant element of McCarthy in his decision. You have Bobby's concern regarding Johnson. Then you have McCarthy. At that point, there was no one suggesting that 
Johnson would not seek re-election. Bobby wasn't going to let McCarthy inherit the Johnson opposition. He was going to try to usurp McCarthy's position. 
G: How would you assess McCarthy as a presidential prospect? 
O: Well, I--G: 
In the context of 1968. 
O: McCarthy was obviously the beneficiary of the mounting anti-Johnson attitude. McCarthy was due to defeat Johnson in Wisconsin as it turned out. It could have been a continuing 
Johnson deterioration and McCarthy could have ultimately been nominated. I don't think you can just assume that, because incumbency would have a great impact on a convention 
and you had a limited number of primaries. The non-primary large states would still be under nominal Democratic control, and I think the Democratic Party would have not had 
an alternative but to renominate Johnson. He could deny McCarthy regardless of these primaries in my judgment. It is somewhat comparable to Teddy Kennedy taking on Jimmy 
Carter. There was no way the Democratic Party could prevail denying an incumbent 
33
O'Brien --Interview XXI --30 
president the renomination. I think the same thing would have happened with Johnson and McCarthy. 
G: What were McCarthy's weaknesses as a candidate? 
O: I think McCarthy was basically somewhat of a loner. He had latched onto a cause. He was a bright intellectual. He really was at his best with his one-liners and quips and 
occasional poetry. He marched to a different drummer. 
G: Really? 
O: I had a lot of contact with him over a number of years. We were not close friends, but I certainly had an opportunity to observe him at close hand. He didn't impact on me in the 
sense that he would be an outstanding president. 
G: There has been some suggestion that as a member of the Senate Finance Committee, he was willing, too willing, to compromise in order to win supporters or votes. 
O: I think Gene's approach to politics was somewhat different than most. He didn't fit the mold. Gene, I think, enjoyed the role of a crusader for a cause. 
In any event, the cabinet members say, "We're going to revise our schedules." I was scheduled to go to Wisconsin, in any event, so I would be fulfilling my responsibility. 
The Wisconsin venture was relatively brief. It was fast-moving, however. I basically covered the state in three or four appearances in twenty-four or thirty-six hours. I was in 
contact with the right people. It was while I was postmaster general, and tied into the schedule was enough postal involvement to justify it. The fact is, it was a political trip. 
Tape 3 of 4, Side 1 
O: It gave maximum exposure in a short period of time. And a chance, most importantly, to observe and make some judgments. 
G: You had been in touch with various people--O: 
I had knowledge of what was transpiring. The people working on behalf of the President were familiar to me. A long-time congressman who was held in high regard in 
Milwaukee--Clem Zablocki--was not a staunch supporter of the President. What brought about discussion with the President over the ensuing few days was my appearance at a 
function in Milwaukee. It was a function that really had been undertaken by postal people. What was shown on national television was O'Brien speaking at a rally of a thousand, 
fifteen hundred people in a ballroom with banners and balloons. A snippet of that on a news program would give the distinct impression of a very enthusiastic audience in 
support of the re-election of President Johnson. 
34
O'Brien --Interview XXI --31 
Something that concerned me occurred after that function in Milwaukee. When we were going back to the hotel, I said that I'd like to swing by the Johnson headquarters. 
Drop in and take a look at the Milwaukee headquarters. We got to the Milwaukee headquarters and it was locked, lights out. There was no activity at all. I knew that was 
highly unusual if there was any meaningful campaign. 
G: What time of day was this? 
O: This was the evening. There were signs outside the storefront, but it was inactive. That led me to ask where the McCarthy headquarters was. I wasn't going to go in but I wanted 
to see what was happening. We went to McCarthy headquarters and people in there--perhaps a hundred of them--were busily engaged. The usual headquarters scene. 
Lights blazing and all the rest. Well, I had my worst suspicions verified. There is an enthusiastic McCarthy effort here and the Democratic pros are not motivated. Coupled 
with everything else I had heard in the state, I left quite depressed. 
In any event, my schedule called for me to go to Springfield, my home town, for an appearance directly from Milwaukee. I stayed that night with my sister and as I was 
leaving to catch my plane to New York, my sister called out, "Dean Rusk wants to talk to you." I said, "Tell him I don't want to miss my plane and I'll call him as soon as I get to 
New York." I didn't envision anything of great significance. It was a little unusual for Dean Rusk to seek me out on the road but I didn't put it in a political framework. 
I came on to New York and when I walked into the Plaza Hotel, the manager was waiting to tell me that the President had been trying to contact me. He was quite 
exercised and nervous about it. I said, "Well, I've already talked to the President." I thought I'd relieve him of his agony. I wanted to get to the room and then call the 
President, which I did. The President said that Rusk had been trying to contact me; he wanted Rusk to brief me on some new elements of the Vietnam problem. The thrust of it 
was that I would be getting some reassurance and some good news from Rusk. 
The President also told me that he had seen this piece out of Milwaukee on television and he was impressed with the enthusiasm. It's not a comfortable situation, but 
I felt I just couldn't allow the President to have reached that conclusion. So I told him candidly that I was very concerned about the situation in Wisconsin. I explained to him 
that this was really a postal function and they were sort of compelled to be there and applaud. I may even have mentioned my distress in seeing the lack of activity of the 
Johnson people, which led him to specifically ask me what I thought the result would be. I told him that he was going to suffer defeat in the Wisconsin primary and it went beyond 
that. "To what extent?" And I told him that I thought the defeat would be substantial. This was a judgment but I had seen enough. It would have been unfair to him and 
irresponsible on my part if I had tried to color that over. So I told him. 
G: What was his reaction? 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --32 
O: I was trying to think. I don't recall. This was pretty blunt and straightforward. I said I would call Rusk immediately. Then he said, "No, don't. Hold on, and I'll get Rusk." I 
held the line for a while and then Rusk and I were in conversation. Rusk told me that the President had directed him to brief me on very sensitive matters that were transpiring at 
the moment, as the President felt I should know about all this. Now, I assume that was to shore me up or whatever. I don't know. It was a dilemma for me because my son was 
departing for Vietnam. We were going to have dinner that night in New York. I was not about to leave the Plaza and go to Washington. I asked Dean, "Is it possible that you 
could fulfill your obligation on the telephone?" He said, "No, I just wouldn't dare." I said, "I'm not going to be back in Washington until tomorrow," which would be Sunday. I had 
been on the road for a few days. He advised me he wouldn't be available on Sunday and it was left that Nick Katzenbach would brief me. I didn't get from Rusk a feeling that it was 
of such great moment that it couldn't wait another day. It was low-key. 
That evening I spent in New York. At Toots Shor's Restaurant I ran into Jess Unruh. Jess, an avid Bobby Kennedy supporter, joined us. He started to express some 
very strong views regarding Johnson and Vietnam and all the rest. I responded in kind, and it got testy--responded in defense of Johnson. Jess at one point made the unfortunate 
comment, "Well, if you feel that strongly, why isn't your son in Vietnam?" I said, "As a matter of fact, this is a goodbye dinner we're having; he's on his way." Well, even Jess 
Unruh had to be set back. I recall Jimmy Breslin, the columnist, was sitting with us. It bothered me; it obviously bothered Jess. We went back a long way together politically. 
The next day he contacted me to express his apology for his conduct the night before. 
So to Washington. I had been away from the office a few days, and I had arranged with my executive assistant to be in the Postmaster General's Office. I would go directly 
there and pick up loose ends, having in mind I'll give Nick a ring. I got to the office and Phyllis Maddock was there and there were a couple of others; perhaps Ira. I was there a 
short period of time when I received the call from Marvin Watson asking if I could come by the White House later in the afternoon on my way home. Well, Nick Katzenbach went 
out of my mind. I was curious about the White House. This is Sunday afternoon. I went to the White House and there was a small group there. The President wasn't there. 
G: Was not there? 
O: Terry Sanford was there. Perhaps Jim Rowe. There were three or four. 
G: Was Arthur Krim there? 
O: I don't recall now. I do recall Terry. And the discussion was about what might be done in Wisconsin over the next thirty-six hours by way of radio or television, this sort of 
discussion. It went on for a while, and I don't remember the details. I did not mention to those present that I had that conversation with the President. 
G: Did they ask you how things looked? 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --33 
O: Yes, and I presented a negative report on that. 
G: I want to ask you something here. Was your evaluation based solely on a comparison of those two headquarters in Milwaukee? 
O: No. In Green Bay and elsewhere in Milwaukee, there were no good vibes. You had to be pretty thick not to realize that you were in the midst of a very negative, depressed 
situation. No one was saying flat out, "LBJ doesn't have a prayer," but there were all kinds of comments about lack of participation and a lot of fault-finding. References to the 
national committee. . .and the press was being very negative. It was a depressing tour, culminating when I observed our locked headquarters. That underscored the strong 
feeling I developed during the period I had been in the state. 
G: Was this a local headquarters or was it a--? 
O: It would be the major headquarters in the state. At the White House no one was contemplating other than a possible defeat. It was a last-minute meeting to consider 
"What could we do quickly that might be helpful?" It added to the depressed state I was in. 
As this unfolded, I still haven't called Nick. Only after the fact did it penetrate with me that the President considered this Rusk-O'Brien meeting to be of extreme importance. 
I had a responsibility to get hold of Nick. Dean Rusk had the responsibility to brief me and Nick was going to do it. 
But as the White House meeting was breaking up Marvin wanted to speak to me privately. He said, "I just wanted to ask you where are you going to be this evening?" I 
said, "I'm going home from here. I'll be home for the evening." He said, "I wanted to be sure I knew where you would be." I did think that was peculiar. 
At some point in the early evening I received a call from, I believe, Larry Temple. He said, "I have been asked to advise you that when the President completes his 
speech"--incidentally, the President was scheduled for a national address on television that evening. I had made no attempt to contact the President at the White House at this 
meeting I referred to. I was sure he was preparing for the evening's speech. He said, "At the end of" or "Immediately following his address, he is going to announce that he will not 
seek re-election." 
I was absolutely stunned. In fact, I limited my response to, "Gotcha," and I hung up. This was shortly before the President was going on the air. There were two or three 
people with Elva and I, including Phyllis Maddock. We were watching the President. I had said nothing until toward the end of the speech. I couldn't restrain myself and I 
blurted, "The President is going to announce that he's not a candidate." I had thought that he was going to do it in the context of the speech. The message delivered to me hadn't 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --34 
penetrated fully. The speech was reaching its conclusion and I thought, "Did I have my leg pulled? Did I dream that phone call?" Then, of course, he made his announcement. 
When you thought about it there was probably no alternative. Wisconsin was on the immediate horizon. The result in Wisconsin was predictable. You could pursue this 
course, as I said earlier, with a Wisconsin defeat and indeed other defeats in primaries. Perhaps the President would have been renominated, but that probably would have been a 
Pyrrhic victory. So the President had to weigh all this. I can't conceive that Larry O'Brien tells you you're going to lose in Wisconsin, you then decide you're not going to run. I 
think, however, it had some weight. Nevertheless, the President had something on his mind politically when he urged me to get together with Rusk for a briefing. The briefing 
that I would have received from Rusk I have to assume was politically significant. But the briefing never occurred. 
I sent a letter to the President the next morning and I meant it. I guess all of us were in a state of shock. I think it's the next morning, April 1. "I am very proud of my 
president and of my association with you. I simply wanted to take this means to express my deep respect and admiration for the position you so courageously took last night. I 
know from the reactions you expressed to the recent memos I sent you and from our other discussions of your deep concern and your total dedication to a peaceful resolution in 
Vietnam. Certainly, no American can question your sincerity of purpose. You have the support of all our citizens in your valiant effort." 
I talked to him probably that same day or probably the next morning, I forget, but it was soon after his speech. He said at that time he felt he had to take any step available 
to him that might bring about a resolution of Vietnam; he concluded that this was the one last additional step he could take and that he could devote his attention for the remainder 
of his time in office to trying to bring about a peaceful resolution. As he put it, "I have put my last chips on the table. There is nothing else to put there. And having done that, I'm 
not at all confident it will succeed." That was a fast-moving few days and I often thought about it afterward. Nothing probably other than my keen desire to see my son one more 
time would have deterred me from leaving the Plaza and going to Washington and meeting with Rusk. Whatever you call it--selfishness or being self-centered--I chose to delay and 
go through with the evening I had planned. Sunday wore on and there was no point in calling Nick Katzenbach, because clearly whatever Katzenbach had to tell me supposedly 
would impact on the campaign or potentially so. 
G: I had one other question about the New Hampshire primary. There was some indication that at least some of the McCarthy vote was actually hawk-oriented vote that felt Johnson 
was not doing enough militarily in Vietnam. Did you have any indication that this was the case? 
O: It strikes me as something that would be quite far out. If I'm a hawk in New Hampshire, for the life of me, I don't know what I'm accomplishing supporting Gene McCarthy. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --35 
G: Well, simply as a protest. 
O: There could have been an element of that but if that were the case it was minuscule. 
G: Now, you talked about the cabinet in Vietnam. I wish you would expand on McNamara, not only from the standpoint of that conversation you had with him but his own change in 
terms of Vietnam. If you saw that coming, were you surprised that he tells you of his own doubts about the war? 
O: No. My exposure was limited really to cabinet meetings, leadership breakfasts. You would hear from the President at the leadership breakfast; you'd hear from the President at 
the cabinet meetings. At each cabinet meeting at some point the President would call upon Dean Rusk, who would give a brief overview of foreign policy, including Vietnam. 
He'd call on McNamara who would give a detailed--which he had great capacity to do--report on Vietnam progress. And it became from meeting to meeting a basic 
statistical report. 
Bob had a reputation for [being] a very intelligent, articulate fellow who impressed the Congress in his early years. He was utilized to the fullest by the President in that 
regard when we had briefings for the members of Congress, which occurred with regularity. Bob would use charts at times. The President would open those meetings. 
There would be a brief agenda and McNamara would make his presentation in a very impressive manner. We all felt comfortable. Then he would take questions. 
I don't recall any cabinet member ever questioning McNamara. Somebody might ask a light question, but you did not have give-and-take among the cabinet following his 
presentations. You accepted it; this was coming from the expert, and there was no one more knowledgeable. 
As time went on I became a little cynical. I recall a comment I made to Henry Hall Wilson one day, "I don't know how many bridges there are in North Vietnam, but there 
must be thousands of them because if you added up all the bridges that are destroyed from one cabinet meeting to the next." But so be it; who am I to question? 
When McNamara decided things were not working out and we were in the midst of a disaster that called for a total change in direction, I don't recall. I do know this: he 
was beginning to wear thin on the Hill. Members who were so respectful of Bob and so impressed with him began to make carping criticisms of appearances on the Hill or 
briefings at the White House. Nothing momentous, but the bloom was a little off the rose. You can maintain a level of acceptance for a period of time. Inevitably, it's going to wear 
a little thin, no matter who it is. I didn't see solid evidence that it was causing harm. 
I felt Bob was running into some thickets and life's a little more difficult for him. That's not unusual for a cabinet member when he is dealing with the Hill or, indeed, 
somebody in congressional relations dealing with the Hill. I sensed this. This was all. I 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --36 
can't recount with any specificity now comments that the President started to make. As support was beginning to lessen, you picked these up and there were memos in my records 
reporting to him on comments made. For example, Senator [John] Pastore suddenly we find is very concerned about Vietnam. You would automatically count him as a staunch 
hawk and there were others in that category. It was one thing to have Bill Fulbright expressing concern but then it seemed to broaden. I have to assume that as that occurred 
on the Hill, that probably contributed to McNamara's increasing problems. 
Tape 3 of 4, Side 2 
O: Bob did not have a political background. The only problem I had ever had with Bob McNamara was when he felt we should shut off the advance reporting to friendly members 
of Congress of defense contracts before the Defense Department formally announced. He got some heat on the Hill in that regard, and he went to the President and demanded that 
not be allowed any longer. The President and I discussed that and we decided we would continue and Bob had to accept the continuance. He was all that was attributed to him in 
those Kennedy years and those earlier Johnson years, and a thoroughly decent guy. I've described some of the concerns I was picking up and some of the concerns I was 
beginning to have myself. At some point it became apparent to us that Bob's impact on the President was lessening. 
(Interruption) 
G: You were saying one incident occurred. 
O: I received a call from Bob and he asked me if I would speak to the chairman of a subcommittee. He was a conservative member, as I recall, from Virginia. This was an 
unusual occurrence, and I asked Bob for specifics. He said this fellow was causing him problems and he just wasn't relating to him any longer. He had tried to correct it but he 
failed, and could I discuss it with the member, which I did. I talked to the member, who claimed it was Bob's imagination. But it was there. I knew it took a lot for Bob to call me 
to help resolve his problem. 
When it came to his departure, I had no conversation with the President. While it might indirectly relate to our activities on the Hill, it was none of my business. When the 
World Bank opportunity presented itself, the President took his action. Bob wanted a change. The President decided to accommodate him. The President stated he was 
reluctant to do it and would miss him in his role as secretary of defense greatly. That was the thrust of the East Room ceremony. 
G: [Arthur] Schlesinger in his life of Robert Kennedy, [Robert Kennedy and His Times], has a radically different version of that. His scenario is that basically there was a leak that 
McNamara was out and McNamara really had no--the implication is that he really didn't have any knowledge, in essence, ahead of time that this was all moving forward. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --37 
O: The President put on quite a show at McNamara's departure. None of us were surprised. 
G: This was just the way it was scripted at the White House. 
O: That's right. 
G: But not any--O: 
My conclusion--I was present at the ceremony and I thought it was a great show but a little bit like promoting Arthur Goldberg from the Supreme Court to the UN. 
G: By the time he left the cabinet, did you see McNamara as a dove or at least a dove on some of the issues? 
O: No. He obviously had altered his position, but I wouldn't be privy to it. The President had Clark Clifford in the wings. McNamara's predictions had not come about. As 
articulate as he was and as dedicated as he was and as loyal as he was, it wasn't happening. So Clifford would be, I would think, in the President's view a pretty ideal replacement 
under the circumstances at that time. Clifford pursued a course that McNamara would have pursued. He was trying to work out means of disengagement. 
But I wasn't aware of the extent of Bob's feeling, the depth of his feeling, until the Bob Kennedy incident I've referred to. I was taken aback that Bob McNamara had, 
unknown to me, become a very close associate of Bobby's. I knew they had maintained a friendship of a social nature. When Bobby suggested I meet with Bob McNamara Bob 
Kennedy obviously felt that I would be very impressed. I said to Bob McNamara in that meeting, "I still say this has to be worked out internally and I refuse to conclude that it is 
impossible." I remember the conversation. I just am not going to conclude that we have to have a revolution; it can still be done internally. The effort [is] from all sources and the 
President will react accordingly in time. After all, he understands this. He has a feel for what's happening to him politically. 
His contention was there's no alternative. Johnson has to go and Bobby has to be the next president. I remember thinking, "Bob McNamara has gone one long way in the 
few years I've known him." But we didn't have a prolonged discussion. My position was, "I refuse to accept that as an alternative. I have not given up having this resolved in due 
course." I was taken aback with the intensity of Bob's presentation to me that day. He had gone the distance to the point where this President had to be removed from office. 
Now, maybe that's an unfair conclusion I reached. He probably didn't put it in words quite that harsh, but he put it in such a way that you could have no question about his strong 
view. 
G: How long did he continue to argue for the effectiveness of the bombing? Do you know how late in his tenure as secretary of defense? 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --38 
O: No, I don't. My knowledge of the inner workings of the Vietnam policy was probably less than some reporters. The extent of my focus would be on its impact on the domestic 
legislative program and its political impact. I never had, that I can recall, a discussion of Vietnam one-on-one with Bob McNamara. 
G: I mean just in terms of his presentations in cabinet meetings. 
O: Well, I don't recall I detected an altering of his views. 
G: So, the first indication came after he left, presumably. 
O: Yes. 
G: Okay. 
O: The first meeting, morning meeting--I can't envision who took these notes or how they came into my possession. Anyway, attending that meeting were Bobby, Teddy, Steve 
Smith, Ted Sorensen, Fred Dutton, Helen Keyes, Tom Johnson, Ken O'Donnell, and Don Gifford [?], I think his name was. He was a close friend of Bobby's. Then you go 
through--well, T. C. S. is Ted Sorensen, I gather. 
G: Well, I assume that those are his remarks. 
O: Yes. So, what that first sentence means, I don't know. "With RFK and LBJ. Politics, keep all options open but will stay out. Could administration people work for whom they 
want? Decide later. Harmonious, regret past differences." What's this "HHH, next visitor." I don't know what that means. "TCS feels LBJ will not go all the way with 
HHH. Off-the-record meetings say that conversation was issues but not politics. TCS to talk to Murphy." That's C. Murphy. I imagine that's Charlie Murphy. "Lay ground rules 
of comment." "O'Donnell to see Humphrey if he can." "Sorensen"--I'm assuming this is Sorensen--" saw Kampelman, told him same thing." Apparently this is a meeting where 
they are talking about maintaining a friendly relationship with Humphrey. Apparently Bobby makes a comment about something McCarthy said. Bobby is concerned about 
Humphrey. "Bobby and Steve Smith"--I assume that means--" to see what Humphrey wants. Probably not VP; how about secretary of state, UN? Bobby wants to do 
something for Humphrey." Then it goes on and on and on. Then somebody--Ted Kennedy reports on Indiana. This is all on April 3. Various people at the meeting are 
designated to talk to various people, such as O'Donnell is to see DiSalle. Pat Lucey and Louis Martin will be in Indiana. In every congressional district we have a good person. 
Up front--Bobby talk to Dick Daley. "Daley will wait for June"--whatever that means. "He'd be interested in how Bobby does in the primaries. Bobby thinks Indiana is the key." 
I am really trying to put this in the context of the date of the meeting, April 3. Let's see. That would have been two days after Johnson's speech. It certainly is prior to any 
conversation that I had with Bobby and Hubert as to what I might do. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --39 
G: Is that right? 
O: Yes, because that didn't occur until Saturday following the speech. Is that right? 
G: Your notes show April 4. That's right. The day after this meeting. 
O: Now, wait a minute. I don't think that--G: 
And Humphrey called on the fifth. 
O: So these minutes are notes from this April 3 meeting--cryptic and not very informative--I just can't gather a great deal from it. It wasn't a meeting I attended. At some stage the 
notes of the meeting were given to me and it might have been after the time I joined Bobby. I don't know. But there was another meeting at Hickory Hill on April 19. This 
meeting doesn't include some of the key Kennedy people. It starts with Seigenthaler who was key but there are any number of names here. Some of them I recognize. Bob 
Troutman; he was from Georgia. Ed Reggie from Louisiana; Ted Sorensen was there. But as I look at this, they're going through a report of states. South Carolina, Tennessee, 
North Carolina, Louisiana, Virginia, Kentucky, Georgia. They even get into various possibilities contesting the unit rule, whether to have a speakers bureau established. It 
sounds disjointed. It probably wasn't, but not being the beneficiary of direct involvement in this, I'm at a loss on these two. Neither memo seems to amount to much. The fact of 
the matter is that following the President's speech that night I commented to my wife something to the effect that "I have a feeling I won't get to bed this evening without a 
couple of phone calls," and sure enough it wasn't long after the speech that Bobby Kennedy called me. I believe he was in New York. 
G: What did he say? 
O: He said, "Now, this is a new ball game." In other words, he was getting across to me "if you haven't thought about it yet, you're relieved of your duties and responsibilities, and 
you have discharged your loyalty, and now I'm going to really talk with you." And he also said, "Did I get to you first?" I said, "I think I know what you mean, and, yes, you did." 
He said, "Now this is"--and he repeated--" This is a new ball game. We're starting from scratch. This conversation starts a new era. We're really going after you." It was that 
kind of a conversation. He said, "Will you promise me you're really going to seriously think about this now? You can think about it now because you shouldn't feel at all 
inhibited." "Yes, I'll think about it Bobby. Nice talking to you," something like that. 
It wasn't until the next morning as I recall that I received a call from Hubert Humphrey. Hubert was, I believe, in Mexico at the time of the Johnson withdrawal. It 
was a similar conversation; now I feel I can really talk to you and I want to tell you right up front"--that sort of thing. So, I did receive the two calls promptly. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --40 
G: What did Kennedy say about Johnson's action itself? 
O: I don't think he dwelled on it at all. I think he felt a sense of relief. This opened up the whole process. You've got McCarthy out there. You can anticipate Hubert in. It was a 
new ball game. You are starting from scratch. 
G: Did this have an influence on the relationship between RFK and LBJ? Did it improve their relationship any? 
O: I don't know. I think it lessened the intensity. You had an entirely new set of facts here. You were going to have a three-man race for the nomination. There's a note that Teddy 
Kennedy was supposed to go to my home that night--now we're at Monday. I know the Vice President called me that Monday. I don't recall that Teddy was to be at my home 
that Monday night or was coming to my home and didn't--I have no recollection of what that could be about. I also have no recollection I talked to him on Monday. But he called 
me on Tuesday and his comments were similar to Bobby's on Sunday night. Everything was in place; they were waiting, they wanted me to take over. But he didn't ask for a 
decision that I recall. Or if he did, he certainly didn't get one. Then Bobby called me the next day or Thursday. This unfolded during that week. There again, "Have you thought 
about it?" "Come on," just what you would anticipate. Teddy called me that evening. Hubert called me on Friday night, and he summed it up, "I have three words. I need you." 
So by Saturday, I had determined I would make a decision, an important decision for me. I would actively support one of these two fellows. That meant I would have to 
leave the administration though I had looked forward to being with Lyndon Johnson through his term. I was reluctant; it bothered me. It was disruptive. I had an unfinished 
agenda, and that was the reorganization of the postal service. I had become very friendly with Hubert over the years. I admired him greatly, but more than that, he and his wife, 
Muriel, and Elva and I had become close friends. We saw a lot of each other; had a lot of fun together. He was a great fellow to be with, and [I] probably [had] become closer to 
Hubert than I was with Bobby although I had known Bobby for seventeen or eighteen years. We saw more of each other and I enjoyed him immensely. So there's Hubert. I 
have no doubt in my mind about his ability. I understand him well. 
With Bobby, while my relationship was much closer with his brother Jack, my relationship with the family was long-standing. It went back to 1951. And that was 
something to think about. My memories of Jack, my great regard for him, fondness for him went into the equation and it wasn't easy. I had dwelled on it from the first Bobby 
Kennedy call. I probably started to dwell on it right after the Johnson speech because I knew damn well there was no way I was going to avoid this. That just wasn't going to 
happen. 
G: Why wasn't that a viable alternative when you had two friends competing for the office? Couldn't you just sit it out? 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --41 
O: That was the easy out and I thought about it a little. I'm the only member of the Johnson cabinet that's being put upon to leave and join a presidential campaign, the only one that's 
being pressed hard. Secondly, I'm the only member of the Johnson cabinet with a son in Vietnam. So I have a sensitivity to Vietnam and what was transpiring on a personal basis. 
But the option of staying for the duration really was not in my judgment a viable option because in a real sense it was a cop-out. Other members of the cabinet--they weren't being 
pressed to leave--said to me, our responsibility is to fulfill our obligation to the President. They preferred not to make a choice. With me I probably would have placed myself in the 
same position except that in the real world I was going to be pressed to make a choice sooner or later. So you might as well work this out in your own mind, which I did during 
that week, phone calls or visits notwithstanding. 
Finally on the Friday night of that week, Elva and I discussed this at length. I must make a decision to support one or the other; I have very strong feelings and good reasons 
to support Hubert or Bobby. Hubert on a more personal basis, Bobby in terms of long association with the Kennedy family all the way back to the first Senate contest. We'd 
been through a great deal and it had a tremendous effect on my life. So the ultimate decision was I would go with Bobby. 
G: Did you weigh into the equation which one would make the better president? 
O: There were some pluses and minuses that you could apply to both. With Hubert, the pluses are pretty obvious. He was bright, intelligent, experienced. The minus might be 
Hubert had been faulted for not being tough enough. On Bobby, the reverse. Bobby is a bright fellow. He had experience as the attorney general; in the United States Senate. 
You could lean toward Hubert on experience, toward Bobby on leadership qualities. Qualities that did not, in my judgment, attain the level of Jack's, but were clearly there. 
What it came down to was, would you feel comfortable with either one of them being president, and the answer was yes. So it was a wash in that regard. 
G: What about electability? 
O: Electability--G: 
I'm not just talking about November. I'm talking about first getting the nomination and--O: 
I would weigh the nomination aspect of it toward Hubert. I think that if you were starting from scratch Hubert, as the incumbent vice president with the resources that he would 
have, would have a somewhat better shot at the nomination than Bobby. On the Bobby Kennedy side, however, you have to weigh it the way you weighed Jack Kennedy. He 
was going to travel the primary route. That would be the route available to him. Hubert would travel the establishment route, the primary avoidance route, because that would be 
in his best interest. So they were going to travel two different paths in the quest, but in competency, ability, leadership qualities and all the rest, it was pretty even. What finally 
weighted my decision toward Bobby was my long relationship with the Kennedy family. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --42 
G: Did any other members of the family call you? 
O: No. There wasn't anyone that was in a position to call me. I don't know who they would be. 
G: Did you weigh in your consideration the Lyndon Johnson factor and how he would regard your support of one candidate or another? 
O: No. I had a feeling that that should not be put on the scale. I knew Lyndon's view of Bobby and also Lyndon's view of Hubert. Lyndon had failed to indicate on different 
occasions that he was totally enamored with Hubert. The fact is the decision should be on the basis of which of these two guys I knew very well I would support. I didn't feel that 
the President would be overly concerned about what I did nor should I be overly concerned about the President's reaction to what I did as long as I fully complied with my 
responsibilities to him and maintained my loyal position and support of him to the end. 
What was extremely difficult was not only to make the decision but to advise the parties. It was not something I relished. In personal terms it was difficult. 
G: Was the desire not to have to choose between either man perhaps balanced by just a real love of political campaigns or--? 
O: I'd like to say it was but I don't think that was in the equation. Frankly, I couldn't see from that date in early April through November that I could peacefully go about my business as 
postmaster general. That wasn't going to happen so let's make this decision now. You're not going to be sitting in the Postmaster General's Office through this election. These 
calls and discussions will never end. 
So that Saturday I called Hubert. He was in his office. I remember Hubert asking, "Where are you?" I was in the Postmaster General's Office. He said, "Let me come over 
and we'll visit. I'll come over." I said, "No, I'll come to your office." I felt it was unseemly to have the Vice President come to my office. I realized why he had suggested 
coming to my office when I got to his because there were a number of his supporters in an adjoining room and he was with them. Hubert and I got together alone. It was one of the 
most poignant experiences of my life. 
G: Really? 
Tape 4 of 4, Side 1 
O: I don't know how to describe it but you're not talking about "Let's go to a ball game next week." 
G: Did he try to dissuade you from your decision? 
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O'Brien --Interview XXI --43 
O: He talked about the merits of joining him, our relationship and our ability to get along, all low key. The conversation finally concluded with Hubert saying, "You know how much I 
regret your decision; how anxious I was to have you join me. I think it would have been a great experience for both of us to be together with you running the campaign. But I 
respect you for your decision and I understand your decision." "But," he said, "now I'm going to ask you to consider something else. I don't want to go through another battle 
with a Kennedy as intense as 1960. I'm going to test the waters; Bobby is going to test the waters." McCarthy didn't come into the discussion at all. He said, "Down the road, I 
may find this isn't working out for me. Bobby may find that it isn't going to work out too well for him down the road. You and I will always retain our friendship. This is not going 
to impact on that at all." He was great. I had all I could do to maintain my equilibrium through this. But he said, "Because this is different--" 
(Interruption) 
G: It seems to me that you could be--O: 
". . .the person who could maintain contact between the two of us." He said, "At times down this road, we ought to communicate and see if there is something that we can work 
out in a sensible manner to avoid serious conflict, come to the end of this road in a unified fashion." He made it that specific. He said, "Bobby is going to be hitting primaries; I'm 
not. I'm going to be out delegate hunting." And he said, "Maybe the time will never come when either Bobby or I would be willing to say, 'I think you're the better man in the sense 
of accomplishment in securing this nomination. '" But he said, "I think in the unique position that you're going to be in, I'd like to have you and I agree on that and I would 
hope Bobby would be in accord." So we closed out the meeting with our arms around each other and I pretty much staggered out of there; went back to the Post Office 
Department. Phyllis was the only one there, I believe. It was a Saturday afternoon. 
I called Bobby. Not immediately. I had to catch my breath and think hard. But I called Bobby and said, "I've made a decision." I told him what it was. He, of course, 
expressed enthusiasm. I said, which I had mentioned to Hubert, too, "This decision is to be held in confidence. It just would be absolutely unfair for me to allow this to be a public 
matter without first presenting my resignation to the President and advising him." I said, "I will do that as quickly as I can but I want to do it in person as I want to thank him for a 
lot of things." So Bobby, of course, agreed and Hubert agreed. In the same conversation--I recounted to Bobby in detail the conversation I had had with Hubert 
regarding maintaining communication. I said, "This is part of my decision, that I have your total assurance that we're going to keep that door open and that I can somehow play 
a role in this because I think I'm in a position to do that." He accepted it with enthusiasm and said what I knew was the case "You know the high regard in which I hold Hubert. I 
think he's a terrific guy and there's no fun in running against a guy like Hubert but this is what's happened to the two of us." He said, "I'm not surprised that he would make that 
suggestion and you have my assurance, as you want to play this out as we move along, we 
47
O'Brien --Interview XXI --44 
maintain communication." Elements of that occurred as time went on in the campaign. 
The difficulty was this was a Saturday afternoon. I realized I've cut the cord, but there is an equally important aspect to this. I had envisioned, without thinking carefully, 
that I would be able to meet with the President no later than Monday. The President was at Camp David but was expected to return on Sunday afternoon. My recollection is he 
delayed his return. I believe that was the weekend of the Camp David meeting with [William] Westmoreland. In any event, as quickly as I could establish a meeting time, I 
did. I don't recall whether it was on Monday or Tuesday, but it was as soon as he returned and I was able to see him. I met with him and told him I had made this decision 
to leave. I handed my resignation letter to him. He read it very carefully. I remember he took the time to read it. I told him how appreciative I was for the opportunities he had 
given me and everything I said, I meant. He responded in kind. 
We got to "Do you have a suggestion for your replacement?" I don't know whether he or I mentioned Arthur Krim. We're in April now and there's just a few months 
left but that could be an honor and recognition of someone. I don't mean to suggest that whoever I might recommend if I had someone to recommend would have been accepted. 
It was just conversation. As I recall, "While Arthur is a good fellow, loyal fellow and he's done a lot"--this is the President talking--" he probably wouldn't be interested." Something 
to that effect. I don't know how it came about; we started to discuss Marvin Watson in the context that Marvin deserved this honor. His service to Lyndon Johnson over a long 
period of time; his dedication to him. I was in total accord. In fact, I thought that was just great. This couldn't have been more appropriate. I'm thinking now of recognition. 
I'm not talking about the Postal Service or the Kappel Commission or anything else. This was a basic matter of having an opportunity to recognize somebody and the President 
underscoring his regard for him. The conversation ended with the President not saying he was going to name Marvin Watson; I don't recall that, but with a discussion of Marvin and 
the merits of going in this direction. And our meeting ended. The President said to me, "Are you going with Bobby?" 
G: Did he? 
O: Yes. I said, "Yes, I'm going with Bobby." I don't recall that he commented beyond that. He kind of smiled. 
G: He didn't seem to resent that? 
O: No. But I had to feel in his own mind that probably O'Brien, the Kennedy years, what else? I don't think he envisioned how deeply involved I had gotten with Hubert. I don't 
think he would have recognized what I had gone through in making the decision because he would just assume it was Bobby. In any event, I left and headed back to the Post 
Office Department and I couldn't have been there fifteen minutes when the phone rang. It was the President. I always appreciated this. He said, "Have you looked at the ticker?" I 
said, "No. Why?" "Well, after you left, I went into the press room." He said, "If I missed 
48
O'Brien --Interview XXI --45 
an adjective describing my regard for you, it's because of the limit of my vocabulary." He said, "You've got to look at that ticker. I hope they ran everything on it." He was 
ebullient. He couldn't have been greater. He said, "I want you to remember and I wanted to put it on the record. It would have been one thing for me to be telling you, just the two 
of us, but I wanted it on the record. I went out myself," which he did. So, I got somebody to check the wire and sure enough the accolades were all there. 
I then had to have the formal departure. So in the auditorium they had the marine band and "Auld Lang Syne" and I departed. 
The President wanted to have a party for me. Just a little gathering of the cabinet, cabinet wives, staff. So he did, within two or three days. I could invite any friends I 
wanted to. We had it in the living quarters. It was a very pleasant cocktail party and all of that. They presented me with a sterling silver platter, which I promptly returned because 
they wanted to have all the cabinets' signatures engraved on it. We had a very pleasant evening and I went on to Indiana. 
G: While you were weighing your decision--Humphrey or Kennedy--was it made clear in each case what your job would be? 
O: Yes. I didn't negotiate any job with them but I would be the campaign director in each case. 
G: Did each campaign have sort of an acting director at that point or simply an interim guy? 
O: I don't know. I gathered all the people in Indiana, all the staff, on arrival and gave them my initial thoughts about the campaign. We had had a lot of contacts in Indiana--the 
Kennedy people--because we had gone through the Indiana primary in 1960. It was really a renewal of acquaintances and you had the situation with [Roger] Branigan, McCarthy 
and Kennedy. Branigan, in a sense, was a stand-in for Hubert. He was a favorite son. I moved right into it. I came back from Indiana after a couple of days and cleaned up a few 
things and then headed out on the road from Indiana to Nebraska to Oregon. 
This was in a sense a replay. It didn't have the attraction to me that the Kennedy campaign had in 1960. The years have gone by; you've done a lot of other things. You're 
back in a campaign. It didn't have the drama to it, the excitement to it that I had experienced at an earlier stage in 1960. There was an element of kind of pushing yourself 
a little as you went along. But I had made the commitment and I'd see it through. 
End of Tape 4 of 4 and Interview XXI 
49
    [ Part 22: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--14 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXII*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XXII 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXII, 6/ 19/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
For Electronic Copy on Diskette from the LBJ Library: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXII, 6/ 19/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-33 
4
INTERVIEW XXII 
DATE: June 19, 1987 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 1, Side 1 
O: I tendered my resignation directly to the President, as I recounted, on April 10 and that would be approximately ten days after he had announced his non-candidacy. I quickly 
took a trip to Indiana to survey the scene, met with the Kennedy supporters and returned to Washington. The farewell in the Post Office Department and with the President at the 
White House took place within a couple of days. I was then in business. 
G: Why don't you describe the campaign structure, the personnel and who was doing what? 
O: The obvious approach to a Bob Kennedy campaign would be the primary route. It would entail a number of primaries to prove his case, comparable to his brother's experience in 
1960. At this point in mid-April as I moved into the campaign, Hubert [Humphrey] had not formalized his announcement. He announced later in April. The lines were clear. 
Bobby would be traveling the primary route; Hubert would avoid the primaries and concentrate on the major industrial states in a direct delegate effort. 
What I was faced with, moving into the situation at this point, was to quickly organize state-level campaigns in each state. The first, an extremely important one, was 
Indiana. So when I took this quick trip out there, it was a matter of trying to get the feel of it. There was some activity ongoing then but it was pretty informal. There was clearly 
a contest between Bobby, Gene McCarthy and the Governor of Indiana, and it wasn't going to be easy. 
I found that rather than engaging in some grand strategy I could best assist with grass-roots organization. Indiana was an example of how you would proceed. Matt 
Reese, an old friend and associate going back to West Virginia in 1960, had become, over the years, expert on a basic campaign, particularly in the utilization of phone banks. A 
major effort was put into setting up a phone bank throughout the state. Between perhaps the twelfth or fifteenth of April and the twenty-seventh represented a ten-or twelve-day 
participation by me. I issued a memorandum on a Get-Out-The-Vote program for the Indiana primary which was specific. The thrust of it was to assemble several thousand 
volunteers for the May 7 primary who would ring doorbells in key areas throughout the state to ensure maximum voting among potential Kennedy supporters. The bulk of this 
manpower, which would be extensive, would come from block captains who had been recruited by Matt Reese through his telephone operation. They would be joined by, 
5
O'Brien --Interview XXII --2 
hopefully, a large number of student volunteers, supporters of Bobby. 
I noted in launching this Get-Out-The-Vote drive that I made reference to the fact that we would not have significant manpower from labor. Labor was sort of on the 
sidelines in Indiana in this contest. 
G: Why was that? 
O: It was early on; Hubert hadn't announced, [Roger] Branigan was in the contest or would be, and labor was not making a move at that point. 
G: Would it be correct that Kennedy had more support among the [Walter] Reuther people than he did among the [George] Meany, AFL [people]? 
O: That's right. But as far as any mass organized effort by labor you'd have to anticipate that wasn't going to occur; by the same token neither of the other two candidates would have 
that kind of support. These were troublesome aspects of Indiana that I had noted very early on. You were not going to have any meaningful participation of party leaders at any 
level in Indiana, because of the involvement of the Governor. With labor generally and party leaders specifically my view was "Let's not spin our wheels; let's concentrate on the 
phone bank to elicit support and let's work arduously on the youth volunteer side to put this army together to accomplish this grass-roots effort." 
The steps that my memorandum recommended be taken went to the fact that Reese had about fifteen thousand block captains in five cities. That included the major 
cities, obviously: Indianapolis, Gary, South Bend, Fort Wayne and Evansville. They would canvass their blocks. These were actually block captains that had to a great extent 
been solicited through the phone bank, and on Saturday May 4 prior to the May 7 date, they would canvass their blocks. The thrust of my recommendation was that was all well 
and good but let's not overlook the fact that we can repeat this effort with the same army on primary day. 
So with that, each block captain should be mailed a printed invitation to attend a thank you reception. What we conceived was if we could get these people in groups, 
fairly good-sized groups, prior to the effort, thank them in advance, it brought us face to face with them. It tested whether or not they were truly motivated. We want to thank 
them in advance for what they were going to do. The bottom line was we ought to try to at least informally organize them rather than be totally dependent on brief telephone 
conversations that had taken place over a period of time. We would have soft drinks and some pastry. I envisioned that these various meetings would have two hundred to two 
hundred and fifty people present. Many would not come to the meeting, perhaps. You would have to be concerned about them not coming, because that might indicate they 
weren't going to be out there on the block effort or on election day, but let's try it. 
Then the student volunteers--they were coming from all over the country. Also, 
6
O'Brien --Interview XXII --3 
[Eugene] McCarthy had a large number of student volunteers from around the country that were coming into Indiana to work on his effort. We should distribute these 
invitations so that at least it wasn't a matter of saying, "Why don't you come to a meeting?" It was "You're invited to a meeting." That in and of itself represented a 
significant effort involving a great deal of manpower. I pointed out that the list of block captains by streets must be divided into local areas and assigned to the various receptions. 
We were going to try to check them off, try to get them formally enlisted. I did say that of the fifteen thousand block captains that supposedly existed--because they on the 
telephone said, "I'll be happy to be block captain," or "willing to be a block captain"--I anticipated that in this context to try to quickly organize them we would probably have a 
participation of about five thousand people at these various Sunday afternoon receptions. 
We set up around the state about ten receptions within a period of few hours, coupled with other receptions that were organized locally that we could not handle 
through central headquarters. Then we had to distribute the family--Bobby, Teddy, their sisters or whoever--so there would be some presence at every one of these meetings. 
These meetings would be running over a period of four to six hours in ten to twenty different locations. 
That was basically what we were preparing to do and I pointed out that the telephone crew would call back on Monday everyone who did not attend the receptions. 
This was rather a mammoth task to undertake over a relatively short period of time. Matt Reese's crew would call back and say, "We know that you were unable to attend the 
reception but we just wanted to advise you that we're anticipating your effort." So you do the best you could. If you have fifteen thousand people say yes and that means you have 
five thousand people combined with the youth volunteers then you've got a fairly good operation going. It was all emphasis on grass roots. 
Complementing that, we arranged newspaper ads for the Monday and Tuesday editions listing the telephone numbers for transportation to the polls and baby sitting 
services and the rest. We also arranged for trailers to be added to the radio and television spots that we had planned for the wrap-up in the closing days. These trailers would give 
the same basic information. Outside these five key city areas we had hoped that maybe something similar to this could be undertaken, but this would not be under our thumb. We 
would just have to hope for the best. We had district coordinators that had been put in place, and it was up to them to see if they couldn't implement this procedure. 
G: Did you have a way of screening some of your local personnel to make sure they were the kind of representatives that you wanted? 
O: You're talking about the coordinators and that--? 
G: Yes. 
O: We had a potential for coordinators, because we had conducted a very intensive primary in 
7
O'Brien --Interview XXII --4 
Indiana in 1960 and a very successful one. We also recognized that while we were successful in the primary, we were most unsuccessful in the election in Indiana. The 
religious issue in Indiana was obvious. The state was split geographically north and south. Southern Indiana had been the hotbed of the Ku Klux Klan in the early days and we 
recognized that we had difficulty. We did very well in the primary because you did have a massive Get-Out-The-Vote drive, you had a very intensive campaign. But when it came 
to the election where you had many, many more voters participating we did not fare well. So, with that knowledge and yet having been able to maintain reasonable contact--Jack 
Kennedy developed a lot of friends in Indiana in those days and even though the years had gone on, there was still a nucleus of friends and former supporters of Jack available. So it 
was not that difficult to identify capable people and get them to work on your behalf. 
G: How did you appeal to the farmers? 
O: Basically, we didn't get into appeals. The issues side was pretty much confined to speeches Bobby made around the state, some directed toward the farmers. In a 
presidential preference primary it's a different ball game. While you can enunciate issues, it is basic political organization. Build a grass-roots organization, whether it is caucus or 
primary; you are not talking about a mass vote. You have a great advantage if you do it effectively. Your Get-Out-The-Vote drive can make a real dent in a presidential 
preference primary, while on election day it may not be that perceivable or that effective. 
G: Aside from the receptions that you've talked about, how did the candidate spend his time in Indiana? 
O: He did a lot of personal campaigning. Going back to Massachusetts Senate campaigns, my view of my role in a campaign was not to be visiting with the candidate often. If I 
started to see the candidate and he saw me on a daily basis it indicated that one or the other of us wasn't doing our job. A candidate is at center stage. The organizational effort 
should be carried on without wasting time, frankly, in discussions with the candidate. The candidate should feel comfortable that the organizational side of it is being carried out. 
That's the best procedure possible. 
G: Well, give me some examples of the kinds of places he would go to campaign? Would he shake hands outside factories or. . . ? 
O: There was a great deal of that because to organize rallies was difficult. Again, it's the manpower, the utilization of it. Where are you going to apply the manpower, how best to 
utilize it? Rallies on occasion could be put together. But your best exposure was street-level, the factory gates, walking the main street of a town and then tie in a Rotary 
Club luncheon, a Kiwanis breakfast, meetings that take place on a regular basis. 
It was a campaign very much similar to the West Virginia primary of 1960 and, of course, very similar to the one we had conducted with Jack Kennedy in 1960 in Indiana. 
Lacking in glamour, motorcades and the rest. That is not what happens in presidential 
8
O'Brien --Interview XXII --5 
primaries. Photo opportunities, a lot of that. You were beginning to garner some press. It was early but national press, a handful, decided to take a peek, but it wasn't a great 
national story. 
G: What did you do to neutralize the opposition of the Indianapolis Star? 
O: There wasn't much we could do. The Indianapolis Star was the bane of our existence and of course it continued to be and always was for Democratic candidates. I think 
particularly the Kennedys were targets. It was very rough. 
G: Do you recall specifically in this campaign what it did to antagonize--? 
O: It bordered on the obscene, but not quite. It was not a class act, but nothing was startling to us. We had gone through it in 1960. The man's name was [Eugene] Pulliam. He was a 
powerhouse. The paper spread-eagled the state to a considerable extent. It was comparable to the Manchester Union Leader in New Hampshire; but not as vicious. The 
candidate did visit the editors of all the papers in the state. He toured the offices, hopefully had a sit-down with the top staff and perhaps a question and answer session. 
Bobby visited the newspaper offices in Indianapolis and did his thing. Everyone was courteous. I visited a couple of times and I can't say that anyone growled at me, but at no 
time did we feel that this was going to be at all productive. The courtesy of the visits for the record had to take place. 
We had people at the county level in Indiana who still held county-level positions. There was a sheriff, a county commissioner here and there, who had local or area impact 
and visibility who joined the campaign for the second time around. There was a friendly newspaper owner, Jim Fleming, in Fort Wayne and it was a solid newspaper. Jim had 
been well-disposed to Jack Kennedy, so that was a help. In fact, more than a little help because it really gave us some assistance in South Bend. In that part of the state there 
was a reasonable amount of Kennedy enthusiasm, but as you got south of Indianapolis--Indianapolis and south--it was difficult. 
G: Were the universities a factor? University of Indiana or Notre Dame or any of these? 
O: They were the source of some manpower. There were a number of students involved with Bobby, but there were probably more involved with McCarthy. McCarthy had a small 
army of young people who were perfectly willing to travel. They would bus them in from various parts of the country. You would find them in Indiana and then you'd find them 
out in Oregon. He had enthusiastic support from a large number of young first-timers in politics. Bobby had a reasonable amount of support, more than the ordinary but not 
approaching Gene McCarthy's. The fact is that we fared well in the Indiana primary. We did not achieve a majority vote, but we ran a solid first. It was accepted generally by 
media as a solid victory. 
G: Did you expect to do better or not so good? 
9
O'Brien --Interview XXII --6 
O: We did about what we expected we could do. We had a short time. I was involved for perhaps a period of three weeks or so. My contribution could only be along the lines I just 
described. 
In the meantime there were other things to do. I recall taking the opportunity to take a look at the Nebraska primary. We had difficulty with the slate of delegates. It 
became very complex. I decided that the best allocation of my time was to briefly visit Nebraska. Bobby picked up the District of Columbia primary. That was a given. 
Hubert came into Omaha to speak at a major Democratic dinner in the midst of the primary. Our people were quite concerned that Bobby would not be at that dinner. It was 
a function of the state party organization but it happened to be at a time I was in the state. Consequently Hubert and I got together. We were in the same hotel overnight. He was 
there just for the one evening. It was suggested that we get together for a drink following his speech. We reminded each other of the conversation we had back in early April. 
Things had not really settled in at that point. Our focus was on McCarthy more than Humphrey, but it was becoming noticeable to us that Hubert, through the efforts of Fred 
Harris and Fritz Mondale, who were handling his campaign, was making real inroads in delegate commitments, particularly in the industrial east at that point. 
It was hard for us to cope. You couldn't ride two horses at once. We had to go the primary route and hope for the best, prove our case. We had to be concerned about 
Hubert's apparent ability to break through with the party establishment in some areas. We made efforts to see if we couldn't contain him or at least keep the door open in some of 
these areas. That was simultaneous with the intensive, all-consuming effort through the primary route. 
In that conversation that night, we agreed that there was really nothing meaningful to discuss at that point. There hadn't been any animosity. There hadn't been even 
concentration on the Humphrey candidacy on our part. He was maintaining a broad-based posture, talking about the issues of the day, while his people were moving on the delegate 
side of it in the non-primary states. We talked at some length, which was not unusual for us over the years. We both had a capacity to talk a lot--probably not say much, but talk a 
lot. It was very friendly. We did have the drink, and kidded a little. He made reference specifically to our early progress in the primaries, what he had been hearing about 
organization. I made reference to the fact that he had a lot of gumshoeing going on, that we were hoping to slow him down as we went along. It was again, as always with 
Hubert, a friendly conversation and it was left indefinite when we would again communicate. It was left open. He could call me. I could call him. He sent his best 
regards to Bobby and it was clear that we would continue that open door policy. At some time it was very conceivable that we'd want to have serious discussions and it was left at 
that. 
We had some solid people in Nebraska. We had been there before. Jim Greene 
10
O'Brien --Interview XXII --7 
and others were still in place. The situation was relatively good. It was one thing to vote for Bobby but they had to focus on the uncommitted slate. That made it intricate and 
difficult. I received a number of complaints from our local people that we were under-financed; there was little or no literature available. We were playing catch-up in 
that regard. Bobby, obviously, had not done much of anything organizationally in anticipation of being a candidate. He really was starting from scratch, other than a few of 
the long-time Kennedy associates. There hadn't been a coherent organizational effort. It was being put together as quickly as you could. You were dependent on these good 
friends locally to carry on the major part of all this. You'd be giving a little direction, hopefully be helpful. Obviously I took a lot of notes of the complaints and made efforts to 
ensure quick delivery of materials; it was basic. 
G: One other question on Indiana before we get into Nebraska. Did Senator [Birch] Bayh and [Vance] Hartke play a role? 
O: Play a role--probably the answer is no in official terms. Be helpful indirectly--some of that on the part of Bayh. There again these fellows were caught. After all, what do you have 
in the Indiana primary? Their governor and Gene McCarthy; in a sense Hubert Humphrey. 
G: Humphrey was known for years as a friend not only of organized labor but also of the farmer, two strong elements in Indiana. 
O: As time went on Hubert garnered a considerable amount of support from organized labor at state and local levels and in a few instances the national level. At that stage there was 
uncertainty. There was no desire on the part of labor to start some anti-Kennedy effort. There was no reason for them not to look kindly upon Bobby Kennedy. He had certainly 
a labor voting record, so that wasn't the problem. Hubert was extremely well-liked by organized labor, well-known to organized labor. He had been a long-time participant with 
them, and time would tell where the bulk of organized labor might land. Meanwhile, you have a McCarthy where there is no interest shown. I don't recall there was any great farm 
interest shown in McCarthy either. You have the shadow over you that a sitting governor can create difficulties and he's running as a stand-in, we claimed; as a favorite son, he 
claimed. That was our major problem. So you were dependent on a grass-roots effort. 
G: Were you involved in any of the activities in the wake of Martin Luther King's assassination? 
O: No. 
G: Where were you at the time you learned the news? 
O: I had to be in Washington. That was April 4. That was prior to my resignation. In fact, it was just prior to my decision to leave government. I don't recall specific involvement on 
my part in the aftermath. 
11
O'Brien --Interview XXII --8 
G: Anything on Kennedy and the black vote in Indiana? 
O: Yes. We made a specific effort in that area. We had solid support from the black community. Interestingly enough, they gravitated to Bobby as they had to Jack, to some 
extent. I can't say that it was to the degree that they gravitated to Jack, but there was a natural tendency on their part to be supportive of Bobby, with the exception of some black 
political leaders who were tied into the state organization. We didn't have a problem with McCarthy in that regard. That was something that was available to us and we worked 
hard at it. 
Talking about traveling this primary route, Indiana and Nebraska, the District of Columbia, what became a major problem, obviously, was Oregon. I'm more inclined to 
think back on Oregon than Nebraska or Indiana. While we knew we were in a tough contest in Oregon, we had the long-time Kennedy supporters in the forefront. We had the 
woman who had led our effort in 1960 in Oregon in place. 
G: Edith Green. 
O: Edith Green. A great reputation in the state. Consequently, because of Edith we had a goodly number of the people who had been in place in 1960. 
I had had a brief conversation with Gene McCarthy in Indiana one evening just by accident. 
G: How did it take place? 
O: I was with a group in a restaurant and Gene arrived on the scene. He sat at a far table but he couldn't resist it, I guess. He came over to visit with me. He told me he couldn't 
understand why I was involved as I was, that he felt he and I had always had great rapport, shared common interests, all with a smile on his face. He made some comment 
that I couldn't quite understand. I think he actually repeated it in a book he wrote later on, something to the effect that "I'm sure you have another flag in your box." I was never 
quite sure what he meant but he thought it was funny as the devil. The reference "flag in the box" I guess meant that somewhere along the line I could support him. That was the 
extent of my contact with him. 
Oregon was a difficult situation and we were putting a valiant effort into it. We had a little more time available to us and we had a good group in place, so you couldn't 
say that it was an organizational failure or a candidate failure or time limitation that impeded our effort. We made a good effort and we put everything we had into it. 
Incidentally, as I became more involved as we moved along, it was interesting to note that the Bobby team was composed of two or three people of my era back to the Jack Kennedy 
period or perhaps more. I'm talking about Ted Sorensen, Ken O'Donnell, people of that nature and a group of younger people who had been involved with Bobby in New York in 
the Senate contest--
12
O'Brien --Interview XXII --9 
Tape 1 of 1, Side 2 
O: --particularly a couple of fellows who were very bright and who had not been involved in the campaigns but were members of Bobby's Senate staff. 
G: Who were they? 
O: I don't recall their names now. But I was able to discern there was some, I wouldn't call it animosity, but some feeling about me particularly, because I was highly identified. I 
arrived upon resignation as a cabinet member. It was never stated, but I think there was a feeling that they were being shunted aside or their roles weren't as key as they had 
anticipated. Whatever it was, I never had a conversation with anyone about it. 
(Interruption) 
O: Bobby sensed it, I guess, because a little incident occurred which was somewhat troubling. Bobby and I were in a serious discussion--I think it was probably in Oregon in the hotel 
room. We walked out of the room together and there was a lot of laughter and kidding around next door and Bobby immediately took them to task and said, "This is a serious 
business and O'Brien and I are breaking our butts and you're sitting around having a good time thinking this is a lark. I don't see the productivity anyway. Why don't you get back 
to Washington, stay in the Washington office." Of course, there was dead silence and they scurried away. Bobby said to me, "These fellows have to recognize who's running this 
show." I said nothing. 
But I thought that's an indication that there perhaps is a little ill feeling around here, but it was never manifested in any way that I observed. I don't recall now anything 
that occurred involving the people on the Bobby campaign team that was not constructive. 
G: I was going to ask if there was any resentment when you first arrived because it seemed that you had a lot of people in high positions. Steve Smith, I guess, had been designated 
campaign manager and Sorensen, campaign director and O'Donnell, director of organization. 
O: As I've related in our discussions, if I would join the campaign I would direct the campaign. Steve Smith said, "We ought to get out a press release." This was when I had 
announced my resignation. I had no conversation with Smith during that period. Steve contacted me and said, "We ought to get out a press release and designate your position." 
I suggested not to. With Ken and Ted and I, we had been together a long time and titles were of no import. Even though I had stayed with Johnson and they had departed the 
scene, we were back in a race that we were comfortable with. 
We went about our business. I made my decision on what area I thought I should concentrate and even though it did not excite me as it did in the Jack Kennedy days, at 
13
O'Brien --Interview XXII --10 
least I'd been through a number of campaigns. It was clear that the most important element in that campaign next to the candidate was going to be the nuts and bolts. The 
primary route calls for it. So I concentrated on those primaries but not totally. 
I diverted to other areas of activity from time to time and I went off on my own a good deal. Going to Nebraska, I decided, was the appropriate thing to do at that time. I 
went on to New York at a later date because I sensed New York could be a potential debacle for us. This was before the California primary. We will pursue Oregon and the 
fact that we had a closing rally with about fifteen hundred people; that was the best we could do. McCarthy's closing rally in an arena in Portland had over seven thousand 
people. That was a pretty clear sign that he was doing extremely well and we were fighting an uphill battle. We did from day one in Oregon and suffered defeat. 
End of Tape 1 of 1 and Interview XXII 
14
    [ Part 23: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--46 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXIII*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XXIII 
PREFERRED CITATION 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXIII, 7/ 21/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXIII, 7/ 21/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-34 
4
INTERVIEW XXIII 
DATE: July 21, 1987 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 1 
O: The Oregon primary was hotly contested. [Eugene] McCarthy showed a better organization than he had shown in Indiana. We were frankly taken aback by it. We had 
the same state campaign director we'd had in 1960 with Jack Kennedy, Edith Green, a congresswoman who was highly regarded in the state. We felt that under her direction we 
had as effective a group as we could put together. The indication that we were in real trouble was at the climax of the campaign, when McCarthy and Kennedy held closing 
rallies. We had considerable difficulty putting together fifteen hundred-two thousand people. McCarthy had an attendance of over seven thousand. Bobby [Kennedy] had gone 
to California, because we were moving into California immediately following the Oregon primary. 
It was rather a shock to lose on primary night. Bobby had returned from California. We were in the hotel, which was the headquarters for media also. The top 
network people were there to report the results and there would be interviews through the night. A considerable discussion took place regarding whether or not Bobby should 
congratulate Gene when the outcome was obvious. There were two schools of thought. The younger group, as I recall it, saw no reason to congratulate McCarthy. They reflected 
on what they considered an awfully bitter campaign and Gene had said a lot of mean things. We, however, concluded that a telegram should be sent. 
In any event, as this evening continued to unfold, another matter came up. Press and network people were anxious to have a spokesman for the Kennedy side in the 
ballroom. I was a little intrigued to find that there wasn't a volunteer. In defeat it's quite a different atmosphere. I had planned to go down in any event. I simply said, "I'll take care 
of that," and I went down. I spent a considerable amount of time fending off the reporters, not conceding for a while and trying to focus on our expectations in California. 
It was clear California was make or break; if Bobby couldn't prevail in California, he should withdraw his candidacy. If he did, he still had a difficult situation. It wasn't 
Gene McCarthy over the long haul; it was Hubert Humphrey. But we would face that as we went along. 
So I made a trip to New York. I was very concerned about New York. You keep looking ahead. One primary was to follow another rapidly. I submitted a memo to Steve 
5
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --2 
Smith, who collated information and maintained records. That memo, which is dated May 18, followed three concentrated days in New York where I talked with our citizens 
committee people, state committee leaders, our upstate campaign people, borough and county leaders in the New York City area and labor leaders. I have a long list of those I 
met with individually and in small groups. I stated, "As of today, May 18, 1968, we could lose one-half the delegates to be elected by districts on June 18, which would 
amount to one-third of the delegation strength of the hundred and ninety. This is the candidate's home state. The party regulars are restless. The depth of commitment to 
Bobby is shallow. The Indiana and Nebraska wins help some, but not enough. All eyes will be turned westward toward Oregon and California. If we win on the West Coast, a 
lot of spines will be stiffened in New York. But we will still need to mount an intensive effort in New York state between June 5 and June 18. Aside from localized animosities 
toward Bobby,"--which among other things included a judgeship fight--G: 
This was the Morrissey--? 
O: No, this was New York and this was the feeling that he didn't support Frank O'Connor enthusiastically. 
G: I see. 
O: "There's a general feeling," I said, "among the pols that Bob has paid little attention to them, even though he's their senator. This is combined with their reading of Humphrey 
and McCarthy grass-roots sentiment and antagonisms toward RFK in various areas." Then I pointed out, "McCarthy has been active in New York for the last three months. 
The Humphrey activity as yet is not vigorous. Gene Foley, a close associate of Hubert's, is the only name mentioned. His contacts have been limited." I continued, "My pitch to 
the nervous organization leaders who are with us was stand pat, don't rock the boat and don't succumb to any Humphrey blandishments." 
Then I had a series of recommendations. The fact of the matter is that I was far from sanguine about what was going to happen in New York. I pointed out finally, "The 
New York campaign is one of nuts and bolts organization, not one of public relations or mass media concentration because you're in a delegate quest and it's an entirely different 
situation." The New York situation was that there wasn't any problem identifying Bobby, acquainting the politicians with him. He was the senator from New York. 
In any event, while Oregon was an obvious serious setback, even an Oregon victory, in my opinion on the basis of this memo, was not going to contribute greatly to an 
improved situation in New York if we were unable to mount a grass-roots effort. You tried to be realistic as you moved along. 
Going into California we were deeply concerned. You have what borders on an impossible localized campaign and you're going to have to arouse general voter support 
through media. 
6
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --3 
G: Impossible because of the size of the state? 
O: Size, yes. Impossible, in our terms, what we like to put in the field. You will recall that was one of the reasons why, in 1960, I made what I thought was a deal with [Edmund] 
Pat Brown, who was governor, on behalf of Jack Kennedy, which was referred to as the Carmel Compact. I've referred to it before, but it's worth noting at this point. Climbing 
the fire escape in a hotel in Carmel and meeting with Jess Unruh and others as they put together their slate of delegates. We were reaching out wherever we could to get our 
share. 
In any event, we were not going into that California primary. We went into seven primaries that were carefully selected in 1960, large state primaries. We bluffed it out 
reasonably well with the threat of going in. There was strong Adlai Stevenson support in California at that time. We did the best we could, making the deal. I won't pursue that 
further because I've talked about it before. But the deal never was consummated. When I met with Jack and went over the deal with him, I suggested he call Pat Brown, thank Pat, 
and be specific as to his understanding of the deal, which he did in my presence. That still wasn't enough. Pat succumbed to Stevenson efforts and waffled. That experience was in 
my mind in terms of California. 
There were spots around the state that were effective, and there were some local and area political leaders supporting Bobby. There was literature distribution; there were 
basic activities. But the indications were a very close situation. Now I don't suggest--I don't recall Bobby and I said, "Okay, this is it." Realistically, the campaign was over if we 
lost. 
Finally, we were able to develop a debate between Bobby and McCarthy. It would be on statewide television toward the end of the primary. Bobby did well in the debate. 
G: Who had sought the debate, do you--? 
O: We did. 
G: Why did you do that? 
O: What else was there we might undertake? There might have been mutual seeking. But from our point of view, we were anxious to have a debate. So if McCarthy showed an 
interest, that was good. The fact is the debate was locked up and Bobby acquitted himself well. That closed out the California primary. 
G: What did Humphrey do during that primary? Did he support McCarthy? 
O: Some of his people did, yes. Humphrey did not officially or formally support McCarthy, but there were clear indications of a considerable amount of effort on the part of 
7
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --4 
Humphrey people to be helpful to McCarthy. 
G: What were they doing specifically? 
O: They didn't have a game plan, but tried to be helpful in whatever way they could. Obviously if McCarthy prevailed, Humphrey in Chicago probably wouldn't have to be 
concerned about Bobby. So it was clear that the Humphrey people were anxious to see McCarthy win the California primary. 
The problem from the outset was how to cope with Gene McCarthy, with the firm conviction that McCarthy was not going to be nominated. Also, [how did you] cope 
with Hubert Humphrey, whose people were out in the large industrial states effectively lining up delegate support? Our head counts reflected that. I'd have occasions when I'd 
have to defend our position. I'd make claims of delegate strength. Try to put the best face on it. Walter Cronkite's researcher devoted full time to the progress of the candidates 
toward the nomination, specifically delegate strength. I can recall one evening trying to convince him that his delegate information was not accurate and mine was. The fact was 
that Humphrey was headed toward a majority of the delegates by the convention. If we had followed California with a better picture in New York, we still would be short. It 
would be necessary to peel back Humphrey support. Some of that support was soft. 
As a realist, you log the support known to you that Humphrey had. Also, some of that support might be soft. There might be ways to reverse the situation. I have to state 
that if Bobby had been able to go on to Chicago, he would have had an uphill struggle to be nominated. That's contrary to what is said by some revisionists, some of them friends 
of mine, who fondly hoped that Bobby [would] be nominated and that hope translated in the intervening years into an assurance that would take place. I didn't feel that way and 
none of us know what the ultimate result would have been in Chicago. I knew, even in the enthusiasm of victory in California, we were going to be fighting all the way and it 
would be difficult. Humphrey had the edge despite the California primary result. 
G: What would have happened if Kennedy had lived and had gone into the convention with your strength? What would McCarthy have done? Would he have thrown it one way or 
the other? Would he have thrown it to Humphrey rather than Kennedy? 
O: I don't know what McCarthy would have done, but if we reached the point where it was clear that we were not going to achieve the nomination, Bobby Kennedy would have 
supported Hubert Humphrey. That goes back to conversations we had early on and the understanding between Bobby and Hubert. There hadn't been any meanness up to 
California involving Hubert. Hubert was playing the game as he should play it: let Gene and Bobby kick each other around. Hubert could not have prevailed in primaries anyway; 
that was not his strong suit. He knew what he had to do and he was busily engaged in doing it. 
I remember vividly that evening Bobby and I in the corridor of the hotel throwing 
8
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --5 
our arms around each other. Of course, there was a mass rush for Bobby interviews and comments. He couldn't handle them all. I handled some of them, tried to cover as many 
bases as we could and we went down to meet with this enthusiastic throng in the hotel. 
Certainly I'd like to think that all through my political life that I was a realist. There were many in those days who would suggest that I was a pessimist. But I always 
felt I'd rather be pleasantly surprised than deeply hurt and that was the kind of personal approach I had. 
The celebration was over and I don't know why Bobby chose to leave the platform and take another exit route through the kitchen. But we parted on the stage and Ira 
Kapenstein and I went back to my suite, which was one of the little cottages on the grounds of the Ambassador. The shots were fired and Bobby had been hit and about 
thirty-six hours later he died. 
I remember my reaction was completely different than it had been in Dallas with Jack. Dallas--I refused to believe at each stage; the shots were fired, but he hadn't been hit 
or he's not seriously wounded. The next stage, he will survive, and the next stage, bring Jackie to view his body, still disbelieving. Ken O'Donnell and I did not allow the public 
announcement of his death for at least half an hour after we had been told he was dead. 
In Los Angeles, I reacted the opposite. I felt immediately it was all over. We all parted Los Angeles a couple days later or a day and a half. The story of the Bobby 
Kennedy funeral and the funeral train has been told in great detail many times. I had never experienced a funeral train. It slowed down at every hamlet on the way to Washington 
with throngs of people along the way and hundreds of people on the train; Jackie, Ethel, all of the Kennedys. 
The one unusual incident on that train was a brief conversation I had with Eunice Shriver. Eunice reminded me that she and Sarge had done everything possible to be 
helpful in the campaign. Eunice had spent a great deal of effort in the primary states, through California. She sought my confirmation of that, which was true. 
G: She had done everything? 
O: That went back to some dissatisfaction in the Kennedy family when Sarge chose to remain ambassador to France and not campaign personally. I didn't think that, as far as I was 
concerned, was a serious matter. In fact, it made good sense. What he could contribute on the scene compared to leaving the President was something that Sarge had to make his 
own decision on. He chose not to leave Paris and that was the reason I felt Eunice wanted to review with me what she felt was the record of she and Sarge in support of Bobby. I 
assured her I had observed what she had done and I let it go at that. 
G: Had Bobby thought that Sarge should leave the ambassadorial post and come back? 
9
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --6 
O: I never had a conversation with Bobby on it. I was aware there were people in the campaign making comments of the negative nature regarding Sarge. What the family's 
attitude was, I don't know nor did I seek to find out. You'd have to assume that probably there were some who shared the view that he should come back, and there were some 
who probably shared my view. I didn't see any great overriding reason for him to take that step. 
G: How did Robert Kennedy's death affect Lyndon Johnson? 
O: At that point I was no longer associated with Lyndon Johnson. I did see him through this period. He was profoundly shaken by it, from my observations. But I did not have any 
extensive conversation with him. 
I don't recall how it came about, but while we were in New York I had coffee, my wife and I, with Hubert and Muriel [Humphrey]. Hubert, I must say, did dwell at some 
length on this tragedy, made reference to his fondness for Bobby and his feeling that it had been shared. He made reference to our understanding to avoid any conflict and there 
would be unity at the end. I remember that specifically. 
G: Had LBJ exercised any influence or attempted to in the primaries that you entered in terms of either--? 
O: Not to my knowledge. 
G: You didn't see him as a factor in New York or California or any other? 
O: No. 
G: Did the Kennedy campaign soften its tone after Oregon? Was it less of a bitter campaign in California than it had been in Oregon? 
O: In terms of McCarthy? 
G: McCarthy versus Kennedy, yes. 
O: I don't recall any softening. It was a short time span. We attempted the basics of organization with heavier emphasis on media because of the nature of the contest in 
California. But I don't recall any restructuring. I do recall that the debate came off without animosity. While there were debating points made on both sides, they were 
professional. 
G: Did you have some establishment support in California? 
O: Yes, spearheaded by Jess Unruh. Jess Unruh early on had adopted the position of strong opposition to LBJ's Vietnam policy and strong support for Bobby. He was among the 
10
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --7 
first, if not the first, to urge Bobby to seek the presidency. He was in the forefront and I reflected on one evening at Bobby's house in McLean, Virginia, where references were 
made to a poll in California, which was part of Jess' continuing strong effort to get Bobby to declare his candidacy. Jess was, as he had been in 1960, a potent factor in California 
politics, with political contacts in just about every county in the state. 
G: What was Pat Brown's role in California? 
O: I don't recall what Pat Brown's position was in California at that time. We're talking about 1968? 
G: Yes. But you don't recall him supporting you or--? 
O: No, I don't. 
G: You had John Tunney, I guess, a friend of the Kennedys? 
O: Yes. He was very active. He was a long-time family friend. In fact John Tunney, I believe, was at Bobby's house this night I just referred to. 
G: Anything else on the California organization or--? 
O: The best way to sum up the California organization was that it was the best we could do. It underscored the extreme difficulty of primaries. And it further underscored the effort 
we made to avoid California in 1960. You could not avoid California in 1968. So you had to depend on not only Jess but others, whose names elude me, who had been staunch 
supporters of Jack. We were greatly dependent upon long-time Jack Kennedy supporters, in turn, to support Bobby. 
McCarthy, as was to be the case with George McGovern later, had the great advantage of this widespread youth support, which was really the peace movement. It 
brought to him an army of grass-roots advocates. It was our good fortune to be able to overcome that in California and our bad luck was not to be able to do it in Oregon. 
Tape 1 of 1, Side 2 
G: How significant was the Cesar Chavez support? 
O: That was important. He had become closely associated with the Kennedys. He had made a major effort in registration and had become a political activist. 
G: Now, how did you deal with the accusation that Kennedy was ruthless? There was the time in the Oregon primary, you were saying. 
O: When a story broke regarding Bobby as attorney general and surveillance of Martin 
11
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --8 
Luther King, the connection was J. Edgar Hoover and Bobby must have authorized it. It was harmful. I believe it probably was the [Drew] Pearson columns. We were persuaded 
this was planted and most unfairly presented to harm to Bobby. 
G: Did you see Hoover behind it or Johnson behind it? 
O: I saw at least Hoover behind it. But I don't know as I thought about Johnson being behind. Hoover behind it was clear to us or it just wouldn't have occurred. It was not 
presented in an accurate way. But that was beside the point. It was harmful. 
G: What was the accurate version of that as far as you were concerned? 
O: I remember Bobby being disturbed when this broke and pointing out to me that those weren't the facts. Yet, what really could you do about it except deny it? You have those 
who are pleased. The image of Bobby in the political world was considerably different than the image of Jack. Bobby, because of his style more than anything specific, had 
created in the minds of many the image of being a ruthless fellow. His speaking style, his style in conversations with him. He was very blunt. He had a way of snapping out 
sentences, giving the impression of belligerency, toughness and some people construed meanness. So he would be vulnerable, in some quarters at least, to that sort of attack. 
The interesting thing was the enthusiasm for him, as it was for Jack, among the young people who were new to politics as so many had been new to politics in 1960. 
Those who had been through the 1960 campaign had a somewhat different attitude toward Bobby than these young people. After Bobby's death, innumerable times over the next 
decade, I would have who were new to the political arena at that period tell me about the devastation of their lives that resulted from Bobby's death, which was identical with the 
reaction after Jack's assassination. They had come into the arena with Bobby Kennedy and they were devoted to him. Now, the older activists, including many who supported 
Bobby, did not have that attachment to Bobby that they had had to Jack. So it was a new generation. They would resent the suggestions that Bobby was ruthless, and 
understandably. You had a differing approach to Bobby among many people who were involved in that campaign. 
G: Did you have a particular strategy, though, for countering that, either developing or displaying his sense of humor more or--? 
O: I guess you could term it a strategy. Bobby had had the experience before he entered this presidential contest of being a candidate in a major state in a difficult contest, had 
acquitted himself well and was elected to the Senate. That wasn't easy because the major accusation was that here's a fellow who became a voter in New York for only one purpose 
and had no interest in the state of New York. That was difficult to overcome. But he overcame it. 
And in his general campaign approach, he was an impressive candidate. Some of 
12
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --9 
the young, newly arrived were staunch supporters of McCarthy, wedded to the peace movement. And others of the new generation knew Bobby's position on Vietnam was no 
different than McCarthy's. Bobby was a more attractive candidate to them. But the two were splitting up the youth movement, with McCarthy having the dominant position 
because of the peace movement. 
G: How about the charge of Kennedy being opportunistic because he did not enter before New Hampshire? 
O: That was made by the McCarthy people, repeatedly. 
G: How did you deal with that? 
O: You just simply ignored it. You pointed to Bobby's long-time record, his position regarding Vietnam. We didn't reflect on the belated arrival on the scene. The McCarthy 
people, of course, resented it greatly. And I suppose if I were a McCarthy supporter, I would have felt that way. 
G: Almost felt that he had some sort of lock on the anti-war candidacy? 
O: Yes. You can go through the whole period, including today, of the Kennedys in politics. Eddie McCormack was accusing Teddy Kennedy of being opportunistic when he was 
elected to the Senate. With his famous comment, "If your name was Edward Moore instead of Edward Moore Kennedy, we wouldn't be here on this platform together 
tonight." The McCarthy people said, "Here's another Kennedy. They're the self-appointed first family." You could play on that pretty well. Our view--I remember 
talking with Bobby at some length about this--was what are you going to do, have a debate about belated entry? Just ignore it. How many times can McCarthy and his people 
repeat that and have any impact? 
G: What was McCarthy's weakness in terms of the campaign? Not necessarily weaknesses of personality or as a potential president but whether it be a voting record or a--? 
O: It was a one-issue candidacy. McCarthy was a free spirit who had been described by some as a loner, by others independent of the establishment through his career. He had the 
good fortune in 1968 and in 1972 to be able to launch a presidential bid off a cause that had tremendous support. McCarthy was the vehicle for them. Bobby's entry was 
considered to be motivated to a great extent because of his personal feeling toward Gene McCarthy. I will have to say Bobby didn't hold Gene McCarthy in high regard; neither did 
a lot of other people. But that certainly wasn't the motivating factor. 
G: Was there an inevitable comparison between Bobby Kennedy and Jack Kennedy during this campaign? 
O: Yes. As the campaign progressed there was growing evidence that people were relating 
13
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --10 
Bobby to Jack. He had some of the "charisma" Jack had. I found them decidedly different and I knew both of them intimately, but I'm talking about public perception. 
G: Well, was there a problem with contrast? Did people say, "Well, Jack would not have done this," or "Jack would stand for that?" 
O: Not that I recall. There's something about a Kennedy candidacy--there's a tendency to focus on the candidate, the image, the personality, and to a lesser extent on the issues. 
G: He almost took on a star status in terms of the crowd's wanting to shake hands with him or grasp him or--O: 
That was part of this evolvement. Almost daily there seemed to be more of that cropping up, more of what you had observed in Jack Kennedy's campaign. 
G: Was this a problem where you had his clothing being torn and I think he had a chipped tooth at one point? 
O: No, you welcomed it. 
G: You didn't worry about his physical safety, in other words? 
O: No. 
G: Was there in advance a fear of assassination? 
O: No. 
G: Really? 
O: Other than what has been quite prevalent regarding the Kennedys. The fact is that when he was seeking the nomination, you would hear frequent references to destiny in terms of 
the end result. The hatred of Kennedys that exists in this country--and I think it did from the beginning and it does today--is so intense while the enthusiasm for Kennedys is so 
great. There is that element that dislikes the Kennedys intensely. To some extent, it went to religion. Now with Teddy, they can avoid that direct confrontation by pointing to other 
so-called failings. It's been there and we did not say it's unfortunate that Bobby is seeking this nomination because there's an inevitability or destiny. 
G: Did you have a sufficiently free hand in this campaign or--? 
O: Yes, it was brief when you think about it. 
G: Well, in your case from--what--April to June, I guess. 
14
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --11 
O: Yes, I was just trying to think it out. I think to put this in proper focus, my involvement was brief. There were those who were involved informally in the discussion stages. But 
the actual campaign from formalization until Los Angeles was a short period of time. 
When you talk about planning and organization, you've got to reflect for a moment. In 1958, Jack Kennedy was re-elected to the Senate. Immediately, we were 
engaged in planning to seek the nomination for the presidency in 1960. Over that two years, we had ample opportunity to put into effect our concept of organization, our 
concept of campaigning, our concept of the use of media. We were able to organize in detail, in depth and maximize every potential. 
Bobby Kennedy enters the campaign for the presidency and over-night the campaign is on. There had been no planning that I was aware of when I got into the 
campaign. I didn't see any indication that anybody had prepared an overall campaign program in all of its intricate elements. This was sort of by the seat of your pants. You 
tried to utilize the procedures that had been proven so successful in prior Kennedy campaigns. How do you implement, I pointed out, the Indiana primary--one day's 
notice--trying to put together a state-wide campaign that would involve the utilization of thousands of volunteers? That's certainly not the way you would have approached it. 
You would have had far more organization than existed in Bobby's campaign. 
Sure, we did basically the same thing in Indiana in Bobby's campaign that we had done in Jack's campaign. Basically the same, but not nearly as detailed; consequently not 
nearly as effective. But we did the best we could with what we had in the time span that we were limited to. 
The same thing in Oregon. In the Oregon primary campaign in 1960, that would be a campaign comparable to seeking the governorship of Oregon. Months of effort was 
put into that campaign. Now you're in Indiana; you have a quick touch in Nebraska, you've gone into Oregon and you've just finished California. California didn't lend itself to 
the kind of campaigns that we waged in the seven primaries in 1960. So you accommodated to what was available. Oregon did; there were some elements of 
continuity. But there had been a break of eight years. At least you could pick up some pieces. The same in Indiana. But to suggest that we had the same in-depth structure that 
we had in West Virginia and everywhere else in 1960 would be a misstatement. We had not, in 1960, had to face California in a primary. We did not have to face New York, 
which was upcoming. It was entirely different, far more difficult. You look back to 1960 in those seven primaries. They were spaced reasonably well. We could fully utilize the 
candidate campaigning in those states. But you have Bobby running in California even on Oregon primary day to make some hay, and into California on Wednesday after the 
Oregon primary. That was the way the campaign was waged. 
McCarthy had a single-issue organization of devoted young followers. They were grass-roots campaigners with a cause. They were on a youth crusade. And the leader was 
Gene McCarthy. 
15
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --12 
G: How did the picture in Pennsylvania look for Kennedy? 
O: It didn't look good. Hubert had been very effective. Fred Harris and Fritz Mondale--I believe Harris probably more so--had put a great deal of effort into the delegate hunt in 
Pennsylvania in developing Humphrey support with labor and the Democratic organization. We were concerned. I watched it very closely. I had all the intelligence 
you could gather and it was depressing. 
G: Really? 
O: I came to the conclusion we had an uphill situation, even with a California victory. 
G: How about New Jersey? 
O: Hubert Humphrey, vice president of the United States, had been in the forefront of progressive action in the Democratic Party for thirty years, and was well thought of. He 
had one overriding hang-up, vice president of the United States with Vietnam. As a candidate, he was tough for us to cope with in 1960. We knocked him out in the 
primaries. He was in a far stronger position in 1968, except in terms of Vietnam. It wasn't a surprise to me that Humphrey's people were able to move effectively in the 
delegate hunt and avoid the primary side. It was the right strategy and it was working. 
G: You did have Richard Hughes in New Jersey? 
O: Hughes was a staunch Kennedy man in 1960. He was in the forefront of that campaign and remained consistently a Kennedy man. I don't want to unduly reflect on the 
difficulties that I saw at the time of the assassination in Los Angeles. But had I concluded that there was no way you could peel back some of the support, no way you could work it 
out? Of course I didn't or I wouldn't have been spending that time and effort in New York and all the other things I was contemplating doing. I'm saying that when you're faced with 
a difficult struggle, you'd better be sensible enough to evaluate it for what it is and act accordingly whatever way you can. That was the mood I was in at that time. I can't 
accept some of the Kennedy supporters who proclaimed without question that Bobby would have been nominated in Chicago. That doesn't mean that my support for his 
candidacy was any less than theirs. 
G: How about Illinois? 
O: Illinois would have been played out as Illinois was played out in 1960; you would have to prove your case. At some point, Dick Daley would evaluate and come to his conclusion 
as to what was best for his candidates in Illinois. Dick Daley was a somewhat late arrival, which was no reflection on him in 1960. We were actually in the convention or 
approaching it within a couple of days with some question about what Daley's ultimate decision would be. We had proven our case to him in the primaries. We would have had 
16
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --13 
to do the same thing with Dick Daley in 1968. When you're approaching Chicago, that's when you get into serious discussions with Dick Daley. What transpired after Jack 
Kennedy was elected, where the relationship became closer and closer, would indicate that Dick Daley would certainly lean toward Bobby. But you could not take that to the bank 
at that time. 
G: Did you try to pin Daley down? 
O: Making sure he knew what we were doing. We knew he knew we were conducting a vigorous campaign, that we were anxious to have his support, obviously, that we felt 
deserving of it. You don't go beyond that with Dick Daley and even with that you're using kid gloves. 
G: What was the situation in Ohio? 
O: I can't relate it directly to Ohio. Humphrey had made inroads in all the industrial states. Beyond that, we felt that organized labor, George Meany, was probably leaning toward 
Hubert. We knew he thought highly of Hubert and they'd had a long, warm relationship. But there again, he'd be torn--a Kennedy and a Humphrey. It's a tough call. Bobby could 
be nominated in Chicago provided he had one great batting average through the primaries. You falter in Oregon; that's a setback. You prevail in California, okay. A couple of 
setbacks would derail the train. 
G: Would losing New York have been fatal? 
O: I can't without a crystal ball determine that, but I can tell you I was very concerned about New York. You lose New York and you're a United States senator from New York? I 
guess it could be fatal, but I wouldn't want to make that call, reflecting back to that time. 
G: To what extent was Kennedy running against Lyndon Johnson? 
O: He was running against Lyndon Johnson's policy strongly. He wasn't personalizing attacks, but he certainly was underscoring his position in strong opposition to the Johnson 
position. 
G: Well, I think we've covered everything I had on the Kennedy campaign. 
Do you want to describe now being asked to join the Humphrey campaign? I think you were asked out to Waverly. 
O: Prior to that, two things happened. One, of course, after Bobby's death, I found myself with the dire need to focus on my own future. I had enjoyed the luxury, if you will, of 
being involved over a number of years--not focusing at all on what I would be doing after that period ended. Obviously, it effectively ended one night in Los Angeles. I started to 
think this out and talked to my wife to determine just what I would do. I would set up a 
17
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --14 
consulting company, decidedly not involving Washington. I had a very strong view that once I was through with politics and government that I should physically depart 
Washington. I received a couple of phone calls during this time, probably within a week or two, that came out of nowhere. There was a call from Jim Hagerty, who had been 
Eisenhower's press secretary and then held a senior position at ABC Television. He said that there was a need for advice and counsel on how the television networks should handle 
some problems, particularly the hue and cry about violence on television. Perhaps the time had come when the networks, jointly, could approach these problems and that 
something could be established by way of public relations. 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 1 
O: They seemed prepared to do something. They asked me if I would be willing to take on this role on a consulting basis. 
So I presented a proposal to them that, without exclusivity, I wouldn't be fully engaged. A meeting they described as historic took place. All three network presidents 
met together. We met in ABC headquarters. They accepted the proposal. 
During that same time frame, Claude Desautels, my long-time assistant, called me to say that he had received a call from a fellow named Bob Maheu, who headed Hughes 
Enterprises. Maheu didn't know me and wondered if through Claude he could arrange for contact with me. I told Claude he could have this fellow Maheu call me and Maheu did. 
He said that on the instructions of Howard Hughes, he had a proposal to make to me now that I'm in the private sector. He invited me to spend a weekend in Las Vegas. My wife 
and son and I went out and I met with Maheu. Maheu proceeded to tell me all about the eccentricities of Howard Hughes, his relationship with him, which was by memo, that he 
never saw Hughes, yet he ran all of Hughes' activities. 
G: Did he seem to think that this was peculiar and how did he explain it? 
O: He said that's the nature of his role and I would certainly consider it highly peculiar. Up front he wanted to explain to me how he dealt with him. He said, "I have been asked to 
explore with you [your] joining the Hughes organization. We've never met before and I'm telling you this crazy story of how I deal with my boss." He took from his desk a sheet of 
yellow legal pad and said, "I'm going to show you this memo. I'm under instructions never to show any of Hughes' writing to anyone. But I know I'll get nowhere having you listen 
to a stranger tell you about peculiar activity." I read the memo from Hughes to Maheu carefully and it said, "I have not been sleeping since Bobby Kennedy's death. I am just 
totally upset. This is a horrible situation. I've been watching everything on television." It went on to say, "I wonder what's going to happen now to these Kennedy people." Then 
he said in the last paragraph, "I want to particularly focus on Larry O'Brien because I watched him on television the other night and I was extremely impressed. Would you see 
if you could contact O'Brien and determine if he would have any interest in joining our organization?" 
18
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --15 
I mention the memo because the memo expressed distress because of Bobby's death and sympathy for the Kennedy family. Years went by and I had a copy of another 
memo thrust upon me when a fellow was writing a book. It was not the same memo at all. In that memo, Hughes was saying to Maheu that he didn't appreciate the Kennedys or 
disagreed with their philosophy or something of that nature. When this man thrust this memo at me during the course of an interview, I read it and I told him I had never seen the 
memo before, which was true. He wasn't ready to accept that because it spoiled his whole theory. In any event, that's why the memo is so firmly in my mind. 
I said to Maheu that I would not have any interest in joining the Hughes organization. And I didn't. I wouldn't have any interest in joining any organization full 
time. 
G: But did they indicate what they wanted you to do in [the organization]? 
O: We never got to that because I said, "No, I wouldn't have any interest." Then I told Maheu that I was in the process of trying to establish a consulting firm which would be 
based in New York. Maheu seized on that and said, "Well, perhaps that would be of interest to us." Then he went on to tell me that what disturbed him and Hughes and 
needed attention was one, the remarkable career of Howard Hughes, basically aviation, that had been lost to the public view because of the eccentricities of Hughes, all the stories 
about him which were negative over the years, that there had a been bio on Hughes early on. Perhaps some program could be developed to present another side of Howard 
Hughes, as eccentric as he might be. Two, he felt there should be some focus on the Hughes Medical Foundation. It had all kinds of programs, but there was no sense of 
publicizing this activity. Maybe a program could be developed to do that. Thirdly, Hughes had a deep, personal view regarding underground testing, that he--I don't know 
what his motivation was--that he'd be blown up, I guess, in a hotel in Las Vegas; whatever. Anyway, he was most concerned about that. Those are the areas that he 
thought could justify having a consulting situation where ideas could be developed. He further said that he had no interest in having any kind of lobbying activity in Washington. 
They had sources and people who did that. He said, "If you want to present a proposal that would speak to what you feel you might be able to do to be helpful to us in these 
areas, I'll send it to the boss and get a reaction." 
The fact of the matter is Ira Kapenstein and I, dollar for dollar, presented the same proposals to Hughes Enterprises and the three networks. The proposal was accepted by 
Hughes Enterprises and the networks. So I was in the position to open an office and launch a consulting business, which I felt preserved my independence. I always said I have 
only two bosses in my life and both were presidents, up to that stage, anyway. I liked the idea that my office would be in New York because I didn't want to be based in 
Washington. I wanted to leave [Washington]. 
Then another problem occurred. Hubert and Muriel had visited my home in 
19
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --16 
Washington a week or so after Bobby's assassination. It was a low-key evening. He had called and asked to come over. We spent the evening chatting. At the end Hubert did 
say, "I don't know whether you would ever become involved with me and I don't want to get into a discussion on this occasion. I'd like to continue the contact and who knows?" 
something to that effect, a very light touch. 
Well, it's not necessary for me to explain to Hubert Humphrey that I'm engaged in trying to put together my personal affairs and get on with it. There was a second meeting. 
The result was that I said to Hubert, "The best I can do if it would be any help is to participate in your campaign through the convention in Chicago." That meant I was going 
to have to postpone the launching of my activities. I had not mentioned that to Hubert. He accepted that offer. I joined his campaign and we both understood I'd terminate the 
campaign activity at the Chicago convention. 
I then contacted Lenny Goldenson, the president of ABC, and explained the situation to him. I was in the headquarters in Chicago as the convention was about to 
open, and who walked into my office but Lenny Goldenson. Goldenson was straightforward. He said, "Listen, we're a little concerned and I thought I'd drop by. The 
agreement is effective the day after this convention ends. Is there any question?" I said, "None whatsoever. While I have not told Hubert Humphrey what my private sector 
activities are going to be, I do have the understanding with him that we close out with the convention." 
Hubert had been nominated. My suite in the hotel was a floor below Humphrey's suite and there was a staircase that connected the two suites. So my wife and Joe 
Napolitan, a long-time associate of mine, and I were sitting just talking, and a Secret Service fellow came in to give me a message that Humphrey was anxious to have a 
conversation with me. I said, "Well, tell him I'll pop up shortly." The three of us had to know what the purpose of that conversation was going to be. It bothered me because all 
that had occurred up to that point had been so devastating and so grossly unfair to Humphrey. We were stricken by the intensity of the opposition. So I went upstairs. 
Hubert immediately said, "I'm sure you have guessed the reason why I want to talk to you." It went on and on and on. He wanted me to become national chairman and stay 
with the campaign and I just had to do it. Reflecting on the agreement we had early on to terminate at the end of the convention, in fairness to Hubert I ought to tell him why. So I 
told him. Just as I told him the Secret Service fellow came in; he had a note he handed to me. He said, "They asked me downstairs to give you this note." So while I'm talking to 
Hubert, I open the note. The note simply said, "Do it. Joe and Elva." 
(Laughter) 
I put the note in my pocket and that led me to say, "I've got to tell you why I can't." I told him about the networks and I told him about the Hughes deal. I said, "This 
is my life and I owe it to my family, certainly. My commitment is in writing with both of them. And it's definite. I've had one postponement. I've postponed in order to be with 
20
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --17 
you through the convention." Hubert said, "I've got a solution for you, if you will buy it. I will personally call the networks and this fellow Maheu and ask them, as a personal favor 
to me, to postpone until the first of the year." There was another element in it which I revealed to him. I had a book contract. I had signed the book contract much earlier, 
probably in April, when I left the White House. It was with Little, Brown. I had a time frame on that and I had taken an advance. So there were three problems: Hughes, the 
networks and the book publisher. Humphrey said, "I'm going to talk to all three." (Laughter) And he jumped up. I remember him saying, "That's it. Now, let's get a couple 
of hours of sleep and I'll see you at 7: 00 a. m."--now it's three or four o'clock in the morning--" and we'll meet here and place the calls. If they say no, then I'm the loser. But 
if they say yes, you've got to stay with me." And that's the way the night ended. 
I went to his suite at the appointed time and said, "Okay, let's place the calls." It turned out he knew Maheu. I never knew what the background was. That may had been 
the first call. He got Maheu and elicited from him the commitment that the agreement would hold, but be effective January 1. Then he called Frank Stanton. Of the three 
network presidents he knew Stanton best. He selected Stanton and not Goldenson. I remember him saying, "Okay. We understand each other. Do I have to call the other two 
or can you assure me you will work it out with the others?" That was the end of the conversation. That assurance came. Then he called the book publisher who reacted as 
though somebody was pulling a joke on him. It was really funny because I don't know whether he gave him some lip, or whatever. He said, "Oh, this is Hubert Humphrey. 
You've got to believe me." (Laughter) And he went through it with him. And he said, "Now I know this delays the time frame, but only for a short period. Will you agree?" 
So, he had the agreement from the three entities. And he turned to me and he stuck his hand out and said, "It's a deal." 
The result of that was I stayed into January. Now we can get back to the activities in the campaign. 
G: First, let me ask you to elaborate a little on this proposal with the networks. Were you, in effect, going to present a proposal for reducing violence on television or for simply dealing 
with the opposition to violence on television? 
O: Both. They didn't ask me to spell out what I was going to do. What I was charged with was, "Get us off the role of firemen where we seem to be, constantly." They were 
re-emphasizing the seriousness, in terms of the letters they had received. I wasn't about to say, "Hey, fellows, that's a drop in the bucket." Immediately Ira and I started to think 
about how they could change their approach. 
It was a broad mandate and I think their view was they didn't have much to lose. They'll see what this fellow might come up with. It was an agreement for one year or two 
years, the same as Hughes, identical with Hughes. It was a very general proposal, lacking specificity, just go at it and see. I think the attitude probably in both cases was, let's see 
what might unfold from this venture. 
21
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --18 
The fee was impressive, and having them both, without any debate or discussion, accept it was pleasing. What was most pleasing was I had a base to start activity and I 
could pursue my book contract. I was not locked into exclusivity in any instance. 
G: Was the book contract something that came to you; did Little, Brown approach you? 
O: I was approached by several publishers and Ted White came to me. We were friends and he was with Little, Brown at that time and very high on them as a class organization. He 
said perhaps I would get higher bids, but that wasn't as important as what they would do with the product. He had obviously been sent to talk to me and I made that judgment on 
the basis of the quality of the organization as Ted described it. At the same time, Life magazine made a proposal. Because Ted and I were friends, I mentioned it to him, 
seeking his advice. He was flabbergasted with the money involved for a three or five-part magazine pre-publication. I met with the Time people to draft an agreement. I came to 
New York to finalize it and told them about two or three elements of the agreement that I wasn't satisfied with. It was indicated they wanted to stick to those elements. We would 
meet in New York and see if we could reach a final decision. 
Simultaneously I received a call from Look magazine and the managing editor of Look said he had to have lunch with me. So with my meeting with Life upcoming--it was 
the same day I believe--I had lunch at the Four Seasons with the Look fellow and his bureau chief in Washington, who was an old friend of mine. He said, "I obviously don't 
know what you've been offered so I'm going to have to gamble. I'm going to make a bid right here." He made the bid and it was substantially above the Life bid. 
G: Was it to do essentially the same--? 
O: Identical. 
G: What did they want you to do? 
O: Extract a specific number of words--thirty thousand or so. 
G: Oh, I see. 
O: The competition at that time between Look and Life was intensive. I went back to the hotel with Ira, we were at lunch together--and I said to Life, "I've received an offer that's 
above yours. I don't think you want to play games and I'm not trying to play games. We could talk about the offer again to see if you'd go above." I said, "I think a decision has to 
be made and I obviously have to make it. As for the nit-picking aspects of our continuing to refine the contract--we might as well close out." He was quite put out. He started to 
reflect on moral obligations, but the fact was it was a pretty weak argument. So I signed the Look contract. This was in existence, this contract, at the time I was having this 
conversation with Hubert. This wasn't something that had occurred within a couple of 
22
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --19 
weeks. This went back probably at least several months. 
Something occurred in December of that year and I didn't go forward with my agreement with the networks or with the Hughes people. Another route came to my 
attention in mid-December or late December that intrigued me more and I chose it. Unfortunately, I made a bad decision. Clearly I was not going to fulfill that book contract. 
So I had lunch with the publisher and returned the advance. I have the most beautiful letter because he said in his experience as a publisher rarely had anyone voluntarily come 
forward and returned an advance. So I didn't have a publisher; I didn't have a relationship with the networks, I didn't have a relationship with Hughes Enterprises, come January 1. 
With all that went into this, including Hubert's intervention, I reached an agreement to become president of a brokerage firm, McDonnell & Company on Wall Street, about 
mid-December or later, over Christmas. I notified Bob Maheu of Hughes Enterprises and I don't know whether it was Goldenson or whoever of the networks. At a later date I had 
an involvement with Maheu and Hughes Enterprises. On the day that Nixon was sworn in, I was on a plane to New York to meet the top staff of McDonnell & Company and 
take over as president. So back to the campaign. 
G: One more question about Hughes before we get to [that]. Did Maheu indicate that Hughes was erratic as well as eccentric? Did he feel that--? 
O: Well, I don't know as he had to spell it out, but I was sitting there listening to what defied understanding in a way. That's why he felt compelled to show me something in writing. 
He said it's awfully difficult to talk about joining an organization when you can't talk to the boss. We were staying that weekend at the Desert Inn, and the boss is on the top floor, 
I'm told. 
G: Did he have an explanation for Hughes'--? 
O: No. He had his problems with Hughes at a later date. They were highly publicized. But at that time my recollection is he told me that other than an initial meeting with Hughes 
when he was hired, through that entire time they had never seen each other. Maheu had been in the FBI; he had graduated from Holy Cross College, he came from Maine. I met 
his family and they were very nice. He had carried on, apparently extremely well paid. It was a darn good job, but it was probably as unique a job experience as anybody could 
have. 
G: Had Hughes been a factor in any of the campaigns that you'd worked in, had he been a contributor or--? 
O: No. I would assume Hughes through his life was a staunch conservative. There was no question about his genius. Taking over the Hughes Tool Company from his father and 
developing it into a massive organization, getting involved in the movie industry. But more than that, this fellow's genius went to aviation. He set all kinds of world records. 
One of the largest ticker tape parades in the history of New York was for Hughes when he 
23
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --20 
broke the world record. That was in his younger days. Then he had built a plane. The fellow was a genius and an eccentric. 
He became more eccentric as the years went on. Supposedly, he deteriorated physically and mentally over a period of time. He had this phobia about germs and dust. 
Along the line he was able to amass a fortune. Then he chose aviation. He was a controversial figure. His aloofness and secrecy lent itself to all kinds of publicity involving 
Hughes for thirty or forty years. 
There's an interesting footnote. The Hughes Medical Center evolved into one of the major research centers in the world. Mac [McGeorge] Bundy, as president of the Ford 
Foundation, was concerned about tax legislation that would affect the foundation. He got to know the head of the Hughes Medical Foundation. They had a common concern. He 
said he was most impressive. And then the Hughes Foundation has gone on to tremendous breakthroughs in research. Supposedly, Hughes created the foundation as a 
tax dodge initially. Maheu's contention was that the foundation was doing a lot of great things but there was a hesitancy to publicize or promote what they were doing and 
enhance the reputation of the foundation. Maheu felt that was one of his responsibilities; he seemed to be involved in everything Hughes was involved in. He was directly involved 
with the Hughes Tool Company and obviously directly involved with the hotels in Las Vegas. He was the boss. He called the shots throughout the whole Hughes empire. 
G: Did he talk about Hughes and politics other than--? 
O: No. I guess state politics. They had to have licenses and what have you for those hotels and gambling entities. On the national scene, interestingly enough, Maheu never discussed 
politics with me. There was some talk during Watergate of a loan Hughes made to Nixon or maybe it was a contribution he made to Nixon. Maheu never got into politics with me. 
I think Maheu had the capacity to compartmentalize. If he was dealing with me, he dealt exclusively on the activities that he and I were engaged in, and then he would go 
on to the next person. Obviously a fellow wouldn't have survived as long as he did with Hughes if he hadn't maintained total confidentiality with his boss. I found him a 
thoroughly pleasant fellow to deal with. But he would never get into--There 
was one incident I'll never forget. I was talking to him and he said, "I had a great day today." I asked, "What happened?" He said, "I signed an entertainer exclusively 
for our hotels for X numbers of years," or "the greatest entertainer alive today." I asked, "Who is it?" He said, "Wayne Newton." I had never heard of him. I didn't dare say after 
that build-up, "Who's Wayne Newton?" It was later on I found that Wayne Newton was indeed the great entertainer in Las Vegas. 
G: Is that right? 
O: In fact, he became really a Las Vegas entertainer. 
24
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --21 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 2 
O: [Inaudible] there for a while. 
G: Okay. Well, shall we start with your visit with Humphrey? 
O: Yes. Well, he, as I had said, visited my home one evening, a week or ten days or whatever it was after Bobby's funeral. In a rather kidding vein he said, "Through all the 
years that we've known each other and the number of times I've invited you out to Waverly, you never came." Shortly after that visit either he called me or Muriel called 
Elva and invited us out for a weekend. We went out and had a very pleasant stay. I wouldn't say you saw another side of Hubert. What you saw was what people liked about 
Hubert. We arrived at Waverly and Hubert was flying in; a helicopter was bringing him to their place on the lake. He got out of the helicopter and the first thing he did was start 
picking up around his swimming pool. He had that reputation of being very neat. His first act was to see if anybody had discarded candy wrappers or what have you. 
G: He must have had a compulsion for cleaning? 
O: He did, yes. 
It was a social visit. Elva and I spent a couple of days there. 
G: What was his place like? 
O: It was a modern home. Nicely appointed but not excessive. He had a house boat. 
G: Oh, a pontoon boat? 
O: Pontoon, I guess it was. And he had an antique car. You were kept active during your stay in the antique car visiting neighbors. Then Elva and I were on this boat on the lake 
and proceeded to stop at various cottages, old friends of his. He went to mass with us on Sunday and then insisted that we, after mass, meet the pastor who turned out to be an old 
friend of his, too. He loved people and these people around the lake were crazy about him. It was his habit just to pop in. I saw him on his home turf. It was a very pleasant 
experience, very interesting one. 
In any event, when I joined the campaign to secure the nomination at Chicago, which was my commitment, I operated out of, for a brief period, an office in the Executive 
Office Building. Most activity at that stage had to do with the convention planning, the operation we'd conduct on the convention floor, the housing of the staff, the procedures 
that would be followed in delegate counting, and trying to assure that we had maximum presence at the convention; for example, gallery seats, floor passes and all that sort of 
thing. We were very inhibited, even in this area, because of the financial problems that he 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIII --22 
was experiencing. Clearly, sources of funding the campaign were quite limited. There was a constant effort being made to have enough funding in order to support the 
convention proceedings and the staffing of the convention. And that became a problem. Other than that, there was the normal procedure to the point of who would place his name 
in nomination, who would second the nomination. Everything you are normally engaged in, preparing for the convention itself. 
G: Well, when you joined the campaign you had two co-chairmen, Fritz Mondale and Fred Harris. And then you had a lot of other executives like Bill Connell and--O: 
At the time that I joined the campaign, Fritz Mondale and Fred Harris came to visit me at my home in Washington. I indicated to Hubert I didn't think it was appropriate for me to 
chair the campaign, with Fritz and Fred in place. I assume that's what motivated the meeting. The thrust of that meeting was their assurance to me that they were totally 
supportive of Hubert's desire. They thought it was the right thing to do and they would be continuing their general activity in his behalf but would step aside in terms of the table of 
organization. They made that very clear to me, because that wasn't something I was seeking; clear to me in consideration of Hubert's proposal that I should know they were in 
total accord. They had discussed it and they'd be pleased if I'd join. So that occurred. 
G: There was reportedly a group of young volunteer lawyers who made up a lot of the core of the active campaigners and they had a session with Humphrey and told him he really 
needed to have you involved at the top running the thing. 
O: I don't recall that. 
G: Have you ever heard of that? 
O: I may not even have been aware of that meeting. 
G: But was the coordination in the campaign decentralized with people like Connell and Jim Rowe and Kampelman, each exercising a certain amount of authority on the one hand and 
Mondale and Harris on the other? 
O: No. I may be talking about a period beyond the nomination; I'm having trouble separating the two segments. We had regular formalized staff meetings; all the top participants were 
obliged to attend these meetings. There were discussions of all aspects of the campaign. It was determined at Chicago that Orville Freeman would take on the responsibility of 
maintaining a dialogue regarding issues. 
The first step I think that I took after I became chairman of the campaign and party chairman was to meet with the agency that had been hired early on to brief me. This 
would be the media side of the campaign. I remember I had Joe Napolitan sit in with me and we fired the agency at the end of the meeting. The agency, I think, later on sued or 
threatened to sue. But the fact is that the presentation was not what we thought of [as] 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIII --23 
top quality. We didn't feel we could fault the agency because they were never given any coherent direction. They hadn't really latched onto the thrust of the campaign, the 
emphasis of the campaign. These story boards and projected television spots just didn't have a focus. We were going to be racing against time in any event. So we let the agency 
go and started the campaign from scratch right then and there. 
G: What did you do in terms of publicity? Did you hire another agency or did you--? 
O: No, we hired the elements of what we conceived to be an agency's role in the campaign; in other words, we hired the best fellow in America to do spots, Tony Schwartz. We hired 
other people to do the bio, the half-hour show, another to do the [Edmund] Muskie segment, others to develop the ad program. We were aware of these people. Between 
Joe and I, we knew these people intimately and we'd seen them under fire and tested. Joe had all kinds of qualifications in this area. He had conducted any number of campaigns 
across the country and the world. He had the capacity to put together the best people. A fellow that does spots is not necessarily the fellow who can do the bio. We didn't feel that 
we were selling beer or cigarettes. This required a particular expertise and experience. The elements of the campaign could be focused on or pinpointed. And under Joe 
Napolitan's total direction and guidance--he was given complete authority--we would bring the appropriate people in for the appropriate tasks and it would be all coordinated by 
Joe. 
G: What did Kennedy's death do to the Humphrey finances? Did it dry up the contributions? I mean, were people contributing to Humphrey in order to head off Robert Kennedy, do 
you think? 
O: I don't know. I wasn't familiar with their activities prior to my arrival on the scene. I wasn't familiar with their financing while I was with Bobby. The fact is, which is not 
unusual in a campaign, there's never a period when you're flush, unless you're a Republican. In those days, you're not talking about federal financing. 
The fact is that material that had been prepared was discarded. The bio would be the intimate family presentation to the American people. The Humphrey family and 
Humphrey the man had no bite to it. It didn't present Humphrey the man. We knew Humphrey the man and it was unfortunate it wasn't there. 
So you had to start over. We did bring the best people available in and with enthusiasm. But those people had to be paid. They're not volunteers and you'll have to be 
up front to defray the cost of production. You had time allocations and an expert in that area. The production costs have to be taken care of and the time buys have to be in 
advance or you're not going to be on the air. What happened is we developed an excellent package of promotion, PR and media, with a price tag of around six million dollars for the 
last three weeks of the campaign. 
We started later than Nixon in this kind of expenditure. He was on the air very 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIII --24 
early. In fact, I think he was on the air Labor Day weekend. We weren't and we tried to conserve whatever resources we would have for a final drive. We found ourselves 
shockingly without any financial resources three weeks before the election. By dint of heavy borrowing from some very wealthy Democrats who were supportive of Hubert, we 
were able to put together approximately half the budget or less than that. We had to drop agreements on time buys and reduce the whole package by about 60 per cent. It was a 
devastating situation. We tried to overcome that [by] pursuing the possibility of debate. That was our only hope to even approach Nixon in terms of impact. We tried to 
circumvent the equal time provision. I remember the tremendous job John McCormack did in the House. In the Senate Dirksen threatened to filibuster. My recollection is that 
Senator Pastore was chairman of the committee in the Senate and Mike Mansfield, of course, was playing a key role. I believe I contacted the President, suggesting that if we 
succeeded that he have a public ceremony and have the candidates there. 
It was one of the most distressing days of the campaign. I was with Hubert in the Waldorf. We were both in New York and we got on the phone. I had made a number of 
efforts to move the legislation to the Senate side. There was some adamancy on the part of Mansfield and less than great enthusiasm on the part of Pastore. The specter of Dirksen 
blocking it in any event and having a big brawl. Our view was let's have the brawl because at least the brawl itself would create some publicity and some free time if you will. We 
got Mansfield on the phone, and I believe Pastore, and talked to them. Both of them determined that they would not bring it up. 
G: Really? 
O: Yes. 
G: Why wouldn't they? 
O: They said it was not going to pass and it would create animosity and interrupt the flow of legislation. If we couldn't assure them of passage, and we couldn't, then their decision was 
not to engage in it. And they weren't buying our contention, "Let's give it a whirl and let's get to a filibuster." It certainly was not going to be harmful. It might have been helpful. 
It was a real kick not to be able to get our own people to go along with it, but they wouldn't. 
Back to the convention. What you had, as we moved toward it, was an assumption that Humphrey would prevail, but [with] some mountains to climb. One 
would be the resolution on Vietnam and what form it would take and whether or not the McCarthy people and the liberals would prevail. How could we get an accommodation 
with them to bring some kind of unity to the convention in terms of the platform? That was a major problem. Hale Boggs and others were heavily involved; David Ginsburg and 
a number of people on that committee tried to work out an accommodation. 
You have the Johnson people adamantly opposed to any kind of plank in the 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIII --25 
platform on Vietnam that would soften the President's position in Vietnam. You had that particularly in the Texas delegation. John Connally was engaged in all kinds of threats, 
which I didn't take very seriously. Fred Harris and I met with Connally in his suite, which was down a stairway from ours in the hotel. He was putting on a mean front. The threat 
was that he would put Johnson's name in nomination. 
Then you had the unit rule. So you had the Vietnam situation and the unit rule. I urged him [Humphrey] to drop the unit rule, at least for that convention. While 
Humphrey had succeeded in locking up the unit rule and they had finessed it quite well, clearly, McCarthy wasn't going to win that nomination. A meaningful gesture would be to 
say, "Let's remove the unit rule, at least for this convention. Future conventions can decide." That incurred the wrath of Connally and others. 
G: Southern delegations. 
O: A number of southern delegations registered vigorous opposition. That created a storm. Humphrey proceeded to formally state his position, removing the unit rule. The Vietnam 
plank in the platform was adopted three to two. 
As you approached the days immediately prior to the convention, you had all of this. George McGovern would be a stand-in for Bobby Kennedy so that Bobby Kennedy 
delegates could support him or--G: 
Or Ted Kennedy, is that right? Was it--? 
O: At one point, George McGovern was volunteering to be a stand-in. Then the question was, would Ted Kennedy be a candidate? Then could Ted Kennedy work out an 
accommodation with McCarthy? McCarthy saying, "I want my name in nomination but at a given moment perhaps I could withdraw." All of this stop-Hubert activity was on-going 
and it all failed. But it was leaving its mark. 
Outside the convention hall was the rioting. It has been reported in great detail 1968. It was an out-of-control situation. The climate was god-awful. It went to the 
convention floor. It went to the Abe Ribicoff speech directed at Dick Daley. It went to every aspect of the convention. 
There was a group of us meeting with Hubert that reached a point in refining what would be the Humphrey position. The Humphrey language for the Vietnam plank would 
be reviewed with President Johnson to get his concurrence. Hale Boggs was playing a role in that. Charley Murphy was involved. Hubert placed a call to the President. To the 
consternation of all of us, he was unable to get the President on the line. The Vice President of the United States couldn't get the President on the line. 
G: This was during the convention itself? 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIII --26 
O: During the discussions on the Vietnam plank. 
The rioting was spurred on by the television networks. Daley was playing a hard line. I was never sure how hard a line he was playing, in terms of the Chicago police. The 
Chicago police were described by media as a bunch of ogres, clubbing poor innocent kids. It was a mess inside the convention and a mess outside the convention. It was extremely 
distressing. Part of my conversation with Humphrey the night he talked to me about staying on through the campaign was to literally sit in that hotel room with the windows 
ajar, and hear these people in Grant Park across the street, in unison, thousands of them, "F___ the Humph, F___ the Humph". It went on and on and on. Here's this man who has 
been nominated by his party for president sitting there with that. 
It was rotten in every aspect in the leadership of that so-called peace movement. They all should be ashamed of themselves. They were completely devoid of decency. 
That was my view. Maybe it was a somewhat warped view at that time, but I don't think so. I had been with Bobby; I had my own views on Vietnam policy but I certainly had 
strong views regarding Hubert Humphrey the man. To have that situation deteriorate to the level it did and the rottenness--certainly I've never forgotten it. The Chicago Seven or 
the rest of these characters who were involved during that period were despicable. They were not remotely interested in the democratic process. 
G: Let's go back to the convention itself. Was there some thought about changing the location of the convention from Chicago to Miami? 
O: No, I don't think so. 
G: Really? 
O: That might have been voiced but if anybody voiced it, they were certainly being naive. 
G: Why? 
O: Would they think for one minute that Dick Daley would voluntarily allow the convention to be moved? A convention could never be moved unless Dick Daley wanted it moved. 
G: And that was simply because of Daley's power or because of--? 
O: Daley's power and the fact that you might as well cave in and say there isn't any Democratic Party if you're going to have a bunch of nuts out in the street dictating where 
a convention is going to be. 
G: Now the next thing, why was the convention so late? Why was it at the end of August? 
O: Because the convention was conceived to be a convention to renominate Lyndon B. Johnson and tradition dictates that the in party has its convention last. The preference if 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIII --27 
you have an incumbent president is to have the convention as late as possible. 
G: I see. 
O: To shorten the campaign, shorten the period your opposition can achieve center stage. So it was established for the latest possible time. It was only a few days before Labor Day 
weekend when it closed out. Conventions have to be planned long in advance. We have an incumbent president; he's going to be seeking re-election and we'll shorten the 
campaign as much possible. As circumstances evolved, it turned out to be a disaster in terms of conducting a campaign. 
G: Now, there were some problems in Chicago in addition to the demonstrators themselves. There was also some telephone strike or something. 
O: Yes, there was a telephone strike, which lessened our opportunity to implement our program of telephones on the floor. 
G: Were there any other logistical problems, other than the fact that you didn't have it at the regular convention center either, did you? 
O: It was the old Cow Palace, all that was available in Chicago. That didn't lend itself to an orderly convention. I don't know if you were smelling too much manure, but it was an old 
decrepit building with a great tradition, but it had seen its time. 
Chicago was determined a couple of years earlier. Daley wanted the convention, and with the good Mayor, none of us, including the President of the United States, fought 
him when he was adamant about something. 
G: Was there a sense that the Johnson people were really exercising control over the convention rather than, say, the Humphrey forces? 
O: It goes to the Democratic National Committee's role in a convention. We made our presentation to the national committee, which has a responsibility for the conduct of the 
convention. Our requirements for hotel rooms, headquarters space, telephones, messengers, floor passes, gallery passes, the usual. And, of course, McCarthy made his 
presentation. In addition to that, it's up to the national committee to determine who will literally conduct the convention, who will chair it, who will be chairmen of the various 
committees, who will be the parliamentarian. We were dissatisfied with what the national committee did for us in terms of our requests. But McCarthy was convinced he was 
getting a bad deal. Steve Mitchell, who was his spokesman, protested vigorously. They contended that all the key positions were filled by Humphrey people, that they were being 
given short shrift. That's not unique or unusual. I don't think that the national committee was partisan. By the same token, [John] Bailey, [John] Criswell et al in the national 
committee would lean toward Humphrey and the establishment in setting up convention activities. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIII --28 
G: Was there some negotiation over the events of the convention such as the LBJ birthday and the showing of the memorial to the Kennedys? 
O: I remember Steve Smith meeting with me and discussing the timing of the memorial. Obviously, prior to that, you went to the President's decision not to attend the convention. 
You had a concern that Steve Smith expressed to me regarding the attention directed to the Kennedy side of the convention. He was suspicious. 
G: Really? 
O: My recollection is that Steve presented a couple of time frames and one of them was accepted. I don't recall it became a big deal, but I do recall some discussions that I was 
involved in relative to the timing. 
G: Was this, do you think, structured to prevent some sort of a draft Ted Kennedy movement or something like that? 
O: It was so conceived by the Kennedy people. I never became seriously concerned about a possible draft Kennedy movement. I think it's somewhat comparable to the 1972 
convention. Those seeking the nomination, in this instance McCarthy, or entertaining seeking the nomination have a common interest. The common interest is obvious; stop the 
front runner. 
I assume it occurred in Chicago--where the Kennedy people and the McCarthy people were in communication and, in fact, in negotiations, to see what steps could be 
taken that might result in blocking Hubert Humphrey on that first ballot. I would not be greatly concerned because when you get into negotiations, the bottom line is who is going 
to be number one. You're never going to agree on it. McCarthy came close enough to say, "I might support a Kennedy draft, but first I want my name in nomination. I owe it to 
my people. I would consider probably withdrawing." That's not in the cards. 
Tape 3 of 3, Side 1 
O: Whether I reflect on 1972 or reflect on 1960 in Los Angeles, you had one interest and that is ensuring that your delegates are kept intact. You have the majority and they've got 
some problem on their hands. 
The Vietnam resolution was adopted by a three to two vote. All of *+the opposition to Hubert Humphrey--Kennedy opposition, liberal opposition, *+peacenik 
opposition, McCarthy opposition--was all united in that roll call. And it meant it was all over. Now you had a much closer roll call in eliminating the unit rule. That was decided 
by a margin that was close, and incurred the enmity of the South in the process. Actually, all the delegations acceded with the exception of the Mississippi delegation, I believe. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIII --29 
G: That's right. 
O: I think we had seated both delegations from Georgia. None of that is very helpful while you had an assured nomination and you're trying to come out of the convention with a 
show of unity. If it was an intention on the part of some to have it close without unity, then obviously it's elusive to bring about perceived unity. 
G: Can you describe the discussions regarding whether or not LBJ would come to the convention. Was it to be on his birthday? 
O: There were discussions. Many of the Humphrey supporters were Johnson people. There was a feeling that he should be there. Those discussions took place. It made sense to me 
that the President not be there from his own point of view. Why should he be subjected to what was going on there? It would have been gross. I never felt it was worth devoting a 
lot of time to because I concurred in the President's judgment. I thought it was ridiculous, as well-meaning as some people were, to try to convince him to come to a convention 
where he was going to be embarrassed. That man didn't deserve that. So I didn't feel that it was really debatable. 
G: Who wanted him there? 
O: Some congressional people and a number of southern governors. I think John McCormack and others in the leadership in the Congress were dismayed that their 
President would not be present at the convention, particularly because it did fall on his birthday, which was intended. These people took their eye off the ball. You were going 
to defiantly bring your president into a convention to be subject to what would have certainly been an embarrassment. 
G: From Humphrey's standpoint, what was the significance of Johnson coming or not coming? How would it affect him? 
O: His gut feeling was that he wanted to have the President there. It was his loyalty to the President and his feeling that it was just unseemly for him not to be there. But my 
judgment at the time was that Lyndon B. Johnson had made a firm decision and people who would try to pressure him, as well motivated as they may have been, were not doing 
him any favors. 
G: Was Humphrey having a difficult time during this period separating himself from Johnson? Should he have been so more definitely? 
O: Not during this period. I don't recall any serious discussions about separation. The discussions went to trying to negotiate a Vietnam plank that would hopefully bring about 
unity. Also, discussions, as I've said, were lengthy and intensive regarding the unit rule. In both areas, it was an effort to nod to the liberal wing of the party, in substance saying to 
the liberal wing, "I'm not steamrolling; I don't want any undue advantages, you detest the 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIII --30 
unit rule, I have this convention locked up with the unit rule, I am going to remove that barrier and let the chips fall." That was our approach. 
On Vietnam, any lessening or limitation in a plank was again to see if we could not get the McCarthy and Kennedy elements of the convention into accord. And that failed 
because you wouldn't have had a roll call. With a three to two win, a substantial number of delegates were registering their disapproval of Johnson's Vietnam policy. There was no 
language that we could come up with. And I can tell you that creative writers such as David Ginsburg and others were deeply involved and some well-meaning people on the 
other side tried mightily. Charley Murphy's express reason for being in Chicago was to see if he couldn't be helpful. 
It wasn't doable. But as far as separating from Johnson, which became extremely significant in the course of the campaign regarding Vietnam, I don't recall discussion on 
the plank or the unit rule was related to trying to separate from Johnson. It was focused solely on, "Can we come out of this darn convention with unity and tackle Nixon?" 
G: Did LBJ, during the time before the convention, the early summer, indicate that they were making progress on Vietnam and that if Humphrey would continue to support the 
administration's policy on Vietnam, that Johnson thought he could bring the peace negotiations? 
O: Yes. There were occasions when there was hope. There was communication with Hubert. I remember there were rising expectations on several occasions on the part of 
Hubert. He constantly remained optimistic about a major breakthrough on Vietnam. He was given to understand there would be a major breakthrough. At least, that's what he 
reported to me on occasions, even to the point where something specific was to occur on a specific day that would be extremely helpful. This never came about, through the 
Chicago convention. It never occurred. Throughout, Hubert, I guess of necessity, remained optimistic that there would be a breakthrough, that the President would work 
something out that not only would be helpful in terms of the Vietnam debacle, but would be helpful in terms of Hubert's candidacy. 
G: Did LBJ threaten to oppose Humphrey or weaken his candidacy if he parted with the administration on Vietnam? 
O: I don't know. I would have no knowledge of whether he transmitted that kind of a threat to him. Certainly that was part and parcel of Connally's posturing. Any departure from 
the Johnson Vietnam policy would be considered by him and southerners he claimed he was speaking for as totally unacceptable, and would bring about disruptions in the 
convention up to and including Connally putting Johnson's name in nomination. Meanwhile, Connally was disturbed about the unit rule and very concerned about 
disruption of the Texas delegation by the convention. He had that foremost in his mind. My relationship with him during those days was amicable. He chose to berate Fred Harris 
to me. He kept telling me privately that everything was fine between Connally and me. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIII --31 
But he didn't trust Harris. And, by God, he wasn't going to sit idly by and let Harris pull the rug out and they'd better know what the consequences would be. Now, obviously, 
while he was being pleasant with me, he was sure that the threats he would make would get back to Humphrey. 
G: One of the press accounts described a meeting with you, Connally and Harris as a shouting match. 
O: I don't recall it as that and there was more than one meeting. 
G: Were they heated exchanges? 
O: I wouldn't call them heated, but Connally was arrogant, abrupt and dismissed Fred out of hand in tone and attitude. 
G: How did Harris react? 
O: Harris didn't respond. Harris is a tough fellow himself and he just rode with it. He felt that he was the fall guy and that he saw through Connally's charade, as I did. I remember 
the one occasion and the others when he asked to see me alone. That's when he decided to use a "I trust you, O'Brien, but I don't trust Harris" gambit. 
But what Connally was concerned about more than anything else was his position and his role. If the Texas delegation was dismantled, Connally was going to run wild. I 
don't think it was so much his concern for Lyndon Johnson as it was John Connally. 
G: Well, to what extent can this sort of disaffection be attributed to the fact that different ones in the Humphrey organization were telling different southern leaders varying things 
about the unit rule and Humphrey's support of the--? 
O: Support of the unit rule? 
G: Yes, or as opposed to doing away with it. 
O: I don't know who was telling them. 
G: You don't feel that different commitments were being made? 
O: Not that I'm aware of. There were Humphrey proponents who ran the spectrum from moderate to liberal. I would have to assume that if those kinds of commitments were 
being made or discussed, they were not being made or discussed with Humphrey's approval because on the unit rule I dealt directly with Humphrey. We discussed it 
dispassionately, practically, and came to a decision, which was the right decision. You were trying to blunt as much as you could this opposition from the McCarthy-Kennedy 
wing. Okay, let's get rid of the unit rule. That ought to make you happy. This isn't the 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIII --32 
casual decision. We've incurred the enmity of a large segment of the delegates. That shows that we're decisive people who are interested in your concerns. We disapprove of 
the unit rule as you do. You came to the conclusion that that was the best political approach, but the reality of the matter is that you could afford it. 
G: Well, did you see Humphrey then, during the convention, as being strong-willed and decisive, rather than subject to influence and ambiguous in his own--? 
O: He was acting in a very practical, sensible, realistic manner. That would go all the way to selecting his running mate. It's similar to my experience in 1960 in Los Angeles, or quite 
similar. In Los Angeles, we were going to be nominated. No matter what the opposition tried, it was not going to affect the end result. We had done our homework. We had 
control. In Chicago, Humphrey is going to be nominated. But what is the nomination going to be worth? Is there anything that we can do to bring about unity? That was not 
an overriding concern in Los Angeles because there was no one seeking that nomination who could have the temerity not to totally support the ticket. 
Here, with the McCarthy movement, you obviously had to be concerned about continuing defections and you were most concerned about establishing a record at the 
convention of fairness and equity to blunt what you knew would be an ongoing problem. We were forced to an intensive prolonged debate on the Vietnam resolution and an 
ultimate roll call. We were forced into an intensive debate and an ultimate roll call that was close on the unit rule, despite our efforts in both instances to avoid that kind of 
controversy. 
G: Anything else on the unit rule? 
O: On the unit rule, Humphrey's proposal was the elimination of the unit rule at that convention. Now that was our effort to try to balance this out; we weren't forever 
dismissing the unit rule. That could be taken up in future conventions. 
To summarize, the unit rule was reaching out to the liberals. It was an attempt on the part of Humphrey to have the record show he was not dictating the convention. It 
was along with our attempts to negotiate acceptable language on the Vietnam plank. 
G: Apparently, the Humphrey forces opposed the black challenge to the Alabama delegation. 
O: It was not a well-presented or well-formed challenge. The legitimacy of the challenge itself had to be questioned. It wasn't a difficult decision. 
G: During this period, did you talk with Ted Kennedy with regard to his own possible candidacy or his own possible candidacy as the vice presidential nominee? 
O: No. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIII --33 
G: But I have a note that said that you placed midnight calls to Ted Kennedy to join Hubert Humphrey as a running mate. 
O: I may have. On the question of his candidacy, I would never have taken that seriously. That was not a disturbing possibility. On the question of joining the ticket, I certainly 
would have strongly favored that. 
G: Would you? 
O: Yes. I would have felt that that was the best move we could make. Didn't guarantee anything but it would, I think, enhance the ticket. If I broached it to him, it might have 
been for the record. I would not have seriously considered that he would accept. 
G: Who was considered as vice presidential. . . ? 
O: After Hubert's nomination, we put together a meeting of key Democrats, with emphasis on southern and border state Democrats. Hubert and I attended the meeting and it went 
on at some length and was not a difficult meeting. Humphrey wanted the input of leading Democrats. He wanted all those present to have an opportunity and he would appreciate 
suggestions on whom he should select, with the understanding that it was his ultimate decision to make. That meeting was a heavyweight meeting. There were perhaps twenty 
to thirty leading Democrats. 
G: Would they be people like John Connally or--? 
O: Yes. Several governors were there. 
O: The response to the invitation to attend the meeting was excellent and we covered the bases we wanted to cover. But it's interesting that the discussion was along this line: "I 
would be satisfied with whomever you select. I don't have anyone specifically in mind." Why would that happen when all these heavyweights were there? Because they suspect 
each other. Nobody's going to start naming a candidate who probably isn't going to be selected anyway and might create animosity with whoever is selected, or animosity with 
some of those who don't agree. 
It was so limited and low-key that the only name that I can recall that was mentioned with a strong recommendation was Cyrus Vance. I believe that related to his 
role in the Vietnam negotiations. I thought it was a surprising recommendation only because Cyrus Vance was not a member of the political establishment. There was a sense 
of appreciation that Hubert had called the meeting; that was clear. 
G: Were you yourself considered? 
O: I saw a memo after the convention. I got a kick out of it because I would have had to step aside in the selection process, if I had any feeling I should be considered or that people 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIII --34 
were advocating my consideration. There was a conversation reported by John McCormack. He had discussed with Lyndon Johnson on the telephone the selection of 
the running mate, and either Johnson had recommended me or he had recommended me to Johnson. I don't know whether it took place. My guess is it did. John McCormack and I 
had become very close associates by then. That was mentioned to me during the course of the convention, which I dismissed out of hand. It could have been mentioned to me by 
John McCormack. But there was never a word between Humphrey and I regarding me. I would have been inhibited if that occurred, because I wouldn't have felt that I could be as 
candid as I was in expressing my views if somehow or other I was remotely personally involved. 
G: How about Sarge Shriver? 
O: I don't recall. 
G: Was he on the list, too? 
O: There was a list but that list was pared down quickly, if indeed there was a formal list. 
G: Well, he had a good reputation, I assume? 
O: Sarge's name could have been bandied about. I think there probably were a number of names, but in quick order it came to a selection between two. The more people who think 
they may be selected, the more assistance you're receiving in getting the nomination. Your whole focus is on your own nomination. That was the story of Kennedy; that was the 
story of McGovern, and it was the story of Hubert Humphrey. 
Fred Harris had a keen interest in being on the ticket. There had been a circulation of Fred Harris material in the convention and an advocacy of Fred Harris on the part of a 
number of people. There had been no Muskie advocacy or Muskie effort. Fred contributed to Hubert's nomination success, which was significant. Fritz Mondale was not 
in that position. He came from Minnesota and there would be no consideration. I don't know who introduced Muskie into discussion. We had, I'm sure, various names bandied 
about. 
But that morning the decision had to be made. There were only two being considered. We invited both to Humphrey's suite, Ed Muskie in one bedroom and Fred 
Harris in another bedroom. Jim Rowe was there and I was there. Hubert was torn because he felt a great indebtedness to Fred and rightly so, yet he was intrigued with what 
he conceived Muskie might bring to the ticket. My recollection with the three or four of us, including Hubert, standing in the living room, was people were being a little cautious. 
It's hard to speak out under those circumstances. 
I remember Hubert standing there and with his index finger, punching me with a finger on my chest three or four times. He said, "All right, enough of this. I want 
38
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --35 
somebody to be specific here. I'm asking you right now," and he punched me on the chest, "who would you select?" And I said, "Ed Muskie." That was my strong view. 
G: Why did you favor Muskie? 
O: For a lot of reasons. I thought Muskie had a recognition factor that was very favorable. He was ethnic, which could be helpful. He was from the northeast, which could be 
helpful. Ed Muskie had a presence that would add a significant dimension to the ticket. I'm not suggesting for a moment that Hubert Humphrey selected Ed Muskie because I said 
Ed Muskie. Hubert Humphrey selected Ed Muskie. That was his decision. I think he was getting a little aggravated because time is running on you. It's absolutely amazing. You 
have to do this in the next half hour. It's unbelievable those decisions are made under those circumstances. Just as Kennedy made his decision on Lyndon Johnson. So 
Humphrey had narrowed it down to two. And the time had come. We can stand and posture and triple talk, but now the decision. At that point Humphrey said, "I will go to 
Fred Harris' bedroom; you people call Ed Muskie out." 
G: Did LBJ or the White House have a favorite? 
O: I don't know if they did. 
G: Were there southerners considered, perhaps Terry Sanford or Carl Sanders? 
O: There were several names mentioned prior to Hubert's nomination, not by Hubert, but by people who were advocates. I think a lot of people felt they might have a piece of the 
action. There's never a dearth of potentials for second spot on the ticket. 
As it turned out, Ed Muskie proved to be an extremely effective member of the ticket. We placed great emphasis on the visibility of Ed Muskie. We felt that with 
Hubert's problems Ed Muskie could play a significant role. We even had an Ed Muskie bio. We placed Ed Muskie with Hubert in our media efforts. His involvement in the 
campaign was as total as we could make it. 
G: Did you ever consider or did Humphrey ever consider Nelson Rockefeller? 
O: That was mentioned by some people that that would be a coup. I had no contact with Nelson Rockefeller nor did I participate in any discussions regarding him. 
Tape 3 of 3, Side 2 
G: Another idea that was put forward was the proposal that Humphrey himself resign the vice presidency. 
O: That may have surfaced during the convention. It certainly surfaced during the campaign. There were some strong views expressed. I had strong views and there were strong 
39
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --36 
views on both sides of the issue. 
G: What was your view on it? 
O: There was lengthy debate on two or three occasions during the early stages of the campaign. There might have been reference to it at the convention. I clearly remember 
the discussions in the early stage of the campaign. My position, which didn't require any great genius, was that Hubert Humphrey had been elected vice president of the United 
States. There could be no conclusion if he resigned other than an attempt to separate himself from the President of the United States, which would be an act of disloyalty that 
the pundits and media would ridicule. It would be counter-productive. I had no reservations whatsoever. That was brought up by two or three major fund-raisers who did 
not specify that failure to resign would mean they would close their billfolds. They were fine people and they were staunch supporters of Humphrey. But they were politically 
naive. 
G: Were the [Evron and Jeane] Kirkpatricks in support of this, too? 
O: I don't recall. 
G: Do you recall who brought it to your attention? 
O: It was initially brought to my attention in a discussion with Hubert. 
G: What do you recall about the nominating and seconding speeches? 
O: Well, I recall we came up with proposals to Humphrey. He did not accept some and accepted others. [Joseph] Alioto would have played some role on that. 
G: Is that right? 
O: Yes. 
G: Why was this? 
O: He had achieved some national prominence. He was known to be an excellent speaker. And he was ethnic. He was not a delegate and there had to be some parliamentary 
decision to clear that aspect. Alioto, at that time, also was one of those on the list as a possible vice president. 
G: Oh, was he? Did LBJ have a presence at the convention through some of his assistants? Who represented him there? 
O: The fellow who seemed to be involved was Charley Murphy. He was very much involved in the Vietnam aspect, the unit rule, and was recognized as a spokesman for the 
40
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --37 
President's interest. 
G: Was Marvin Watson--? 
O: I don't recall. 
G: --involved there? 
O: No. 
G: I have a note that says that LBJ's control of the convention was so complete that Humphrey's son-in-law had to stand in line every morning for tickets for the Humphrey 
family. 
O: I don't accept that--G: 
Really? 
O: He continued to control the Democratic National Committee at that point. The national committee makes those decisions and they're not going to deviate from the President's 
guidance. Criswell could have been talking *+to LBJ every day or every hour. The fact is that the Democratic National *+Committee did make an effort to remain evenhanded. If 
that's the case with the tickets for the family, you can be sure that somebody was standing in line for Kennedy tickets or McCarthy tickets. I wouldn't place any particular emphasis 
on that. He had control of the convention, running the convention. I'm sure that John Bailey, John Criswell and others couldn't name a chairman or a parliamentarian or 
chairman of a committee without clearance with the president if he was that interested. 
Humphrey was one candidate at the convention. He was not in control of the machinery of the convention or the leadership of the convention. 
G: Should he have been? 
O: No. 
G: One of your memos, I think, indicates that you were having trouble just getting a tentative schedule of the events and the floor plan of where the different delegations would be. 
O: There was delay and inability to get specifics. And that had to do with the internal operation of the national committee and their formalization of the convention. There was 
an inordinate period of time before that was resolved and I think that goes to the fact that Lyndon Johnson was not a candidate. It's Lyndon Johnson's national committee and the 
national committee probably was having considerable difficulty getting guidance and direction. The result was a degree of disarray. But most of the disarray had nothing to do 
with the national committee; it had to do with the thousands of people who were in 
41
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --38 
protest. 
G: There's another memo in these files that is really a draft of a letter to John Bailey suggesting that young people have some forum for expressing their ideas. 
O: Yes. That is another example of our efforts to establish contact and dialogue with the young people, which was extremely difficult. I sent this to Humphrey as a draft motivated 
by the desire to come up with ideas that would indicate to these young people that Humphrey wasn't an ogre. We wanted to see if we couldn't give them a forum, an outlet, 
and hopefully lessen the other activities we anticipated they were going to engage in. There were memos on anticipation of the problems of Chicago. There were reports of 
conversations with some of the leaders of the peace movement and assurances from a couple of them that it was not their intention to engage in any violence, that they wanted 
peaceful expression. They in turn were concerned about Daley and the Chicago police and how they might react to them. 
That was of great concern to us. This would be an aspect of effort we were trying to expend to contain the situation and to the point where emissaries from our side dealt 
directly with the leaders. 
G: The mobilization group? 
O: Yes. As one of the memos will indicate, there were many elements involved, from the liberal to the far left to the wild-eyed. It was clear that if they were motivated, we were 
not going to control the situation. 
G: Did the Humphrey letter to Bailey go out and was it released to the press? 
O: My recollection is it went out and I assume it was released to the press. 
G: I want to ask you to describe a little more of the scene in the Humphrey organization's hotel rooms there in the Hilton Hotel. You mentioned hearing the demonstrators outside. 
Was the tear gas also in evidence? 
O: The hotel became a battle area. People were urinating in the lobby and throwing things out the windows. It was known to be the headquarters hotel for Humphrey. We didn't 
have any incidents in the actual headquarters area. 
As you moved from the hotel to the convention hall or from the hotel to another hotel, you observed a great deal of activity, much of it peaceful. But eruptions escalated 
dramatically. And Grant Park became a scene of considerable violence. Depending on your point of view, the violence was caused by the youth movement or the police 
overreacting. There were elements of the youth movement intent upon violence. The fact is that the Chicago police had a reputation of being tough. So I think you could find some 
fault on both sides. The majority of the police probably tried to act in a professional 
42
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --39 
manner and, certainly, the vast majority of the youth movement similarly tried to act. You had a lot of young people who had no desire whatsoever to be involved in any violent 
acts. But you can't have thousands and thousands where you're not going to have some problems. The record has been pretty well established by those who have reported the 
convention as overreacting on the part of the police. But what I observed outside the hotel and in the lobby and the immediate environs certainly was not the result of police 
actions. 
G: How did Humphrey react to the spectacle of these--? 
O: When the obscenities were being hurled at him from Grant Park late that night into the early hours of the morning when he and I were discussing the matter that I've reviewed, 
neither Hubert nor I made any comment. It was the most depressing situation for him in human terms. You talk about unfairness, insensitivity and lack of decency, that's the worst 
example I ever experienced. Hopefully I'll never experience anything like that again. There were just the two of us in the room and you could hear this clearly. I didn't say, 
"Isn't that horrible?" to him or he didn't say, "God, will you listen to that" to me. Nothing like that. He had been forced to accept that kind of attack. 
G: Do you think that at Chicago he was aware of the extent of the upheaval there in the streets? 
O: No, because I wasn't. Other than the immediate vicinity of the Hilton Hotel, that was the only time I had the opportunity to view and hear. 
Activities in the convention itself? No. I was located in the Humphrey rooms in the convention. We were operating from our own areas. I was on the convention floor a 
good deal. The incident of Abe Ribicoff attacking Dick Daley from the podium was probably the most intense moment that I observed in the convention hall. 
G: Let me ask you to recall as much as you can about that. 
O: It was the usual convention floor mob scene, pushing and shoving, crowded aisles and all that. Suddenly--and I wasn't paying any attention to what Ribicoff was saying--his voice 
and tone reached a crescendo and I happened to be where I could view both Ribicoff and Daley. Daley rose and screamed. I didn't hear what he was saying, but he attacked 
Ribicoff from the floor vociferously. You could see his face redden and he was damned mad. Ribicoff was very vigorous in his attack. It created a lot of commotion, but not any 
violence. 
I think one of the top anchormen was forcibly removed from the floor at one point or not allowed on the floor. But that had nothing to do with the youth movement. It had 
to do with security and his reaction. He hadn't gone through security check or something like that. He reacted violently himself because his ego was bruised in the process. 
43
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --40 
G: Who was it? 
O: I don't remember which one. 
I don't remember having any difficulty in moving in the convention hall. I assumed protesters were being kept at a distance. When you're involved in so many matters with a 
time frame that locks you in, you're apt to be oblivious. You're concentrating on what you do next or where you're going next or who you're going to talk to next. 
Back to the hotel, on a couple of nights, very late, I did observe this obscene aspect and I observed the trashing of the lobby. It was childish stuff, kids urinating in the 
lobby. But you hustled to your elevator, had somebody escorting you, ignored it to the best of your ability. 
G: Were you aware of the confrontation between the McCarthy campaign workers and the police in the hotel? 
O: I don't know as I would have separated out the McCarthy campaign workers from the others. No, I don't recall. 
G: But there was a point, apparently, when McCarthy himself intervened in trying to protect some of his people who were being pushed down. 
O: I don't know. 
G: At what point do you think Humphrey became aware that the nomination itself was diminished by all of this violence that accompanied the convention? 
O: Well, I don't know as it was the violence that accompanied the convention nearly as much as the Vietnam policy. 
G: Really? 
O: I think that that was the specter from the beginning; it took no time at all to realize the degree of adverse impact his candidacy had on the public generally. 
The convention closed out in late August. It was necessary to immediately focus on the campaign. We decided to spend a few days at Waverly. Humphrey had a guest 
cottage there. We'd be isolated there. I went out with Ira Kapenstein and Joe Napolitan, using the guest cottage as we worked on the development of the campaign. We were 
joined, I believe, the following morning by Orville Freeman, Bill Connell and others. Humphrey came over to the cottage from time to time, in and out. We worked through 
the night. Joe Napolitan, particularly, is an amazingly creative fellow. He didn't need a secretary because he started life as a newspaperman. I've never seen a man operate a 
typewriter as he does or be more creative. 
44
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --41 
We developed this campaign outline. I do recall one aspect of it was the obvious launching of the campaign. Hubert was scheduled to go to New York for the Labor Day 
celebration. Traditionally this is a labor activity in New York, but we've got to have a big street show in a major city immediately. This would be a motorcade. We agreed that was 
the candidate's first step. That should be the first major appearance. 
We tried to determine what city or cities we could consider for this. It turned out to be a useless effort. We made preliminary contacts in two or three cities. One of them, 
I remember, was Boston. Either I talked to Teddy or someone did and the reaction we got from preliminary check-out was it was premature; later in the campaign would be a 
better time, and a clear feeling they didn't want him. That was the first cold shower. 
G: The fear that there would be unrest or that he--? 
O: No, he was a negative to them. So, for what is going to be a very brief presidential campaign, that wasn't a very good start. However, other than that, we did accomplish a 
great deal, organizationally, in the media approach to which I referred. There was a great deal accomplished and I felt awfully good about the stint at Waverly--the contribution 
from everybody, the old-time Humphrey people and us new arrivals. Ira and Joe were extremely bright and able. Ira didn't have the political experience but was innately bright 
and quick. Joe has a great deal of political experience and was equally bright and quick. So [with] the input of the others, we had things lined up in our mind. 
As the campaign began to progress, my role as party chairman brought me into the national committee headquarters. I took over John's office and it brought the whole 
campaign into national committee headquarters. We decided it would be a separate campaign. It would be under the aegis of the national committee. That was simple 
because I was wearing both hats. 
G: Why did you decide to do this? 
O: It seemed to be the obvious thing to do if the campaign chairman is the national chairman. Secondly, there was a practical reason. There was space there and we didn't have to go 
chasing around. We were going to have a broad-based citizens committee, functioning in the traditional role in a national campaign. It was to be conducted identically as the 
citizens committee in the 1960 campaign. All the elements of the citizens committee, youth groups, women's groups, professional groups, you name it, people that may not be 
political activists. There were probably twenty or thirty different segments. Terry Sanford was chairman of the citizens committee. They established headquarters in another 
location. The space need would require that. They would function coordinated with us. Terry was given a great deal of leeway and I reviewed all of this with him. Terry had been 
early on involved with Hubert. 
Of course the most important function was the candidate and his role. As we 
45
O'Brien --Interview XXIII --42 
busied ourselves implementing the campaign as we envisioned it, we put it in writing at Waverly and part of the campaign was the Humphrey speaking schedule. The apparent 
concern of well-meaning Democrats regarding the early presence of Hubert in their state or cities was underscored when we started the candidate touring. He was being berated at 
every stop; he was being interrupted at every appearance. It was a disaster. What happened to Hubert, the banners, the yelling and disruptions, became the story, not what 
he was saying or attempting to present on the issues. 
You couldn't have had a more difficult situation. When you look at the Chicago convention, when you look at the early stages of the Humphrey election campaign, it was 
an absolute disaster. The first national poll that first week, right after Labor Day, showed Humphrey losing the election by sixteen points. Frankly, we were never able to catch up. 
Every week there was a poll and we were alert to it--generally candidates have some access to the results before publication. We could see, not early on, but after the first 
three or four weeks, some movement. You tried to promote that movement. You'd call selected reporters; you'd tip them off. It was a yawn. If you had a movement one week, it 
really didn't become publicly known for another week or ten days. You're always playing catch up. I don't think there was a pundit in America who felt in that last week of the 
campaign that Humphrey had closed the gap to 5 per cent or less. There was absolute dismissal of his candidacy from beginning to end and it was unanimous across the country 
from media that he was a loser. The consequent loss of monies that might have been available flowed from it. Then to have it a close election was a terrible experience and the 
most unfair, as I see it, conclusion. But that was the case. 
As we've discussed the campaign we particularly discussed the turning point of the campaign, which was the Salt Lake City speech, we have to have in mind that we were a 
rather desperate coterie trying to keep the dam from totally breaking. 
End of Tape 3 of 3 and Interview XXIII 
46
    [ Part 24: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--19 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXIV*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XXIV 
PREFERRED CITATION 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXIV, 7/ 22/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXIV, 7/ 22/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
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researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-35 
4
INTERVIEW XXIV 
DATE: July 22, 1987 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 1 
G: Okay, one more question about Chicago. Did you make an effort there to have [Eugene] McCarthy support the nominee at the convention? 
O: Yes. There were contacts made with McCarthy and we, as indicated in the negotiations on the Vietnam plank and on the Unit Rule, sought opportunities to create an atmosphere 
that might lead to unity. At the same time, of course, there were ongoing negotiations involving the liberal wing of the party, the [Robert] Kennedy supporters and the McCarthy 
supporters, to see if they couldn't mount a unified effort on their part to stop Humphrey. As I indicated earlier, their problem would be who is going to be first among equals? You 
are never going to resolve the situation because if Gene McCarthy wasn't going to be first among equals then there was little advantage to him in going through the exercise of 
putting the Kennedy-McCarthy pieces together. We were anxious to have McCarthy endorse Humphrey. Over these several days there was no serious concern on my part 
regarding the outcome of the first ballot. 
I should mention the fellow who accompanied Leonard Goldenson to visit me, to have my assurance that I would be working on behalf of the three networks the day after 
the convention. He was Bill Lawrence, who was an old friend of mine. It is worth noting that George McGovern gave strong support to the Humphrey nomination despite their 
different views. The record should note that came without difficulty. In fact, George promptly moved to endorse. It should be noted also that Teddy Kennedy strongly 
supported Humphrey's candidacy, so it left you after the convention with Gene McCarthy as a problem. That remained a problem for a considerable period of time. We were 
talking about the launching of the campaign over that Labor Day weekend. 
G: One other thing first. McCarthy's forces had complained that delegates had been stolen or that the maneuvering at the convention had not been fair to the McCarthy support. Was 
this a legitimate argument? 
O: I have no recollection of that being a legitimate argument. It is not an abnormal convention situation in any event. I can look back to four conventions that I had active 
participation in and in each instance there were charges of that nature, whether you are talking about Los Angeles, even Atlantic City, Miami and then Chicago. We didn't feel 
the national committee was giving us a fair shake. The fact of the matter is we were treated evenhandedly with McCarthy. We had no advantages over McCarthy other than 
5
O'Brien --Interview XXIV --2 
one obvious advantage; we had more delegates than he had. 
G: You did at Chicago prepare a long memorandum for Vice President Humphrey on the campaign, a memo dated August 27 that discusses very frankly the strengths and 
weaknesses of the campaign and the candidate. 
O: Yes. 
G: Do you recall the motivation for that? 
O: Yes. I felt the appropriate close of my commitment to Hubert should include whatever views I had regarding the campaign itself. That would be the final chapter. A great deal 
of thought was put into it. Joe Napolitan had a very active role in developing this. It is considerably different in thrust than a campaign manual or an organizational outline, 
although it incorporates organizational activity with emphasis on media. It was an attempt to be candid regarding the candidate and the public attitude that I perceived regarding 
him--his strengths and his weaknesses. It encompasses about thirty pages and it goes into detail on many basics--materials, the appropriate use of media, the role of labor and other 
elements. It also spells out, state by state, where I felt the emphasis should be. I have no recollection whether or not Humphrey had read this by the time he and I met in the wee 
hours of that morning concerning my continuance. But it was the basic document that, once I stayed aboard, we tried to follow. 
G: The memo was submitted before you had your meeting with him, is that right? 
O: I believe so on the basis of the date. It would almost have to be because--or maybe it wasn't. But it was prepared, certainly. 
G: You do mention in there that [Orville] Freeman--you do not have a role for yourself in the campaign, so I assume--O: 
No. It was not envisioned as a document that would include a role on my part. The Freeman aspect of this would not have been--if I hadn't stayed--easy to resolve because 
Freeman was still a member of the cabinet. If he were designated officially as a campaign leader, I think it would have created some difficulties. However, that was not my 
problem. So that would not deter me from suggesting what Freeman's continuing role would be. He had been very active in support of Hubert from the beginning. But I was 
the only cabinet member to resign and participate in the campaign that I recall. 
I remember during that period from the time I joined Hubert and the close of the convention that I had spent time in his office in the EOB [Executive Office] Building. To 
be utilizing the office of the Vice President for political purposes could raise some eyebrows. That is what occurred; opposition surfaced. I had a touch of that when I took 
my group around the country in 1964. We were obviously immersed in campaign activity. Yet I was a member of the White House staff. People could have said, a) he is receiving 
6
O'Brien --Interview XXIV --3 
his government salary but he is out politicking; b) he is violating some procedure by being engaged in a political campaign when he has an official capacity. None of that occurred. 
You didn't give it much thought and you didn't worry about it. The same using Humphrey's office. It did enter my mind. You're a little vulnerable. But it wasn't 
significant. It wasn't of any interest to anyone. 
G: Where were the headquarters for the Humphrey campaign? 
O: At that point there was ongoing activity on the citizens' side. The people involved in the Humphrey campaign, Bill Welsh, Bill Connell and others were Humphrey staff people. 
The citizens' activity was conducted elsewhere. So that was really the nature of the campaign up to that point. The appropriate place for me to function for a brief period 
would be in those offices. Offices were turned over to me for my use and it was very doable to function from there. 
G: Then did you move over the DNC later or--? 
O: Once the extension I referred to was agreed to, I took over the chairman's office of the [Democratic] National Committee. Our plan was to take over the national committee and, 
as needed, supplement the existing staff. This would be a coordinated effort, the national committee and the Humphrey campaign. That was formalized and then I went directly to 
Waverly. 
G: In this memorandum you make it clear that the way to win the election is through television. 
O: That's right. Television had become an extremely key factor. It is more so today. But what awakened us to the role of television, the impact of television, were the 
Kennedy-Nixon debates. The turn of events immediately following the first debate was enough to convince you that from then on television would play an extremely important 
role in all elections. Also, Humphrey acquitted himself well on television. Proper packaging of spots and other material seemed the best opportunity to promote him. Of 
course, with the selection of Muskie it became even more obvious. Even then television was extremely expensive. You were dependent on substantial campaign contributions to 
carry out a media program. You can have the best people in television and it might be interesting to view their product in an office somewhere but can you utilize the product to 
the fullest? 
That's where the frustrations come in because in the Humphrey campaign there were two overriding problems. One was Vietnam and the second was money. You 
launch a campaign with Gallup or Harris saying you're sixteen points down in the polls. Political realists have a tendency not to reach into their pocket quickly when it's not a 
good bet. It has a tremendous negative impact on a campaign. You can't avoid the reality that a down side in the polls has a tremendous effect on your ability to finance a campaign. 
That's exactly what did happen. 
7
O'Brien --Interview XXIV --4 
G: Let me ask you to go into the media in some detail. Did you meet with Tony Schwartz during the campaign? You indicate in the memo that Tony Schwartz should be retained to 
produce some spots. 
O: Yes, I did meet with him. We went over in detail what I envisioned to be the thrust. We met with others who were involved doing the bio. 
G: Tell me about your conversations with Tony Schwartz and your strategy there. 
O: Initially I told Schwartz it was two-pronged. We had to present a strong, decisive Hubert Humphrey. He had license as to how he presented this. Equally important, I saw a 
splendid opportunity to go on the attack. I felt both Nixon and [Spiro] Agnew were vulnerable--their leadership qualities or lack of them, deviousness, harking back to the fur 
coat, the Nixon-Kennedy debates. So I saw a potential for very powerful spots. 
Now the record shows that they were powerful in the attack. They were somewhat personalized and they went up to the line in terms of possible 
counterproductivity in the sense of public reaction. They would feel they were too negative, too nasty, too whatever. We, recognizing the sixteen points and the long shot 
aspects, were going to take chances. And the chances were taken. In a couple of instances, spots were surfaced and then withdrawn after we felt we had made an impact. 
We scared the candidate to death when he saw one or two of them. 
Schwartz was important because we were going to be heavy on spots. We could develop a Humphrey bio. We could develop a similar bio for Muskie which would be a 
first. In the past, from my experience, a vice presidential candidate was not emphasized to that extent. He wasn't front and center almost in an equal position. In my table of 
organization, the media side was of utmost importance. I made it clear Joe Napolitan would have complete control and total coordination of all aspects of media. We had a 
specific idea of the general thrust and the implementation would be left solely to Joe Napolitan. He had my authorization to make every decision necessary as we went along. 
Somebody else had the responsibility to raise the money for implementation and that was Bob Short and some close friends of Hubert, Duane Andreas and several others. 
G: Describe some of the spots you remember as being particularly strong. 
O: There were a couple of Agnew spots that were strong and hard-hitting. One was "A Heartbeat from the Presidency," which was a simple spot showing the heartbeat as it went 
across the screen simply saying, "Spiro Agnew, A Heartbeat from the Presidency." There was another spot, on Agnew. A fellow is watching his television set and Spiro Agnew 
appears and the fellow chuckles, then laughs and then becomes hysterical, simply saying, "Just imagine Spiro Agnew vice president of the United States." There were some spots 
where we used Nixon clips and they were hard-hitting. We carefully reviewed Nixon's 
8
O'Brien --Interview XXIV --5 
address to the American people when he was retained by Eisenhower on the ticket. 
G: The Checkers speech. 
O: The Checkers speech. We considered excerpting from the Checkers speech with another punch-in-the-nose type spot. We were getting into dangerous territory because how far 
do you go and where do you stop before it becomes a negative factor and comes back to hit you in the nose. We finally decided not to use any of the Checkers material. I must 
have looked at that film ten times and with some reluctance decided to drop it. 
G: Were there any spots that you did not use at all that Schwartz prepared? 
O: Well, there were a couple. One was our Wallace spot. We knew he was going to garner blue collar support, organized labor support, and we decided to play hard ball. I had 
suggested to Schwartz that he think that aspect of it out. Here is this sort of woebegone fellow waiting to go into the voting booth which was curtained. He's mumbling, sort of 
talking to himself as he was going up the line. He made it clear he was a lifelong Democrat. He was concerned about what he was considering doing; it was a sign of 
disloyalty to the party and certainly a decided change in his approach over his lifetime. It was bothering him but he was sorely tempted to vote for George Wallace. He finally 
convinced himself as he was about to enter the booth that he was going to vote for George Wallace. He pulled the curtain and you hear the lever and the whole thing 
disintegrated. We didn't use it. That was a very strong spot. Of course, it was tied not to Wallace; he was going to vote for Wallace and [Curtis] LeMay. 
G: Then it ends in an explosion? 
O: Yes, the whole thing disintegrated in an explosion. It was clear what you would accomplish if you assisted in electing Wallace-LeMay. 
G: Were there any spots that your own candidate reacted to? 
O: At least one of the Agnew spots I referred to. I was not sure when I received a call from Hubert Humphrey whether he had actually seen a spot or it had been reported to him. But 
he had received a negative comment from some Democratic county chairman, and that would impress him and he was disturbed by it. It was described to him and when he called 
me he was upset. 
I listened and did not agree with him. There were others who were wishy-washy in their reactions. We had committed to use both spots through the first go-round. We 
closed out one of them. One of those two spots we did not rerun. We were playing with some fire but it's an indication of the approach to the problem of climbing that mountain. I 
agreed that Agnew a heartbeat from the presidency could be conceived as a joke. There was a personal element to it. Some people can construe that was mean. We were just 
talking about Spiro and Dick and we had balance because the other side of media was to 
9
O'Brien --Interview XXIV --6 
present the Hubert Humphrey that we knew. 
Now, a half hour bio film had already been done. Joe and I reviewed it. Joe had a very strong negative reaction. He thought it was weak and meaningless. He didn't 
hesitate to express a strong view. So we discarded it and started all over again. 
(Interruption) 
O: The new program that was developed was awfully well done. 
G: Who did it? 
O: An outfit in St. Louis. Napolitan negotiated that and it came over beautifully. You had him at home in Waverly, with his grandchildren, with his kids. You had him in a very 
warm situation with a youngster who was retarded. A great family man with a marvelous wife and a wonderful family: Middle America. We received great positive comment 
regarding it. Unfortunately, we couldn't use it often enough because of our budgetary problems. We had a similar program developed that was good on Muskie and we had 
spots, of course, presenting Hubert and his positions and policies and record. I don't want to overemphasize the attack side of the media. We did succumb to temptation to a certain 
extent. It was reasonably effective. 
G: In your memo you had recommended using Charles Guggenheim, who had done those--O: 
He was active in that campaign. We selectively brought people aboard for their particular expertise. That would be an area of expertise that Guggenheim could engage in as 
Schwartz on spots and others were involved. So there was no single media entity. 
G: There was also a spot utilizing Ted Kennedy's endorsement of Humphrey, is that right? One out at Cape Cod. 
O: That was a unique situation. Ted had done a number of things during the campaign that [were] helpful. He had introduced Hubert in Boston. He was doing his best to be helpful 
and it was greatly appreciated. As the campaign was closing out, we had committed to a telethon to close. 
G: A telethon. 
O: A telethon. That was unique. We were to the last two or three weeks of the campaign. The monies raised from about a dozen Humphrey supporters in the context of loans 
assured us that 40 to 50 per cent of our projected television would be utilized. We had to cut the time by more than half. We would have no television for the last three weeks, 
except for a meeting that was held at the Waldorf with Hubert. I committed to approximately three million dollars. That assured us we could stagger through the 
remaining three weeks. 
10
O'Brien --Interview XXIV --7 
G: The subject has come up; why don't you go ahead and describe that meeting? 
O: The meeting was hosted by Duane Andreas. 
G: Give me the background of it. How did it--? 
O: Duane was a lifelong friend of Hubert's; had been a contributor during the campaign and recognized the disaster that faced us. 
G: Were you actually going to have to shut down all the media? 
O: That's right. 
G: Was that how dire it was? 
O: Yes, we were through. The last three weeks of the campaign would have been whatever the press reported. While Nixon had a tremendous media package in place for the last 
three weeks. He had started his media earlier than we had. 
G: There was no way to borrow any more money? 
O: No. 
G: Had you tried? 
O: We had done everything possible to raise money. 
G: Tell me, how did this get--did you go to Humphrey or did Andreas go to Humphrey or--? 
O: Andreas volunteered to host this. He had an apartment in the Waldorf and it was handy. He served lunch--very carefully selected group. I knew some of the eleven or twelve who 
were there. I knew John Loeb from Wall Street. I knew Arthur Cohen, a realtor in New York. And I knew [Edgar] Kaiser, the head of the Kaiser [Aluminum] Company. There 
were others at that financial level. 
I was in the role of describing what our program for the remainder of the campaign would be, provided we could finance it. So I was to give them a pitch. I went through 
the media aspects with emphasis in that area, because that's where the cost factor predominated. 
It was a low-key situation. They were not people who had to be persuaded to support Hubert. They were supporters of Hubert and in about every instance had made 
contributions by then. Now you are saying to them, "We're desperate. Can we come up with a concept of loaning us the money with hope for repayment? If we're successful, we 
11
O'Brien --Interview XXIV --8 
have a strong Democratic National Committee; we will have fund-raising opportunities after the election. This is not a contribution. It's a loan. Would you help us? We're 
desperate." 
Duane Andreas took over the discussion by saying that he thought that was a vehicle. 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 2 
O: No one was guaranteeing the return of the loan, but they were not prepared at that point to make further direct contributions. All of them had made contributions. 
(Interruption) 
G: Concept of the loan became--O: 
The end result was that perhaps everyone there made a commitment to loan the campaign money with the provision for repayment down the road. 
G: Did they all agree to lend an equal amount or was it--? 
O: I don't know as it was totally equal, but as a result of that luncheon we would have three million dollars to finish the last three weeks of the campaign. Overridingly, that money 
would go into media and we would be postponing all of our other indebtedness as much as we could. We would cut in half the media package which was six million dollars. We 
were able to see a 50 per cent effort in our media program. The reality was that Hubert Humphrey would not have been on television the last three weeks of that campaign. The 
campaign would be over three weeks before election day. 
G: Well, do you think that the standing in the polls that gave Nixon an early lead was what hurt the contributions? 
O: There were two aspects. Obviously, the big story out of Chicago was the riots. There was a tremendous negative hanging over the campaign as we departed Chicago. The 
Vietnam situation was in the minds of most Americans and Hubert Humphrey had to share that burden with LBJ. That was a tremendous negative in this very short campaign. It 
was reflected in the Gallup Poll eight weeks before election. Sixteen points down indicates that the odds are heavily against you. The fat cats, so called, are in many 
instances not reacting from the heart when they contribute to a campaign. The polls continued to reflect negatively, even though there were slight changes. At no time, until 
the last days, did the polls indicate a close election. Even then the mere indication of a close election was not impressive to media. We're dedicated and we're not going to be 
deterred by bad news from polls, but the heavy contributor doesn't react that way. 
We were desperate to keep abreast of the polls before they were publicized to see 
12
O'Brien --Interview XXIV --9 
if there was an improvement in the situation. The time frame is closer now, but in those days they came to their statistical conclusions and then, a time frame for publication. You 
did have that period of probably several days. We couldn't afford our own polls, but state-level candidates would conduct polls. The presidential aspect was in all the polls. I 
remember learning the result of a Texas poll that showed Humphrey carrying Texas in a three-way split. Among those in media that I called to give them this good news to 
persuade them was Rowlie Evans of the Evans-Novak column, [who] was a long-time friend of mine. While the conversation was pleasant, I was unable to persuade Rowlie 
Evans there was a clear indication that Hubert Humphrey would carry Texas. He was disbelieving. 
You're playing catch-up ball or trying to. You're desperate to create a climate that this election isn't over. That was a continuing effort to persuade, persuade, persuade. It 
was reminiscent of my efforts to persuade media that Bobby Kennedy was in better shape delegate-wise as we headed toward the Chicago convention. You try to place the best 
face on it you can. 
There are those who have written about 1968 who say if he had only had another couple of weeks he would have prevailed or if he had only had the necessary money that 
was budgeted he would have prevailed. It doesn't mean much. The fact is that he didn't prevail. I am absolutely persuaded that if we had been able to implement fully our 
campaign program and could have financed that campaign as we developed it, Hubert Humphrey would have been elected. And it wouldn't have taken the additional two or 
three weeks. He was improving in the polls; some people say, "Two or three weeks more the polls would have turned to a Humphrey victory," and there are others who say that if 
we could have financed it fully there would have been a Humphrey victory. I share that point of view. The same people who said there was no way he could win and predicted 
his overwhelming defeat through the campaign were quick to say he would have won if. It's something to speculate about and can be a conversation piece. 
The other overriding problem we've referred to on a number of occasions was the Vietnam issue. When I was discussing with Hubert the possibility of joining him through 
the convention, I remember having lunch with him and he showed me--I can't remember the content now--a statement regarding Vietnam that he was going to issue. It did 
represent to some extent a change in position. He said, "I'm going to issue this. I think it would be helpful, but obviously I'm not going to until I discuss it with the President. I am 
meeting with the President tonight or tomorrow." A few days went by and I heard nothing. I was with Hubert and I asked him. "Well," he said, "I did meet with him but we 
weren't alone. There were a couple of other people present. I didn't have an opportunity to go into something as serious as this with him. However, that opportunity will present 
itself I'm sure in the next few days. I'll get it done and I'll keep you advised." I heard nothing further about that. 
Then there was another occasion as we moved toward Chicago. By that time I was aboard. Showing me the statement was part of a pitch to come aboard. So, this later 
13
O'Brien --Interview XXIV --10 
occasion was at a time when I believe Humphrey had been at the Ranch and had been in direct discussion with the President. He came to the office, the EOB building, and was 
very enthusiastic as he told me that there was going to be [a] big break regarding Vietnam. It would be publicized or initiated by the President shortly--that was highly confidential. 
He wasn't at liberty to discuss it with me in any substantive way. I never heard about it again. 
So as the campaign was launched, Hubert obviously remained awfully concerned about this issue that was so harmful to his candidacy. Nevertheless there were no 
discussions that I recall regarding positions he would take that would be contrary to the President's position. 
The initial campaign swings were disastrous. While audiences in some locations were respectable in terms of size, invariably there was a segment, a significant segment, of 
the audience that was present solely to harass Humphrey; disrupt his speech, interrupt him, unfurl banners that were mean. So the stories coming out of his campaign were not 
positive. There was a tendency on the part of media to lead, "Last night's appearance of Hubert Humphrey was disruptive. There was a segment of the audience that registered 
their disapproval of him and the Vietnam policy." Even worse, the segments on the news of his appearances focused almost totally on the actions of those in the audience who were 
harassing or berating him. And the polls were, in those early stages, not reflecting any improvement. But I don't recall the polls ever went below that initial poll of sixteen down. 
The time finally came when Hubert made a decision to devote a nationally televised speech to the subject of Vietnam, his position regarding it and what he would do 
if elected president. 
The issues aspect was basically a team input. Orville Freeman would chair meetings on issues. Ed Cubberly was the liaison between the campaign operation and this 
issue group. He would attend these meetings and memo me as on what took place. They were discussion groups and there are a number of Cubberly memos to me on the record. I 
don't recall any great emphasis in those discussion groups on a change of position regarding Vietnam. Orville was a very staunch supporter of the Johnson Vietnam policy. 
He was very much a hawk. He was the most hawkish member of the cabinet and he was the most aggressive in touring the country, appearing on college campuses, taking a lot of 
abuse but hanging in there with his jaw out supporting the policy. I admired him greatly for it, and he never deviated one inch. It was not because he was supporting Lyndon 
Johnson solely, it was because that was the policy he firmly believed in. 
But I do remember in late September--it was a Saturday--I was in the national committee headquarters and delivered to me was a draft of the Vietnam speech that at 
long last was going to be presented to the American people on national television. We had reserved a hundred thousand dollars for this program. I read the draft and I was 
appalled. I telexed Humphrey my views. He was on a campaign trip on the West Coast. This is the Ball-Welsh Vietnam Draft. George Ball was active in the negotiations with the 
14
O'Brien --Interview XXIV --11 
Vietnamese and was an acknowledged expert in his field, and Bill Welsh was a writer among other accomplishments. It was clear the two of them got together on this draft. 
I say in my reaction, "This draft is an abomination. It's not worth the expenditure of a hundred thousand dollars. Overall, it has no eloquence or drama. It will be a major 
disappointment after having been billed as a major speech." I went on to say, "It is way too heavy in what the President can do and has done. It is very weak on reducing troop 
levels. In fact, it takes us back to deciding next January 20 to de-Americanize the war instead of moving ahead with a pledge of troop reduction which would in fact accomplish 
de-Americanization. It contains no real political challenge to Nixon. It is strictly a State Department approach. May be appropriate for delivery by an under secretary of state. It 
places major emphasis on two points which are not new and which everyone in this country accepts. Mutual troop withdrawal; in other words, we'll take out all our troops, if 
the enemy would take all of his troops. Then, noninterference in the post-war government; that's a noble objective which has nothing to do with stopping the fighting." 
Then I add, "There are numerous other specific problems in phrasing and wording." 
A couple of hours or so elapsed and Hubert called me. He said, "I have just read your evaluation of the Vietnam speech. That's certainly rough. I've got to tell you 
something. I haven't seen the draft. It hasn't caught up with me. You obviously feel strongly about it. I'd like to have you drop whatever you are doing, get on a plane and 
join me and we'll discuss this." So I did just that. 
I arrived on the West Coast on a Sunday morning--this was Saturday when this conversation took place. Hubert had instructed the top people in the campaign to get 
together. Hubert joined us and a general discussion began without rancor or animosity. I don't recall whether Hubert made reference to my memo. But nothing was being 
accomplished. We weren't getting into the subject, yet the speech was only, I guess, a day and a half away. 
So the day was wasted and it was decided that we fly on with Hubert to Salt Lake which was his next stop. And we did, Ball and Welsh and I and a few others who 
happened to be present. 
That night Hubert did not have any appointments. This was a layover night and the speech was going to be the next day. So, in his suite the discussion started and it 
ended--at least my role ended at four o'clock in the morning when I left the meeting. There were several people present. 
G: Rowe was there, is that right? 
O: On the side that something definitive had to be done to adopt a position that would have an impact were Fred Harris and me; on the side of those who--" There's no way that you 
can do what's being suggested without being accused of being disloyal to the President. That would be counterproductive and be harmful to the campaign." That was the view of 
15
O'Brien --Interview XXIV --12 
Bill Connell and Jim Rowe. This went on and on and on. 
G: What about Ball? Did he participate? 
O: Well, I guess so. But I don't--G: 
He wasn't firmly identified with either group? 
O: Ball had been called in. He was really not part of the campaign; he had been called in to draft a speech. My problem in recollecting who else was in the room is difficult because 
this finally emerged as a debate, Harris and I with Rowe and Connell, Hubert sort of sitting there and occasionally making a comment. 
G: Did it seem that Rowe and Connell were motivated by a desire not to alienate the White House? 
O: Rowe was. Rowe was extremely strong in repeating and repeating his view that, "Let's not discuss the substance of Vietnam, what you could do if you were president. There is 
no way you should undertake anything that would deviate from the LBJ position on Vietnam. There is only one interpretation that would be made and that is that you are a 
disloyal vice president that has walked away from your leader." Quoting Jim, "How can you contemplate anything such as is being advocated in this room? It's an absolute 
disaster if you ever went in this direction." Harris and I are equally vehement saying this isn't a personal matter, that we were persuaded that the politician LBJ would understand. 
Indeed, obviously this would be made known to him in advance of the speech. He would be alerted to it. Granted, it might disturb him. It might arouse him in some way. He 
might be disappointed in Hubert Humphrey, but he'd been through a lot of political campaigns and he knows there is only one bottom line: win. This campaign cannot 
continue this way; it's not going anywhere until there is a specific presentation by the candidate. 
G: Were the negotiators at Paris a consideration here, [Averell] Harriman and [Cyrus] Vance? 
O: Yes. 
G: You didn't want the speech to be construed as something that would undercut the U. S.--? 
O: The speech was to be forthright, direct: "This is what I would undertake immediately upon becoming president. I have been totally supportive of his [Johnson's] policy. I have been 
totally supportive of my president. If I am president, the responsibility becomes totally mine and at that point I would undertake the following." 
Well, at some point in all of this Hubert became exasperated. Dr. Edgar Berman was there. There were other people in the room making comment from time to time. 
16
O'Brien --Interview XXIV --13 
There are two opposing points of view here. Fred Harris and I weren't comparing notes. It was a visceral reaction we had. Fred Harris and I had no hesitancy to express our views 
even if that might not please Humphrey. The time had come. The chips were down and I know in my mind I was thinking, "I'm taking a tough position here because at some point 
we've got to come to some middle ground." Now, maybe Rowe's motivation might have been similar on his side of the issue. 
But then the comments came to--" You have an image," directed at Hubert--I don't know whether it was this specific or whether it evolved this way--" of not being your own 
man, not having guts." This was repeated two or three times and finally Hubert exploded and said, "I am sick and tired of hearing this. I am insulted. I have guts. I am my own 
man. Nobody can question my loyalty to Lyndon Johnson, but nobody can question my ability to be president. I've listened to the Gene McCarthys say that I'm gutless. I'm not 
going to listen to any more from you people. I'm telling you right now, I've got guts. Now, damn it all, I'm sick of listening to all of this. Give me a pad"--and he took out a 
pen--" I'm going to write this damn speech myself." 
Well, that kind of quieted everybody down and somebody--I think Edgar Berman--said, "We ought to get some sandwiches. Nobody's eaten and maybe we ought 
to have a drink." (Laughter) But Hubert took stage center. "You can shut up; I'm taking over." He started to write. Then he started to read what he was writing. This went on 
and on. The nitpicking aspect started again and he was becoming aggravated all over again. 
Finally, under his direction and with his decision alone, the final draft was put together. It was in rough form but that was basically the final draft. Now, it's about four 
o'clock in the morning. Everyone is totally exhausted, including Hubert. There's no point in pursuing this. I decided I wasn't going to go to bed because we were going to the--G: 
The tabernacle. 
O: --the tabernacle. There were things that Humphrey had to be engaged in relatively early in the morning. I remember thinking, "If I go to bed now, I'll never get up. So the best thing 
to do is shower and shave and change clothes and stay up." So I got up and said, "I'm going to leave." I started to the door and Humphrey looked at me and asked, "Are you 
leaving?" I said I was and he said, "You're not giving up that easily, are you?" I said, "Do you think that I'm giving up easily?" "No," he said and he smiled. I smiled back. I felt 
what Hubert meant was, "I'm sorry you're leaving not totally pleased." But we had negotiated. 
With what was at stake, the end product is not that exciting--probably nobody considered it justified, that lengthy debate and negotiation. The key passage had its share 
of qualifiers. The key passage was, "As president, I would be willing to stop the bombing of North Vietnam as an acceptable risk for peace because I believe that it could lead to 
success in the negotiations and a shorter war. This would be the best protection for our 
17
O'Brien --Interview XXIV --14 
troops. In weighing that risk and before taking action, I would place key importance on evidence direct or indirect by word or deed of communist willingness to restore the 
demilitarized zone between North and South Vietnam. If the government of North Vietnam were to show bad faith, I would reserve the right to resume the bombing." 
The first paragraph was the one I wanted and the added paragraphs were urged upon him by Rowe and Connell. It represented a compromise. There was contact made 
with the President prior to going to the studio to put the speech to bed. He was advised. What his reaction was, I don't recall I was ever sure. George Ball was involved in that 
aspect in some way. 
The fact is that the speech went. And the amazing fact is that there was a dramatic turnaround immediately following the speech in terms of the campaign and the reaction to 
Hubert Humphrey. I've never quite understood it. I guess it's another example of the power of television because none of us contemplated this was going to most dramatically 
affect the campaign. Clearly, the speech was middle-of-the-road. In fact, when you read it, you wonder why there would have been such meaningful impact, in terms of a news 
story or what have you. 
In any event, we departed Salt Lake to North Carolina where I was picking up a private plane to Washington. On the plane ride down, there was a telegram from Teddy 
Kennedy to Hubert strongly approving the speech and complimenting him on it. That pleased him, obviously. We got off the plane and there was a throng at the airport. Terry 
Sanford and others were just glowing. What had happened overnight? You must attribute it to the speech. From that moment on, the momentum increased, reflected by 
the enthusiasm and size of crowds at all the stops and disappearance of the protesters that would harass him. You suddenly found yourself in a campaign with substance and 
discernible progress. So it was the turning point. 
Now you're in early October. You're talking about four, four and a half weeks. You're trying mightily to catch up with the polls and persuade media to take another 
look--to open its eyes to a truly hotly contested election. The media still wouldn't buy. We were in our last desperate effort to raise funds. There was an enthusiasm level that a 
couple weeks earlier you would not have found. I doubt that you would have a group willing to loan money if this turnabout hadn't taken place. 
There was the feeling that Johnson was disturbed with Hubert. There was a suggestion that he wasn't supportive of him. That was put to bed as the campaign 
progressed with the great rallies in Texas toward the end of the campaign, where Johnson and Connally and all the others participated. Johnson had made at least one national 
address supporting Humphrey. I'm not suggesting that he was pleased with the Humphrey speech. I don't know how displeased he was, but there was an uneasy situation 
throughout the campaign involving the President. I remember memoing the President with suggestions, if he could take time for active campaigning. There were areas of 
campaigning we would consider a priority and whatever he decided to do would be greatly 
18
O'Brien --Interview XXIV --15 
appreciated. We were anxious to have him. 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 1 
O: There was another occasion, however, when Hubert told me he felt uneasy about the President. That perhaps, while no one had purposely done so, it was conceivable we had 
ignored the President. Hubert had great hesitancy to push the President to greater effort in the campaign. He didn't feel it was fair to do that. He suggested I might have some 
communication with the President to ensure he was aware of our anxiety and my interest in having him participate to a greater degree than he had been. Whether it was that memo 
or subsequent memos I forwarded to the President, I don't know, but there were efforts made to elicit more participation. Clearly there was an uneasiness which didn't affect me 
because my role would not be to contact the President directly. It would be Hubert's role. Hubert was concerned that there was, at least as he perceived it, an atmosphere that was 
not totally what he'd like to have. 
G: Was there a feeling in the Humphrey campaign that too close an association with the President or involvement of the President would be counterproductive? 
O: There were some who would suggest that, but it never became a great issue or a great point of discussion in the campaign because there wasn't any indication he was being that 
active. So it never became an issue. It wasn't as though the President or his people were advising us that the President was prepared to take a more active role and would like to 
have any thoughts we might have. That never happened. It was, on our part, an attempt to have a better line of communication and clear the air if it needed clearing. That 
concerned Hubert at some point, because he made his concern known to me. But it never reached the point where somebody would say, "Lyndon Johnson is going to do the 
following. I think that could be counterproductive." That never happened. That might have been the view of a couple of people in the campaign if that situation arose, but it 
never did. 
I think the key is, and I have no knowledge concerning this, how strong was Lyndon Johnson's reaction to the Hubert Humphrey speech at Salt Lake? 
End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview XXIV 
19
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In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
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11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-36 
4
INTERVIEW XXV 
DATE: August 25, 1987 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 1 
G: We finished last time with a discussion of the Salt Lake City speech which, I believe, was the end of September. It's clear from going through your memoranda that the scheduling 
was a major concern and at times a major problem, getting the candidate into the right cities at the right time. Let me ask you to just talk generally about scheduling as it applied 
to this campaign. 
O: This had an element that I wasn't accustomed to. You had a degree of reluctance on the part of Democratic leaders at the state and local levels to have Humphrey aboard. That 
changed after Salt Lake but it was catch-up ball. Where could you spot him where you could avoid some of this and yet make a media impact? We discussed this at great length. 
It became troublesome to maximize Humphrey as the candidate and avoid having the lead story not what he said but what occurred in the audience. This was very troublesome. 
That had a decided impact on the scheduling process. 
Following Salt Lake, miraculously almost, all of this seemed to die out and there was acceptance of Humphrey, the nominee of the Democratic Party for president, among 
Democratic leaders across the country. There was a growing enthusiasm regarding his candidacy. You're trying to compensate in a short period of time for the loss of the prior 
weeks in scheduling and that complicated it further. But I'll have to say again, the last few weeks of the campaign went quite well on the scheduling side. 
Another aspect of scheduling was the emphasis on the candidate for vice president. That was somewhat unique. It became more and more apparent as the campaign 
progressed that Ed Muskie was a decided plus, even to a greater extent than we had envisioned in Chicago when he was selected. With our limited financial resources we 
were endeavoring, on scheduling, on literature and of course on public appearance, to underscore Muskie to the point where we envisioned the two of them almost equal in the 
campaign. 
G: Were there prospective campaign stops that you did not schedule because you feared adverse media reaction? 
O: There were stops that we would have put into the schedule were we not persuaded local political leaders were not being cooperative. They were rather passive, at best. There 
were centers of greater concern to us than others in terms of anti-Vietnam activities. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --2 
G: Like California, for example? 
O: California would be an example. The Vietnam protesters were vociferous out there. They had a tendency to follow candidates and impose upon them. This lack of enthusiasm that 
permeated the early stages of the campaign seemed to compound itself in California. There were leaders who just walked away from us. There were others who were giving us 
token support. There were some who had the courage to step up and speak out. But what would happen is that in bypassing some of these people you knew were not 
Humphrey enthusiasts, they'd express resentment if they weren't named to specific positions in the campaign. They wanted it both ways. How could we overcome this? We 
had problems with the Vietnam protesters and the lack of enthusiasm. That went to the scheduling. You had so many weeks, so many events that you could cover, a certain 
number of opportunities. If you couldn't capitalize on scheduling, you were in a difficult position. 
G: One senses from the memoranda a desire to have these stops arranged in such a way that the candidate doesn't spend a lot of time crisscrossing the country, so that he can go from 
one stop to another in an adjacent state rather than having to come back the following week from the opposite coast or something like that. 
O: That's inherent in scheduling, but looking at one of the memos as early as September 16 of the campaign policy committee meeting on that date, you see all the elements of the 
campaign which were discussed at these policy meetings. 
G: Why don't you elaborate on the group? 
O: Look at those in attendance: the treasurer, Bob Short; Louis Martin on black issues; George Mitchell representing the vice presidential candidate; Joe Napolitan, media; Fred 
Gates, fund-raising; Fred Harris, Max Kampelman, Jim Rowe, Bob McCandless; Al Spivak on press and Orville Freeman on issues; Al Barkan, labor; Bill Connell, a close 
associate of Humphrey; Fritz Mondale, extremely active; Terry Sanford, the head of the citizens committee; Geri Joseph, the woman's division. The make-up of that policy 
committee was all-encompassing. 
The reason why these policy meetings became organized events was that at mid-September, with just barely two weeks under our belt, we had made a number of 
assignments. We had carved out about every aspect of a presidential campaign by way of assignment and I wanted to be sure that we had the closest coordination. I found in prior 
campaigns it was extremely helpful if people responsible for elements of the campaign compared notes and had an understanding of the overall campaign. So you have the 
fund-raisers, the citizens groups, the women's groups, the ethnic groups, the blacks and the rest. They each had their own duties and responsibilities. Meeting to go over the 
issues and to go over even the basics of the campaign so they would be well understood by all concerned was the objective of these meetings. Note that at least at mid-September 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --3 
I proceeded to have regular meetings of this policy committee. Notice the subject matter. The first meeting we talked about scheduling and advancing the candidate. There was 
discussion. These were very open meetings. Everybody was urged to participate, express their views. For example, in this meeting I'm stating the problems of too heavy 
scheduling. That meant that we were not properly utilizing the candidate and some of our key people, not taking advantage of built-in crowds. Then I'm concerned that we haven't 
come up to quality in advancing. Max Kampelman concurs--he says he's kept too far away from the crowds; that would have to do with the advance man. Not enough bands, 
loudspeakers and what have you. So we get into a lot of detail along with discussions of the broad issues. 
G: Do you think in general the advance work was not as professional as it had been, say, in 1960 or 1964? 
O: Probably not much different at the same period. I'm a critic through these meetings and I'm encouraging that kind of criticism. You're trying to whip things along but you can't 
avoid reflecting on the time span, that over Labor Day you tried to construct a campaign organization. Now you're two weeks later or probably a little less. There have been 
preliminary forays and there have been tests of this structure, for example, on scheduling and advancing. Now you feel the time has come to build in better coordination, hopefully, 
every hour of every day. 
G: How did you bring the advance work up to the level that you expected? Did you have written sets of guidelines? 
O: Yes. There was a delay in getting these guidelines printed, getting distribution. Every time you found delay, it went to finances. For example, we said, "The Muskie group is 
having some problems and manpower is limited. Many advance men haven't been brought up to date on changes in campaign style, more TV time, less traditional stops." Right 
there on the sixteenth of September we're asking Fritz Mondale to continue to allow his man, Mike Berman, on loan to us, to stay with the campaign full time because we want to 
move him to the advance desk. We talk about Jerry Bruno being more actively involved. 
We are searching for more manpower to fill some of these gaps. On September 16 Bob McCandless reports, "We now have in place four regional coordinators in 
Washington," the country divided into quadrants. Under them there is what we'd call the semifinal list of state coordinators. The copy attached shows that many, in fact just about 
all, of the state coordinators have been assigned as of Sunday, September 15. It is called a semifinal list because we're hopeful we can bolster that list. But it's quite an impressive list 
of state coordinators under these four regional coordinators. 
In addition, on September 15 we had set up our "boiler room," as we called it. These were the women that would handle the daily reporting from the field and daily 
contact with the field. That operation was under the direction of Nancy Lyons, who had been extremely effective, she and the other women, in the Kennedy campaign. She was 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --4 
then on Ted Kennedy's staff and he loaned her to us full time for this purpose. Detailed, yes. We were trying to be as detailed as possible and this would follow the procedures in 
past campaigns. "They will talk to every state coordinator every day," and there were two women assigned to each one of the regions. "They will prepare memos on intelligence and 
problems which will be distributed by mid-morning of the next day to key personnel. Each morning the director of organization and his regional men will meet to work out the 
problems in the overnight intelligence reports." Now that is detailed organization and that's the way it should be. 
G: Was there anyone following the Nixon campaign or was it simply a matter of reading about it in the press? Did you have anyone--? 
O: At this stage, we did not have people in place that I recall. 
G: Later did you in the campaign? 
O: Yes, people were assigned to that activity. At this point what you have in place is a national organization. You have coordinators in place at the state level. You had the 
boiler room in place. You had the regional coordinators in place. You have advance men in place. You would like more volunteers, but we were able to cover this reasonably well 
across the country in every state. 
We discussed this at this meeting. Geri Joseph said we need to clearly define guidelines on utilizing the state coordinators and the boiler room. And Mitchell says, "The 
state coordinators could be most helpful in deciding who to call when the candidates are coming in." That would be another aspect: who should the candidate make direct contact 
with when he's in the area? Who should be invited to participate with the candidate? 
Then a question came up: how would this campaign organization relate to the citizens committee, which is a separate entity? It was decided the citizens group could not 
be just a paper tiger; that the same concept of organization would be carried out by the citizens group to the local level. But it would be dovetailed with the main organization. 
Re: the regional meetings--we were trying to have these regional meetings as promptly as possible and Humphrey and I were both concerned that we hadn't gotten the regional 
meetings going as of the fifteenth. 
Joe Napolitan reported on radio spots, five to fifteen minutes in length, ready to go out to local areas. We provide the spots and they would try, through their own resources 
locally, to utilize them on local radio. The state coordinator would be responsible among his other duties to locate people who'd carry on this effort at the state level. Then to the 
themes of the major speeches, the campaign theme as such. That was to be dovetailed into all of this through utilizing Orville Freeman to chair an issues group that would meet 
separately but would report directly to this committee. 
G: With regard to the state chairman or state coordinator, how much impact do you think 
8
O'Brien --Interview XXV --5 
that individual's enthusiasm and/ or ability had to do with whether or not you carried the state or how well you did in the state? 
O: It would be significant because it is one thing to find a Smith and a Jones and say, "Okay, you're the state coordinator in Ohio or in New York;" it's another thing to have Smith or 
Jones a man of substance who has ready acceptance locally among Democratic activists and labor leaders. That's the key. If that is the case, obviously his contribution to the 
overall effort in that state is going to be significant. But does he have the experience and the ability to carry on a very important task? You had to reach at times, but not any more 
than in the Kennedy campaign, which was the campaign prior to this that required this kind of massive organization with which I had any experience. I can't tell you that all our 
state coordinators were perfect, that they couldn't be improved upon if you had the manpower to do so. You did the best you could with what you had. I will say that as you 
peruse the minutes of these meetings you see they're very extensive and intensive. They incorporate every element of the campaign. At the last of these meetings I express great 
pleasure in what had transpired in a very brief period of time. I was extremely pleased. I felt that we had done an effective job. 
Then speech themes. A comment by Jim Rowe, "This is the first candidate I've ever heard of who campaigns on the plank that he won't cut taxes. I don't agree with 
pushing Nixon on gun controls. We'll lose votes on both issues." There you're into the liberal-conservative or the liberal-moderate, if you will, views. We talked about the gun 
control stand recommended by [Orville] Freeman and Kampelman reports that Bob Nathan's tax position was cleared with no one in advance. So there's concern expressed 
about people going off on their own, issuing statements or suggesting positions without my concurrence, or other key members of this committee. 
G: Did Freeman's position give him an advantage in directing what issues would be brought up or what position would be taken on issues? 
O: To some extent, but the fact is that speech writers and researchers have an opportunity for some input. You can have a basic position and find that in the rhetoric it can get a little 
warped or altered. That's always the concern of the person who has the responsibility for the establishment of the positions. Incidentally, two weeks prior to this meeting the 
splitting off of advancing, scheduling and issues was necessary, but now we have to regroup. In other words, the Freeman group with my concurrence--and Ed Cubberly has 
memos in the records of the meetings of the Freeman group--were for a while sort of independent of the overall organization. At this meeting I determine this would no longer 
be the case. For the purpose of in-depth discussions of elements of a particular issue, they'd meet because time would not allow that with a group this large. But that did not 
mean they made independent judgments. They simply reported back their views to this group and we made the overall judgment. 
And into the public relations resources. Al Spivak was full-time in that area. Bob Squire suggests that the VP staff is spending too much time with the candidate instead of 
9
O'Brien --Interview XXV --6 
the press. These things which sound rather minuscule or insignificant are nevertheless important. I underscore that to emphasize the depth of these meetings. You could 
discuss the candidate not spending enough time with media or the candidate not being allowed to get close to the public at an airport. "This committee would get into that?" 
Yes. There was nothing barred from these meetings. They'd run the gamut and there were no holds barred in the process. 
G: Would you say then that the central result was to provide a degree of coordination that the campaign needed? 
O: Yes, and coordination will come if those involved in the campaign have a basic, overall understanding and knowledge of the campaign as a whole. Bob McCandless in his area 
should have a basic knowledge of the issues, a basic knowledge of the media procedures, a basic knowledge of the financial situation. Everyone should have an overview of the 
campaign and they're much better equipped to carry on their own responsibilities when they have that knowledge. 
G: Had meetings of this type been held in 1960? 
O: Yes. This follows the same pattern. 
G: Again, going back to the question of state chairmen. Can you think of a particular state where because of the enthusiasm or extra effort on the part of the state coordinator, you 
did better in that state than you could have expected? 
O: I don't think you could prove that. You'd make the judgment of how well the state coordinator had done. Whether that turned the state would be awfully hard to discern. 
What you could discern is whether he had made a significant contribution to the overall situation in the state. 
What should be emphasized at this meeting--not to pursue it in great detail but it is the first meeting as I recall of this nature and there were several that followed rapidly--is 
that no aspect of the campaign was overlooked; no aspect, as minor as it might be in the overall picture, was barred from discussion. What was encouraged was participation to 
the fullest in these meetings to make them meaningful and worthwhile. And indeed they were. 
For example, there is a comment, "We need material on the record of the Eisenhower-Nixon years." And Orville Freeman responds, "We have it in great detail. I'm 
making it immediately available to you." Then there's a query about material on [George] Wallace, and Freeman responds that the research on Nixon is good but the material on 
Wallace is thin. Then there's a comment, "The Wallace material is critical. We cannot get at Wallace by ridicule. Let's do it by attacking his statements and his record." Then a 
query about press clippings from around the country, and Spivak's rather defensive response is, "We have a lack of personnel." Geri Joseph points out at that point she has 
10
O'Brien --Interview XXV --7 
women volunteers who are available to participate in this area, which no one had thought of. "All volunteers are listed in the large card file on the first floor, 1100 17th Street." 
Then Gates, who was on the financial side, points out, "We have to avoid conflicts on scheduling fund-raising appearances and other fund-raising activities." He wanted to 
be sure that was totally coordinated. Bob Short, who was the treasurer of the campaign, says, "Neither the VP nor Muskie should make any kind of fund-raising appearances 
unless they've been approved by the treasurer's office in conjunction with the scheduling desk." That was again noting that there were occasional fund-raising efforts conducted 
unknown to us or certainly not with our approval. 
Then it's pointed out, "We've got to have ground rules on scheduling various speakers at the fund-raisers." That was the nature of the first meeting and that basically 
followed in the subsequent meetings. If you look at the distribution list for these minutes you'll find that it encompasses the entire campaign. It went from the Vice President to 
Muskie, O'Brien, Freeman, Mondale, Harris, Sanford, Geri Joseph, Louis Martin, Bob Short, Fred Gates, Don Nichol, George Mitchell, Bob McCandless, Joe Napolitan, Al 
Spivak, Bill Connell, Al Barkan (labor), Jim Rowe, Max Kampelman, John Hoving, Claude Desautels, Bob Squire, Mike Murray, Ed Cubberly, Bruce Solomonson, Tom 
Hughes, Jim Thornton, Norman Sherman, Burt Bennett who is a citizens fellow, Ted Van Dyk and my good friend, Dr. Edgar Berman. That list gives you an indication of the key 
players in the campaign. 
G: Let me ask you about Humphrey in the South. 
O: Humphrey in the South was in not much different a situation than Humphrey nationally. The Humphrey problem was basically Vietnam. The concern Jim Rowe articulated on any 
number of occasions was Humphrey being too dovish on Vietnam would be harmful in the South. The attitude toward Humphrey in the South was focused to a greater extent on his 
liberalism than Vietnam or his loyalty to the President. Some people in the South always had looked askance at Hubert and continued to through the campaign. So, while he 
would not be too liberal for the Northeast or California, he could be considered a little too liberal for the South. 
That was a basic problem in the Vietnam plank at the convention. There was suggestion later that the Vietnam plank should have been more dovish. While it may have 
reasonably satisfied 60 per cent of the delegates, it's unfortunate it didn't satisfy over 80 per cent of the delegates. Where is the breaking point? The breaking point probably was 
pretty close in the language of that plank in Chicago. But as far as the South is concerned, Hubert Humphrey's liberalism would have some impact on certain southern Democrats. 
G: Well, particularly in terms of civil rights. 
O: His early advocacy and his strong position on civil rights. I think the Vietnam issue was so overriding, in our judgment, as reflected in the minutes of these various meetings, that 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --8 
it diminished the civil rights problem. You could have mutterings about it, but the fact is that at this stage it wasn't, in my recollection, the issue it had been in past presidential 
elections. 
G: But was there any effort to moderate Humphrey's statements on civil rights in order to minimize the loss of white southern votes? 
O: Our suggestion to Humphrey was to make reference to the record--the Johnson record on civil rights, the Democratic Party record. The party has responded to its responsibility. 
G: There was one reference in the minutes of these meetings to a planned appearance before a black group in St. Louis and the comment was that this would simply further antagonize 
middle class whites, that he didn't need to make this kind of appearance, he already had the black vote--that he needed to--O: 
I don't know who made the comment or what meeting you're referring to. He didn't need to make a highly publicized appearance before a black audience. He was seeking the 
middle class white. Avoid antagonizing that middle class white while you're making this major effort to convert them to your cause. Whoever made the comment would be trying 
to make political judgments. 
G: But how did you seek to obtain the black vote in 1968? Certainly you wanted to affect turnout, you wanted to maximize it. 
O: You did it in a traditional sense. A key to that effort was Louis Martin. Louis Martin's resources extended throughout black media across the country at all levels--to the blacks 
who held positions of prominence, to the black professionals, to registration efforts among blacks. Louis Martin was a realist. Louis was a firm believer that the grass-roots 
registration, the efforts to involve the black ministers and black leaders at the local level should be carried on vigorously, but Louis always pointed out that it cost money. You 
just had to invest monies in registration drives. You had to invest monies to accomplish registration and get out the vote. It was an activity that, without reasonable financial 
resources, would not succeed. 
The September 15 meeting was followed promptly by a meeting on September 18 with similar attendance where we're discussing such matters as the Fortas issue, how it 
plays politically, and the nuclear treaty. Order and Justice, as it is titled, was considered an area that would present a side of Humphrey not readily observable--that he was tough 
on law and order, that he really insisted upon eliminating crime in the streets. 
And Jim Rowe, I think, summed up the discussion quite well when he said, "We can't compete with [Richard] Nixon and Wallace on law and order. But we're going too 
far on the justice emphasis. Let's emphasize order and justice." Then you have Geri Joseph, a great liberal, commenting that "if the election depends on law and order, we 
won't win. The liberals are very concerned that we are talking so much about law and 
12
O'Brien --Interview XXV --9 
order. We need a careful analysis of what this means to the liberal and why he also ought to be concerned about this issue." So you can see this was considered touchy. 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 2 
O: Louis Martin commented on this saying, "There's a good line in Tuesday's speech that Nixon is for building penitentiaries and Humphrey wants to build schools and houses. 
And also the line that Humphrey is running for president and not sheriff." And O'Brien says, "No one is suggesting that Humphrey gets to the right of Nixon or Wallace in this 
area." Then Van Dyk closed out that topic by saying, "Our biggest problem on this issue is that Humphrey projects as a nice guy, which doesn't fit this issue. Instances such as the 
Tuesday handling of a heckler do more to help us on law and order than anything else." I don't know what that specific instance was except probably a heckler being thrown out of 
a hall. There are others who said, "Be sure you have cameras collecting film of all this activity they're engaged in because that's helpful to us." 
Then I state, "Our contacts with party people across the country show they have the identical concerns many of us have about our Vietnam position. They feel, as many of 
us do, that it is high time we clearly identified what our position is in cold, political terms. Particularly in the last forty-eight hours, Democrat after Democrat in the states across this 
nation have expressed deep concern. They're not happy at all with the Vice President's stance." And Max Kampelman says, "I have concluded tentatively that the Vice President 
shouldn't say another thing about Vietnam for at least another week. We need careful planning to develop a final definitive position." And Jim Rowe weighs in as he did 
consistently throughout the campaign, he says, "I'm a hawk on the tough policy side. Until Humphrey gets some kind of lead from the administration, he's going to look like a 
wobbler and a hypocrite. Let's keep to favoring the majority plank for the time being. Perhaps this will be the issue in October and a bombing halt will be the debate but for the 
moment I come down on the side of silence." And then I say, "If a position had to be taken today, what position would those of you at this table take?" McCandless, "I have to 
take it on the dove side." Connell, "I won't answer an iffy question." Then Max Kampelman says, "Our July poll shows there is no majority for any position on Vietnam." 
Then Bill Connell, who wants to avoid the Vietnam issue, says, "We're trying to switch 68 per cent of the voters in the middle. The best way to do it is with law and order." Then 
Burt Bennett said, "It is important for Humphrey to take a position with which LBJ disagrees, that they agree to disagree." Then I say, "We can't win by postponing for 
another week or another month a decision on the most important issue." Then Rowe asked me what I'd do and I said, "I would develop a program for troop withdrawal based 
on being president January 20." 
G: This is really sort of a foreshadowing of your Salt Lake City--O: 
Yes. 
G: The issue is shaping here and--
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --10 
O: Yes, because Geri Joseph goes on, "It isn't just Vietnam. It really has to do with who is HHH. He has to say, 'I'm the candidate; this is my point of view. I stand on what I said. '" 
And I point out, "New York, California--we have to carry those states. There's no enthusiasm or interest in those states if we just say, 'Let's wait before doing anything 
decisive. '" 
Then at that point there's a reference made to Humphrey resigning as vice president. There was a period--and it's probably just about this time--when there was a 
great deal of promotion of this idea. It was promoted, as I recall it, by some of our major contributors, some wealthy New Yorkers who started to push hard that Humphrey resign. 
G: Why did they want him to resign? 
O: They wanted him separated from Lyndon Johnson. I had no problem with that issue at all. I was absolutely opposed to it. It made no sense whatsoever as I saw it. It would be 
absolutely counterproductive; it wasn't worthy of the amount of debate and discussion that was being expended to bring it about. 
G: Well, particularly running against Nixon who had run from the incumbency in 1960. 
O: That's right. As I say, Humphrey resigning would be adverse. 
Then you have, as was the case in all these meetings, a report from Bob McCandless on the organization, the scheduling and advance activities. We were 
beginning to catch up now. As was pointed out, we had no lead time. This is being rectified quite well. This meeting scheduled for September 24 through October 2 was 
placed before the group. Then our goal was to move the schedule two weeks ahead. We were trying to build our advance teams of local people and we were developing 
pre-advance work. It was mentioned that there were some good advance people available we hadn't utilized as yet. We all agreed to bring them aboard promptly. 
It was pointed out by Freeman that Humphrey had agreed that from now on in this area he was taking orders instead of giving them. Those who saw Humphrey regularly, 
very close intimates, were giving him all kinds of advice on scheduling and there was a tendency for Hubert to be agreeable. It took some tightening of the screws on my part to 
close this out. But it closed out. That was the eighteenth. 
Then two days later on the twentieth. An item that I spoke to at the outset of that meeting was the failure in clearance of policy statements or policy letters. I point out that 
there had been serious communication failure regarding the issue of the recent press releases and other public documents dealing with matters of policy. And I mentioned, 
"The previous day's press release on the trucking bill was not cleared by the Vice President or this committee, nor were letters regarding the tobacco and textile industries 
properly cleared. The position of the Vice President stated in the trucking bill release is 
14
O'Brien --Interview XXV --11 
contrary to the President's position. I have met with the textile people and discussed the textile situation with Governor [Robert] McNair. Letters that have never been authorized 
on any specific position, the publication of these letters by the tobacco and textile industries will hurt us financially. The real problem is the issue of decision-making, the 
lack of coordination, failure to understand existing procedures regarding the functioning of this committee." 
G: How were these statements going out? 
O: There were people who were charged with drafting a letter--in some instances, people who were not in the campaign organization, people with expertise, for example, in textile 
or tobacco. They'd develop a press release, a position paper. 
G: But they'd get it approved by somebody, wouldn't they? 
O: No. There were instances where somewhere along the route they just issued them. Maybe somebody winked at them, but it was intolerable. I can tell from the language I 
used here I was not going to tolerate that any further. 
G: Well, how much of it was due to Humphrey's own agreeable nature? 
O: Some. Sure. You get Hubert's ear and he might say, "That sounds pretty good," or something to that effect. It took a little doing for Hubert to get his back up but when he 
got his back up he was very impressive. But it took some prodding to get him to that point. 
G: Was he different in this respect from Kennedy and Johnson? 
O: Yes. It was his nature. He didn't relish confrontation. He had a tendency to be complimentary to people. He appreciated advice and counsel and support. You could 
interpret that as meaning he was in accord with what you were suggesting, so you'd put it in writing and issue it. 
We got into some discussion of the debate issue, too, which was of importance to us. I pointed out that we were having serious difficulty in getting the bill reported from 
committee. Claude Desautels states that the bill has been passed by the committee and it makes it mandatory for the three national candidates to appear together. This, of course, 
was doomed to ultimate failure anyway, but we kept pursuing this because I state, "Our position is we will accept any form of bill, although we prefer a provision for two-man 
debate. Nixon has stated that he will not debate with Wallace, only Humphrey. Republicans and southern Democrats are working mightily to prevent the bill from being 
reported out of the committee. You should reconsider the possibility of formal invitation to debate to Nixon and to Wallace. It appears there is little chance the bill will be passed." 
Then I say, "Let's get to the assumption we can't get a bill." I've mentioned that Hubert called Representative Harley Staggers and I discussed the bill with Representative John 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --12 
Moss. At my press conference that morning with Ray Bliss, who was the Republican national chairman at that point, I stated that we would accept any kind of debate 
arrangement but Bliss avoided the issue. 
G: Nixon had concluded that it was not in his self-interest to debate because of the lead, is that--? 
O: Sure. 
G: Did you ever expect him to move from that position? 
O: No, but he had been caught in this--at least we had him on the record saying he was going to debate. Of course, he was saying that, not being concerned about the success of that 
legislation. I point out, "Nixon is safe on the basis of the bill's present status. He hasn't been on TV for two years on an open format. He has told CBS nothing regarding a 
proposed one-hour "Face the Nation" program in which he'd appear with Hubert." 
G: The joint appearance was your next strategy if you didn't get a--? 
O: Yes. That's right. 
G: I know you've explored this joint appearance thing from a number of angles. Let me ask you to recount this and go through your--? 
O: We made the best effort we could to bring about the legislation but, as you can see from the notes of this meeting, I was not optimistic about ultimate success. 
G: Why wouldn't the Democrats support you on this? 
O: Lack of enthusiasm, basically. 
G: Did they view it as simply political? 
O: You couldn't arouse them. The bill ultimately was enacted in the House by the efforts of John McCormack, the speaker of the House, who locked the doors of the House and kept 
them in to get the bill passed. It was just tremendous, historic. On rare occasions in American history has the speaker locked the House and kept the members in. 
G: But in the Senate you didn't have even the support of the--? 
O: On the Senate side, Mike Mansfield was not enthusiastic. Neither was [John] Pastore, who was chairman of the committee. Beyond that, [Everett] Dirksen had notified the 
Majority Leader that if this bill was brought to the floor it would be filibustered. Neither Mansfield nor Pastore were enthusiastic about that prospect. We, of course, urged that it 
be brought to the floor. If we had to settle for a filibuster at least we could get a great 
16
O'Brien --Interview XXV --13 
deal of publicity. What was happening was an effort in the Senate to block this legislation to protect Nixon from debating Humphrey, who Nixon feared. We were looking for any 
edge we could get. With that, you were encouraging the networks--for example, "Face the Nation" would fit that category--where there were established programs to extend the 
half-hour program to an hour and invite the two candidates to appear. Maybe that could bring about this head-to-head confrontation. Somehow, could you corner this guy Nixon? 
You probably were not going to corner him in terms of a Nixon-Kennedy type debate. 
G: Did it, to any extent, on the part of Pastore or Mansfield represent a lack of enthusiasm for Humphrey? 
O: No. They felt they were being realists saying, "There's no way we can work this out on a timely basis where it would be effective in this election. So why go through all this?" We 
found that our contention, that the effort itself even to filibuster, was bound to inure to our benefit. That fell on deaf ears. 
G: What about the possibility of simply debating without Nixon, debating Wallace? 
O: No, we would never get into that. 
G: For the same reason Nixon didn't want to debate you? 
O: We'd accomplish nothing as a result of that. We'd pursue this from all aspects. George Mitchell brought up the possibility that Muskie should challenge Spiro Agnew to a debate. 
Presently there is no Wallace vice-presidential candidate so we don't have the third candidate problem. You have to remember that the southerners, many of them in the 
Congress, were opposed to this because the goal was to have a two-man debate, not a three-man debate, and Wallace would be blocked out. Of course, I had already said, 
"Listen, we'll settle for anything." We could have a three-man debate. We've stated our preferences but if that would get over the hurdle, "Okay, include Wallace." Then we're 
saying, "Muskie challenge Agnew." I say, "This would help perpetuate the theme of challenge." But, of course, everybody recognized that Agnew wasn't about to debate 
Muskie on any voluntary basis. 
G: Now, how about the alternative of appearing jointly on one of the news programs, "Face the Nation" or "Meet the Press?" 
O: The roadblocks were put in through the Republican National Committee, the Nixon Committee and what have you. They weren't about to be cornered. Nixon had learned a 
hard lesson that probably cost him the presidency in 1960. When he stepped forward to take on this "young squirt" Kennedy and show him up and have it go in reverse was 
something that he'd carry for the rest of his life and he wasn't about to get involved. We had the debate with Humphrey and Kennedy in West Virginia. Long before that the 
debate with Henry Cabot Lodge and Kennedy in Massachusetts and then we had Nixon and Kennedy in Chicago. In each instance, Kennedy destroyed them. Lodge never came 
17
O'Brien --Interview XXV --14 
back for the second debate. Humphrey was satisfied that there weren't any further debates in West Virginia and Nixon certainly didn't want to debate again. 
We got into, at this meeting, a pretty detailed discussion on the current polls which were dreary. The picture was not very pretty at that stage. We have George Mitchell 
suggesting perhaps Muskie should take on Agnew rather than concentrating on Nixon. And Kampelman saying, "There are only two main spokesmen for the Vice President. We 
should develop more. Larry has gotten great press. Governor [Terry] Sanford is also good." And I point out that Harris gets excellent press. 
G: One of your observations is raising the question, "How can we assure keeping Agnew alive is an issue?" When did it occur to you that Agnew was or could be a detriment to 
Nixon's campaign? 
O: I think after the initial reactions to his selection. It didn't take long to conclude that this fellow had a soft underbelly. 
G: You said, "How can we show that despite certain humorous aspects of his heavy-handed, bumbling style, he is a dangerous man to have only a heartbeat away from the 
presidency?" 
O: I notice I used the phrase here. I don't believe [Tony] Schwartz had developed the "heartbeat away" at that point but you know that became a television spot. I don't know 
whether that was a throw-in line in this meeting or whether I had focused on "a heartbeat away" as the key to some Agnew negative spots. 
G: Agnew did make some unfortunate statements, even a racial slur during this time. 
O: As Louis Martin says, "We are getting a great response regarding the Agnew Polack comment." I don't remember the comment, but he had misspoken regarding the Polish. 
We were into ethnic discussion at that point obviously because we say, "We should make maximum use of [Joseph] Alioto." I comment, "We will have speakers in about seven 
main areas for Columbus Day observances." Alioto was an excellent speaker and as an Italo-American, it was important to emphasize him. We mention Pastore and Mike 
DiSalle. Then I comment, "Before we get to finance I have three or four other items," and I mention, "I understand we have a Vietnam paper in progress that Bill Welsh is 
preparing." And Freeman responds, "That's right." I say, "I would like to see this paper. This fits in with the earlier discussions we had regarding the trucking, textile and tobacco 
matters. We have to coordinate our positions. This goes back to the gun control position where political judgments were lacking." Freeman says, "All the cabinet members were in 
on it. There were political"--gun control--" There were political judgments." Obviously, he and I weren't in agreement. Then I say, "I hate to be a minority of one, but I felt 
otherwise. I never had an opportunity to be heard." 
G: What was the problem with gun control? 
18
O'Brien --Interview XXV --15 
O: I don't remember, but obviously this was handled without coordination. We talk about the grape boycott. "How should we deal with Cesar Chavez? The Vice President will be in 
California next Tuesday." And Mary Zon reported for labor. "Rarely have I seen the full AFL-CIO executive board so active in support of a candidate. Our lawyers have warned 
us concerning too much direct activity." This was, of course, labor's strong reaction to the George Wallace candidacy and the obvious fact that George Wallace was siphoning off a 
segment of organized labor. 
G: Why was this so? Why do you think Wallace was able to appeal? 
O: It was very simple; blue collar, law and order, pointy-headed liberals, very appealing to the average working American. 
Then Louis Martin talks about a poor peoples registration campaign and the Jackie Robinson Program is now funded in part. "Medgar Evers is going to work for us in 
California. We have [Julian] Bond, Philips, Evers, [Aaron] Henry, Robinson and others on tape for radio spots. We need money for a full-page ad. The ad publisher should give 
us a deal on reprints since we don't have the money for separate literature. Our problem is not the candidate, it's getting the people out." Then I point out, "We have a great 
opportunity under the registration laws in New York, where we have no money. If we do come up with some it would be best to put it in New York registration." 
John Hoving comments, "Louis is the best man I ever saw operating without money." I state, "We need eighty-five thousand to a hundred thousand dollars for New 
York registration." I mention the Philips Randolph Foundation and Louis reports the foundation has no money. Then I close that discussion saying, "In round figures we are 
talking about six hundred thousand dollars for registration." We raised about two hundred eighty thousand for the A. Philip Randolph Foundation and that was it. 
We had the results that day of the current Harris Poll and it showed Nixon 39 [per cent], Humphrey 31, Wallace 21. Further about scheduling, and George Mitchell talks 
about the Muskie schedule and says he needs good substantive speeches; his speeches must improve. "The content of many speeches has been poor." That again reflects the 
nature of these meetings but that meeting was on the twentieth and the next meeting was on the twenty-third. 
That meeting emphasized advertising and media with Joe Napolitan leading the discussion. That brought us to campaign materials and Geri Joseph gave a detailed report 
on women's activities. Bob McCandless reported on the regional meetings which were ongoing at that time; he reported on Denver and Atlanta as good meetings, Louisville as 
not [good] and that Detroit and Ohio were outstanding. But he does say--this is now on the twenty-third of September--" There's no decision on who will head up southern 
California. We hope to reach a decision today. And Warren turned us down." Warren Christopher? 
19
O'Brien --Interview XXV --16 
G: Yes. 
O: Fred Harris says, "Apparently Warren didn't have Unruh's full backing. Then Harris added, "I like Don O'Brien and Stan Greigg. They are doing a good job in California." 
Then talk about some of the foul-ups on scheduling Humphrey in California. "Why at Pepperdine, a conservative college?" Then to the issues and poll results. Apparently we 
were trying to promote some aspects of poll results. It's reported that in this last swing of Hubert's, the crowds are better and the Vice President is speaking well, although some of 
the crowds are synthetic. But they point out a serious mistake, which upset the Vice President. He is scheduled to attend a mass in Columbus where there is strong 
anti-Catholicism. We talk about the plane being understaffed. "Could we give Hubert some nap time in late afternoon?" Interspersed through this is the need for money each 
step of the way. Rowe says that every time the Vice President would state that the war is his number-one priority we'd get an explosive response, but "he says too much about law 
and order." Freeman says, "I have told him several times that he should separate law and order from the issue of justice." They talk about press reports, pro and con, and the Vice 
President's calls should be screened. "He's taking too many so-called urgent calls." McCandless says, "This Vietnam thing keeps undermining us. We need one position to be 
stated all the time. Reporters are claiming that Humphrey is stating various positions on Vietnam in one day's campaigning." Then we have an appendix to this meeting on issues. 
"Repeat constantly firm, clear, unequivocal stand for law and order." 
Two days later the group is again convened and Terry Sanford leads off, at my suggestion, to discuss citizens committee activities. He points out that he needs daily 
information because he feels in some states we can't win without a citizens organization. "In Kentucky we probably need a citizens organization to bring in the McCarthy people." 
Then Sanford suggests we need a liaison between the two groups on a full-time basis. He's taking on the task of getting key McCarthy people into the citizens group, the same 
with [Nelson] Rockefeller and [George] McGovern people. He compliments Steve Mitchell on doing a good job--Steve Mitchell of course was manager of Gene McCarthy's 
campaign--and suggests I meet with half a dozen key McCarthy and McGovern people. 
Then we discuss others--Henry Ford, who is a supporter of Humphrey; trying to have him in a titled position in the organization. Terry also reports that he has picked up 
some young Kennedy people, a lot of whom are waiting for their cue from Ted Kennedy. We're trying to get Ted Kennedy to announce support. Louis Martin goes into some 
detail on black activities. His national tour of black leaders is now operating in thirty-nine states. Joe Napolitan reports the media spots, in his judgment, are going well. He tells 
about the spots that are scheduled for the next few days. We have time buys in the World Series and so forth. Material is being shipped and there's an indication of considerable 
movement in shipping material. 
There's a discussion about the immediate response group. There has been work put into that by this date. We talk about "A Question a Day" format to be put to Nixon. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --17 
Pat Brown expressed an interest in this area. Freeman says it is a problem of coordination and Hughes is assigned the task of getting Pat Brown into action. We talk about blitzing 
Nixon in Florida on debate evasion with banners and posters. Desautels reports the debate bill came out of committee by voice vote. Al Barkan was present and gave a detailed 
report on labor's efforts. Barkan's report was upbeat. I point out, "I am tremendously impressed by the boiler room operation." That's in response to a comment by Dave 
Ginsburg that he thought there were real serious organizational problems in California. And I state, "We have resolved California four different times. If we can get these people 
to settle their own problems, maybe they can get around to helping us out." Next Kampelman points out the dilemma, "It is clear that law and order and Vietnam are 
uppermost in the minds of the voters. The polls show people to be hawkish on Vietnam, yet the needed enthusiasm for Humphrey lies with the doves. This puts us on the horns of 
a dilemma. The same is true of law and order. While the greater portion of the voters want a hard-line emphasis on law and order, the Negro community wants the stress put on 
justice." 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 1 
O: Ira Kapenstein mentions, "The polls are generally against a pull-out in Vietnam. The polls show also, however, that seven out of ten people are dissatisfied with the war and want it 
ended." I point out the Vice President is getting standing ovations when he talks about ending the war. Ira says, "I call your attention to today's Washington Post editorial on 
Agnew," which obviously was negative, "I have talked to twenty reporters. All are down on Agnew." Then I say, "I also have something for a twenty-second spot on Agnew. It's 
the greatest I have seen yet." I'm not sure now which spot I was referring to. 
G: Well, it's a statement that Agnew made in New York against savings bonds, it says here. 
O: I think my comment was not related to that. 
G: Oh, I see. Yes. 
O: I guess I must have in mind that heartbeat from the. . . . 
G: Yes. 
O: The next meeting is two days later on the twenty-seventh and I open it by [saying] "We'll review the procedures which will be followed on the pre-empting of the NBC time for 
Humphrey. Promos will start on Monday." Squire reports on the scheduling of the half hour. Short reports it is paid for. It's interesting. We're leading up to Salt Lake and the 
turning point because, in response to the announcement we made that it will be taped in Salt Lake City, Freeman says, "This is the first I've heard of Salt Lake." I think that's an 
indication. Freeman was known to be, probably with the exception of Jim Rowe, the greatest hawk in the group. Orville had consistently held that position from the outset. Of 
course, you had Bill Connell and Jim Rowe [who were] very hawkish. I respond, "That's 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --18 
where it's going to be." Freeman asks, "What about taping in Seattle?" And I point out, "We are concerned about leaks if we tape too early." 
G: Well, why the advantage of taping [there]? Why does he want to tape in Seattle rather than Salt Lake City? 
O: I think he felt there'd be a time frame there; why not do it there? We had a reason not to. You want to tape as close to air time as you possibly can. 
G: So that the word wouldn't leak out, was that what it was? 
O: Yes. "It should be noted that we're running newspaper ads. Our promos will be in terms of a major policy statement. We've alerted Senator Muskie's staff that the Vice President 
wants the Senator to be with him when he makes the television address and he suggested that we should announce the speech for the Sunday newspapers." Spivak objects to that 
suggestion but I respond, "After all, Nixon knows we've pre-empted TV time." And I point out, "The reason we're keeping it in this room is that the traveling party has not told 
us we can go ahead. Everyone here is important on the orchestration. Each of you will have to be available the entire weekend." 
Dr. [Evron] Kirkpatrick, Jeane Kirkpatrick's husband, gives an in-depth report on the polls. We're naming Arthur Goldberg our New York state campaign manager. The 
latest California data, "We're running nine or ten points behind and it's a bleak picture." And he said, "People want peace without capitulation," whatever that means. "They do 
want to end the war. Over 50 per cent regard it as the greatest failure of the Johnson Administration, and Humphrey inherits this failure." Joe Napolitan tells Kirkpatrick, 
"We're faced with an inconsistency in logic. People are unhappy with the administration but still support its policy." Kirkpatrick says, "Only a low percentage agree with the 
policy." I ask him, "What about the suggestion that Humphrey isn't his own man, that he's an LBJ stand-in, not the current leader of the Democratic Party?" Kirkpatrick says, "I 
couldn't agree more. All this relates to a picture of indecision, lack of leadership and lack of independence." 
Joe Napolitan complains about the lack of reservation of time for Humphrey to do taping and this filming. Joe feels it would take two or three days. We talk about the lack 
of preparation in some of the taping. There's a good deal of complaining on the part of the professionals, Squire and Napolitan. We expressed concern about the report from 
Governor [Richard] Hughes in New Jersey. 
It closes with Kirkpatrick and I agreeing that it's an image problem, that people don't pay much attention to the record, the Great Society programs and the rest. It comes 
to the problem of the Humphrey image. We canvass the Democratic employees on the Hill and we have collected about two hundred volunteers from the House and Senate. 
Ira Kapenstein reports that in Denver, Nixon said he would debate Humphrey. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --19 
"Humphrey sent a telegram to Nixon last night welcoming Nixon's stand and naming Chairman O'Brien as the representative to work out arrangements with the Nixon 
representative. First response was through a Nixon spokesman who said the debates were presently out of the question because of the pending legislation. Nixon then accused the 
candidate of kid stuff. Humphrey shot back, noting Nixon's lack of statesmanship." I was sending another telegram stating that Nixon and his spokesman had misunderstood the 
Vice President's proposal, outlining in detail the procedures for debating regardless of congressional action, with an offer to share the cost of purchasing TV time for debates. 
"Humphrey is willing to debate Nixon separately from Wallace." Joe gives us the scheduling of the three national TV spots for that week. 
G: Why do you think Nixon made that statement? 
O: Probably there was inadvertence. Obviously we tried desperately to latch onto it. It's interesting to note that we were proud to have purchased a spot on the NFL, but in 
response [to] "Do we have an Olympic time," we had to admit we just can't afford it. Attached to these minutes is detailed analysis of the public positions regarding Vietnam, 
the bombing pause, law and order, with further statistics on poll results, which I assume was the material that Kirkpatrick utilized at the meeting. Further attached is a New York 
Post article, "HHH's Speeches, They Do Go On." "One trouble with Vice President Humphrey's campaign is he talks too much." 
(Interruption) 
O: The next meeting of the policy committee was on October 5 and the first item of business was a report on polls. Joe Napolitan had some polling information from [John] Kraft and 
Crossley showing an improvement, but not substantial. I notice we had thirteen state polls. We were going to release the polls but I say, "I will not release the Illinois poll." 
G: Why was that? 
O: I assume it was because it was so poor. And I say, "I'll make California public tonight." California at that point was 33-44 for Nixon. On this date the poll results still were 
depressing. Of course, you can torture yourself with polls and we proceeded at that meeting to do just that. I announce that our next half-hour program will be a week from 
this meeting on CBS at 7: 30 p. m. and it is on law and order. I reported that as of the prior night, we had received some $149,600 as a result of the Vice President's Monday night 
TV speech, which was pleasing. 
Joe Napolitan reports that we're working on spots requesting money, featuring Kirk Douglas, Lauren Bacall and Gregory Peck. We were placing considerable emphasis 
on fund-raising efforts tied into TV to assist the sad financial situation. I mention that, "The Monday night request was off the cuff and no one really anticipated the tremendous 
response. So next Saturday we'll want to gain maximum impact." Joe Napolitan reports, "There are fund-raising requests built into both of our thirty-minute films." 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --20 
Then we get to handling hecklers. Max Kampelman had prepared a memo on this subject, which I read and opened the matter for discussion. Jim Rowe contended that 
Humphrey is not handling himself well, that the hecklers are bothering him more than they should. Jim was concerned because he said, "After the Salt Lake City speech, a newsman 
indicated he felt Humphrey wanted a bombing pause," and this was the general reaction of the press and he saw youth with signs after Salt Lake City reading "If you meant it, 
Humphrey, we're for you." In Florida, NBC overplayed the disturbances. Jim said that he understood that Douglas Kiker was reprimanded for the overplay. It was a minor brush 
with some labor people and peaceniks. Jim said, "I personally feel that the matter of hecklers is a dying issue." He went on to say, "I think things have been working out fine 
since Salt Lake. The kids are now identifying with Hubert. There was no real trouble in Charlotte." 
There was a feeling the same people are following Hubert around--and Jim Rowe talks about the SDS [Students for a Democratic Society]. Joe again says, "We should 
follow this crowd with cameras. It would be great film." Then back to how should Hubert handle this. Jim Rowe saying, "I'd rather see some scuffling than have the police 
move in." Apparently Seattle was a fiasco because there's reference that the newsmen felt the hecklers should have been thrown out. There are suggestions: "How about the use of 
labor teams standing near the demonstrators or try to have a preliminary speaker draw the fire?" All of this, general conversation, not coming to any specific conclusions. 
Interestingly enough, the hawks had a tendency to suggest tougher measures at these meetings. 
G: What was your feeling on that? 
O: I was not for force. You had to live through it--the candidate, that is. Interrupting the speech was a horrible situation but stay with it, don't allow them to force you to quit. 
G: Martin raises the question, "Can't we infiltrate?" And you said, "We have not yet been successful." 
O: I think that was more the suggestion that at these meetings, obviously, we had a reasonably strong labor representation. Why not have them located near the hecklers? 
That might deter them but no one was suggesting combat. They would be applauding vigorously while the hecklers were heckling. That sort of thing. 
G: I thought the context was referring to infiltrating the demonstrators and actually getting--O: 
I don't know of any attempt that was made. I notice Martin makes reference to that. This discussion that goes on here at some length was really no more than that. We're 
concerned about it. There's some indication it is lessening, which it was. But it was a little too early to be sure that was the case. You come to no conclusions about what to do 
about it. Do you have the police quell the mob or do you see it through? And if heckling 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --21 
continued, how long could that continue to be the lead story? As far as infiltration is concerned, I have no recollection we ever made any real attempt. I don't know what 
would happen if you did infiltrate. 
The campaign fact book has at long last been printed and it will be ready on the following Monday. I mention there was a discussion with the Vice President on the lack 
of materials. It was precipitated by a misunderstanding regarding an alleged hundred thousand dollars sent from West Virginia for materials when in actuality we were sent 
$1,960 for one hundred thousand items. We had spent a hundred seventy-five thousand dollars to date for all campaign material and I underscore that, "This amount wouldn't be 
justified for one large northeastern state. We have sent eight thousand catalogues listing purchases at cost by local organizations." That was a major effort we undertook. We'll 
sell to you. Under that system the manufacturers would mail directly to the local organizations. That would be a smoother operation. 
Berman says he has released eighty-four thousand dollars that day for materials; "By Monday we'll have another twenty-four thousand for a total of a hundred and ten 
thousand." He said, "We've heard claims from Chicago, for example, that they have fifty thousand they would use to purchase materials. We distribute our catalogues at the 
regional meetings and through our coordinators. And we'll be able to stay ahead of the Vice President"--that would mean on his travels--" with basic simple materials which are 
referred to as bumper stickers and buttons." We talk about further production and Jim Rowe says, "John Bailey paid money months ago and has not yet received his material." I 
point out he hasn't paid any money. "In any case, you can't ship out materials when you've only invested a hundred and seventy-five thousand dollars." So that was a nagging 
problem and we just had to cope with it as best we could, but people would say they didn't have materials. We, in turn, would have to admit they didn't have materials nearly 
sufficient for the purpose because we didn't have the money to pay for the materials. We even got to--" We are also going to have ten million people stickers. These are made of 
paper and are very inexpensive." They read, "If I had a button, I'd be for Humphrey and Muskie." 
It was a sad situation. By this time we had a well-organized operation; we had a lot of people working as volunteers in various capacities, but the shortage of money was 
dragging us all the way. Joe Napolitan mentioned how many radio spots had been cleared and "we've sent two thousand ad managers miniature reproductions of our ads and they've 
been asked to solicit from local Democratic organizations the money to utilize the ads. We'll have another ten to fifteen spots available in the next two days. However, we are off 
regional television as of Monday"--and this is October 5--" as of Monday. We have no money. We do have a five-minute network spot scheduled for this Monday." Joe points 
out you can buy five minute national exposure now because the networks, CBS in particular, have shortened some of their half-hour programs to twenty-five minutes and a 
one-minute spot on the NFL game cost forty-six thousand dollars. 
Then to the TV spot on Agnew. I say, "We have that spot. It's excellent." 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --22 
Napolitan responds, "We have an oscilloscope. You can hear a heartbeat. Two names flash on the screen, Spiro T. Agnew and Edmund Muskie. The viewer is asked about 
which one he wants a heartbeat away from the presidency." I say, "You'll be hearing criticism, no doubt, on this Agnew spot. There is another one involving laughter that runs 
for about twenty seconds." That's the one that we discussed earlier where the person becomes hysterical at the thought of Agnew. Joe says, "The only audio on this spot is a 
man laughing. The camera opens up on a TV screen reading "Agnew for Vice President." The commentary is, 'If this weren't so serious, it would be very funny. '" I comment, "I 
mention it because some people may not think it's particularly funny. We have a newsletter going out using the same theme." 
Then to labor and scheduling which is attached to this memo in detail. The plea by Mary Zon is for more exposure of the Vice President to labor. Jim Rowe points out the 
crowds are getting better and better and labor has a lot to do with it. Then into the scheduling of the candidates and pointing out adjusting the schedule to labor conventions. 
This discussion goes back and forth. Bill Wirtz joins in by saying, "I think you're all missing the point by a mile. No longer is it valid that the labor rank and file is tied to the 
Democratic Party. The problem is the leaders getting to the rank and file. You miss the point when you talk of seeing a few of them. To see larger groups is basic. There is a gap 
between Humphrey and the rank and file labor millions that's miles wide. But they are getting the impression that nothing is being done to bridge it." 
"Humphrey can turn any convention into a success," Mary Zon says. And Bill Connell says, "I've seen fifteen conventions this year. Humphrey turned them on every 
time. We just can't schedule any more." It was a question of time. Then there's a debate on whether the stop in West Virginia was valid or not. Rowe contends it wasn't; Freeman 
thought it was a wise scheduling move. And there was disagreement between Rowe and Freeman on the impact of it. We get into some of the nitty-gritty of the schedule, whether 
there should be a stop in Utica or whether we should visit the Westinghouse plant in Schenectady and so forth. 
G: The business on the schedule, particularly with what Rowe says, "Every member of the national press was on my back. It was a disaster. The whole day was wasted." Who was 
really responsible for determining the schedule? Was that a collective decision that--? 
O: Yes. It had to be centrally approved. Rowe is saying it's a disaster; Freeman saying it was good. The fact is if you had gone through the campaign without a West Virginia stop, 
there would have been significant criticism. So whether the actual stop was as good as it should have been is questionable, but Freeman probably would be as objective as Rowe 
and they viewed it from different angles. 
Then to closed circuit television fund-raising. That's been refined over the intervening years. There's a suggestion that we discuss it with Roger Stevens. Napolitan 
mentions Nixon raised five million dollars this way. Republicans had a capacity to raise far more money than we could, no matter how they approached it. This was a matter we 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --23 
discussed a month ago and came to the conclusion it was not feasible. It's simple to say, "Let's have closed circuit television fund-raising." Then the implementation, the cost 
factors involving it. A ray of hope at this stage was our national pleas which were producing reasonably good results; as I've said at a prior meeting, surprising results. We 
hadn't anticipated we could pick up one hundred seventy-five thousand dollars in a quick twenty or thirty-second fund-raising pitch on national TV. 
Then California strategy. Supposedly the UAW is beginning to help. Somebody points out, "I understand we can get an endorsement from Cesar Chavez but it won't do 
much good unless he has people to lead. Our coordinator met with the Mexican-American group recently. They're talking about the Mexican-Americans 
submitting a hundred thousand dollar budget. We feel we might be able to pick up twenty-five thousand." I comment I wasn't aware of Hy Raskin's efforts in this area but he 
was to be told he has a green light. I also mention that "I had an experience a few weeks ago in Los Angeles. A get-out-the-vote campaign in a Negro neighborhood cost 
seventy-six hundred dollars." And I suggest, "The budget can be reduced if you work on it." But Louis Martin says he wants to get some permanent fellows in California like 
Clarence Mitchell. 
Then to the problem of organized labor. We say, "Maybe our coordinators should forget some of the western states and go to California." Phil Hoff and Clarence Mitchell 
are in California as we're discussing it. We talk about Fred Dutton coordinating the scheduling in California. Fred at that time was working on a legal analysis if the election 
were thrown into the House. Jim Rowe says he thinks Dutton's presence would cause problems in California. Pierre Salinger is mentioned. We talk about other states and other 
coordinators, general scuttlebutt--who's doing a good job and who isn't. We throw some names around. 
Jim Rowe reports that the politicians thought the recent attack on Wallace was good. I felt it had impact outside the South. Jim Rowe mentions on law and order that 
Hubert is getting away from the social justice angle, putting more of himself in evidence, his experience as mayor. On the Vietnam speech, the general impression is he favors a 
bombing pause all the way. I say, "That proves again that people don't read. I think it was very well done." Jim Rowe is still somewhat rankled because of what happened in 
Salt Lake. 
Then a problem regarding the SOS reports brought up by McCandless, they've got to be circulated more promptly, and those responsible for getting them into circulation are 
alerted. I say, "I couldn't be more impressed by those girls and the operation on the third floor. The reports are outstanding. They are the heart of this operation. We've all got to 
support Bob in his efforts." Then I point out, "I'm at fault on this, too, because people were making direct calls, not coordinating them through the boiler room activities." I 
said, "I've made direct calls on occasion. We should stay in channels. Maximum cooperation with Bob is essential, the coordination of all information for the system to 
work properly. This system is solid and proven. It has been refined to the point where it's 
27
O'Brien --Interview XXV --24 
the best I've seen." Then Max Kampelman closes out the meeting by saying, "I understand McCarthy is speaking out next week." And I report, "We have had people in contact with 
him. Arthur Goldberg is going to introduce him." I don't recall what resulted from that. 
We're back in session on October 11 talking about promotion of the upcoming Saturday speech and the strategy on releasing it, the timing of the release. Freeman 
mentions the speech has been gone over and over again and it's now left entirely up to Humphrey if there are any late adjustments. It was noted that Humphrey was not feeling 
well and had canceled a couple of engagements. It seemed to be a case of plain exhaustion. The objective of this upcoming speech is to identify Humphrey with the lower 
middle-income whites. Kapenstein says, "I'd like to underscore that Saturday night isn't the Vietnam speech. It's a much different ball game. We've got to get the text to the press 
early Saturday." Then we mention that we have serious competition on Saturday night, the Beatles movie and the Apollo shot. I say, "We were aware of this when it was 
scheduled. Thursday was the only other time available and perhaps it should have been taken. But the pros advised that Thursday was 25 per cent lower than Saturday on ratings 
and Frank Stanton recommended Saturday night." 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 2 
Gates reports, "We are still getting hundreds of letters a day from our first appeal. We have collected well over two hundred thousand dollars." 
I say that the Vice President is adamant that he's going to present the three-way debate format at a press conference. I said, "I feel the Vice President should move to a 
direct challenge tomorrow night. The Republicans have had a good argument in characterizing the present legislation as a Democratic bill which would give equal time to a 
racist third party candidate." I felt the Republicans had made a strong point there. I point out this was a bill that was called up by the Senate yesterday; it's not our bill. "As I 
indicated, Humphrey is insisting on the three-man format. He says that Wallace is obviously a national candidate, the race is three-way. It's my feeling that we can 
compromise this by stating that since Nixon has foreclosed a three-way debate, as provided by the legislation, we'll challenge Nixon alone to a privately financed debate." 
We apparently discussed a Scotty Reston suggestion about Madison Square Garden in the debate context. I respond, "I don't want to spread the debate story too thin. I think 
someone should make a note regarding how we should work out our appeal for money also. It can be a complicated matter. We don't want to ask money for purposes of 
financing a debate and then the debate is independently financed." 
I point out that "Issues and Answers" sent a telegram indicating they would air all three candidates on an equal basis. "Larry Spivak has had a long-standing invitation for 
joint appearances. It's agreed to contact Spivak and [Martin] Agronsky in setting up a joint invitation." Then I say, "If I were Nixon, I'd wind up going on 'Issues and Answers. ' 
The whole question would be fuzzed over. To keep the debate question as simple as possible, you want three television dates." Apparently CBS had offered time on the 
28
O'Brien --Interview XXV --25 
twentieth for a first debate. I talk about Wallace possibly challenging Humphrey which I say I fear because "the CBS invitation apparently extends to any two candidates." 
Kampelman recommends that if that came first, debate Wallace. "The overseas press called and asked Humphrey and Nixon to appear together. They'll also be together next 
week in New York at the Al Smith dinner," to which Jim Rowe says, "That's a Republican gathering. They're all lace curtain Irish." 
(Laughter) 
I tell Jim, "That's one thing you could never say about me, Jim." I point out the coup that Kennedy pulled in 1960 at that dinner. We recorded his remarks and sent them all over 
the country; it was a tremendous boost to our workers. Then Louis Martin discusses a Negro rally to get out the vote, apparently under the direction of Reverend [Ralph] 
Abernathy. 
Joe Napolitan reports that Nixon has two hours on NBC, 9: 00 to 11: 00 p. m. the night before the election. We have two one-half hour prime time programs the night 
before the election. On our film showings, we'll have two during the week of the twenty-first, two during the week of the twenty-eighth and three during the last three days 
before the election. This will give us seven prime time spots in less than a three-week period. We will maintain our network schedule this week and next but we'll not have 
regional TV for these two weeks. Then I said, "If the budget is maintained, however, in the last two weeks we anticipate matching Nixon dollar for dollar in TV time. Since 
Nixon has been dominating television to this point, we should gain a psychological advantage." 
"The telegram is going out to state chairmen and state coordinators, telling them that we had the production materials and our polls show us doing much better than some 
newspaper and private polls indicate and generally encouraging them regarding our situation in the campaign." It's mentioned that the spots with Senator Kennedy are good. 
"We have five-minute and one-minute spots and are working on another thirty-second spot and we're using it on the network." We go into the cost factors of television, radio, 
regional, local, national and the various materials we have, the clips we have. 
One suggestion had been made to rerun the Nixon-Kennedy debates. Wirtz brought up Nixon's famous California press conference. I pointed out we had the same 
idea. We looked at the film a couple of weeks ago and concluded in general that Nixon came off rather sympathetically. Jim Rowe agreed. He said it was about time somebody 
told the press off. Various spots were discussed. 
Then to the get-out-the-vote report from John Hoving, in which he talks about a plan for financing phone banks; all this information regarding phone banks will be available 
shortly. Bill Welsh suggests that everyone ought to be urged to go all-out on an anti-new left, anti-SDS theme. Joe Napolitan mentions the New York Times editorial, "Knocking 
Hard at McCarthy," and Joe is going to try to build an ad around it. What McCarthy is 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --26 
saying is that parties should be put ahead of country. We talk about the citizens committee; they claim a million volunteer participants in this get-out-the-vote drive that 
they've been publicizing. And then Bill Wirtz brings up the subject of a possible election stalemate. That surfaced from time to time and was a particularly interesting subject for 
experts on the process and historians, but the realities were another thing. Wirtz said, "I would say to the people on the get-out-the-vote committee that George Wallace has 
publicly declared he would make a deal. Wallace has stated that his intent is to prevent anybody from winning so he can make this deal. What kind of a deal?" Wirtz goes on to 
say, "He spelled out seven points last July. They concern an undermining of poverty programs, civil rights programs, foreign aid and so forth. They are direct quotes. He's 
going to swing his votes to the person who makes concessions to these policies. I think people should be told about this. We can point out that Nixon has already made one deal 
with Strom Thurmond. The only possible deal is between Nixon and Wallace. Larry thinks this is what is going to happen and people should be told about it. The Wallace 
quotes on this matter are unbelievable. Wallace has made the statement he is not going to let the election go to the House to a group of men he doesn't know. Nixon has made a 
very strong statement, while the Humphrey statement is less clear." 
Then the TV format. I'm worried about the fact that many people I've talked to are writing us off; specifically the Christian Science Monitor story, which was current, 
was a killer. Apparently we started to contemplate picking up the Humphrey student theme, "I need you and you need me." Ginsberg tells me, "I think that you must be 
directly involved here." Rowe comments, "The three of you, Humphrey, Muskie and yourself, should probably appear on the program." "If you can bring this Wallace thing 
into the same package, you could help me," Louis Martin says. I say, "I would like to have Joe and Bill get together on it. It has potential." 
We talk again about Wallace throwing his electorates to Nixon, keeping the election out of the House. We get into the New York lawsuit regarding McCarthy's name 
on the ballot, which was a troublesome matter at that point, too. "We have in New York a strong possibility," I advised them, "the name of McCarthy will be on the ballot. In Ohio 
we're waiting for a Supreme Court opinion on Wallace's qualifications as a presidential candidate." Someone mentions the Coalition Party in New York--McCarthy originally 
petitioned to take his name off the ballot and the Secretary of State complied. The trial division of the New York Supreme Court sustained the decision but the appeals division 
reversed and ordered McCarthy's name placed on the ballot. 
We had a very lengthy discussion on how we should handle this. We ask Goldberg and he referred us to Kostekian, who is his law partner. Kostekian, in turn, referred us to 
Justin Feldman. I got the idea the firm was too busy with other matters. Then I blew my stack. "We are now going to have a meeting with Kostekian, Feldman, Goldberg--if he 
can be there--Klein and a representative of Walton's law firm." This is Freeman reporting. Then we talk about the time frame, "Do we have enough time?" I asked, "How can we 
resolve this?" Freeman said, "Well, either we're going to have to file de novo or pressure [Louis] Lefkowitz" and it goes on from there. "Has anyone approached McCarthy?" 
30
O'Brien --Interview XXV --27 
Freeman said, "I called him yesterday. I talked to him on the phone. That's the reason I had to leave the room. McCarthy said, `What has the Democratic Party done for me? I 
wrote a letter to the Secretary of State. You're asking me to destroy myself. If you had any sense you'd back me in New York and California and then we could talk about my 
electors. Furthermore, I don't like these inside petitions and editorials regarding my neutrality. If it keeps up, maybe I won't be neutral. ' McCarthy asked why the only person 
he talks to is Norman Sherman. He asked, `Why not Humphrey or O'Brien? ' O'Brien responded, `I can't talk to him. On the basis of the conversation that Humphrey had with 
him two or three days ago there is no use of my talking to him. '" 
G: What was--? 
O: It was not a good or pleasant conversation. McCarthy was up to his old activities that he was well known for. Typical of Gene would be to say to Freeman, "What's the 
Democratic Party done for me? Why don't you support me in California and New York?" He had his cynical shoes on and was playing games, which he obviously was enjoying. 
We went on again back to this New York situation, "No political lawyer in New York wants to stick his neck out." Again talking about who we can get to represent which is a 
sad commentary when you think about it. What Democratic lawyer in New York can we spur on to handle this? I say, "There must be other people. We can't allow New York to 
be stolen." Jim Rowe responds, "Maybe Barry Goldwater was right, they should just cut it off." "Nothing is more important," I said, "than this situation in New York. The GOP 
poll today showed only a 2 per cent Nixon margin. Our poll shows us leading by 3 per cent. On an honest judgment I know we have New York." I say, "There is no doubt we 
are leading. They are stealing it from us. Kostekian and Goldberg just don't want to get involved. Regarding that meeting tomorrow, those going had better pack their bags and 
prepare to stay there until the job is done." 
We moved off the New York situation to New Jersey briefly, and mentioned that "Alioto is scheduled for only three out-of-state appearances between now and election 
day. There is a lot of pressure on him at home to look after his local responsibilities." We decided we're going to have to get Alioto more involved. 
McCandless gave his field report. "Remaining materials out to the big electoral states, the states that look promising, New York, California, Texas and so forth, including 
seven thousand fact books." We discuss other states, Michigan, Delaware, the SOS reports we're sending out. Apparently Lou Rivlin, who was one of our state people, was 
disturbed because the Vice President turned down a meeting with area leaders. I comment, "I can't imagine anyone more important than a state adviser." Jim Rowe said, 
"Humphrey was always looking for them on the plane so I don't understand his attitude this time. Maybe he just had a bad day." McCandless brought up a point, "We're getting 
a lot of questions about the President. As soon as we have information on his availability and schedule, let's get it out." I say, "I think the Vice President should discuss this with 
the President again. The President launched his campaign very successfully last night. He told the Vice President last week that he would do anything that was asked of him." 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --28 
Rowe said, "Leaders in Tennessee and Kentucky want the President. I also think the President should go to southern Delaware and Maryland." I say, "I feel the Vice President 
should discuss this matter with the President one more time." 
Then there's talk about other stops and other states and we get back to the New York problem again. "Let's get the pressure on tomorrow. Let's get Louis Nizer arguing 
for us." I say, "What about Lefkowitz?" Freeman reports he has done nothing. Jim Rowe says, "We should blast them both." That terminates the meeting. 
The meeting of October 21 opened with a discussion of our position in the event of no electoral majority. I raised the question regarding what Humphrey's position should 
be in the event he does not receive a plurality of the popular vote and Nixon does not receive a majority of the electoral vote. I mention, "This was posed on 'Face The Nation' 
yesterday and it could well be a question we'll be faced with. He has taken the position he would abide by the constitutional provisions, saying he would fight it out in the House. I 
think there may be some difficulty in that there may be a public issue here." Spivak mentions Kirkpatrick's comment which was to the effect, "Because the House will select 
someone whom it felt was compatible with Congress, this would strengthen the elected president's hold on the government. A lot of people are speaking of the ability to govern 
with less than a majority of the votes. A majority expression of support from the House will strengthen his ability to govern." Wirtz said, "I felt the Vice President took the right 
approach to play it straight with no hanky-panky and no deals." Connell said, "No deals with extremists. This is a good posture." 
I ask what consideration were we giving to a Nixon-Wallace elector deal. "What steps are available to us if this occurs?" Freeman states the fact that there are sixteen 
states in which electors are required to vote for the candidate in whose name they were elected. I point out that the electors meet on December 16 and that there is some question 
about the role of the current Congress. I say, "It's my understanding that Congress could be called back in session by the President before the electors meet." This comes to no 
conclusion at this meeting. Wirtz summed it up, "I don't think we should touch this situation. Under no circumstances should we make any deal. The Vice President could 
have stopped yesterday after his first sentence, `I will not make a deal under any circumstances. '" 
To the election eve television plans. I call on Napolitan and Squire. "This evening we'll know whether we've made a purchase." I query, "Assume we do have time, how will 
we proceed? We're negotiating with ABC for two hours, eight-thirty to ten-thirty, and if they turn us down we'll have to go to NBC on equal time basis. On NBC, Nixon and then 
Humphrey would each have an hour and a half and Wallace would have a half hour. The ABC prospect looks very good at this time. Do we anticipate any other problems 
regarding election eve?" Apparently there were alternatives depending upon how the situation flowed. Napolitan says, "Muskie will appear with Humphrey on the telethon and 
tomorrow night we have a five-minute Muskie spot. We have another five-minute spot on Saturday, Red Skelton Show and Jackie Gleason Show." 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --29 
This emphasizes the role of Muskie in this campaign. I don't think in the past you could find a situation where the candidate for vice president is being emphasized to this 
degree. Everyone agrees that Muskie does very well. We comment that you have to be impressed with the Harris Poll this morning. Wirtz mentions that he's been out in the field 
for four days and the enthusiasm regarding Muskie is great. [John] Gronouski says that's been his experience. McCandless says, "I received a report from Senator Harris on Ed 
Muskie, who has been with Senator Harris in Oklahoma. Muskie is adamant that it doesn't matter where he goes at this point. He feels the election is not going to be 
influenced except by the media. Senator Harris disagrees a hundred per cent. I suppose that it is Ed Muskie's schedule but it's Humphrey's campaign." I say, "It's clear to me that 
Muskie has geared many of his stops to assist Senate friends. Right now I think we should try to settle for exposure of Humphrey and Muskie together on national television. I feel 
we dropped a real opportunity in last night's mob scene. Muskie ended up with a thirty-second introduction spot in which he was not even identified. I understand that 
reached some seventeen million adults. The amazing thing is that we lost only about 1 per cent of the audience between half hours. My point is that we use Muskie for just thirty 
seconds on that program." Joe Napolitan mentions, "I think it should be noted that Muskie didn't want to make the solicitation for contributions yesterday." 
We discuss a program involving Humphrey and Muskie which Squire points out would mean probably changing the schedule. I comment, "I was thinking in terms of split 
screen," which is not nearly as effective, as Squire points out. I respond, "There are problems. But I feel very strongly that we must get Muskie and Humphrey together on a 
half-hour network program." Somebody suggests, "Let's produce the program before we decide." Obviously, there is unanimity of opinion regarding the need to have Muskie and 
Humphrey appear jointly. 
G: Was this in any way a reflection on Humphrey? 
O: No, it's a reaction to the reports from our field people, supported by reports from people in the field occasionally, like Gronouski and Wirtz. There's unanimity of opinion that 
Muskie is making a very solid impact and that we're not fully utilizing him. We've got to upgrade even more the Muskie role for the remaining period of the campaign. What's 
interesting is that you don't detect in reviewing the minutes of this meeting any quarrel about the Muskie role. It's unusual to have unanimity of opinion in these meetings on any 
subject. 
G: Humphrey himself would not feel that this was cutting in on his--? 
O: Not at all. During all of our activities in this area I never got from Humphrey anything but total approval of whatever decisions we made on the utilization of Muskie. He was 
perfectly amenable. And as Terry Sanford points out, "We have a remarkable team to offer the American people." Wirtz said, "Humphrey was great yesterday. We should get 
Muskie in on it." Squire posed the question, "To get the feel of what is being proposed, is 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --30 
it suggested that we put Muskie along with Humphrey into the same discussion group?" Wirtz said, "I'm just hoping to get the two together. I think that's the greatest punch we 
have. It's not a move of desperation; it's a show of strength." And Louis Martin said, "The appeal of Muskie is spilling over into the Negro community also." Everybody gets 
quite exercised as the discussion continues, to the point where everyone agrees we've got to move on this and assure it. We discuss where Humphrey and Muskie will be over the 
next several days. I told John Hoving, "I'm assigning you and Governor Sanford to work this out. It's got to be done." Then to another subject. 
Back to polls. On this date, Connell, who was the source of the advance information on Gallup Polls--and this date is October 21--reports that the Gallup Poll 
shows us still 12 points behind, 43 per cent Nixon, 31 per cent Humphrey, 20 per cent Wallace, 6 per cent undecided. Even though we show a 3 point pickup we are nowhere 
near Nixon. We gained 4 points in the East, 1 in the Midwest, 10 in the South, where we went from 19 to 29, and 2 in the Far West. The advance made in the South is 
encouraging. 
G: How do you explain the improvement in the South? 
O: The Daily News poll in New York reported we're running about 19 points ahead in New York City. We question Gallup's reconciliation with the Daily News poll. Somebody 
suggested [Thomas] Winter, [Richard] Scammon and Harris meeting together; maybe they can help us. I asked what was the difference between Nixon and Rockefeller before the 
Miami convention and Connell said, "I think Gallup showed a 7 point spread. He was 10 points off in 1948." So we were busy trying to knock the pollsters. We talk about Harris: 
"When is the next Harris Poll?" We are talking about having a Harris-Gallup press conference. Al Spivak advises, "The AP has written a long wire story on the differences 
between Harris and Gallup and it amounts to some seven million votes. We've got to say the polls are very inconclusive because of the wide margin between Harris and Gallup and 
we will have a favorable Harris Poll, probably, next time out because his polls have been moving stronger in our direction than Gallup." They sum it up, "The Gallup Poll agrees 
with the others regarding an upswing for Humphrey. Nixon is down and Wallace is down. The only question is can we catch up before election." 
It is pointed out that the middle of the Gallup Poll that we're discussing that day was conducted about twelve days earlier. That brings me again to our contention that 
playing catch up ball from the outset was difficult at best. Any changes in the polls in our direction we couldn't promote, because the poll results would reflect voter attitude of ten 
to twelve days earlier in those days. At least that was our contention. John Gronouski reported he was informed by some press that a Humphrey spokesman observed that 
Humphrey could win if the campaign were two months longer and [Gronouski] pointed out that we all must be very careful regarding what we say to the press. I commented that 
the prior day I had spoken to Alan Cranston at length regarding an allegation that California was being written off. I explained, "Contrary to this we are enlarging our media 
budget in California and programming another visit by the candidate. The fact is we are 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --31 
always going to be harried by the unfounded views of some people. We just have to anticipate statements of this nature." On that note I closed the meeting. 
We met again on the twenty-third of October. I wanted to discuss the media policy for the remaining days of the campaign. I had gone to St. Louis to look at the 
Humphrey biography film and was impressed with it. The party film, so-called, had been shown the previous Sunday and I referred to the last meeting where the consensus was to 
get Humphrey and Muskie together. I had talked to the Vice President that morning and it was clear that he shares our view. "He is strong in his feeling. Regardless of any other 
views you may hear, on the basis of my direct conversation with Humphrey he wants the joint format even if this means a significant adjustment to the schedules." Then there was 
a discussion of the Sunday program; the general reaction apparently was quite good around the country. Gates mentioned that on the basis of the mail the prior day the 
contributions were running close to seventy-five thousand dollars and he expected that the mail that day would be even heavier. We made a hundred and twenty-five copies of the 
program that morning; fifty-four of them had been ordered. Those who order make all the arrangements and pay for the time; all we do is send the film. We used to say we want to 
get the full hour out rather than portions of it, if we possibly can. 
We review some of the local area activities in utilizing the media. The help we're getting at the local level is becoming impressive. We talk about the contents of the 
various spots that are being finalized; get into issues, projections of the Democratic economists about unemployment. I point out, "Nixon is hitting hard at Humphrey as 
Wallace has dropped in the polls, but his radio format is the loftier presentation of the issues." We talk about staying on the Nixon attack, trying to balance it. I say, "It seems 
to me that all Humphrey needs is a one-page summary which he can refer to while giving his standard speech. This way he can include the issue by easy reference to the summary. 
I remember Kennedy did this." "We could extract a few key paragraphs," Bill Welsh says, "for him to study. He could make the proper references having in mind that UPI and AP 
stories have been filed on the basis of the release statement." Terry Sanford added, "Tell him at the bottom of the summary, `For God's sake, don't elaborate. '" (Laughter) 
We talk about an open letter to Wall Street and Bob Nathan's involvement. On the Humphrey speeches and appearances, crowds became more enthusiastic, filled with young 
people who want to help. He asked, "Could Humphrey have a truck load of material to distribute at rallies and speeches? Is this feasible?" Poor Mike Berman says, "Maybe a 
trunkful. The problem is quantity." "We've sent everything you had to L. A.," Sanford says. So I asked for a materials report and the schedule was distributed by Mike Berman 
who said, "By Monday, all materials that we have will have gone out. The tallies are shown on the list, in the end we'll have distributed about eight million pieces--Tape 
3 of 3, Side 1 
O: "Everything on order has been completed and is being shipped out." I asked about throw-aways and Berman says, "So long as money can be obtained, they can be printed." 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --32 
McCandless reports that he appeared in my stead at a local debate and the Nixon man admits that within the Nixon staff there's an argument as to whether Nixon should debate. 
He ended by saying there's still that possibility that Nixon may accept the debate. 
I say, "Along the media materials line we are making a concerted effort to beef up our campaign in selected areas. This does not include print advertising but there will be a 
significant increase in radio and TV in selected states. This will mean that our program for the remainder of the campaign will at least equal Nixon's and we will probably be ahead on 
media time." Nixon has been advertising during the Olympics and we don't have any Olympic spots; they cost about seven hundred fifty thousand dollars. When the time buys 
were made, seven hundred fifty thousand dollars was obviously out of the question. By the same token I feel we are compensating for this slow start now. Louis Martin said 
Walter Reuther said he was willing to--( 
Interruption) 
G: Say there is simply no time to be had? 
O: Yes. 
G: What do you mean by that? 
O: Well, at the networks, there's no time for political use left. 
G: They've sold it all out? 
O: Yes, all that they will allow. I said, "He can get his own time and pay for it." I said I would talk to Walter Reuther about this immediately and if he buys time I don't see how 
that can be charged to us on an equal time rule because they were apportioning this time on the basis of maximum allocation to each candidate. Bob Squire gives the final report 
on the election eve time: "Telethon will run from 8: 30 to 10: 30 p. m. Eastern Time, 7: 30 to 9: 30 p. m. Central, 6: 30 to 8: 30 p. m. Mountain, and 8: 30 to 10: 30 p. m. Pacific. The 
program will be taped in L. A. between 5: 30 and 7: 30 p. m. It will then be fed back to the West Coast at 8: 30 p. m." 
We talk about the difficulty of getting Muskie and Humphrey together in Los Angeles for the taping. That obviously has to be resolved, then there will be two segments 
to the program. "One will consist of the phone-in portion and the other of top-notch entertainment during the phone-in breaks. The phone-in itself can be done in two ways. 
In the standard format, a celebrity takes the call and writes down the question. The host or another celebrity reads it to the candidate. We are also planning to use the direct 
phone-in. Here the caller talks directly to the candidate. Calls are pre-screened by the show's producer and by an additional seven-second delay mechanism. We may have major 
political figures and other celebrities dropping in. Probably we could use film reports from different parts of the country." 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --33 
Then about the telephone company, because in California Nixon will be running at the same time we are. It's emphasized it's necessary for Muskie to be in the same studio. 
We review the possibility of telephone tie-ups and adverse reaction. Welsh says, "Since we have both ABC and NBC tied up for the same half hour, run the telethon on both 
networks." That is our option. We discuss getting out releases on various aspects of the telethon. 
As to get-out-the-vote, I point out, "Let's return to a more mundane subject." John Hoving reports, "We have projected thirty-two hundred phone banks in eighteen 
states. We now have ordered or authorized some 1818 phone banks in thirteen states. This represents 57.5 per cent of our planned final operation. The AFL-CIO and Gordon 
St. Angelo already have a significant phone bank program in operation. The get-out-the-vote program of labor is also under way and the UAW and the Teamsters 
have agreed to coordinate their efforts." It's pointed out, "This is a coordinated effort involving labor, our organization, the citizens committee. People on the Hill, everyone 
who can be spared out to the field to work on get-out-the-vote. We need a few more people in New York. We have a pretty clear idea in response to my question as to the 
minimum amount of money required. The good part of last night's meeting is that it included everyone." I ask, "Why can't we get all this committed to paper?" I'm assured 
this will be done as soon as the New York meeting takes place. We talked further about emphasizing the coordination of labor's rather massive get-out-the-vote effort with ours to 
be sure that the potential is maximized. We talk about mass mailings that have gone out that week, including polling information as well as other information that could be helpful 
locally. 
What is coming out of this conversation about the get-out-the-vote drive and the thousands of people that'll be involved, the phone banks and the rest is the enthusiasm. 
There is report after report of a pickup in every section of the country and the comment was made that unfortunately for a long time people thought we would lose. They sat on 
their hands; now they have no program so we have to make up for this as best we can, because while the enthusiasm is late in coming it's there. 
G: Hoving raises the point that essentially there is no woman's program. 
O: Yes, well, that's a point he raised that Geri Joseph would quarrel with because she had the responsibility for the woman's program, and my recollection was it was well-organized. 
You'll note repeatedly in minutes of meetings it came up constantly, Geri was always promoting the utilization of women and the availability of women in various categories 
rather than just a woman's committee. That was what we were trying to emphasize. The tradition was a woman's committee with well-known women on the committee and have a 
few social gatherings, but that was in the past. Women should be full participants in all phases of the campaign and they were in this campaign. When comments like that are 
made they overlook the boiler room. They overlook a number of our coordinators. They overlook a lot of the activities that are being carried out by women across the country. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --34 
G: So you feel that in terms of get-out-the-vote, there was a significant national--? 
O: Perhaps more than I had seen in prior elections. On another aspect of get-out-the-vote--there should be special communications to the senators and 
congressmen in key areas, which we agreed to. I made the comment that the Vice President had a typical recent experience in Connecticut along these lines. Senator 
[Abraham] Ribicoff, who initially met with Humphrey, adjusted his schedule to ride with him in the motorcade. Many now feel more comfortable with Humphrey. As the days 
have passed in the all-too-brief campaign of just a few weeks, there has been a decided change in the attitude of prominent politicians, obviously reflecting public attitude. At this 
point we could feel comfortable about this contact we were developing on get-out-the-vote with senators and congressmen. A month earlier it would have been 
useless to contact them in this regard or any regard. There was a disinterest, a coolness. Bill Welsh says, "[ Get] the addresses where key congressmen and senators can be reached 
in the field at home because," he points out, "Pres [Governor Preston] Smith in Texas is a good example of somebody who after holding back for a long time is now fully 
committed." And Bob Squire chimes in saying the entire reception in Texas yesterday was just great." Martin said, "It was so good it was hard to believe." 
Then I say, "I should note that on Friday we will meet for the last time as a group. Beginning Friday afternoon many of us will be on the road concentrating on 
get-out-the-vote. I will be having meetings with those of you involved in particular projects. Friday, however, we will wrap up the policy meetings." We talk again about 
Muskie's and Humphrey's participation. And as Squire describes it, "We have again two different half-hour shows. Certain questions can be directed by the Vice President to 
Muskie or Muskie could add his own comments to Hubert's answers. The entire tape could be edited down to the most desirable questions and answers. Plan to have 
Humphrey and Muskie sit down together and hold a conversation on the campaign and its issues. This will be either the best or the most imaginative format of its kind ever put 
together or the dullest and the worst." And, incidentally, this was all put together and it worked out beautifully. I excused myself, I notice in these minutes, because Muskie was 
on the phone and I went to take the call. 
I asked Marty or Al to discuss our election day operation. Ira points out I'm referring to our three-pronged program regarding election day legal matters. On the legal 
side, Freeman responds, "We will have several things going on election day. Already we've contacted some thirty states in our Operation Watchdog program. We will have 
cadres of attorneys in all the states watching out for any election day problems. Secondly, we have asked Tom Downes, who I understand is an expert in recounts, to help us with 
this contingency. He'll be coming in Monday. Third, we have been in touch with the Department of Justice. They are keeping an eye out on any election day obstructions. 
The United States attorneys have also been alerted. We have two other projects going. We are studying the procedures, should there be no majority in the electoral college. One 
aspect of this is the question as to whether we should keep the Wallace electors pledged to 
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O'Brien --Interview XXV --35 
Wallace. We are also studying the various problems which may arise if the election goes into the House. A lot of the governing procedure here is not statutory and is ancient 
history. We must be prepared for all these eventualities. We are reaching for the very best legal talent available. We may put out an Operation Watchdog story because we 
heard of some threats in this area." And it's pointed out by Hoving that in his experience the lawyers should defer to the public relations men in making decisions on press releases. 
Bill Welsh says, "I'm convinced that any premature talk of this kind is counterproductive. It puts us in no man's land. We should be laying out a story for Nixon. If we limit it to 
the Wallace-Nixon deal, which we're still talking about, that there is a deal, it would be good. 
Then Ginsburg got into the Vietnam situation. He met with some State Department people. "Should there be a peace development? They urge us to take a 
statesmanlike line with no gloating or no politics. We should state for this one important step toward peace that we want to wait and see what happens. The Department of State 
itself doesn't know how things will develop." Then we talked about a half-hour daytime buy. Bob Squire mentioned, "We're running mostly fives. The Muriel Humphrey spot ran 
yesterday as a prime daytime slot." 
Then Gates closed the meeting on money received this week. "We received roughly seven thousand pieces of mail amounting to over $77,000 in contributions. Today 
I predict perhaps five thousand pieces adding up to fifty thousand dollars or more." So there was a flow of money coming in in small denominations as a result of these pitches on 
television. Attached to this is a complete record by state of the distribution of all the materials in the campaign and just looking at the record would indicate that this was done 
in a very systematic, businesslike way considering the limitations imposed on us financially. So the volume wasn't nearly what we would have liked to have seen. 
To the October 25 meeting, the last meeting of the policy committee. I asked Napolitan to give us a report on the media campaign for the final days and he went into 
some detail, which is worth noting. "Starting this past Tuesday"--which would have been the Tuesday prior to this meeting--" we will be spending about $200,000 a day on media. 
Starting next Tuesday and continuing through Monday, November 4, we will be spending about $250,000 a day. This will be for combination network and local spots. We're 
arranging a taping for Humphrey and Muskie here tomorrow. Depending how this session comes out we'll see how our final week's time is allocated." Then he pointed out in 
addition to the half hour on ABC for that night, "We have half hours on Friday, November 1 on CBS at 8: 30 p. m., Saturday, November 2 on NBC at 9: 30 p. m., and Sunday, 
November 3 on NBC at 8: 30. This last half hour we're holding open for the President. On Monday the fourth we have purchased, as you know, two hours on ABC from 8: 30 to 
10: 30 p. m."--that's the telethon. We're now trying to beef up the week preceding. "Next Tuesday we'll begin showing half-hour spots on a local basis. We have been getting a 
good response from the states on this. Senator [Ralph] Yarborough has purchased the entire hour from last Sunday for a Texas showing. We're getting similar requests from 
other states. We have culled our one minute and twenty second spots." And I noted, "We 
39
O'Brien --Interview XXV --36 
have ordered off the Agnew laughter spot. There were some complaints but I feel it has already fulfilled its purpose." I concurred. "We're substituting the twenty-second spot on 
the heartbeat." Our Spanish radio programs are now coming in and we have four different language spots. 
I added that at the session for the following day which was at 2: 30 p. m., "We'll set up a format that can be altered in any direction. Humphrey will be flying in, going directly 
to the studio." I express the hope that he wouldn't be tired. "We will have an opportunity this time to completely control what happens. We should be able to make very clear in the 
course of one half hour program or any shorter spots what we want to emphasize. I told both Humphrey and Muskie that the only matter brought up at these meetings which was 
unanimous was that the two of them should get together in the remaining days for this taping. I have high hopes." We point out we've been promoting the half-hour show in 
selected ads. We talk about what type of questions we'll use, the producer we'll use, how we'll tie all this together. Apparently there was a Senator Kennedy-Wallace speech that 
we're trying to promote on television. Time buys which use tough spots are our next objective. We talk about Mayor Richard Daley's office requesting the Sunday hour. 
Kampelman talks about a two-page ad that he was asked to bring to the attention of the committee. Joe Napolitan responded that he thought that one page was fine but he didn't 
think anyone would take the time to read the second and he could name six other ads we already had which were much better. We reviewed all the print material and all that for 
local use and all the promotional aspects of these final days. 
Then of course to money again and the availability of this material for local use with local financial support. We talk about the costs in California and I have rough 
calculations. We're talking about seven hundred fifty thousand to a million dollars. The expenditure problem is obvious. The ad concept is discussed in great detail, including 
trying to have a coupon on it, Bob Short says, "for solicitation of funds." Joe Napolitan feels the expenditure on an NFL spot on November 3 is a better investment and I chime in 
by saying, "At any rate, we have had many ads appearing. A full-page businessmen's ad was in the Wall Street Journal this morning." Bob Short points out the ad cost $17,500 
and they paid for it. But we're making the copies of the ad that Max Kampelman presented for general use. We'll have mats. Bob Short complains, "Why should we 
distribute this ad without a coupon?" He wants everyone to understand we've gotten almost one million dollars in small contributions from our various appeals and this is ten 
times more than the DNC has ever received in any campaign. Everybody agrees we can't go off television. Then referring to the prior Sunday's show, we comment on how great it 
was. Many people want to purchase it at fifty thousand dollars a purchase. I advised, "I want everybody to look in tonight. I saw the biographical film in St. Louis and I share 
Joe's view. The film has real merit. I want all of you to advise us tomorrow of your reaction. We haven't got time here to view it. We had to make a judgment and decide to 
let it go tonight." 
G: What did you think of the film? 
40
O'Brien --Interview XXV --37 
O: I thought it was excellent. 
G: Do you think it had an impact? 
O: Yes, very much so. I think it was the best biographical film I had seen in politics. It was very well done. It was widely approved. Of course, there were some people who had 
criticism, but I never recall anything being so widely approved. We consider the remaining material in the can, making a determination of what material we're going to use 
and what we're going to discard. Bob Short is pressing hard for this fund appeal in all areas, in all television and all spots and he's speaking like a true treasurer who is in dire 
need of funds. We also consider repeating the spots on the Nixon record. 
Then to the speakers' program for the remaining week and the entertainment blitz. We have planes scheduled in Ohio, California, New York, Baltimore; press people 
aboard. We're coordinating with county chairmen, setting up local programs. These were entertainers and stars who agreed to go on that last swing across the country. We have 
the final report for the purposes of this meeting on the get-out-the-vote effort. John Hoving reported that 76 per cent of our phone operations are now authorized on a 
twenty-four hour basis. "We're well along to meeting our goal. Our basic problem now involves the expenditure of a small amount of money in the black community." Bob Short 
asked, "How much do you need?" Hoving: "One hundred twenty thousand." Bob Short said, "You've got one hundred thousand." Louis Martin responded, "We're in business." 
Apparently at this point Al Barkan was expressing concern. He'd be happy to have that money. Hoving says he can't have any of it. He was apparently extremely concerned 
that labor had extended itself, while we had done nothing in this area which, of course, was not the case. Then I commented, "It's been my feeling we had to program this 
campaign properly. I didn't want to be confronted with statistics showing that X number of workers multiplied by Y number of dollars meant that Z number of voters would be 
gotten out. This is the way it had been done in the past. I have insisted that the program be spelled out specifically. We should know who is directing any local program and what 
is being done. There is little doubt in my mind that we can come up with something better than in past years, which amounted to spending money. Now we have a specific program 
which we are in a position to implement." 
If I can interrupt this thought, "I have just been handed the results of the Gallup Poll last Sunday: Nixon, 44 per cent, Humphrey, 36 per cent, Wallace, 15 per cent, 
undecided, 5 per cent. These figures were compiled between October 17 and October 20." This represented the best picture by far through the campaign. It showed us 8 points 
down as of October 20, roughly two weeks before election day. The Gallup Poll gap has closed from 15 per cent to 8 per cent in three weeks. Joe Napolitan pointed out, "The 
final day of the poll period ended before our media campaign started on the twenty-second. Nixon is not moving at all. We show a net gain of four points." So with 
that rather pleasing news we got back to the get-out-vote effort coordinated with labor's effort. This was two polls in a row that showed an upswing. 
41
O'Brien --Interview XXV --38 
G: Short says, "The smart money is now coming in." 
O: People who had decided they could pass this one and not have a problem on the record of failure to contribute felt now they should take out an insurance policy. We hadn't gotten 
to the insurance policy aspect of this until just about this time. In past campaigns you generally had a certain amount of insurance contribution--people giving you a thousand 
while they were probably giving your opponent five thousand. They wanted to just be on the record. But we weren't the beneficiaries of that kind of contribution until this late 
period. 
We were anxious to get these poll results out to the state coordinators and through them widespread distribution to spur on effort. We go back again to the various priority 
areas, the various assignments, the total implementation of the get-out-the-vote in the last waning days of the campaign. We discussed various states and various participants, 
including some commotion about our representative in Maryland. It's best described by Hoving saying, "In the last phase of the campaign you always run into this nonsense. 
Everybody is looking for somebody to blame. It is important we get all the intelligence here for evaluation. [Daniel] Brewster is a frightened man. He is going to have to sweat 
it out." This is the senator from Maryland. Apparently Brewster was making some threats of publicity of a negative nature. I add, "We're all in together in Maryland. I can't 
see Brewster risking this kind of publicity." So we dropped it. Mike Berman says, "It seems that everybody is planning to go on the plane this last week. This cannot be done. 
The Vice President's plane has been overloaded twice already. We will be carrying a hundred and sixty press people next week. We'll be having a rally tomorrow at 1: 15 at 
National Airport. The Vice President has requested this. I'm determined any staff that are not there will not be permitted on the plane to Minneapolis election day." Mike is making 
a pitch for this rally. And then they discuss who has been put on the list and who is being contacted to draw a crowd for this rally. 
Bob Short says, "Today has been the toughest day yet. I've had to come up with two million dollars. It's not easy but we'll make it. By Monday it will be up to 2.3 million 
if we get that additional NBC time. If we make the NBC buy, you won't be able to watch television election eve without seeing Humphrey. I think we'll even be competing against 
ourselves. This is largely borrowed money but we'll get it back if we win." Then to show that there's always a little more nuts and bolts as you wind down, "It should be mentioned 
that we are putting out a two-weeks' notice as of today regarding campaign employees." Bob Short says, "Yes." Then I say, "That notice should stress that employees will be 
given a one-week salary extension as compared to the past." In other words, the tradition in campaigns was you were cut off as the polls closed and no provision was made for any 
kind of a break. Ira says, "I suggest we get that out to the press. Also, that we make reference to inaugural plans in such a notice." 
Then I say, 
42
O'Brien --Interview XXV --39 
There is one more matter. I want to thank everyone for their attention and for the high attendance of these meetings. There have been differences of views on 
a variety of subjects but at no time has any view been imposed by one group upon another. I have spent a lifetime in this business, as you know, and never have I 
worked with a more cooperative, able or dedicated group of people. I shall retain this experience as one of the high points in my career in politics and I will 
communicate this thought regarding your individual performance to the candidates. Many of you will be working on specific activities next week, particularly on the 
get-out-the-vote projects. We are not closing out the campaign. I will be available to any of you in any of these areas. I would like to conclude by expressing my 
deepest gratitude. You have made it a wonderful experience for me and I hope you feel the same. Thank you. 
In reviewing parts of those memos which are reasonably detailed, and unusual in terms of campaigns--it's a rarity to have detailed, concise reports of meetings of this nature. In 
fact, that's what is wrong with campaigns, the record-keeping aspects. In this instance you could refer back to a series of meetings that included every element at the top level of the 
Humphrey-Muskie campaign from beginning to end. Every view, some of them off the wall, some ridiculous, some significant, some creative. Everybody had an opportunity to 
be a participant to have knowledge of all aspects of the campaign. That is unique. It came about to a great extent because of the shortness of the campaign, the tremendous 
problems of launching, to quickly coordinate a national campaign. 
The Vietnam speech in Salt Lake turned the corner. The Muskie candidacy was a major plus in the campaign. We were able to play catch-up ball, not nearly all we would 
have liked to. We did stay in the fight with Nixon, pretty evenly matched in terms of media exposure and campaign effort over the last two or three weeks of the campaign. If 
that convention had been scheduled as it would have without an incumbent president to be routinely renominated, the convention would have been a month earlier. If you could 
schedule the convention after the President withdrew as a candidate, you would have scheduled it a month earlier. But that was impossible, because conventions have to be 
planned a year, two years and even longer in advance. The Vietnam issue was overriding. We placed great emphasis on law and order, with some relevance in the campaign. 
Economic issues had some relevance. But the overriding issue was Vietnam. The corner was turned in terms of public perception with the Salt Lake speech. 
But it was a perception and it was amazing. There was a perception, which Jim Rowe expressed concern about, but this perception on the part of many liberals and many 
anti-Vietnam young people across the country was favorable to Humphrey. Anybody who carefully analyzed the speech word by word, phrase by phrase would have difficulty 
concluding it was capitulation from existing administration policy. But be that as it may in the political world, it was enough to--Tape 
3 of 3, Side 2 
43
O'Brien --Interview XXV --40 
O: --push a button and we tried to capitalize on that to the best of our ability in the short period of time that was left to us. You were probably talking about six, seven weeks. 
G: What was the purpose of having this record prepared of the campaign policy--? 
O: That was the kind of staff I had. Ed Cubberly, who I would send to meet with the Freeman group on issues, would report back in detail, probably more detail than I needed. 
He was a very solid young man who took his assignments seriously. During the campaign I didn't make any particular reference to these minutes, inasmuch as I had all that in my 
own mind. I was rather surprised when I went over my papers to find there was such a detailed accounting of these meetings by Cubberly and in a couple of instances I believe 
Ira Kapenstein. They really acted as secretaries of the meetings. 
G: But you don't recall any effort to track the decisions that were made at the time? 
O: Oh, yes. I'm talking about the minutes themselves. You were tracking; you were evaluating, you were resolving, and I don't think I probably found it necessary to go to 
these documents for recollection. You'll notice these meetings for a period were almost back to back. Notes were dutifully taken, submitted to me and circulated. That was one 
purpose, of course, for those who were absent--G: 
Those who were absent were able to keep abreast of the meetings? 
O: The list for circulation was rather lengthy. I'm sure I didn't suggest to either Ira or Ed that they follow any particular format. The purpose of taking notes primarily would be to 
circulate them, so I wouldn't run into people saying, "I wasn't at the last meeting; tell me now." I wouldn't tolerate that. You may have a good reason for not being there, but you 
had no reason not to be knowledgeable about what occurred. 
G: Well, this seems to be almost verbatim. It does seem to be verbatim. 
O: I think with Ed Cubberly particularly. 
G: Two questions arise from this. One, what is the significance of the fact that Mondale and Harris and, to a large extent, Freeman stopped coming to the meetings? 
O: With Mondale and Harris, they were in their areas of activity. They were expected to be out in the field. They were taking on speaking engagements. It's like Al Barkan; Al 
Barkan didn't attend many of the meetings but Mary Zon, I am sure, reported in detail to Al Barkan. He was kept fully abreast. These were not for the most part meetings that 
established overall policy. These meetings did not establish the Vietnam position at Salt Lake, but none of those positions after the early stages were carried out without my 
approval. I always made sure to get the input of anybody who wanted to make input, encouraged input. 
44
O'Brien --Interview XXV --41 
This was a good team, well representative of a campaign organization. It was a rarity that somebody wasn't present at the meeting who could have input into a particular 
area of discussion. You had Terry Sanford quite regularly at the meetings; you had Orville Freeman pretty regularly at the meetings, but Fritz and Fred really had become 
more involved in appearing at functions, filling in for the candidate. They drifted away from the nuts and bolts. 
But, you see, while every subject possible is discussed, you'll notice there's no reference to the role of the President really, if any, in the campaign. That would not be 
something that would come into discussion among a large group. There is no reference to the ultimate content of the Vietnam speech purposely. You can be open, but there are 
limitations. There were people at these meetings who were in organization and registration and get-out-the-vote and ethnic matters. I would not want a major policy 
discussion particularly. Not that you'd want to bar them, but it would not be productive in that type of a meeting. 
The Vietnam impact on the campaign, crowd reactions, what to do or not do, all of that was part of those meetings. There were many things I was engaged in that didn't 
directly relate to these meetings. 
G: Another question. There seems very little input from the candidate himself in these discussions, not so much in terms of his own presence because I realize he can't be there 
but in terms of feedback from the candidate. Why is that? 
O: Feedback from the candidate often came to me and he and I would talk regularly, often. If he were in town I would be at his apartment in the morning or we'd have coffee together, 
but I made it a rule that the candidate was to have limited involvement or non-involvement in most of the areas of activities that we were discussing here. That is an unnecessary 
burden on the candidate. 
What you had to avoid or eliminate was the situation in which three or four close friends hung around with him bending his ear. They have little or no knowledge in most 
instances of the overall campaign, but somebody complains about something. I had any number of calls from Hubert Humphrey throughout that campaign saying, "I was out 
somewhere last night, Larry, and somebody told me there's no literature," things of that nature. Or he'd call and say, "I'm told I really ought to do the following on law and order. 
What's your view?" 
My views were given to him with the bark off and, I must say, were solicited. The impasse we reached on the Salt Lake speech underscores that. I was in high dudgeon. 
That really wasn't the right way to approach it, but I blew up. And I didn't know where I could find Hubert within the next three or four hours so I'll get something out on a wire 
that will get to him faster. I'm not going to spend the rest of the day trying to find him and have him respond, "I appreciate getting that hard-hitting thing but you might be interested 
to know I haven't read the speech." 
45
O'Brien --Interview XXV --42 
G: Tell me, you've mentioned spending some time with him at his apartment when he was in Washington. Run through the range of other alternatives, phone calls. 
O: Oh, yes. 
G: Would he call you in the evenings or would you call him? How would that work out? 
O: Most of the time he would call me, very frankly, because it wasn't very easy to contact him when he was on the road. I didn't find it necessary to contact him on the road but I would 
get calls from the road with regularity. 
G: Were they generally in the evening or not necessarily? 
O: Not necessarily. Whenever he had an opportunity to--G: 
How often would this communication take place? 
O: We communicated almost on a daily basis. 
G: Okay. Did you ever travel with him? 
O: Yes, very limited. At the end I traveled with him. Also, I was forced to travel with him for a couple of days because of the Salt Lake situation. I think I stated way back in our 
interviews--going back to directing Jack Kennedy's Senate campaign--that I feel a campaign manager or director is responsible for organization. If he is spending time 
traveling with the candidate, he's not doing his job. Jack Kennedy and I used to kid each other because I would see him rarely. The candidate is out there--that's his job--breaking 
his butt campaigning. Your job is to see if you can bring that 3 per cent we've talked about that might make the difference, through campaign organization, strategy and 
implementation. So if I hear that some campaign manager of a candidate for president is at the shoulder of that candidate all the time, he's no campaign manager. He's just another 
hanger-on. 
G: Did you feel that you had local people who were able to assess his impact in a given situation, that you were getting good feedback? 
O: For the most part, although you can get varied impact from the same incident. It depends on the eyes and ears of the beholder. You make that judgment on the basis of your 
knowledge of the person giving you the input. You would find almost without exception that you could get a solid objective appraisal of a situation, an incident, from people 
whose judgment you had confidence in and you feel comfortable with. That wouldn't mean somebody picking up the phone in high dudgeon because he didn't get a chance to 
shake hands with the candidate would impress you. People involved in coordinating and organizing learn early on that they should be candid and objective and not gild the lily. If 
46
O'Brien --Interview XXV --43 
they gild the lily they're going to pay a price for it sooner or later. They must fulfill their role in a responsible manner. I have found that uniformly the case. There are able people 
who participate in politics and able people constantly coming into the political world at the local level and moving along. It's a matter of giving them the opportunity. 
End of Tape 3 of 3 and Interview XXV 
47
    [ Part 26: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--29 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXVI*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XXVI 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXVI, 8/ 26/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
For Electronic Copy on Diskette from the LBJ Library: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXVI, 8/ 26/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-37 
4
INTERVIEW XXVI 
DATE: August 26, 1987 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 1 
G: I wanted to ask you about President Johnson's role in the campaign. 
O: There was an uneasy situation that I referred to earlier. It would percolate from time to time in discussions. People would suggest we see if we could get the President to travel, 
south, southwest; could we have the President make some individual spot appearances. There were memos that went to the White House, outlining ideas we had. He did, of 
course, make some appearances, some nationally-televised speeches. 
But it was not a close working relationship. There was a time when Hubert [Humphrey] expressed concern, reflected in some of the minutes that Hubert should have 
more direct contact with the President. I assumed, and still assume, that Hubert's contact with the President was somewhat limited during the campaign. My contact with him was 
quite limited. I felt somewhat inhibited, frankly, because I felt the campaign chairman dealing with the President was not appropriate without direct agreements between Hubert 
and the President. 
So it drifted. There was no indication that the President wasn't in support of Hubert. There was no media suggestion that the President was not in support of 
Humphrey. But the President's personal role in the campaign was limited. His role, however, became more active as the campaign closed. He played a key role, in my 
judgment, in the last days of the campaign, particularly as the campaign closed in Texas. That attracted a great deal of attention and was helpful. 
G: What did he do in that regard? 
O: Well, appearance with the candidate. I believe the record will show in the last few days of the campaign, the tour of Texas was widely acclaimed. The President's contribution to the 
events in Texas was an important factor in closing out the campaign with a high level of enthusiasm and confidence. 
But, to summarize, the best I can recall is that there was some contact. There was some contact by memo and there was some direct contact, but very limited on my part. 
I'm not familiar with the degree of contact between Hubert and Lyndon Johnson during that period. Hubert, on at least two occasions, expressed concern to me about the 
President in the context that we probably should have more contact with him and more 
5
O'Brien --Interview XXVI --2 
involvement with him. And as I said, my feeling was that that had to be worked out between Hubert and Lyndon Johnson. The indications were that the President was going 
to devote time and attention to the campaign. It would be my responsibility to keep the President totally apprised and work out with him or his staff what his personal 
involvement would be. But it really never reached that level of activity, as far as my end was concerned. 
G: Was it more of a situation that the problem of persuading the President to become involved when he was reluctant to do so or of the campaign not wanting him to become 
involved? 
O: I think there was probably a little of both. There were people in the campaign who felt that a highly visible presidential role would not contribute to the campaign. I must say 
they were a minority and their views certainly didn't affect me. My feeling was that if the President was willing, political reality indicated that there were areas of the country and 
particular types of events the President could make an impact on. 
To pursue it directly with him--I didn't feel it was seemly. Until Hubert Humphrey would say to me, "I have talked to the President and the President wants to do the 
following and he has several openings that he's reserving in his schedule. You be in touch and work out the details to maximize the effort that he's willing to expend." 
But it seemed when Hubert would talk about the President to me, it was more a concern that the President might feel we were aloof, that we had not focused on this 
aspect of the campaign and steps should be taken to bring about greater presidential involvement. My response to Hubert was, "I think the appropriate procedure is for you to 
have a discussion with the President. And in general terms, you and he agree on what he's willing to do. Of course, having that opportunity to utilize him in the campaign, we will 
do everything to make sure that's properly handled." 
But it sort of drifted. And there were, as I say, occasions when it would become a topic of discussion. I know that I sent a lengthy memo to the White House to the 
President outlining my thoughts on what activities he could engage in, carefully stating, of course, that it was entirely up to him but we would be most pleased if he could do some or 
all of these things. I don't recall any follow-up. 
G: To what extent do you think his March 31 announcement that he was not going to, in effect, be involved in politics while he was trying to bring an end to the Vietnam conflict 
have on this political involvement in behalf of Humphrey? 
O: I think you can't overlook some aspects as this evolved, going back to his announcement of non-candidacy and his statement of nonpolitical involvement. His sole concentration 
would be on the resolution of the war for the remainder of his presidency. I think that set the stage for non-involvement. But you have to also recall that at the convention in 
Chicago regarding the negotiations on the Vietnam issue, there was the clear indication at 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVI --3 
the height of this negotiation on language that Hubert's attempt to clear it with the President or discuss it with the President, at least in my presence, failed. He was unable, 
although he was vice president of the United States, to communicate with the President at the Ranch. I remember there were three or four of us, perhaps, in the room when that 
occurred and it was a source of obvious embarrassment. 
Then there was the other aspect, extending an invitation to the President to attend the convention. That was done and the President declined. There was the John Connally 
aspect saying, "The President is being mistreated and I'm so disturbed I'm about to put his name in nomination." Now, that was a threat he made for his own personal reasons. But 
that was the climate in Chicago. 
Then the next major development was the Salt Lake speech of Hubert Humphrey. The President was advised in advance that the speech was going to be made--" in advance" 
probably meant just prior to the taping of it. Who called whom in the White House? I don't recall. I think George Ball had some involvement with it and Hubert directly. 
Throughout that night in the hotel in Salt Lake, Hubert, while he didn't articulate it or probably made only fleeting reference, was concerned about what the President's reaction 
would be. 
Following that speech, there were probably a couple of occasions when Hubert expressed concern to me about the President's limited role in the campaign and that we 
should be probably more aggressive in trying to pursue him. And as I said, my response was, "Hubert, why don't you work it out with him? Take a few minutes and work it out 
with him and we'll implement it." I don't know how strongly the President reacted to Salt Lake but I have to assume he reacted negatively. And the President, being a solid 
Democrat in the final analysis, did restate his staunch support for Humphrey. That was in the climactic days in Texas. That basically was the role of Lyndon Johnson in the Hubert 
Humphrey campaign. 
G: There was described in Humphrey's autobiography an occasion to which he was campaigning in Maryland and had an appointment with the President at the White House, 
came in and the appointment was canceled at the last minute. And Humphrey really vented his feelings, I guess, to Jim Jones. Do you recall that episode? 
O: No, I don't. 
G: There were a lot of assertions that LBJ was not helping Humphrey in other ways as well. He could have done more to advance a Humphrey candidacy. Was this just the case, do 
you think? 
O: I think in the area of fund raising, for example, with the terrible difficulties we experienced he probably could have done more. I don't know whether anybody ever asked him. In 
that phase an incumbent president is in a position to be of some considerable help, taking the time to call long-time supporters and urge them to be more active and be of some 
7
O'Brien --Interview XXVI --4 
financial assistance. I'm not talking about speech making, public pronouncements, and the rest; I'm talking about inside campaigning. And I don't recall noting anything particularly 
in that area that you would attribute to the President. 
G: Two areas in particular: one, there was a fund, I guess in the President's Club account, of approximately six hundred thousand dollars that had been collected, I think, from 
corporations in some sort of published volume, I think, back in 1964, 1965. I know that people in the Humphrey campaign wanted this money freed up for Humphrey's use. Do 
you recall the efforts to get that? 
O: Yes, I recall a good deal. I recall Bob Short and others being very exercised about it in their attempts to get the money released. I recall a lot of negative comments concerning 
the failure to act. That did create a great deal of disturbance among the Humphrey people. Obviously, a great disturbance to Short and others that were involved in the 
financial side. I don't recall I had any involvement in attempting to negotiate that. 
G: Why wasn't the money released? 
O: I really don't know. I think it probably is an indication of foot-dragging, a little reminiscent of experiences I had personally in politics. The principals are not engaged in 
activities or failure to act in a negative or derogatory sense. But people who are close to the principals sometimes have a tendency to over-react. There's a far greater tendency on 
their part to make negative comments or carping criticisms. I think the six hundred thousand dollar fund would be an example of that. 
I don't recall Hubert Humphrey exploding regarding it. I don't recall that I had any in-depth discussions with anyone regarding the fund. I was aware of its existence. I was 
aware of our dire need for the money and I was aware of the efforts that were being expended to release it. But I was not directly engaged in any negotiations. 
G: Were there any legal obstacles to using the fund for that purpose? 
O: I don't recall that there were. If there was some technicality that people were presenting, suggesting, "We'd be happy to do this, but--" I don't think on the Humphrey side there 
would be any acceptance of that argument. 
G: There was also the question of the Humphrey campaign getting access to the membership list to the President's Club, so that the campaign could solicit directly these wealthy 
contributors. Do you recall any negotiations to get that list? 
O: I don't recall specific negotiations but I do recall there was considerable concern expressed by all of us on what we construed to be undue delay and lack of cooperation in that area. 
It follows the same pattern as the six hundred thousand dollars. As far as many of us were concerned, there were clear indications that the "Johnson people" were most reluctant to 
be cooperative and were not forthcoming. That would be an example of what we 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVI --5 
construed to be a lack of cooperation. 
G: Was this primarily Arthur Krim? 
O: Arthur Krim was involved. I believe Duane Andreas became a participant in discussions. Of course, our treasurer, a long-time Humphrey supporter, Bob Short, was an aggressive 
fellow who had a great burden on his shoulders. He made tremendous sacrifices on Hubert's behalf in the campaign and was not kindly disposed to delaying tactics or failure 
to cooperate. 
I have never been a fund raiser. I rarely got even indirectly involved in that aspect. My concern would be, which I would express to Short, obviously almost daily, we had 
this program that had to be financially supported. It was up to him and Fred Gates and others who were close to Humphrey. There was this fellow Paolucci. There were wealthy 
people. Duane Andreas is another good example. There were a half a dozen people who were dedicated to Hubert, who had made tremendous personal contributions. They, in 
turn, were trying to solicit additional funding. Bob Short was the center of that, in terms of his full-time responsibility in this area. 
G: Well, let me go back to a question that I asked earlier, with regard to the source of the problem. Was it that LBJ simply was unwilling to jump in on Humphrey's behalf? Or was 
it a question of him not being sufficiently asked to do so? If you were writing this yourself and coming down on one side or the other, in retrospect, what was the problem? Why 
wasn't the money freed up? Why didn't Johnson do more? Why didn't the list become available? Was it, do you think, a question of LBJ simply not being approached directly 
and asked? Or was it a question of him just not being willing to--? 
O: I think there's fault on both sides. Johnson's people were not as forthcoming as they could have been. Whether that was under direct orders or from the feeling Humphrey somehow 
had deserted Johnson in Salt Lake, I don't know. That's one side. The other side is a little more clear to me. I don't think the effort was expended by the Vice President directly to 
push the issue with Johnson. As you point out, the climate was not very pleasant. If the vice president has an appointment with the president and he arrives and his appointment is 
canceled, that's an indication that something has gone awry. 
Now, how did it all start? I think Salt Lake had a real impact on Lyndon Johnson. And I think it probably dried up some potential funding. It certainly had resulted in some 
foot-dragging on the part of people who could have been more helpful. They were known to be close Lyndon Johnson associates. And Hubert Humphrey, with concern about his 
relationship with the President, would from time to time try to focus on it. 
Clearly over a period of time, there was not the relationship between the White House and the Humphrey campaign that should have existed. I think all of us chose not to 
overplay that or give it undue attention. We probably all had the attitude--the President is on the record supporting Hubert; we see indications he could be doing more, his people 
9
O'Brien --Interview XXVI --6 
could be doing more and that's disturbing to us, but this has not created visible strife that would attract media attention. Humphrey was concerned or nervous about it. That was 
the uneasy situation that existed. 
G: Yes. 
O: And as this campaign in the last two weeks became a true contest, the end result was expressions of interest and enthusiasm. Support began to flow and it fed on itself. There 
was a major change in the last two weeks. The statistics, of course, support that. With that, you had a president, out of the White House, helping his party's candidate. Then, of 
course, you had the action on Vietnam that occurred just days before the election, which was widely considered to be an effort on the part of Lyndon Johnson to be helpful to 
Humphrey. 
G: Was it? 
O: Who can tell? But, certainly, with rising expectations, that was most welcome from our position. We embraced it with enthusiasm, feeling that it certainly would have some 
contributing aspects to it. It was considered a plus. Some pundits and observers felt that it might have been an overt attempt on the part of Lyndon Johnson to help Hubert 
Humphrey. There might have been an element of that in it. 
G: Nixon certainly felt that that was the case. 
O: I can understand that. Actually, the timing would indicate the President, rather than making some routine comment--" You know I support Hubert Humphrey. I hope Hubert 
Humphrey wins"--that really isn't very newsworthy--took an action that became a dominant story to inure to the benefit of the Democratic candidate. It happened prior to 
the election and it had a positive impact on the campaign. 
G: The critics charged that Johnson was, in fact, playing politics with the war because this was the very move that he six months earlier said would endanger American lives. And 
suddenly the week before the election, he decided it wouldn't endanger American lives. 
O: I know. But the fact is that the thrust of Johnson's efforts from March on was to resolve that war. Certainly he was entitled to change his view on the impact of that action. That 
may have political overtones and I'm not dismissing that. But the fact is that of its own weight, it holds up. I would certainly not fault any president to have a change of view as 
he tries to achieve the goal that is most difficult with a limited time frame. 
G: Within that context, did Johnson feel that Humphrey was eroding his position in terms of trying to get the North Vietnamese to make concessions to--? 
O: I can't speak for the President. We have been discussing campaign strategy, campaign policy, campaign activity, and total support was not there among the Johnson people. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVI --7 
There's no indication you could place that at Johnson's doorstep because certainly the record shows he consistently supported Humphrey. 
But did he feel that Humphrey and his political maneuvering to achieve the presidency had caused additional problems in terms of what he was attempting to do 
regarding Vietnam? Clearly, the President didn't feel that the Salt Lake speech added a positive dimension to his efforts. How negatively he looked at it, obviously, I don't know. 
G: Then we move to the Nixon campaign and the White House information that Nixon was perhaps causing the South Vietnamese government to drag its feet, in terms of coming to 
the peace table. To what extent were you and Humphrey aware that this was going on? 
O: I wasn't to any extent, other than some discussions would lead to questioning Nixon's role. But I was not privy to clear evidence of direct contact which would prove the case. 
G: Give me an example of how it would come up. 
O: There were a small number of Humphrey advisers who were quite suspicious of the Nixon role. They would focus on it in general discussions fairly often. And if there were 
activities of this nature, we had no evidence to support it. I would be apt to dismiss it, say, "That's wishful thinking." So, the pursuit of Nixon in this area, from the campaign 
level, was certainly minimal. 
G: Did Humphrey ever talk about this element in retrospect at the time of the election? 
O: Some of this type of discussion took place in his presence. 
G: You don't think he ever felt or expressed the sentiment to you that he should have used this information against Nixon? 
O: Actually, when this information finally developed into something assumed meaningful with the Anna Chennault situation, it was very late in the campaign. It was not brought to my 
attention. This is not general conversation or wishful thinking. This is something at least potentially significant. Should you go or not go? You don't have documentation, but it's 
beyond the point of thinking wishfully or being suspicious. There's something clearly there. We were convinced of that. But I didn't focus on that until, I'll have to say, 
probably forty-eight, seventy-two hours before the election. 
What happened was I went to California. I had close-out meetings with our California people, trying to utilize my time over those last couple of days as effectively as I 
could--not at some rally in Texas, or being with the candidate. 
All of us fanned out across the country. You'll note we closed out the meetings around the twenty-fifth of October or something like that, expressly to have everybody fan 
out into the grass-roots. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVI --8 
Humphrey came into Los Angeles very upbeat. I'll have to say I was upbeat because the reports I received on the Texas venture were upbeat. Humphrey was the old 
Humphrey, with all his enthusiasm. Actually, it was evident in Los Angeles in his touring of the city. This campaign was coming to a great upbeat climax. 
Now, in that atmosphere, there was a brief discussion with Hubert on this matter. I recall it was hasty. He's going somewhere; I'm going somewhere. It probably didn't last 
more than a few minutes, and I must say my focus wasn't total. But it did penetrate enough for me to realize that Humphrey had sufficient evidence of Nixon involvement to 
consider going public. But it was also clear that he really didn't want to discuss it in detail with me. Not that he was keeping me out of the circle, but he was wavering and leaning 
towards leaving it alone. 
G: Did he seem shocked by the information or did he seem to think that it was scandalous? What did he say to you? 
O: He expressed deep concern, made a couple of references to Nixon personally, "What kind of a guy could engage in something like this?" He was, I guess you'd have to say, 
shocked. 
But now, in the context of what knowledge he had, I think what came across to me was his concern about utilizing it--whether it was justified, whether there was enough 
evidence so he could hold his head high and not be accused of playing cheap politics at the end in a desperation effort to win an election. But the fact is he did not indicate he was 
prepared to discuss it in detail with me. He let it hang there. 
If he'd discussed this in detail with me and I'd really focused on it, I would have pressed him hard to go. I think he knew that and he wasn't prepared. We went through 
the glorious Los Angeles events into the close on Monday night late, and onto an airplane to Minneapolis where the subject wasn't discussed. 
G: Earlier in the campaign, there were a series of Humphrey statements, almost anticipating what he wanted the administration to do, troop withdrawals. He made a statement in 
Houston which was contradicted by the President at the American Legion Convention in New Orleans. 
O: Yes. 
G: Do you recall these I guess you would call them his misstatements of--? 
O: Yes, and I'm sure aggravated the White House. Whether you're discussing Vietnam or any other subject with Hubert Humphrey, his greatest admirers, his closest friends, were 
constantly trying to turn him off. You saw references in our discussions and our committee activities--have him just stay with the statement, no off-the-cuff comments. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVI --9 
After Salt Lake, there was concern on our part because he seemed to be taking a variety of positions on Vietnam that didn't relate as he bounced around the country. In every 
instance, it would be offhand comments that he would make, not prepared text. We were urging him to let people interpret what he said in any way they want to because they are 
now anxious to interpret what he said in a favorable context. 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 2 
O: Even the peaceniks wanted to say, "Hubert is a changed Hubert," because they wanted to support him. 
Finally it did settle down. 
(Interruption) 
G: [Do you have any] particular recollections of the White House reaction to that statement in Houston that--? 
O: No, I don't. 
G: Let me ask you about some other issues in the campaign. One that Humphrey describes in his memoirs tied to funding was a group of oil men visiting him in Waverly and apparently 
offering to contribute money to his campaign if he would support maintaining the depletion allowance at the current level, which he refused to do. Do you recall that? 
O: I recall his refusal. I was not at the meeting or privy to it. 
G: You think that was a significant loss of money, of financing, for his campaign? 
O: Yes. 
G: Do you? 
O: That happened in a couple of other areas. I don't remember the details. My admiration for Hubert probably was further enhanced, even though you said, "Oh, my gosh." 
(Laughter) "The empty pot now has a hole in it." 
G: Was this the textile manufacturers that--? 
O: I believe so. I recall there was an offer that was pretty crass. All he had to do was formalize a position and their pockets would be open. There would not be specific 
figures, but this would open the door. Hubert had a tendency to react from the gut and dismiss from his mind the fact that we're broke, which was admirable. 
The aspect of the fund raising I referred to that took place at the Waldorf late in 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVI --10 
the campaign for media over the last two or three weeks was, no one present at that meeting was asking for anything. 
G: No strings attached? 
O: These were fellows who had a great admiration for Hubert. When they were loaning money that day, I don't think there was a man in the room who had a real expectation he'd 
ever see that money again. 
This was aboveboard. They had the resources and you'd make the plea on that basis. You could not make the plea, "Hand me two hundred and fifty thousand dollars." 
That was not the right approach so there was in the context, "Would you loan me two hundred and fifty thousand dollars?" Or loan the campaign. It was on a loan basis and 
after the fact, there was one participant who seriously came forward and reminded us that we owed him the money and that it should be repaid. I'm sure it wasn't, but the rest I 
never heard from. 
G: Really? 
O: I don't think Hubert did. 
G: Yes. Was there a formula for resolving the campaign debt or as much of it as possible, a percentage of it? 
O: The problem with the campaign debt is that you lost. If we had prevailed, everyone would have had their loans repaid and every debt would have been paid off. But we were left 
with the devastating situation of having lost and leaving behind, with the Democratic National Committee, a significant debt. We had been able to scurry around to pay current 
obligations, the ones that you had to pay. That was primarily media. But as far as the other debt, travel, airlines, telephone, all of that added up to several million dollars--it was 
a Democratic National Committee problem. We'd have to leave that to others in the future, which is not unusual in a campaign. What was probably unusual was the extent of 
the debt. 
G: Was there an attempt to settle those debts for, say, twenty cents on the dollar or something like that? 
O: Yes, there were efforts. There were some settlements in the brief remaining period that I was involved. Bob Short was a committed fellow. 
If you had a twelve hundred dollar debt with some little printer and you had twelve hundred dollars, he got the twelve hundred. When you got to airlines, telephone, you 
weren't in a position to pay it off, then you were into negotiations of so much on the dollar. Every candidate for president has engaged in that. I remember Senator [Hugh] 
Scott of Pennsylvania proposed that a political party had to pay its debt a hundred cents 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVI --11 
on the dollar. Clearly it was aimed at us. Republicans have always been in a position to pay debt. They have a surplus while Democrats invariably, even in good times when you 
do prevail, spend a good portion of time trying to pay off debt while in incumbency. When you're out of office and have a debt, you're left pretty much naked. 
G: Well, it was in effect a way to get de facto financing in the campaign from, say, corporations if you simply didn't repay the loans. 
O: It was debt legitimately owed. There was no reluctance on the part of the airline to give you credit or the telephone company. That doesn't mean that you shouldn't pay the debt, 
but there is some give and take. 
But that doesn't apply to some printer. Those people are entitled to have a priority. That's the way I looked at it. If you had a hundred thousand dollars Bob Short 
would say, "Let's look at the list. Let's start at the low numbers." Those are the people who in most instances are not in a position to absorb any debt. So you'd clear those up 
and as you move up the list, then you're to negotiating. 
G: Let's look at some other issues. The Nixon campaign pressed hard on law and order and attempted to give the impression that Humphrey was soft on crime. 
O: That's right and Humphrey took a strong position on law and order. We had controversy regarding this position. That's reflected in the material. I firmly believed that, regardless 
of the Nixon posture, the climate of America was such that the average American would look carefully at a candidate in this area and would expect him to take a strong and, 
indeed, tough position. I felt that way personally. There were those who felt Humphrey was going too far, that he had placed too much focus on this issue and justice should be 
emphasized to a greater extent. Many of his liberal friends expressed concern. But we did take what I thought was a strong, solid position and a consistent one in that area. 
G: How about nuclear proliferation and the whole movement late in the administration to have a Soviet summit to restrict the proliferation of nuclear arms? Was this a genuine 
difference between parties and the two candidates? 
O: There was a clear difference. That was a comfortable issues position. It was consistent and it did point out a void between the two parties. 
G: What was the significance of the Fortas nomination here? 
O: Political significance? 
G: Yes. 
O: That played both ways. Our feeling on the Fortas nomination was that this is a key nomination in terms of social progress, assurance of a liberal bent on the Court. I don't 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVI --12 
recall we had any particular trouble with it. There was a strong position on Fortas. The Jewish community had a particular interest. That was about the extent of it. 
I don't recall the Abe Fortas nomination becoming a pre-eminent issue. From our polls and I believe reflected in Gallup and Harris, there seemed to be two overriding 
issues: Vietnam and law and order. Some law and order aspects were brought into focus to some extent because of George Wallace's candidacy. There were other issues that 
impacted on single-issue groups. But the broad-based issues of that campaign were Vietnam and law and order. 
Interestingly enough, on economic issues I recall suggestions he made that, "You can't go before the American people and advocate raising taxes. But you can go before 
the American people advocating reducing taxes and it's probably not a good posture to go before the American people in neutral." There were those among us who felt Hubert 
should have been more aggressive in tax reduction. Jim Rowe mentioned at one point he never knew of a candidate who didn't advocate reducing taxes. Well, since then we've 
known of a candidate advocating raising taxes, and it was a disaster. 
G: Nixon wrote in his memoirs that had Wallace not been in the race, he would have won in a landslide comparable to Eisenhower's in 1952. 
O: I don't know whether he would have won that big. We carried Texas, but it would have been extremely difficult in a two-man race. The Wallace vote was significant, although 
Wallace dropped considerably in the polls as the campaign progressed. The fact remains you could identify the Wallace vote as traditional Democratic. 
G: But the question is, would the vote have otherwise gone to Nixon or would it have gone to Humphrey in this particular [campaign]? 
O: That is the question. You could put a number on it. You could split it. What you had was blue-collar support for Wallace with heavy law and order. It was traditionally pretty 
much Democratic. Wallace isn't on the ballot and it's Nixon and Humphrey. For Nixon to play the numbers game, saying it would have been a landslide comparable to Eisenhower 
is a gross exaggeration. 
G: Would it be accurate to suggest that Wallace hurt Nixon more in the South and Humphrey more in the industrial states? 
O: That would be accurate. I think the Texas situation is a good example. It would be hard for me to contend we would have carried Texas if it had not been a three-man race. On 
the other hand, I would conclude that we would have carried New Jersey if it were a two-man race. Wallace hurt Humphrey greatly in the industrial North and Northeast. 
And he had an impact adverse to Nixon in the South and Southwest. 
G: With this regional differentiation in mind, did the Humphrey campaign ever advance 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVI --13 
Wallace's candidacy in places where they felt that it would impair Nixon? 
O: We didn't attempt to advance his candidacy but we were less anti-Wallace in those areas. Our tendency was to let Wallace play his game. There wasn't any real impact we could 
make anyway. Try through labor primarily and through our own resources to blunt the Wallace negative impact on us in the North and Northeast. We were aggressively trying 
to do that. 
G: Okay. Let's look at some of these. You've discussed New Jersey. Were you surprised by the outcome in New Jersey? 
O: Yes. I focused on New Jersey on the basis of political history. Looking back over prior elections, a New Jersey win would have projected in my mind a close Humphrey victory. 
A New Jersey loss would indicate you were on the downside. I focused my attention on New Jersey in those early hours after the polls closed, by direct communication with 
Governor [Richard] Hughes and the state chairman. 
I was reluctant to accept their initial report that was pessimistic. Hughes was very candid. He said, "It's going to be close but it doesn't look good." New Jersey, to me, is a 
significant early indication. Hughes called me back. I talked to Hughes again until it was all over in New Jersey. That was it. You just couldn't wishfully think any further. 
I did not suggest to Hubert that he concede. In fact, I went with him to the ballroom where he stated, "It is early. It's premature to reach any conclusions." He 
remained optimistic and went back upstairs. 
It turned out to be a sufficiently close election so that when I left Minneapolis, the next day I went directly to my office at the national committee to have people explore a 
recount in Illinois. I felt strongly, having lived through Illinois on the win side, that there could be hanky-panky in southern Illinois and it was conceivable that we could make an 
effort on recount. I remember talking to Danny Rostenkowski and others. As the hours went by, this went aglimmering. There was no effort on our part to do that. 
I focused there because of my knowledge of that state. People talked about Dick Daley and Cook County, but if media had made an effort they could have looked at 
southern Illinois and have found a rip-off in the Republican strongholds of that state. But be that as it may, that wasn't pursued. If Illinois could have been turned around, that 
might create a gray area in the electoral college. 
G: How helpful was Mayor Daley in that election? 
O: Very much so. 
G: Was he? 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVI --14 
O: Yes, completely aboard. 
G: Humphrey wrote in his memoirs that he had written off Illinois too soon, that if he had devoted more attention to it--O: 
I think you could say that, with that extremely close margin in Illinois. I'm sure it's exactly what Nixon went through in 1960. You're bound to go to the next stage. We should have 
put more resources in Illinois, made a greater effort there. That serves no useful purpose. It's Monday morning quarterbacking. 
G: The assumption is that the resources would have had to have been taken away from someplace else. 
O: Sure. The statistical game is interesting, probably, but it is rather meaningless. You can take the popular vote and spread it around--a half a percentage point here or one vote in 
every thousand there. You could drive yourself mad. 
G: In general, did you feel that your own polling accurately reflected where work was needed? 
O: Yes. We had to lean on some of the other polling, state polling and local polling. Our polling was more limited than we would have liked and so we would evaluate polling 
available to us and make our decisions accordingly. We were closer to reality in our internal polling than the poll results that were nationally disseminated. I recalled some of 
our discussions on polling in the campaign. Some sources gave us earlier poll results than the press, a week later or five days later. 
We were frustrated trying to sell the media on something that we were firmly convinced of. And I was totally frustrated. A pundit would say you're down twelve 
points when I was absolutely persuaded we were down eight. He's talking about eight points and I'm persuaded we were down four or five and he's talking about six points and 
I'm persuaded that this has developed into a horse race. In each instance I couldn't sell. Consequently, we were never able to generate timely public reaction--and it's there. 
Polling is extremely important and poll results have an inordinate impact. The rapid movement of that campaign over the last three weeks and the polls weren't catching 
up. We were catching up, because we'd get the quickest and earliest results from our own polling and one of the national polling organizations. It's going to take four or five days 
before some pundit will say, "O'Brien has a point there." But he'd just laugh it off when I would talk to him. Now, you've lost another four or five days of movement. That was 
extremely frustrating. If you were playing a con game that would be one thing, but we were believers in those last three weeks. We knew something really dramatic had 
happened out there in the countryside. 
I remember the reverse of that in 1960 when I flew to Hyannis on election day. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVI --15 
Despite the fact that Monday Gallup Poll showed but a three-point margin, I believe, I was convinced we had a very comfortable win. As that night unfolded it turned out otherwise. 
In the Humphrey-Nixon election, I was absolutely persuaded we were in a horse race. And we were. But the pundits weren't persuaded. 
G: Let's talk about Ohio for a minute, another pivotal state that you lost. 
O: It followed the basic Ohio pattern. We weren't able to overcome in Cuyahoga County in Cleveland the results coming from the rest of the state. I don't recall anything in terms of 
the campaign in Ohio that was significant. We were in another tough, close race. State by state you can see these close margins. There are people who have said it probably would 
have been just as well if Humphrey was soundly defeated in 1968 because from where he started and where he came from with all the problems, it was a terrible blow. To realize 
that with additional money or an additional week or two, it probably would have been different. You dwell on that. I still dwell on that. That was the most difficult result I was 
ever forced to accept. 
G: If the bombing halt had come sooner, a week sooner, let's say, would that have made a significant difference? 
O: Conceivably. If it had come earlier, perhaps it would have had a more significant effect. If it hadn't come at all, those election results might have been a little different. So you 
take what you can get and be thankful for it. 
G: There was some discussion in your campaign policy committee minutes and in the press and elsewhere of what if the election were thrown into the House of Representatives. 
O: Yes. There was discussion in media and internally with us. I never devoted a lot of time and attention to it. It was extremely remote as I saw it, no matter how you played the 
numbers. Why devote an inordinate amount of time during the middle of the campaign to this subject? That was titillating to students of government and the press. 
(Interruption) 
Our position was established early and I guess requires some clarification because of some offhand comments Hubert had made at some point. 
There was discussion of deals, that Wallace and Nixon had worked out a deal. We simply stated there was no such thing as a deal. We had no interest in a deal. The closest 
we got to anything like that was Gene McCarthy's comment, "Why don't you support me in New York and California and I'll get the electoral votes and then we can discuss the 
matter." I'm sure he was being facetious. 
G: Humphrey was, as you say, quizzed by the press with regards to whether or not he would support the candidate that attracted the most votes, the plurality. 
19
O'Brien --Interview XXVI --16 
O: Yes. I don't think he made a definitive response. 
G: Yes. 
O: Which was the appropriate position to take. 
G: You mentioned being in Minneapolis on election eve, election night. Let me ask you to recall as much as you can of that occasion. You did say in your book that emotions were 
high that night. 
O: We moved into Minneapolis with real enthusiasm. It had taken a long time, but we were upbeat and we fully anticipated a close election. We were confident that a close election 
could turn in our favor. 
The long election day that everybody experiences was with some of the staff, Joe Napolitan. There were others, Ira [Kapenstein] in my suite, being sure they had the 
appropriate contacts to keep abreast of the results as they came in. The Humphreys were in a suite on the same floor down the hall with a handful of relatives and intimate friends. 
As the results started to come in, the tenseness rose because the expectancy of a close election was being borne out and, obviously, your hopes rose accordingly. I don't 
think there were many, three or four weeks earlier or even two weeks earlier, who would anticipate an election night that would have the suspense that one did. I recall a movie 
actor who had staunchly supported Hubert drifted into my rooms. His name was Gene Barry. He had other movie-type people with him and were invited to sit down. They 
were enjoying themselves and quite relaxed while we were becoming more tense by the minute, to the point where Joe Napolitan erupted and ordered them out of the suite. I 
think it was just an indication of the tenseness that we didn't want laughter in the background. We needed concentration. I would go down the hall to the Humphreys' suite 
from time to time, visit there. It was relatively quiet. There were some early favorable results and real enthusiasm in the suite. That enthusiasm was not at the same level in my 
rooms because it was generated by watching television sets in Hubert's suite. His friends, who would not be as politically alert as we were, made some assumptions that were 
exaggerated off early returns. 
I've mentioned New Jersey, but there were probably some other indications from Ira and Joe and others making contacts around the country that kept us reasonably 
optimistic. But as the hours wore on, optimism waned. New Jersey was a blow to the solar plexus. It was to me. 
The time inevitably came when demands were made on Hubert to make a statement or make an appearance. He and I discussed that and by the time he made his 
appearance downstairs, we were not nearly as optimistic as we had been earlier. We were finding it more difficult as the minutes went on. So he agreed that he would go down, 
20
O'Brien --Interview XXVI --17 
take Muriel with him, and simply tell the press that it was too early to come to any definitive conclusions. And I remember saying, "I'll go down with you," because I felt that 
lonely vigil was beginning and I wanted to keep him company. We came back upstairs and as I mentioned earlier, Bryce Harlow wanted to talk to me and that call was never 
completed. 
It drifted into the early hours of the morning to dawn. It was over. That's the way an election night plays out when you're on the wrong end. 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 1 
G: [You'd] not had a lot of experience with being on the wrong end of the column until this. 
O: No, actually it was a new experience. The only other experience remotely like that, but was infinitesimal in comparison, occurred the night that Bobby Kennedy lost the Oregon 
primary. It's not very pleasant to move through a losing election night, because at the presidential level, I've always considered election night somewhat comparable to the final 
game of the World Series, the NFL Super Bowl, and the NBA's final game all compressed in one event. It is overwhelming--the excitement and enthusiasm and joy that can emanate 
from election results when you're a winner and the depths of despair when you're a loser. You think about it as an event every four years that is really, truly an American event, the 
way we conduct campaigns. When you think of the effort that has been expanded, in some instances years of effort. 
The culmination in victory is almost beyond your capacity to cope with. Your joy and enthusiasm reach a dimension that I've never experienced in anything else in life. By 
the same token, in loss, you reach a depth of despair that I probably haven't experienced in life. That night in Minneapolis has been burned into my memory. But of course the night 
in Hyannis is also burned in my memory in reverse. 
G: Did this give you a desire to be out of politics for a while? 
O: No, I had planned that in any event. I had faced up, as I recounted, to the need to direct my life more appropriately in terms of my responsibilities. While I had been on a roller 
coaster in terms of the private sector through those months, I have no doubt in my mind that I would have gone into the private sector if Hubert won. Even though I failed in 
some of the commitments I had made, the fact is, at that point in my life it was essential that I have some game plan for the future. You couldn't achieve any plan if you were to 
remain in the political arena. 
So I didn't have a reaction that this is such a disastrous situation that I didn't want any part of politics anymore. I had made that decision early on. Within a couple of days I 
went to Ireland. I stayed in Ireland to try to unwind for a week or two. And I came back to face the realities of the future. 
21
O'Brien --Interview XXVI --18 
One of the most poignant moments in my Hubert Humphrey experience was the night before inauguration. Hubert had called me and suggested he and Muriel would like 
to drop by our house. And they did. It was emotional as far as I was concerned because the purpose, as it turned out, was to thank us. Muriel thanked us for what we had done 
and, as they saw it, the sacrifices that we had made in their behalf. And they regretted that it had turned out the way it had, but they wanted us to know then the deepness, the 
sincerity of their appreciation. I couldn't believe it because this man was destined the next morning to sit on the platform and see his opponent sworn in as the president of the 
United States. He'd have to be there as the outgoing vice president. I focused on that as we were chatting, that he could be as pleasant, as normal and natural as he was for the 
hour or so they spent with us that early evening, having to go through this heartbreaking situation the following morning. In personal terms, that made a great impact on me and 
on Elva. It certainly enhanced--there was no need of it but it enhanced--our high regard and affection for both the Humphreys. I never met finer people in my life and never had a 
more rewarding association. 
G: That night in Minneapolis was Humphrey gracious in defeat? 
O: Yes, he was. 
G: He didn't blame the press? 
O: No, he wasn't Nixon in defeat, I can tell you. There was nothing like that. He was very much the man I admired. 
G: Let's move back to Lyndon Johnson for a moment. It has been argued that LBJ was not a good party leader, that he allowed the Democratic National Committee to wither away, 
that he placed the party machinery in a position that lost a lot of governorships this year, in addition to the White House. Was Johnson a negligent party leader in that respect? 
O: He was basically in the same role as Jack Kennedy. I was in the White House with both. I, more than anyone in the White House other than the President, should have been 
sensitive to and concerned about the party structure. After all, I had been deeply involved in the party structure. But I found that my attention was directed elsewhere, that the state 
of the party was not a matter I focused any great attention on over those years. I say that only because I noted that presidents have a tendency to do the same, unfortunately. We 
had only fleeting involvement with the Democratic National Committee during the Kennedy years. The President's reaction to the national committee was that it is where a 
great debt lies that somehow I'm personally responsible for and it's necessary for me to defray that debt. There would be a desire to be helpful in defraying the debt. But I did 
not get the sense that the Presidents, Kennedy or Johnson, looked to the national committee for guidance or support, or indeed looked at it as a viable entity that was 
meaningful. It was neglect. It wasn't purposely done. Both Presidents showed a lack of party leadership, which is part of their role. The president of the United States is 
commander in chief and the leader of his party. With the third hat, attention wanes. We 
22
O'Brien --Interview XXVI --19 
looked to the national chairman, certainly in the Kennedy period particularly, as a fellow who could take the heat when things didn't go well in appointments or patronage. We did 
not consider that the chairman should be very much a part of White House activities and interests. By that, I mean being present. An occasional invitation to a social event to the 
chairman seemed to suffice. 
That was much the same in both the Kennedy and Johnson periods from my White House perspective. I take some blame for that. I firmly believe, in retrospect, that I 
would have been listened to, at least by Kennedy; with Johnson, maybe not to that extent because I didn't have the long-time, close political relationship with him. But I think he 
would have listened if I had done more than express passing concerns from time to time. If I had formalized procedures, some activities that would directly relate the national 
chairman to the president and to the administration, it would have been helpful in terms of party organization across the country. By the time we arrived in the White House, we 
didn't feel any great sense of debt. 
(Interruption) 
The 1960 campaign was waged basically independent of the existing structure in the national committee. We took over the resources and the office space of the committee. 
We named a chairman, Scoop [Henry] Jackson, and then John Bailey became chairman after the election. But it was the Kennedy organization, as we saw it, across the country 
that had achieved the victory. 
And the years drifted on. If presidents gave a thought to the national committee, it wasn't in the sense that, "The national committee can be awfully helpful, effective in 
promoting my program, in off-year elections and the upcoming national election." The role of the national committee in the election context wasn't really focused on. I don't 
remember any meaningful discussions with the Presidents in that area. As things unfolded, you became totally absorbed in your role as president, commander in chief. Lyndon 
Johnson had won in a landslide. He had become president through the assassination and then won on his own. The national committee was responsible for convention procedures 
and all that sort of thing, had some degree of involvement in the campaign--we've recounted that. But, again, was the national committee the focal point for the campaign 
effort? The answer would probably be no. You implemented and utilized it. It was a help, obviously. 
So the accusation that Lyndon Johnson did not prove to be an effective party leader is an accusation that probably could be leveled at just about everyone, back to 
probably after the second term of Roosevelt. Jim Farley in the Roosevelt era was in a unique position. He was a cabinet officer and also party chairman. People didn't frown on 
that sort of thing in those days, didn't consider it unusual. Jim Farley was involved directly with President Roosevelt. He had been a long-time confidant and associate of his. They 
had a break later on and went their separate ways. 
23
O'Brien --Interview XXVI --20 
But after that, for example, when the party was out, Paul Butler made a major effort to activate the national committee and have an effective organization. He was 
turned back by the Democrats in Congress consistently with all the efforts he expended. I remember I was privy to some of this as an observer. And I remember feeling that Butler 
was mistreated by the Democratic Congress. And he was. He was dismissed out of hand. 
So the strength didn't lie there. As the years unfolded, you have, and it's the case today, Senate and House Campaign Committees. They engage in major fund raising. 
Contributors across the country to the Democratic Party will contribute to individual members of Congress, Democrats, collectively. I found I did not relish the experience of 
sitting at the head table at a congressional fund-raising event that was probably raising a million dollars that night, as chairman to the Democratic Party with a nine million dollar 
debt when none of the proceeds would go to the Democratic National Committee. The Democratic National Committee, as an entity raising funds, has possibilities that improved 
over recent years. 
Let's get back to the President; was he an effective party leader? I think in the climate of those years and the perception of the Democratic National Committee in those 
years, particularly when the party's in power, it was such that you can't fault presidents and say, "Well, he lost governorships and lost that election because he failed to be an 
effective party leader." I think there were too many other elements of this that have to be considered in that regard. Neither President I was associated with purposely wanted to 
diminish the role of the national committee or render it ineffective. It was just a matter of lack of focus on the party organization full time. I regretted it, having been in the national 
committee. I understood it. I was sensitive to it, but I did nothing about it. 
G: To what extent was it a matter of personnel if a close ally of Lyndon Johnson had headed the national committee instead of John Bailey? 
O: It would have had some effect in that President Johnson would have paid more attention to the national committee, have a sense of greater responsibility toward the committee. 
While John Bailey wasn't an intimate, close associate of Jack Kennedy's, they had known each other for a long time and Bailey had been one of the first supporters of his candidacy. 
So the relationship, on a personal basis, was a pleasant one--two fellows who had known each other a long time and Jack Kennedy liked John Bailey. 
So, with Lyndon Johnson, if he had somebody intimate or close to him as national chairman, the fellow could have had access to the President. There just wasn't that kind of 
relationship or interest in the Oval Office. With President Johnson, I believe he was desirous of having his own man in place as national chairman, a person directly 
accountable to him and closely associated with him. But I don't think beyond that, if that were the case, he would be greatly involved. As I've discussed in earlier interviews, we 
were informal patronage dispensers in my office. When some member of Congress would be turned down, John Bailey might give him the bad news. We'd do that quite often. I'm 
not suggesting that was proper procedure. I firmly believe in a national party and a 
24
O'Brien --Interview XXVI --21 
national structure, but I'll have to say I haven't seen an effective national party that is ongoing, fully financed, in a position to carry out the programs you envision. That is a 
glaring weakness in the system. 
Now, the Republicans never have financial problems. I'm not familiar with how they function as the out party. But you go back a long way to find a strong national 
chairman who had the kind of relationship I would envision with the President. And that goes back to Ray Bliss. At least by reputation, he was the Republican Jim Farley. 
It's a vehicle that has utilization. But it does not play the role I envisioned and still envision. Maybe that is coming. The national chairman currently, Paul Kirk, as chairman 
of a party that's out, is working arduously at his task and I think is doing all the things that a chairman should do. With the advent of federal financing of national conventions, it's a 
different situation. You have some of the financial burden off your back. That has to be helpful in carrying out your responsibilities. 
Back to Johnson and Kennedy, I didn't detect any particular difference in approach and attitude towards the national committee with either of them. There was the same sort 
of neglect, not purposely, but due to overriding circumstances. You just don't focus on some office downtown somewhere. 
G: You mentioned several sessions ago how complimentary President Johnson was when you left the cabinet to join Robert Kennedy's campaign. I'm just wondering, in retrospect, 
when you were in the fall of 1968 managing Humphrey's campaign, did you sense any residual dissatisfaction that the President may have had with you for your earlier alliance 
with Robert Kennedy? 
O: No. I didn't. I recall my conversation with him when I submitted my resignation. I recall his immediate public reaction, and he really extended himself to ensure that, as he said, all 
the accolades were there. His appreciation as expressed to me was total. I detected no reservations. 
G: You never sensed through [James Rowe] or Humphrey or anyone else that he resented your working for Bobby? 
O: No. It may have been there, but I never sensed it. I visited with the President shortly before he was leaving office and I was leaving office as national chairman. We had a long 
and very interesting conversation. 
G: Tell me about it. 
O: There was a good deal of reminiscing, reflecting on the good days, the legislative successes, the Great Society, all of that. He was departing and I was departing. We had 
shared a lot. He talked on at length. He was very warm and extremely pleasant. I remember that it was extensive because Jim Jones, on at least two occasions, interrupted 
25
O'Brien --Interview XXVI --22 
to remind him of his next appointment. He dismissed him saying, "I'll be with you later." And then on the second or third interruption saying, "I'll tell you when I'm ready. Larry 
and I haven't finished." 
It was heartwarming to me because I had not had any meaningful contact with the President since I had departed, other than those references I made. He seemed to have all 
the time in the world to visit. He talked about his family's direct involvement with Vietnam, and so did I because my son was serving in Vietnam. Finally, I thought it was 
appropriate for me to close it out if I could. I told him he was way behind on his schedule and I really appreciated the opportunity to visit with him. We wished each other well. 
He asked one question through all of that, "Who is Hubert going to name as national chairman?" As I recall the timetable, the decision had been made; it hadn't been 
announced. I had suggested Terry Sanford to Hubert. Hubert, for his own reasons, selected Fred Harris. He felt he owed him a debt. That was understandable. So I said to 
the President, "It's my understanding he's going to name Fred Harris." And the President shook his head negatively. 
G: Really? 
O: I don't recall a comment specifically, but clearly he didn't think that was the right decision. I don't know what to say other than that. But when two men put their arms around each 
other and say goodbye, if I had created any problems or any negative attitude going with Bobby or whatever, it wasn't apparent that night and it wasn't necessary for him to spend 
that amount of time with me as we both closed out our activities. 
G: Did he indicate that there was anything in his presidency that he would have done differently? 
O: I don't recall that he got into that specifically. He did reflect on the torment of Vietnam and the tremendous difficulties that it brought --and he did say that--that he had done the 
best he possibly could, that he had been dedicated to the resolution of Vietnam, that any failures in that regard throughout were not of the heart. His heart had been with it. He 
did not fault anyone for the escalation of the war, as I recall. I knew he felt strongly about the advice he had gotten from William Westmoreland and others and probably even the 
Defense Department. 
But none of that came into this conversation. It was just a man, ready to pack up, feeling that despite the Vietnam disaster he had done the best he could and had dedicated 
himself to the job, and that he felt comfortable with the record. 
G: Did he speculate any on the Nixon presidency to follow? 
O: I don't think we got into that. 
26
O'Brien --Interview XXVI --23 
G: Rehash the Humphrey campaign? 
O: No, we really didn't do that either. It was more a personal discussion. We had something to reminisce about. That was the legislative program, obviously. The only moment I 
would consider a little off the track was his inquiry regarding who the new national chairman would be. Other than that, we discussed our respective families, reviewed the 
era. We were really saying goodbye to each other. And, as I say, if there were any problems, I never sensed them. 
G: Okay. I want to ask you about a couple of the assertions raised in the book that we've discussed before, Citizen Hughes. One is the assertion that Hughes, of course, was trying 
to prevent nuclear testing and that he had commissioned [Robert] Maheu to offer LBJ a million dollars, perhaps for the Library, perhaps for the School of Public Affairs, 
something, to stop the proposed nuclear test. Were you aware of that and did you ever take this up with the President? 
O: No. I never had any discussions with the President regarding Hughes on any matter. I believe that book indicated, if it didn't state, that I arranged for the meeting. I not only 
didn't arrange the meeting, I was not even in the White House. I had long left the White House before that supposed meeting. It did take place because Bob Maheu talked to me 
about it since the book you referred to. I have no knowledge of what conversation Maheu had with Johnson at the Ranch. I was not privy to the meeting and I certainly had nothing 
to do with arranging the meeting. 
But in the conversation I had with Maheu since the book, he was chuckling telling me about the instructions from Hughes. Apparently, he got instructions up to and almost 
moments before he went into the meeting that he dismissed out of hand. It's a story that you ought to get from Maheu. I don't recall the details, but there were several humorous 
elements to it. 
When the book came out, at some point I had a conversation with Jimmy Jones. He had no recollection, as the appointment secretary, of ever having any discussion with 
me about any meeting. In fact, he took the occasion to verify that in the records. 
So I was at a total loss. That wasn't the only item in that book that threw me. I finally learned what you can be subjected to--the libel and slander--without recourse if 
you're a public figure. The book was replete with misstatements and outright lies to achieve the writer's objective. I unfortunately agreed to meet with this character for an 
interview. I refused to meet further when I learned about his despicable background. He was in possession of stolen documents; he had been indicted with Abbie Hoffman for drug 
sales to underground cops. Hoffman was convicted but this fellow wormed his way before another grand jury and claimed he was present as a press observer, which was 
laughable. In addition, he had fled California to avoid testifying in the criminal case involving the stolen documents. That was the type of contemptible character he was. 
27
O'Brien --Interview XXVI --24 
Like so many others, I simply had to endure it. There is really no recourse under the law if you're deemed a public figure. I was invited on some TV program with this 
fellow, but there was no way I would lower myself to the level of association with a man of this stripe under any circumstances. 
G: A couple of his assertions concerned the 1968 campaign, one suggesting that Maheu's friendship with [Edmund] Muskie was partially responsible for Muskie's selection as vice 
president. 
O: That is as far from reality as you can get. Maheu had no more to do with Muskie's selection than Khaddafy. It's ridiculous. 
G: Another point that he makes is the suggestion that Hughes contributed significantly to Humphrey's campaign. 
O: I just don't know. The only time Maheu's name came into conversation between Humphrey and me was when I had the long discussion with him in Chicago that night. 
And I had made a commitment to the Hughes people. They were becoming clients of mine, along with the networks. I mentioned Maheu specifically. He talked to Maheu in 
my presence as he was one of those he called to ask for a postponement of an agreement. It was a brief conversation and his request was readily acceded to. He also talked to 
[Frank] Stanton of CBS and to the publisher I was dealing with on a book. He made no reference to how well, if at all, he knew Maheu. I never conceived that he knew him. He 
was just a name along with Stanton and the publisher. The calls were made back to back and that was it. I had no knowledge of any relationship or whether he received 
contributions or didn't. 
G: In one particular case, the author asserts that you received twenty-five thousand dollars for Robert Kennedy's campaign after Kennedy's assassination and turned it over to Steve 
Smith. 
O: That's accurate. I had made public comment on that years earlier. Maheu, in a visit to Washington, told me--this is after Bobby's death, of course--that he had made a 
commitment early on to Pierre Salinger, to make a contribution to Bobby Kennedy's campaign. He said that he felt conscience-stricken because he did not fulfill the 
commitment and could I arrange for the money to be forwarded to Steve Smith. I said sure and he gave me an envelope. I never saw how much was in it, but I believe he 
mentioned twenty-five thousand. I did not open the envelope. That was in the evening. The next morning I called Steve Smith in New York and I told him that I had this 
envelope that Maheu wanted to get to him, and Steve said, "Fine." He sent a fellow to Washington on the shuttle. I turned the envelope over to my secretary, Phyllis Maddock, 
and the fellow came to the office and picked up the envelope from Phyllis Maddock. Maheu had said he considered it a contribution that still was valid because he knew there 
was a campaign deficit and this could be applied to the deficit and it fulfilled the commitment he had made to Pierre during the course of the campaign. 
28
O'Brien --Interview XXVI --25 
I was not aware, obviously, of the commitment. It was a matter of sending the envelope to New York. Maheu wasn't going to New York and would I get it to Smith. 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 2 
G: [Could I get you] to elaborate on your trip to Ireland in November of 1968, after the election? 
O: I felt the dire need for a change of scenery. Over there, I was contacted by Irish television and the Irish press. The election was still fresh in their minds. So I went through a couple 
of interviews. Then a television show with a live audience and four panelists invited me for an hour. This was a program that had achieved prominence in the country. I agreed 
to go on it. One of the panelists was a daughter of John Huston, but the one that I wound up in some controversy with was a professor at Trinity College, who apparently was well 
known in the country. He proceeded to discuss the campaign and the election in the United States in rather negative terms. 
G: What did he say? 
O: Well, he started to ridicule. "All you people do is have rallies and have balloons and bands and you don't have any serious substantive discussions." I took affront. I rather enjoyed 
it, as a matter of fact. He and I entered into an extensive discussion of American politics. I was rather sharp with him and he with me. It relaxed me. 
In any event, this was my first night in Ireland. Then as I traveled the country, to my amazement, at every stop, people were recognizing me from that program. Most 
complimented me on what I had done to the professor. Apparently, they had been waiting to have somebody take him on. But that was just the side bar of the Irish trip. I stayed in 
Ireland ten days, and then back to reality. 
End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview XXVI 
29
    [ Part 27: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--22 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXVII*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
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LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XXVII 
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NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
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(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-39 
4
INTERVIEW XXVII 
DATE: September 23, 1987 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 1 
O: On the evening prior to inauguration, my wife and I were visited by Hubert Humphrey and his wife, Muriel. Hubert had called earlier in the day and said they'd like to drop by, which 
they did. I found it unusual and, indeed, memorable because the visit was for Hubert to thank me for the efforts I had expended in his behalf. He made reference to our friendship 
over the years which had been enhanced through the campaign and he said would continue in the years ahead. Similarly, Muriel expressed to Elva an underscoring of this friendship. 
We had a very pleasant chat of an hour or so. I was most appreciative of the visit. I was extremely impressed that these two people could take time to really extend themselves to 
express appreciation and a pledge of continuing friendship. We had become close to the Humphreys and held them in the highest regard. I considered Hubert a close friend and I 
looked forward to the continuity of our friendship. 
The next day Hubert Humphrey was to go through a tortuous day. He was to be on the inaugural platform, as departing as vice president of the United States, and sit 
through the inauguration of the man who had defeated him. In any event, it was, for my wife and me, a memorable experience that we've treasured to this day. We have the 
fondest memories of the Humphreys. 
[The] inauguration proceeded and I was intent upon departing Washington, which was a commitment I had made to myself long before. A commitment that when I was no 
longer in government or politics, I would definitely prefer not to spend future years in Washington but to cut the cord. The off-again, on-again attempt to prepare myself for the 
private sector that extended back prior to joining Hubert Humphrey and shortly following the death of Bobby Kennedy had been brought into focus. I had failed to comply with the 
agreements I had made with the three networks and Hughes Enterprises to have them as clients of mine. But meanwhile, in December, up to Christmas of 1968, I had gotten into 
intensive discussions with the Wall Street brokerage firm, McDonnell and Company, and had concluded that offered better prospects for the private sector than the initial concept 
of the consulting arrangement. 
So I had committed to come to New York to become president of McDonnell and Company on Wall Street. As I recall it, the firm had thirty or forty branches across the 
country, was one of the largest in the country and a member of the New York and American Stock Exchanges. This was a foreign field to me. I had some general 
knowledge of the McDonnell family--a well-known Irish-American family that had 
5
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --2 
achieved a great deal in the business sector through the father, who had established this firm many years earlier. 
G: Do you have any idea how you were approached by the [McDonnells]? 
O: Yes. There was a mutual friend by the name of George Bissell. George was related through marriage to the McDonnells. His former wife was a McDonnell. There were a 
number of McDonnell children. It was a large family. Henry Ford had married a McDonnell. George Bissell and I had known each other for years. My exposure to 
Murray McDonnell occurred probably late in December, certainly in December. George Bissell brought Murray McDonnell to Washington. We had lunch, which led to intensive 
discussions over a period of several days. I remember it reached Christmas because Murray's wife sent my wife flowers at Christmas. Murray's brother had been chairman of 
the board of McDonnell. Murray was president. Sean had died of a heart attack while jogging. He was in his mid-thirties. Murray had to replace Sean. Murray's proposal to 
me was that he would become chairman of the board and I would become president. 
It called for a contract that I was quite impressed with. I weighed it in the sense this was an ongoing business, firmly established with an assured salary and benefit level, all 
of which I would have to put together in my own company from scratch even though I had a good base to start. George Bissell, my good friend, with Murray, pressed the issue. 
I came to the conclusion just prior to the first of January of 1969 to drop the concept of a consulting firm in New York and join McDonnell and Company as its president. Either 
way, I would be coming to New York. 
So I joined the firm and came to New York to meet the top officers of the firm for the first time. I think it was literally on the day that Nixon was being inaugurated. I 
moved into active participation in the firm almost immediately, no later than the first of February or earlier. I had no knowledge of Wall Street. I had no understanding of the 
brokerage industry. I had, obviously, no concept of the general disarray on Wall Street at the time. I was most naive and I was intrigued with the package offered me and the 
stability that package would present. By accepting the McDonnell proposal I didn't have to go through the initial stages of developing an entity of my own. In any event, I chose 
that route. Ira Kapenstein, my deputy, agreed to move his family to New York. That was part of the agreement I made with McDonnell. Phyllis Maddock, my top assistant, who 
had been with me for years, similarly agreed to come to New York. So I negotiated with McDonnell the package that brought my two top people with me to join me in this new 
endeavor. 
I wasn't at McDonnell and Company very long when I realized that all wasn't as had been presented to me, in terms of the state of the industry and the state of McDonnell 
and Company. In those conversations that led to accepting the position, we had discussion regarding broadening and diversifying McDonell and Company well beyond the 
brokerage firm, with thirty-five hundred or four thousand employees. That sounded challenging. 
6
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --3 
Also, you had to own a percentage of a firm in order to be accepted as a member of the exchange. Also, the normal requirement was that you take an examination, I 
believe orally and in writing, along with interviews prior to acceptance. In fact, Joe Fowler and I believe General [Lucius] Clay, who arrived on Wall Street simultaneously 
with my arrival, went through this whole procedure. It was arranged that I would meet the requirement of stock ownership by signing loan agreements with a bank and the bank 
was only too happy to accommodate me. In fact, the vice president of the bank came to my office at McDonnell's to have me sign these documents. I was investing no money of 
my own. I wasn't in any position to do that. I recall the only bright decision I made during those early stages was when this banker said, "Just sign here." I signed loan 
agreements for just what was required at that time, which was half of what I was to receive. That would be satisfactory in fulfilling the requirement of the exchange and 
meant I hadn't committed myself to as significant an indebtedness as the smiling vice president was encouraging me to do. Later events proved that that was probably the only 
smart decision I had made in some time. 
Beyond that, the officers of the exchange met with me in a formal setting. John Loeb was one of the key people on Wall Street and he and I had become friendly in the 
Humphrey campaign. There were a couple of other prominent Wall Street people who joined with John Loeb and notified me they were waiving all other requirements. 
So I found myself president of a brokerage firm with a waiver from the stock exchange that brought me membership and acceptance by the exchange almost 
simultaneously with arrival. Then we proceeded to look at McDonnell. Every brokerage firm on Wall Street was in some serious difficulty. Firms were closing; firms were 
merging. The operation was in a total state of disarray. That was prior to computerization. Nobody could clearly determine stock ownership of individual 
purchases. It was a total mess. In addition to that, McDonnell and Company owned several seats on the New York Exchange. My recollection is probably five. They owned 
several seats on the American Exchange. My recollection is probably three. 
Contrary to what I had envisioned, we weren't engaging in any serious considerations regarding diversification. Rather, we were in discussions constantly 
regarding survival. Survival meant there had to be an input into McDonnell and Company of a significant amount of money. Significant was in the millions. As we pursued this, we 
were forced to sell some seats on the exchange to meet the exchange requirements in cash on hand. I guess we probably reduced the five seats to two on the New York Exchange 
and three seats to one on the American Exchange. That was our sole source of cash flow. 
G: Pardon my ignorance but what was the advantage of having five seats as opposed to one or two seats? 
O: Well, it was a matter of prestige and it did mean you could function nationally in better order than with one seat. Your position on the exchange was more significant. And it 
7
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --4 
was considered a good investment. The seats on the New York Exchange were probably in the vicinity of half a million dollars at the time, but beginning to drop. The going price 
can vary and does. I have no idea what it is today. I imagine it's very substantial. The New York Exchange sent us notice a couple of times that we were delinquent in meeting 
our obligations to the exchange. This was what you were engaged in. 
Now I'd begun to catch up with this situation probably in the first ninety days. It took that long before you realize that not only was it a serious problem which required a 
significant input of money in order to modernize, but the money wasn't there. This went on for probably ninety days or longer and you hoped to see daylight. You didn't have time 
to regret what you had done. You had made a commitment and tried to fulfill it. It was a very depressing situation. But you continued to hope for the best. 
The McDonnells' mother was still alive. She was very much a matriarch and a very impressive woman. I didn't know her husband, who was the founder of the firm, but he 
had been extremely successful. They had their compound in the Hamptons and their homes in New Jersey. This was a socially prominent family, one of the most highly visible 
Irish-American families in the country. On the Flanigan side of the family, Murray's wife had a brother, Peter Flanigan, who became an aide to Nixon in the White House, and her 
father, Horace Flanigan, who--not in his presence--was referred to as Horrible Horace, was president of Manufacturers Hanover Bank. Another McDonnell was married to a 
man named Johnson, who was a lawyer active in the business world. All of them had a share of ownership in McDonnell and Company, all the children. There was a brother 
who was head of the Detroit office. 
It became a matter of widespread concern in the family. Finally it came to a head. I remember it vividly. There was a firm on Wall Street, Donaldson Lufkin, an investment 
firm with a high reputation. Lufkin, who was close to the McDonnells and in good shape financially, made a commitment to invest in the firm if the McDonnell family was able to 
make further investment. At this point, Don Lufkin, who I was extremely impressed with, told me he did see hope for the firm, that the firm was a victim of the general situation on 
the Street. No firm was immune. Some firms were worse off than others. 
We had had one opportunity to merge. We had serious meetings on merger, which probably would have salvaged the firm. But Murray McDonnell, and I guess his view was 
shared by the family, refused to merge. That went to family pride. 
Meanwhile, all managers in various parts of the country who were also investors in the firm, at least they had a stake in the firm, along with a fellow by the name of Tom 
Cassidy, who joined the firm with me as vice president and signed similar notes for his share of stock, were becoming more and more upset and concerned, as was I. So a 
decision was made to call in the branch managers for an all-day session at the Summit Hotel. We would review the problem, try to reassure the branch managers and we felt, 
through Don Lufkin, that we were going to be able to give them some good news. Meanwhile, Murray McDonnell and the McDonnell family were in deep discussions with 
8
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --5 
Mr. Flanigan, Murray's father-in-law. 
G: Horrible Horace? 
O: Yes, who obviously was a sure source for significant financial input. I was charged with conducting this all-day meeting, fully anticipating Murray would be joining me. Murray 
had taken ill shortly before that and had put himself into a hospital. I went to visit him in the hospital and it was clear what he needed was some rest to try to pull himself together, 
leading to this climax. That was the climate when they opened the meeting. These managers from around the country were expressing their concerns and Murray McDonnell 
failed to appear. I wasn't in any position to give them reassurances because the other piece of the puzzle was not in place as far as I knew, namely Mr. Flanigan. I knew Mr. 
Lufkin's role was dependent upon the involvement of Mr. Flanigan. However, as the meeting dragged on, Murray McDonnell arrived. He prefaced his remarks by saying he 
had been delayed because he was having discussions on the status of McDonnell and Company, that he was pleased to announce a deal had been cut and the necessary 
financing would be available immediately. Obviously the climate of the meeting changed dramatically. And my view of things obviously changed dramatically, too. The meeting 
ended on a high note. 
In the office the next morning, Lufkin wanted to see me privately. He advised me that what Murray had said the previous day was not the case. It was his hope, but it had 
not been satisfactorily concluded with the Flanigan end of the family. He, Lufkin, felt in good conscience that he should advise me that he didn't anticipate it was going to 
conclude satisfactorily and therefore he would not be a participant. I remember saying to him, "Do you see any reason why I should continue to be president of this company 
beyond the close of business today?" He agreed that he couldn't see any reason. I called Phyllis and Ira, my two associates who had pulled up stakes and joined me in New York, 
advised them I was going to resign by the close of business. I then looked for Murray McDonnell, who was not in his office. I had to wait a while before he finally arrived. I 
advised Murray McDonnell that I saw no future in continuing, that I was there less than eight months, that this was not only a personal disaster to me but it afforded me no 
comfort that the company seemed to be going deeper and deeper into the hole, and that the commitments he had made to me in terms of the thrust of the company and its future 
had never been fulfilled. 
I then indicated to him that I had two choices in my press release resigning as president. To state the facts as they are or to state that what I had anticipated would be 
the thrust of the company was not forthcoming and therefore I did not want to continue. In other words, a flat-out statement or a diplomatic statement and that was dependent 
upon how he conceived Ira Kapenstein's continuing role. He had grown to be extremely impressed with Ira and rightly so. Frankly, he needed Ira not because of his knowledge of 
the Street, but as a right arm as Ira had been for me. I wanted some assurance that Ira had some continuity, if that's what he cared to do at least for the time being, that he was not 
resigning at five o'clock along with me. If Murray and I could have that understanding, 
9
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --6 
then we could have a publicly amicable departure. Murray was very quick to accept that. In fact, that was his preference. So it wasn't a matter of negotiation or debate. He was 
anxious to have Ira stay on. He could not debate with me my departure and so we had no real conflict or mean conversation. It was almost throwing up his hands and saying, 
"Well, what can I say?" 
G: How did he account for his misrepresentation of the financial situation? 
O: I don't know as he accounted for it. He made no attempt to suggest that I had the wrong impression, nor did he attempt to suggest, "Just give it a little more time and the Flanigans 
will be aboard." It was clear that these intense discussions within the family, which I was not party to, were not going to be fruitful. 
Obviously, Lufkin, who was in a far better position to know the facts than I, particularly the facts regarding the Flanigans, had reached his conclusion. I think it was 
very considerate of him to advise me of this. He wasn't going behind Murray McDonnell's back. He recognized I was entitled to know, as president of the company. I certainly was 
entitled to know that he was not going to pursue this course. His commitment had been made on the basis of a Flanigan commitment. 
In any event, Murray and I closed out our discussion amicably. Murray McDonnell at no time had been devious. Those were his expectations back in December. 
He was looking at the company through rose-colored glasses. What motivated him in convincing me to become president I never understood, because I had no background in 
the business. He probably thought I was a name to put on the letterhead. I often wondered and I wondered about my own decision. I think my own decision was based 
more on the bottom line of the agreement than common sense in going into a business I had no knowledge of. 
G: Well, do you attribute any of the firm's decline to your own lack of knowledge and were there any decisions or shots that you called that should had been called a different way? 
O: No, because there weren't any shots. The firm was in a sad, sorry state upon my arrival. The Street was in a sad, sorry state. Several firms folded over those months. A number 
of firms merged and then merged again, trying to save themselves. This was a very difficult period for the Street and this was not due to anything Murray had done. His firm 
was in no better or worse position than many others on the Street. It was extremely unfortunate that this firm, which had been built over two generations into a prestigious 
Wall Street firm, was in terrible decline. But obviously, without further financing, without even the hope or expectation of any source of further financing, there was no purpose in 
my staying there. I closed out my involvement. I issued a brief press release, simply saying, in substance, that Murray and I were not in agreement on the thrust of the 
company. It was a very light notification that you were no longer president. You had to make some statement. If you hadn't made the statement, then people would have certainly 
been inquiring quickly, particularly the New York Stock Exchange. 
10
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --7 
So Ira stayed on for a period of time. The company drifted along. Finally, there were charges brought against Murray by the exchange. Ira stayed until the firm was 
dissolved, which was probably a year or more later. Meanwhile, my departure was not that simple because the following morning, after I announced my resignation, this friendly 
banker was figuratively on my doorstep demanding payment on the notes. In addition, as part of my agreement with the company, the company purchased an apartment for me. 
The apartment was in a co-op; therefore it was in my name not the company name because in a co-op, you can't have commercial ownership. So I received two demands the next 
morning--one for payment of the notes, which was delivered to me certified mail, and the other demand was that I immediately depart the apartment. 
My friend, George Bissell, came to the rescue. I didn't fault George one bit for encouraging me to take the position in the first place. George had no more awareness of 
the problems of the company than I did. But George was in a financial position to be helpful. Through a loan from George, I walked into the bank and had the satisfaction of 
closing out my own personal account with the bank and paying off the indebtedness, which taught me a lesson about banks, the cold-bloodedness of banks. I wasn't being 
given one hour to work this out, no suggestion that we work out some kind of a long-term payment or whatever, nothing. So I cleared that up. Then I called Murray and made an 
offer to purchase the apartment. It was a flat offer, take it or leave it, but it was an offer that was readily accepted because that did mean that there was a little money flowing into 
McDonnell and Company that day. I became the owner of the apartment by sending a certified check. 
Tape 1 of 1, Side 2 
So I purchased the apartment, paid off the indebtedness. 
I then, of course, had to start thinking about what happens now. I had certainly cut the cord with the networks. There was no way the networks would want to talk 
further to me. (Laughter) I had been off and on again with them at least three times the prior year. But I decided to go back to the drawing board to see if I could once again 
undertake establishing the consulting firm. I talked to Ira at some length about it. He was still at McDonnell and he was receiving his salary on a regular basis, working arduously to 
be helpful to Murray and they were getting along fine. I told him about my plans and we informally agreed that if I could get O'Brien Associates established, he would like the 
opportunity to consider joining me and leaving McDonnell. 
I proceeded to try to locate some potential clients. There were a few people who had expressed some interest months ago or years ago in having a client relationship. In 
the course of that, I decided to screw up my courage and renew discussions with Bob Maheu of Hughes Enterprises. I talked to Bob at some length. He still seemed to be 
intrigued with the ideas of promoting Hughes and promoting the Hughes Medical Center. In any event, initial contact with Bob resulted in his comment, "Let me think about it," 
11
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --8 
and, "Let me communicate with the man." I believe that's how we referred to him. Shortly I heard back from Bob and he agreed to enter into a client relationship on the 
same basis, at the same money as we had talked about many months earlier. I told him that in order to try to achieve some early stability, I would like to have a contract for a 
specific period of time. We agreed on a two-year relationship. Meanwhile, Claude Desautels was back in the picture and through some of his sources and some of my 
sources, we picked up jointly four or five other clients. So we had a half dozen clients including Hughes and we were in business. Ira and I discussed his leaving McDonnell and 
joining me. Claude would not come to New York; he would remain in Washington. 
Phyllis, who left McDonnell when I did, was working with me through this period. We were able to assure a pretty good initial launching and reasonable stability while we 
continued to build the company. I sent out press releases to business publications, to the press generally. I continued to make whatever contacts I could and I reached agreement 
with Ira on joining the firm. I found myself rather quickly in business. I then could look to repaying the debt I owed George Bissell, which was significant. I was able to repay 
that debt within a period of twelve months. Most of my income went to discharging debts during that early period. 
By the time I received a call from Ben Bradlee, I had recovered reasonably well from the shock of my eight months experience on Wall Street and was beginning to 
contemplate other activities, book activities. The call from Bradlee came, I guess, sometime in early February, and I was stunned. Ben said, "I want to welcome you back to 
Washington." I remember, knowing Ben as intimately as I had over many years, that he was fully capable of pulling your leg and having some fun with you. I had no idea what he 
was talking about so I asked him. He said, "You know that Fred Harris resigned?" I said, "No, I didn't." He apparently had resigned that morning. And he said, "It's clear to me 
that you'll be back as chairman." We chuckled about that and I told him that he was as crazy as ever and that terminated that conversation. That was my first knowledge of 
Harris' resignation and the first contact I had following that. 
Then this began to unfold. I don't recall the exact chronology, but it happened with great rapidity. One contact was from Colonel Jake Arvey, a lifelong Democratic 
leader out of the Daley organization in Chicago, an eminently respected fellow in the party across the country. And he said, "You're going to be pressured greatly to make comment 
about the chairmanship." I said, "There won't be any great pressure, Colonel, because my comment is obvious. I'm in the early stages of a new business and the last thought in my 
mind would be to discard that and be back as chairman. It's nice of you to call. But that's the extent of that." Arvey replied, "I'm going to ask you one favor. Would you not 
comment or if you do, don't comment negatively. Just refrain from commenting for a day or two because I want to get back to you and I want to talk seriously about some aspects 
of this. You would be doing me a favor. I don't want to get into all the details. You'll be doing me a favor if you'd just refrain from barring and locking the door, because that 
would make it more difficult for me in what I'm attempting to do." I said, "That sounds fair enough." And that was that. 
12
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --9 
It went on from there. There were several comments about who would be chairman. I guess I was mentioned among them. My recollection is I observed Jake 
Arvey's request and remained mute and was out of contact. The candidates began to surface. It was apparent that there was going to be a real contest for the chairmanship and 
that was fine. I recall the mayor of Providence had perhaps announced his candidacy. 
G: Oh, Joseph Doorley? Was that--? 
O: That's right. There was Joe Crangle and the chairman in Indiana. 
G: That was Gordon St. Angelo? 
O: Gordon St. Angelo and there were others, I guess. It was developing into a contest and the Executive Committee of the Democratic National Committee had or would receive a 
recommendation from the titular head of the party, which should resolve this. Hubert Humphrey would make known his choice to the executive committee and that would close 
the matter out. I had no conversation with Hubert Humphrey. Arvey got back to me and the sequence of events eludes me now. Hubert was about to or had made his 
recommendation to the executive committee of the national committee and his recommendation was the former governor of Indiana, Matt Welsh, who, in my judgment, 
would make a fine chairman. I knew him well; thought highly of him. However, the executive committee did not support Hubert's recommendation. That left the matter, 
apparently, in considerable disarray with several avowed candidates and Hubert's recommendation of Welsh not acceptable to the executive committee. 
Arvey called me and said the executive committee had instructed him to contact me and ask me to accept the chairmanship. He urged me not to respond, that he was 
going to hang up because all he was asking me to do was just think about it. And he hung up. I don't know how much thought I gave to it. I don't know now whether I'm talking 
about days or what. 
In any event, I had become a director of George Bissell's modular home company in northern California. This is the same man who had bailed me out in terms of my 
problems with McDonnell and Company. He was having a public presentation of his first modular home. Would I come to this press launching? I went to California, spent a day 
or two there. I think I was asked by one reporter about the chairmanship. I said I was on modular home business and there wasn't any pressure to talk about the chairmanship and it 
certainly was not in my mind. I owed George a debt and I wanted to do everything I could with the launching. At the airport in San Francisco I believe, heading back east, I 
ran into Bob Novak. Bob did attempt to question me and I told him I had no involvement. 
When I returned to New York, Hubert Humphrey called me. He said if he had thought for a minute I would accept the chairmanship, he would have presented my name 
to the executive committee and no one else's, but that he made the basic assumption that 
13
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --10 
there was no way I would be interested. I replied, "You're right." We had a pleasant chat. At that point, I believe his choice of Welsh had been turned down. 
G: Did you suggest anyone else? 
O: No. I don't know as we got to that. It was a very pleasant call. The purpose was that he wanted me to know that he assumed I had no interest and if by any chance I had had any 
interest, he would have been in touch with me and I would have been his choice. 
There was a call from Bob Strauss, who was on the executive committee, as I recall it. And Bob said that if I would take the chairmanship, he would take the treasurer's 
post which was certainly not a pleasant prospect [for him] and he would commit to me to break his butt, so to speak, to raise money to keep the Democratic National Committee 
afloat, to do something about the debt. 
I was not aware of the extent of the debt. I had been out of the committee for a year. I was totally out of touch. As part of determining the debt, it was Bob's query, 
"Would you come to Washington? I'll put together the treasurer of the committee and other officers and we'll have dinner. I'll find out exactly what this debt is and maybe we 
can talk further." 
At Paul Young's restaurant one evening I met with Bob and three others in the national committee to go over the debt. Through the course of dinner, it became apparent 
the debt extended far beyond what I had heard or read about. My recollection is the debt was in the vicinity of nine million dollars, not five or six million people had been talking 
about. There had been a significant increase in the debt over the prior year. Fred Harris had borrowed additional monies. There had been a fund-raising event in Florida that had 
been a failure, a debacle. This was the state of affairs. 
G: Do you know why that event was unsuccessful? 
O: I didn't know. I'm sure I didn't even know it took place until I got into this. 
G: One of my notes indicates that Harris, in effect, had given Nixon's Justice Department an invitation to investigate organized crime in Democratically controlled municipal 
governments and had really crippled the party structure in big cities even more. Is that a--? 
O: I don't recall that. I think probably Fred, at that point, had had enough. He apparently came back from this Florida misadventure and resigned. That started this whole thing. 
G: Why was he ill-suited for that role? 
O: I really don't know. When I finally arrived at the national committee, I found the staff in total disarray. I never pursued that. All I knew at Paul Young's restaurant that night is 
14
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --11 
whatever Fred had done or not done, he had added significantly to the debt during that year and probably had no way to avoid it if he were to keep the national committee doors 
open. That's all I knew. There was some further contact from Hubert coinciding with the dinner. There was contact from Meany and contact from others. 
I came back to New York and Ira and I and Phyllis and Elva came to the conclusion that this was ridiculous. Furthermore, there had been further statements by 
candidates for the chairmanship. There were three or four candidates. There was no way in God's world, if I gave remote thought to going back, that I would go back in a 
contested situation. 
So I announced publicly I had no interest in going back as chairman and that was flat. Following that some or all of these candidates in one way or another indicated that if 
I would take the chairmanship, they'd withdraw as candidates. With one exception as I recall, Gordon St. Angelo, who was busy traveling the country, talking to the national 
committee people in his quest for the chairmanship. Additional conversations ensued between Hubert and me. Hubert was busily informing me that the decks were all being 
cleared; all I had to do was say yes. The national committee meeting had been called; a date set. This was quickly coming into place. 
Hubert said, "Why don't you come down to Washington the night before the meeting and we'll talk further?" Ira and I went down. I was listed as being in the 
Mayflower Hotel. I decided I didn't want to talk to anyone. If Hubert wanted to talk further with me, I would make myself available and I wouldn't be available to any national 
committee members or any press. So I literally checked in at the Mayflower, but I went to another hotel, the Madison. Ira was with me. As the hours went by there was recognition 
I wasn't around the Mayflower. I don't know how it occurred--but Joe Crangle finally tracked me through Ira in some way. Joe came to the Madison to talk to me. He was no 
longer a candidate if I would accept but he would be a candidate against St. Angelo or anybody else if I didn't. He urged me to accept. That sort of thing went on through the 
night. 
G: Did he tell others where you were? 
O: I don't recall. I think there were a couple of other telephone contacts through the night but I never went near the Mayflower. So the next morning, Ira and I, early in the 
morning, went to the Mayflower to meet Hubert. He was excited, all aglow, "This is great; got it all done." I said, "You haven't got it all done. What are you telling me?" He 
said, "Well, Gordon St. Angelo is still a candidate but don't worry about it." I said, "I've told everybody that there's no way I would touch this in any kind of a contest." "Well, 
you'd beat them." I said, "I don't care how much I would beat them by. I'm here in Washington now. Everybody keeps saying you're a lifelong Democrat and all that. You 
know, this doesn't add up to anything." Finally, there were several people in the suite. 
The meeting was about to start. People went to talk to St. Angelo and 
15
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --12 
apparently--I never knew how this came about--St. Angelo said he'd withdraw as a candidate if I would take it, but he wanted to have ten minutes to speak to the national 
committee to thank them for all the kindnesses they had shown him as he toured the country. I just sat there. We were drinking coffee. Finally, a committee arrived in the 
suite. People from the national committee had been designated as a committee to escort me to the meeting. 
So down I went and I became chairman, at which point I probably destroyed the private sector forever, I don't know. The adrenaline is flowing and I make a speech. I'm 
chairman again. 
G: You were really sort of railroaded into it? 
O: Actually, it was unbelievable it turned out that way. Why did the executive committee turn down Hubert's recommendation of Welsh? I never understood why. I remember a 
time when Adlai Stevenson supposedly was titular head. I guess titular head doesn't mean much. Fritz Mondale would be titular head of the Democratic Party right now. Hubert 
found to his dismay that these people loved him but they weren't interested in his proposal. In addition to that, clearly there would have been several candidates contesting. I would 
assume, at least six. There were three or four avowed. I think all of the avowed had been campaigning for the chairmanship. 
So it was the old story. If O'Brien takes it, then everybody disappears. If O'Brien doesn't take it, we're in turmoil. So I think there were probably people who said, "Let's 
get O'Brien to take it." They weren't so much pro-O'Brien as they were anti-turmoil or didn't want to start choosing up sides. But it played out on its own. I never had one 
conversation that I initiated with any member of the national committee throughout this period. And Bob Strauss dutifully took over the treasurer's job. We took our respective 
places in the national committee. 
G: Let me ask you, how do you explain Humphrey's interest in this thing? 
O: Humphrey was, in my view, fulfilling a responsibility he saw he had as titular head of the party. And his advocacy of Welsh, I'm sure, was not based on any desire on the part of 
Humphrey to have any active role in the national committee. I think it probably came about--and it was a good choice--with Hubert looking around and saying, "Who would be 
a good chairman who would be a fellow of stature?" This fellow had just left the governorship. I think that he had to be stunned when he advised the executive committee, 
"Here is my recommendation. I'm complying with my responsibility," and have the executive committee reply, "Thanks but no thanks." 
That, of course, opened the door to a spate of candidates. None of them, individually, would have sufficient support to plow through this easily. They probably 
would have gone through innumerable ballots to elect a chairman. I'm sure Gordon St. Angelo felt that if the specter of O'Brien hadn't arisen, he would have been chairman. I 
16
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --13 
don't know. 
All I know is that a fellow silly enough to take that chairmanship, as I did under those conditions, had to have politics in his blood and somehow couldn't resist it. It's 
almost as if you're an addict. I turned my back on a burgeoning business with a heavy debt following a disaster. And there I am, blithely walking into the ballroom of the 
Mayflower Hotel, accepting the chairmanship in February, when O'Brien Associates has existed for but a few months. 
So I was forced to immediately contact each of my clients. Regardless of the agreements I had with them, in the instance of Hughes Enterprises it was a two-year 
contract that was in probably its fifth or sixth month, I called each and told them that whatever the agreement they had with me, obviously, they were at liberty to tear up the 
agreement. After all, I am becoming a chairman of the out-party and that isn't, probably, a pleasant prospect to clients. Maheu's first reaction was the obvious, "Is this outfit of 
yours going to continue?" I said, "Yes, it is. Claude Desautels is going to stay in place. There are a couple of other people involved and it may be necessary for Ira Kapenstein to 
stay with O'Brien Associates." Bob was not about to give his approval and said, "I can't tell you that we will continue. We have a two-year contract and I'd see it through if you 
insist upon it, but if you're giving me an opportunity to be released I would have to talk to the man again." He got back to me and asked, "What we're interested in, is there going to 
be continuity?" I replied, "Joe Napolitan is in the PR business and extremely able, and I think he can handle some of your activities and you can drop out anytime you care to." 
He responded, "On that basis, let's see. I dislike the idea of canceling out. There's nothing in the agreement indicating you couldn't be party chairman, but you understand our 
position. That could be a negative situation for us." (Laughter) He concluded, "Let's let it be for now and see how it works out." 
As time went on, his contacts were with Joe Napolitan and Claude. Then my son returned from Vietnam and he took an active interest in O'Brien Associates part-time and 
became president, while he was finishing law school. Despite what I was saying to clients about Ira, Ira came with me. (Laughter) Ira said, "You can't leave me behind." He was 
anxious and excited about being the deputy. 
In trying to operate the national committee, you look first to keeping the door open. Could you maintain a decent staff? Could you pay the bills? Bob had committed 
he would do everything possible to assure that and he did. Bob and I would kid back and forth. I told him, "My job here is to spend the money you raise. Your job is to raise it." I 
immediately considered what role the committee could play as the out-party. Now it's March 1 and you're in the midst of an election year. Can the committee be helpful to 
Democratic candidates? What role can the committee play as the loyal opposition? What role can I play as a spokesman? Is there a role taking on the administration? What can we 
do to organize the staff and have it as effective as severe financial limitations will allow? So we started to focus on the remainder of 1970 and the off-year election. 
17
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --14 
G: Before we get into that, let me just ask a couple more questions about the selection. Did the southerners boost Buford Ellington for national chairman? 
O: I think they probably did. There seems to me, there were indications that the South would like to have a chairman. There were some indications that perhaps Lyndon Johnson 
wouldn't be happy to see me as chairman because I had joined Bobby Kennedy when I left his cabinet. If that was brought to my attention it was of no interest to me because I had 
no interest. 
G: Do you think party leaders regarded Harris as too far to the left and not appealing to the mainstream of Democratic voters? 
O: Fred took over a difficult situation . . . the party in disarray. You have a very serious financial situation. What can you do to show Democrats there is a meaningful Democratic 
National Committee? As the debt increased that year, there were no observable activities in the committee. The attitude towards Fred, which I assume was supportive at the 
outset, obviously deteriorated. Fred decided that's enough and he would walk out. I don't know that it went to Fred's political views. The committee was barely alive and nothing 
was happening. 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 1 
G: Had voter registration lagged before you came? 
O: I'm not faulting Fred Harris personally. Fred had to be completely disenchanted when he found he couldn't raise funds to function on a current basis. 
G: Did you, upon assuming the chairmanship, sense a need for making the party more appealing to middle-of-the-road Democrats? 
O: That was part of it. We, clearly, were in difficulty with the mainstream, the traditional Democrats. There was a prevailing view among the Democrats that the party, as 
represented by those who were speaking for the party, was soft on crime and not attendant to the problems of Middle America. We weren't, as a party, effective in 
articulating our positions leading into an off-year election to a degree that would impress the average Democrat, who had traditionally supported the party but had little enthusiasm 
for the party at that stage. That lack of enthusiasm continued through 1972. The whole Wallace venture. George Meany and organized labor were deeply concerned about the 
drift of the party, as they saw, to the left. And you still had the party under the cloud of Vietnam. It certainly was not a favorable climate. 
If I had any initial advantage, I did enjoy a continuing reasonable acceptance on the part of the Democrats in the Congress. I could attempt to establish a closer relationship 
between the committee and the Congress and the party structure. We had lost a number of governorships. We were not in good shape nationally. 
18
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --15 
But, basically, with this relatively small entity, probably thirty or thirty-five staff, the debt problem--what could you do? What could be meaningful in organization, in 
communication, and in the role of the loyal opposition? First, review the small staff in total disarray. Most of them wondered if they'd survive. A number had left off and on 
during the prior year. 
Bob Strauss had focused on keeping the door open. We'll develop fund-raising programs as best we can. A hundred dollars per month membership for those who haven't 
been contributors. Fund raising is much easier for the House and Senate campaign committees and candidates for governor than it is for the national committee. You're very 
much low man on the totem pole; you get no financial support from those who are in a position to raise big money. You have to contact dedicated Democrats who might 
contribute modest amounts in addition to helping fill the coffers of the House and Senate campaign committees and/ or who would be willing to contribute a thousand dollars a year 
to the national committee. That's what Strauss was faced with. You were also faced with restructuring the staff, restructuring the basic operation of the committee, reassuring the 
staff. You worked on the structure first. You divided responsibilities. You set priorities. 
As early as April at one of my staff meetings, on my agenda, the first reference is inspiration. What is our mission? Preparation for the 1970 campaigns and how to be 
helpful to candidates. Building toward the 1972 convention, the challenge of party reform, which was a hot item, and coordinating and assisting state organizations. That 
was basic. 
So I decided to set up three major operations. The first, obviously, finance; communications would be the second; campaigns and organization, the third. I urged 
them, if they have problems, to work them out within the family. I didn't want any more negative publicity emanating from the committee. I reviewed the role of vice chairman, 
deputy chairman and executive director; they were going to play key roles. Then I did get to an item which, on reflection, I wonder about. This is April 20, 1970 and I'm talking 
about office security. "Know who is working after hours;" responsibility for volunteers and interns. I'm sure I was not contemplating a Watergate. I felt we were going to keep 
these offices open late. We could secure interns and volunteers in the evening. We were going to find use for them and somebody would have to maintain security, because the 
hours would no longer be nine to five. I talked about decorum and appearances, supplies and desks: "Let's put on a good show for visitors." I have an item: "Press, responsibility 
of communications director and press secretary." "Don't gossip," underlined. Then the mail--that always bothered me--" Expedite replies." And then of course, "Keep expenses 
down." That was the first order of business. 
I had the good fortune of having some fine staff people. Stan Greigg came with me; Ira came with me. I inherited some solid people: Bill Welsh, John Stewart. We hired 
Joe Mohbat as press secretary from the Associated Press. There were several others who were solid. You had a nucleus but you had to give it direction. You had to give 
19
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --16 
department heads areas to operate, and "those working in these departments would know the department heads had my full confidence and my ear at all times." So it was launched 
and it worked out quite well. 
Then to all aspects of help to candidates. We decided to put together several regional meetings. First, a closed-circuit television three-hour, in-depth communication 
setup beamed out to twenty or twenty-one major areas of the country. We took the loyal opposition on television. We had some initial success and then had the door closed on us. 
I took to the attack often, as far as Nixon and the administration were concerned. That wasn't costing money other than stamps. I toured the country extensively in 1970, 
appeared at many events involving candidates for governor or Senate or the Congress. That was ongoing through 1970. We installed a communication system to record 
statements from members of Congress and others to be immediately disseminated nationally, with emphasis on radio. This was at no cost to them, and was meaningful. 
Meanwhile, Bob was trying to develop a membership program that would bring in some money. We had a few modest fund raisers. 
I found it interesting and challenging from the start. It was considerably different than my role as chairman on a prior occasion, as chairman of a presidential campaign with 
the additional title of chairman of the national committee. During that Humphrey campaign, the focus was on the campaign period. Now, you're engaged in activities which 
the committee should engage in, trying to upgrade and be creative on the communication side, and also be a voice in the party. You place emphasis on youth; you ensure you 
maintain a close relationship with Al Barkan and COPE and labor generally. I was in communication often with George Meany, hoping he would not kick over the apple cart 
and we could develop unity. As an outspoken chairman, I obviously would be stepping on the toes occasionally of some members of Congress who would not be in agreement. But 
you needed to be aggressive. 
At one point in 1970 you were berating Nixon for moving into Cambodia. Some in the Democratic Party didn't feel it was the right thing to do. But the leadership on the 
Hill and the party generally were in accord. I didn't get any great flak on that. It afforded me an opportunity to make a speech that was, I thought, hard-hitting. We were able to 
get it on national television. That gave some exposure to the party, whether you were in total agreement with the position on Cambodia or not. You were constantly harping on 
the economy. You were trying to enlist Middle America again in the pocketbook issues, the basics. 
We had some free promotion through 1970 because of equal time--the loyal opposition demands that we made on the networks. We were finally able to get one 
network to agree to four prime time segments of loyal opposition. We did the first national show and there was flak. We found the FCC, chaired by Dean Burch, who was 
the former chairman of the Republican National Committee, agreeing that the Republican National Committee should have an equal opportunity to answer me. This would have 
20
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --17 
been endless. You found the networks had a good relationship with Senator Pastore; they were getting along quite well. John Pastore was not that concerned about the networks' 
position or change of position. All of this was the subject of a great deal of activity through 1970. 
We developed manuals. We created contacts with candidates. Obviously, we couldn't offer money to them. We reached out as far as we could reach to be involved 
with them and their campaigns. We had an active 1970. 
G: Was there a temptation at this point, as candidates were looking ahead, to aid one candidate more than others in a campaign, Humphrey's for example, just as an example? 
Were you tempted to favor Hubert Humphrey over other contenders for the nomination? 
O: No. This is 1970. It became more sensitive later on, and we'll get to that later. You tried mightily, as chairman, to avoid any indication of preference for a candidate. Your role had 
to be equal consideration of every candidate, including John Lindsay, ultimately. Every candidate must be treated equally and fairly by us. That was going to be severely tested. I 
would be severely tested before it was over in 1972. 
There was another aspect of the start, the first sixty days or so. I reacted rather strongly to an effort by Sarge Shriver to develop an entity outside of the structure of the 
national committee. My gut reaction could be anticipated with all the problems we had internally. We had an existing structure. The need to create some independent outside 
structure eluded me. 
While this national committee activity was going on, Sarge had been busily engaged in eliciting from members of Congress approval of a concept of his to travel the 
country promoting the party. He would need certain funding for that. The record shows there were a number of attempts made to meet with Sarge. Several appointments were 
scheduled for Sarge to meet with me to go over this and educate me. It never occurred. At some point, these memos will reflect I must have wondered why an appointment hadn't 
been made and Sarge and I haven't sat down. I obviously asked somebody to review the record and we found fifteen or twenty incidents of attempts to arrange a meeting and all 
failed. A couple of meetings were scheduled and Sarge didn't appear. There were some suggestions his secretary neglected to tell him. That went on for quite a while. 
Ultimately, it resulted in Sarge sending me a long handwritten letter outlining his ideas on this entity he was establishing and stating unequivocally as strongly as he could 
that this in no way was construed by him to be interfering with the national committee. Indeed, he would consider his role would be to be as helpful as he could to the national 
committee. I finally decided to accept that. I had enough on my plate without controversy with Shriver. 
So I instructed my people to go along with it. In fact, as we got requests for speakers, we had a problem filling those requests from around the country. "Could you 
21
O'Brien --Interview XXVII --18 
get us a known Democrat or a Democrat of stature to appear at our function?" We tried on the Hill time after time and got very little help. You often received requests for Ted 
Kennedy or Ed Muskie. We never could get them to accept speaking engagements under the aegis of the national committee. So I found that Sarge's activities, bouncing around 
the country, could be helpful to us. We instructed the staff, when trying to fill these engagements, to get balance or variety, to contact Sarge. And Sarge did accept a number 
of them. So we were providing Sarge with considerable exposure which is what he desired. 
As time went on, his activity dwindled and disappeared. That was a side bar of the early start and I reacted, as I said, strongly in opposition to what he contemplated. But it 
turned out to be a harmless venture, which faded in due course. I don't recall it was very lasting. Meanwhile, you try to cope with party problems and internal problems that face 
you. 
End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview XXVII 
22
    [ Part 28: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--34 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXVIII*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
Project. In addition, some interviews were done for the Library under the auspices of the National Archives and the White House during the Johnson administration. 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XXVIII 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXVIII, 9/ 24/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
For Electronic Copy on Diskette from the LBJ Library: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXVIII, 9/ 24/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-40 
4
INTERVIEW XXVIII 
DATE: September 24, 1987 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 1 
G: Let me just go back to yesterday. You discussed [Hubert] Humphrey's pre-inauguration visit to you. Did he talk about why he thought he had lost the campaign? 
O: He did not. The visit was to express appreciation for my efforts. It was a somewhat emotional meeting, but we did not Monday morning quarterback the campaign. 
G: One other thing about that period. Did you have any part in LBJ's departure from Washington, either going out to the airport or attending any of the parties? 
O: No. As a matter of fact, on the day of the inauguration I came to New York to plunge into my new activities. 
G: Now, let me ask you to talk in more detail about the equal time initiative, the effort to have the party receive more television time. 
O: Let me preface that by again stating at the time I again assumed the role of chairman, not only was the Democratic National Committee in dire straits financially but the schism of 
Chicago in 1968 was very much present. It clearly indicated there were great difficulties ahead. During the [Fred] Harris period, as a result of actions at the Chicago convention, 
commissions were formed, particularly the so-called [George] McGovern commission. It was an ongoing activity that would probably increase rancor and dissension as time went 
on. Indeed that was the case. The reorganization of the national committee had to be attended to promptly. 
The reorganization of the staff, which I undertook immediately, brought some new people aboard. Some left. I established the position of vice chairperson of the national 
committee, a woman's role, with for the first time a full-time vice chairperson, Mary Lou Berg from Wisconsin, who had achieved distinction as a party activist. Though we had 
serious financial problems, clearly we should establish a woman on the national committee at a full-time high level, and that was accomplished. 
Also it was clear the committee should establish closer relationships with the Congress. Traditionally, the committee and the Congress did not have such a relationship. 
There was very little communication between the two entities. I felt my involvement with the Congress in the past lent itself to working in this area. We established divisions within 
5
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --2 
the national committee with authority given to those in charge of these various divisions. We felt we had to place emphasis on youth activity, and we did by establishing a specific 
entity. We had to establish a closer relationship with members of the national committee on a continuing basis, and we put that in place. It was essential, I thought, to also 
establish close relationships with state chairmen and people at all levels in the party. We wanted to have Democratic governors and other officeholders around the country 
involved with the national committee. Vice chairmen were named. Governor [Robert] McNair became a vice chairman to be liaison with the governors. Congressman [Charles] 
Diggs was named a vice chairman. Bob Wagner, the former mayor of New York, and Senator Mike Mansfield agreed to be vice chairmen. In each instance, it was necessary to 
ensure that these people were activists in the national committee. 
G: Anything else specifically aimed at the Congress? 
O: Yes. We thought the first stage of rapport with the Congress could best be established by affording support in the 1970 off-year elections. Members of Congress in contested 
districts should be approached and we should provide whatever we could by way of service to them. Stan Greigg was doing that coordinating. He was a former member of 
Congress. We met with them and we were able to do a fair amount to persuade the Democrats in the House and Senate that we were sensitive to their political problems and 
willing to do whatever we could to be helpful. That worked out quite well during 1970. There was an increasing attitude of acceptance that was helpful in establishing the DNC as 
a viable entity. This whole process was internal; it was structural. It was re-organizing and opening it up in terms of communication and contact with elected officials and party 
leaders at the state and local levels. 
We revised the O'Brien Manual once again. The manual was widely used in the 1970 off-year election. With this reorganization, we were able to have regional meetings 
around the country. I traveled extensively in 1970 on behalf of candidates seeking election or re-election. In the fall of 1970, the early fall, we put together a closed circuit television 
conference that was detailed and extensive, including all the party leaders in the country. There were some eight thousand Democratic leaders from the state, county and local 
levels across the country who participated in that closed-circuit activity. Nothing like that had ever been undertaken. 
G: What was the advantage to using closed circuit in terms of--? 
O: To reach out quickly to a large number of people in order to impact on the November 1970 election. That took a lot of doing. We were very pleased with the result. There 
was a fallout in the sense of recognition across the country of an active DNC. That is the role that I envisioned for the DNC. I'm not suggesting this was a 100 per cent effective 
effort, but it was a good effort. 
There is another role I envisioned for the DNC when the party is the out-party. I had felt for a long time that a chairman should play an active role in the issues area and 
6
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --3 
should speak for the party. 
I found during 1970 that Nixon had free reign. That was not unusual. A president has great advantages. I had seen that in my days on the other side. But what was 
disconcerting was that he seemed to be on television constantly. There didn't seem to be any effort on the part of Democrats on the Hill and around the country to question him, 
debate him; he was having a free ride. 
When I returned as chairman, I didn't envision I was simply going to be a nuts and bolts chairman. I could become a spokesman. I could express my views in the interest of 
the party, and my concerns with the administration. I was responsible to the party and its leaders in terms of not doing anything detrimental, but I didn't feel inhibited. I had been 
with two presidents. Then you would feel inhibited because you always felt responsibility for what you said or did in terms of the president. Now, I felt a sense of freedom in that 
regard. But you were concerned about funding to support these activities. You could be creative, but the problem would be implementation. That would be dependent to a great 
extent on financial support. 
G: Was there a dilemma between, on the one hand, raising money to support activities, and, on the other, raising money to retire that nine million dollar debt? 
O: Frankly, we didn't focus on the debt. The priority had to be on continuity. The Democratic National Committee was perilously close to closing its doors and going out of 
existence. After all, the Democratic National Committee had been in existence for decades. So your initial focus had to be on continuity, the needs of the moment. You 
would have to set aside discharging the existing debt. That caused a problem in and of itself because, obviously, creditors were on our back constantly. I should say that, to a 
great extent, they were on Bob Strauss' back. Bob took on the burden and tried to keep me removed from it as much as possible so my attention wouldn't be diverted from the 
various activities. But it wasn't a pleasant situation. 
G: Did he raise money to fund the activities or to pay off the debt or--? 
O: What money he was able to raise went almost totally into the funding of these projects and programs. There was very little available in those early months of 1970 for negotiating the 
existing debt. 
G: How successful was Strauss in raising money and how did he do it? 
O: He established this membership program. Those who traditionally contributed to candidates--and there were many, even in the climate at the time--who might be persuaded 
to participate to some modest degree with us. Obviously, we were a low priority with people who were contributing to the House and Senate Campaign Committees, 
contributing to candidates for governor or preparing to contribute to candidates for the presidency. That left us pretty much saying, "Would you become a member of the DNC 
7
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --4 
and that would be a hundred dollars a month?" or "a commitment to contribute a hundred dollars a month." We were able to bring aboard a number of people who, out of the 
goodness of their heart, without any advantage to them, said, "You can count me for a hundred dollars a month." In addition to that, we aimed at those who might make small 
donations, life-long Democrats who might, through a variety of activities Strauss introduced, contribute ten, fifteen, twenty-five dollars. It was very difficult and I don't 
recall any great fat cat contributions. By the same token, Bob and I had an agreement at the outset that he would vigorously pursue his end and I would concentrate on the 
chairmanship. 
We had exchanges of a humorous nature from time to time. "Bob, it's your job to raise the money and I'm the fellow who will spend it." Bob would say, "Larry, you're just 
not a fund raiser." We had a nice relationship and we were able to keep going. "Keeping going" didn't mean we had even a two-lane highway. As a matter of fact, we got into 
greater financial difficulty to fulfill our responsibility to conduct the national convention in 1972. It was baling wire and adhesive tape. It was a terrible struggle to see that 
convention through and fulfill the responsibility to run a national convention. 
G: What happened to the President's Club? 
O: I don't recall that the President's Club remained very active, if at all. 
G: Did it cease to exist or did--? 
O: I think it became quiescent. I don't recall the President's Club being particularly helpful to us. Frankly, on fund-raising, Bob was very circumspect about taking up my time or effort 
on the fund-raising side. He carried that out on his own. On some occasions he would say, "It's necessary. I'm bringing this fellow in for you to sit down with us and give him a 
pitch" which, of course, I willingly did. So my specific knowledge of fund-raising through this period, certainly in the early months of 1970 and into 1971, is limited. 
All I know is there were occasions when it was touch-and-go to meet the payroll, but we never failed to meet it. We did not engage in mass firings, but we were not able to 
bolster the staff particularly. We were able to retain an able, dedicated staff that accepted long hours and the rest without ever quibbling. That's the way we lived. It was a 
hand-to-mouth existence but, to a reasonable degree, we were able to carry out these programs. 
How do you get to a point in fund-raising where you can make a mass appeal? You'd have to gamble on that--a mass appeal, perhaps a television appeal, to see if you 
couldn't get to the small contributor. Bob and I concurred to use some resources and really gamble to buy television time, to make a massive hard-hitting, hopefully productive 
fund-raising pitch. 
There was a problem with that. Could you work out with the net-works some 
8
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --5 
accommodation to buy time for spots or limited television pronouncements? We were stymied. We felt we had to go to the FCC. Fred Harris had made some effort in this area 
while he was chairman. I decided to pursue this. What we were faced with was tying in television in terms of equal time, the loyal opposition, utilization of television for fund 
raising. We were dealing with the FCC and we were dealing with the networks, trying to pressure the networks to see it our way. You had the FCC chaired by Dean Burch, 
Nixon's appointee, who was a former chairman of the Republican National Committee. Realistically, you couldn't be optimistic about the FCC. You had reason not to be because 
we were stymied throughout this effort with the FCC. Meanwhile, we had hoped that in the Congress there would be a vigorous effort launched by the Democrats to try to bring 
about some semblance of loyal opposition and equal time. We were disappointed that we weren't able to enlist members of Congress, particularly on the Senate side in this effort. 
They felt comfortable with their exposure to television. They didn't feel that this was as serious a matter as I was claiming it was. They did not share my intense interest in this 
area. There were people of goodwill. They weren't negative but it was hard to build a fire under them and have them become really aggressive. So the battle went on. Finally, the 
negative decisions by the FCC, of course, released the networks from any problems. We were not going to get into any major television fund-raising effort. 
The equal time side of it was another matter. There was one breakthrough during 1970, during the campaign period. One network did agree that the President's repeated 
national exposure--for example, the invasion of Cambodia came about--did justify some response on the part of the loyal opposition. Jim Hagerty of the ABC network contacted 
me and said, "We are in agreement that you can respond on the Cambodian issue and we're giving you twenty-five minutes of prime time for that purpose." That coincided with 
the speech I would deliver in Milwaukee and I took that occasion to debate the Cambodian issue. 
G: It was that speech that was televised? 
O: That's right. 
G: Who wrote the speech for you? 
O: I don't recall. I imagine it was probably a group effort. John Stewart played a significant role in the writing. He was well equipped to do it. The speech was hard-hitting. I felt 
anything short of that was a waste of national television time. I might as well be provocative and create attention of the media to the speech. That was a single 
breakthrough in this process. 
G: Tell me how the speech was received. 
O: It was received well by the audience, but you'd expect that. It's the Democratic Party chairman making a speech attacking a Republican administration, specifically Richard 
Nixon. As far as general press reaction, my recollection is it received a fair amount. It 
9
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --6 
was worthwhile in that regard. It was applauded in some quarters by Democratic leaders, applauded in the sense they approved the thrust and content of the attack on Nixon's 
Cambodian policy. And it caused dismay in some other quarters. Very limited in the area of dismay, but there was some. I remember specifically Bill Connell, who was a long-time 
associate of Hubert Humphrey. Bill and Jim Rowe had rather adamantly opposed the Salt Lake City speech in 1968. Bill sent me a lengthy memo suggesting that I was overlooking 
the basic issues involved in the campaign, that the soft under-belly of Nixon really went to the economy, to domestic issues, that you had a Hubert Humphrey at that time urging the 
Democratic Party to focus on crime in the streets to show Middle America we were sensitive to their problems and concerns. Bill clearly shared that view. George Meany 
was deeply concerned with the party's continuing movement to the left. The Cambodian speech was obviously accepted by those who you would construe to be dovish. 
The agreement with Hagerty was I was getting the twenty-five minutes of prime time for the express purpose of responding on Cambodia. In any event, we utilized the 
time. And more importantly perhaps than the content of the speech, we had established a precedent that you could have response opportunity from the networks. They accepted 
the proposition that this was conceivable under a certain set of circumstances. They were far from saying it should be built into the process. 
Meanwhile, as I became more active, I focused on the role that [Spiro] Agnew had assumed on behalf of Nixon. He traveled the country extensively. He was riding high in 
1970 and so was Nixon. They envisioned making a significant breakthrough in the off-year elections which, as it turned out, they didn't. But Agnew proceeded to take me 
on on a personal basis. He and his cohorts or the Republican National Committee started to circulate questionnaires to the media saying, "These are the things you ought to be 
asking O'Brien," trying to create further divisions in the party and position me as best they could. Agnew did refer specifically to my presidency of McDonnell and Company and 
how it had gone broke under my presidency. In fact, that was not totally accurate, but certainly it hadn't made any progress under my presidency. I accepted that because I felt 
the more Agnew focused on me the better opportunity I had to make an impact in what I would say or do. I felt it was a great advantage, in terms of trying to move this into some 
media attention, to have Agnew attacking me personally on a regular basis, which he was. 
But you also had the guts of this; equal time and opportunity to convince the networks there should be a loyal opposition concept in the two-party system. Now, all of 
this I was engaged in, we must remember, wasn't costing any money. You were spotlighting the committee's efforts and activities and could engage in it to the fullest. It 
wasn't like many of the projects in the national committee that required funding, whether it was voter registration, youth efforts, women's efforts, the closed circuit television 
programs, the regional meetings, the communication system to be helpful to congressmen and senators. All of that cost money to maintain. In this area, you could be aggressive. It 
was something that you could engage in and you were beginning to get the attention of the networks and you were causing concern in the networks. 
10
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --7 
Meanwhile, the committee that I had established to focus on the location of the next convention had been activated. They were visiting cities across the country to 
determine interest and financial support. This activity took some of my time. I visited various cities with the site selection committee to have discussions with local business, 
political and community leaders. 
I was in Louisville, which was a potential city, for the presentations. I returned to my hotel rather late and there was a message for me and a telegram. It was from Frank 
Stanton in which he said that CBS had determined that the loyal opposition concept was viable and they had, in the public interest, a responsibility to go forward with it. He 
regretted that he was unable to communicate directly with me during the day and he resorted to the telegram to advise me. We would have four prime-time, half-hour loyal 
opposition programs over the next few months. I was stunned. I hadn't anticipated we would have a breakthrough. I had hoped, but I hadn't been optimistic. Frank Stanton had 
really taken on something. 
G: He had also agreed to sell you some segments, too. 
O: Yes. 
G: Sixty-second spots. 
O: Sixty-second spots. So this was a tremendous breakthrough. And the first program was established. It would be one of four. 
G: Why do you think Stanton agreed to do this or CBS agreed to do this? 
O: I found throughout these discussions over those months, that Frank Stanton had a keen sense of responsibility to the public. He personally felt that way; he had to convince 
himself that the network should take that direction. When dealing with all three networks we had the sense that Frank Stanton reacted favorably to our claims of equity in 
communication. Be that as it may, I was still surprised at his decision because it meant he was personally undertaking something that could be difficult for him down the road. 
Nevertheless, we had the date and we went to work. John Stewart and others put together a format for the utilization of that time. 
Our difficulty on a program of this nature was that I had to foreclose utilizing any actual or potential candidates for president. I found that there was very little interest in 
participating on the program on the part of officeholders and I was barred, of course, from the obvious bigger names who could have national impact as in every instance, as you 
reflected, they could be presidential candidates. I could find myself in a terrible bind in my role of exercising fairness to all candidates and treating them equally. A rather innovative 
concept was decided upon. We would take film clips of Nixon and Agnew where the President or in a couple of instances the Vice President made specific pledges and 
commitments. 
11
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --8 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 2 
O: I would take on the role of citing the true record. The agreement was that CBS would have a commentary for five minutes at the end of the twenty-five minutes and that would 
accommodate the half-hour. They reserved the right to make comment regarding the program. 
G: Let me ask you before you get into this. Why did the non-candidates not want to participate? 
O: Some would undoubtedly participate if the format intrigued them. We were going to have four programs. We did not have a lengthy time span from the agreement to the first 
program. I felt the format we came up with in the DNC was an intriguing one. We would devote the first program to that effort and then, of course, move on to programs two, 
three, and four, which would not have included my personal involvement. We would have an innovative format, not just using the twenty-five minutes to make a speech that would 
bore the country. We had to proceed with this one quickly as best we could. As it turned out, using the film clips and then citing the record item after item for twenty-five minutes 
was extremely effective. Not because I was a participant in it. It was an extremely effective format and a fair one because the record was replete with Nixon failures to fulfill 
pledges and commitments in a number of areas, particularly in domestic matters. 
We were pleasantly surprised to find that the program enlisted considerable media attention. In fact, it was a page-one story in many major newspapers the following 
morning. But, also, it enlisted a great deal of interest, concern, and bitterness in the White House. I had no personal problem with the then Republican national chairman, Rogers 
Morton, who was a pleasant fellow. There had been no personal attack either way and the White House was concerned that Morton didn't seem the tiger they wanted after me. I 
was causing them problems, far greater than I envisioned I was causing them, at least from their perspective. So they enlisted Bob Dole, Senator Dole, who later became 
Republican chairman during the period I was Democratic chairman, to go after me. Bob was very well-equipped for that role. That caused some pretty tart and harsh exchanges. 
But a demand was made by Morton following this program. The accusation was that it had been purely a political program not responding to issues, that it was crass and 
scurrilous. They contended there should be equal time response for the Republican National Committee. They proceeded to the FCC and made that claim. It is unbelievable 
the FCC could come to the conclusion that my loyal opposition half-hour in turn gave the Republican National Committee a right to respond. The fact is that the FCC agreed with 
the Republican National Committee. The former Republican national chairman, who was chairman of the FCC, was happy to announce that this was a valid complaint and an 
opportunity should be given. 
Their objective--the obvious one, to disrupt CBS and put fear into the hearts of the other networks--was accomplished. Unknown to me and not revealed until several years 
12
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --9 
later, the White House assigned Charles Colson from Nixon's staff to take on CBS specifically and put the fear of God into CBS. There was direct communication between 
the White House and Frank Stanton and Bill Paley, which was all revealed in Watergate several years later. So you have the FCC activity and the clandestine activity. 
Now Frank Stanton had, in the judgment of fair-minded people, risen to the occasion. Things happened to Frank Stanton. One, of course, the FCC decision that the 
Republican National Committee should have an opportunity to respond. Two, the attack on the network by the White House under the President's direction. And three, which was 
a sad commentary, the attack that Stanton was submitted to in a hearing on the Hill by the Republicans without any support afforded him by the Democrats on that committee. I 
believe it was [John] Pastore's committee. 
G: Why didn't the Democrats support him? 
O: The Democrats were pretty relaxed on the Hill in terms of their relationship with the networks. They were getting their share of the action. They were on television regularly. 
They were on the various talk shows. 
G: Was there anything that you could have done or other party leaders could have done to have rallied the Senate Democrats? 
O: I should have made a more vigorous effort to get these people to be supportive of Frank Stanton, not sit in a committee hearing and have him berated by the Republicans with 
nobody on the Democratic side coming to his defense. What all of this ultimately led to was a call I received from Frank Stanton. He wanted to put together an immediate 
luncheon, which occurred. 
G: You were in New York at the time? 
O: I believe so. Obviously his keen desire to meet as promptly as possible got your attention and you could assume what the subject would be. So I contacted Joe Califano, our 
general counsel, and I might add, a very effective one. He made one terrific contribution in this difficult area and in a variety of matters we coped with in the DNC through 1972. 
In any event, the two of us arrived at CBS in Frank Stanton's private dining room and Frank in turn had the counsel for CBS. 
The conversation became a little intense as the luncheon unfolded. Frank made no reference to having heard from the White House and that's understandable. That never 
surfaced until years later. He chose to express the concerns of some of his affiliates regarding the program. Putting that program on in lieu of programs normally scheduled, 
some of the affiliates had said wasn't good business practice. He mentioned, as I recall it, that I had to understand that many of the affiliate owners were Republicans and just on 
political grounds they weren't happy with this program. The bottom line was that programs two, three and four would not, as had been originally agreed to, take place prior 
13
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --10 
to the election in November. But program number two would be authorized by CBS after the election and we could talk about three and four at a later time. What he was saying is, 
"You've had one program. The heat is too intense. I'm not going to allow another program. I regret it because I did commit to it. I'm not going to allow it prior to the 
election; however, I made the commitment so, in some way, after the election we will try to work it out." 
There weren't any mean exchanges and Stanton made a couple of good points. Beyond his affiliate problem, he said he was very depressed as a result of what had 
occurred at a hearing he had attended where he was berated by the Republicans and received no support from the Democrats on the committee. He had received no avowed 
support or comments from Democratic leaders from the time he had initiated the loyal opposition idea and he had been left naked. I told him that I regretted it and I took some 
personal responsibility for it, that I should have put in writing our thanks to the network. I should have made some public comments regarding the statesmanship of Frank Stanton 
and I should have been sensitive to or alert to the need to encourage the Democrats on the Hill to speak favorably regarding the actions he had taken. Having said all that, I then 
said, in substance, as I recall it, "We, in view of this, intend to pursue an appeal of the FCC ruling and pursue this in the courts--the right to equal time--and Joe Califano, our 
general counsel, will prepare the necessary documents. We're in a fight." 
G: What was his reaction? 
O: He thought that was overreacting on our part, that the loyal opposition concept was not in total discord, that there would be other programs at some future time but not before the 
election, and that, in a sense, he was suggesting this was on a personal basis unfair to him. He was the fellow who stepped out, was now taking the rap and, in addition to that, we 
were going to be suing CBS. The luncheon closed out on that note. The door was closed. CBS, as I recall, also did not have to pursue the FCC suggestion that they owed 
time to the Republican National Committee. They just closed the door for the time being. And we did not, as I recall, pursue what we told Stanton we were going to pursue, that 
is, further action in the courts at that time. 
G: Did Stanton comment on the program itself? 
O: He had commented on the program almost immediately following the pro-gram very favorably. 
G: Did he? 
O: He had commented, not in the sense of being a partisan, but said we had utilized that twenty-five minutes very effectively and he was impressed with the format and the 
presentation. I'll say we were darn pleased with what we put together and, of course, the reaction to it proved the case. It wasn't just another speech. It had caused a media 
reaction and it certainly had caused terrific reaction on the part of Mr. Nixon. 
14
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --11 
G: Who had been responsible for producing that program? Had Tony Schwartz been involved or did you use another firm? 
O: I can't recall who we enlisted on the technical side. I recall we devoted half a day to putting it in the can the afternoon of the night it was going on the air, but I don't recall the 
participants on the technical side. I recall John Stewart specifically. I should not limit it to John; there were others on the staff and we had to obviously reach out for some 
professionals on the technical end. 
G: Well, did Stanton at this luncheon revise his opinion of the thing or merely point out that affiliates were upset with it? 
O: The latter, and understandably. After all, I couldn't fault Frank Stanton years later when I learned all the facts. He and his network were just whipped by the White House. He 
leaned on two aspects of this in trying to explain why, at a minimum, there was going to be a postponement. One was the affiliates and his concern about the failure of the 
Democratic leaders to give him support. He had been creative and responsible to the public interest but he was left completely naked on our end, berated by Republican 
members of the Senate committee and taken to task by a number of affiliates. The combination caused him to tell me he could not pursue the other three prior to election but 
to assure me that "In some way--we will work out the details later--there will be three programs but only after the November election." Well, the three programs after the 
November election were of no current interest to us. We knew we had launched something that had made some impact and we were anxious to pursue two, three and four. 
In fact, with Bill Welsh, John Stewart, Sam Greigg, and Ira Kapenstein in the DNC, there was discussion and planning of program two. They were busily engaged in considering 
the format and content of the next program. 
G: Did you have any sense of Bill Paley's role in this as opposed to Stanton's? 
O: No. When you consider what Stanton did that day I received notice from him in Louisville, it was far-reaching. It was really the action of a man who felt a deep 
responsibility and was positioned to do something regarding equity and fairness in terms of the two-party system--that the out-party should have some opportunity for response. The 
advantages of the presidency were too overriding in terms of public exposure and it was an unfair situation. That, in the same decision, we could purchase sixty-second spots for 
fund raising was a far-reaching decision that neither NBC or ABC remotely contemplated, even though we were aggressively pressing the issue. 
ABC's reaction to the issue was to do a one shot prime-time twenty-five minutes on a specific subject, Cambodia. That was a breakthrough, but was far from developing a 
long-range procedure for loyal opposition response. Stanton had undertaken that with the four programs and the sixty-second fund raising. And if it had moved through four loyal 
opposition responses, it is very probable that procedure would have become part of the 
15
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --12 
process on a permanent basis. 
G: What did you do with the sixty-second spots? Did you produce some spots, buy the time? 
O: No. At that stage, while we had the right to purchase the spots, the climate had been clouded by my rather aggressive statement that we were going to start lawsuits. 
G: Could you have raised the money to pay for the spots if you--? 
O: Possibly not. I recall that Joe Califano joined in this discussion on legal procedure; in turn, Frank Stanton's counsel joined in the discussion, and Joe and the CBS lawyer had a 
detailed exchange on the legal aspects. Joe was, of course, in accord with what we contemplated and saw possibilities of success legally. But I'd have to say that it was more 
in the context of a strong reaction to Stanton's decision rather than the realities of pursuit and the time and money that would be involved. 
The off-year election was on. The Cambodian aspect sort of faded. My recollection was that Nixon, prior to the November election, took actions and made 
statements that were strengthening his position. It dwindled as an issue and we weren't in much of a position to make political gain from it. We finally got into debating the speed 
of withdrawal, the time frames and the rest. I found myself having to make statements basically in support of Nixon's withdrawal procedures, saying this wasn't a political issue 
and that we hoped he would fulfill these commitments promptly. The issues in that off-year election became the economy and law and order. 
G: Going back to the speed of withdrawal from Vietnam, there you did have a difference of opinion within the Democratic Party. The Democratic Policy Council on the one hand 
setting a deadline--I think it was eighteen months or some period of time--and the Democratic leadership in the Congress on the other hand taking a more conservative 
approach. How did you deal with these two factions in your own effort to maintain unity in the party? 
O: I made a conscious effort not to inject myself in the midst of these somewhat differing points of view on withdrawal. I let nature take its course--these two areas of 
disagreement really focused on time frames--and let it be. My position remained that the President had announced a withdrawal procedure with a timetable and it was my hope he 
would adhere to his commitments. 
We tried to pick up on the domestic issues. In my travels around the country I found myself focusing more on insisting that the Democratic Party was sensitive to law 
and order; the Democratic Party was deeply concerned about the economic state of affairs, inflation, unemployment. I adhered to that and diverted from foreign policy issues. 
I utilized that time in Milwaukee in adherence to Jim Hagerty's offer of time for a specific purpose and under a certain set of conditions. There hadn't been an opportunity 
16
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --13 
for the loyal opposition to express views on Cambodia and Nixon had had an inordinate amount of air time to express his views. We had been strong in our opposition to two of 
his appointees to the Supreme Court. They both had been turned down. That we considered a political plus. The economy, in our judgment, was in pretty much of a mess. 
Of course, we were still contending he hadn't ended the war although he had committed to do it. 
G: Did Hagerty catch any flak from the White House for allowing--? 
O: I don't recall. 
G: Was the Democratic Policy Council something that you regarded as a nuisance or an interfering body in terms of the--? 
O: I don't recall I considered it a problem for us or that it inhibited us. It certainly didn't inhibit me and it had no impact on what we were engaged in. 
We got into another equal time situation, however, that's worth noting and it was another contact by Jim Hagerty. He called me. It was the weekend before the November 
elections. Hagerty advised me that the Republicans had contacted ABC and asked to purchase a half-hour of prime time on election eve. He offered to split the half-hour if we 
were prepared to purchase fifteen minutes. In fairness we should be given an opportunity. If we did purchase the fifteen minutes, he'd limit the Republicans to fifteen minutes. I felt 
Jim Hagerty suspected we were in no position to buy fifteen minutes of prime time, but I was faced with the offer. My response was to tell Jim Hagerty that the half-hour should 
be fifteen minutes Republican, fifteen minutes to us as free time. I didn't have any other argument to present, because I knew we couldn't pay for it. I'll have to say, if he had 
agreed to do that just prior to the election, I would have been in a dilemma. I couldn't have arbitrarily given that fifteen minutes to Muskie or Humphrey or any presidential 
contender. Probably I could have gotten Mike Mansfield or Carl Albert. I assume I could. At that time there was a group headed by Averell Harriman. 
G: Would you give me a little of the background of that group? 
O: It was basically, to the best of my recollection, an Averell Harriman informal group, including a few others surrounding him. 
G: It wasn't necessarily designed as "Support Muskie," is that correct? 
O: Not that I was aware of. Averell Harriman was in a position to be financially helpful to the Democratic Party over the years and, consequently, due deference was always paid to 
him. Averell Harriman had not contributed to the Democratic National Committee, nor was there any indication he had any interest in doing so. But you could enlist Averell's 
support for some cause or policy position and this fell into that. 
17
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --14 
I failed in my effort to secure fifteen minutes of free time. The Harriman group purchased the fifteen minutes and their decision was to have Muskie. Muskie did an 
outstanding job with the fifteen minutes. His appeal to reason, his style contrasted beautifully with the arm-waving film that was used by the Republicans. This is just prior 
to the election where Nixon and Agnew and their cohorts truly believed their law and order, arm-waving approach would have a tremendous impact on the election results. 
They made prognostications that turned out to be excessive as to what they would gain in the House and Senate. 
The result was far from the Republican sweep that was predicted. The Republicans lost twelve seats in the House and picked up only two seats in the Senate, far 
short of the number needed for control. We scored impressive net gains. We had a net gain of eleven governorships in that off-year election. Most interestingly, on a 
district-by-district basis, an analysis of the vote showed the Democratic candidates ran an average of 3 per cent better nationally than we had in 1968. So we had an overall 3 per 
cent pick up and they had House losses. They had a meager gain in the Senate and lost a significant number of governorships. 
So, all in all, 1970 was a good year for Democrats. Particularly when you consider that at the start of 1970 the pundits were proclaiming our party politically dead. The same 
pundits were now suggesting that maybe Nixon would be a one-term president. I think off that 1970 election fear was instilled in Nixon's heart regarding 1972. I feel his reaction to 
the November 1970 results played a significant role in his determination to act in the manner he did over the next two years, which brought about Watergate. 
G: I want to ask you some of the details about your role in the 1970 election, but first, anything on [G. Harold] Carswell and [Clement] Haynesworth? Any role that you had in 
generating opposition to--? 
O: We had discussions with Carl Albert, Mike Mansfield, and other leaders in the Senate and House on this matter. We did not have a coordinated effort in opposition to the nominees, 
but we shared a common interest and we had a total understanding that we would be vigorous and, hopefully, other Democrats around the country would join in opposition to 
these two nominees. In both instances, there was a lot for us to work on. Interestingly enough, there were serious problems with both these nominees that were brought to 
public attention and not solely by us, by any means. So as time went on, the nominees were found to be mediocre at best. In both cases they had serious problems, and they 
turned out to be very poor choices on the part of Nixon. The end result in pure political terms was to impose a defeat on Nixon. 
G: Also that year you had Chappaquiddick. What did that do to the Democratic Party? 
O: I had no personal involvement at all in Chappaquiddick. 
G: Did the Kennedy people seek your advice on how to deal with it? 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --15 
O: No, they did not. It was assumed by some members of the press that I would be involved in the aftermath. I was queried by several press people when it surfaced that some 
Kennedy allies were called into consultation at Hyannis. That involved several of my former colleagues. But I received no contact, directly or indirectly, from any Kennedy 
source throughout the entire Chappaquiddick incident. 
G: Did it surprise you that you weren't consulted? 
O: I don't know as I thought about it particularly. Certainly I had no resentment that I wasn't consulted. 
G: How should it have been handled? 
O: I think it's difficult to comment. It's easy to say, "Simply step forward and state the facts," if you're not the person involved. You had a Kennedy position, for example, in the Bay of 
Pigs that I applauded. You had a position taken by President Kennedy in the Cuban Missile Crisis that I applauded. Individual reactions to circumstances such as this are 
difficult for me to judge. I don't think it is appropriate for a nonparticipant, completely removed, to make a judgment. There are many who have stated over the years the only 
way to handle that was to step forward and present the facts immediately. That seems to be the prevailing view, but we don't yet know all the facts of Chappaquiddick. I knew the 
people. 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 1 
G: You said that you knew the people involved. 
O: Yes, who were gathered at that cottage. That was an annual event. It was really a reunion of the boiler room girls of 1960 who happened to be the boiler room girls of 1968 
who I was able to enlist in the Humphrey campaign. I had known them for years. They were a marvelous group of young women and each year they would get together for a 
reunion during the summer. It would be appropriate to have Teddy if he could do so to pay them a visit, to participate in the reunion. 
I have no knowledge of what occurred following his departure from the reunion. Anyone who has experienced tragedy must live with it for the remainder of your life. In 
the instance of Ted Kennedy and Chappaquiddick, it continues to arise in discussion and I have to assume that it will never end. 
The Teddy Kennedy I knew was a man with whom I had a fine relationship. I've always enjoyed his company. He was younger than I. There was that void. He was 
dedicated to his brothers and from what I've been able to observe during his years in the Senate, he has acquitted himself well. He continues to have the overwhelming support of 
the people of Massachusetts. He can stay in the Senate for a lifetime. Whether or not he 
19
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --16 
has continuing ambitions to be president, I don't know. I've had no discussion with him in that regard. 
G: If it had not been for Chappaquiddick, would Kennedy have been the Democratic nominee in 1972, do you think? How would he have fared against Nixon? 
O: If there had not been Chappaquiddick and he had an interest in seeking the presidency in 1972, he would have been a strong candidate. But I think you have to remember that 
1972 was very unique. The delegate selection process that we'll get to, the whole McGovern approach represented a revolution in terms of the party's procedure in selecting 
a nominee. It's conceivable that if Teddy had been with Hubert and Muskie and others in that quest, he could have suffered as the others did in terms of McGovern's ability at an 
early stage to take full advantage of the new rules and have a broad base of support on the part of young anti-war activists who had the vigor and drive to lock up a nomination 
before a convention. So I don't know whether Teddy could have overcome that, but I considered Teddy a potential candidate in 1970 and 1971. 
Once the election was over, the off-year election, I had to look ahead to the 1972 convention, the presidential election, and to focus on the role of a party chairman trying to 
maintain peace and harmony among contestants. There were obviously numerous potential candidates on the horizon in January of 1971 when I thought it out. Was there 
anything that I could do to keep these candidates from tearing the party further apart in 1972 in what was obviously going to be strongly contested primaries and caucuses? I 
decided to go forward. So on February 9, 1971, I convened what was certainly an unprecedented meeting of those I considered to be presidential contenders without notice 
to them of the purpose of the meeting or who would be present. 
G: How did you get them all to come? 
O: By extending a personal invitation to each one saying that I wanted to discuss party matters. The invitation was extended individually. In no case did I suggest who the other 
guests would be. I kept my fingers crossed that I could really get a full complement of those who I would like to have present. I wanted no forewarning, because I truly didn't 
believe I could put it together. There would be "no, thank yous" around. I tried to carefully orchestrate this, and these people started to arrive at my apartment. As the 
doorbell rang in each instance, the earlier arrivals would look toward the door. One by one the new arrivals would appear and everyone was looking at everyone else. It was 
interesting to observe the reactions. 
It's worth noting those present and it did represent everyone I thought should have been invited at that time. There was total attendance. In addition to my presence, I had 
Bob Strauss and Ira Kapenstein from the national committee. Then the other guests were House Speaker Albert, Majority Leader Mansfield, and seven senators who were potential 
candidates for the Democratic nomination of 1972--Hubert Humphrey, Ed Muskie, Henry Jackson, George McGovern, Harold Hughes and Fred Harris. Senator Birch Bayh was 
20
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --17 
invited but he was out of the country so that was one absentee. It was tricky to put this together. You had no idea what the end result would be by the time the evening ended. 
And there were perhaps some who thought it was pretty presumptuous. 
G: At the time did they say so? 
O: No, none of that was said at the time. I think that each person in the room decided to remain close-mouthed as to the purpose of the meeting until they had more evidence of 
what was going on. So there was just small talk until it was time for dinner. 
The only announced candidate at that point was McGovern. He didn't say it to me directly, but I think I learned there was some indication that Teddy Kennedy felt I had 
taken advantage because his posture contrary to the others was that he was not considering seeking the presidency. 
G: And this put him in that posture. 
O: Yes. 
G: Well, tell me about the conversation at dinner. 
O: Well, before that I recall that Gene McCarthy's friends afterwards complained because he wasn't invited. And I saw no reason to invite McCarthy under these circumstances. It just 
didn't add up. Sam Yorty, who I wouldn't seriously think of, took the occasion for publicity after the fact, calling for my resignation because he wasn't included. I invited 
Ted because, despite his disclaimers, he was widely viewed as a logical candidate. I had a second meeting later to which I invited Wilbur Mills, who had not come to my attention at 
that time but was later discussed as a dark horse contender. 
I maintained top secrecy. There was no advance notice or no press knowledge of this meeting. The staff, other than Bob and Ira, in the DNC had no knowledge of the 
meeting. I had feared that if I told them I was calling a meeting of potential candidates for the presidency, they would assert their non-candidacy and that would end that. As I said, 
no guest knew who the other guests would be so there was a lot of head-turning and joking each time the door opened and another "contender" arrived. 
G: Still, just the logistics of getting all these guys on the same night must have been formidable. 
O: It was extremely difficult because I felt there was no way I could reveal the purpose or I would not be able to do it. So, it took a lot of careful planning and individual contact. 
G: Was it a stag affair? 
O: Yes. I opened the discussion over dinner by saying, "Now, of course, the DNC has a 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --18 
responsibility for the 1972 convention," and I want to ask their cooperation in the planning of the convention. That was easy. And I wanted their support for the party's delegate 
selection reforms. That wasn't quite as easy, but the fact is they were in place. I hadn't initiated them. The national convention in 1968 had set the stage. Then I went on saying 
I wanted to minimize intraparty bloodletting in next year's primaries, and that opened the discussion. I went into some considerable detail, making a plea to help me discharge my 
responsibility as national chairman. There was nothing that I said in those preliminary remarks to which anybody could take affront. "I'd like you to help me in planning the 
convention. I'd like to have your commitment to adhere to the rules and procedures in delegate selection. I have a responsibility to avoid bloodletting and I need your full 
cooperation in order to accomplish that." 
The meeting opened up and there was enthusiasm. It was amazing. You didn't know what was going to happen. This could break up at a moment's notice. There was a 
great deal of tenseness as dinner started. Nobody in that room other than Strauss and Kapenstein had any idea what to say. Was this the Chairman trying to have a little social 
event? They had to feel that couldn't be the case because as they looked around the room there was a common interest in a particular objective. We had a great session. 
Enthusiasm to the point where Hubert Humphrey noted this was a private session, but it was so productive, it had great potential, there was much enthusiasm and harmony and he 
wanted to compliment the Chairman. Everyone joined in this. 
He said he thought it was a shame if we didn't have a picture of this unprecedented gathering. Ira then had to try to locate a photographer because I hadn't anticipated the 
extent of favorable reaction and there had been no provision made to record this for political history. He telephoned around. In a rather desperate move he had called the 
New York Times photographer, George Tames, at home and prevailed upon George to hustle over. It was a long session. We went on late into the evening. I joined in the 
enthusiasm. I thought it was terrifically productive. George Tames finally arrived and took the picture. Then it was brought up for discussion and agreed that I was authorized 
and should inform the press that the Democratic contenders for the presidential nomination 1972 would concentrate their fire on the Nixon Administration, not on each 
other. They would support the party reforms; they would assist the DNC fund-raising effort which was a little bit of a joke, I think, and they would work with the Democratic 
National Committee in its fight for loyal opposition access to television, which was a fight I envisioned would be continuing. The meeting ended on that note. The only photo or 
record of the meeting that exists was George Tames' which, of course, the New York Times ran the next morning. But we had no other, and Ira advised the press the meeting 
had taken place and what the general subject was. 
We had a later meeting in which we came to a specific agreement which was more meaningful than probably the general discussion of the first meeting. In this we presented 
a ceiling on each candidate's media spending. It would be five cents per registered voter in the primary states and three cents per voter in the non-primary states. This, of course, 
would be helpful to everyone concerned. That meant the money saved in the spring could 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --19 
be used against Nixon in the fall. I must say it was closely adhered to. It finally came into play during the primaries. The only charge brought up by any candidate against another 
that he violated the O'Brien agreement was an exchange between Humphrey and McGovern in the last days of the California primary. Even thinking back on it now it 
represented solely an effort in the interest of the party. I was taken aback that there was that degree of success as a result of that effort. 
I've often reflected on that first meeting; it was extremely interesting and we often talked about it. Obviously, I was extremely pleased with the unbounded enthusiasm, the 
end result, and I was greatly relieved that I hadn't created a situation that would cause some eruption and difficulty that I'd always regret. A specific agreement on capping 
expenditures for television was helpful and it was adhered to. That represented an effort to fulfill my role as chairman in the first week of February in 1971. 
G: What was Tames' reaction when he showed up? 
O: I don't recall because Ira was waiting at the door. We had dinner in the dining room of the suite. We had gathered initially in the living room. Ira's in the hallway, anxiously awaiting 
the arrival of Tames. We all embraced the idea and naturally we were anxious. I was anxious to have the picture and if the party broke up before Tames' arrival I would have 
been distressed. I never would have deigned to suggest we have a picture or issue a statement. I would have been perfectly satisfied to have them say, "We appreciated the 
invitation and we assume you're going to adhere to your commitment that this was private." If that had been the resolution of the evening, I would have obviously accepted 
it. I had no intention of playing games with them to publicize it. It was their suggestion. In fact, Hubert's suggestion was joined in around the table and we unfortunately weren't in 
a position to take full advantage of it in terms of media attention. 
(Interruption) 
G: Okay. I wanted to ask you a little bit about the off-year congressional elections in 1970. First of all, with regard to your own travels, you spoke at the U. S. Chamber of Commerce 
in Washington. Do you remember that? Anything significant about that occasion? 
O: I vaguely remember that. I guess I did. (Laughter) 
G: You went to Indianapolis and spoke there. 
O: I don't recall specifics of the stops, even the ones that you have listed. There were many more than that. It was a basic speech. The situation would be generally a meeting of 
party people or labor people or a joint meeting or often a fund-raising event for a candidate, such as Ohio for [John] Gilligan. It would be on request that I make myself 
available. I was anxious to get around the country in any event. I had gone to the Democratic Governors Conference at the Lake of the Ozarks in Missouri when I first took 
the post back--hadn't even settled in the office. I didn't seek opportunities, but it's always 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --20 
difficult to get people to commit to making appearances. It's difficult for candidates oftentimes to get some highly visible person in the Congress. 
So these occasions arose. There were a number of them and oftentimes it would be a two or three-day trip where you would have a luncheon stop and a dinner, so you had 
a basic speech. A basic speech you would sandwich with the opening remarks directed to those present, to the candidate that was being honored or whatever the situation might be 
and an appropriate close. These stops always included a press conference. You would try to have a meeting in the form of a cocktail reception where you would meet the various 
local party officials and officeholders. Then to the next stop. I certainly was available to do as much as I could for Democratic candidates. There was considerable contact with 
the national committee requesting speakers. And there would be these occasions when the request would be made for me. I can't suggest that there was anything particularly unique 
in these appearances. They were basically party advocacy, opposition to the administration, straight-out politics. 
G: Your speech in Minneapolis for Humphrey, your appearance there. Anything in particular about that? 
O: I don't recall specifics on that. In fact, as we're talking I'm having some difficulty even recalling the stops. Nothing unusual that I recall. There is a traditional annual event in 
North Carolina that evokes the memory of a couple of Democratic leaders of the past. It's somewhat comparable to a Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner, and the governor of North 
Carolina, who I believe was Governor [Robert] Scott at that point, would introduce you. It was a large statewide dinner. There was a tour I made in New York on behalf of the 
ticket. It included stops in Upstate New York, Albany and Syracuse as well as an appearance with Congressman [Richard] Ottinger in his district--a swing through the state 
that had several stops in it. That would be typical of the type of thing I did. 
G: [James] Buckley won the New York Senate race. Any insights on that? 
O: No. 
G: Bella Abzug was elected in the House. 
O: No. I'm sure of one thing. I wasn't invited to her district. 
G: Louise Day Hicks was the seat vacated by John McCormack, House seat in Massachusetts. 
O: She was a very controversial lady in Massachusetts and it was a simple matter of a Democrat succeeding a Democrat. . . stop--G: 
The [Adlai] Stevenson stop? 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --21 
O: It's worth noting because of the unusual aspects of an appearance in Cook County. My recollection is that this was a different format than you would find as you crisscrossed the 
country. When you arrived in Chicago, the procedure was to pay a courtesy call on the Mayor prior to the function. The Mayor had two offices, the mayor's office and the 
county chairman's office. The county chairman's office was in the hotel where the function was to take place. I visited with Dick Daley and the visit was scheduled so that after a 
half-hour to an hour with Daley in his office it was time to go to the ballroom to attend this luncheon. Adlai Stevenson would be the centerpiece as the focus of the luncheon was 
to be on his candidacy. 
Daley escorting you to the luncheon meant down the center aisle through the ballroom to standing applause--not for me, for Daley--to the head table. The program 
started, Adlai Stevenson spoke and received vigorous applause. There were other speakers, then it became my turn. The Mayor introduced me with all the accolades in his 
inimitable style. As he went through this litany, there would be applause after every couple of sentences. I detected as I was speaking I was receiving applause for lines I 
didn't think were that great. I noticed the Mayor encouraged the applause. So these twelve or fifteen hundred people in this ballroom went through this procedure that I'm 
sure others experienced under similar circumstances. You might think you had made a great speech, but you would be naive if you left Daley and Chicago and thought you had 
made a tremendous impact. 
G: Governors' races? 
O: Five governors' races and maybe a sixth one, I don't recall. I had direct campaign involvement with the candidates. I'm not suggesting I contributed to their victories at all. 
All it suggests is that I was accepted in those states at those events I had been invited to attend. It was a matter of complying with the invitation and being a participant. Those 
stops were never limited to just appearing at a dinner or luncheon. They always entailed other activities, meetings with county leaders, a reception, a press conference. When you 
went on the road you were going to be fully occupied. They made sure of that. 
G: I wanted to bring LBJ back into the picture. You have been referring to Hubert Humphrey as the titular head of the party, even though he had lost the nomination. You 
had one living Democratic ex-president who you have not mentioned during this whole period. Why not? What happened to Lyndon Johnson in this? 
O: He went home and it was assumed he didn't want to be bothered. Hubert Humphrey was still active in the party. He had his own agenda. He was titular head of the party. The 
candidate, if he fails, is the titular head of the party. There has been some historic significance to that. But as I indicated early on, that seems to have dwindled into oblivion. 
Going back to Adlai Stevenson, after his defeat, he was referred to as the titular head of the party. I think it was relatively meaningless then and became even less meaningful in 
intervening years. As far as President Johnson was concerned, he left for the Ranch and it was a matter of non-involvement and retirement. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --22 
G: Was he consulted at all during this time? 
O: There was a widespread recognition that he had no interest in being contacted on political matters. 
G: Strauss was a fellow Texan. Did Strauss stay in communication with him, do you know? 
O: Not to my knowledge. Strauss--really his association was with John Connally. He had come into active participation in the Democratic National Committee through Connally. 
In the 1968 convention, Bob was always with Connally anytime you saw John Connally. He was with him when I had the lengthy meetings with John that we have discussed. Bob 
was politically close to Connally rather than to Lyndon Johnson. 
G: One of the press accounts indicated that you had been helpful or cooperative with LBJ when he was working on his memoirs, The Vantage Point. 
O: I have recollection of being contacted from time to time regarding elements of the book as it was being written. I don't recall I was engaged in any in-depth discussions, but I did 
have contact from the Ranch on occasions, checking a fact or fleshing out a situation. As far as cooperation, obviously, if Lyndon Johnson had said, "I want you to stay at the 
Ranch for six months and help me with the book," I would have packed my bag and gone down. I owed a lot to him. 
G: The other living Democratic ex-president was President Truman. He was quite elderly at this point. Did he have any continuing interest or involvement in Democratic Party 
[activities]? 
O: No. While I was chairman I was invited to be the speaker at the annual Harry Truman dinner in St. Louis. We arranged for me to make a stop en route at Independence and I 
have reviewed that in some detail early on. It was the highlight of that period to have the opportunity to meet with the Former President and Mrs. Truman. It was a memorable 
occasion for me. He was still vigorous in articulating his views, but he was using a cane, as was the case when we were at the Truman Library for the signing of the Medicare bill. 
The Former President, of course, was present for that signing ceremony. But 1970 through 1972, there was no thought given to activity on the part of President Truman. 
That would have been unseemly to even consider. And President Johnson certainly--let me put it this way: among us there was no one that didn't accept and recognize he was 
retired and wanted it that way. At a time when I contacted him on appearing at the 1972 convention he made it clear to me he had no interest. 
G: Did he seem to appreciate the invitation? 
O: Yes, I would have gotten to that as we discussed the convention but I had a conversation with him. It was fairly lengthy. It was a warm discussion. He said he appreciated the 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --23 
invitation but would decline. We discussed members of his family attending the convention and provisions we had made in the event any of the Johnsons cared to come--Side 
2 of 3, Side 1 
O: --they would be our guests. He expressed appreciation for that. I finally resorted to asking him that inasmuch as he would not attend the convention would he do the preface 
of our convention book, which he agreed to. 
G: Before we get into the pre-convention questions of the two commissions, I want to ask you about your trip to Russia in the fall of 1971. Can you describe that in some detail? 
O: Yes. I had felt I would like to visit Russia. It intrigued me; that's the extent of it. I suggested to my wife that we take a ten-day trip. Russia could be an experience. She had 
no interest, so I leaned on my son to join me. 
In the process of securing the visas, it was brought to the attention of the Russian Ambassador [Anatoly] Dobrynin that I was to be traveling to Russia. He contacted me 
and suggested dinner at the Russian Embassy to explore what he could do to make my visit comfortable. I explained to the Ambassador that I didn't want to put him out. There 
was no need for dinner and I preferred that he didn't extend himself. I pointed out my son was going to be traveling with me. We were going as visitors and tourists and that was 
the extent of it. He said, "I just don't feel right about this. Would you come over and we'll have a little cocktail hour? I'll confine it to a few people on my staff and you can 
bring some friends. At least we could have a drink together." I was in no position to refuse and I did go. 
Clearly, the purpose was to explore why was I going to Russia, what did I have in mind. I reiterated I had no interest other than the interest of a tourist. I was looking 
forward to it. He asked me if there were any specific areas of interest and I said no. I was going to be in Moscow and Leningrad. He made a couple of suggestions: "You would 
enjoy seeing Gorky Park," and there was some exhibit emphasizing the Russian astronauts in Moscow that he thought I'd enjoy. 
On arrival in Moscow a couple of fellows came aboard the plane and identified themselves as people designated to greet me. We were taken off the plane separately from 
the other passengers. The other passengers were going in a bus to the terminal, but they had a limousine to take Larry and me. We were extremely tired, anxious to check into the 
hotel. They were courteous and pleasant; nevertheless, they wanted to discuss some details of my stay. They asked about my schedule which was the typical tourist schedule. 
Then they asked if I would be willing to appear at a meeting of Georgi Arbatov's group. Georgi was liaison between Russia and the United States. We were aware of Arbatov's 
role, which is a continuing role to this day. 
I preferred not to get into that sort of thing. I'm paying for this trip. I'm a tourist 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --24 
and I didn't like to have sightseeing derailed. However, I agreed to do that. I agreed to another group--I don't recall. It was chaired by some professor. I agreed to visit the 
Kremlin to meet with the second-ranking, I guess, in the hierarchy. The head of government was on vacation. I haven't been able to depart the airport. 
However, finally my son and I were back in the car and we checked into the hotel. I wasn't in the hotel long when I received a telephone call from a man who had been a 
long-time AP reporter in Russia, an American, who asked me what my schedule was and I told him. He had been there for a long time and was about to retire from the Associated 
Press. He asked me if I was going to be received by the American Ambassador. I told him I was not, and he asked, "Has the American Embassy been in contact with you?" I 
said, "No." And he expressed disbelief. He said, "I can't understand how this could happen. You are the chairman of the Democratic Party and the Ambassador has ignored 
your presence." I said, "The Ambassador may be unaware of my presence. I'm here as a tourist." That seemed to excite him and it disturbed me because I didn't want an issue 
made of something I hadn't even thought of. I had no interest in the American Ambassador. Then he said he'd like to take Larry and me to dinner with a few friends of 
his, and I agreed to that. We were to meet for cocktails at his apartment and go on to a Georgian restaurant that he described as the best in Moscow. 
G: Were these American friends of his? 
O: I don't recall who they were. I do recall that when we got to his apartment he made mention of the fact that his apartment was in the building which contained other reporters 
and it was under surveillance, so I could be sure I had been checked entering. We visited there and went on to dinner in a restaurant that was rather noisy with mediocre food. He 
was an extremely pleasant fellow. Including Larry and me and the reporter, it probably turned out to be a party of eight, with friends of his, none of them Russians. That was the 
launching of my long-anticipated trip to Russia. But I did enjoy the evening. He was extremely interesting and recounted stories of a long career of some thirty-eight years 
representing the AP in Russia. 
Meanwhile, it became clear we were going to have at our disposal a car and driver that I hadn't made provision for, and an escort. That would remain the case until our 
departure from Russia. Escorts were present all the time. 
I found myself with Georgi Arbatov and his people at his headquarters. I recall a U-shaped or rectangular, very large table that probably accommodated fifty or sixty 
people. Georgi greeted me and presented me and I made some brief comments. Then Georgi had asked me if I would take questions. The end result was a rather lengthy Q & 
A. I had to go through an hour or more of this. There was no difficulty with it and everything was low key. I assumed that terminated my stay with Georgi Arbatov, who I 
found prior to this visit and in subsequent years to be an extremely bright, able, and interesting fellow who works arduously at ensuring he had the fullest possible degree of 
intelligence and understanding of our political process and those involved in it. He's an 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --25 
expert at it. That's been his life's work, and apparently there is great dependence on Arbatov on the part of whoever is ruling Russia. The position he has removes him a little 
from Red Square and creates a situation where he is not supposedly part of the apparatus. This gives him some leeway in dealing with American politicians of both parties. 
Following that session Georgi suggested that I join him for lunch. You're now occupied for lunch and you haven't seen anything of Moscow as yet. We adjourned to an 
attractive building a short walking distance from his headquarters to a private dining room. Now we're joined by a dozen for lunch of the sixty that I had just met, which I assume 
represented the top level of Georgi's group. The lunch began with the usual vodka toast and went on and on. It was at a minimum a two-hour lunch, confined basically to small 
talk. It began to go beyond small talk in terms of political conversation. But I never at any point opened the door for any meaningful discussions if that's what they had in mind. 
What stayed in my mind and caused Larry and me to have a real laugh afterward was the fellow sitting opposite Larry, who had been press secretary in the Russian 
Embassy in Washington. I could not take my eyes off his necktie because it was a Countess Mara necktie. It seemed incongruous to be in Moscow with this Russian 
wearing a Countess Mara necktie. 
Meanwhile, perhaps the previous night, there was contact from the American Embassy. We were extended an invitation to a reception at the Embassy. It was clear to 
me this reporter had made inquiry at the embassy because he was intrigued that the national chairman of the Democratic Party could be in Moscow and the American 
Embassy not recognize his existence. It didn't bother me in the slightest. I wanted to avoid that sort of thing and wander around to see Moscow. But you had to make a 
decision. The decision would be to drop by. Otherwise you might create a situation that could be misinterpreted. So off we go to this cocktail party. I don't remember the 
Ambassador's name. He was a career ambassador. A large number of people were there. Clearly the party had not been structured to entertain me. It was really to honor a couple 
of other people I don't recall. But the Ambassador was courteous and we went through that little charade. 
The next thing that occurred was, would I visit a Russian intellectual group, academic group? So here we go again. Meanwhile I have these companions at all times. 
The only benefit you could derive was transportation. So I visited that group and my son became kind of resentful. This group now is composed of probably fifteen or twenty 
people. An elderly professor was chairing the group. He obviously headed this entity. He and others started to talk about mistreatment of Russians in New York. At that time there 
had been incidents at the Russian consulate. I think there had been incidents at their living quarters in New York of a rather nasty nature. They were in high dudgeon: "This is just a 
terrible way to treat people." I guess I was supposed to apologize for my fellow Americans. I was thinking "I wonder how long this is going on. I don't want to create a 
scene." But my son created a scene because he suggested that as long as we were on the subject he would like to talk about persons not being allowed out of Russia. The name 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --26 
now eludes me but it was a worldwide story. So Larry said, "As long as we're on the subject of mistreatment, I want to know why this man isn't given freedom of movement," 
and he went on. He was sitting next to me. I kicked his leg but it didn't do any good. This fellow chairing the meeting became awfully exercised. It got into a loud exchange. 
Finally things settled down. The meeting ended and we departed. I said to Larry, "I couldn't care less about those characters. Why bother?" He said, "Well, I just couldn't 
stand it any longer." That was the highlight of that meeting. 
Then we were to meet in the Kremlin. There were three or four present in this large room at a long table. It was nothing but light exchanges of views in a courteous 
manner--a discussion of the two-party system, how it functions in the United States. It was not unpleasant but it was time-consuming. But as part of that it was insisted I have a 
tour of the Kremlin and some of the buildings, which took place and was very interesting. I had my friendly escorts with me throughout all of this, too. 
Then it was suggested that I would undoubtedly want to visit Lenin's tomb and we agreed. That was appreciated. We arrived outside the tomb and there must have been ten 
thousand people, six abreast, waiting to get in. Our car pulled to the front and we entered Lenin's tomb. I made the unfortunate mistake as I descended to the crypt to have my hand 
in my pocket. I was growled at by one of the guards and I didn't understand what he was saying until he made motions to take my hand out of my pocket. I guess I was 
inadvertently exhibiting disrespect. 
Meanwhile, I do visit this exhibit in Gorky Park and the Russian circus, along with various restaurants and a degree of touring. It so happened that one Sunday I would be in 
Moscow and the following Sunday in Leningrad. So Sunday arrived in Moscow and I told our guide that I wanted to attend mass. He found that difficult to cope with. Finally, it 
was resolved that there was a mass at the American Embassy in a room in the basement and we went to mass there with a handful of others. 
Then it was decided we would visit a museum and a cemetery where many famous Russians are buried--outside the Wall. Rowlie Evans, before I had departed for Russia, 
had suggested that if I really wanted to give them a little challenge during my stay in Moscow I should ask to visit the grave of Boris Pasternak, outside of Moscow. 
While touring the museum I mentioned to my traveling companion, one of the two that were with me, "By the way, when we finish our tour of the museum I'd like to visit 
Pasternak's grave." Well, that caused a sudden halt. He said he'd have to check into that and was pointing out reasons why it didn't fit my schedule. I said, "Regardless, I'd like to 
go there." He departed. We continued through the museum and he was gone for some time. Finally he returned and said that it had been arranged. 
As we were driving, we were passing several dachas of prominent Russians in this wooded area and I told the guide I'd like to swing in and take a look. He wasn't 
enthusiastic. But we did. That's what it amounted to. We walked around this area and 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --27 
there were people sitting on porches and strolling. 
G: What was it like? Was it comparable to suburbia here? 
O: The architecture was considerably different, but it seemed to be a pleasant and obviously quite private area. There were people here and there. 
We arrived at the cemetery and there's a little church that was locked. There was no admission there. Then you started down a footpath from the church, a fair distance, 
not well-tended but you could traverse it. Finally to Pasternak's grave. There were six or eight people huddled around the grave site, and there were three or four modest little 
bouquets of flowers that looked like they had been recently placed on the grave. I imagine that goes on daily. That was the extent of it, but we had accomplished our objective. 
Meanwhile, this "guide" would meet us in the morning and be with us until the close of our day, back at the hotel. He would have Pravda in the car and sit up with the 
driver. He was young and his English was not perfect but good. Of course, he kept saying he was a member of the Russian tourist entity which I had made no provision for. 
He apparently felt he had a handle one morning as he referred to a piece in Pravda in which the IRA in Northern Ireland was lavishly praised for its activities. He applauded 
that vigorously. It was clear to me he had pieced together I was of Irish heritage and thought I would enjoy this camaraderie. I firmly advised him I had no interest in that 
subject and that ended that conversation. 
All in all, Larry and I concluded it was an interesting visit. Of course, the AP reporter had advised us our rooms were bugged, and, of course, we couldn't enter or leave 
our rooms without checking with the person at the desk on the floor. 
We were going on to Leningrad by Euroflot. Our friend is in the car once again en route to the airport, and to my amazement at the airport he is going with us. We flew to 
Leningrad and when we arrived there is a three-car motorcade to meet us with several of his friends, and we're brought to the hotel. 
There was one area of interest in Leningrad we were looking forward to and that was the Hermitage. Larry had a particular interest because he had taken art courses at 
Harvard and was excited about the prospect. I must say the treatment we were receiving was advantageous in that instance. We were escorted into the director's office and the 
director served us coffee and cakes. We chatted for a while and then pointed out our stay was obviously too brief to see the Hermitage in its entirety or even remotely its entirety. 
He asked if there were any particular areas we might want to focus on, which I left to Larry. Then a lady was called into the office to be our escort. The Hermitage was the 
highlight of our visit to Leningrad. 
It was decided we should also see the Summer Palace. We went by hydrofoil. And we were invited to the ballet. I later learned that the people who had our box had 
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O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --28 
been ousted to accommodate us. 
There was insistence that we attend a reception at a refurbished palace in Leningrad. A woman was its director and it was considered a highlight of any foreigner's 
visit. I protested a reception and finally negotiated a visit that would not be a full-blown reception. It was a very interesting visit and a very interesting woman who, incidentally, 
sent me Christmas cards for ten years after that. She was an impressive lady and her English was fine. She mentioned other Americans who had visited, including American 
astronauts. I suggested this represented heavy investment and asked how she was able to get this great project done. She responded she had a close friend in [Leonid] Brezhnev 
and he had provided the funding. Then we had probably fifteen to twenty people present and they were serving cocktails. 
Next she asked me if I minded being interviewed, as there were two reporters. I was taken to a side room and there was an effort made to have comments that might be 
newsworthy from their point of view. I refused pleasantly and said I was a tourist enjoying my stay and I would have no comment beyond that. 
Sunday is arriving. My local new-found friends plus my friend from Moscow are still with us. I advise that we want to attend mass on Sunday. Some time elapsed before I 
could get a response. Finally they said that they had made arrangements. So on Sunday morning we joined this motorcade and off we went. We traveled for some period of time. 
Wending our way out of Leningrad, we come to a suburb and the Catholic church. At this church there were probably forty or fifty people in attendance. What was interesting 
was that my traveling companions lined up against the wall in the rear of the church almost in military formation and stayed in that position through the entire mass. Nothing was said 
as we returned to our hotel. 
They were anxious, in their own way, to entertain us. They wanted to take us to dinner at the hotel in Leningrad that had been within view of Hitler at the siege and would 
have been his headquarters on the fall of Leningrad. The dining room was similar to a ballroom and quite crowded. It was pointed out that many occupants were Finns as it was 
a short trip from Finland by water. They had apparently more opportunity to enjoy themselves in Leningrad and drink to whatever extent they cared to. I got the impression 
they came over with regularity. 
There was a soft drink I was told that was made from bread. The Russians seemed to enjoy it as we enjoy our colas. It came in a little barrel that night. You could have it in 
a glass. Our host insisted on having a barrel delivered to the table. It had a little spigot. It was horrible. We drank a little as they were very proud of it, and apparently most 
Russians drank it. In Gorky Park they had a dispenser for these drinks, and my escort had asked me if I'd like to try it. It was a warm afternoon and there were many people in the 
park. All of them studiously avoiding looking directly at us. They averted their eyes as we were passing. It was a strange experience. You were spotted immediately and you 
were avoided totally. I realized there was a common glass at the dispenser. They put a 
32
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --29 
coin in the dispenser, filled the glass and put it back for the next person. I wasn't about to participate in that procedure. 
We were closing out the trip. There is no converting of Russian money and I had some left. I said to my guide, "Here's my remaining money. I'll have no use for it." I was 
flying to London. He replied, "Let me do something with it." He disappeared and came back with a large container of caviar. He said, "This balances out the money you had 
left." 
At the airport there were long delays. We were placed in a private room. There was checking and rechecking up to and including the steps to the airport. It was a boring 
and somewhat disconcerting procedure to leave Russia. There again, Larry and I were in this separate room which was like a dungeon, but it was far better there than in the midst 
of the mess in the airport, until they decided to have the plane leave. We went on to London. 
I had no later discussion with Dobrynin regarding the trip. The activities I engaged in with Arbatov and others were probably well-intentioned. I do think they honestly felt as 
long as I was there they'd like to have some contact and some discussion. They take it all very seriously. There was very little banter or laughter connected with any of this. These 
meetings were deadly serious and the questions were deadly serious. The climate was not a relaxed climate at any stop. 
But I must say I was pleased that I made the trip. 
G: You had worked for two presidents. Did they show a particular interest in questioning you about either these presidents or the presidency itself? 
O: There was some of that but as I indicated, most of the discussions at these meetings were in the context of the American system--Tape 
3 of 3, Side 1 
O: --in the context of the two-party system, in the context of my role as chairman of one of the parties. It flowed that way. I made no effort to turn the conversation to discussion of 
the Russian form of government. The attitude simply appeared to be one of interest in a political activist from the United States and how that government functions and what his 
role is. 
So, with the exception of the attack on us because of the treatment of Russians in New York, there was nothing spiteful. I must say, I think from the time Dobrynin 
originally contacted me through the trip, the Russians couldn't understand why the Democratic Party chairman and his son would just take a break for a couple of weeks and 
go to Russia. There must be some motive, some reason beyond tourism. 
33
O'Brien --Interview XXVIII --30 
End of Tape 3 of 3 and Interview XXVIII 
34
    [ Part 29: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--38 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXIX*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XXIX 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXIX, 11/ 3/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXIX, 11/ 3/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-41 
4
INTERVIEW XXIX 
DATE: November 3, 1987 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 1 
O: I should make a comment on another candidate for the presidency in the context of past discussions we've had, such as the dinner meeting in my apartment in Washington 
involving the candidates. Another candidate that surfaced for a brief period: Wilbur Mills. Representatives of Wilbur Mills met with me in my apartment in New York and urged me 
to consider resigning as national chairman to take over a campaign for Wilbur Mills for president. I declined. 
At a later date, I was contacted directly by Wilbur. It coincided with a visit I made to Dallas to attend the wedding of one of Bob Strauss' children. Wilbur arranged to have 
a plane pick Elva and me up at Dallas and fly to Little Rock, where we transferred to a smaller plane to Wilbur's home town. He and I spent some time that day discussing his 
views on his candidacy. At that time, he didn't ask me to undertake an active role. It was more exploring what potential he had and how he might go about it. 
I recall particularly a small cottage alongside the railroad track, with a smaller cottage adjoining where his mother lived. It recalled conversations I had with him over 
the years regarding his experiences leaving that town and attending Harvard Law School. He couldn't acclimate himself to Boston and New England. I sat in this little living room; 
his wife Polly joined us at times. But she and Elva spent most of the time in another room. It was an experience to meet with Mills under those circumstances and have a 
fuller understanding of where he'd come from. The simplicity of it--he had retained his roots and that's where he felt most comfortable. 
He ultimately did enter the New Hampshire primary and nothing meaningful came of it. But he was, at one period of time, added to the list of candidates. I did not consider 
that to be the case when I arranged the initial meeting of the candidates I thought [had the] most potential. Wilbur Mills was not included. That was the extent of his candidacy 
in any event. 
G: What did he say about his prospects for nomination? 
O: I think Wilbur felt he had considerable national recognition, that he had a record he could point to with pride and that was clearly the case. But it did not, in my mind, suggest real 
potential as a national candidate. He was not persuaded; he toyed with it. He felt he had 
5
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --2 
better credentials or at least as good credentials as anyone seeking the nomination. But all the difficulties of entering primaries and the financing he had a tendency to gloss over at 
that time. When I left him I felt there was a degree of seriousness, and I wasn't surprised that he did put his foot in the water in New Hampshire. But I had no expectancy that his 
candidacy, if he went forward, would be effective. 
Concerning Wilbur's lifestyle in Kensett, Arkansas, my recollection is his family owned the local bank. I'm not suggesting he was a barefoot boy leaving for Harvard Law 
School. To sum it up, I was somewhat surprised with his serious approach and that he had gone that far in his thought process, although, as I said, I recall associates of his 
visiting me in New York several months earlier proposing I resign and take over Wilbur Mills' campaign for president. Wilbur approached it in a serious manner for a period of 
time until finally reality set in. 
G: Did he have an issue that he was going to hinge his campaign on? 
O: He felt that he could speak to the economy, to domestic issues, from his position as chairman of the Ways and Means Committee and his contribution over a period of years in 
terms of the economy, with emphasis on the tax side. That was the extent of it. I don't recall having any discussions with him, particularly on foreign policy or social issues. 
G: Okay. Do you want to move to the reform movements and the various committees or commissions that were--? 
O: When I returned as chairman, I had to focus on reform. The convention had made a specific commitment to reform. There were to be actions taken that would impact on the 
national convention in 1972. In the intervening year, from the time I left until I returned as chairman, the Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection had been 
formalized. Fred Harris, as chairman, had moved that 1968 mandate to a commission, chaired by George McGovern. The commission had by 1970 put in place with great 
specificity procedures for delegate selection. There was another committee on rules chaired by Jim O'Hara. Those two committees had determined procedures that would 
govern the delegate selection process and the rules of the convention. McGovern, when he formalized his candidacy, resigned as chairman of the commission and he was 
succeeded by Congressman Don Fraser. The vice chairman of the McGovern commission, which was how it was referred to, was Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa. Obviously, the 
commission was heavily weighted to the liberal wing of the party. But there was a commitment and it was my responsibility to fulfill that commitment as chairman of the 
party. 
And we proceeded to do just that. The delegate selection process would be altered completely. The provisions in the McGovern commission report were difficult to 
implement. For example, there had to be open, publicized delegate selection. No longer could party bosses just proclaim delegate slates. Beyond that, the delegates were to 
reflect the population. You had to ensure there was appropriate representation of youth, 
6
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --3 
ethnics, blacks, Hispanics, women. The concept was that you would have a balanced delegation from each state, consequently, a balanced national convention, representative 
of the population as a whole. There was a postscript that nothing in the McGovern commission mandate was to be construed as establishing a quota system. How you could 
carry out the mandate of the commission and not have the end result a quota system was hard to determine. Yet, that is the way the mandate read. We advised Democrats across 
the country on these procedures and alerted them that these procedures would be rigidly adhered to and full compliance was expected. Failure to fully comply with the mandate 
would mean barring seating at the convention. 
As this unfolded, it was clear that many party regulars were not implementing as directed. Organized labor--George Meany specifically--was very much disturbed with the 
McGovern procedure and the McGovern wing of the party. 
G: Was this because it displaced labor's traditional role? 
O: That would be one aspect. But beyond that, Meany felt that McGovern and his cohorts were leading the Democratic Party down a road to disaster. He personally and labor 
generally did not share the ultra liberal views of the McGovernites. The conflict was there and it was broad and deep. However, the process went forward. The Democratic 
National Committee formally endorsed the McGovern commission recommendations. 
So the role of the chairman of the party was to ensure that these provisions were carried out. The end result, of course, was that you had a convention that had 
representation, as I recall it, of probably 35 per cent or so women (compared to the 1968 convention it tripled or quadrupled the representation of women) and 14 or 15 per cent 
representation of blacks (which probably tripled the representation of blacks at the prior convention). You had 20 plus per cent, as I recall, young people under thirty, both men 
and women. That was far beyond youth representation at the 1968 convention or any prior convention. So, once this delegate selection process was completed, you had 
achieved the objective of the McGovern commission, which was supported by the national party and the Democratic National Committee. 
Meanwhile, you had elected officials of the Democratic Party throughout the country who had regularly attended national conventions, who were simply appointed. 
They overwhelmingly decided they would not contest for delegate status and would not attend the convention. 
G: Was it simply a matter of their own discretion not to subject themselves to the factionalism? 
O: That's right. 
G: Or was it a fear that they might not be able to get elected a delegate? 
7
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --4 
O: Both. That was an understandable fear. First of all, there were about twenty-two states, as I recall, that had established primaries. In those primary states you did have a 
publicized election of delegates. Compliance could not be questioned if you had that kind of procedure. But in the non-primary states, it became an extremely difficult situation. I 
recall labor representatives deciding they were going to take over a caucus and get their slate elected. They appeared at the site and provided box lunches and all the rest. They 
were going to prevail. The day wore on, the evening wore on, midnight came and the labor people became tired of the procedure and went home. The McGovern people stayed 
until the wee hours and wound up having their delegates elected. The organized effort of the McGovernites across the country in this process was impressive. Their willingness to 
devote all the time and effort that was necessary to get this done was impressive, and they got it done. It's interesting to note, after the process had been completed or toward its 
close, that Al Barkan of the AFL-CIO proclaimed there would be more labor delegates upcoming in the 1972 convention than at any convention heretofore. It was difficult to 
equate that with the procedure. They had five hundred plus labor delegates. That was his claim and I had no reason to doubt it. 
G: Looking at the representation formula and the whole evolution from deciding not to exclude or discriminate against minorities and women in choosing delegates, going all the 
way to a requirement that elements be represented in proportion to their percentage of the population. Do you recall the specific decisions that were involved in this progression and 
did you yourself have a role in it or was it--? 
O: No, this was formulated by the commission prior to my involvement. It was a statistical matter. Even those who were not in the McGovern camp developed balanced slates. 
They wanted a slate that could meet the challenge of balance. 
These would be party regulars, Humphrey supporters. Where labor succeeded, if they had over five hundred delegates, was they perhaps were very careful in their delegate 
selection to ensure they were in general conformity with the McGovern commission mandate. But you can't get away from the fact that this commission took the pains to 
include in its report that nothing was to be construed as invoking a quota system. 
G: Well, wasn't it in fact a quota? 
O: Of course it was. The mere fact that the commission had taken the pains to state this was a clear indication that the commission knew they were actually mandating a quota system. 
That's the way it unfolded. 
G: In retrospect, how should it have been handled? 
O: Like every situation to correct a basic problem. There's a middle road. The creation of "super delegates" to include a substantial number of party activists and officeholders is a 
solid example. There's no question the delegate selection procedure of the Democratic Party in 1972 was not democratic. It leaned heavily toward party bosses. That was the 
8
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --5 
history of party conventions. So 1968, when Humphrey prevailed, the liberal wing of the party was able to enact this mandate. The convention did not think too long or hard on 
this reform demand and it was accepted by the convention. Once the opportunity was there the McGovern people grasped it firmly and moved aggressively. The Democratic 
National Committee approved the commission's report and recommendations in toto. We had no alternative but to fulfill this obligation by implementation. That had been mandated 
by the national committee. 
You could see ahead there would be controversy. It was inevitable there would be protests. And there were. The Credentials Committee, which would be an entity of the 
national convention, would have the responsibility to review all protests and rule on them. Their decisions, of course, would be subject to the ultimate determination of the 
convention itself. So it became clear to me that, while I'm implementing the commission's recommendations, I have a responsibility to ensure there's a fair and balanced procedure in 
the Credentials Committee. That resulted in controversy because Harold Hughes made it clear he should be the chairman of the Credentials Committee. I felt this was where I 
should make a decision. I decided to ensure a chairman of my liking would be elected by the national committee. 
That resulted in a bitter contest. Hughes pursued his efforts; literally started a campaign for the post. I was able to persuade Pat Harris to accept the role of chairman if 
she were elected. She accepted with considerable reluctance. She recognized that this would be very controversial. She was not enamored with the idea of entering a contest for 
chairman. She did not have any great interest. But I felt she would be an excellent chairman if she could be persuaded to take the post. Bob Strauss and I met with her, 
discussed it with her at length. She agreed to consider it and ultimately agreed to accept the role with the proviso that she would not be an active candidate. She would not seek 
Democratic National Committee votes for the post, but if elected, she would serve. That's the position we were in. 
It came to a head when I learned that Ed Muskie had decided to support Harold Hughes. I talked to Muskie about this and I was upset. I told Muskie I was not a rubber 
stamp chairman. I would recommend my choice to the National Committee at a formal meeting and I would vigorously support my choice. Muskie had hoped, apparently, to 
make a deal with Hughes for his support of Muskie's candidacy, which would be a real plus from Ed's point of view because Hughes was allied with McGovern and was known 
widely as a co-reformer with him. If Ed Muskie could get his support it would make an impact. So Ed and I had words. My position was made clear and Ed's judgment was 
Hughes was the ideal choice. 
G: I would have thought that Muskie would have opposed anyone that was pro-McGovern at this point. 
O: It appeared that Muskie was in the process of weaning Hughes away from McGovern. 
9
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --6 
G: Really? 
O: And the way to do it was to support him for this role, which Hughes was most anxious to secure. The quid pro quo would be the endorsement. 
G: Would that have worked, do you think? 
O: Well, he endorsed him. 
G: So it did work. 
O: For what value it was. But, in any event, immediately following that conversation, it was clear to me I had, as chairman, a larger stake, almost to the point that the chairmanship 
was on the line: support the chairman or oppose the chairman. 
G: Was Pat Harris, likewise, aligned behind one candidate or another? 
O: No, she was not. Pat Harris was a reluctant participant in this. She was an ardent Democrat, but she had not been involved with candidates, which was a plus. Furthermore, 
Jim O'Hara, as chairman of the Rules Committee and Don Fraser, as the then-current chairman of the McGovern commission, both agreed that Hughes should not be chairman 
of the Credentials Committee because it was a clear conflict of interest. The commission had established the rules. They were accepted. The commission in a sense legislated. 
Now the Credentials Committee was to be the judge and jury. Hughes did not belong in that role. I made a bigger issue of it than it probably was. But following the Muskie 
conversation, it became clear to me that this battle then had to be won. So I immediately put together a head count, assigned the hundred members of the national committee to 
various people and I took some of them myself. We proceeded one on one to lobby the national committee. 
It became an intense struggle and did divert my attention from other matters I could have been working on. Prior to meeting, we had a luncheon. All the candidates 
would appear at the luncheon. That included Scoop Jackson, Muskie, Humphrey, McGovern and others. My recollection is that two or three, in their remarks, registered 
their support for Harold Hughes. Two or three others refrained from evidencing support for any candidate for chairman of the Credentials Committee. Meanwhile, Pat Harris 
became subject to pressure. She was pressured by Coleman Young, mayor of Detroit, and by a congresswoman from New York. 
G: Was that Shirley Chisholm? 
O: Shirley Chisholm. 
G: What was their motivation? 
10
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --7 
O: They were strong supporters of Hughes and they were both black. They felt they could persuade Harris, a black, to drop out. 
G: But did this have a tie in with the presidential contest? Were they behind one candidate or another? 
O: Yes. They were behind McGovern. They didn't know Pat Harris. She resented very much the Chisholm call. She called me immediately and she was exercised about it. She 
told me she had told Shirley Chisholm she did not appreciate an attempt to pressure her. In fact, she resented it. The call had caused her to move from a position of 
non-involvement or basic disinterest. The agreement was she'd accept if elected but she'd never ask anyone to vote for her or engage in any politicking, which is exactly the role she 
played. Pat Harris was elected by a two to one vote in a tense meeting. Following the votes, people filed up to congratulate Pat, including Coleman Young. I overheard Pat say, 
"Oh, Mr. Young, we've never met before but aren't you the man that called me and tried to pressure me?" which was very embarrassing to Young. (Laughter) 
G: What did he say? 
O: He sort of smiled and quickly left. Pat Harris was a strong chairman. She was the perfect person, as it turned out, to chair the committee because it did become very controversial. 
G: Had you anticipated this outcome? 
O: You couldn't avoid it. The resentments were building. You were to have challenges from a number of states: Illinois and the challenge of the Cook County delegation brought 
against Daley's delegation by Jesse Jackson and others; the challenge to the California delegation, on the unit rule, which was the rule in California. The Humphrey people 
decided to challenge on the basis that there should be an allocation of delegates. 
G: South Carolina was in there. 
O: There were a number of states. There were several credentials challenges. 
G: What I'm wondering is did you realize in advance that Pat Harris was going to win that selection as the credentials chairman? 
O: When I first persuaded her to take it, I didn't envision an intense struggle. I felt she was ideal for the chairmanship. The problem with Pat Harris was to convince her to take it. 
Once she agreed to serve, you found yourself in a battle to see it through. That was the meaningful role I saw I could fulfill to bring some degree of balance to this process. I had 
not fulfilled my responsibility as chairman in the implementation of the McGovern commission guidelines. But I also felt that, as chairman, I should ensure there would be a 
strong Credentials chairman to consider all the protests that were bound to emanate. I didn't think Harold Hughes was that chairman because of his involvement in the 
11
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --8 
McGovern commission guidelines. 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 2 
O: So there were two very significant developments. One was the Credentials Committee's action regarding the California delegation. The Credentials Committee made a decision to 
allocate the delegates on the basis of the popular vote. That decision was then appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court chose rightly not to become involved in the 
matter. On procedure, this would be subject to a decision by the convention. 
The Illinois or Cook County situation continued to be controversial. On the Sunday prior to the opening of the convention, I received a call from Mayor Daley. It was 
a low-key conversation in which Daley made clear to me that, with great reluctance, in the interest of the party, he would be willing to compromise with the McGovern people and 
split the delegation. I thought that was a very positive note. I believe Daley had accepted my role--I was an impartial chairman doing my best in the interest of the party without 
regard to candidates. He assumed that I would move his suggestion forward. I could not complement it. I did not have control over McGovern delegates or Jesse Jackson or 
anyone else. But I certainly was not violating impartiality by relaying to the McGovern people Daley's point of view. So I proceeded to contact George McGovern and simply 
related to McGovern my conversation with Daley. 
G: Called McGovern on the phone? 
O: Yes. That was obviously what Daley wanted me to do and that was fair enough. I told McGovern that if he were interested in the Daley proposal that he and/ or his people 
should be in touch with Daley's people promptly. It was up to them. I left it with him and he was very enthusiastic about it. He thought it was an excellent idea, that it would go a 
long way toward containing the animosities that existed. I never heard another word. Whether McGovern was reacting to me in a pleasant manner, whether he was serious--and 
I think it was the latter--he was derailed by his advisers. It was clear within a day that no contact had been made and a decision therefore had been made by the McGovern people 
to sink Daley, which they proceeded to do. 
On the California situation, I received a number of visits in my suite from supporters of the various candidates. I would have to make a decision, and it would be a 
parliamentary decision. What constituted a majority of the delegates in determining the California protest? Joe Califano and Jim O'Hara discussed this at great length. There 
were others in the discussion. Lee White was involved and perhaps Dick Neustadt. O'Hara and perhaps Joe Califano discussed this in detail with Lew Deschler, the 
parliamentarian of the House of Representatives. 
G: Did you use the House in order to get some comparable procedure? 
O: That's right. Lew was widely recognized as the pre-eminent parliamentarian in the 
12
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --9 
country. There was unanimity of opinion and it was obvious what the opinion would be. If there are 151 delegates in the California delegation and they are being challenged, 
obviously those delegates don't vote on their own challenge. That's step one. Step two is what represents a majority of those present and voting. There were 3,016 delegates at the 
convention. You eliminate 151 of them from this decision and rightly so. No one could quarrel about their lack of right to participate in the decision affecting their own situation. 
That meant there would be 2,865 delegates who would have a vote on this protest. And a majority would be 1,433. 
G: A majority of those eligible to vote? 
O: That's right, 1,433. The anti-McGovern people, which included everybody who was seeking the nomination other than McGovern, opposed the argument. They claimed that 
even though these 151 couldn't vote, nevertheless, you had to have a total of 3,016. It was hard to rationalize that. But believe it or not, this became a serious situation and no 
one knew whether McGovern had a majority of the whole. Everyone assumed he had the majority of the whole minus 151. There was that last hope he didn't have that majority. 
G: You mentioned in your book the precedent or the example of the Supreme Court if there were only seven justices voting, that it would be a majority of those seven, or four. 
O: That's right. 
G: Did you have a precedent that you leaned on in this particular instance? 
O: No, actually, it was common sense. People were totally exercised. The pressures on me were exerted by representatives of McGovern, Humphrey, everybody involved. Either the 
principals or representatives or both visited me during that forty-eight hour period. Hubert Humphrey visited me. Hubert, among all of them, did not attempt to pressure me. 
He said he knew that whatever decision I made would be based on an honest effort to be fair and impartial. And while he hoped for a certain decision, he would certainly accept 
whatever my decision was. That was typical of Hubert. But that didn't apply to some of his cohorts and it didn't apply to some of Scoop Jackson's friends and others. So when the 
decision was made that a majority of those present and voting would make the determination, all hell broke loose. There were rumors that I was going to be ousted as 
chairman, all kinds of things were going to happen. Max Kampelmann was in the leadership of that effort. 
Meanwhile, I heard nothing from Hubert. There were no indications of Hubert being a participant in this. I made the decision, the vote was taken and the end result was 
the obvious one. The convention decided to adhere to the winner-take-all procedures that were historically in place and were in place in that primary. 
G: You did describe in your book a pool game with Humphrey before this--
13
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --10 
O: Yes, in this suite, this obscene suite in the Fontainbleau Hotel, to which I was assigned. 
G: Why do you call it obscene? 
O: It was Miami art deco and included the billiard room. Hubert at no time during that conversation attempted to persuade me. He wanted to assure me he felt comfortable 
because he knew that I would be properly motivated. So we proceeded to the billiard room. Hubert and I played two or three games of pool and had a lot of fun. That was the 
end of that meeting with Hubert. 
The McGovern people had done their homework. They arrived in Miami and they had the nomination. The effort to derail McGovern at the last moment was somewhat 
reminiscent of the last fleeting moments prior to that first ballot in Los Angeles in 1960 with the Johnson people and others. There were a number of candidates and a degree of 
unity among them at the moment. They didn't know where they were going if they succeeded in the first step, to stop Kennedy. If they could stop McGovern, then they'd see 
what would happen. In the case of Kennedy and the case of McGovern, the end result reflected the intensity of the effort that had been expended over a period of a couple of 
years. It reflected the ability of these people to extend themselves beyond the norm. They were not to be deterred. 
Ed Muskie, who had withdrawn as a candidate following the incident in New Hampshire, was still very much in his own mind a candidate. Muskie contacted me and 
asked that I host a meeting of all the candidates in my suite to see if they could reach some understanding, I guess aimed at trying to open the convention and trying to--G: 
When was this? When did they--? 
O: This was shortly before the opening of the convention. 
G: Is that right? 
O: Yes. So, a telegram went forward to everyone imaginable that could be construed as a candidate, actual or potential. I arranged the time of the meeting to include lunch. I had 
our people provide sandwiches in my suite. The guests began to appear. What you knew was going to take place did take place. There was one absentee. 
G: McGovern? 
O: McGovern. 
(Laughter) 
So we sat there for quite a while, small talk and chit chat. A considerable length of time elapsed and it became clear that McGovern was not going to appear. As a matter of fact, 
14
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --11 
there was a phone call from McGovern. He regretted deeply, due to his heavy schedule, he would be unable to be present. You can envision the climate or atmosphere in the 
room. Somebody said, "Well, I guess there's only one thing to do. Let's eat the sandwiches." 
G: What was Muskie's motivation in it? 
O: The general motivation would be: is there something you can do to keep this convention open? It brought to mind, as I sat with my guests, the 1960 last-minute efforts to stop 
Kennedy. This was a stop-McGovern meeting. Why Ed felt McGovern would join that meeting I don't know. Envision the clear front runner who had a lock on the nomination 
saying, "I regret this. Let's start all over again." It wasn't a meeting that McGovern had any interest in attending. 
G: Was [George] Wallace there? 
O: No. 
G: Had he been invited? 
O: I don't recall but I assume so. My role was to extend the invitations. All Muskie asked me to do was host the meeting. That was an appropriate location for the meeting. I was 
chairman of the convention. 
The Wallace situation was obviously a difficult one from the beginning. 
G: Excuse me. I don't want to get you away from the meeting itself, but was there substantive discussion about stopping McGovern? 
O: There was no discussion. 
G: No discussion. Even small talk? 
O: Just small talk. There was nothing meaningful. It was a group of fellows trying to carry on a conversation that probably went to the weather. There was no purpose whatsoever 
unless Mr. McGovern appeared. 
G: Who else was there? 
O: Terry Sanford, who was a peripheral candidate. It included Jackson, Humphrey, Muskie, and there might have been others. I don't recall. 
G: Was [John] Lindsay there or was he completely--? 
O: I don't believe Lindsay was there. A telegram went out immediately when Muskie made 
15
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --12 
the request so that due notification was given. I wasn't placing any limits on the meeting. I was not going to chair the meeting, although I had a feeling Muskie felt he could move 
me into that role. It was a side bar--an indication of the extremes people go to. You try to latch onto any angle that might have the desired effect. 
The Wallace situation from the outset was troublesome. As this unfolded, I remember Florida, Michigan, and there were others, where he was showing strength. I 
was reluctant to include Wallace as a legitimate candidate because I was extremely fearful that Wallace would be a third-party candidate. It became controversial. There were 
articles in the southern press that I was mistreating Wallace, that I was causing harm to party unity in November in the South. As Wallace in some primaries showed strength, it 
became clear to me that on a roster of candidates, Wallace would have to be included. The problem was I did not ask any candidate for a pledge to adhere to the result of the 
convention. That was simply that a candidate seeking the nomination of the Democratic Party would not leave the convention and support any other candidate. A fellow could 
leave and remain mute. I demanded that of Wallace and I thought rightly, because Wallace had a record of being a third-party candidate. He was unique in terms of the 
candidates and I would not consider him a legitimate candidate for the nomination unless he publicly stated he would not support any candidate other than the nominee. 
G: Was there any reason not to have the other candidates make the same kind of pledge? 
O: I didn't consider that necessary as there had never been any deviation from the party. Wallace was unique in that regard. I received a request from Wallace asking for housing 
for his people at the convention. I granted the housing. I found no support within the party for any effort to oust Wallace from the party. In fact, I found no indications of any 
stop-McGovern move through the course of the primaries and caucuses. Nor was there any indication of any organized attempt to bar Wallace from the proceedings. 
G: Did you ever talk to Wallace about this issue of party loyalty during this period? 
O: That was formally transmitted to him and he formally responded and accepted the provision, probably to the surprise of some. It was a clear indication that Wallace did not 
intend to pursue his 1968 course after Miami. He could, but it would have been extremely difficult for him to make that commitment and then proceed to do otherwise. That 
lessened the tensions to a great extent. There were those who said that I put Wallace's people in a poor hotel. The fact was that by the time he asked for space we had difficulty 
finding space, but we did. It was then my decision to have Wallace appear at the convention. He had made a request to appear and I decided I would put him on the 
schedule. 
After the attempted assassination took place, Wallace was in a hospital in nearby Washington. I thought it was appropriate for me to pay a visit to Wallace in the hospital. 
No party official or party leader had visited Wallace. But I did. It was a personal decision. I felt it was appropriate. It was the right thing to do. It had no political 
16
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --13 
significance. I went and his wife [Cornelia] was obviously very pleased that I came. I had to wait a short time as he was being examined by the doctors and I visited with her in the 
waiting room. Then she brought me in to George. He was propped up in the bed. We shook hands and chatted for several minutes. In fact, he was in pretty good spirits, 
amazingly so. It was clear, because he thanked me several times for coming, that he appreciated this gesture. Interestingly, following my visit, a number of party leaders 
visited George Wallace. 
G: What did you and Wallace talk about? 
O: He discussed how he felt he was coming along, how appreciative he was that I had come. It was a simple visit. No in-depth discussion on any matter. 
G: Was there any discussion of the Kennedy assassinations? 
O: No. I was a little taken aback in the sense that I didn't know what to anticipate. Mrs. Wallace seemed pleased that I was there. The doctors did say they wanted the visit to be 
brief. They indicated he was strong enough to see this through. Indeed he was. 
At the convention, the podium contained an elevator. Not for Wallace. It was part of the structure, so you could move from a lower level to the podium. Wallace 
arrived by helicopter. He was brought in onto the elevator in the wheel chair and the podium was set up so he could speak directly into the microphones. He gave a speech 
which was not adverse to anyone and it went very well. 
G: It's hard to imagine this convention delegation being a Wallace crowd. 
(Laughter) 
O: They were receptive. There was some concern on my part as to what crowd reaction there would be, but everyone acted appropriately. He was greeted cordially and with 
reasonable applause. His speech was well accepted. He did not get into controversies that would arouse the convention. It went smoothly. 
G: The press accounts at the time, some of them, suggested that you, through the loyalty requirement, were trying to read Wallace out of the Democratic Party and you responded 
you were trying to read him into the party. 
O: That's right. 
G: Did you shift in your attitude toward Wallace as he picked up delegate strength? 
O: I believe so. At the early stage there was no action on my part or need for action. Wallace was doing his thing. But as this unfolded, Wallace was showing strength in 
primaries. You were moving past the point where you could validly claim he wasn't as 
17
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --14 
serious a candidate as several others. 
I anticipated there might be some effort to block Wallace from participation, that he should be drummed out of the party officially. None of that occurred. Meanwhile, 
Wallace was showing considerable strength. Again, in my role, what could be done in the interest of harmony? Have Wallace under the tent; don't drum him out of the party. I said 
at that time, drum him into the party. The obvious test would come with my demand he adhere to this provision. If he didn't, I was faced with an extremely difficult situation. I, 
frankly, don't know how I would have played that out. 
But the fact is, somewhat to my surprise, he came forward without reservation. I had occasion to send a detailed letter to a senator from Alabama, who had accused me of 
trying to drum Wallace out of the party. I closed the letter by saying, "The following is the requisite and I believe this is something you should take up with George Wallace. This 
is not a decision I will be making. He will be making it." Whether it was a result of that letter or it unfolded at a later date, I know that by the time Wallace appeared at that 
convention, he was not the disruptive force that had been envisioned. 
G: Was his strength, let's say particularly in Michigan, a foreshadowing of what would happen in November, do you think? 
O: I think so. 
G: Did you view that with alarm? 
O: Yes, I did. Wallace as a third-party candidate in 1968 in a sense was helpful to Humphrey in some ares, as we know; Texas is a good example. But we are going into the 1972 
convention and Wallace is showing, to an extent, the strength he had in 1968. That support for Wallace in Michigan was an indication the so-called blue-collar vote support 
was still retained by Wallace. This certainly indicated that if McGovern were the nominee, it would be hard for me to envision these Wallace supporters supporting McGovern. And 
of course, they didn't. 
G: You started in 1972, the Democratic Party, with a 9.3 million dollar debt from 1968, really. What did this debt represent to the party in the seventies? How much of a 
handicap was it? Did it keep you from--? 
O: It was a serious handicap. When I returned as chairman in early 1970, Bob Strauss agreed to become treasurer and we would work together. Bob and I had all we could do from 
that early period of 1970 through the convention in 1972 to keep the Democratic National Committee's head above water financially. It was a terrible drag. We had no illusions 
about our ability to significantly reduce the nine-million-plus debt. We would have all we could do to maintain an active national committee and fulfill our obligations through the 
convention. The national committee, of course, has the total responsibility for the conduct of the convention. 
18
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --15 
All the activities that I engaged in as chairman, all the attacks on the Nixon Administration, all the efforts for equal time, all we've discussed, were not costly. Those 
are areas you could be extremely active in without incurring additional debt. So within those financial restrictions, I did everything I could to be an aggressive, vigorous, 
hard-driving chairman. This ultimately caused Watergate. Throughout, Bob just devoted every effort to the financial side. I must say he did an outstanding job under difficult 
circumstances. We reached the point where John Y. Brown entered the picture. John talked to Bob on several occasions and advocated a telethon to raise money for the 
national committee. There was no record of a network's willingness to participate in selling time for a telethon for political fund raising. It was unprecedented. 
G: Wouldn't it have been terribly expensive? 
O: Bob and I discussed it and we felt it was not realistic. But we decided that because of John's enthusiasm, we'd suggest to him he pursue it on his own. If he were successful in 
persuading a network to sell the time, he would be willing personally to pay for the time, which was a million dollars. We would go forward with the telethon, with the 
understanding that John had first in first out on the million dollars. He would be made whole, not anticipating this would ever occur. 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 1 
O: Well, to John's credit, he continued the pursuit and, to our amazement, arrived one day with a commitment from a network, and it was a million-dollar commitment. We would 
now go forward with the telethon. We would tie it to the convention proceedings and have it emanate from Los Angeles and Miami--from Los Angeles to secure, hopefully, top 
celebrities, and from Miami, for those on the scene. John then undertook to promote the telethon, traveling the country. It became to some degree a self promotion. John was 
doing the promotions, appearing around the country. 
Meanwhile, we were able to persuade David Wolper to undertake the production of the show. Well, it was John's show as he saw it, not only as a fund raiser for the 
Democratic National Committee but the actual production of the show. So John based himself in Hollywood and proceeded to undertake the lining up of stars. Wolper was a 
volunteer, willing to devote his time with his staff to production. It finally came to a head in my apartment in New York, where Wolper, John Y. Brown, Bob Strauss and I met. 
John was reluctant to come to New York for the meeting, protesting that he was so busy on the promotion. I told him it was imperative he be at the meeting. We let our hair 
down. I made the flat statement that David Wolper would handle all aspects of the production of the show and he, John Y. Brown, would have to defer to Wolper in that 
regard. John didn't like it. He felt this was his show; it was his million dollars up front and that was true. On the other hand, it was clear to me that David Wolper was leaving 
us. He was not going forward and John was not qualified to produce a nationally televised show. Wolper was. So we finally resolved it. John, with great reluctance, 
19
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --16 
agreed he would back off that phase of the telethon. Wolper would proceed as planned. It was his show. 
The telethon, I think, resulted in pledges of over two million dollars. 
G: And it cost a million dollars in terms of--? 
O: Yes, and there were some other expenses. 
G: But it was, would you say, profitable? 
O: We netted about a million dollars from the show. In terms of telethons subsequently, that was not very impressive. But, in our terms, it was extremely helpful as we went into the 
convention. We had negotiated the best deal we could with the people in Miami. With the money and the goods and services they produced, we still needed significant money to 
see the convention through. Of course that's no longer the case today. We have government contributions of millions of dollars to each party to aid them in conducting 
conventions. Then you had nothing but whatever you could produce to conduct that convention. 
G: One of the points, I guess, that the network raised was how many affiliates would actually carry the telethon. Did you ever get a reading on how widely disseminated the broadcast 
was? 
O: There was some fall off, but we had a substantial number of stations that carried it, a hundred twenty-five or more across the country. That worked out quite well. 
The problem was that Bob and I and the staff had to be involved with the telethon along with the other planning aspects. But the seriousness of our financial situation is 
underscored by what occurred up to the closing of the convention. We had made provisions, which were typical of conventions, for gifts to distinguished guests. We were 
to have duplicate gavels. We ordered twenty or so watches to be suitably engraved. We had to provide for music. All of these are normal, widely accepted practices. We had 
trailers outside the hall. The million dollars derived from the telethon was extremely helpful. 
The convention itself extended and extended. When the nominating process was completed, it was time for McGovern to give his acceptance speech. We were faulted for 
having his acceptance speech in the wee hours. The fact is, we didn't have the financial resources to continue the convention for another day. We could not defray the additional 
costs. I had Dick Murphy, the convention manager, pleading with the orchestra to stay on. We didn't have the money on hand to pay them for the additional hours. We had a 
sheriff serving a subpoena on the podium for nonpayment for the watches. We didn't have a penny. We couldn't carry the convention any further. They would have closed the doors 
on us. 
20
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --17 
G: The alternative would have been to try to speed up the proceedings so that McGovern could have spoken at a reasonable hour that night. You had a lot of--O: 
That was not an alternative because there were a number of candidates placed in nomination for vice president. 
G: Right. There was a big dispute in New York, too, about their own regulations or delegate process or something. 
O: Yes, there were disputes. 
G: Did you get involved in them? Did you try to accelerate the proceedings so that McGovern wouldn't be speaking on--? 
O: We tried desperately to. 
G: Tell me about that. Go into that whole scenario. 
O: I could not close out the nominations because delegates have a right to petition the chair, to place a person's name in nomination. It was endless. I was desperate to close it out. 
But there wasn't any way. The roll calls were lengthy. This was an open process. We have this electronic equipment to handle the roll calls. On the last roll call, I gave the 
figures before the roll call had been completed in order to stop it. It was unfortunate for McGovern. But I must say those who contributed to this were his own people. 
G: Is that right? 
O: The McGovernites wound up vying among themselves for prominence. 
G: Did McGovern himself or his key campaign people make any attempt to speed it up so that he could speak at a reasonable [hour]? 
O: You were faced with people who couldn't care less. They were going to have their moment in the sun. From the outset, platform debate and motions offered caused 
considerable delay. At the end of all this and you finally had a nominee for president and vice president, available time had elapsed. 
G: What about the New York haggling, the New York delegations; did you make any effort there to--? 
O: This convention, incidentally, turned out to be far less rancorous than Chicago. We had wondered about what might occur. We devoted an inordinate amount of time to the 
security side. We also had the Watergate aspect. There was a group that--
21
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --18 
G: National Welfare Rights Organization? 
O: That's right. Supposedly, that was an umbrella group. The closest we came to any serious disturbance was caused by that group. I recall we were meeting with the Arrangements 
Committee. This would be the closing meeting of the Arrangements Committee. In the midst of that meeting, in a ballroom of the hotel, there was a commotion outside. We had 
security at the doors and suddenly the doors--they were large, double doors--burst open and the security guards were pushed aside. In came this group of a hundred or so people 
led by Ralph Abernathy and the largest woman I've ever seen. 
(Laughter) 
They were roaring and they circulated. The security guards recovered. The meeting was totally disrupted and the security guards hustled me out a side door, to an elevator and up 
to my suite. In the suite I asked, "What are we doing? The guards explained that was their job. I thought a moment and said, "I can't tolerate this." So I went back down. 
By the time I arrived in the room, Abernathy was at the microphone. I went up to the podium and interrupted Abernathy and the howling started again. He did step aside. I 
said I would give Abernathy a chance to finish his little speech as long as it was brief, provided they agreed they would leave the room accordingly and they did. However, he 
finished his speech by making all kinds of demands for passes, just what you'd expect. But I must say they left. We then reconvened the committee and finished our business. And 
that was the extent of that. 
G: What did the committee agree to do in terms of meeting or not meeting their agreement? 
O: There was no agreement. We would see what we could do and that's exactly what we did. We saw what we could do, which was minimal. And that brings me the New York 
delegation. I must say when you think of all that occurred, the fight over the Credentials Committee, the protest on seating delegates, the parliamentary decision on a majority of 
those present and voting regarding the California delegation, it was amazing that there wasn't more conflict or controversy or disturbance, in or out of the convention hall. What 
was disturbing was not a disturbance. The percentage of first-time delegates had to be extremely high, probably 70 or more per cent. They wanted to be full participants. 
Chairing a convention is not an easy task at best. They were verbose and there were nitpicking discussions that delayed the schedule. That was the disturbing factor. But as 
for problems such as in Chicago, there weren't any. 
I learned later the Abernathy group was grievously disappointed in what Murphy was able to provide them in the gallery. But they didn't cause further commotion. The 
reason I learned about it was some New York delegates gave their credentials to Abernathy and his friends. A number of them were seated in the New York delegation. 
(Interruption) 
22
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --19 
G: We were talking about the campaign debt left over from 1968. I have a note here that AT& T was owed a large amount of money. Did this affect your communications? 
O: In those days, there was a tendency on the part of large corporations like AT& T and American Airlines to allow you to incur a great deal of debt. Indeed, in a campaign there 
were numerous negotiations later on for relatively small percentages of the debt, to clean it up. That has changed over the years. 
People submitted bills, including some who had done yeoman work, fellows like Neustadt and a couple of speech writers and others who had incurred expenses. There 
was some ill feeling created after the convention because of our failure to fully pay some of these expenses. There should have been no question. But Bob Strauss felt he was 
totally strapped, I guess. Some of this was left unfinished. 
G: But until you got to the convention itself, was there ever a question of not being extended credit? 
O: Not that I remember, nor was there ever a time when we failed to meet the payroll. In fact, we expanded the staff after I went back. I added a few key people, and we were able 
to function. We would have the occasional creditor making demands on us. We had to be pretty cold-blooded about it. This was debt that had been incurred over a long period of 
time. It had grown considerably in the one year of Fred Harris. And we inherited it. It was nine million dollars and you could not function with any degree of competency while 
trying to defray past debt. We handled our current costs without a great problem up to the convention. That is to Bob's credit. 
G: We have, in your papers, a listing of the Democratic Policy Council. What did the policy council do? 
O: They engaged in issues-oriented activities. It was a prestigious group. They functioned occasionally to come up with a policy position, issue press releases. That's about it. It 
was not an entity that impacted greatly on the party. 
Governor Jimmy Carter of Georgia suggested that I had misled him concerning my feelings about the South. I took the occasion to straighten him out in that regard, pointing 
out that I didn't feel I had misled anyone at any time on any subject. Apparently, he was referring to an interview in the Atlanta Constitution in which the writer speculated far 
beyond the scope of my conversation with him. I gather the crux of this was that he felt we were not focusing appropriately on returning the South to the Democratic Party. 
G: What did you see as a potential for the South in--? 
O: In evaluating the party at that time and the Wallace problem that existed, you would have to be an utter fool not to realize you would fail in November without significant southern 
23
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --20 
support. But there was a sensitivity on the part of some southerners. They felt the party had written them off, was not making an effort to re-enlist their support. And I gather this 
from the tone of my letter, where I review my selection of Ruben Askew to deliver the keynote address and I emphasize my insistence that I want to be chairman of a national 
party. I point out I felt the record over those two years indicated our keen interest in a unified party and our total understanding of the importance of the South if this was to be 
accomplished. Beyond that, I don't know what the content was of his note, but then he responded to my letter in which he said, 
I appreciated your letter and certainly did not mean to imply that you had misled me. Your goals and mine are in unison. However, it hurts us Democrats in the 
South to have our leaders insinuate that our nominee might be wasting his time to campaign down here. I still remember the results of 1960 when your candidate 
worked in my state. We gave him his biggest victory. I could see clearly the difficulties they had but they can very well be minimized by changing alignments. I 
want to avoid. . ." 
I don't know, I can't quite read it. "The continual exchange of information and ideas among us can be of great help. Thank you." I think that was the extent of it. He was 
governor of Georgia at that time and it's interesting that he chose a handwritten note in response to the letter. 
G: Carter would emerge as the next presidential nominee to the party. Did he play a significant role in 1972? 
O: He played some role. He was somewhat involved in convention proceedings and he had an interest in his own possibilities on the ticket. I believe he made his availability known in 
terms of the vice presidency. How vigorously he pursued it, I'm not aware. I was not privy to McGovern's activities in the selection process. But Jimmy Carter was anxious to 
explore the possibility of national recognition and the word was loud and clear he was interested in being on the ticket. You would think, as the governor of Georgia and 
recognizing that the candidate was faced with perhaps disastrous defeat, he would forego being a party to that defeat. 
But that wasn't the case because that wasn't the nature of Jimmy Carter. Jimmy Carter, as we all know, started from scratch and became president of the United States. 
He was not reluctant to take on what appeared to be impossible tasks. That would explain the interest he showed in the vice presidency in 1972. 
G: Yes. In mid-February you went to New Hampshire for the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner. Can you recall that trip? You had a lot of the major players there from George 
McGovern to Sam Yorty. 
O: I recall it in terms of an incident. This was a function rather typical of New Hampshire and Iowa. Several of the potential candidates were present. There was a dinner and these 
candidates were afforded the opportunity to speak briefly. They were seated on a stage. 
24
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --21 
Sam Yorty pushed his chair back and fell off on the rear of the stage at some point in the proceedings. That was probably the highlight or the lowlight of the evening. 
(Laughter) 
G: He was unhurt, right? 
O: Yes, he was unhurt. 
G: Muskie's campaign stumbled in New Hampshire. 
O: His campaign naturally flowed from the reputation he achieved in 1968. The aftermath of 1968 defeat was a recognition across the country of the caliber of Ed Muskie. He had 
performed exceedingly well in that campaign as we've recounted. In the early stages, leading into 1972, he was widely recognized as a significant candidate. In fact, there was 
a stage where he was considered the front runner. In the context of Watergate, there was a focus on Muskie by the Nixon people, including efforts regarding his headquarters. As 
time went on, they left the Muskie effort and moved over to a McGovern effort. 
They still occasionally write about and talk about Muskie's appearance before the Manchester Union Leader building when supposedly he broke down, defending his wife 
against the attacks of the newspaper. There's no paper in America, perhaps, as vicious as the Manchester Union Leader. [William] Loeb, in his heyday, and Mrs. Loeb still run 
that paper. They were difficult when we were in New Hampshire in 1960. The Democrats were castigated consistently by the Union Leader. Ed Muskie as a front 
runner was being particularly maligned by the Union Leader. Whether it was the cold, the snow falling or emotions, it had a tremendous impact on his candidacy in a negative 
sense. It was grossly unfair for the press to interpret what occurred that day in that way. Nevertheless, they did and it was very harmful to him. 
G: Would Muskie have been a contender had it not been for that effort? 
O: I believe so. There are contenders and contenders every four years. Muskie at that time would not be categorized as a contender. He would be categorized as a serious 
contender, and rightly so. The time frame of his departure from the campaign re: the Manchester Union Leader incident, I don't recall. But, clearly, that did create a story 
that was repeated and embellished on as time went on. It caused him difficulties and obviously had a great impact on his ultimate decision. But as I pointed out earlier, Muskie 
never really left the campaign. And as the files indicate, he was the instigator, if you will, of the meeting that was attempted among the candidates and he included himself among 
those candidates, even though at that time he was not an avowed candidate. The flicker of hope remained. 
G: Yes. How would you assess John Lindsay's candidacy? 
25
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --22 
O: I didn't give that much credence. I became acquainted with him initially when he was a member of Congress. He was a moderate Republican or indeed a liberal Republican. He 
voted with us on a number of occasions. He became mayor of New York. He engaged in negotiations with the unions in New York, creating a very favorable pro-union position. 
He apparently felt this would ingratiate him with the national unions. That would stand him in good stead as a candidate for the presidency. My recollection of Lindsay as a 
candidate probably can be summarized by an experience I had with him when I was touring northern California, primarily San Francisco. I was chairman and I was making 
these various appearances during the day, starting with the press conference in the morning. I was surprised to find Lindsay standing beside me at the press conference and 
then appearing at two or three other functions I was participating in that day. He chose these various functions I was engaged in as appearances to include him. 
G: You've talked about Wallace. How about Scoop Jackson? 
O: I had little contact with Scoop during that period. He was on his own course. He was a fellow who had played a prominent role back to 1960, when he was designated by 
Kennedy as national chairman after he was not selected for the vice presidency. Scoop's people were very disturbed with my decision at the convention regarding the California 
delegation contest. 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 2 
O: That was made known to me by one of his associates. I believe his associates did engage in some discussions regarding me with representatives of other candidates who were 
similarly disturbed with my decision and felt that I should pay a price for it. 
Nothing surfaced in that regard and I had no direct contact with Scoop of a meaningful nature that I can recall. I believe I recall correctly that he was at the aborted 
luncheon meeting in my suite that Ed Muskie had requested. 
G: In terms of the primaries, was there, as far as you were concerned, a turning point? Wisconsin or California? 
O: I think perhaps California was, because there was the direct confrontation between McGovern and Humphrey. It was a highly publicized primary. There was a great deal of 
effort; the obvious effort by the McGovern people, and the Humphrey effort was extensive. California was, if not the first occasion, one occasion when it came to my 
attention that Humphrey was showing some organizational grass-roots effort. The result was close. But there again, if Humphrey had prevailed in the California primary, it 
probably would have changed the course of events. But he didn't and even though it was a close margin, the steam-roller kept going. That was where Humphrey made a stand. So 
probably, if you could point to a turning point, that California primary probably was it. 
G: Did Ted Kennedy ever seriously consider entering the race in 1972? 
26
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --23 
O: Not to my knowledge. As a matter of fact, I don't recall a Ted Kennedy presence. It was assumed, despite his denials or indications of disinterest from time to time, he would 
surface. That was the assumption I made. 
(Interruption) 
G: --negotiations? 
O: On the vice presidential selection from day one, it was McGovern's desire and dream that Kennedy join him on the ticket. None of this involved me directly, nor should it in my role 
as chairman. But I was given to understand that repeated efforts were made to accomplish this. There were others who were involved. There was some promotion of 
Kevin White, who was mayor of Boston, for running. And there were others. But what I knew was secondhand. The people who seemed to be the closest advisers to McGovern 
throughout were [Gary] Hart, [Frank] Mankiewicz and perhaps three or four others. But I'm not familiar with the [Thomas] Eagleton selection and how it unfolded. 
G: In order to implement the campaign reforms and to inform I guess the local Democratic machinery on how to conform with the reforms, you sent out the actual how-to-do-it kits, 
instructing delegates. Can you describe these? 
O: It was purely informational. It was part of the effort to advise and educate. You detected throughout this process a lack of attention being directed to the reforms on the part of 
party activists who were not part of the McGovern group, in other words, regulars. It was a combination of disinterest and an assumption this would go away and that the old 
practices would be accepted in the final analysis. You could envision a point where complaints piled up and frustrations ensued. It was conceivable that the DNC would be 
faulted, that we failed to fully advise. 
So our effort was to spell out the procedure and the requirements needed to comply. There were those who attempted to balance their slates in self defense or in 
anticipation they might be challenged. That was the motivation more than any real desire to have balanced slates. It's the old story of those who work harder and longer. . . . And 
they had the vehicle to work with. McGovern was nominated by the Democratic Party to an extent because he was head of the McGovern commission. He was the reform 
candidate of the new era of the Democratic Party. 
G: There was an agreement among the seven contenders to limit campaign spending. 
O: Yes, that went back to the dinner meeting in my apartment. To my surprise, there was broad compliance. Some assumed this proposal was rhetoric. It was a good press release. 
But the fact is, it was adhered to across the board. It turned out to be worthwhile. 
G: There was also an effort to have federal financing. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIX --24 
O: Well, that was off-again, on-again. That went back to the Kennedy period. 
G: Nixon threatened to veto the proposal and you criticized his action. 
O: Yes, and we had problems with our people in the Congress. The federal financing effective date was beyond the 1972 election. It was such a long struggle and I was 
wedded to this struggle. I was convinced that in terms of the democratic process it resulted in one man, one vote, one dollar. As unsettling as it was to have the effective 
date moved farther ahead, the fact that there would be federal financing was most pleasing. 
It's worthwhile to mention McGovern's financing of his campaign. Maybe I'm jumping ahead, but in the context of lack of federal financing, the highlight of the 
McGovern campaign was the fund raising. There was a tremendous number of small givers across the country. It was somewhat comparable to the Goldwater situation in 
1964. Goldwater and McGovern had enthusiastic, deep-rooted support that unfortunately for both of them was not broad-based. Those supporters of Barry Goldwater were 
committed. That resulted in grass-roots funding for Barry Goldwater that was spearheaded by Ronald Reagan. And the McGovern period was the same. You had the 
right with Goldwater and the left with McGovern. But in that dilapidated campaign headquarters, where I spent some of the worst weeks of my life, the flood of mail every 
day--thousands and thousands of letters with contributions of ten, fifteen, twenty, twenty-five dollars, an occasional hundred dollars--was nothing short of phenomenal. The 
devastating defeat of McGovern could not be attributed to lack of reasonable financing. It was not comparable to 1968 when Hubert Humphrey could have probably prevailed if he 
had been appropriately financed. McGovern did not have that problem, not that he was rolling in money or that he could match the Republicans; no Democratic ever can. But he 
certainly elicited deep commitment as well as pocketbook assistance from thousands of supporters. However, they had but one vote each. 
G: Yes. McGovern also appears to have, in effect, done some fund raising for the Republicans in that they would utilize some of his economic ideas as almost a scare tactic. 
O: That's right. In fact, it was a scare tactic and was effective. And I must say, he aided the whole process. 
G: Did you make any effort to put these statements in a favorable context or cut your losses? 
O: Some of the comments, particularly the one about the so-called thousand dollars per person "grant" was a shocker. Meanwhile, I was attempting to focus the McGovern 
campaign on Watergate without any success. 
G: Yes. Even before the break-in in the convention, you were jousting with the Nixon Administration in the early part of that year, attacking various statements or actions of the 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIX --25 
Nixon White House. 
O: I tried to seize every opportunity. Some of it was not very effective because Nixon had Russia and China during that period, both of them pluses. I finally resorted to wishing him 
well on his negotiations with China. My most effective attacks on Nixon really went to his conduct of the office. The exposure of ITT [International Telephone and Telegraph] was 
really troublesome to them, not to the nation, not to the press, but to them and for good reason. I had really touched a nerve. This was a scandal of the first dimension and the 
press chose to ignore it as they ignored Watergate later. I was absolutely sure I was on the right track. I had figured these people for what they were. And because of those 
attacks, I became their mortal enemy. 
G: Let me ask you to go into the ITT case and how you became aware of it. 
O: It was brought to my attention that ITT was to acquire the Hartford Insurance Company and must have Justice Department approval. In the course of these deliberations in 
Justice, the ITT made a commitment of four hundred thousand dollars through a hotel they owned in San Diego for the Republican convention, which had been set for San 
Diego. The Hartford insurance situation smelled to high heaven and it is hard to believe there wasn't a full-blown exposure at that time, not just the lone voice from the DNC. 
There was one columnist, Jack Anderson, who focused on the Dita Beard aspect of it. 
During that time you had no foreign policy issues that could impact. On the domestic side there were problems, and we were trying to spotlight them with limited 
success. The Democratic candidates were busy campaigning among themselves. 
G: Were you getting advice or information from the Justice Department or where? 
O: No. 
G: On something like this you must have gotten some tips from someone who was privy to--O: 
We did a lot of our own research. 
G: Did you? 
O: Yes. You didn't have to be awfully bright to spot that there was four hundred thousand dollars involved in San Diego re: ITT. Coinciding with that was the approaching decision 
regarding ITT-Hartford Insurance. A cursory review of the records and some research brought you to obvious conclusions. I must say you had little evidence to prove your 
case. But you have an assistant attorney general conveniently in Europe when you make inquiries about ITT and you're told he will respond when he returns. Almost in the blink of 
an eye he is named a federal judge in Chicago. Regarding ITT, he makes a statement that as assistant attorney general he could testify without reservation that John Mitchell and 
[Richard] Kleindienst knew nothing about ITT and Hartford Insurance. It was just an 
29
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --26 
absolute disgrace. Yet it was pulled off. But at a later date of course it was all exposed. 
G: Do you feel that the ITT thing helped focus the Nixon Administration's operations on you as a target? 
O: There's no question about it. There were other things. A review of the Nixon files certainly proves that back to the battle for equal time, my regular attacks caused focus on 
me. I made these attacks on the administration's policy and its record, its failures as I saw them, at no financial cost. These were areas you could apply yourself to and not be 
inhibited by financial restrictions. I built a record in the White House of being a pluperfect s. o. b. The record shows that that's exactly the position I was in in the White House. 
There were two targets throughout 1971, 1972: Larry O'Brien and the front runner of the Democratic Party, for a period Muskie and later McGovern. The objective was to 
destroy. 
G: You ended up as chairman of the convention, temporary chairman and permanent chairman. Let me ask you to describe this arrangement. 
O: As you develop plans for the convention, one of the charges is to designate those who will fill key roles. The party chairman is chairman of the convention until a permanent 
chairman is selected. You have a keynoter and the assignment of members of various committees of the convention, i. e., Arrangements Committee, with concurrence by the 
DNC. That is all part of the arrangements. A key was permanent chairman and I gave that a great deal of thought. 
But there were some members of the United States Senate who I talked to regarding roles they might play in the convention. And in each instance, my suggestion 
was turned down. I found that no one on the Hill or in statehouses around the country had any interest in a significant role in the 1972 convention. In terms of permanent 
chairman I tried to persuade Carl Albert, who had had the role, I believe in 1968. I'll never forget one conversation I had with him. He chose, when I brought up the subject, 
to assume I was engaging in humor. He didn't take it seriously. Finally he realized I was serious. In fact, I was rather desperate. Carl Albert to me was the answer to my problem. 
By the time we finished that discussion, it was clear to me that Carl Albert was not going to take that gavel under any circumstances. It was in that session that he had a specific 
suggestion. His suggestion was I be permanent chairman. He thought I was the best choice. In turn, I thought that I was having my leg pulled a little bit by Carl. Carl chose 
also to publicly state his preference for permanent chairman at some point. 
I gave up the ghost. You were not going to get people involved. Jim O'Hara was unusual in that regard. He didn't feel inhibited. But the rest were not interested in being 
involved. Many of them were turned off by the reforms. Many of them were not going to be at the convention; they were not going to be delegates, they weren't going to be in 
Miami. The end result was that I took on a dual role; that was a first. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIX --27 
G: Again, going back to the fight over credentials, the seating of delegates. What was Daley's reaction to the Illinois delegation? His delegations not being seated? 
O: Bitter. 
G: Was he? Did you talk to him after that? 
O: I don't believe I had the occasion because shortly, I was no longer chairman. The McGovernites embarrassed, indeed maligned Dick Daley publicly at the convention. Then 
the nominee, within days, rushed to Chicago to embrace Daley and almost with tears in his eyes, pleaded with Daley to be active in his behalf. I can't recall anything quite as inane in 
terms of political operation. Daley supported McGovern. So did I. So did a lot of Democrats. We didn't do what some of our Democratic friends did to Hubert Humphrey 
in 1968. We supported them, but could you envision Dick Daley aggressively working on behalf of George McGovern after what happened in Miami? You can't do that to 
someone and expect him to say, "Oh sure George, I love you. I won't sleep between now and election day working on your behalf." Of course Daley didn't say, "Don't vote for 
George McGovern," or anything like that. But his heart couldn't have been there. 
G: In terms of the California vote and the whole issue of sustaining the decision or in this case securing their own vote, their own winner-take-all delegation in California: the McGovern 
campaign apparently had devised a strategy of not bringing any challenges to the floor on any questions until California, making that one the first one while they were at full 
strength. And as a result, some other delegate challenges like South Carolina were not advanced and they ended up in a position of siding with the opposition on these 
preliminary matters. And I assume that the opposition understood this strategy and was pushing the other way? 
O: That's right. 
G: Let me ask you to describe this whole process. 
O: You had the gavel and you're going to treat everyone fairly. You're going to recognize without prearrangement. The strategy is divorced from the chair. I remember in the vice 
presidency in Los Angeles. We did enlist support in the sense that as the roll call flowed, a person was designated to move to make it unanimous. No one enlisted me to become a 
part of any strategy in any aspect of this. 
The strategy developed by the McGovern people was appropriate from their point of view. It was to put the focus on California. They had two objectives in mind. One, 
ensure they were at maximum strength in the California vote and they prevailed rather easily. The other, which was asinine, was to ensure they kicked Dick Daley out of the 
convention without any thought to the next day and what you do about Illinois and Cook County. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIX --28 
I was not directly involved. I had no unusual request for recognition. This played out in a normal manner; keep the convention moving, have all sides of an issue fully 
explored and then call the roll. 
G: Anything in particular on South Carolina? 
O: I don't recall anything in particular. 
I think the California test at that convention, when you weigh the parliamentary procedure and consider how far they were reaching to suggest a vote that would require a 
majority including those in contest, can only be described as desperation. It doesn't hold up when you evaluate and analyze it. Was there some other action that could have been 
considered in a stop-McGovern effort? The opposition chose this and they grasped a very weak reed. 
So it's like anything that fails: losers aren't very rational. You can't say to them, "How could you anticipate the decision would be other than it was?" The reaction is, 
"That s. o. b., he really gave it to us. He acted unfairly in the interest of one candidate." I don't know that there was a reporter who indicated there was something unfair about that 
decision. 
G: Right. How did the appearance of the convention differ from the earlier ones that you had attended? You talked about the--O: 
It was less structured in this sense: when someone gained the floor in prior conventions, you felt that person's position in the party called for the floor. You didn't have Joe Smith 
and Mary Brown demanding recognition. Mary Brown might come from Sioux City, Iowa, and has never been to a convention. She's twenty-one years of age and she's been a 
McGovern activist for a year or two, and probably a McCarthy activist as a teenager. She's got drive and gumption, so if she's of a mind to, despite the chairman of her 
delegation, she's going to demand recognition. 
Tape 3 of 3, Side 1 
There were very few people on that floor who were known to a television audience or indeed known to the chairman. If you review my opening of the convention, it was a 
reflection of an understanding that this was a first. This was not a convention of party pros. That's why I had to be, with all of the problems, pleased that it had moved as well as 
it had. There hadn't been any untoward disturbances. To manage that before millions of viewers is not an easy task. In conventions in which I had participated, you knew who the 
key participants would be and who would be making the moves. 
G: Was it noisier than previous conventions? 
O: I don't recall it was. 
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O'Brien --Interview XXIX --29 
G: Did the specificity of these new rules regarding the selection of delegates, do you think, impair the electorate from choosing whom they wanted to? 
O: In twenty-two states, where you had primaries, it was a mini-election. I say "mini" because the degree of participation is far below that in a regular election. Yet the 
participation's broad enough to be fairly termed a democratic procedure. But caucuses were held in some instances in somebody's kitchen. It got to that small a group in the 
selection process. Who are the electorate? The electorate are the dedicated enthusiasts with a cause. They overwhelmed the traditionalists, who are not that motivated, but are 
Democratic Party activists. When you have that kind of a confrontation, the dedicated people with the cause are going to prevail. 
G: In the case of California and other primary states, was there subsequently an effort to apportion the number of delegates to the percentage of the vote, rather than a unit rule 
that you had in California? 
O: You mean after 1972? 
G: Right. Yes. 
O: The unit rule should not have prevailed any more than it should have initially existed. If you're talking about pure reform, the McGovernites were on the wrong side. That was 
contra to the McGovern commission recommendations in the fine print. Why would you mandate recommendations balance in representation at a convention and then add that the 
unit rule will prevail? That, of course, was the procedure in California. It's worth noting that the effort on the part of Humphrey, later joined by others to alter this unit rule, was 
belated. It wasn't the day after the primary or even soon after; neither side made that claim during the primary. (Laughter) It was quite belated. It was one of those 
last-minute efforts brought to the Credentials Committee. And the Credentials Committee rightly decided that the unit rule shouldn't prevail. But right is not going to prevail. You 
could be as reform-minded as you want to be but when the chips are down, you play the game like anyone else. 
G: Let's talk about your being tendered the chairmanship of the national committee. 
O: By McGovern? 
G: Urged to continue as chairman, yes. 
O: I have a clear recollection of that. 
G: Had he approached you at all during or before the nomination? 
O: No, up to and including the telephone conversation I had with him regarding Dick Daley, 
33
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --30 
which was on Sunday afternoon. I do not recall any reference made directly to me by McGovern regarding the chairmanship. I want to focus on that phone conversation 
because that was probably, in that period, the only time I had a direct conversation with McGovern. I wasn't in the habit those days of having conversations with candidates. I 
wasn't seeking them out. 
The convention closed in those early hours. There were a couple of traditional breakfasts scheduled. I remember deciding on the way back to the hotel not to bother 
attending. I had one more task and that was to chair the meeting of the Democratic National Committee, to be convened later that morning. From time to time, over the days 
up to the convention, during it, and perhaps on earlier occasions, there were references occasionally as to whether I would continue as chairman. I was asked on a few occasions, 
and I chose to have responded that I would not discuss the matter. I had a full plate and I was not going to engage in discussions beyond the convention. I did that for one reason. 
I wanted to have the strongest hand I could with the gavel, so there wouldn't be some feeling I could be pushed around because I was a lame duck over the last few weeks. Let 
the status quo be maintained and that was the way it worked out, because no undue amount of interest was expressed or questions asked. 
That morning I received a call from McGovern some twenty minutes or less before the opening of the national committee meeting was due. He initiated the conversation by 
saying he had expected to catch up with me at the breakfasts and he was disappointed that he didn't see me. I told him I tried to get a little sleep. He said, "We've got to talk," or 
something to that effect. I pointed out to him the Democratic National Committee meeting was about to start and it was necessary for me to go downstairs to the ballroom 
and convene the committee. That was it. I was relaxed about it because I didn't feel I had anything to talk to him about. I was anxious to get that committee meeting under my belt 
and leave Miami. That would be the last phase of my activities. 
And I did that. I convened the meeting and we were into the first phase when someone came to the podium and said that it was urgent that I contact George McGovern 
immediately. I thought about it for a minute or two and concluded that it was pretty bare-faced, in view of the conversation I had with him a bit earlier, to ignore this. So I 
summoned Mary Lou Berg, who was on the platform, and asked her to take over the meeting for a few minutes. I went to a public phone outside the room. I called McGovern 
at the Doral Hotel which was two or three minutes from where we were. He pursued the earlier conversation. He said, "I've got to talk to you. There's no way out of it. I'm just a 
couple of minutes away. Isn't there some way that you could join me and let's talk?" I told him, "I'll see what I can do." 
I realized that if I broke away from the meeting at that point I'd leave it in disarray, which you couldn't let happen. So I decided to recess the meeting. I stated that Senator 
McGovern, who was to appear at the meeting, was going to be delayed for a period. In view of that, as we were approaching the noon hour, I would declare a recess for lunch 
and reconvene, as I recall, at 2: 00 p. m. 
34
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --31 
I decided to take Joe Mohbat, Stan Greigg and Joe Napolitan with me to the Doral Hotel. They were nearby the podium. As we entered the suite, through a doorway to an 
adjoining room I observed Mankiewicz, Jean Westwood, Gary Hart and Mrs. Eleanor McGovern. We had no conversation and McGovern said, "Why don't we go into this 
room?" which was beyond. McGovern then asked me to stay on as chairman. There was no equivocation about it. It was flat out. That was, as he said, "his urgent request." We 
had a discussion regarding my desire to close out with the national committee meeting. McGovern made a strong pitch. He had ordered lunch for us in the meantime through 
room service. I said, "Let me do this. Let me talk to my associates." 
G: Were they in the room with you? 
O: It may have been he and I were meeting alone. They were in another room. I don't recall. In any event, he said, "I'll go back with my people and I'll return in a little while, okay?" 
The sandwiches had been delivered. I said, "Fine." My people and I proceeded to discuss this. What you'd assume would occur did occur: "There's only three months; you could 
make the deal to go through the election, it looks a little unseemly if you don't, you're kind of stuck," that kind of conversation. No one with any enthusiasm. No one was saying, "Is 
this a great idea?" It was more what should you do to protect yourself in these circumstances. We finally concluded, all right, drag through another three months, but 
when we formalize it at the meeting, it's specifically through the election, so there would be no misunderstanding. 
As I say--and I remember it vividly--it was almost like some form of punishment, but you couldn't avoid it. If you did, you could be accused of lack of support of the party. 
So the easier way out was to commit to the three months. Then we sat there for a while and there was no George McGovern. I became concerned because we were beginning to 
approach this deadline to reconvene the committee. So I was getting a little nervous. Finally George came in and said to me, "I've got to talk to you alone." So my three 
friends left the room. George said, "I've run into difficulty out there," out there meaning whatever room they were in. He went on, "In my haste, since I've had such a little time to 
think since the selection of the VP, I've been strongly reminded that I had said I'd consider having a woman as chairman." Then he mumbled, "I have an idea. How about you and 
Jean Westwood as co-chairmen?" I said, "George, there's no provision for co-chairmen of the Democratic National Committee, nor should there be. That's absolutely ridiculous," 
something to that effect. "Well, gosh, I just--." I added, "I've got a suggestion." He asked, "What is it?" "We turn the clock back to the call you made to me at the national 
committee meeting, we wipe the slate clean, nothing occurred since then and allow me to proceed back to the hall, reconvene the committee and conduct the business of the 
meeting." He said, "That's the--you don't see any--?" I said, "That's my solution," and I got up from the chair and told him, "We need to do this fast." He said, "Probably I should 
go over--why don't I go over it with you?" I replied, "That's fine." 
So into the car with Jean Westwood and Pierre Salinger. Whether Pierre was in 
35
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --32 
that room I don't know. I reconvened the meeting. Prior to introducing McGovern I announced I would close out my chairmanship at this meeting and thanked them. I did 
that before McGovern rose so there would be no further foul-up. 
McGovern devoted a good deal of time to advising the members that he had made every effort possible to convince me to stay, that he deeply regretted my decision, that 
he'd have to accept it. He belabored the subject, which aggravated me further. So I stood on the platform until he finished. Then I departed and I believe Mary Lou Berg must have 
taken over. I went to my suite and I learned later that McGovern had continued to sort of conduct the meeting himself and that he proposed Pierre Salinger for--G: 
Vice chairman. 
O: Vice chairman, and proceeded to be defeated, which probably never happened to a nominee in history. (Laughter) 
I returned to Washington on my flight which had been planned prior to this happening. I felt my last act should be to have a thank-you gathering with the staff of the 
national committee. Arrangements were made for this I believe on Sunday evening. I went to the national committee office. This would be my last visit to gather some personal 
belongings. 
While I was there, I was notified McGovern was looking for me. Back at my apartment I returned McGovern's call. It was essential he see me immediately. I told him 
it was impossible that evening, because I was having a party at the apartment. It was a buffet to thank the staff and say good bye to them. He then asked, "When do you think 
the affair will be over?" I said, "I don't know. Probably around ten-thirty." Then he suggested, "Why don't I drop over to see you at ten-thirty or eleven o'clock." I replied, 
"Okay." 
Everyone had departed by ten-thirty. He arrived later and I offered him a drink, which he declined and asked if I had any ice cream. I served him a dish of ice cream and 
we began the next go-around. He prefaced the discussion by saying his wife had told him he had made the most serious political mistake of his career, that he had totally goofed, 
that I should know she fought vigorously in Miami in support of the request he had made of me. She was opposed by his own advisers. 
G: Do you believe that? 
O: Yes, because I spoke to her at some time later. She was truly disturbed with him. 
[L. O'B. postscript: I met George and Eleanor at the 1988 Atlanta convention. He advised me he had recently read the transcript of the 1972 convention and 
noted how eminently fair I had been. This underscored Eleanor's original position which she quickly repeated. I found this exchange sixteen years later amazing.] 
36
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --33 
It's eleven p. m. and I told George, "You didn't have to come here to tell me about your wife's disturbance. I have no problem. I'm relaxed and want to focus on my future." 
To backtrack, after I left the national committee meeting, I received a call from Tom Eagleton. He had caught up with what had occurred and was beside himself. He 
said, "There has to be some way of unwinding this. You've got to stay as chairman. This is absolutely ridiculous." He was distressed that George McGovern had not discussed it 
with him, although there wasn't any obligation for him to do so. 
Back at the apartment it's getting late. McGovern advised, "I'm going to the Black Hills early in the morning and you have to commit to me that you'll take over the 
chairmanship of the campaign." I responded, "What are you talking about? You have a campaign organization." "This would be sort of an umbrella chairman of the campaign." 
He further said he either had talked to Eagleton or would be talking to him and that he and Eagleton thought this was just a terrific idea. 
This was endless. I declined and what you'd anticipate occurred. "Don't finalize it tonight. We've a couple of days here, no more than that. We'll get this straight. I've got 
to correct this error I made." This sort of conversation went on. "I'll be in the Black Hills. Let's leave it for tonight and I'll be in touch with you. I want you not to say 
anything to anyone." "Okay. Good night." This was around midnight. 
At some point I reconvened my friends and presented them with this new chapter. (Laughter) There again a repeat, "Only three months to go." So what are you going to 
do? I don't know whether you're motivated by exhaustion or, down deep, concern you're going to look like a louse. You're winding up your political career, but can you wind it up 
without some controversy? 
When contact was made by McGovern, I acquiesced, at which point he said, "We've got to have a press conference. Tom, you and I. I'm coming back tomorrow." 
And, by gosh, if he didn't schedule the largest hearing room on Capitol Hill for the press conference. 
So to the press conference with O'Brien, McGovern and Eagleton and to a mob scene. I don't know what everyone had expected. Of course he is the nominee. He could 
draw people to a press conference. So there is this crowded room. He proceeded to indicate this was a long-time idea. This was super chairman. (Laughter) So he made the 
announcement. Eagleton joined in and I spoke about party unity. There we were and I'm chairman of something, I wasn't sure of what. 
G: National campaign chairman, was that right? 
O: I guess so. This was the corrective measure taken for the grievous error in Miami. What I was faced with now was something that I thought on that plane from Miami had ended 
37
O'Brien --Interview XXIX --34 
for good: that I didn't have to be concerned about the next three months in terms of the campaign. I had to be concerned about the next three months in terms of Larry O'Brien 
and what's next. But now I'm going to postpone that for three months. Here I am and I have agreed to do it. 
This old broken-down building in downtown Washington was headquarters for the campaign. They had worked out some arrangements with Edward Bennett Williams, who 
owned the building and intended to tear it down in the near future. It would be used for three months as a campaign headquarters. It was a dump. 
G: This was on K Street? 
O: I guess so. So an office was set up for Chairman O'Brien and in due course my loyal troops joined me. We march in and try to figure out what I am supposed to be doing, 
other than putting on a good front proclaiming party unity and party loyalty. It wasn't long before there were indications that perhaps some of McGovern's troops weren't any 
happier with this development than they had been with his Miami suggestion. I don't know and I had no interest in his troops. But nearby, in adjoining offices, was Gary Hart. 
Gary Hart showed he was the class of the McGovern group. He asked to sit down and we chatted at some length. Gary pointed out he felt his position was to be under my 
direction and that's the way it should be. There had to be one head and I was the head; it was clear in the McGovern decision. He had talked it over with George and he wanted 
me to know there would be total cooperation. I appreciated that and it proceeded that way. 
But now we're to the post-Eagleton period and then what transpired in the campaign. 
End of Tape 3 of 3 and Interview XXIX 
38
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Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-42 
4
INTERVIEW XXX 
DATE: November 4, 1987 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 1 
G: One point on something we discussed yesterday: your continuing as national chairman. McGovern in his book maintains or takes the position that it was you who changed your 
mind, at first didn't want it and then did want it, and that was his explanation of his own change of position on the deal. What can you tell me about that? 
O: The fact, as I describe it, is underscored by his repeated reference to his wife. Eleanor's feeling was that he had made a misjudgment. In his discussion with me in my apartment 
that evening, he described his wife's disturbance with him. The fact is that, though I wasn't present during their discussions, his wife was supportive of his view that I continue 
and of his pleasure that I would continue through the election. That view was not shared by the others. It's a minor point. 
Clearly, I would have stayed through the election if that last phase of the discussion hadn't occurred when he returned, said he had a problem and he had committed 
to recognizing a woman in that role. Jean Westwood, as I recall it, was in the room with him. She was an ardent, long-time McGovern supporter. The view of his advisers 
prevailed, and he couldn't cope with it. When he returned, he broached the idea that Westwood and I be co-chairmen, which was a ridiculous suggestion. I think he realized it. 
It was dismissed out of hand. It made no sense. 
You have to assume that following Miami this was a matter of continuing concern. That was manifested by his request to come to my apartment late that evening. Then he 
had another approach. I said to him I would not respond affirmatively that night and I had serious questions about it. He was departing the following morning to tour the Black Hills 
and he would be out of touch for a few days. He planned to return for a scheduled vote in the Senate. Could we come to a conclusion on this and work it out? If we could, 
immediately upon his return he wanted to publicize it. It did result, as I've recounted, in this press conference. I think he felt relieved. I have no idea about the reaction of the 
advisers who had been negative at Miami. But George McGovern was perhaps pressured by his wife, Eleanor, to resolve this and had something to do with his intense effort to 
bring this about. 
In any event, it came about and, of course, Tom Eagleton was pleased. He had been disturbed with what occurred in Miami, which was unknown to him until the incident 
was over. He had contacted me from his hotel to express his concern. He recognized that 
5
O'Brien --Interview XXX --2 
as George's vice presidential running mate, he did not have any right to be involved in making a determination. It's conceivable, I suppose, that he might have had some input in 
this national chairmanship of the campaign. In any event, there was the matter of formalizing this decision. It meant you were to take space in the McGovern headquarters, 
that you would bring aboard key members of your staff and that was the case. It was a matter of clearing the air, but the implementation in terms of the structure of the campaign 
was never discussed in any detail. I was left, when I arrived at the headquarters, to pursue my own course. 
As I mentioned, Gary Hart had a lengthy conversation with me and made it clear he totally understood. Obviously, if this campaign was going anywhere the party regulars 
would have to be participants. Gary Hart was a student of the Kennedy era and the Kennedy campaign in 1960. He was well aware of the need to broaden the McGovern 
base. He, at that session, detailed his frustration. He emphasized that the organizational concept of the Kennedy drive was to immediately seek out all elements of the party. Two 
things happened: one, Lyndon Johnson as the vice presidential nominee added an immediate dimension in the Kennedy campaign, and two, the regional meetings 
throughout the country, with which he was familiar, had been an initial effort to broaden the base. He said, "Now, we're faced with the same basic problem, but I am already 
frustrated because the regional people we've named are almost exclusively McGovern loyalists who have never participated in a national election campaign. They are wedded to 
George McGovern, dedicated to him. They have no basic interest in the Democratic Party as such. They consider it solely a vehicle to work within and they're in no position, if they 
had the will, to extend themselves beyond the McGovern base." He assumed my participation could have some impact in bringing in the party regulars. The result was that 
I focused on that. 
The people involved with me, in their evaluation of the McGovern campaign, were highly critical. This was confidential to me. They pointed out that Gary Hart was 
continuing in the role he had, which was good; that Frank Mankiewicz apparently had carved out a role of traveling with McGovern through the campaign. He would be at his 
shoulder and his key adviser. There was no perceivable coordination in the offing to ensure there was a good mix and a maximizing of what potential there was. 
I was urged by my people, as I had been designated national chairman, to place the elements of the campaign that did exist under my direction. There was another aspect by 
that time. Jean Westwood was in place as chairman, and there was no indication of any coordination between the McGovern campaign and the national committee. Jean 
Westwood and her people were carrying on in a rather independent manner. She and her people were dedicated to McGovern, there was no question about that. But this was a 
significant element of any presidential campaign, the role of the national committee. We had taken care in any campaign I had been in to ensure that the national committee was 
melded into the overall national campaign even to the point in 1968 of having the Democratic National Committee the center of the campaign, as I was campaign chairman 
and also national committee chairman. 
6
O'Brien --Interview XXX --3 
G: Is it normally intertwined with the campaign at the state level through the various national committee representatives? 
O: No, that would be dependent on the individual members of the committee. The national committee in my years of involvement was to a great extent a mixed bag. There were 
members of the national committee who were members solely because of past activities or had been designated by a governor or a senator or both as a national committee member, 
men and women. There were a number of them who were not apt to be active. There were some who did, but it varied. 
In any event, I was reluctant, and that was a mistake on my part, to say to the Mankiewicze1s, the Henry Kimelmans, that everything flowed through me. I didn't feel 
comfortable with it, and I didn't do it. That meant I was not performing effectively, for which I should have been faulted. And I faulted myself. The fact was that I decided I had 
a pleasant relationship with Hart. I didn't involve myself in fund-raising, so that was not troublesome. I had to conclude that Jean Westwood was going to go her own way. So I 
decided to concentrate on labor and party regulars. This would be informally coordinated with Gary Hart. He and I had daily communication. We were in nearby offices. 
We tried to pursue having organized labor active in the campaign. That posed a problem from the outset because of George Meany's attitude toward McGovern. You did 
not have at the top of the AFL-CIO vigorous movement in behalf of the ticket. That meant you had to deal with individual international union presidents and through that 
means develop an organized labor interest. George Meany was not going to object to that. He more or less washed his hands of the whole thing. He had no concern about the 
members of the AFL-CIO being as active as they cared to be, but he did not have the enthusiasm to lead this effort. So we put together a committee of labor leaders on our 
own, including Joe Beirne, head of the communication workers; John Keenan of the electrical workers, Floyd "Red" Smith of the machinists and Jerry Wurf of the federal, 
state, county and municipal employees. These were people widely as liberal labor leaders. They then proceeded to line up the support of key officers of forty-two international 
unions. That represented a majority of the union membership. Then in August "Red" Smith and Leonard Woodcock of the UAW arranged a joint session of their unions' top 
people. That was, incidentally, the first time there had been a formal joint session between the AFL-CIO and the UAW. 
I was invited to speak to the joint session. It was heartwarming. These fellows were enthusiastic and were willing to put their resources on the line. You had to devote a 
lot of time and effort to finding, first of all, four, five or six top union leaders, presidents of international unions and then go to Leonard Woodcock to try to meld their efforts with 
the AFL-CIO. That meeting discarded the polls which were horrible and did not express concern about George Meany's inactivity. They proceeded from that meeting to do the 
best they could. You had key representation of forty-two international unions in one room. They were going to wage a major effort. 
7
O'Brien --Interview XXX --4 
The end result was probably predictable. These leaders were unable to persuade their membership to become involved. It became apparent they were faced with a 
widespread rank-and-file revolt. To sum it up, they found that their membership generally was hell-bent to get to the polls and vote for Richard Nixon. 
G: Had Nixon's campaign encouraged this support? 
O: There were committees of labor for Nixon as there were John Connally Democrats for Nixon. It came to him rather than he seeking it out. We weren't faring any better with the 
party structure. I made hundreds of personal contacts, hour by hour, day in and day out, twelve, fourteen hours a day contacting party people across this country. 
I felt I should lean on the Congress, despite the knowledge that there was discontent among Democrats in the Congress. Party reform had caused a negative 
reaction among elected officeholders, which became personalized because under the guidelines of the McGovern commission they could no longer be designated delegates. 
They had to seek the position. Many of them had decided to refrain from that. They were turned off and it was comparable to what we were experiencing in labor. So I made an 
effort to bring together a group of Democratic congressmen and senators, and forty or fifty of them agreed to join me at a meeting to discuss this. They came to my apartment 
and we decided to let our hair down. 
G: How were they selected? 
O: Whoever we could get was what it finally came to. We made individual contacts by telephone and tried to get a representative cross-section of the Democrats in the Congress. 
At the outset of the meeting the climate was reasonably good. Several said they were pleased an effort was being made and their advice was being solicited. But, as a 
group, they expressed great frustrations. It's easy to express frustrations if you have no real interest in being involved. What struck me at that meeting was that the handful of 
those present who really were McGovern supporters were the most critical of the campaign. 
Abe Ribicoff was probably the most highly visible party regular in the country in support of McGovern. He dwelled at some length on his frustrations and the lack of 
coordination with him and with other senators. Abe mentioned McGovern's public comments on welfare were faulty. He objected to them and worse than that, he, an expert 
in the field, had not been consulted. If anyone could have helped McGovern carve out the right path in that area it was Abe Ribicoff. I was taken aback because my approach was 
that a handful of congressmen and senators who are McGovern supporters would join me in an enthusiastic presentation. I find the most vocal critics as the meeting unfolded are 
the very people who should be supportive. I'm not suggesting their criticism wasn't valid. For example, Adlai Stevenson strongly objected to McGovern's position on amnesty and 
8
O'Brien --Interview XXX --5 
he stated unequivocally he couldn't support that position in Illinois. Warren Magnuson, in his inimitable style when someone suggested we need more research on the issues said, 
"We don't need any more research on issues. What we need is a campaign." While my meeting has not erupted in total disarray, positive utterances seemed to be absent. On the 
House side, Thomas "Tip" O'Neill, [John] McFall, and [Hale] Boggs and others chimed in saying the same things. 
G: What was the conclusion of the meeting? 
O: We got to formal speeches. I had a high regard for Gary Hart, so I called Gary, who was present. He outlined the campaign as he saw it, the need for broadening support and the 
hope that those present would enthusiastically join in. That settled things down. They were receptive to Gary and receptive to the comments I made. What transpired from the 
meeting was that those present agreed to name one of their close advisers or staff members as a coordinator in the campaign and that there would be an involvement of their 
office and their facilities through this coordinator. The meeting, therefore, turned out worthwhile. 
While there were coordinators who became available to us, the reality was that enthusiasm didn't seem to be forthcoming. What you had was a campaign that was as 
predictable as the convention in Miami. But, if I'm going to spend any time how could I most effectively utilize my time and what effort could I undertake? 
Part of what was agreed to was, through these coordinators, we would develop statements and speeches and position papers that could be utilized by the members of 
Congress in their back-home activities. This would be coordinated through John Stewart who had joined me and had been on my staff at the national committee. Also, there was 
discussion of direct involvement of the congressmen and senators in the campaign. 
The meeting was in three parts. It was a lengthy meeting, as I recall it. One was a bitch session, a complaint session. Part two was a formal presentation of the campaign 
structure and finally, a determination to institute specific activities, the assignment of people on their staffs, the development of statements and speeches and the agreement 
these members would make a special effort to promote the McGovern candidacy in their states and districts. For the life of me, I couldn't think of what else to do because I had 
never been in such a role in my life. Realistically, this candidacy of George McGovern was doomed to failure and these practical politicians were not going to break their pick. 
They were going to do some things. There would be a modest effort to be helpful. They are Democrats and this is the Democratic ticket. 
Then the concern about internal coordination to which I referred. The evaluation made by my own people after our first days on the scene raised the question of my 
responsibility to surface what was a lack of coordination. 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 2 
9
O'Brien --Interview XXX --6 
O: That was a sensitive area because the more I would surface the more I could be accused of attempting to take over. Yet I couldn't live with the disarray. So we tried to bring the 
group together with the candidate at his home, including Jean Westwood. 
I was always reluctant to take the candidate's time, as I was always reluctant to take a president's time unnecessarily. But I felt I was just not in a position to ensure some 
kind of coordination on my own. It might cause problems internally, which I certainly did not want to see happen. But we did get together. The meeting was held at McGovern's 
home and this was in late August, August 30, I guess. Gary Hart, Frank Mankiewicz and Jean Westwood were present and there were others, not a large group. The purpose, as I 
saw it, was to come out of that meeting with a coordinated effort for the remainder of the campaign. Now this is August 30. 
Jean Westwood arrived with a bulging briefcase of material. It's George's meeting even though I have been the initiator. I look to him for leadership. In short order it 
bogged down totally. Jean Westwood took the lead role and proceeded, in detail and at great length, to describe a voter registration drive in a single area of New York State. To 
my dismay, George McGovern allowed this to go on and on. I became very distressed because there was no purpose whatsoever in subjecting the presidential candidate to this 
sort of nitty-gritty. So I finally spoke out. I said I had never seen a presidential candidate concerning himself with the details of a local voter registration drive. I told George 
bluntly, "You can't be an effective candidate this way. It interferes with your activities." Well, it kind of threw a cold shower on things. I assume that perhaps Jean considered that 
a personal affront. I had no concern about Jean personally, but I couldn't tolerate such a waste of precious time. I must say the meeting was nonproductive. There were other 
comments made here and there. George made some comments, but we closed out a lengthy session that as far as I was concerned had accomplished nothing. So you were 
destined to pursue the course you had been following. 
You always seek under those circumstances, I guess, a little humor and there were side bars from time to time. That night I was able to make a point before we closed out. 
To my dismay when I joined the campaign, I found there was no mention in any material or headquarters signs of the word Democrat. Whether it had been ignored or there was 
some concept that if you avoided reference to the Democratic Party it would be a plus factor in the campaign, I don't know. The people involved were not looking at this 
campaign as a party effort, as Gary Hart had said about some of his coordinators. He mentioned in one session that just that day he had had a problem with a coordinator who 
had acted in a ridiculous manner involving party regulars and had caused animosities. These coordinators had the time, the commitment, the dedication to George McGovern, 
but didn't have the perception or experience to carry out their role effectively. 
I had the temerity at that meeting to tell George that the only place I had seen the word Democrat so far in the campaign was in the literature of John Connally's Democrats 
for Nixon, and that "You, George, in addition to being the nominee of the party, are 
10
O'Brien --Interview XXX --7 
supposedly the head of the Democratic Party and reservations about so stating are troublesome." George's reaction was interesting. It was clear that this had escaped him. 
He recognized he hadn't been proclaiming himself as a Democrat, that he wasn't reflecting on the Democrats of the past--the Roosevelts and the Trumans and Kennedys--that he was 
sort of an independent candidate for president. It was not what he wanted or intended; it was inadvertence, and he reacted accordingly. He said, "Larry, you couldn't be more 
right." This is sad when on August 30 you're sitting in the man's home and he's saying, "You're right. We are Democrats." 
G: But did he in fact give the party a larger billing in his campaign as a result of it? 
O: He certainly committed to a larger billing that night. The remainder of the evening was devoted to discussing party loyalties and everyone committing, particularly the candidate, 
to emphasizing the party from that moment on. We were engaged in an effort to enlist the active support of party people across this country. The meeting closed out on this 
note--we're one party and I'm the nominee. The party and its accomplishments have to be referred to. With that we went home. I can't document how far we went in that regard, 
except within the headquarters through John Stewart's monitoring we were able to ensure we had a more normal party situation, whether it was press releases or statements that 
were issued. There was reference to the Democratic Party. That in terms of that campaign was a relatively minor matter. I am sure those around me were more sensitive 
to that than people generally. I'm not suggesting that, in that meeting of members of Congress, there was any expression of dismay, disturbance or wonderment about party 
loyalty on the part of the candidate or his people. So I'm not suggesting that had become a matter of general concern. 
You weren't dealing, as I had been accustomed to, with people who had commitment to the party. This was a one-time thing. Therefore, I think my tendency 
perhaps was to exaggerate the situation because it disturbed me personally. In any event, as I became concerned about Jean's lengthy presentation of a local registration drive, it 
probably led me to be more vociferous and direct than perhaps I intended to be. I had no regret about what I said, and George McGovern took it in good spirits and responded 
affirmatively. 
G: Did you ever get to the point where you threatened to leave the campaign unless--? 
O: There were press stories--I don't know whether they were stories or a story. But there came at some point--G: 
September sometime. 
O: Yes. There was a story in a Chicago newspaper. I knew the writer well. We had had a conversation and at no time did I indicate I was leaving the campaign. I tried to put the 
best face on things. He had some strong views of his own and suggested I must be awfully frustrated. When the article appeared, it had no quote from me but it caused an 
11
O'Brien --Interview XXX --8 
uproar. 
G: Did it? How so? 
O: My best recollection is George McGovern immediately jumped into this. George talked to me by phone expressing concern. If there was something troubling me he'd correct it 
immediately. I did the best I could to paper it over. 
G: Let's see. I think that there's a Chicago Tribune article on August 10. 
O: Oh, it's that early. 
G: Then the Washington Post September 2 has a piece saying that O'Brien had hinted two days ago that he might quit unless the campaign direction was improved. 
O: That's as close as they could have come to "I'm going to resign," that "he hinted to someone." The fact is that was not in the cards no matter how frustrated I became. I had 
made a commitment; I would adhere to that commitment. In good conscience you wouldn't do otherwise and you would avoid any suggestion you would leave a sinking 
ship. Whether you were unhappy, distressed, dismayed, frustrated or whatever, that commitment, formalized at that press conference with McGovern and Eagleton, was a 
commitment through election day. McGovern reacted by immediately contacting me to say, "Gosh, let's sit down before you do anything." We resolved it by my reassuring him 
that there wasn't any need to have a discussion. 
G: The accounts at the time indicate that at first there was resentment among the McGovern staffers when you joined the campaign. 
O: There probably was, although I can't cite any direct evidence. I think you'd have to assume that. There had been opposition to me at Miami and there was no reason to 
believe that wasn't continuing. When McGovern decided to publicize widely my designation as the national campaign chairman, if there were continuing resentments they 
would surface. If I were Frank Mankiewicz and Gary Hart, who have devoted a couple of years to the candidate, and a fellow at this period in the campaign is crowned national 
chairman, I think that could be bothersome. Whatever resentments may have existed, they did not surface. Whatever disarray there was in the campaign that was troublesome to me 
was due to ineffectiveness. 
Gary Hart not only did not express resentments but went out of his way to ensure an appropriate relationship with me. And I responded in kind. Gary was really the fellow 
with whom I had direct association. My contact with Frank Mankiewicz was limited. He was on the road with McGovern. I cited a meeting in McGovern's home. There was at 
least one subsequent meeting at McGovern's home and there were rare occasions when Mankiewicz would appear at headquarters. 
12
O'Brien --Interview XXX --9 
I had made fleeting reference to it and I think it's worth underscoring. The highlight of the campaign was the fund-raising. It was most impressive. I had not been 
involved in a campaign with such grass-roots response. Literally thousands of letters poured into headquarters. All of them contained modest contributions. Also, there were 
the fund-raising efforts conducted under the guidance of Kimelman. That would be the large donor, the Democratic liberal side. The interesting aspect of the campaign was there 
was not that nagging, overriding problem I had faced in 1968 of underfinancing. And that gets to the most expensive aspect--media. 
The media side became a troublesome matter that again was evidence of lack of coordination. I enlisted Tony Schwartz to take a look at our campaign. Tony is most 
expert in creating TV spots. Charlie Guggenheim was handling McGovern's television. I don't recall any particular input I had, other than recognizing what was being utilized was 
pretty bland. I was groping for a breakthrough. The polls were reflecting we were getting nowhere. The time had come to gamble. I had been through that in the past. So I asked 
Tony to create some five spots and he did. One or two were not usable, but that's what you preferred Tony to do, extend himself, and then you make the judgments. 
G: The Watergate spot, was that useful? 
O: I don't recall any enthusiasm for a hard-hitting concept. 
G: There was a corruption spot, too, I understand, or was this part of the Watergate spot? 
O: It was a heavy spot. You might as well shoot the works. There's no point in waiting for the Gallup Poll to close. I injected myself into the media side of the campaign. I 
suggested we develop a hard-hitting half-hour. Of course, we had made demands that there be debates. The last thing in the world that Richard Nixon was going to do was 
engage in a debate with George McGovern. We tried to publicize his negative attitude on debates for whatever mileage you might get. I recalled what had been a very productive 
half-hour in the 1970s. I knew it was productive because of the reaction of the opposition to the half-hour at that time. Let's have McGovern debate Nixon using Nixon film, spots. 
The film clips would present the Nixon side of issues and McGovern would present his side. George McGovern initially rejected that approach. I did stress to George, "This is 
not going to be mean and vicious. It's going to be eminently fair." Off that, George gave the okay to proceed and we did proceed. We located the appropriate film. Charlie 
Guggenheim was enthusiastically involved. He finally had the rough cut. We met, the candidate and three or four of us, to view the result. We were completely taken aback. 
The end result, as George McGovern said, was a debate that Nixon won. That was the end of that project. 
G: I want to raise one other question about the issue of resentment among the other veteran McGovern campaign leaders. There was one note in the press that indicated that some of 
these displaced or offended campaign organizers had planted a press story that you were there merely as a figurehead and that McGovern reacted with hostility to that action. Do 
13
O'Brien --Interview XXX --10 
you recall that? 
O: That was another occasion when McGovern reacted strongly and quickly. He again contacted me, expressed his dismay and assured me the culprits were going to be removed 
from the campaign. George, I guess, assumed that I was upset. I assured him that I wasn't upset and there was no need to determine the culprits. It was another indication 
that George was uneasy throughout and hopeful I would be happy in my role. The overreacting of George in the instance I referred to earlier and in this instance indicated 
the degree of his concern. 
G: Did you ever feel that you were just there as a figurehead? 
O: No, I wasn't there as a figurehead at all. I can't tell you what would have occurred if I had aggressively taken over the full role of chairman of the campaign. George in his remarks 
at that press conference spelled it out in considerable detail. No one could have concluded at the end of that press conference that I was to be other than the chairman of the 
campaign. The follow-through, I guess, was up to me. The mandate was clear and I did not follow through. If I had, perhaps this disturbance, to whatever extent it existed among 
the troops, would have surfaced. I don't know, but the fact is that I didn't test it, because I didn't feel comfortable. I tried to carve out a role where I felt I could have some impact. 
That was with labor and the regulars. I would say the campaign manager was Gary Hart, basically. There was no conflict between Hart and me. Without question, I was frustrated 
throughout but not because of any perceivable effort to undermine me. In fairness to the McGovern people, it never occurred. 
My frustration went to my inability to arouse the troops in labor and the party structure. That was extremely frustrating because, to the end of the campaign, the 
negative attitude toward McGovern's candidacy remained despite the effort of a number of labor people, and, indeed, a goodly number of elected officials who didn't hide and who 
I'm sure experienced the same frustrations I did. Throughout this, you're seeking some sort of a breakthrough. 
G: Let's go into some of the issues and statements that the candidate made. First, let me ask one other thing about your taking on the role of national campaign chairman. I have a 
note that indicates that, as part of his effort to persuade you to take the position, he had held out the prospect of virtually any job in the government in a McGovern administration. 
Was this the--? 
O: He might have. I don't recall that subject ever coming up and I don't believe it did. If it did I would have chuckled. 
G: Did Frank Thompson become disenchanted with the organization and his--? 
O: He did. Frank had a great track record in the organizational side of campaigns. He had been involved with us in 1960. Frank threw up his hands. He couldn't be bothered any 
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O'Brien --Interview XXX --11 
longer. 
G: The issues fellow, I guess, was Ted Van Dyke. 
O: That's right. 
G: The accounts seem to stress a disconnection between Van Dyke and the candidate on the road. Apparently a tendency not to think out an issue or response, to simply--O: 
Yes. Ted Van Dyke played an important role in the Humphrey campaign. Ted was a creative fellow and a realist. I've never had any in-depth discussions with Van Dyke as to 
his experiences on the road. The role of Frank Mankiewicz was significant and Ted could have found it wasn't an easy path for him. My recollection is disenchantment there. Ted 
Van Dyke is a very able fellow and you had no difficulty determining Ted's views. He was outspoken in that regard. He devoted a great deal of time and effort to whatever he was 
assigned to. He was a significant plus in the Humphrey campaign. 
G: Was it difficult on the issue of Vietnam to pursue a path that advocated a negotiated settlement quickly and yet at the same time not give the appearance of undermining the 
present foreign policy of the country? 
O: It was difficult. 
G: How did you straddle that? 
O: I don't know as it was straddled. The difficulty was compounded by the candidate. 
G: Tell me about the [Pierre] Salinger trip to Paris. 
O: I'm not familiar with it. 
G: Really? 
O: No. 
G: He met with representatives of Hanoi and then apparently there was a confusion in McGovern statements with regard to what had taken place at whose authorization. You 
don't remember these? 
O: I recall a general state of confusion. Each element of this campaign you introduce into discussion provides further evidence of the disarray. What Pierre's designated role was 
and what supposedly would result from it I was never privy to. 
G: Any other aspects on Vietnam? 
15
O'Brien --Interview XXX --12 
O: You had a campaign running very smoothly on the Republican side. Nixon had effectively blunted meaningful foreign policy debate. 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 1 
O: He and [Henry] Kissinger had progressed to the extent that we resorted to criticizing his lack of domestic progress, specifically complaining about his obvious actions to dismantle 
Democratic social programs. In order to emphasize that, McGovern made his own proposals which, as we have said, fell of their own weight. 
(Interruption) 
G: --put these proposals in a more favorable context. Did you make any effort to modify them in such a way that they would be better received by the electorate? 
O: It was not my role following that election or today to Monday morning quarterback. McGovern probably acquitted himself as well as could be expected under the 
circumstances. I don't think it's fair to fault him personally. I think the McGovern drive was destined as the Barry Goldwater drive on the other end of the spectrum had been 
destined in 1964. 
Now, that focuses, however, on one area that was most frustrating for me. That was the effort to spotlight Watergate during the campaign. My public statements 
represented an attempt on my part to bring Watergate to stage center, and that, too, was doomed to failure. I recall a meeting with McGovern prior to a press conference. This 
press conference was contemplated for some time. A lot of thought had been put into it. My emphasis was that Watergate be brought stage center by McGovern. Really focus on 
Watergate. We were in accord. We reached agreement that the candidate up front get into this aggressively, and not be dependent upon questions from the press, and it went 
forward that way. 
I was not totally satisfied because of frustrations I had experienced back to Watergate in trying to spotlight this. McGovern did launch aggressive comments, which 
did elicit some low-key questions, not many but enough to keep the flame alive. He did a credible job of trying to sock it to them. What was the end result? The same as it had 
been. You could not get media to consider this a matter of serious proportions and that was to continue to be the case through the election and well beyond. If there was an issue 
potentially in that campaign that might have had some impact and have aroused public interest, it was that. But there's no way I can fault McGovern, because it never surfaced 
as a meaningful issue. 
It was the climate of the time. Now knowing the actions taken by Nixon and his staff to cover up in the course of that campaign, the Nixon people rightly felt Watergate 
was behind them. They had succeeded in putting a cover on it. It's amazing that that could be the case. Nixon was able not only to be overwhelmingly re-elected, but survived 
16
O'Brien --Interview XXX --13 
as president for a considerable amount of time beyond that. But that's another subject. 
The summary of that campaign is that we were destined. It never served, as far as I was concerned, any useful purpose to suggest that disarray to whatever extent it existed 
was a major contributing factor of the end result. The lack of hard-hitting media was a contributing factor. The attitude of the Democratic establishment, some elected officials 
and Democratic activists--disinterest and lack of enthusiasm--was a factor. It affected the vote count to some degree, but it did not affect the end result. 
You had a significant factor that could not have been anticipated, the Tom Eagleton factor. I felt Tom Eagleton was an excellent choice by McGovern for his 
running mate and my view was generally shared. He was extremely well thought of. We all felt he would be an effective campaigner. He had a sufficient base of recognition to 
move quickly into the campaign. As part of the Nixon operation, of course, there was this exposure of his medical record. The press didn't seem to think how it became public was 
significant. You could condone breaking into hospital files and stealing a person's records. That was a minor aspect; the major aspect was the record. McGovern's initial gut 
reaction, which was totally understandable, was that he supported Tom a thousand per cent. That came back to haunt him. This was a sleazy political act on the part of the 
Nixon people. Be that as it may, it resulted in Tom's inevitable departure from the ticket. 
G: Why was it inevitable? 
O: It was too heavy a burden for Tom to carry and, most importantly, the nominee to carry. It would place him in a very defensive posture. You could anticipate a good deal of 
attention directed to this matter throughout the campaign. The inevitable aspect is that the VP nominee will come to the decision he must withdraw and the presidential candidate 
will come to the decision that it is in the best interests of his candidacy, though it is despicable on the part of the opposition. McGovern was faced with a major problem that 
could not be anticipated along with all the other problems he had. 
G: But it was basically an issue not substance as far as McGovern was concerned, i. e., having a guy a heartbeat away from the presidency who had this history of--O: 
Not at all. 
G: That didn't bother him? 
O: Not at all. 
G: It was strictly from the standpoint of the press and the defensive posture. 
O: The political fallout was the focus. I never heard from McGovern the slightest indication the medical record impacted on Tom's ability to perform a heartbeat from the presidency. 
It was a political decision. 
17
O'Brien --Interview XXX --14 
G: Should it have come into the equation? 
O: I don't think so. I don't think it in any sense would have adversely impacted on him as a vice president, a heartbeat from the presidency. But McGovern had a major problem. He 
had the backlash from his initial comment and then the accusation of not being supportive of his running mate, a sign of weakness or worse. That was heavily played. Then he had 
the problem of replacement. 
G: In retrospect, how best could the Eagleton affair have been handled having the benefit of hindsight? 
O: The comment, "I support him a thousand per cent" created a problem you can't cope with. Is there a best way? Probably not. I think what it called for was silence at the outset, 
then quick communication between Eagleton and McGovern, resulting in a unilateral decision on the part of Eagleton promptly to do two things: decry what occurred and on 
the basis of what is best for the party and the candidate, withdraw but not in an apologetic manner. He could be strong in terms of decrying. But the decision would have been 
Eagleton solely. McGovern's response would be one of deep regret. If he had had his "druthers," he would not have accepted his resignation. 
G: Did Eagleton show any interest in wanting to take this initiative or being willing to take this--? 
O: I'm not aware of what occurred directly. The shock waves were there. With that scenario, you have no assurance you surmount this problem without negative fallout, 
obviously. There is simply no way. But beyond that, you were faced with a tremendous problem that had to be resolved quickly. 
In the course of that, I found myself again in one-on-one dealings with George McGovern that involved me personally. He sought out Hubert Humphrey. Hubert 
Humphrey would decline without question. As you run through the party leadership, that would be an obvious first step or certainly an appropriate one. But as low key as possible, 
because it's not going to succeed. The next step was again quite obvious--to try to prevail upon Ed Muskie. Ed Muskie's decision took some time and this was unfortunate as it 
fanned the flames. Ed chose to fly to Maine to consider the request. 
G: Someone commented that he might decide by election day. 
O: That left George on tenterhooks. Could George, following Eagleton's departure, say, "Step one is to quickly contact Hubert; get his negative response, quickly contact Ed." 
While Hubert's response was assured, Ed's response was less so. The problem was the delay in response. George McGovern was trying to look beyond Hubert, beyond Ed 
Muskie and preparing for stage three. But you just take it one step at a time as quickly as you can. The delay on the part of Muskie certainly contributed to a further setback of the 
18
O'Brien --Interview XXX --15 
McGovern candidacy. Then if not Hubert and if not Ed, who? 
Hubert would formalize his "no" and prior to Ed Muskie finalizing his "no," I received a request from George to have dinner with he and Eleanor, Elva and I, at the 
Jockey Club in Washington. It was rather strange. He was the candidate for president and a public restaurant where there was a lot of neck-craning was a little unsettling, but 
that was his preference. Of course, the subject was Eagleton's replacement. I found I was in a difficult position because George brought up Humphrey's name, Muskie's name and 
he might have mentioned others. Through dinner it was, "What is your judgment, Larry?" Not that he was going to accept my judgment; I don't want to give the wrong impression. 
It was just kicking it around. 
It was either that evening or subsequently that McGovern made a comment to me that was surprising. He said, "You undoubtedly know, Larry, I seriously considered you 
at Miami." That was news to me. That would inhibit anyone who is being asked, "What do you think?" In any event, prior to Muskie turning it down, McGovern and I had a 
phone conversation initiated by him in which he said, "As you know, I'm waiting for Muskie's decision and if his decision is no, I'm going to be back to you immediately." Be 
back to me for what, for further discussion of the replacement or for discussion that would involve me directly? Thrust of the conversation would indicate the latter but there was no 
need for me to comment. The conversation terminated by, "Let's see what Muskie's decision is and I hope that he'll make it quickly." Muskie said no, and I did receive a 
prompt call from George McGovern in which he stated he wanted me to know he was seriously considering me to replace Eagleton. He did not state that was exclusively the 
case, nor did I construe it to be. Clearly, the chances were good that McGovern would be discussing this further with me. 
I was left in a quandary. I was in my apartment. I took the call in the bedroom because I had guests in the living room. The guests included Dick Murphy and Stan 
Greigg. So when I hung up I called Elva who was in the living room with them to the bedroom and told her of the conversation. That put both of us in somewhat of a state of 
shock. While it might be a high honor to be considered for the ticket, it also posed some serious problems, far more serious than the problems I had faced with McGovern from 
Miami on. She and I concluded we would make no reference to this. There would be time to make a decision. Our feeling was that if this comes about, despite the high honor, 
I should decline for a number of reasons. Among those reasons was my lack of confidence in myself as a candidate in my ability to make a significant contribution to the 
campaign. Be that as it may, that wasn't a decision that had to be made then. 
A couple of days went by and George McGovern calls. Meanwhile, there had been public comments, certainly not initiated by me. A couple of governors--including the 
Governor of Maryland--commented in support of me as the replacement for Eagleton. George said, "I want to update you on what has occurred. We"--which I assumed were 
his advisers--" have discussed this at great length and we have conducted a quick poll. I want to tell you that you fared extremely well." I'm a little taken aback that I would 
19
O'Brien --Interview XXX --16 
perform well in a poll, but I'll accept what he said. The poll had to be conducted in a twenty-four to forty-eight hour period. And he said, "I am very pleased with the poll 
results concerning you. However, there is a feeling you fared well in the poll in the political context, that you are identified as a politician and some of us"--or "the 
folks"--" suggest that under the circumstances it probably would not be a good idea to have a visible politician on the ticket. There's been discussion of Sarge Shriver." We've 
been discussing this and there is a feeling that perhaps Sarge would be the most appropriate replacement." 
My response was, "I think it's an excellent idea. There's no question Sarge would be a vigorous, aggressive candidate that would carry on his end extremely well." I 
expressed a very favorable reaction to Sarge Shriver. Then he closed, "We haven't concluded this matter but I just wanted to update you." We closed on that note. I knew 
the decision had been made and I appreciated his courtesy in calling me. At no time had I remotely indicated any advocacy of Larry O'Brien nor had anyone else known to me. 
Undoubtedly, others had discussed me, unknown to me. My sense was one of relief. The fact is it was the better choice in my judgment under the circumstances at that time. That 
terminated that aspect and was an added element of my experience with George. 
(Interruption) 
O: As the result of the election indicates, this was a free ride for Richard Nixon. It obviously was not Nixon's nature to settle for a strong win. Watergate indicates he wanted to ensure 
victory beyond that. There wasn't, in the campaign, an undue amount of Nixon-type rhetoric or Nixon dirty tricks. That was taken care of in Watergate. There would be an 
occasional burst and McGovern was a pretty good target. It could be capsulized in a comment that I believe can be attributed to Senator Hugh Scott and repeated ad nauseum 
during the campaign. Scott said, "The McGovern campaign is the campaign of the three As: acid, abortion, and amnesty." That was particularly repugnant to me because the 
media played it to an inordinate degree while we were busily engaged in an attempt to surface Watergate and failed to do so. 
G: How important was busing as an issue in this campaign? 
O: Well, it was a sensitive issue. I don't recall it was overriding but the sensitivity to busing was there. 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 2 
G: But was there one of McGovern's positions that you feel cost his campaign more votes than anything else? 
O: I think the commitment to spread the wealth, so to speak. It made an impact. It was widely reported and debated. 
20
O'Brien --Interview XXX --17 
(Interruption) 
O: The candidate and all of us muddled our way through. We closed out the campaign and he returned to South Dakota for the election returns. It was a very early night obviously. 
There were no expectations and no excitement. It was deadly dull. I spent the night in the McGovern headquarters in Washington. Relatively early on I decided I would call 
McGovern. I had always had the experience of being with the candidate on election night with the exception of Lyndon Johnson's election in 1964. But even then we talked during 
the course of the evening on a number of occasions and kept abreast of things that way. There were no plans for the candidate's involvement election night that I was aware of, so 
I decided to initiate a call to the motel where he was staying. I offered the appropriate condolences and complimented him, rightly so, on his individual effort throughout. I 
couldn't think of anything that he could have done that would have changed the situation so he shouldn't have any regrets in that regard. He had campaigned tirelessly. He, in turn, 
thanked me for my efforts but he made a comment that was rather surprising to me. He said that he had truly felt in the last few days up to election that he could win. He felt that 
he had turned it around and had some degree of optimism regarding the end result. That optimism to my knowledge wasn't shared by any of us but perhaps it was the nature of the 
fellow. 
The most memorable aspect of that conversation to me was that he brought up the Doral [Beach] Hotel and said that he always regretted and always would regret what 
occurred that day. Following that we terminated the conversation. I reflected on this aspect. I thought, "Here is a man who is in the midst of suffering a devastating defeat, 
who took the occasion to reflect on the Doral Hotel and the problems that he and I had regarding the chairmanship." That was surprising. He did bring it up again by way of 
apology. Apparently it made a lasting impact on him. That probably would account for the extent of his effort to ensure my continuing involvement in his campaign. On 
reflection, there were any number of steps he took to ensure that involvement. The fact is it was not essential to McGovern that I be involved in his campaign. Whatever reputation 
I might have could in no way account for the depth of his concern regarding my continuity. I've always felt that the role of somebody in an effort of this nature can be 
grossly exaggerated. There's no individual who is important enough or able enough or knowledgeable enough to make a significant impact on a presidential election other than 
the candidate. So perhaps in closing out my relationship with McGovern in that phone conversation, I had a better understanding of the man than I had heretofore. 
But in defeat there's the aftermath in terms of the party structure and the role of the defeated candidate for president as titular head of the party. The role is a diminishing 
role, as reflected in Hubert Humphrey's effort after 1968 to designate his choice for chairman of the party when the party executive committee declined to go along. Clearly, 
the discontent that existed in the election indicated that McGovern was not going to have any leadership role in the party whether he desired to or not. That became eminently clear 
in his choice for chairman, Jean Westwood. She faced strong opposition. Jean had been chairman from the end of the convention in Miami to election night and her days were 
21
O'Brien --Interview XXX --18 
numbered. There was a meeting of the national committee scheduled about a month following the election. During that time there was intense campaigning and maneuvering 
to determine a successor to Jean Westwood. She had made it clear she would be most willing to continue as chairman. 
That brought a number of candidates for the office. Chuck Manatt had been California Democratic chairman. He played a very active role in California party affairs 
and had a long-time desire to be national chairman. George Mitchell of Maine had been state chairman in Maine, extremely active in the party and a long-time associate of Ed 
Muskie. He, too, enjoyed a fine reputation across the board. And Bob Strauss, who had performed admirably under difficult circumstances as treasurer of the national committee, 
clearly had a keen desire to be chairman. There were others I'm sure who entertained the idea. 
In that period I had conversations with George Mitchell and Chuck Manatt, who came to my apartment to visit on the subject of the chairmanship. Each stated he was 
going to seek the chairmanship, and I believe followed through. Bob talked to me on the phone a couple of times and made clear his interest. 
Meanwhile, some of my long-time associates suggested perhaps I would consider seeking the chairmanship once again. It added up to nothing sensible or serious. I 
described to them my view. Yes, undoubtedly an element of the national committee would be interested in my candidacy. 
However, my view was this would result in defeat of Bob Strauss because among those we were aware of would be people that otherwise would support Bob. That was 
something I would not engage in. Nor did I feel I should become involved in the contest for the chairmanship. It was far better to close the book. They had shared with me an 
extremely difficult period. None of us had at any time done anything but what we thought best on behalf of the candidate. We were life-long Democrats and would continue to be. 
There was no point in causing any disruption because the party was going to be in dire need of, again, reorganization. Beyond that, I thought well of Manatt and well of George 
Mitchell. They were two high-quality fellows. Also, I thought highly of Bob Strauss but when the chips were down, the man who had earned the right as I saw it was Bob Strauss. 
Bob had the capability of mounting a campaign and he had a lot of support. He had no assurance of victory, but he certainly was in the position to make a real contest out of it, 
as were Manatt and Mitchell. So we closed it on that basis. Bob, as it turned out, in a strongly contested situation was elected chairman by a very narrow margin. But he 
succeeded. 
G: Were you there at the meeting? 
O: No. He was entitled. During his period as chairman he performed well in the office. 
So that's the way I closed out. 
22
O'Brien --Interview XXX --19 
End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview XXX 
23
    [ Part 31: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--37 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXXI*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XXXI 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXXI, 12/ 10/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
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Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXXI, 12/ 10/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-43 
4
INTERVIEW XXXI 
DATE: December 10, 1987 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 1 
O: Watergate has been part of our discussions throughout this oral history. At this point, it might be helpful to consider Watergate from its beginning in chronological order and to 
discuss all its aspects: its motivation, its impact and its end result. 
The first realization I had that there was animosity toward me in the White House was a conversation with Rowland Evans of the Evans-[ Robert] Novak column at lunch, 
perhaps in early or mid-1971. Rowlie asked me why Chuck Colson hated my guts. I responded that I didn't know who Chuck Colson was. The name was a name I wasn't 
familiar with. Rowlie said, "Of course you know Colson. He comes from Massachusetts. He was on the staff of Senator Leverett Saltonstall at one time. You must know him." I 
repeated I didn't. He identified him then as a member of Nixon's White House staff, at which point I think I had some vague idea I had heard the name. That was the extent of 
my knowledge of Chuck Colson at that time. I closed that conversation by suggesting to Rowlie that if he wanted an answer as to why he hated me, he'd have to ask Colson. I 
dismissed it from my mind and thought nothing further about it. Other than that, there were two or three occasions which, again, were meaningless to me. A reporter might call 
to say, "They are trying to harm you." "Who are they?" "The Nixon people. They send blind memos over the transom." 
G: That had happened before in your political career? 
O: I don't recall that it had. One of the blind memos was forwarded to me by a reporter who chuckled and said I might be interested in seeing it. It coincided with an appearance I was 
to make, I believe, at the National Press Club. The memo substance suggested questions to be posed to me. It was so ridiculous that upon receipt of it I dropped it in the 
wastebasket. It suggested that questions be posed to me as to whether there was any conflict or tie-in between the clients of O'Brien Associates in New York and my political 
activities as chairman of the Democratic National Committee. 
It then proceeded to list some of the clients. The list had been made public when I launched O'Brien Associates in the fall of 1969. As part of the promotion of the launching 
I had listed initial clients. That list included the Dyson-Kissner Corporation where I had my offices. The Dyson-Kissner Corporation was a private investment company engaged 
in a variety of manufacturing. It also listed, in addition to the Dyson-Kissner Corporation, 
5
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --2 
the head of the company, Charles H. Dyson, and gave background on him. Incidentally, Charlie Dyson was a close friend, as his son and my son had served together in Vietnam. 
He found himself on the major enemies list of Nixon. He was one of twenty people on that list. That was the price he paid for association with me. Also listed was the 
American Society of Composers and Publishers, an initial client when I opened the firm. ASCAP of course is the national organization of composers and publishers. Listed also 
was Hughes Enterprises, one of my initial clients, and Dukor Industries, also one of my initial clients. 
Dukor Industries paid a terrible price because I was a member of its board of directors. It was a privately-held company based in northern California engaged in the 
production of modular housing. A long-time friend of mine, George Bissell, was the owner of Dukor Industries. He found that the Federal Housing Administration either 
delayed his applications or denied his applications without any grounds. At a later date it was determined that Chuck Colson in the White House had instructed the regional director 
of the Federal Housing Administration to do whatever he could to disrupt Dukor Industries. The net result was that Dukor Industries floundered. George Bissell suffered a 
tremendous financial loss in the process. That was the price that he had to pay for being a client of mine and having me on his board of directors. 
Another company, Riker-Maxman, an electronics firm, was an initial client. This client list was included in the announcement of the organization of O'Brien Associates. 
The announcement appeared in several newspapers and I believe Newsweek magazine. So the author of this blind memo did not have to do any research. There was nothing hidden 
or secret. It was a memo detailing who these people were and what they were involved in. "Why don't you ask him what he does? Does it have any governmental involvement?" 
And all this sort of thing. I never heard another thing about it and I'm referring to it only in the sense of questioning whether anything should have alerted me that some unusual 
activity was being engaged in. The fact is the Rowlie Evans conversation and a couple of routine phone calls from friends in the press, along with receipt of this memo from a 
reporter, did not cause me to consider there was a massive effort to harm me. 
However, as Watergate unfolded later, the Nixon files reveal that as early as August 1970, within ten months of my return as national chairman, there was a memo 
suggesting I had an association with an entity called Public Affairs Analysts. Bill Safire, who was on the White House staff at that time, suggested an attempt be made to find a 
way of claiming Public Affairs Analysts was engaged in foreign activity which would require it to register. Incidentally, this information on PAA appeared in Newsweek. 
That's where Safire picked it up. His memo said, "I saw this item in Newsweek." So there was a vigorous effort, and a series of memos reveal it, to pursue Public Affairs Analysts. 
The background of Public Affairs Analysts was that there were four of us involved in the company, each holding shares of stock. In reality it was run by Joe Napolitan, a 
long-time friend and associate. He had been engaged in political campaigns with me for a couple of decades. PAA did not engage in any kind of foreign activities. It was a public 
6
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --3 
relations company. Joe personally was engaged in a number of political campaigns. He was an extremely able fellow and extremely successful. The other three members of the 
firm were really old friends who were listed as directors. There was Martin Haley and Cliff White and me, along with Joe Napolitan. But the firm was Joe's in a real sense. He 
was based in New York but had an office in Washington which I never saw. I was not a participant in the activities of the firm. Off this weak reed, the White House launched a 
massive effort, which included a break-in to the office in Washington. This is revealed in very careful language in a memo from John Caulfield to John Dean. 
G: What does he say, do you recall the language? 
O: You have to see the humor of this. There were several White House people involved in checking this out. It involved H. R. Haldeman and Dean. I guess they felt there was an 
opportunity here. Caulfield surveyed the office, checked the files and found it a modest office with an answering service. The most humorous aspect as revealed in the memos is 
a warning signal in the White House. They found Cliff White was a partner with me and Cliff was a conservative Republican who had played a prominent role in a number of 
Republican presidential campaigns. He was a close friend of people on the White House staff. So to their dismay, they found that White and I were in some kind of partnership. 
The warning went up, "We cannot embarrass Cliff White or cause problems for him. In that context let's see what we can find out." Well, it died aborning. Notations in the 
memos include, "Involvement of Clifton White makes it doubtful whether any political gain can be made from focusing on O'Brien." 
G: Who wrote that memo, do you know? 
O: I only have initials. It's to Dean and it appears to be CJ or FCS. The memo is in the Nixon files. But what started with Safire, in which he stated, "Let's . . . keep O'Brien on 
the defensive," became a matter that involved the effort of several members of the White House staff. 
G: What did they hope to find specifically at this--? 
O: Who knows? They didn't know. I think they felt Public Affairs Analysts might conceivably include activities representing foreign interests or foreign countries. That of 
course would mean that you would have to register. That was their thought process; there might be something. I mention it only because it indicates that keen interest in me became 
apparent in the record as early as 1970, which was the year I returned to the national chairmanship. There are a number of indications--and the record spells that out--involving 
the Dyson Corporation, Dukor, PAA, which was not a client but which I had an affiliation with, and Hughes Enterprises. There was a keen interest in determining what activities my 
firm was engaged in. This would be the pattern when your objective is to get this fellow, this chairman of the Democratic Party. There was a strong interest in what the client fees 
were. There was a particular interest in what the fee was with Hughes Enterprises. There are several memos that focused on that. 
7
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --4 
G: What was the motivation for this, do you think? 
O: A fishing expedition. 
G: But do you think it was maybe for IRS purposes rather than--? 
O: We'll get to that later. A fishing expedition being conducted by a venal White House. A Committee to Re-Elect the President with nothing but money. All of this resulted in 
disaster for them. On the Hughes fee, there are memos that suggest Bebe Rebozo should be in a position to determine what my relationship was with Hughes in terms of fees. 
They became busily engaged in that area with storm signals, however, as the memos reveal. They were reluctant to push this matter too far because they didn't want to cause 
any problem with the Hughes people. The record reveals they had a long-standing relationship with the Hughes organization dating back to Nixon in California. Threaded 
through the memos is a concern they not disrupt their relationship. That went to loans that Hughes had made to Nixon, to Nixon's brother and a current donation in cash to the 
Nixon campaign that was supposedly a hundred thousand dollars. So again, as with PAA and Cliff White, they were trying to determine whether there was anything to mine with 
me with Hughes Enterprises, but with the note of caution, "Let's not cause any harm to our relationship." 
G: Who authored these memos, do you recall? 
O: Chuck Colson was active in this, but as this was pursued it reached Haldeman. Haldeman was encouraging the continuing effort. They were ill-informed throughout, which reflects 
the ineptness of their people. The memos indicate a tendency to develop theories out of whole cloth to justify their salaries, to indicate they were busily engaged. For example, as 
part of the Hughes effort, [John] Caulfield sent a memo to Dean in which he said that my relationship with the Hughes organization was due to my long friendship with Bob Maheu 
because Bob Maheu and I knew each other as classmates at Holy Cross College. Well, I had not attended Holy Cross and, as I will get to later, I had no knowledge of Bob Maheu 
until after Bob Kennedy's assassination. 
To keep this in chronological order, those were the indications of activity that transpired in 1970, within a short period of my return as chairman. What impressed me 
was the time and effort being devoted to this. I've recounted information brought to my attention--Rowlie Evans and the other matters I've discussed--during this period. Other 
activities were brought to my attention subsequently which were engaged in during 1970. 
The first indication on the record that President Nixon was keenly interested in me appeared in a memo in January of 1971. It certainly indicates that the degree of this 
activity that I have recounted was carried out, as inept as it might have been, as innocuous as it actually was and as ridiculous as some aspects of it were. The misinformation 
threaded throughout was due to the realization of the White House staff that Richard 
8
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --5 
Nixon was anxious to get me. In January of 1971 he sent a memo to Haldeman stating, "The time has come to make O'Brien accountable." At that stage I had been attacking the 
record of the administration. I cannot suggest that activity was creating great waves in media, but there was a considerable sensitivity to it in the White House revealed 
throughout the record of Watergate and White House activities. 
On June 17 I was in Miami, Florida, to review the planning of our national convention. My schedule called for me to leave Miami at 8: 00 or 9: 00 a. m. on the 
seventeenth for New York to review the convention film which was in process. The deputy chairman of the Democratic National Committee, Stan Greigg, placed a call to me 
that morning just prior to my departure for the airport. He advised me he had been called by the Washington police in the early hours of the morning in my absence and was asked 
to come to the Washington police station, and also to view the contents of a room in the Watergate Hotel. He found in the room Mace, stacks of hundred dollar bills and some 
electronic equipment spread out on a bed. He was then taken to the police station to view the five burglars who had been arrested to determine if he could identify them. Of course, 
he knew none of them. They all had given assumed names in any event. You couldn't contemplate this--five burglars, Mace, money, burglar equipment, electronic devices--a 
break-in carried out by apparent professional burglars. Stan and I concluded this didn't make any sense, but perhaps a pursuit of it would determine the real purpose. But neither 
one of us at that point considered this to be political. 
I went to New York, reviewed the film and proceeded to the airport to travel to New Orleans where I was to address the National Conference of Mayors. Stan Greigg 
contacted me at the airport to advise me that the Washington police had determined one of the burglars was an employee of the Committee to Re-Elect the President and a present 
or former employee of the Republican National Committee. His name was James McCord. The other four were identified as Cubans who resided in the Miami area. That 
was the extent of my knowledge as I headed for New Orleans. 
I must say the report of the break-in in the press was almost nonexistent. It had been reported by Bob Woodward. I arrived in New Orleans and Joe Mohbat, the press 
secretary of the Democratic National Committee, contacted me at the airport. He advised me James McCord had been identified. The first indication of Nixon committee 
involvement had been reported. John Mitchell had issued a statement from California which said, 
James McCord is the proprietor of a private security agency who was employed by our committee months ago to assist with the installation of our 
security system. He has, as we understand it, a number of business clients and interests and we have no knowledge of those relationships. We want to emphasize 
that this man and the other people involved were not operating either on our behalf or with our consent. I am surprised and dismayed at these reports. There is no 
place in our campaign or in the electoral process for this type of activity and we will not permit it or condone it. 
9
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --6 
Joe asked me if I cared to respond. I was on a tight schedule, but I did draft a response as follows: 
Continuing disclosures in the wake of Saturday's bugging incident at the DNC raise the ugliest questions about the integrity of the political process that I 
have encountered in a quarter century of political activity. No mere statement of innocence by Mr. Nixon's campaign manager, John Mitchell, former attorney 
general, will dispel these questions, especially as the individual allegedly involved remains on the payroll of the Nixon campaign organization as filed with the 
Congress. Only the most searching professional investigation can determine to what extent, if any, the Committee for the Re-Election of the President is involved 
in this attempt to spy on Democratic headquarters. I call upon Attorney General [Richard] Kleindienst to order an immediate but thorough investigation by the FBI. 
This investigation must remain open until we know beyond a doubt what organization or individuals were behind this incredible act of political espionage. 
We shall anxiously await the Attorney General's response. 
That evening I was contacted at my hotel by a camera crew from I believe the "Today Show." The interviewer asked what knowledge I had of the break-in and I proceeded to 
say basically what I had said in my statement. 
Already things were beginning to unravel as far as the Nixon crew was concerned. As Jeb Magruder described in detail, their concern grew rapidly. It happened John 
Mitchell and other key members of the Nixon group were in California. Jeb Magruder had received a call from [Gordon] Liddy, as he recounts it, which was startling, in which Liddy 
said, "I goofed. We got caught." Magruder was thunderstruck because he had been a direct participant in the arrangements of the break-in. He then describes what transpired 
over the intervening hours. Immediately, efforts were made to spring McCord from jail. That was their first concern. The efforts extended to contacting Attorney General 
Kleindienst at a golf course in Washington to ask him to directly intervene, which he declined. So they were left with the identification of McCord; their knowledge that 
McCord was an integral part of the break-in because of his electronic expertise. He was the only non-Cuban arrested that night. It's clear that when Mitchell issued his statement 
suggesting McCord was somebody he probably never heard of, it was in the midst of consternation in California. Obviously at this point I'm not aware of that. 
I made my appearance before the National Conference of Mayors. At the end of the speech I had plans for immediate departure to Washington. I'm anxious to return to 
Washington because I am now intrigued with all of this, although far from contemplating the extent of the activity. 
G: What did you think at this point? Did you have a theory? 
O: It was clear to me that, at a minimum, there was illegal activity on the part of the Nixon 
10
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --7 
committee. There was no doubt in my mind at that point. With my political hat on and obviously with no concern regarding the fruits of the break-in, I was contemplating what 
steps I should take beyond my statement. 
G: Did you see it as an opportunity to--? 
O: Perhaps vaguely. I had a plane trip ahead of me to think about it. 
Tape 1 of 3, Side 2 
O: At that appearance there was a large number of press--the National Conference of Mayors. As I left for the airport, some press asked me to update them on the break-in. 
Not in any very serious manner; it was almost in passing. Again I repeated my initial comment. 
(Interruption) 
O: Immediately upon my return to Washington I convened members of my staff to discuss the procedure we should follow. The result was the preparation by Joe Califano, general 
counsel for the Democratic National Committee, along with John Stewart and Stan Greigg, of a filing of a lawsuit against the Committee to Re-Elect the President and others. 
This suit would demand damages of a million dollars. I was an individual plaintiff because of the violation of my civil rights and the Democratic National Committee, an 
unincorporated association, was the other plaintiff. The defendants we listed were James McCord, along with the Committee to Re-Elect the President, Bernard Barker, Eugenio 
Martinez, Frank Sturgis and Virgilio Gonzales. We added McCord Associates, Inc. and Maryland Corporation as a defendant and, of course, John Doe and other conspirators 
whose names are now unknown. That suit was filed on June 22, so we did not waste any time. One of the reasons in filing the suit was political in the sense of upgrading this to a 
full-blown story, because nothing other than routine notice had been taken of the break-in in the media. There was only routine reference to the revelation that the man who had 
taken an assumed name was James McCord, an employee of CREEP. 
So we decided to launch the filing with a press conference. I held a press conference and referred to my concerns as expressed in my initial response to John 
Mitchell and decried this entire matter as vigorously as possible. The result was meaningless in terms of media attention. The initial media reaction was a yawn of major 
proportions. The New York Times had reported the break-in on an inside page in a couple of paragraphs suggesting a Cuban connection. The only interest at that early stage 
emanated from Woodward and Bernstein. In a civil suit of this nature, in due time, you would take depositions. 
G: Was this a consideration in filing the suit to be able to subpoena documents and depose--? 
O: That was one consideration, but the primary consideration was that this was the only 
11
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --8 
vehicle we had to have attention directed to this. 
G: Was there any concern that you might not win the suit, that it might result in some liability on your own part? 
O: We didn't consider that. We came quickly to the point that the only vehicle available to us was the filing of a lawsuit. Our desire was to move this to public attention. On June 22, 
four days after the break-in, we had little or no knowledge. For example, Magruder's overriding concerns as this unfolded was his knowledge that fifty-three or fifty-six hundred 
dollars in hundred dollar bills had been observed by Stan Griegg in that hotel room. Magruder knew that Liddy had been financed. He didn't know the purpose of having the 
money in hand during the course of the break-in and he engaged in some dreaming. Hopefully, that money might be Democratic National Committee money, because if it 
wasn't, there was no question in his mind it could be traced to CREEP. He hoped for a miracle. He was disabused of that in short order. I'm relating this because obviously, they 
were pursuing a cover-up and they were deeply concerned, yet the nation, the press were oblivious to the whole thing. 
It's worth noting that this was the major thrust of a plan which had been devised by Gordon Liddy, an employee of CREEP. It went back to early February, 1972 when, with 
the approval of the White House, Liddy, Magruder and John Dean had met with then Attorney General John Mitchell to propose a plan to him in his role as chairman of the 
Nixon campaign to engage in illegal activities. That included bugging my office at the national committee, bugging my rooms at the convention in Miami, creating a variety of 
disruptions at the national convention and, also, nude-ins and drug-related activities; anything that Liddy could imagine. 
Magruder and Dean with Liddy presented this to John Mitchell, the attorney general of the United States. Mitchell's concern was that he thought the price was too 
high. The budget presented by Liddy was a million dollars, so he did not give it immediate approval. However, they were not to be deterred and Magruder, for one, was under 
considerable pressure to move rapidly on this by Charles Colson. He therefore decided that Liddy should reconstruct the plan and present it in a reduced mode, which was done. 
This time the only change was a focus on me in considerable detail, extending a little beyond the initial plan, along with activity affecting the leading candidate for the 
Democratic nomination for president, who at that time was considered to be Ed Muskie. After a series of discussions the plan was approved with a reduced budget of, as I recall, 
$250,000. 
In recounting this series of meetings Jeb Magruder, in his book entitled An American Life, One Man's Road to Watergate, points out that "Larry O'Brien, the 
Democratic chairman, was giving us a hard time, particularly on the ITT affair and if we could implicate him in some way it would be, in substance, great to discredit him." Liddy 
had said he had some indication that business people involved with the Democratic National Convention were going to be forced to give kick-backs to the Democratic 
12
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --9 
National Committee for the opportunity to participate. Of course, this was another pipe dream of Liddy's. It had no substance whatsoever. They succumbed to a Liddy plan that 
had elements of craziness to it. 
What's important to note is this was a plan being promoted from the White House, participated in by Magruder representing CREEP and Dean representing the White House 
with great pressure being exerted to move the plan rapidly by Colson, with the certain knowledge of Haldeman and others. As Magruder said, Mitchell finally advised him he 
approved the plan but that Liddy should receive only $250,000 to implement it. "Magruder and Mitchell further discussed the target and it was agreed that Liddy should 
go ahead with the wiretapping of Larry O'Brien's office at the Watergate. Then we'd see about the other targets." Magruder goes on to say that Mitchell came close to rejecting 
the Liddy plan and that, in his judgment, Mitchell would have rejected the plan but Liddy had presented it in a highly effective way. Magruder felt that if Liddy had simply stated, "I 
have a plan to burglarize and wiretap Larry O'Brien's office," it might have been rejected. But instead he came in with an elaborate call girl, kidnapping, mugging, sabotage, 
wiretapping scheme. What the group was doing was trying to tone it down, feeling they should leave Liddy with something. They were reluctant to send him away with nothing. 
But as Magruder points out, Mitchell at that point was operating under tremendous pressure. The ITT hearings were ongoing and he was later to be accused of perjuring 
himself in those hearings. "And no one," quoting Magruder, "was making more of the ITT affair than Larry O'Brien. The fact that O'Brien was a prime target of the Liddy plan 
was incentive for Mitchell to approve it." He hoped that something could be found to silence his chief Democratic tormenter. 
The plan went forward, as the record shows, with first an aborted attempt to break into my office, a second undetected break-in that resulted in planting bugs and taking 
some of my files. This material, representing papers and memos, was taken by the burglars to Miami to be photographed by a friendly photographer and then were presented 
to John Mitchell. Mitchell was extremely disappointed. He commented that this was certainly a very poor result of an expensive project; it was meaningless and of no value, 
that they had to do better. 
Meanwhile, I had been placed under extensive surveillance. As the evidence showed later, I was under surveillance in Washington and in New York. A person named 
[Al] Baldwin, an employee hired by Hunt and Liddy, was given a hundred dollars or so each evening to see if he could locate me in Washington restaurants, determine who I 
might be with, whatever he could pick up. 
G: This was Alfred Baldwin? 
O: I believe it was Al Baldwin. Caulfield and [Anthony T.] Ulasewicz and others were also engaged in this activity. I was totally oblivious to all of this. I learned at one time that 
Baldwin came to my office, knowing that I was not there, and introduced himself as a cousin of John Bailey, my predecessor as national chairman, and expressed a curiosity to 
13
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --10 
see the office Bailey had occupied. And in the course of being given the tour by my secretary, he located the unlisted telephone number of my phone on my desk. In my hotel 
apartment in Washington, files had disappeared and there were indications of monitoring my phone. My wife noted strange sounds on the telephone in our apartment in New 
York. On occasions when my wife and I would be at dinner in New York, I was advised by the maitre d', who we were known to, that a fellow or fellows had asked who was in 
my company at the table. I kept my personal files in an apartment on East 68th Street in New York temporarily. There were two attempted break-ins. Neither break-in seemed to 
succeed but the management detected a broken lock in one instance and some gouges in the door on another occasion. 
G: Tell me, do you recall Bill Haddad's warrant? 
O: I'll get to that. 
G: Okay. 
O: It is hard to realize I could have been so naive. When I think back to 1970 with a record replete of White House efforts to harm me, why did I not become alert to some of these 
incidents? 
But more than that, during 1971 I found myself focused upon by the Internal Revenue Service. There were audits and repeat audits. I had no concern about my tax 
returns, but I did wonder why this great interest in what were routine tax returns. So there again I was not alerted. As later revealed, I was being scrutinized under direct 
orders of the White House. 
There was a development in the Watergate situation that was interesting. Throughout this period, particularly in 1970, I had crisscrossed the country in the off-year 
elections. And I must say I had vigorously attacked the record of the Nixon Administration throughout that campaign period. I found myself the target of Spiro 
Agnew, which did indicate I was having some impact on the White House. He became personal in his attacks on me, which I relished because I felt that was evidence I was 
having some modicum of success. During that time I was repeatedly demanding equal time on television for the Democratic Party. I had gone to the courts, the Federal 
Communication Commission and each step of the way as I have recounted earlier, this was strenuously opposed by the White House. I had decried, even though I didn't apply it to 
myself, evidence early on that the White House was scrutinizing tax returns. There had been a congressional inquiry and there were indications certain tax returns had been turned 
over to the White House by the Internal Revenue Service on demand. That was a sensitive area. 
I had vigorously pursued what was known as the ITT Case. ITT had worked out a merger of the Hartford Insurance Company and other companies that were subject to 
approval by the attorney general. This was not a national story at the time but I noted the 
14
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --11 
involvement of Dita Beard, the Jack Anderson column that spoke to this, and I also noted with great interest the revelation that the Republican National Convention was tentatively 
planned for San Diego, California, and that ITT had committed, through one of its hotels in San Diego, $400,000 to the Republican Party. Without evidence to support it, it was in 
my judgment more than a coincidence that ITT, while awaiting the decision of the Justice Department, would be showing great interest in the Republican Party and John Mitchell, 
who was either by then designated as chairman of the campaign or was considered to be chairman. I decided to go after this. I felt that the only way to do this, lacking evidence, 
was to address the subject directly with the Attorney General. 
Before I get to that, I should mention again in trying to direct public attention to Watergate, on June 18, coinciding with that press statement responding to Mitchell, I sent 
a telegram to Attorney General Kleindienst urging him to order an immediate and thorough investigation by the FBI. I stated, 
Only the most searching professional investigations can determine to what extent if any the Committee for the Re-Election of the President is involved in this 
attempt to spy on Democratic headquarters. 
I went on to say, 
No mere statement of innocence by Mr. Nixon's campaign manager, John Mitchell, former attorney general, will dispel these questions. The investigation 
should continue until we know beyond a doubt what organization or individuals were behind this incredible act of political espionage. 
Now, that is the day after Watergate when I sent the telegram. I received a response the following day, June 19, probably the most rapid response any bureaucrat has ever made to 
a letter from a citizen, but the response was not from Mr. Kleindienst. It was from the Assistant Attorney General, who was to become prominently known as Watergate 
unfolded, Henry E. Petersen. He said, 
Your telegram of June 18 to the Attorney General concerning the arrests made on June 17 of persons who had entered rooms occupied by the headquarters 
of your party has been referred to this office for reply. 
Then he went on: 
As indicated in published reports concerning this incident, the Federal Bureau of Investigation immediately initiated a full-scale investigation thereof. I 
trust this will serve to assure you that all aspects of this matter will receive the fullest consideration and that based upon the completed investigation we will move 
vigorously to secure appropriate disposition of such federal violations as the full investigation may disclose. 
15
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --12 
On June 24, with that kind of a response, I wrote to the President, detailed all the elements of the break-in and closed saying, 
Accordingly, I respectfully request that you direct the Attorney General to appoint a special prosecutor of unimpeachable integrity and national reputation and 
provide him with whatever resources he requests to investigate the facts surrounding this violation of First Amendment rights and to prosecute those 
responsible to the full extent of the law. 
There was no response, of course. 
Then on July 2 I sent a telegram to the President who was then in Miami Beach, Florida, in which I pointed out, 
A week ago I wrote to request that you direct the Attorney General to appoint a special prosecutor. To date you have chosen not to reply. Indeed, I am 
informed that you have referred the matter to the Committee for the Re-Election of the President as a political matter. 
Then I stated, 
I am aware, Mr. President, that in a recent news conference you deplored this break-in which was a blatant attempt at political espionage on a major political 
party. But I'm sure you'll recognize, as I do, the grave implications going to the First Amendment rights of all Americans, the growing number of questions that 
remain unanswered to me. 
I went on, 
I would now suggest that it is your decision whether this unparalleled case lands in the political arena or is treated in a cold, impartial manner that will ensure 
that the constitutional rights of all Americans are protected. I repeat, therefore, my request that you direct the appointment of a special prosecutor of an 
unimpeachable integrity and national reputation and provide him with whatever resources he requests to investigate the facts surrounding the affair in violation of 
constitutional rights. 
This elicited a response the next day, July 3, when I received the following letter: 
This will acknowledge receipt and thank you for your letter of June 24 to the President which has been forwarded to me for response. You may be assured 
that the recent incident involving the breaking and entering of the headquarters office of the Democratic National Committee is being fully and thoroughly 
investigated by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and that this department will prosecute violators of the federal law to the fullest extent. 
16
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --13 
Signed, Richard G. Kleindienst, Attorney General. 
But the New York Times reported on July 4 a statement by Ron Ziegler on July 3: 
In San Clemente, California, where Mr. Nixon is taking a working vacation, Ronald Ziegler, the President's press secretary, said the President had 
rejected Mr. O'Brien's suggestion. He said that Mr. Nixon was confident that the FBI and other law enforcement agencies would conduct a thorough investigation. 
It had been further reported that Ziegler stated there would be no reaction from the President to "anything Larry O'Brien sends around." 
There was other correspondence with the President that I will get to later. But back to the planning of the break-in and burglary--G: 
As you do that, I wish you would just speculate for a minute on yourself as the target of this and what they might have gotten from those files? Had you by the time of the 
break-in largely moved your own operation to Florida or were you still actively working out of--? 
O: No, we had not done anything. My visit that coincided with the break-in was of a preliminary nature, viewing the facilities, working out the details of the agreements we had 
made with the city and the chamber of commerce--all part of the planning of a convention. As far as files and records, none of that had been shipped. The files and records that you 
would forward to Florida would in any event be quite limited. They would apply directly to national convention planning and activities. 
G: You indicated that your business-related files, O'Brien & Associates files, remained in New York, is that correct? 
O: Yes, because for a period of time the business functioned through my son, who had returned from Vietnam. He was trying to maintain contact with the few remaining clients. 
Files would be material you didn't have a place to store. 
G: What would they have found in your offices at the DNC? 
O: They would have found correspondence with party people and others, schedules, organizational material, minutes of staff meetings, all routine. Beyond that, a file cabinet 
or file drawer of unpaid bills. So, it's worth noting that even after knowledge of the break-in and knowledge that material in my files had been removed and transported to 
Miami for photographing, I had no concern about discovery. They related to my activities as chairman and my relationship to the staff and they would be comparable to files you 
would find in any organization. 
G: The various theories that what they were after were primarily related to what you might 
17
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --14 
know about the Nixon-Hughes connection. 
O: That never was the case. There was never a discussion of it in any Mitchell meeting. The only aspect of Hughes' connection that they were interested in which I'll get to, was the 
financial aspects of my client relationship with Hughes, as it related to the Internal Revenue Service. There might be something with Hughes or other clients in my tax 
returns they could focus on. 
G: But the suggestions, however valid or invalid they may be, are structured this way: that O'Brien because of his relationship with Bob Maheu might have known things about the 
Nixon-Hughes relationship or the relationship with Nixon's brother. What did you know about the Nixon relationship with Hughes? 
O: Nothing. 
G: From Maheu you hadn't--O: 
Nothing. I never had a word regarding Nixon, Hughes or whomever with Maheu at any time. In fact, the nonsense of the contention that that was the reason for the break-in has 
been documented. 
There had been a problem with media lack of attention in the initial stages, with the exception of Woodward and Bernstein and Daniel Schorr. No one seemed to have any 
interest in this. When you step back and look at the big picture, at the degree of surveillance, the involvement of so many people in the "get O'Brien" aspect; when you 
focus on the President's directive in January of 1971, "the time has come to make this guy accountable," I must have antagonized them no end. When you view the deep concern of 
the Attorney General regarding ITT and as it unfolded, obviously a deal had been made. When you recall I had secured "loyal opposition" time from CBS which they were able to 
abort so no second and third segments were in the offing; when you consider the efforts I was making at the Federal Communication Commission and elsewhere to secure time, and 
when you realize Spiro Agnew was detailed to take me on and the 1970 election represented a defeat for Nixon, the true facts were there. I deserve no credit whatsoever 
for that 1970 defeat, but I probably was the most active Democrat touring the country and berating the opposition. 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 1 
G: . . . .when you go about a presentation? 
O: Yes, made by Liddy and all its elements. Focus on the Mitchell concern that existed at the very time of his approval. Obviously Mitchell and his cohorts had no knowledge of how 
much I might know about ITT. Add it all up. Muskie hired a chauffeur who turned out to be in the CREEP operation. When Muskie dropped out as front runner and it became 
McGovern, an aborted attempt was made on McGovern headquarters. With all of its 
18
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --15 
elements, it was a widespread operation. Cast out the largest net you can in every direction and see what you collect. 
G: It does go far beyond the Hughes connection. 
O: Their particular interest in Hughes was, "Is there something we can find on the money side?" They tried that with other clients and they made a particular effort with Hughes. 
As I indicated earlier, their effort had an element of sick humor. As the memos point out, "Let's find out what the deal is, but let's be careful that we don't incur the enmity of our 
friend Hughes and also remember that there are some things involving Hughes that we are not very keen about." But they were willing to take that gamble. Why would they pursue 
me with Hughes if they truly felt I knew the details involving Rebozo-Hughes-Nixon? 
In any event, I cannot overlook ITT. I was going blithely along pursuing ITT. 
The Liddy, Magruder, Dean, Mitchell discussions of the Liddy plan were initiated in February, 1972. I had hand-delivered to Mr. Mitchell a letter on December 13, 1971. I 
won't read it all; it's in my book, but the salient points are: 
Continuing public reports about the methods of financing the 1972 Republican National Convention raise a serious cloud over the recent out-of-court 
settlement by the Department of Justice of three anti-trust cases involving International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation, ITT. The reports indicate 
that the Sheraton Corporation of America, a subsidiary of ITT, has pledged a $400,000 underwriting of the city of San Diego's bid to host your party's 
convention next August. According to press accounts San Diego was the personal choice of the President. Eight days after the selection of San Diego was 
announced by the Republican National Committee, the Department of Justice and ITT announced agreement on an out-of-court settlement of three pending ITT 
merger cases involving Hartford Fire Insurance Company, the Grinnell Corporation and Canteen Corporation. As national chairman of the Democratic 
Party, I call on you today in your dual roles of chief law enforcement officer of the United States and chief political adviser to the President to make public the full 
record of your decisions as settled with ITT, as well as ITT's involvement in financing your party's convention next year. Specifically, before the selection of 
San Diego as host city, did Chairman Bob Wilson of the House Republican Campaign Committee meet privately in New York with ITT officials and if so, for 
what purpose? 
I had evidence of that meeting. 
After the selection of San Diego, did Congressman Wilson meet with Deputy Attorney General Kleindienst to discuss resolution of the government's 
anti-trust case against ITT or any other aspect of that case? If so, why? Are you able, through a candid exposition of all the facts, to allay my suspicion, any 
19
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --16 
suspicion that there is a connection between ITT's sudden largesse to the Republican Party and the nearly simultaneous out-of-court settlement of one of the 
biggest merger cases in corporate history to ITT's benefit? 
Incidentally, it was one of the biggest merger cases in history. That's December 13, 1971. On that very day, I received a letter from Richard Kleindienst that I won't read in full--it is 
also in my book: 
Dear Mr. Chairman, 
The Attorney General has asked me to respond to your letter of December 13 for the reason that since he became the attorney general he has removed himself 
from any matter coming before the Department of Justice which could or has involved the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation. His former law 
firm has performed legal services for some of the subsidiary corporations of ITT prior to the time Mr. Mitchell assumed his responsibilities as attorney general. 
Therefore, I have discharged the responsibility of the attorney general from time to time as and when necessitated by any matter which would involve action of 
decision by the attorney general. I have of course done so as the deputy attorney general and as required by law. 
And he then says, 
I have no knowledge direct or indirect that the Sheraton Corporation has pledged $400,000. I do not know whether San Diego is a personal choice of the 
President. I was not consulted or involved in any way directly or indirectly. The settlement between the Department of Justice and ITT was handled and negotiated 
exclusively by Assistant Attorney General Richard W. McLaren, who is in Europe and is not expected to return until the evening of December 20. Upon his return I 
will request that he communicate with you immediately with respect to the matters raised by your letter. 
He goes on to say, 
With respect to Congressman Bob Wilson, I have no knowledge whether he met privately in New York. I have never discussed with Wilson. I verified this 
with Wilson. 
He closes the letter by saying, "Assistant Attorney General McLaren will be able to provide the information upon his return." At some point he stated I would certainly hear 
from McLaren. Then he gives me a dig. He says, "The American people may well begin to question the fairness and responsiveness of the political process when they read of 
alleged statements of fact alluded to by you in your letter to the Attorney General." But that initiated the entire ITT effort on my part and it was on the basis of press clippings and 
a sense that this was more than a coincidence. 
20
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --17 
G: Well, plus the lead with regard to Wilson. 
O: Yes. 
G: Was that from the press or was that from a private source? 
O: That the meeting took place? 
G: Yes. 
O: That was from a private source that was absolutely knowledgeable. 
G: Is that right? 
O: Yes. 
G: It wasn't somebody in the Justice Department or the--? 
O: No. But you see this was one of the most significant cases in history. What inured to ITT by the action of the Justice Department is unbelievable, for a piddling $400,000 and who 
knows what else in commitments and promises. I had struck the soft underbelly of a major scandal. There were clear indications of this. The role of Harold Geneen, the head 
of ITT, the activities in the Justice Department through the course of this matter, the fact that Kleindienst's skirts weren't clean and I should add that McLaren, this fellow who was 
going to fill me in on the details when he returned from Europe in short order, appeared as a federal judge in Chicago. I need not add that McLaren never contacted me. If you're 
John Mitchell sitting with Gordon Liddy, you're thinking of this mess on your hands. At a Gridiron dinner in Washington--I've recounted this before but it fits--as I was waiting to 
move to the head table from the holding room, Barry Goldwater and I were chatting and Dick Kleindienst came by. Goldwater grabbed him by the arm and said, "Have you ever 
met Larry O'Brien?" We had never met. We shook hands. And Goldwater said, "I'll bet, Dick, here's one guy you'll never correspond with or put anything in writing with again." 
G: Do you attach any significance to the documents that were taken to Miami and filmed? 
O: Not at all. I think I became privy to the contents of those documents. 
G: Did they show a pattern or a particular interest? 
O: I don't think they showed any pattern. Just documents from various files. I chuckled when I learned at a much later date that John Mitchell was very disappointed with the 
documents and that's what resulted in the final break-in. As this unfolded, our effort was to fan the flame. 
21
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --18 
Counsel for us in the suit was the firm of Williams, Connolly and Califano. Joe Califano was our general counsel, and Ed Williams took a keen interest. I received a call 
from Ed, "I want to advise you that over the weekend I am going to Connecticut. I have reason to believe the person I'm meeting with will be able to provide additional 
information regarding Watergate. I am not going to tell you who I am meeting with, but I will let you know the results." Following that weekend, Ed advised me the meeting had 
been productive. He had met with counsel for a person who had a direct involvement in Watergate whose name had not surfaced. That person was deeply concerned about what 
might occur to him as this continued to unfold. He had gone to this lawyer seeking advice. Ed went on, "This man was stationed in the Howard Johnson Motel. He was 
hired by Hunt and Liddy. His job was to monitor your telephone, to observe whatever he could. He was assigned evenings for surveillance to determine your movements around 
Washington. He was monitoring in position at the moment the burglars were intercepted." Hunt came charging in--he had avoided interception--snatched his briefcase which I 
believe contained a gun and hastened to depart the scene, ordering this fellow to dismantle the equipment as rapidly as possible and get out of sight. 
The break-in that night was for two purposes: one, to correct a malfunction of the bug on my phone. They weren't getting clear and total signals at all times. James McCord 
would correct that. In addition, they were to install an additional or a new ceiling bug to monitor conversations in my office and take additional files of mine to supplement their 
prior burglary. None of this information regarding Howard Johnson's was known. When Ed advised me of this, he said, "I'm not going to give you his name or the name of the 
person who I've discussed this with. You're better off not knowing. I assume that you will want to publicize what I've told you and in response to queries as to your source you 
should be in the position to say my source is counsel. Additionally, the lawyer I met with noted that you are due in Connecticut shortly to speak at the state Democratic dinner. He 
would like to come to the head table and shake hands with you. He envisions that he might become a judge in Connecticut sometime and he assumes you have a close 
friendship with John Bailey. 
G: Williams was advising you not to have any--or was he saying that all you would do was shake hands? 
O: It was clear to me the fellow knew Williams was going to relay to me all he had told him and he'd like to be on a friendly basis in terms of the future, hoping that I might look 
kindly upon him for his service to the party. He did come to the head table, did identify himself as attorney so-and-so and we shook hands. 
I had a press conference and I proceeded to present these new revelations. 
G: Was the press at all skeptical, would you say or were they--? 
O: Yes. Probably the skepticism emanated from one member of the press, Sam Donaldson, who asked, "What is your source for these revelations?" I should say that press 
22
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --19 
conference was well attended. I told them my counsel was the source. That was accepted but I did announce we were amending our lawsuit. We were adding defendants and 
increasing the million dollars to three million dollars. In that amended suit we were including Maurice Stans, Hugh Sloan, Gordon Liddy and Howard Hunt as defendants. 
G: Why did you do that? 
O: Because of the new revelations and the fact that Hunt and Liddy were going to be identified by this fellow as the people who hired him. He was going to detail this for sure 
at some point. The fact is that within days this fellow gave his story to the Los Angeles Times. That was apparently a judgment made by his counsel. He had to get it out and 
that was the way to do it. But his counsel had given Ed this information earlier. 
G: This was Baldwin. 
O: This was Al Baldwin who had been hired from an ad he ran in some FBI journal. He was a former FBI agent, I believe. Then all hell broke loose. 
G: Let me ask you one other follow-up to this. Did the attorney ever receive his judgeship in this--? 
O: I can't recall his name. If I did, I would not identify him, even now. My guess is he succumbed to Ed Williams' blandishments. In any event, what he gave us was accurate. I 
could use it without fear I would get myself into a mess. 
As this evolved, of course, the Committee to Re-Elect the President hired counsel. I believe his name was Kenneth Parkinson. All hell broke loose in the White House. This 
had taken on another dimension. The cover-up was failing at every turn. It was doomed to failure and hysteria ensued. It became clear to Haldeman, Dean and the rest that 
something had to be done to counteract this and to attack O'Brien one more time. So the obvious: "Let's sue O'Brien." Parkinson was asked for his legal advice and he notified the 
White House he found no legal grounds to sue me. 
(Interruption) 
O: Dean sent a memo to Haldeman, subject: counteraction of Watergate. He described the elements of a suit they would bring against me despite the advice of outside counsel that 
there were no legal grounds for suit. He stated the action would be filed by the Committee for the Re-Election of the President and the Finance Committee to Re-Elect 
the President against Lawrence O'Brien. The memo states, "The filing of this action was announced by Clark MacGregor and it will be filed after the amended complaint in the 
O'Brien civil case is filed." Then it talks about the basis for this malicious abuse of process. 
It's based on the unfounded civil action brought against the committee by 
23
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --20 
O'Brien. O'Brien and Edward Bennett Williams continue to be quoted in the press saying that the suit was not brought for damages but to expose for partisan 
political purposes and to preoccupy the Republicans during the campaign. 
Then he points out, "Under the common law of the District of Columbia Committee there might be something there. A complaint for libel, this would be Stans against O'Brien." He 
reviews the legal merit of this. He notes that depositions are presently being taken of members of the DNC by the defense counsel in the O'Brien suit. "These are wide-ranging 
and will cover everything from O'Brien's sources of income while chairman of the DNC to certain sexual activities of certain employees of the DNC." Then he said, "They should 
cause considerable problems for some being deposed." He talks about First Amendment action, "The cause of action against O'Brien for violation of the First Amendment." He 
goes into what's required to bring a libel suit. 
I have assigned a task force to do nothing but work on every possible action we can charge against this activity and develop a means whereby someone 
can get into court as soon as possible and join this blatant violation of the laws. We may have struck gold in that we may have our first chance to really hit them 
where they are already hurting the most, that is fund-raising. 
I don't quite understand that comment. He did say he concurred with counsel that there was no merit to any of this legally. But he also concurred they should go forward because 
it would afford them a splendid opportunity for publicity and public relations. 
Now, as to the judge handling the civil suit, Charles R. Richey. Ed Williams reported from time to time that Richey was amenable to having the civil suit go forward. 
He had given whatever concurrence was necessary to depositions. He envisioned trial in the fall. Now, this is what Ed was advising me and Ed was obviously pleased with these 
developments. 
Meanwhile, at a point, Judge John Sirica came into the picture. He turned out to be a strong judge who would brook no nonsense. Following another Gridiron dinner, I 
was in a suite with several people, some of them I knew well. I was escorted over to a sofa by a fellow who said, "Someone wants to meet you." It was Judge Sirica and he used 
some strong language to indicate to me there was no way those so-and-sos were going to get away with what they had pulled. He was going to see to it. I was totally taken aback 
and I was noncommittal. With a smile I told him how glad I was to meet him. 
G: Could you tell who he was referring to, the burglars themselves or--? 
O: By that time he had several defendants before him. But back to Richey. He had a reported friendship with a man who was an officer of the Republican National Committee. 
I was told they were neighbors. I'm not placing any particular credence in that but a strange occurrence took place. Richey advised Joe Califano that he felt a conflict of 
interest existed in his firm representing the Washington Post in a related suit and 
24
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --21 
representing me, and he and his firm must make a judgment on which party they were to represent. There was no conflict of interest. Joe called me to advise me he had met with 
Williams and Paul Connolly, the other senior partner, and they were faced with a difficult dilemma. I told him that as I wasn't much of a paying client and obviously the 
Washington Post was important to them, they should make a decision on that basis. Joe said, "In doing this I will pursue with other counsel a replacement for you." 
Joe did pursue other attorneys. In each instance, with friends of ours, formerly in our administration, the answer was either "we're too busy," or "that's not our field of 
expertise." No one would take my case. Fear of the Nixon Administration prevailed and I had to understand. My long-time associate, Claude Desautels, was in Duke Zeibert's 
restaurant having lunch and he ran into Ed Morgan, a partner in a firm in Washington. Claude mentioned I was in this difficult situation. Morgan was appalled as a lawyer. He 
couldn't believe it. While he had no interest in the case, he told Claude that if on an interim basis I wanted to have him file on my behalf, he'd be happy to do so. Claude also 
mentioned I was scheduled to leave for Ireland for two weeks. Claude advised me and suggested I call Morgan at home and confirm this. I called him and thanked him. He said 
he would assign a lawyer in the firm named Charlie McNelis. He turned out to be outstanding and was with me throughout. Ed Morgan emphasized, "This is interim. We 
have no desire to pursue this. You make your own decision. But you cannot be out of the country for two weeks and left without counsel. You don't know what might happen 
in that courtroom. You might have a dismissal." That's what occurred and Charlie McNelis became counsel and stayed. 
John Dean in his memo to Haldeman relates depositions were ongoing. McNelis was proceeding with depositions and he called in Caulfield. Caulfield had some excuse for 
not being able to go through with a deposition on that day. But he wanted to relay through McNelis a message to me that, despite efforts made by his superiors to have him 
engage in activities to cause me harm, he always resisted and that he thought highly of me. He wanted me to know he never engaged in that sort of activity. I guess Caulfield didn't 
envision his memos would surface someday. John Mitchell was designated for deposition. His lawyers pleaded his inability to arrive at a date. A date certain was finally established 
after some foot dragging. 
Coinciding with that, Judge Richey took a different point of view. He advised McNelis that the civil suit would not go forward. Despite the fact he had informed Ed 
Williams that the criminal action would not interfere with progress of the civil suit, he now felt that because of the criminal action it would be best to delay the civil suit, which 
obviously would be months in the future, if ever. He also issued an order that all depositions cease immediately which effectively saved Mitchell from being deposed. But 
that wasn't as bothersome as it might have been. It was becoming clear that what I had hoped for was going to take place without my pursuit of the civil suit. Judge Sirica was 
going to move with great vigor and a record would be established of what took place in Watergate, at least the break-in aspects. 
25
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --22 
Tape 2 of 3, Side 2 
O: Let me reflect back to those days immediately following the break-in. On the Saturday following the break-in, I was in my office at the national committee. There had been some 
activity on the part of the FBI. FBI agents had been in to look over the offices. I received a call from the acting director of the FBI, L. Patrick Gray, whom I did not know. He 
introduced himself and went on to tell me he and his people were vigorously pursuing this matter. I could have his total assurance the investigation would be carried out to its 
fullest. He was not going to tolerate any lack of action; he was going to fulfill his responsibilities. He went on at some length, and then made a comment toward the end 
that I didn't appreciate to the effect that we Irish have to stick together. I thought about it and concluded, "I guess he's just trying to ingratiate himself." The record shows he later 
advised the White House of this conversation with me and said he felt he had succeeded in totally reassuring me. 
Also during that early period following Watergate, in my effort to move this to the public domain, I noted that Sam Ervin through his committee could appropriately conduct 
an investigation of the break-in. I called Sam and we discussed it. He asked, "Is the FBI carrying on an investigation?" And I said, "Yes." He responded, "I think that's where it 
belongs. It seems to me that's sufficient. I don't see that my committee should involve itself." I mention this because it's interesting to note in the context of the role he 
ultimately played. 
G: What was your argument that he should do it? 
O: This deserved investigation from outside the executive branch. The Congress was obvious and his committee was appropriate. He had no interest and again it was in the period 
when very few had any interest. 
There was another possibility that we explored. Related to this was the so-called laundered money. It was money that had been moved in and out of Mexico and some of 
that money wound up with Barker, one of the Watergate burglars. Wright Patman picked up the idea that on the basis of laundered money that his committee--G: 
Banking and Currency. 
O: --Banking and Currency, could become involved. We discussed that aspect and he determined to go forward. 
G: Did you approach Patman or did he approach you? 
O: I know we discussed this but where the thought emanated from, I don't recall. He was aggressive and he would be apt to seize this. He felt comfortable that it was pro forma 
getting his committee approval to have hearings. It turned out not to be pro forma. 
26
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --23 
As a matter of fact, there were Democrats who voted against their own chairman to block the hearings. Jerry Ford, the minority leader of the House, was aggressively 
involved in lobbying to block the hearings. The White House was aggressively involved and two of these Democrats, I was told later, were advised they might have IRS problems 
if they didn't go along with the White House. I was stunned and so was Patman to find this fallout on the Democratic side. The White House was able to effectively block the 
hearings. 
Also, in those early stages, you had theories emerging. One of the initial theories, I believe, was reported by the New York Times. That was the Cuban theory, that 
somehow the Democratic Party was involved with Castro and these Cubans were delving into my files to determine what might exist in that area. It was a theory based on no 
evidence other than the presence of four Cuban-Americans. That theory went into discard. There was another wild theory that there was CIA involvement in the break-in 
due to the exposure of Hunt particularly and Liddy in the second stage of discovery. 
You had another aspect or theory: the burglars were intercepted because I had prior knowledge of the break-in. Bill Haddad, an active Democrat, had sent a letter to me 
in which he indicated he had been advised through his sources that activity against the national committee was to be undertaken under the aegis of something called the 
November Group. He did not go beyond that. The letter did get my attention and I instructed John Stewart to follow up on this. Stewart checked this out, came back to me 
and reported there was nothing he could find that would indicate that this was factual. 
Theories floated regularly in the early stages. The concept that plain-clothes cops who made the arrests had been alerted in advance to move in through me or the CIA in 
concert with me were ludicrous. 
G: One of the points that they make is that there had been several previous attempts of break-ins at the headquarters and there seems to have been no emphasis on security by the 
DNC at the headquarters. 
O: That point was made when I was interrogated during the course of the hearings, to my amusement. The contention was that CREEP had electronic monitoring, excellent 
security, surveillance on an around-the-clock basis and there wasn't any indication that the DNC had anything but a lock on the door of the headquarters with several members 
having keys. I quickly agreed that was the case and I pointed out the great difference between the financial aspects of CREEP and the financial problems of the DNC. We had 
not undertaken any particular security measures. There had been a couple of break-ins. Petty cash or perhaps a typewriter had been stolen at one point; I don't remember the 
details. The result was a memo to the staff to be more alert. We had little of value in our headquarters. Nothing of any real monetary value. 
G: How about having your phone conversations bugged, the eavesdropping? 
27
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --24 
O: You mean did we check on whether or not--? 
G: Well, no, was this a concern? 
O: No. 
G: You have a picture in your book of yourself talking from a phone booth. Was this more of a--? 
O: This was after the fact. 
G: This was to dramatize the--O: 
I did not enter that phone booth for that purpose. It was in the lobby of our building. I left the office, and downstairs I thought of something. The photo was taken by some 
passing photographer and it ran around the country, but it was not posed. 
G: Okay. But was this a concern, that information could be or was being obtained--? 
O: No, we never had discussions about phone taps. I had no evidence that any of our phones had ever been tapped in any prior campaigns. Security went to using common sense and 
good judgment in telephone conversations. There was really nothing of a sensitive nature that would overly concern you on interception. If that represented failure to provide 
proper security in a political entity, then it was my failure and my naiveness. 
G: How would you answer the charge that the burglary was so badly done that it was a deliberate attempt to embarrass the administration? 
O: I don't think--G: 
They taped a lot of doors that didn't need to be taped, for example. 
O: The record shows that this was an authorized burglary, authorized by the White House and authorized by the Attorney General of the United States. You could talk about the 
ineptness of the burglars, but the White House had initiated this. It was under its aegis. 
G: Did you have any hint of CIA involvement? 
O: None at all. I think as a reporter your curiosity is aroused and you look at a group of Cubans. Maybe this has some Cuban-Castro element to it. So you explore that and 
there's no rational reason that would justify pursuing that concept. Then you note the emergence of Hunt and Liddy and there's a CIA connection. As a reporter you think 
perhaps there is some devious CIA activity. There again, there was no rational explanation. It made no sense. There were other theories. There were those that pursued 
the police department in Washington to determine if it had some tie-in with the CIA in this 
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O'Brien --Interview XXXI --25 
instance. I was questioned about what tie-in if any I had with the police department and I believe I was asked about the CIA. 
G: In retrospect you don't attach any significance to these relationships? 
O: None whatsoever. You can't because the evidence is there. When you view this entire picture, the hearings, the court proceedings, the Nixon archives, you have a very detailed 
story that ties in and throws into the discard these various theories. 
Judge Richey had effectively closed out the civil suit, which was to languish for a long time. Judge Sirica was moving precipitately on the criminal side. My objective was 
being achieved. At long last this story had taken hold and surfaced. Then you have the Ervin Committee. 
It was September of 1972 when I was on "Face the Nation" with Bob Dole. Watergate was discussed. I expressed my concern and disturbance. Dole, of course, as 
the Republican national chairman threw all of my contentions into discard. But it was one of the rare occasions when there was any media discussion of Watergate in any real sense. 
Beyond that, I found that wherever I might have a press conference, Watergate would never surface in a Q & A. I would always make a statement before the press conference 
closed on my continuing concern about Watergate. It elicited little or no interest. As I mentioned, George McGovern made an effort to put this on the front burner. Even 
though he dwelled on Watergate as a major issue, it didn't take off until well beyond the election. 
Now to what I consider the most significant aspect of Watergate, something that extends far beyond the break-in, something that didn't come into focus until as late as 
1974, when testimony before the House Judiciary Committee was made public. What the President of the United States had engaged in back to January 1971, when he put in 
writing to Haldeman a demand that "O'Brien be held accountable," meaning get O'Brien, was to misuse the power of the Internal Revenue Service. Throughout the Ervin hearings 
this did not surface in any meaningful sense. The Ervin hearings focused on the break-in and the cover-up. Somehow or other, perhaps it was the time frame, the most appalling 
aspect of this entire affair, the use of the Internal Revenue Service, did not come into focus. It wasn't until the House Judiciary Committee hearings this became meaningful and 
then it was in the context of possible impeachment and never became the prime area of focus of the House Judiciary Committee. I was attacked by the IRS, coinciding with or 
immediately following the Nixon directive to Haldeman to hold me accountable, to get me. 
G: Was there a context, hold you accountable for what? 
O: No, this was just a brief memo dictated on Air Force One. 
G: Did it make reference to the IRS? 
29
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --26 
O: It was in the context of the various activities I was engaged in which they considered troublesome. I was an arrogant wise guy in their view. I had caused them real concern. I 
had hit sensitive areas which I didn't recognize to be as sensitive as they turned out to be. So with that I was subjected to a series of audits in 1971 and in 1972 that gave me pause 
only because this seemed to be somewhat unusual. I believe in one audit the Internal Revenue Service disallowed a deduction of four or five hundred dollars, something like 
that. In another audit, there was nothing. I was not concerned about audits. They were bothersome only in diverting your attention. But I began to wonder why this was 
occurring and concluded I was stuck in the computer. That was the extent of my interest in the matter. However, I was to learn otherwise. 
G: Did anyone ever give you any information on those audits or the IRS' interest in you? 
O: Let me go through some of it. 
G: Okay. 
O: I had put in writing the following: 
Documents of the Nixon presidency reveal that by express order of President Nixon, officials of the Internal Revenue Service repeatedly abused their 
power over an extensive period of time in an attempt to destroy me. As the target of Watergate, I was at various times placed under surveillance, my telephones 
were wiretapped, my files were ransacked. But for me the stunning manipulation of the power of the IRS can be considered the most shocking phase of the 
Watergate scandal. Additionally, the evidence establishes that some of my business associates and people with whom I invested were intentionally subjected 
to similar harassments under the guidance of Nixon Administration operatives. 
Mr. Nixon's personal papers contain blunt directives from the President of the United States to senior White House staff members to directly engage the IRS 
to do me injury in every way possible, including the creating of exposure to criminal charges. These documents and the records of the Senate Watergate 
Committee and the House Judiciary Committee confirm that senior officials of the IRS were approached based upon these presidential orders and actually took a 
number of actions aimed directly at me through the tax system. Beginning in 1971 Mr. Nixon notified H. R. Haldeman by memo that the time has come "to get 
O'Brien." In August 1972 an obviously agitated Richard Nixon sent a further memorandum to H. R. Haldeman. It stated in part, "You can discuss with 
Ehrlichman on a totally confidential basis. I have mentioned it to Ehrlichman and Ehrlichman says that unless O'Brien responds to a voluntary IRS interrogation that 
he would be subpoenaed. I think that this should not be handled on that basis until a telephone call is made by the head of IRS to O'Brien. Before O'Brien then 
stonewalls it, a subpoena should follow." 
30
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --27 
These are the words of the President of the United States in writing. And he went on, 
"The most important factor, however, is urgency. I consider it of the highest priority to have John Ehrlichman if he has the time or you personally to 
ride the IRS on this matter. Be sure to emphasize to John and all concerned that we are not trying to develop a legal case that is airtight. What is most important is 
that the IRS audit of O'Brien begin. This means that the call must be made by the head of IRS to O'Brien so the stage can be set for his subpoena. Don't let him 
delay." 
John Ehrlichman subsequently testified under oath that he followed through on the Nixon directive and ordered the IRS to dig into my tax returns even though the agency had 
already done so earlier and found nothing wrong. I quote John Ehrlichman, "I wanted them to turn up something and send O'Brien to jail. Unfortunately, it didn't materialize." 
That's Ehrlichman's testimony. I might add this is a Mr. Ehrlichman who has now petitioned President Reagan for a pardon. The record reveals that the earlier harassment 
of me by IRS was renewed with vigor as a result of the Nixon directive to Haldeman. 
In July, 1974 testimony of IRS Commissioner Johnny M. Walters to the House Judiciary Committee was released. We must remember now this is July, 1974. Walters 
stated that, "Beginning in 1971 or early in 1972 the IRS began an intensive investigation of O'Brien. Sensitive case reports were regularly delivered to the Secretary of the 
Treasury." Nonetheless, Walters testified during the late summer of 1972 Secretary [George] Shultz ordered him to have my tax returns further examined. 
Now let me emphasize that this memorandum, this directive from President Nixon to Haldeman, is dated in August of 1972, two months after the Watergate break-in. It is 
clear the break-in and what was unfolding from it was not deterring the President for one instant in his effort to get me. I continue, "Direct instructions were given"--and this is 
Walters' testimony; this is the testimony of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue--" Direct instructions were given to the Assistant Commissioner of IRS for compliance by the 
Commissioner to get on with developing a case against O'Brien." Walters later reported to Secretary Shultz that my returns had again been examined. Walters then testified that 
"from Secretary Shultz I learned that Mr. Ehrlichman was not satisfied. And Mr. O'Brien was to be personally examined." Walters said that "IRS then did interview Mr. O'Brien." 
Believe me they did, with two characters from IRS spending an inordinate amount of time with me trying desperately to figure out what they should be asking me. Walters 
continues, 
So again IRS then did interview Mr. O'Brien and furnished a copy to Secretary Shultz. Secretary Shultz informed me that Mr. Ehrlichman was not 
satisfied. At the request of Secretary Shultz I went to his office so that we could review the O'Brien matter. We then jointly telephoned Mr. Ehrlichman. 
31
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --28 
Ehrlichman stated, "I'm goddamn tired of your foot-dragging tactics." 
That's to both Shultz and Walters in a conference call. Walters went on to testify that following that encounter he proceeded to furnish additional data on me to Secretary 
Shultz. The facts are that this targeting of me, having been set in motion, continued unabated through subsequent years and did not cease until the administration of President 
Carter, when all elements of the Nixon Administration were finally purged. 
At a later time, again confronted by IRS-directed activities I found it necessary to write to IRS Commissioner Donald C. Alexander stating, "No amount of harassment or 
pressure will influence my handling of the Watergate case." Later still, to my amazement I received a telephone call from the then district director of IRS in New York. He 
explained that my income tax returns were being systematically flagged and examined under direct instruction from his superiors in Washington. His orders were clear. He had 
no choice but to follow them but he wanted me to be aware that this was the situation. I was grateful for this small display of courtesy. And I can just add that I am not prepared 
at this stage of my life to have the shadow of Nixon's depravity follow me to my grave but that's what has been happening. 
G: Did you ever approach members of Congress with regard to the IRS pressure? 
O: No. I did not have that information at that time. As I point out, this did not come into full focus until 1974 when finally these IRS actions surfaced. Beyond that there were other 
attempts to use IRS with others. It never ended. It is almost beyond comprehension now to have the secretary of the Treasury and the commissioner of Internal Revenue making a 
conscious effort to do everything possible to make a president happy by getting me. 
As Nixon pointed out in his memo, it does not have to have any legal merit, just work it out. This was in August of 1972--to utilize every means possible to get me--a 
most frustrated Richard Nixon in August of 1972, despite the break-in or perhaps because of it. My reactions to it and my demands for action had aroused him to the point where he 
had no hesitancy to renew his directive in no uncertain terms. Haldeman or Ehrlichman were to get with this immediately. There was to be no delay and they were not going to 
brook any foot-dragging on the part of the Department of the Treasury or the Internal Revenue Service. 
Now, that's scary. The fact is that they moved heaven and earth. They have caused me over a period of years tremendous costs in terms of accountants and lawyers 
and the rest. They have never closed out that period. I communicated recently as with the present Commissioner of Internal Revenue. And I made him aware of this rottenness that 
did exist and perhaps still does in the Internal Revenue Service and I haven't had the courtesy of a response. It's too hot for him to handle. 
Now back to the involvement of the Ervin Committee and all the rest. 
32
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --29 
Tape 3 of 3, Side 1 
O: My direct involvement with the committee was quite limited. I haven't gone back to committee records so I don't have specific recollection, but I do recall an interview 
conducted at my apartment in Washington by staff members of the Ervin Committee, the thrust of which was to explore my advance knowledge of the break-in which I have 
reviewed. There were other aspects of the interview as I recall. It was a matter of placing my comments on the record. Meanwhile, my lawyer, Charlie McNelis, was monitoring the 
activities of the committee in the interest of determining facts that we might not be aware of and, hopefully, just keeping abreast of things. I did not personally monitor it. 
There was a request by the committee for me to testify. That took place in one of the office buildings. The only member of the committee present was Senator [Lowell] 
Weicker of Connecticut. I was there with counsel and there were others. Senator Weicker reminisced with me about our mutual friend John Bailey, the former Democratic 
chairman. He said that he had been designated by the committee to conduct this hearing--it was in the early evening. He didn't seem to have great interest in devoting time 
to this. He asked me two or three questions--I can't remember what they were--and indicated this was a lot of nonsense and I was dismissed. I believe counsel stayed and 
there might have been other witnesses; I don't recall. That was the extent of it. Weicker at one point in the hearings said to Charles Colson, "I deal in hard-nosed politics; you deal 
in crap." Clearly Weicker's attitude during that brief experience I had with him was it was nonsense to have the victim of Watergate, the target of Watergate, sitting in the hearing 
room. What were they supposed to question me about, was I pleased being broken into? 
But back to the committee. Archie Cox was busily engaged as special prosecutor. I did meet with his staff to flesh out any other information I might have or ideas I might 
have that could lead in new directions. I don't think it was productive for them because I don't know as I had anything at that point to add. 
But, interestingly, as I took the plane from New York to Washington to visit these people, a fellow came up to me at National Airport and introduced himself. He said, "I am 
the former commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service." I was startled. "I am Johnny Walters and I want you to know that a great effort was made to destroy you and a great 
effort was made to have me participate in this and I would have no part of it. In fact, I had threatened to resign if they forced me." I replied, "It was nice meeting you," and 
walked on. That was my exposure to the former commissioner. 
As the Ervin Committee hearings unfolded, the hearings spoke for themselves. I had no direct contact with members of the committee or staff, other than the interview I 
mentioned with one exception. I will say that people who were in a position to closely monitor the committee did advise me that the only members of the committee who had 
any sensitivity to or understanding of my plight as the target were Senator Danny Inouye and Senator Lowell Weicker. They apparently on occasions tried to focus discussions in 
executive sessions to "What they did to Larry O'Brien. Shouldn't this be part of our 
33
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --30 
consideration?" No other member of the committee, at least as I was told, had any interest in what had occurred to me as a result of all of this. However, I was contacted by 
a fellow by the name of Terry Lenzner of the committee Democratic staff. Sam Dash was the head of the staff. 
Lenzner asked to come to New York to meet with me. He brought a younger member of the staff with him. We visited at some length in my apartment. Lenzner made 
a lengthy presentation of a theory that he and Sam Dash had become wedded to. The theory was that the reason for the break-in was the concern of Nixon and his associates 
that I had knowledge of activities involving, I believe, a hundred thousand dollars supposedly in the form of a campaign gift from Hughes to Nixon, handled by Nixon's 
friend, Bebe Rebozo, paid in cash in two fifty-thousand dollar increments. That was supposedly diverted to refurbishing Nixon's summer place in Florida. 
I couldn't believe a person who had been living with the Watergate hearings as long as Lenzner had could have blinders on. He and Dash chose to ignore the facts, the 
breadth and scope of the findings. I don't believe they at that time had any real indication of the IRS aspect of the Watergate mess which, as I have said, was by far the most 
significant and the most appalling aspect of Watergate. While I wasn't present at the series of meetings held in Mitchell's office, he and I and the world were now aware of the 
activities that had taken place. Certainly what had been exposed to that point revealed an extensive operation involving a number of illegal activities. To come to a conclusion that 
all of this that engaged scores of people, hundreds of thousands of dollars, and some two years of activity was for the sole purpose of finding out whether O'Brien knew about 
Rebozo and a hundred thousand dollars was preposterous. 
Beyond that, it made no sense that Larry O'Brien would, as chairman of the Democratic National Committee and knowing of this alleged incident, keep it to himself. 
The whole world would have known about it the moment it came to my attention. In the interest of the record and history it would be irresponsible to close this matter out on that 
premise. Every aspect of this indicated to me clearly that this in no way made any sense. It was apparent to me that Lenzner and Dash were trying desperately to come up with a 
theory to avoid being no more than an asterisk in history books. To have the sole contact made by the Democratic staff to have me agree with a ridiculous theory was something I 
didn't appreciate. 
The record shows that Dash and Lenzner in their anxiety to lock in their theory, lacking credibility, chose to ignore the motive for the breaking into--G: 
[Lewis] Fielding's office? 
O: No, the office of the--G: 
[Henry] Greenspun. 
34
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --31 
O: Greenspun office in Las Vegas. 
G: Was it the Sun? 
O: Sun. The thrust was to learn if the rumor heard by the Nixon people that Greenspun might have material in his safe derogatory to Ed Muskie was valid. They could enlist the 
Hughes people in orchestrating this because supposedly Greenspun also had Hughes documents. They chose to ignore the Muskie aspect and tried to relate that break-in 
through the Hughes document angle to the break-in at my office. They were reaching as far as they could reach. 
Credibility was totally lacking, and I think it's unfortunate that they were at a later time able to sell their theory to a writer named Anthony Lucas, who in 1976 wrote a piece 
for the New York Times Sunday magazine section. He recounted all the matters involving me we have discussed, up to and including IRS because by 1976 that was widely known. 
Nevertheless he joined Lenzner and Dash in supporting the Lenzner-Dash theory. I took the occasion to write to the New York Times spelling out my views and suggesting this 
was an unfortunate oversimplification of history. It failed to hit the target. The target was so broad and deep, the involvement so widespread, the IRS aspect so overriding it was 
unfortunate to ignore all that. 
I had forgotten that episode until recently when, at a symposium at Hofstra University where Lucas was present along with Jeb Magruder, Lucas queried Magruder 
on the reason for the break-in. Magruder stated the reason was they thought I knew something about Rebozo, Hughes and the hundred thousand dollars. I had read [this] in 
Magruder's book some ten years earlier. He recounted in detail the entire Watergate episode. He did not include the Internal Revenue aspect, as that was not part of his role 
because he was at CREEP. The Internal Revenue Service aspect was handled directly by the White House. The CREEP activities were handled by CREEP under the guidance of 
the White House. I decided to reread Jeb Magruder's book. It is clear as he recounted these various meetings with Mitchell, including his full involvement that the goal was to 
cast out a big net, catch what we can, and Mitchell's motivation in approving the Liddy program at least in part was his disturbance with me due to ITT. In his memoirs, 
Magruder repeatedly states I was the most difficult fellow they had to cope with, politically. I was giving them more problems than anyone and that Mitchell and others 
would love to come up with something, somewhere, somehow that might cause me embarrassment or disturbance. Also, interestingly enough, I checked the index of the 
book and found that the name Howard Hughes does not even appear in the book. What Magruder's current recollections are or what his motivation may be, I can't answer. 
Lucas called me. I had seen the reference in the New York Times to the Hofstra symposium, but hadn't thought anything further about it. He was the author who wrote 
the story of the Dash-Lenzner theory for the New York Times in 1976. He reminded me that I had questioned his support of this theory at that time. Frankly, I had forgotten the 
episode. He said that all the elements of Watergate, and he included IRS, added up to a 
35
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --32 
mammoth effort against me and he also understood what had been done to my friends and associates. That this had involved scores of participants and hundreds of thousands of 
dollars and I survived it; they didn't lay a glove on me. But he insisted, despite all that, the reason for the break-in was this theory. He closed by saying that he had been asked to do 
an op-ed piece for the New York Times and he felt in fairness that he'd include a reference that I still questioned his theory. 
A side bar to this: after a couple of days it dawned on me that I thought I was talking to Tony Lewis of the New York Times. When the op-ed piece appeared, I realized 
I had been talking to a free-lance writer who indicated that he was going to write further on this subject, probably try to develop a book. He referred to a professor from the 
University of Wisconsin who's engaged in writing a book on Watergate. He's not alone I'm sure. 
During the Watergate hearings there was a deep interest on the part of Sam Dash and Terry Lenzner in my business activities. One staff member had occasion to advise me 
that he couldn't get over Lenzner pressing inordinately to know everything he could regarding me. 
It began to hit me that somehow I was no longer the target or victim of Watergate. I'd have to defend myself to those who chose to ignore me throughout, but then tried to 
lock me into a ridiculous theory. It led me to question the motives of Dash and Lenzner. In reviewing all of the theories, as you indicated, the CIA theory still seems to surface. I 
haven't heard the Cuban theory recently. I think the theory that it was a setup orchestrated by O'Brien is probably in the discard. That would have been intriguing. 
Perhaps I should have allowed them to pursue that down a dead-end street, that I sat at my desk gleefully awaiting their arrival so they could be intercepted. 
In summary, as far as I'm concerned, you can look back to Judge Sirica as playing an extremely key role in breaking this open. The Ervin Committee did pursue its 
responsibilities, but you certainly can point to the House Judiciary Committee in exposing the most appalling aspect of all of this: the direct use of the Internal Revenue Service by a 
president to try to destroy a citizen. It adds up to a sad, sorry spectacle and a sad, sorry time in the history of our country. I cannot emphasize too much my continuing deep 
concern about the Internal Revenue Service aspect of this. If that can occur in this country, and it did, it is a matter to be deeply concerned about in terms of our democratic 
process. 
I like to think Watergate was an aberration. I have not reflected on it in a partisan sense. I was partisan in my initial efforts to expose it but certainly not partisan in that I 
have accused any other Republican administration or felt that any Democratic administration has acted in this manner. I am persuaded that for Nixon to go that far at 
that time, it was conceivable that he would have held the reins of the presidency in some way whether he was re-elected or not. 
36
O'Brien --Interview XXXI --33 
As an assistant to two presidents I spent almost eight years in the White House; I recognize loyalty of staff, dedication of the staff to the president. I also recognize that a 
staff reflects the attitude of a president, that no staff member becomes involved in any activity unless he knows the president would approve if he is not aware or he is carrying 
out direct orders of the president. 
Regardless of theories, the record stands. And one more reflection on the Internal Revenue Service: the service was used on other occasions. It is clear that early on the IRS 
forwarded to the Nixon White House, on demand, tax returns of citizens. I suspected that at an early stage and publicly decried it. Nobody listened, but it was occurring. 
In terms of IRS there is another memo containing a recommendation by President Nixon that the entire Congress be audited. To cover that up, he suggested they could 
quietly audit some White House staff so when the Congress reacted they could point to the White House staff audits. Nixon was totally hung up on his dislike for the Congress 
generally, his hatred of me obviously--and I don't single myself out as the lone person on his hate list; there were many others. I should add that he was encouraged in his renewed 
effort after the break-in to get me through IRS by John Connally who, as the Nixon files show, had urged him to continue his effort on me. At that time Connally had of course 
taken on the role of chairing or co-chairing Democrats for Nixon and later became a Republican member of the cabinet. 
G: Do you recall the wording of Connally's memo? 
O: His was not a memo. It was a couple of references the President made in the memo, "Connally tells me that I should keep working on O'Brien. Connally says he feels I'll find 
something somewhere." 
As far as other aspects of all of this, the Hughes matter took a turn in a different direction. I have remained quiescent regarding that and now I want to detail the facts. 
G: Okay. 
End of Tape 3 of 3 and Interview XXXI 
37
    [ Part 32: "Attached Text" ]
 *Pages 1--27 from  Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXXII*
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY ORAL HISTORY COLLECTION 
The LBJ Library Oral History Collection is composed primarily of interviews conducted for the Library by the University of Texas Oral History Project and the LBJ Library Oral History 
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1
LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN ORAL HISTORY, INTERVIEW XXXII 
PREFERRED CITATION 
For Internet Copy: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXXII, 12/ 11/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Internet Copy, LBJ Library. 
For Electronic Copy on Diskette from the LBJ Library: 
Transcript, Lawrence F. O'Brien Oral History Interview XXXII, 12/ 11/ 87, by Michael L. Gillette, Electronic Copy, LBJ Library. 
2
NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION 
LYNDON BAINES JOHNSON LIBRARY 
AND 
JOHN FITZGERALD KENNEDY LIBRARY 
Legal Agreement Pertaining to the Oral History Interview of Lawrence F. O'Brien 
In accordance with the provisions of Chapter 21 of Title 44, United States Code, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set forth, I, Lawrence F. O'Brien of New York, New York, 
do hereby give, donate and convey to the United States of America all my rights, title and interest in the tape recordings and transcripts of the personal interviews conducted on September 18, 
October 29, October 30, December 4, December 5, 1985; February 11, February 12, April 8, April 9, June 25, July 24, July 25, September 10, September 11, November 20, November 21, 
December 17, December 18, 1986; April 22, April 23, June 18, June 19, July 21, July 22, August 25, August 26, September 23, September 24, November 3, November 4, December 10, December 
11, 1987 at New York, New York and Cotuit, Massachusetts and prepared for deposit jointly in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library 
This assignment is subject to the following terms and conditions: 
(1) The transcripts shall be available for use by researchers as soon as they have been deposited in the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and the John Fitzgerald Kennedy Library. 
(2) The tape recordings to which the transcripts relate shall be in the possession of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library and shall not be available for use or review of or by any source 
during my lifetime and for a period of time thereafter ending with the 10th year anniversary of the date of my death. At such time, access to the tape recordings by 
researchers shall be permitted but only for the limited purpose of background use, and researchers may not cite, paraphrase, or quote therefrom under any circumstances. 
(3) During my lifetime, I retain all copyright in the material given to the United States by the terms of this instrument. Thereafter the copyright in the transcripts shall pass to the United 
States Government. During my lifetime, researchers may publish brief "fair use" quotations from the transcripts without my express prior consent in each case, but no 
other quotations from the transcripts shall be published, except with my express prior approval in writing. 
(4) Copies of the open portions of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be provided by the library to researchers upon request, subject to the terms, conditions 
and restrictions set out herein. 
(5) Copies of the interview transcripts, but not the tape recordings, may be deposited in or loaned to research institutions other than the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library or the John 
3
Fitzgerald Kennedy Library, subject to the terms, conditions and restrictions set out herein. 
Signed by Lawrence F. O'Brien on April 5, 1990. 
Accepted by Donald Wilson, Archivist of the United States, April 25, 1990. 
Original Deed of Gift on file at the Lyndon B. Johnson Library, 2313 Red River, Austin, TX 78705. 
ACCESSION NUMBER 92-44 
4
INTERVIEW XXXII 
DATE: December 11, 1987 
INTERVIEWEE: LAWRENCE F. O'BRIEN 
INTERVIEWER: Michael L. Gillette 
PLACE: Mr. O'Brien's office, New York City 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 1 
O: There was additional evidence concerning ITT that underscored the existing concern during the period when [G. Gordon] Liddy made his original proposal to [ John] Mitchell 
and the actual break-ins. 
There was a lengthy memo dated March 30 from [Charles Colson] to [H. R.] Haldeman reviewing strategy to secure the confirmation of [Richard] Kleindienst as 
attorney general. Colson reviewed in considerable detail the assignments of people to various members on the Hill and the current status of the effort. He emphasized there was 
deep concern that perhaps Kleindienst's confirmation could fail on the floor. And he commented that, of course, that would be adverse to the President's interest, too. 
>From that memo you can note the concerns. Colson states, "Certain ITT files were not shredded. These files would undermine testimony." He names people and 
mentions having a memo rewritten so it would be contemporaneous with a certain meeting that took place. He expresses concern about Mitchell and Harold Geneen of ITT as both 
Mitchell and Geneen had testified that they discussed policy only, not the individual ITT case, and Mitchell claimed he had talked to no one else. From this memo it's clear that 
wasn't the case. Colson states that [John] Ehrlichman assured Geneen that the President had instructed the Justice Department. They're insisting that this was only in terms of the 
bigness. A favorable decision and the opposition of the Justice Department is simply because of bigness. He goes on to say, "There is another internal memo. It follows the 
1970 [Spiro] Agnew meeting, which suggests that Kleindienst is the key man to pressure [Richard] McLaren, implying that the Vice President would implement this action." 
Colson says, "We believe that all copies of this have been destroyed." 
Then he refers to other memos; Kleindienst to Haldeman, dated June 30, 1971, which precedes the date of the ITT settlement and sets forth the $400,000 arrangement 
with ITT. He points out copies were addressed to [Jeb] Magruder and then Mitchell, and this memo put the Attorney General on constructive notice of the ITT commitment at that 
time. If known, this would be considerably more damaging than other materials. Magruder believes it is possible the Attorney General transmitted his copy to him. 
Magruder doesn't have the copy he received. He only has a xerox of the copy. In short, despite a search, this memo could be lying around somewhere. The memo continues, 
"The Justice Department has thus far resisted a request for their files and there are several memos that could be embarrassing. Whether they still exist or not is unknown. One is a 
5
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --2 
memo from Kleindienst and McLaren to Ehrlichman responding to Ehrlichman's request in respect to the rationale for bringing the case against ITT in the first place." 
There are further comments regarding a variety of memos. "There is also a memo to the President in this same time period. We know we have control of all the copies of 
this but we don't have control of the original Ehrlichman memo to the Attorney General. This memo would again contradict Mitchell's testimony and, more importantly, directly 
involve the President. We believe we have absolute security on this file within Justice, provided no copies are made within Justice and provided there are no leaks. We have no 
idea of the distribution that took place within Justice." That Colson memo of several pages is clear evidence of the deep concern of Mitchell, the President and everyone else 
regarding this matter. 
G: This is March 30, 1972, Colson to Haldeman. 
O: The memo has additional significance because the Liddy plan was initially reviewed in February, 1972. It was carried out in June of 1972 and as Magruder states in his book, 
when Mitchell approved the plan to break into my office to bug me and take my files, Mitchell certainly was deeply concerned regarding me and my knowledge of ITT. It is 
rather amazing that I relied on news clips in the early seventies regarding Congressman [Bob] Wilson and the $400,000 and the potential site for the Republican convention, and 
direct correspondence with Mitchell and Kleindienst. They had stonewalled me, but because of Mitchell's resignation and Kleindienst as his successor, they were now faced 
with interest being expressed in the matter by the Senate committee. Kleindienst had written to me totally denying he had any knowledge of or involvement in ITT. He had 
also stated in that letter that Mitchell had no involvement or knowledge regarding ITT. Yet, evidence surfacing to show that wasn't the case. 
I would conclude that with all the activities I engaged in which the President and the White House did not look kindly upon, this probably was the most sensitive in terms of 
concerns because of the activities they had engaged in. This was, as I noted before, one of the most significant decisions ever made by the Justice Department in terms of size. But 
the ridiculous Dash-Lenzner theory of the break-in stated it was because of the White House concern regarding what knowledge I might have of a transaction between the 
Hughes people and Nixon with Bebe Rebozo the middle man. 
I was to learn that at some stage of the hearings that Chester Davis, who had replaced [Bob] Maheu in a palace coup, was queried intensely by I believe [Terry] 
Lenzner or perhaps [Sam] Dash and Lenzner regarding my activities with the Hughes organization. They insistently sought all documents that might be in existence regarding 
payments of fees to me or whatever. Davis called me to advise me he had asked his interrogators to contact me to seek my approval for release of whatever might exist. He, 
Davis, had no knowledge of what might exist, but he felt very uneasy agreeing to this demand by counsel. He wanted me to know that he had urged them because of my right 
of privacy, as I was not a party in Watergate as far as the committee was concerned other 
6
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --3 
than having been the target. He felt they should simply contact me and ask me for my approval. He was told in no uncertain terms that they weren't going to ask me, that I had 
no rights and he was ordered--with penalties if he failed to fulfill the order--to provide whatever personal information regarding me he could, which he did. I appreciated his call 
and I must say that I deeply resented the attitude of those Democrats on that committee toward me. That was evidence that I was simply a tool in their effort to somehow, 
somewhere provide some kind of evidence that would justify their theory. 
G: Do you attribute it to simply a desire to have that theory supported rather than any old political--? 
O: Yes. First of all I didn't know these people. I had no contact with the committee throughout the hearings. The only contact involving me was made by the committee to 
me and that was as I described. I don't believe either of these two people had any political background, in any event. I think it was simply an endeavor to establish a theory for their 
own self-satisfaction. That's fine except Lenzner came to me to try to get me to agree with this theory when his theory wouldn't hold water. That was another indication of their 
intense interest in trying to establish a record that they had found the real reason for the break-in. It was just an ego trip. 
However, as this unfolded, it went beyond the [Sam] Ervin Committee to the House Judiciary Committee, and of course the record is replete with documentation of 
what occurred during that period. Meanwhile, my civil suit dating back to June of 1972 was still languishing. Nothing occurred regarding the suit after Judge [Charles] Richey 
had barred the depositions and had stated the suit would be delayed until all criminal actions were completed. I have detailed the IRS aspect of Watergate as it applied to me 
and this became a primary matter to be considered by the House Judiciary Committee. Regarding Dash and Lenzner and others on the Ervin Committee, I had a feeling they had 
little knowledge of the extent of IRS activity involving me or they would not have tried to find a simplistic answer to this massive two-year effort against me that was spotlighted by 
the break-in of my office. 
But the lawsuit finally reached a point where it seemed the only resolution was a settlement. By the time a settlement was being considered by counsel on both sides of 
these suits--there was the O'Brien suit and there was the [Maurice] Stans suit against O'Brien--Jerry Ford had become president and a friend of Jerry's from Michigan, a former 
senator, Charlie Potter, was designated by Ford as a member of CREEP. The Committee to Re-Elect the President was still in existence. There was a significant amount of money 
in the coffers of the committee. Potter, who was a fellow I knew and thought well of, contacted me and suggested we resolve this and close it out. He construed his mandate 
from Ford was to dissolve CREEP, close it out as quickly as he could. During that period at some point there were discussions between counsel. 
There was a time when I was visiting with a friend in the Waldorf Hotel. There were several of us in his suite and lo and behold we were joined by John Mitchell. 
7
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --4 
G: How did that happen? 
O: He was invited to join the group and the--G: 
He just happened to be at the--? 
O: I had never met Mitchell prior to that. Mitchell chatted about sports. It was a conversation being carried on among three or four or five people, whatever. But finally 
Mitchell brought up Watergate. He said he continued to be extremely resentful of and disturbed with Maurice Stans, as Maurice Stans had been the catalyst for Watergate. He 
added that the fellow in his crazy, ridiculous way had allowed this to come about. He felt it was all extremely unfortunate. Now, at this point, all the revelations regarding Mitchell 
had not become public. Finally this led to Mitchell suggesting to me, "Why not settle those lawsuits?" I listened but did not comment. The word was being given to me of an 
interest in settling the lawsuits. I was no longer national chairman. The lawsuits remained alive. So I later advised Bob Strauss of this interest. It was up to Bob Strauss if he 
wanted to pursue it. I don't recall that he did. 
But finally at long last through Charlie Potter's efforts an out-of-court settlement was reached. That did not occur until August of 1975. When Jerry Ford pardoned Nixon 
and the public comment I made in response to media requests simply was that I had no desire from the outset to see Richard Nixon in jail. I didn't condone the pardon, as I felt it 
was unfortunate that all the facts would not be available to the American people and to history. This was effectively closing out prematurely what required further exploration. 
This out-of-court settlement would be in the vicinity of, as I recall, $750,000. It was decided that settlement for my personal suit, violating my rights, would be $400,000. 
You could have, I suppose, negotiated on and on but by that time, 1974, this was of little interest to me and I was in no position in the private sector to be pursuing it. I remember 
my lawyers on one occasion overlooking the fact that I was with them discussing with great glee what they would do to Maurice Stans when they deposed him. I sat there 
thinking, "Well, that's interesting. I'm sure Stans' lawyers are sitting somewhere discussing what they'll do to me when they depose me." My lawyers used vulgarities in describing 
what they were going to do to Stans. I've now been long in the private sector. All of this is now on the public record. I've gone through the courts; I've gone through the 
Congress, I've gone through every aspect of this. Why would I subject myself to continuing this ad infinitum? 
I reminded my lawyers that they had overlooked the fact that their client was with them and I suggested that perhaps they should be exploring some rational way of resolving 
this matter, as there was nothing to be accomplished by continuing to pursue it. It was figuratively a dead issue and there was no need to pursue it because my original 
motivation was not money. From the start my motivation was to surface the matter and bring it public. Consequently, the monetary aspect of a settlement was of no interest to 
8
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --5 
me. They had the responsibility to do their best because I had stated from the day I introduced the suit that whatever resolution would ultimately be reached involving 
damages, my proceeds would be turned over to the Democratic National Committee. The last thing I wanted was to gain a nickel from what I considered a national tragedy. So the 
settlement was $400,000. 
I immediately contacted Charlie McNelis who was the lawyer in the firm representing me from the time he replaced Joe Califano. This is 1974, and there have been 
heavy costs and I hadn't paid the firm a cent. The check was issued and hand-delivered. I felt a debt of gratitude to this law firm for carrying on throughout. I asked Charlie to 
immediately send me his bill for fees to close out the case. I recall Charlie saying, "There's no hurry. We'll get around to it." And I also recall responding, "Charlie, I want the bill 
today. I'll feel better if I have it in hand. I want to resolve this as quickly as possible. I would like to have the bill." 
It was an interesting bill because under any set of circumstances the fee would have been substantially higher. I quote from the covering letter, 
Dear Larry: 
Now that the Watergate suit has been settled, we have tabulated our time for legal services and out-of-pocket expenditures attributable to our representation 
of you in the matter. Based upon our normal time charges a total of $82,151 for legal services is indicated, plus out-of-pocket expenditures of $2,269 for an overall 
total of $84,420. Considering the nature of this celebrated case, in our desire to reflect a meaningful contribution of our own in the matter, we have arbitrarily 
reduced our bill by $20,000 as reflected in the enclosed statement to you for $64,420. 
I paid that in full on August 28, 1974. 
It was my intention to immediately pay it. The remainder of the $400,000 would be transmitted to Bob Strauss and the national committee promptly. However, my son, 
who is a lawyer, reminded me, thank God, that if you do that you can be subject to a gift tax and the Internal Revenue Service probably would enjoy imposing a gift tax on this. He 
advised me that I must seek from the Internal Revenue Service an advance ruling that this was not a gift, that it's a simple transmittal. I thought that would not be difficult and it 
was clear to me it would be a mistake not to have that ruling in writing from the Internal Revenue Service. Little did I know that wasn't going to be an easy matter. So I hired 
attorney Richard Daly--experienced in dealing with the Internal Revenue Service--to contact the Service and secure this ruling. He ran into a stone wall and it went on and on. 
There was a great reluctance on the part of the Internal Revenue Service to act on this matter because of, I guess, the sensitivity of it. It took months, but it was finally 
reconciled and the Internal Revenue Service made a ruling in writing. 
9
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --6 
Dick Daly will never forget the final session he had with the IRS. He said it was held in a conference room of the Internal Revenue Service with a number of lawyers and 
staff people present. There was really no debate as to the ruling. This was most routine. It would have been made routinely except for who I was. With all in agreement that this 
was appropriate and a set of documents before them, no one at the conference table would sign the documents. Daly said it was one of the funniest experiences he ever had. He said 
it was as though they'd burn their fingers if they signed. So they reached a conclusion. They would take the document to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue because, as they 
pointed out, that's what he's paid for, that responsibility is his. He should sign it and he was the person who did sign it. As this involved Mr. Daly's time to an inordinate degree, I 
incurred an additional legal fee of fifteen thousand dollars. 
I wrote to Bob Strauss and enclosed the check that represented the net of $400,000 less the legal fees to Charlie McNelis of $64,420 and the legal fees to Breed, 
Abbott & Morgan of $15,000. I must say that during the course of this delay, I was queried by people on the DNC staff. I'm not sure, but I guess perhaps Bob Strauss called 
me a couple of times. Obviously they were most anxious to get their hands on the money. There wasn't any concern about my future legal problems if I didn't get this resolved 
properly. That bothered me as I felt that I should receive some understanding from DNC counsel, who was a former commissioner of IRS, Sheldon Cohen. He was particularly 
anxious to secure the funds to the extent that he stated he couldn't see any problems with future tax returns of mine. His motivation obviously was to secure the funds, but it wasn't 
a pleasant experience. 
Furthermore, I received a call from Rowlie Evans one day--the Evans-Novak column--and Rowlie said, "I have received information from a source that you are holding 
up payment to the national committee you committed to make at the outset of Watergate." I blew up. I assumed someone was using Rowlie to try to put pressure on me so I just 
blew up. That's really the only way to describe it and that terminated the conversation. Within fifteen minutes to a half an hour Rowlie Evans called back and apologized for 
asking me or suggesting that. He had cleared it up and he realized exactly why I blew up. He just wanted me to understand he totally understood and he was sorry he had ever 
initiated the call. 
Those were aspects of this that were troublesome, as you moved to fulfill a commitment you made that you didn't have to make. The $400,000 has been awarded to 
me, directly to me. 
In any event, I wrote Bob, as I felt I wanted the record totally clear, and I quote from that letter, "In addition I incurred significant out-of-pocket expenses through the 
course of the legal actions and also through the harassment I was subjected to during my chairmanship by IRS and others"--which was true. "These costs incurred over the last 
several years, in addition to my loss of time, are in the amount of $18,700 and include accounting and legal fees, travel, hotel and long-distance telephone"--because I had to 
move back and forth from New York to Washington through most of this period. Then I 
10
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --7 
went on, 
As the enclosed check will indicate, I have decided to waive my right to reimbursement for these personal expenses. Over these last three years it's been 
painful for me to note a failure on the part of a few in responsible positions with the Democratic National Committee to comprehend the grave damage I suffered 
through the violation of my constitutional and civil rights by the Nixon Administration. Also, some even had the temerity to question my right to a 
judgment and the validity of my insistence that the tax consequences of the settlement, if any, be determined prior to my turning over the proceeds of my 
award to the Democratic National Committee. 
I then stated, 
Incidentally, I have learned that Mr. [Lawrence] Gibbs, assistant commissioner, technical, of IRS, indicated that indeed I have followed an 
appropriate and prudent course. This was at a meeting attended by my counsel and Sheldon Cohen during closing agreement negotiations. Suffice it to say I am 
not about to provide further opportunity for my critics to fault me or remotely suggest that somehow I personally gained from this experience. 
And I go on, in fairness to Bob, to say, "In this context, Bob, let me emphasize I am most appreciative of your understanding throughout. It has been a frustrating and depressing 
time and I've been strengthened by your consistent cooperation and support." Upon receipt of the funds, Bob and I chatted and he said that he was going to issue a statement 
to the effect that the Democratic National Committee had received the proceeds. That was done because I saw a brief paragraph in probably the Washington Post a couple days 
later. 
I received a letter not long after from Senator John Stennis, a distinguished gentleman that I enjoyed a warm relationship with, even though there were occasions 
when he wasn't in the right column in our head counts. It was a pleasant note saying he had seen this item and he wanted to tell me that he was impressed, that he thought it was a 
fine gesture in the interest of the Democratic Party and underscored my commitment to the party. I appreciated the letter and dropped him a note saying, "I do appreciate your 
letter, John, and you might be interested to know that you are the only person that contacted me on this matter in any form in any way following my forwarding of the 
funds." That closed out that chapter. 
G: Nothing formal from the DNC? 
O: No. 
(Interruption) 
11
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --8 
G: Was it ever determined whether or not the tap or bug on your phone was ever operational? 
O: It clearly was operational during some period, until the burglars were apprehended. I do remember that the problem with [Alfred] Baldwin and others who were monitoring my 
phone was a little difficulty in receiving clear signals. My phone might be located where they were getting a little interference from a steel girder or something like that. But the 
answer is, yes, it was operational, but not to the degree they wanted and they were to correct the problem that night and, as I said earlier, either add to or place in the ceiling an 
additional bug. One was probably there and they were going to place another. 
G: There was a report of an additional bugging device found and uncovered in September. 
O: Yes, that was a report I learned of. I had no direct involvement because by that time I no longer occupied the office. I can't testify to that. There was a bug on the phone of 
Spencer Oliver, who was director, I believe, of Democratic state chairmen or Young Democrats or in some similar capacity. There's evidence to show that that bug was also 
working. 
Tape 1 of 2, Side 2 
G: [Why do] you think Spencer Oliver's phone was bugged? 
O: I just don't know--logic would indicate that if you were going to have additional bugging of a phone, the priority would be the treasurer of the national committee, Bob Strauss. 
That would be a location because Bob obviously would be using his phone in soliciting contributions. Beyond Bob I can think of the deputy chairman, Stan Greigg, a couple of 
the department heads, and John Stewart. Spencer Oliver would be low on the list of priorities if you were seriously trying to garner information. There had to be some reason 
for Oliver being selected. It could have been a random bug in an office removed from me because Oliver was not in regular contact with me. He was not a strategist. But I really 
don't know why his phone was selected. 
G: Baldwin never offered any information through the attorneys as to why--? 
O: When I learned of the existence of Baldwin--not by name but his existence--from Ed Williams and learned the details of his activities from Ed, I don't recall there was any 
reference by Ed to any other activities other than those related to me. 
G: There were suggestions that the Democrats themselves planted this September bug in order to call attention to the break-in and the earlier bugging effort. 
O: That doesn't hold water. I was not present during that period and would have no knowledge of that. I do recall being told that there were additional bugs found at a later 
date. It reminds me that the director of the FBI, Patrick Gray, was obviously desirous of 
12
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --9 
having evidence on the record that he was fulfilling the commitment he had made to me to investigate this matter in detail, which was on July 7. Following Gray's earlier call, I was 
visited by two Secret Service agents in my suite at the Fountainbleu Hotel in Miami. We were in the midst of preparing then for the convention. One of the agents was Paul 
Rundell, associate director of the Secret Service. The other agent was Clint Hill, who I had known during my White House years and was with us in Dallas and played a 
prominent role during the assassination. They told me they had been instructed to advise me that an examination of the national committee offices by the FBI uncovered no 
additional electronic devices. I knew the FBI supposedly had torn the place apart and had removed ceiling panels. I had other things on my mind at the time. If they said there were 
no additional bugs, so be it. Later evidence revealed that bugs had been placed on my phone and on Spencer Oliver's phone at a minimum and I cannot to this day explain the 
discrepancy. 
I guess it's like other aspects of this I encountered during those troublesome months and years. It was of interest to me, as an afterthought, that these two Secret 
Service agents, one of whom was a friend, had been instructed by the FBI to contact me. They were insistent upon seeing me personally to relay to me an FBI report. Someone 
was lying through their teeth and it was not Clint Hill or Paul Rundell. They were innocent. Obviously, they were given a report and told to relay it. Gray or any FBI agent 
never contacted me. 
G: After the break-in and the capture of the burglars, did you or anyone else in the DNC ever have a security service come in and sweep the place for bugs and eavesdropping 
equipment? 
O: No, we did not because the FBI was engaged in that. There was no need to crawl up the back of the FBI. Supposedly, the situation was being handled in an appropriate manner by 
a government agency. 
G: But you never heard any suggestions that maybe some Democratic partisans had planted a subsequent bug just to call attention--? 
O: This is at a later date that you've referred to? 
G: Yes. 
O: No, I have no knowledge of that at all and I would totally discredit that suggestion. 
G: Any other contact with the Nixon Administration officials in addition to that meeting with John Mitchell that you described? 
O: No. 
G: How about Leon Jaworski; did you have any dealing with him? 
13
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --10 
O: Never had any contact with him. 
G: Archie Cox? 
O: No. Archie Cox was a fellow I had known over the years, but in the context of his special prosecutor role I had no contact with him. 
G: Shall we go on to the Hughes--? 
O: I have made numerous references to the so-called Hughes matter in recounting these months of Watergate involvement. Colson and others in the White House had early on 
expressed a great interest in my client relationship with Hughes. As I said earlier, this was not any secret. There was no problem for them to determine a relationship had existed. 
Publications had printed the fact that I had opened an office in New York. In fact, I had run an ad in the Wall Street Journal and the New York Times announcing the opening of 
the office. I was able to garner some publicity for this opening and included my initial client list with the announcement to ensure that potential clients would be aware of the 
activity. So in terms of White House interest in my clients, I had spelled that out. They took my clients to task in each instance, with a couple of exceptions. I don't recall they 
involved themselves with ASCAP, but they certainly involved themselves with Dyson-Kissner, involved themselves with Dukor, involved themselves with PAA, where I 
had a business relationship and involved themselves with Hughes Enterprises. And that led them to illegal use of power by the President re: a sensitive agency of the government, 
the IRS. We've reviewed that. 
At a later date, November, 1977, while I was commissioner of the National Basketball Association, I had a request for an interview by a person who identified himself 
as a former reporter with the Washington Post and the Wall Street Journal. He was in the process of writing a book. His name was Michael Drosnin. My first reaction was that 
I really didn't have the time to bother with Michael Drosnin. However, over some twenty years I had been courteous to the press and never failed to respond to an inquiry from a 
writer or a journalist. While my days as commissioner of the NBA were extremely full, my conscience bothered me a little and I advised my staff to set up an appointment for Mr. 
Drosnin. My recollection is that he was given an appointment for 11: 00 a. m. and he failed to appear until approximately 11: 20. After a half hour or so, I advised him I just couldn't 
extend the time and the best I could do was set up another appointment for some future date, which I did. 
At that later time he asked me if I minded if he taped the interview. I had no problem with that as I had regularly allowed taping of interviews. I asked him initially a 
couple of questions--he was a total stranger to me--on his background. As it turned out, he puffed up his background. He said he had been a reporter with the Washington Post 
and the Wall Street Journal for brief periods of time and was a free-lance writer and he was engaged in writing this book. He proceeded to take some memos from his briefcase 
14
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --11 
and questioned me about my experience with Hughes. This interview went on for some time. I believe I allowed an hour for him, recognizing that perhaps he needed that in order 
to have a full interview. 
But as the interview proceeded, I realized I was dealing with somebody who seemed peculiar, to put it mildly. But, in any event, I discussed with him the 
circumstances of my involvement with Hughes Enterprises as I have recounted in detail. 
At a point in the second interview--the first one had been, as I described it, somewhat brief--he launched into an attack of a highly personal nature on Hubert 
Humphrey. It bordered on the violent. It was irrational and it was vicious and venomous. So I ordered him to shut off his tape recorder, which he did, and I proceeded to berate 
him in no uncertain terms. I perhaps have never been more angered than I was at that moment. To think that this little pipsqueak would have the temerity to malign one of my 
closest associates, a person who I had great fondness for who was no longer in a position to defend himself. I remember his face reddened. He remained silent and I told him that 
was it, that I considered him despicable and that terminated any discussion we would have. 
He then made a plea to me and he finally prevailed. He was quite persuasive. He was abject. His apology went on and on. He made a plea that we continue the interview. 
I've done some ridiculous things in my life, but ultimately I guess felt a little sorry for this guy. He was a young fellow unknown to me and I had been extremely tough on him. 
Finally I said, "Okay, on the basis of that, let's turn on the tape recorder. We'll continue." 
I don't remember every detail of the interview. He had a list of people who, with a couple of exceptions, I didn't know. He simply asked if I knew them, had any contacts 
with them. The answer was no. I detailed the background of my initial contact with Maheu. He had made a blind telephone call to introduce himself. I reviewed what 
transpired from that time on through the off-again, on-again aspects of Hughes as a client. This was consuming an inordinate length of time. In fact, it was extending well beyond 
the allocated time. At a point toward the close of the interview he showed me what was apparently a copy of a memo from Hughes to Maheu, their normal procedure of 
communication. It was lengthy, probably two or three pages. While handing it to me he said, "I'm going to show you this memo and ask you to tell me whether this is the memo 
that Bob Maheu showed you as evidence of his authority to discuss a relationship with you." I glanced through it. It had some negative references, probably to all the Kennedys, 
Bobby Kennedy. I didn't read it in detail. There was no need to because I had never seen that memo before. It was not the memo Bob Maheu had shown me so I simply stated, 
"I've never seen this memo and I can tell you definitely this is not the memo Bob Maheu showed me." 
Interestingly enough, he didn't make any point of that. Later events would reveal that at that moment, unknown to me, I was destroying the thrust of his book. So my 
statement was not only worthless to him, but was destructive as far as he was concerned 
15
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --12 
in terms of his objective. That interview terminated with his request for another interview in the near future. I advised him he could contact Jan Akerhielm, my assistant, and she 
would determine when such a meeting could take place. He remained low key after I chastised him and was very careful not to have something occur that might disrupt again. 
After he left I thought I better, while fresh in my mind, jot down questions I had regarding him. So on a legal pad I wrote a quick memo to Jan Akerhielm re: Drosnin. I 
said, "Active file, further check out. Following second interview Drosnin requested one more session"--this was in December--" for next February." Meanwhile I would check file 
records if any, refresh memory and then I said, "Note: Drosnin is a hater"--this was to myself really--" regardless of his abject apology for attacking HHH." I added, "Well, I 
kicked hell out of him. I should have thrown him out, most vicious comments I've ever heard." So I underlined, "So before another meeting let's check him out." Other than 
"Obviously NG" which I assume means no good, "Who and what is he? Hold reviewing files"--this would be my file--" in checking out"--which would be him. "Hold until he 
requests February appointment. Could be wasting time as I seriously doubt we'll hear further. He doesn't want facts. He's out to smear and has accomplished his dirty work so 
I assume"--so I guess what I was saying was I assume he doesn't want to meet me again. But I believe he did request the February interview. In any event no interview took place. 
Following that I received calls from friends. One was Arthur Krim, who said he had a request to meet a Michael Drosnin who had told Arthur Krim that I had suggested 
that he call Krim. I, of course, told Arthur that wasn't the case and also told him I had had an unfortunate experience with this fellow. It was up to Arthur whether he wanted to talk 
to him or not but he should at least know my experience. A similar call came from Steve Smith who told me, "This fellow Drosnin is very persistent and said you urged him to 
contact me. If so, I'm willing to see him." I told Steve Smith my experience, as I had advised Arthur Krim. I received a call from Joe Napolitan who said, "This fellow Drosnin 
has said that you've recommended he contact me, that he's in interviews with you and you told him I could be helpful." I filled him in. I think there were others. I had reached the 
conclusion that while it had been ridiculous for me to subject myself to this experience without knowing Drosnin's background, having had the experience, in fairness to those 
who inquired of me regarding him I should describe the experience I had and they could make their own decision regarding him. 
(Interruption) 
O: As I stated, my recollection is that Drosnin did make some preliminary contact that would lead up to the suggested February interview. That triggered my feeling that I should 
determine who this fellow was. My security director, Jack Joyce, who handled all NBA security would be an obvious person to check this fellow out. First of all, a New York 
Times print-out on Drosnin showed he had been the recipient of a large number of Hughes files from the Hughes Company that had been stolen in a break-in of a building where 
these files were stored in California. In the investigation of the break-in certain arrests were made and trials were upcoming. Drosnin became known to have stolen property in 
16
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --13 
his possession and he was subpoenaed. He disappeared from California and it was reported that he had surfaced in New York. Efforts by the California courts to subpoena 
him in New York through court reciprocity failed because he couldn't be located in New York. The end result was he had avoided the trial that resulted from the break-in. 
That he was in possession of this material was known at the time of this trial, as I was to learn that Drosnin visited the Los Angeles FBI office in July of 1976, represented 
himself as a reporter from the New York Times and offered to exchange information he had regarding some crime figures in return for the FBI's information on a person by the 
name of Donald Woolbright who he was interested in. He was told that the FBI did not engage in this kind of activity but would appreciate any information he was willing to give 
them regarding crime figures. The following day Mr. Drosnin called the supervisor in charge of the Woolbright case--this man was the defendant in the break-in trial--and he 
made the same offer again to the government's supervisor in charge of the case and was given the same answer. Prior to these contacts with the Los Angeles FBI office, Drosnin 
had contacted the Los Angeles Police Department with the same offer and, of course, with the same results. In 1978 Drosnin was continuing to duck a subpoena in the Woolbright 
case and the case was finally dismissed on June 16, 1978. The authorities were unable to serve a subpoena on Drosnin either in California or New York. He had skipped to avoid 
service. 
But that didn't end it. He became known around New York once he was off the hook in California. He was described in the report I received from a reliable, confidential 
source as "a surly, irresponsible, abrasive, obnoxious, anti-establishment individual who enjoys embarrassing celebrities, politicians and persons identified as being with the 
establishment." The report continued, "On August 28, 1973 this fellow Drosnin was arrested with Abbie Hoffman, Diana Peterson--described as a self-employed handicraft 
worker--and Carol Raymer, a twenty-four year old secretary who resided in New York. They were charged with selling three pounds of cocaine to undercover policemen at a 
Times Square hotel. I believe the exchange was in the vicinity of thirty-six, thirty-eight thousand dollars. Hoffman and the others allegedly sold an additional eighth ounce of 
cocaine to undercover officers in August of 1973. They were incarcerated for a brief period and subsequently indicted. As the indictments dragged on, Drosnin came up with a 
defense for his presence with Abbie Hoffman. He again went before a grand jury, at which time--Tape 
2 of 2, Side 1 
O: --he had found a witness to appear before this grand jury named Lewis H. Lapham. He was the managing editor of Harper's magazine. Lapham proceeded to testify that he 
could account for Drosnin's presence with Hoffman when the deal was made as an effort by Drosnin to pursue an article he was writing supposedly under Lapham's direction on 
drugs. Lapham did not indicate that the article would be finalized and appear in the magazine. The grand jury bought this con job and Drosnin's indictment was dismissed. It 
was of interest for my people to note that no such article ever appeared in Harper's 
17
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --14 
magazine. 
That was the background of this fellow who had, as it turned out, attempted to sell a book based on this stolen material to at least six book publishers. He had, I believe, 
requested a hundred thousand dollars as an advance and he was turned down by all six publishers at prior times on the grounds that he could not and would not and did not 
respond to the question of how the material came into his hands. He refused adamantly to do so. The fact that the material was stolen would concern responsible publishers. The 
fact that they didn't know how he received the material or what legal problem might result would concern them and he failed to peddle it. However, he made a comeback at a later 
date and finally succeeded. 
(Interruption) 
O: When I had my experience with him he was in the process of writing the book under an agreement he had reached with Holt, Rinehart. The book ultimately was published and it 
was just what you would have anticipated by virtue of my experience with him. 
The book was heavily promoted by ABC television program "20/ 20." That brought me to having contact from a fellow who was with "20/ 20" at that time named 
Geraldo Rivera. 
(Interruption) 
O: I received a letter from Rivera, who was senior producer and correspondent for "20/ 20," in which he requested an interview. He posed in writing--now this is December 1984--a 
series of questions that would refer to Hughes that we have previously discussed. For example: what was your relationship? There is no need in repeating all of this. I 
responded to all his questions. "Your recollection of Bob Maheu as a person" and "What was it like to work for Hughes?" My response says, "I have no idea in the world because I 
had never had any contact with Hughes, obviously." And then, "What did you do for Hughes?" "Was your relationship with Hughes the real reason for the DNC break-in?" 
"What was the length of the contract? When did the Drosnin interview take place and what were the circumstances of it?"--which I responded to in detail. 
The result was Rivera visited with me and spent hours trying to persuade me to appear on the "20/ 20" program with this fellow Drosnin. He said he appreciated my 
candid written response to all his written questions and the discussion he and I had regarding all of this for a period of several hours in my apartment in New York. But I 
declined to go on the program for a good reason, as I saw it. I told him there was no way I would allow myself to be brought to the level of a Drosnin by appearing in some format 
on "20/ 20" with a person of his ilk. Rivera hated to take no for answer and asked me to keep thinking about it. This went on for weeks. I was in London, I remember, and I once 
again told Rivera by phone that I had not changed my view nor would I. Rivera, just prior to filming the segment, called me from the ABC studios here in New York and asked if I 
18
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --15 
had changed my mind--he'd send a car or a camera crew. I said, "No, I'm not going to alter my position." He replied, "Well, I'm going to say some nice things about you 
because I respect you and admire you and I don't want this situation to cause a friendship that I feel has developed between you and I to be harmed in any way." 
The program went forward and it was again what you'd anticipate, certainly the Drosnin aspect of it. Rivera pointed out I had refused to participate in the program and 
also stated I did indeed get Wilbur Mills to change his view and protect the Hughes Medical Center in some compromise legislation in the Senate, something to that effect. 
At this point I hadn't seen the book. I'd been told by Rivera much of what was in the book in reference to me. It bothered me that my old friend Wilbur Mills if by any 
chance he saw this program, he would think, "What in the hell? O'Brien never talked to me or tried to position me in any way on any foundation tax legislation." So I decided I 
ought to call Wilbur Mills and I did. I asked him if he saw the show; he hadn't. I said, "Before anybody mentions it to you"--he interrupted, "You're too late. A Los Angeles 
Times reporter has already called me on the comment supposedly attributed to you. Knowing this was something you would never do, that it was misinformation, I promptly 
told the reporter, 'I never heard of it. I don't know anything about it. It never occurred. '" So that was a relief to me in my relationship with Wilbur Mills. 
Another aspect of this burglary at the Hughes warehouse: at the trial evidence was presented and it was widely known that the burglars had tried to make a deal with the 
Hughes people for the return of the material for a million dollars. What was Drosnin's role in that, I don't know. The fact is this is the material Drosnin was able to peddle to a 
supposedly reputable publisher. The Hughes people had no interest in paying anyone a million dollars. So it had dragged on and the second stage was where can we peddle it 
and how can we peddle it? Drosnin had the proceeds of the burglary in hand and peddled them for money finally by way of a book. 
I had people proceed through the Drosnin tome. He had gotten a great promo to launch it on "20/ 20." Rivera, in his effort to convince me to join in the activities, told me 
about his interviews with Drosnin. He said he finally located him but he was a recluse and, as Rivera described it, he had a room in the Lower East Side containing a mattress and 
ping pong table. He described him in a way I felt was Rivera's attempt to persuade me I could take care of Drosnin on "20/ 20," which I wasn't buying. I referred to the Mills 
aspect of "20/ 20." I had further contact by Rivera in which he said, "Didn't you think I did well by you last night on the program?" I thought I'd take the occasion to tell him, "As 
long as we're talking, let me point out you went 180 degrees in quoting me on Wilbur Mills and the foundation tax matter." There was dead silence for a moment and he 
responded by saying, "Oh, my God, I think you're right. It was inadvertent. I just"--he said, "The difficulty now with correcting it is we have to go through the legal 
department." He went on, "Let me see if I can't find some way to correct it because if you contact the network and the legal department it's a very intricate procedure." Well, I had 
no intention of doing that anyway. I must say for Rivera following that conversation, I 
19
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --16 
received a letter from him apologizing for the inadvertency or his misunderstanding. He had gone back to his notes and admitted I had said the opposite of what he quoted. But 
he put some of the blame on me. He added, "This wouldn't have happened if you had come on the program." That ended the Rivera episode. 
Then it came to reviewing the book from a legal position, the libel/ slander aspect. I had it reviewed in detail and it was replete, as you would envision, with misinformation: 
venom throughout, misquotations, misstatements of time and places. In the context of that review I think it's well to summarize the Hughes matter and my relationship to 
Hughes Enterprises. 
(Interruption) 
O: As I stated previously, a contractual relationship came into being between Hughes Nevada Operations and O'Brien Associates by virtue of a confirming letter of December 24, 1969, 
from Bob Maheu to O'Brien Associates--in care of Lawrence F. O'Brien--confirming a two-year contract. Reimbursement would be paid on a monthly basis and the contract 
could be terminated only by mutual agreement of both parties. The contract was retroactive to October 1, 1969. In writing to Bob Maheu's successor, Chester Davis, I 
terminated the contract in mid-contract on February 11, 1971. I stated in the letter to Chester Davis, 
When you contacted me late last December and I reviewed with you the management consulting and public relations services provided under the contract, 
you indicated a desire to continue these services. However, my son informs me there have been no further payments to the account in close to three months; the 
account is now close to three months in arrears. Also he tells me that in this period no requests for services have been forthcoming. 
And then I said, "In view of this I feel it advisable to chronicle the events that led to this agreement and to summarize the services rendered." I detailed the record. I went through 
it in detail because obviously I didn't know Chester Davis as I had known Bob Maheu. Following this chronology of activities, I summarized, "The areas of consultation and 
recommendation extended from below ground to the moon." That was because, as I recount in this litany of services rendered, there was the matter of Hughes interest in 
underground testing and the matter of the Hughes satellite, Halo, which the Hughes people were most anxious to promote as helpful to the Hughes image. This included the 
commercial future of the Hughes TV network which I have recounted at an earlier stage, the long-range outlook for cable television in the satellite program, the area of activity, 
actual and potential, of the Hughes Medical Center which they were endeavoring to promote, indeed, the image of Hughes personally in terms of public recognition of his 
record. They wanted to revive the old Hughes glamour in aviation. I also recalled being with Bob Maheu in trying to achieve a settlement of the TWA suit. 
Then I commented, "So much for the past." And I add, "There is no indication 
20
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --17 
you and your associates intend to further utilize the services provided under our contract." And further, 
Even though O'Brien and Associates by choice does not provide governmental or political services to clients, even though I am no longer managing 
the firm, perhaps my position as the Democratic chairman may be a source of embarrassment to you and your associates. This would be understandable because 
I assume it is essential in your new responsibilities to maintain the best possible relationship with the current Republican administration. But whether this is the 
case or it is simply a matter of no need, we must look at the facts and we have concluded that although the existing contract is legally binding, there is no desire 
on our part to continue to enforce it and we want now to take whatever steps are necessary to terminate this contract which requires mutual consent. 
So I terminated it. 
Davis wrote me perhaps about a month later saying, "I was unable to reach you upon my belated return to the office"--his office was in New York at 120 Broadway--" and 
I'd like to talk to you with respect to your letter." And he suggests, "Let's see if we can't get together." We did meet at my apartment at which time Davis said, "You expressed 
concern about nonpayment for a period of months and I've checked that out. That's purely a matter of office incompetency, the changeover. We have no desire to terminate 
this contract. We want to see it through. We want to fulfill our obligation." He went on in a pleasant vein but, nevertheless, we ultimately agreed that my termination letter was 
effective and he made some adjustment for some back payments. He emphasized he was reluctant to do this but it was clear I was adamant and I was. It was costly to me as I had 
lost some clients when I first went back as chairman who decided not to stay with the firm. I must say for Chester Davis he asked, "Would it be all right if I contact you from 
time to time for advice?" I replied, "Sure, Chester, you can call me any time." There were no future calls except the one I referred to when he told me about the pressure put on him 
by the Ervin Committee to furnish any files or materials regarding me and the Hughes organization. 
So now to a quick overview of the book called Citizen Hughes. 
(Interruption) 
O: Part of the Rivera comments regarding me on "20/ 20" was that "lobbying to save a loophole, Larry O'Brien told me he made a personal visit to Wilbur Mills, chairman of the 
powerful House Ways and Means Committee. It was classic Washington lobbying and apparently it paid off. The loophole was left intact." It sounds pretty innocuous and it is 
not definitive; it's just a guess. But by the same token my sensitivity to my long-time friendship with Wilbur Mills is what caused me to be concerned. 
This, however, is not answering what--
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O'Brien --Interview XXXII --18 
(Interruption) 
O: Finally regarding the book written by Drosnin; I am not going to attempt to go through every reference in the book that is inaccurate or libelous but rather focus on some of the 
more important elements. For example, the initial meeting between O'Brien and Maheu. The Drosnin myth conjures up a Machiavellian conspiracy by Howard Hughes following 
the assassination of Robert Kennedy to put Larry O'Brien on the "payroll," with Hughes as O'Brien's "new boss," as part of an effort by Hughes to "buy the government of the United 
States," unquote. Further, Drosnin states that Robert Maheu, Hughes' chief aide, sought to recruit O'Brien by showing O'Brien a handwritten Hughes memo in which Hughes 
expressed hatred for the Kennedys. "The Kennedy family and their money and influence have been a thorn relentlessly shoved into my gut since the very beginning of my business 
activities," the memo said. Mr. Drosnin asserts that Mr. O'Brien, "in his eagerness to take the job," misread the memorandum and interpreted it as a eulogy to Robert Kennedy. The 
facts: 
Mr. Drosnin's construction of events involving me represents a conscious attack by the author on my integrity based upon factual falsehoods. The facts are 
these: Robert Kennedy was assassinated in Los Angeles early in June 1968. During the difficult emotional weeks that followed the assassination, I decided to 
open my own public relations consulting firm. In late June, I received a telephone call in his Washington office from a man who identified himself as Robert Maheu. 
I go on from there, through the initial Maheu contacts, the turndown and the change of direction on my part that led to the ultimate client relationship. 
My agreement to take on Hughes Enterprises as a client in my public relations consulting business did not make Howard Hughes in any sense my boss. 
Nor was I in any way part of an effort to buy the U. S. government. Furthermore, contrary to Drosnin's assertions I was to provide public relations management 
advice and not lobbying or political work. 
And then I say, 
I never saw any Hughes memo calling the Kennedys "a thorn in Hughes' guts" or expressing any criticism of the Kennedys. I specifically told Mr. Drosnin 
in a 1977 interview that I had not seen such a memorandum. Maheu has stated that Mr. O'Brien was not shown such a memorandum and has further stated any 
claim to the contrary is not only a lie, it is ludicrous. I have a letter from Mr. Maheu which I'm quoting from that states that he was aware of Mr. O'Brien's 
dedication to the Kennedys and that the memorandum I was shown was "not derogatory to the Kennedys." 
In short, Drosnin had made a vicious attack on my integrity with no basis for asserting that 
22
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --19 
the memorandum he found in Hughes papers was in fact ever shown to me and obviously it never was. 
The second myth was a meeting to bribe President Johnson. The Drosnin myth: Drosnin asserts that Howard Hughes directed Maheu to offer President Johnson a million 
dollar bribe in an effort to cancel an underground nuclear bomb test in Nevada. Drosnin asserts as fact that Mr. O'Brien set up a meeting between Maheu and Johnson in which the 
alleged bribe was to be offered. In addition, Drosnin's manuscript states that I had been told that the purpose of the meeting was to bribe the President. Drosnin contradicts 
himself as to whether the meeting I am alleged to have set up between President Johnson and Mr. Maheu actually occurred. Drosnin writes on one page that the meeting took 
place, page 276. On page 279 Drosnin writes that LBJ refused to have the meeting. The facts: I did not set up or try to set up any meeting between Maheu and Johnson at any 
time. I was never told of any bribe for President Johnson or any plan to bribe President Johnson. Mr. Maheu had stated that he never told me about Hughes' bribery proposal, 
that he never asked me to arrange any appointment, and he, not I, made an appointment with the President at the LBJ Ranch in which Mr. Hughes directed that a one million 
dollar payment be discussed with President Johnson. Mr. Maheu states that, in fact, he never raised the subject with LBJ. 
Furthermore, the contents of the Hughes-Maheu memoranda republished at page 276 to 279 of the Drosnin diatribe are totally inaccurate insofar as they state or imply that 
I knew about any such bribe attempt or that I was actively involved in any effort to have the December 1968 bomb test canceled. I managed Vice President Hubert Humphrey's 
presidential campaign through early November 1968, took a vacation in Ireland thereafter and remained DNC national chairman until early 1969. I simply played no role in this 
matter. So once again Drosnin's statements about me have no factual basis. At best they are erroneously based on memoranda that Drosnin and Holt, Rinehart knew to be 
unreliable, knew they were, in fact, false and were never checked with Maheu to determine their accuracy. 
I might add that I received a letter dated January 28, 1985, from Bob Maheu. It's a fairly lengthy letter but in part it says, 
Dear Larry, 
I continue being amazed at the complete disregard for truth which is being utilized by Michael Drosnin, author of Citizen Hughes. In his quest for 
sensationalism during repeated interviews he disjointedly mixed varied inputs so as to discredit very honorable people. What makes this technique even more 
despicable is that he continually states that he has researched the Hughes episode in great depth. I am really disturbed that you have become involved in Drosnin's 
misrepresentation. During the interview he flashed a memorandum from Hughes which is very critical to the Kennedy family and claims I showed you this 
document at the first meeting which you and I had in Las Vegas. This is not only a 
23
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --20 
lie, it is ludicrous. I was fully aware of your dedication to the Kennedys. Having anticipated that you might find it strange not being able to see or talk to Hughes I 
have a very vivid recollection of instructing my son, Peter Maheu, to review documents in an attempt to locate a memo containing your name which was not 
derogatory to the Kennedys. He found such a document which mentioned Bob Kennedy has surrounded himself with able people and which specifically referred 
to you. Logic never seems to prevail in the world of a Drosnin. Please rest assured that if such a document as that to which I refer above had not been found, 
no memoranda would have been produced for you to read. Larry, I'm truly sorry for all the consternation which this book must have caused you. Incidentally, 
--this is the P. S.--you 
must be surprised that Drosnin also ties you with my trip to the LBJ Ranch. I made those arrangements directly with the White House and Hughes did not tell 
me the purpose of my visit until five minutes before my departure by jet from Dallas. Again, the record shows that the assignment was not carried out. Instead 
the President and I discussed a nominal contribution to the Johnson Library which, in fact, was never made. 
To check that out further I have a report from Linda Hanson of the LBJ Library Archives who responded to the request of Jan Akerhielm who asked her to check the daily log and 
back-up book for August 12, 1968, the date of the supposed meeting between Johnson and Maheu at the Ranch. And she reports there is no reference to who made that 
appointment or how it came about, just time of arrival of where they went and time of departure. Further, I contacted Jimmy Jones while he was member of Congress in 1985 to 
elicit his recollection because he was the appointment secretary for President Johnson at that time. He says, 
The book indicates that I confirmed in an interview with Mr. Drosnin about seven years ago that you arranged an appointment for Mr. Bob Maheu with 
President Johnson in August 1968. I don't remember meeting or talking with Mr. Drosnin and I doubt seriously that you arranged that meeting. It was well known 
that you and President Johnson had strained relationships at that particular time because you had resigned as his postmaster general in order to run Bobby 
Kennedy's campaign. It is highly unlikely that you would have undertaken to arrange such an appointment. How and whether such an appointment was 
arranged is something you may want to pursue with the archives of the LBJ Library, 
which I did. 
As far as the other quote attributed to me--and I don't know what that is--I don't recall saying the words that were printed. However, I do remember 
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O'Brien --Interview XXXII --21 
President Johnson stating that he felt the Howard Hughes organization "would not be fair with you." 
Then another Drosnin myth, and that's the foundation tax bill. Although I referred to it previously I want to spell it out in more detail. Drosnin wrote that I was at the center of 
Howard Hughes' effort to win a special tax exemption that would apply to the Howard Hughes Medical Institute. In particular, he asserts that I was instrumental in convincing 
Wilbur Mills to support the exemption in question. He specifically claims that I met with Mills after a revised bill had been reported by the Senate Finance Committee which 
included the exemption. The facts: Drosnin's account is inaccurate in every respect. In general, I did not play a major role or even a significant role in the 1969 tax bill. I had 
nothing to do with either the foundation provisions or the capital gains provisions. A Washington law firm handled the lobbying activities in the tax bill for Hughes Enterprises. 
In particular, the lunch in question was held at Congressman Mills' invitation and he was the host. The discussion covered primarily subjects other than the foundation tax 
question. That was purely incidental. It was a little reunion of old friends. Claude Desautels, my associate over the years, was also present at that luncheon. I made only 
one brief mention of the foundation tax proposals and that was limited to problems that certain New York foundations, specifically the Ford Foundation, had with the provisions 
of the proposal. Neither Hughes nor the medical research center exemption was ever mentioned. I recall this lunch took place early in 1969, long before any bill would have 
emerged from the Senate Finance Committee, long before any House-Senate Conference and long before any discussion with Mills could possibly have had the strategic importance 
that Drosnin assigns to the lunch. 
Another Drosnin myth: the trade of [G. Harrold] Carswell votes for Nevada nuclear test postponement. Drosnin reprints a memorandum that claims O'Brien 
participated in an effort to swap votes for Carswell in exchange for a postponement of a Nevada nuclear bomb underground test. The fact: I was never consulted by Hughes or 
anyone working for him about such an effort. I never had anything to do with such an effort. The memorandum in question, if it exists, was part of a correspondence with a 
mentally unstable individual. It is clear that Maheu ignored many orders from Hughes and that Maheu made many statements to Hughes that were not accurate. Under these 
circumstances, the repeated and indiscriminate reproduction of statements about me in memoranda as truth is obviously indefensible. 
Inaccurate reporting of my assignments: Drosnin's manuscript reports a series of assignments that I allegedly worked on for Hughes. He implies that O'Brien was 
consulted on Hughes' bid for ABC, on Hughes' bid for Air West, which Drosnin describes as a plot to swindle the stockholders, and on an effort to prevent unfavorable publicity for 
the space program. Drosnin asserts Maheu plotted with me to strike at the bankers, to retaliate for a court judgment against Hughes in connection with TWA, that I worked 
extensively in late 1968 to delay the Nevada Nuclear Test Program, that I worked on CBA hearings with respect to the Air West takeover, that I worked to win passage of 
legislation making it possible for Hughes' opponents to secure triple damages in TWA 
25
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --22 
suits. 
Tape 2 of 2, Side 2 
O: The fact is I did not work on any of the matters mentioned by Drosnin. I was directly involved in several significant activities on behalf of Hughes enterprises, including the 
reorganization of the Hughes television network, the negotiations to settle the TWA lawsuit--the expansion and promotion of the Hughes Medical Institute and publicizing the 
launching of the Hughes satellite, Halo. I also recall discussing a long-range program to enlist public support for Hughes' anti-nuclear testing position and the possibility of 
producing a documentary film about Hughes highlighting his career in aviation and space. 
(Interruption) 
O: Mr. Drosnin lists projects that I did not work on and omits the matters I did work on. Now to the limited period of the consulting arrangement. Drosnin myth: Drosnin rarely 
makes clear the period of time that Hughes Enterprises was a client of O'Brien Associates. As it suits his purpose Drosnin states or implies that I carried out assignments or that 
"Mr. O'Brien's business relationship with Hughes Enterprises began in 1968 and at times hence that the relationship extended into 1972." The fact: my business relationship with 
Hughes Enterprises began when it became a client of O'Brien Associates in the fall of 1969. All work for Hughes Enterprises ceased effectively in November 1970 and the 
relationship was formally terminated in February of 1971. 
Then he says the Hughes relationship is motive for the break-in of my office, another Drosnin myth. He states that President Nixon's assistant, Charles Colson, knew 
promptly that O'Brien's consulting relationship with Hughes Enterprises ended in the fall of 1970. Nonetheless, Drosnin still advances a thesis that the motive behind the break-in 
at the headquarters of the DNC was somehow tied to concern about O'Brien's knowledge of the Nixon-Hughes relationship. The fact: the break-in at the DNC, as we all know and 
I've recounted in detail, was June 1972. This was approximately one year and eight months after my activity with Hughes Enterprises had ceased. There have been many 
theories as to why persons in the employ of the Committee to Re-Elect the President broke into my offices and in the final analysis the only individuals who know the truth are 
the Nixon Administration officials who planned and authorized it. But I do state again, I have never seen any evidence that the break-in in Watergate was to determine what I 
might know about the personal and political relationship between Richard Nixon and Howard Hughes or to discover if there was any material in my files at the DNC 
concerning activities performed for Hughes Enterprises by O'Brien Associates during the approximately fifteen months during which a contractual agreement existed. Finally, in 
reference to the garbage in this book, I believe that evidence at Watergate trials and congressional hearings clearly indicates the break-in was carried out in the hope of 
attaining information that CREEP, President Nixon and his associates, could use against me in the 1972 presidential election in the hope of embarrassing me and the Democratic 
candidate who had not been selected at the time of the break-in. Then I review what 
26
O'Brien --Interview XXXII --23 
transpired and the suits I brought following that. 
I've devoted more attention than is called for to this subject, but it is the first time and probably the only time that I will document for the record the venom that coursed 
through this book. The author certainly has a history of shady dealings and apparent inability to hold a legitimate job in journalism. Diatribes such as this are not uncommon; 
they crop up frequently. It is the price people pay for being considered "public figures" under existing law and that designation seems to extend to millions today. Under the 
decision of the courts in New York v. Sullivan, it is realistically impossible for a victim to prevail, as actual malicious intent must be proven. Efforts have been undertaken on many 
occasions to convince the courts to rule against unethical publishers and writers such as I contended with in this instance, without success. I'm a realist. I recognize there's little or 
no hope you can succeed. You must suffer the consequences and take your lumps. Many of my associates have been subjected to similar scurrilous attacks. They have suffered 
through them. They have not succeeded in securing a retraction or an apology for misstatements and malicious actions, not to mention favorable court determination. That's 
the price paid by those engaged in public service. You're defenseless. 
Despite that, our democracy remains the best form of a government yet devised by man and it is a privilege to have an opportunity to serve. I enjoyed those years; they were 
most rewarding. I was very fortunate to have had the opportunity to participate. Despicable people such as this writer and his publisher I have referred to along with the 
contemptible Watergate group I encountered did not cause me to have any regret whatsoever that I was a participant. 
Not long ago, a friend commented in reference to Watergate, "Larry, they punched away at you for a long time but they didn't lay a glove on you." I don't think that's quite 
accurate. I do carry some scars. But they failed in their effort to destroy me and I hold my head high. 
End of Tape 2 of 2 and Interview XXXII 
27